Ethics of Knowledge Policy

8/13/2019 Ethics of Knowledge Policy

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................5

2. FOUR DEVELOPMENTS THAT ILLUSTRATE THE SHORTCOMINGS OF

INDIVIDUAL ROLE-RESPONSIBILITY............................................................6

3. FROM INDIVIDUAL ROLE RESPONSIBILITY TO COLLECTIVE CO-

RESPONSIBILITY ...............................................................................................10

4. FORESIGHT AND KNOLEDGE ASSESSMENT..............................................14

5. FORESIGHT AND DELIBERATION......................................................................16

6. DELIBERATION ON NE TECHNOLOGIES! NANOTECHNOLOGY"

CONVERGING TECHNOLOGIES.....................................................................20

LITERATURE REFERENCES.....................................................................................24


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From the Ethics of Technology towards an Ethics of Knowledge Policy and Knowledge Assessment

F#$% &'( E&')*+ $, T(*'$$/ &$#+ E&')*+ $, K$(/( P$)*

K$(/( A++(++%(& 1

Ren von Schomberg 2

1. I$*&)$

My analysis takes as its point of departure the contested assumption that contemporaryethical theories can not capture adequately the ethical and social challenges of scientific and

technological development. This assumption is rooted in the argument that classical ethical

theory always addresses the issue of ethical responsibility in terms how intentional actions ofindividuals can be justified. Scientific and technological developments, however, have

produced unintentional consequences and sideconsequences. These consequences are very

often the results of collective decisions on the way we wish to organise our economies andsociety, rather than from individual actions. !or already a long time, it is not sufficient to

construct an ethics of science and technology on the basis of the image of a scientist who

intentionally wants to create a !rankenstein. So as a minimum we would require an ethical

framework that addresses both the aspect of unintentional side consequences "rather thanintentional actions# and the aspect of collective decisions "rather than individual decisions#

with regard to comple$ societal systems, such as the operation of our economy. %e do not

have such a theory at our disposal. More disturbing than the principle shortcomings of ethicaltheory, constitute the shortcomings of conventional ethical practice vis a vis technological

developments. &elow ' will mention how four developments can illustrate these

shortcomings, which centre around the fact that individuals in our society can simply not beheld fully accountable for their individual role within the conte$t of scientific technological

developments. ' will call it the shortcomings of a theory "and practice# of individual role

1 (orrect citation) *on Schomberg, +ene von "--#, From the Ethics of Technology towards anEthics of Knowledge Policy and Knowledge Assessment, a working document from the /uropean(ommission Services, 0irectorate eneral for +esearch, &russels

This working document has benefited from earlier collaborative work with 2rof. (arl Mitcham" (olorado School of Mines# and 3ngela uimaraes 2ereira "4oint +esearch (entre, 'spra#. ' am also

especially indebted to 2rof. 3lfred 5ordmann and 2rof. 'mre 6ronsky for critical comments on an

earlier draft of this document.

0r. 0r.phil. +ene von Schomberg "email) +ene.vonschomberg7ec.europa.eu# is at the /uropean(ommission, 0irectorate eneral for +esearch. The views e$pressed here are those of the author andmay not in any circumstances be regarded as stating an official position of the /uropean (ommission.

8


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WORKING DO!"ENT

responsibility. !rom there, ' will argue why we have to shift our attention to an ethics of

knowledge assessment in the framework of deliberative procedures instead.

2. F$# (($%(&+ &'& )+&( &'( +'$#&*$%)/+ $, ))) #$(-

#(+$+)7))&

There has occurred, a proliferation of roles within which individuals define their

responsibilities. !irst, as a consequence of the professionali9ation of multiple taskspreviously carried out in nontechnical or private spheres, an enormous differentiation of new

roles individuals can take in our society. Science and engineering itself provide modest

illustration, as it has broadened its functional speciali9ations from research, development,design, and construction to include production, operation, management, and even sales

engineers: and its content speciali9ation to include biomechanical engineering, biomedical

engineering, biochemical engineering, nanoengineering, and more. Stepping outside thetechnical fields, the unfortunate reductio ad absurdum in this trend is the roleprofessionali9ation of virtually every workrelated activity) janitors become maintenance

professionals, friendship becomes professional grief counseling, one hires professional

personal trainers to help one get the right e$ercise, etc. 3lthough this development isprimarily manifest as the quantitative proliferation of roles, it inevitably has qualitative

implications.;

Second, and in parallel, the area for which an individual may be held responsible has

been narrowed, as may be illustrated with an e$ample from the sciences that would applyequally well to engineering. 'n the 1--s there were natural philosophers who pursued

natural science. 'n the 1


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geographically. This means, practically, that responsibility is more identified with a role than

with a person, thereby complicating the responsible organi9ation of professional tasks while

significantly diminishing technical professional ethical commitments not to mentionloyalty.

!ourth, contemporary society is not only characteri9ed by the differentiation of roles

but also by the intensified institutionali9ation of the socialinstitutional spheres in which the

role differentiation takes place. Science, engineering, economics, education, politics, art,religion, and more have all become so institutionally distinct that they largely determine the

conditions for their own functioning. +egulation, insofar as it occurs, must increasingly take

place internally within each sphere. Scientists regulate science, engineers engineering,economists the economy, and so on.

3s a result of this fourdimensional transformation of role differentiation space,

technical roles may be said to have become increasingly less robust at the same time that

opportunities for role conflict have only intensified, proliferated, and speciali9ed, withindividuals more freely floating between roles, although large role aggregates are more

rigidly separated from each other than ever before in history. The result is a multifacetedundermining of that very role responsibility which has been the traditional basis of socialorder and for which it is dubious that principle responsibility alone is able to compensate.

3lthough roles are increasingly central to the functioning of technoscientific society,

technical responsibility, while continuing to be framed in terms of roles, is progressively

weakened in the moral sense. 0uring the last half of the -th century in contemporarytechnological societies, professional roles gained such prominence that, together with their

associated e$pectations and codes of conduct, they constitute one of the major foundations of

contemporary ethical problems and dilemmas. /specially the role responsibility of e$ecuting

assigned tasks from superiors has, outside of professional philosophy, become an importantethical issue of the -th century.

3s was most dramatically demonstrated in the 1@A trial of 3dolf /ichmann, strict

adherence to role responsibility easily leads to an almost banal immorality.B 0uring the trial,

/ichmann defended himself by appealing to his role as chief administrator of the masse$ecution of 4ews during %ord %ar '', pointing out that his responsibilities were limited to

administrative tasks in a hierarchy in which he had to fulfil the orders and follow the

instructions given to him by superiors. 3lthough the /ichmann case is e$ceptionallyhorrifying, the kind of appeal he made is not so e$ceptional at all, as 6annah 3rendt

documented in her famous book on the /ichmann case) for her the case documented the

banality of evil, e.g. a type of ethics we all as ordinary citi9ens sometimes seem to refer to8.

B. See, e.g., 6annah 3rendt, Eichmann in "erusalem# A Re$ort on the %anality of Evil"5ew ?ork)*iking, 1@A;#.

8 +ecent historical research has contested 6annah 3rendtCs findings. 3ccording to this branch ofresearch, /ichmann apparently was very =motivated= to do evil things and 6annah 3rendt had

underestimated the fact that /ichmann would justify his deeds in different manner than in their

original conte$t. ?et, ' believe that 6annah 3rendt argument on the =ethics of role responsibility= isat least not devalued for other conte$ts and represents still a major insight in moral thought.


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+epeatedly individuals in technoscientific and contemporary management positions

find themselves resorting to a line of reasoning to justify their behaviour, not that dissimilar

to /ichmannCs attempt to demonstrate the normality of his behaviour in the conte$t of ahierarchical administrative process. 'ndividuals may find themselves, in accordance with

which role they identify themselves with, "partly# responsible for particular consequences but

not for the whole overallprocess. The assignment of blame to particular individuals "as inthe /ichmann case# is a more difficult case to make in comple$ scientifictechnological

matters. The widely studies (hallenger disaster of 1@


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with the underlying social orders or the development of normative responses to the

occupational responsibility problem itself.

'nterdisciplinary studies of the ethics of science and technology nevertheless regularlyhighlight the e$tent to which people increasingly feel inadequate to deal will the comple$

moral dilemmas in which role responsibility places them. The more common phenomenon,

in the face of /ichmannlike situations, is not /ichmannlike self justification, but what

3ustrian philosopher unter 3nders might associate with the doubts and guilt manifested by=6iroshima bomber pilot= (laude /artherly.11 &ut was /artherly really responsibleG %hat

about 4. +obert Hppenheimer, the leader of the scientists and engineers who designed the

bombG Hr what about 2resident 6arry Truman, who ordered the bomb droppedG Hr2resident !ranklin +oosevelt, who established the Manhattan 2rojectG Hr even /nrico !ermi

and 3lbert /instein, who wrote the 1@;@ letter to +oosevelt that called attention to the

possibility of an atomic bombG I

The very comple$ity of the atomic bomb project calls into question any attempt toaccept personal responsibility for the results. ?et certainly Hppenheimer and many other

atomic scientists e$perienced some guilt, and their concerns led to the kinds of publicactivism illustrated by the founding of the !ederation of 3tomic "later 3merican# Scientistsand the creation of the%ulletin of Atomic Scientists. 3ndersC parado$ical critique and idealistcall for e$panding human powers of imagination and responsibility1 is but the more

philosophical manifestation of that intensification and multiplication of moral dilemmas

which has led many people to feel that various issues are at once their responsibility and>orbeyond their role competencies. The familiar notinmybackyard "5'M&?# syndrome in

response to industrial construction or waste disposal and personal refusals to limit the

consumption of high pollution consumer goods such as automobiles are but two sides of thesame coin.

%hat thus emerges from our description of this fourdimensional transformation of

the technical role responsibility space and the three attempts to respond to such atransformation is the picture of a society in which there is an imbalance in the relationbetween the individualCs responsibility for a particular and temporary role and the collective

responsibility which is represented by the simultaneous fulfilment of great number of roles

1-. Hne prominent synthesis of such approaches has become known as the Science, Technology, andSociety "STS# movement. !or a good introduction to STS, see Stephen 6. (utcliffe, &deas'(achines' and )alues# An &ntroduction to STS Studies"Danham, M0) +owman and Dittlefield, ---:and Stephen 6. (utcliffe and (arl Mitcham, eds., )isions of STS# *onte+tuali,ing Science'Technology' and Society Studies"3lbany, 5?) State Eniversity of 5ew ?ork 2ress, --1.

11 (laude /artherly and unter 3nders, %urning *onscience"5ew ?ork) Monthly +eview 2ress,1@A1#. 'n fact, /atherly was not the pilot of the plane that dropped the 6iroshima atomic bomb on3ugust A, 1@B8. The pilot of that plane, the Enola -ay, was 2aul Tibbets, and his bombardierThomas !erebee, neither of whom ever e$pressed any regret about his role. /artherly was the piolot

of a reconnaissance place that preceded the Enola -ayand gave the go ahead. Juestions have alsobeen raised about the reality of /artheryCs feelings, but he still stands as a symbol for a certain kind of

response.

1 unter 3nders,!ie Anti.uierheit des (enschen, vols. "Munich) &eck, 1@


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for the longterm. This is illustrated by the fact that in increasing numbers of instances it is

impossible, even in a hierarchically structured technical professional system to assign to any

one person responsibility for solving some particular problem. %ho or what role isresponsible for nuclear weapons proliferationG !or stratospheric o9one depletionG !or

global climate changeG 'ndeed, who or what role is responsible for even such mundane

problems as traffic congestionG !or the malfunctioning of my computerG !or the presenceof unlabelled genetically modified foods in grocery storesG The chance that any one

individual can be identified as responsible for the consequences of our collective actions

within and between the myriad systems and subsystems of the technoscientific world hasbecome infinite small. 'nstead, in most instances it is increasingly the case that some form of

coresponsibility for a collective organi9ation and action leading to consequences "both

intended and unintended# is operative. 3t the same time, such collective coresponsibility is

difficult to grasp and elusive: it often seems as difficult to pin down as individual,organi9ation, or even single that might be held accountable for scientific and engineering

developments.

3. F#$% I)) R$( R(+$+)7))& &$ C$(*&)( C$-#(+$+)7))&13

' have described, in an admittedly summary manner but with some empirical

references, a society in which it is difficult for anyone to be held responsible for the

consequences of many technoscientific actions. %e rely on a theory of occupational roleresponsibility that is no longer in harmony with e$isting social reality, in response to which

we commonly propose an alternative and e$panded notion of role responsibility. The fact is

that the consequences of a wide variety of collective actions cannot be reconstructed from theintentions of responsible individuals, and role responsibility ethics can bear only on the

consequences of individually and intentionally planned actions.

'ndividuals assume responsibility for the consequences of their actions if and only if

they can intentionally direct those actions and reasonably assess the consequences, bothintended and unintended. "Enintended consequences may on some occasions be effectively

covered by insurance, as with automobile insurance.# &ut the consequences of scientific

discovery and engineering design often escape all common or natural means of assessment.

Science and engineering e$ist, in the first instance, within the scientific andtechnological systems and, subsequently, by means of a complicated transformation and use,

are transplanted into the systemspecific logics of the economy, politics, and law. 5one of

these system logics are traceable to the intentions of individuals, nor are the possible

unintended consequences always assessable. Scientists who have knowledge that leads to

applications which are then critici9ed by many in society, may rightly point out that theyanticipated other applications. /ngineers who design products, processes, or systems that

wind up actually being used in a variety of ways "guns that kill people as well as protectthem, for e$ample# make the same argument. Scientists and engineers may even claim that

1; FarlHtto 3pel has tried to develop a philosophical justification for such an ethics" see especiallyhis book =0iskurs und *erantwortung= "1@@


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the possible applications and>or uses are not part of their occupational role responsibilities as

scientists or engineers. 'n another sense, the scope of the ethics of engineers is a different

one, than the responsibility for simple applications as such. !or instance, a responsibility forthe specification of particular technical standards for productsafety and efficacy rather than

for the complete implementation of all kinds of requirements for a particular endproduct.

%hat is clearly required is thus some transformed notion of responsibility beyond the simplemultiplication of roles or the e$pansion of occupational role responsibility to encompass

public safety, health, and welfare. 'ndeed, technoscientific applications can remain ethically

problematic even in cases where scientists and engineers have the best possible intentionsand users have not conscious intention to misuse or abuse. This situation constitutes the

major ethical challenge we face today.

6ow are we to address the problematic consequences of collective actionG

Technological risks are e$amples of special concern. The nature of many technological risksis far beyond the framework of individual responsibility. Such risks arise, as (harles 2errow

has argued, as a consequence of an interaction of semiindependent systems, many of which

may themselves be in part so comple$ as to be outside direct control. 1B "Think of the

e$amples of the economy or the legal system as well as those of the various sciences andfields of engineering.# Such risks often cannot even be constrained within the dimensions of

some particular time and place, which makes the identification of possible victims

impossible. !or such risks it is thus not even possible to take out insurance. Many of thetechnological risks in our society have the same status as natural catastrophes.18

'n response to this problem, we would need an ethics of collective coresponsibility.

The itemi9ed inadequacies of occupational role point precisely in this direction. Such a

collective ethics of coresponsibility arises from reflection on the social processes in whichtechnological decision making is embedded. "'t may even be interpreted as involving a

renewed appreciation of (iceroCs fourfold root of role responsibility.# That is, any new

ethics must deal with the same substance as the old role responsibility ethics, namely withvalues and norms that restrict or delimit human action and thus enable or guide traditional

decision making: but in the new ethics these values and norms will arise not simply in

relation to occupational roles and their allocation to particular individuals. 6ere it isappropriate to address at least four general features and requirements for the implementation

of such an ethics, from which ' can only elaborate the fourth features in more detail here.

1. 2ublic debate) To be co/res$onsible includes being $ersonally res$onsive . 't isclear that the norms of specific technical professions are insufficient because they arise fromrestricted perspectives. 3 true ethics of coresponsibility must be both interdisciplinary and

even intercultural, in order to provide a standard of justice for evaluating and balancing

conflicting occupational role responsibilities. 'f we fail to provide such an ethics, we

inevitably continue to aggravate the clash of cultures and unarticulated hostile responses toparticular "globali9ed# technologies.

1B (harles 2errow, 0ormal Accidents# 1iving with igh/Ris3 Technologies "5ew ?ork) &asic&ooks, 1@


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3ccording to my view, an ethics of collective coresponsibility is e$pressed at the

level of free "international# public debate in which all should participate. 't is unethical and

even unreasonable to make any one individual responsible for the consequences and>or"adverse# side effects of our collective "especially technological# actions. 't is, however,

ethical and reasonable to have the e$pectation that informed and concerned individuals

engage in the participation in public debates "subject, of course, to the particular situation#, orat least make this the default position for which persons must give reasons for being e$cused

from such a duty. Epon everyoneCs shoulders rests a particular moral obligation to engage in

the collective debate that shapes the conte$t for collective decision making. 't is not justengineers who do social e$perimentation: in some sense all human beings are engineers

insofar as they are caught up in and committed to the modern project.

'f we trace, for instance, the history of environmental challenges, we see that many

issues which depend on the involvement of personally responsible professionals were firstidentified and articulated within the public sphere. 2ublic deliberation does not primarily

aim at creating of itself a reasonable consensus, but serves, among others, the function of

presenting different relevant issues to the more or less autonomous systems and subsystems

of society that is, to politics, law, science, etc. The typically independent discourses ofpolitics, law, science, etc. are called upon to respond to issues raised in public debate. 3n

appropriate response by the appropriate subsystem to publicly identified and articulated

issues constitutes a successful socioethical response. (onversely, responsiblerepresentatives of the subsystems are drivers for new debates, when they publici9e particular

aspects of an issue that cannot be fruitfully resolved within the limits of some speciali9ed

discourse. The continuous interaction between the autonomous subsystem discourses and acritically aware public provides an antidote for fro9en societal contradictions between

opposing interests, stakeholders, or cultural prejudices.

. Technology assessment) To be collectively co/res$onsible involves develo$ing

trans$ersonal assessment mechanisms. 3lthough the institution of the public realm andinteractions with the professionali9ed subsystems makes it possible for individuals to be coresponsive, these deliberations are in many cases insufficiently specific for resolving the

challenges with which technological development confront us that is, they do not alwayslead to the implementation of sufficiently robust national or international policies. Therefore

all kinds of specific deliberative procedures for instance deliberative technology

assessment procedures must be established to complement general public debate and to

provide an interface between a particular subsystem and the political decisionmakingprocess. The widely discussed consensusconferences are one e$ample of an interface

between science and politics.1A"Hf course, the question remains here, whether this type of

interfaces are the adequate ones#.

1A. See '. Mayer, !ebating Technologies# A (ethodological *ontribution to the !esign andEvaluation of Partici$atory Policy Analysis"Tilburg, 5etherlands, Tilburg Eniversity 2ress, 1@@#:and '. Mayer and 4. eurts, =(onsensus (onferences as 2articipatory 2olicy 3nalysis) 3

Methodological (ontribution to the Social Management of Technology,= in 2. %heale, +ene von

Schomberg, and 2. lasner, eds., The Social (anagement of -enetic Engineering "3ldershot,/ngland) 3shgate, 1@@


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The implementation of ethics codes by corporations also constitutes an interface

between the economic sector, science, and stakeholder interest groups, while national ethics

committees are often meant as intermediaries between the legal and political system./$periments with such boundary activities or associations have been, depending on the case,

more or less successful. They represent important e$periments for enabling citi9ens to act as

coresponsible agents in the conte$t of technological decision making. ?et the absence ofadequately deliberative forums is certainly one reason why we are not yet able to

democratically plan our technological developments

;. (onstitutional change) *ollective co/res$onsibility may eventually entailconstitutional change. The initiation of specifically new forms of public debate and thedevelopment of transpersonal science and technology assessment processes may eventually

require constitutional adjustment. 'ndeed, the adaptation of specific deliberative principles in

our constitutions must not be ruled out.

(onsider, for instance, the possible implementation of the precautionary principle,which is inscribed in the /uropean Treaty and now also guides important international

environmental deliberations "the Fyoto 2rotocol on (limate (hange, the &iosafety 2rotocol,etc.#. This principle lowers the threshold at which governments may take action and possiblyintervene in the scientific or technological innovation process. The principle can be invoked

if there is a reasonable concern for harm to human health and or the environment, in the light

of persisting scientific uncertainty or lack of scientific consensus. The very implementation

of such a principle requires new and badly needed intermediate deliberative sciencepolicystructures1. 't imposes an obligation to continue to seek scientific evidence and enables also

an ongoing interaction with the public on the acceptability of the plausible adverse effects

and the chosen level of protection. The principle gives an incentive for companies to becomemore proactive and necessarily shapes their technoscientific research programs in specific

ways.

B. !oresight and Fnowledge assessment. The issue of unintentional consequences canbe traced back among others to the "principle# limited capacity of the scientific system toknow in advance the consequences of scientific discoveries and technological actions.

*irtually all comple$ technological innovations, from which our societies do benefit, are

surrounded by scientific uncertainties and several degrees of ignorance. 'nstead of addressingthe ethics of technology, it could therefore be more appropriate to address the =ethics= of

knowledge transfer between our societal spheres such as the knowledge transfer between

science and policy. 3s the =quality of the knowledge= will, by large, determine our relativesuccesses in using this knowledge in the conte$t of all kinds of possible applications. 3t the

same time, we do constantly need a form of foresight "as predictions about our future have

been shown to be enormously imperfect# in which we evaluate the quality of our knowledge

1 See my contribution =The precautionary principle and its normative challenges= in) &m$lementingthe Precautionary Princi$le Pers$ectives and Pros$ects/lisabeth !isher, 4udith 4ones and +ene vonSchomberg, (heltenham, EF and 5orthampton, M3, ES) /dward /lgar, --A. This volume give an

overview of the "prospective# implementation of the precautionary principle in various scientifictechnological fields in /urope, ES and 3ustralia.

1;


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WORKING DO!"ENT

base and try to early identify societal problems and new knowledge needs. 'n the ne$t section

' will analyse the normative elements of "foresight# knowledge assessment1


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1. !oresight knowledge is non/verifiable56 in nature since it does not give arepresentation of an empirical reality. 't can, therefore, also not be related to the

normal use for the Lpredictability of events. The quality of foresight knowledge isdiscussed in terms of its plausibility rather than in terms of the accuracy of the

predictability of certain events. !oresight e$ercises are therefore often characterised

as Le$plorative in nature and not meant to produce nonverifiable predictions:

. !oresight knowledge has a high degree of uncertainty and comple$ity wherebyuncertainties e$ist concerning particular causal relationships and their relevance for

the issue of concern

;. !oresight knowledge thematises usually a coherent vision whereby relevant

knowledge includes an anticipation of Lthe unknown:

B. !oresight knowledge has an actionoriented perspective "identification of

threats>challenges>opportunities and the relevance of knowledge for a particular issue#

whereby normalscientific knowledge lacks such an orientation.

8. !oresight knowledge shares a typical hermeneutic dimension of the social sciencesand the humanities, whereby the available knowledge is subject to continuous

interpretation "e.g. visions of Lthe future or what can account for a Lfuture are

typical e$amples of such an hermeneutic dimension#:

A. !oresight knowledge is more than futureoriented research) it combines normativetargets with socioeconomic feasibility and scientific plausibility:

. !oresight knowledge is by definition multidisciplinary in nature and very often

combines the insights of social and natural sciences.

!oresight knowledge can be understood as a form of Lstrategic knowledge necessary for

agenda setting, opinion formation and vision development and problemsolving. 'n the case

of underpinning the objective of sustainable development, rOnwald-

has captured thecharacteristics of Lstrategic knowledge for sustainable development, in which many of the

above mentioned general aspects of foresight knowledge reappear, in the following threestatements)

strategic knowledge, as a scientific contribution to sustainable development, consists

out of targeted and conte$tsensitive combinations of e$planatory knowledge about

phenomena observed, of orientation knowledge evaluative judgements, and of action

1@ ' am aware of course that also for current knowledgeparadigms the terms =verification= and=falsification= may not reflect the most recent views in the philosophy of science when it comes to the

evaluation of these knowledgeparadigms: here these terms are only used to make the point that anyof those or alternative terms, would not be applicable for knowledge bases which refer to the future,

and that we are not preoccupied with the possible =truth= value of foresight activities.

- runwald, 3. "--B# PStrategic Fnowledge for Sustainable 0evelopment) The 5eed for+efle$ivity and Dearning at the 'nterface between Science and SocietyK, &nternational "ournal ofForesight and &nnovation Policy, 1.1Q) 18-A

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WORKING DO!"ENT

guiding knowledge with regard to strategic decisions "compare the aspects B,8 and

above#:

this strategic knowledge is necessarily provisional and incomplete in its descriptive

aspects, as well as dependent on changing societal normative concepts in itsevaluative aspects "compare aspects and A above#:

dealing with strategic knowledge of this sort in societal fields of application leads to a

great need for reflection on the premises and uncertainties of knowledge itself.

+efle$ivity and the learning processes building upon it become decisive features inproviding strategic knowledge for sustainable development "relates to aspects 1 and ;

above#.

5. F$#(+)/'& D()7(#&)$

!oresight activities should be adapted to processes of deliberative democracy of modernwestern societies. 0eliberation goes obviously beyond the meaning of simple discussions

concerning a particular subject matter, and in its broadest meaning can be understood as Lfree

and public reasoning among equals "(ohen, 1@@B#1.

0eliberation takes place at the interface of different spheres, as we will see for e$ample whenwe deliberate on the basis of foresight knowledge. 'n this section, ' especially e$plore the

deliberations that take place at the policy making level and at the sciencepolicy interface.

The deliberation levels that relate to particular spheres, such as Lpolitics, Lscience or

Lpolicy, can be characterised by specific normative boundaries. The specific outcomes fromeach deliberation level can be fed into other levels of deliberation, which are constrained by

yet another set of distinct normative boundaries. Most often these boundaries are not simple

consensual assumptions, justly shared by the actors involved, but may be fundamental policyor constitutional principles which are the result of longer learning processes and which have

to be shared in order to achieve particular quality standards of policies and decisions. !or

instance, deliberation on risks and safety under product authorisation procedures within the/uropean Enion are guided by the policy objective, which is enshrined in the /E treaty, to

aim at a high level of protection of the /uropean citi9en.

&elow, ' will outline the normative boundaries of the different levels of deliberation "see

table 1# within which foresight activities are invoked, implemented or applied. 't should benoted that the different levels of deliberation do neither represent a hierarchy nor necessarily

a chronological sequence, as deliberation levels mutually inform and refer to each other,

deliberation at each particular level, can spark new deliberation at other levels.%e work here on the basis of e$amples of a most advanced form of embedded foresightintegrated in a wider policy conte$t. %hat follows is an idealtype of description of all

relevant deliberation levels in relation to the use of foresight knowledge "although there are

striking similarities with the usage of "scientific# knowledge in policy as such#. Theorists of

1 (ohen, 4 "--B#. 2rocedure and Substance in 0eliberative 0emocracy in S.&enhabib "ed.#0emocracy and 0ifference. 2rinceton, 5ew 4ersey, 2rinceton Eniversity 2ress.

1A


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deliberative democracy work on the clarification of particular levels of deliberation within

particular spheres of society. 5eblo"--B# describes levels of public deliberation in terms

of Ldeliberative breakdown. !isher; "--;# and 0ry9ekB "1@@-# describe procedures ofdiscursive politics. rin et al "--B#8 defines particular deliberations as practices ofLrefle$ive design. %e will here elaborate the levels relevant for deliberating foresight

knowledge for public policy.

The very first level concerns a broad $olitical deliberation, which assumes a politicalconsensus on the need for longterm planning when it engages in foresight e$ercises.

3t that broad political level, foresight will be understood as a form for early anticipation and

identification of threats, challenges and opportunities that lie ahead of us. !oresight e$ercises

are essentially about the identification of such threats>challenges>opportunities. 't is therebyimportant to realise that, for instance, a Technology !oresight e$ercise identifies technologiesor other developments that may have an important impact, rather than assessing those

technologies themselves)

7The act of identification is an e+$ression of o$inion"italics) by authors of this paper# "whichamounts to a form of implicit, covert assessment, the assessment of the relative importance ofthe technologies identified must necessarily follow their identification8"Doveridge, --B)p.@#.

Those Lopinions are unavoidably normative in nature, and do not relate directly to theassessment of the technology but rather to the assessment of their potential with regards to

particular perceived or actual threats>challenges and opportunities. 3 proper foresight

e$ercise should therefore make these dimensions e$plicit in order to feed a deliberationprocess on asoundbasis before achieving final conclusions. !oresight e$ercises need to referto widely shared objectives "for instance those in international treaties and constitutions# such

as the objective of sustainable development with its recognised three pillars "social,

economic and environmental# in order to embed the broad political conte$t. !oresighte$ercises can also be built on more controversial assumptions, yet those e$ercises may have a

function of stimulating and informing a broader public debate rather than aiming at particular

policies and or actions. !oresight e$ercises can be invo3ed at this political level ofdeliberation.

5eblo, M.3. "--B#. Thin3ing through !emocracy! !eliberative Politics in Theory 9 Practice"2aper presented at the (onference on L/mpirical 3pproaches to 0eliberative 2olitics /uropean

Eniversity 'nstitute, !iren9e, 1 May --B

; !ischer, !. "--;#. Reframing Public Policy !iscursive Politics and !eliberative Practices.H$ford) H$ford Eniversity 2ress

B 0ry9ek, 4.S. "1@@-#.!iscursive democracy# $olitics'$olicy' and$oliticalscience' (ambridge)(ambridge Eniversity 2ress

8rin, 4., !eli$, !., &os &. and Spoelstra S. "--B#. 2ractices for refle$ive design) lessons from a0utch programme on sustainable agriculture,&nt " Foresight and &nnovation Policy. *ol 1. 5os 1> ,pp.1A1B@.

1
http://picarta.pica.nl/DB=2.4/SET=1/TTL=8/CLK?IKT=4&TRM=Discursivehttp://picarta.pica.nl/DB=2.4/SET=1/TTL=8/CLK?IKT=4&TRM=Discursivehttp://picarta.pica.nl/DB=2.4/SET=1/TTL=8/CLK?IKT=4&TRM=democracyhttp://picarta.pica.nl/DB=2.4/SET=1/TTL=8/CLK?IKT=4&TRM=politics,http://picarta.pica.nl/DB=2.4/SET=1/TTL=8/CLK?IKT=4&TRM=politics,http://picarta.pica.nl/DB=2.4/SET=1/TTL=8/CLK?IKT=4&TRM=policy,http://picarta.pica.nl/DB=2.4/SET=1/TTL=8/CLK?IKT=4&TRM=politicalhttp://picarta.pica.nl/DB=2.4/SET=1/TTL=8/CLK?IKT=4&TRM=politicalhttp://picarta.pica.nl/DB=2.4/SET=1/TTL=8/CLK?IKT=4&TRM=sciencehttp://picarta.pica.nl/DB=2.4/SET=1/TTL=8/CLK?IKT=4&TRM=sciencehttp://picarta.pica.nl/DB=2.4/SET=1/TTL=8/CLK?IKT=4&TRM=Discursivehttp://picarta.pica.nl/DB=2.4/SET=1/TTL=8/CLK?IKT=4&TRM=democracyhttp://picarta.pica.nl/DB=2.4/SET=1/TTL=8/CLK?IKT=4&TRM=politics,http://picarta.pica.nl/DB=2.4/SET=1/TTL=8/CLK?IKT=4&TRM=policy,http://picarta.pica.nl/DB=2.4/SET=1/TTL=8/CLK?IKT=4&TRM=politicalhttp://picarta.pica.nl/DB=2.4/SET=1/TTL=8/CLK?IKT=4&TRM=science


15/23

WORKING DO!"ENT

3t a second level, one can identify deliberation at the$olicy level which immediately buildsupon outcomes of political deliberation. 't will need to map and identify those challenges>

threats and opportunities which are "in#consistent with more particular shared objectives,such as a high level of protection of consumers and the environment, sustainable growth and

economic competitiveness. 3t this level a policy framework needs to be agreed upon for the

implementation of foresight in a broad sense, at least by identifying institutions and actorswhich will take charge of foresight e$ercises. 3 number of countries have institutions, such

as particular councils, committees or assessment institutes for those tasks in place.. Such

institutions can then plan studies which are part of the foresight e$ercise and can includeactivities such as "sustainability# impact studies, costbenefit analysis, S%HT analysis,

scenario studies etc. These studies should outline scenarios, challenges and threats and verify

its consistency with relevant drivers for change.

3 third deliberation level, the science:$olicy interface, is of particular interest since itqualifies the input of a diverse range of knowledge inputs, e.g. those of the scientific

community, stakeholders and possibly the public at large by a$$lying foresight "scenarioworkshops, foresight techniques>studies>panels etc#.

3t the science>policy interface, the state of affairs in science needs to be identified in relationto the identified relevant threats>challenges and opportunities. 3 particular task lies in the

qualification of the available information by formulating statements on the available

information in terms of sufficiency and adequacy Q a preliminary form of Knowledgeassessment. The identification of knowledge gaps is a particular task to sort out the state ofaffairs in science, possibly leading to later recommendations for further scientific studies to

close those gaps. 3lso, depending on the timelines during which those decisions should be

made, particular decision procedures for situations under conditions of uncertainty need to betaken into account. %hen communicating the results of the science>policy interface to the

policy and political level, the proper handling of uncertainty has to be taken care of, and

failure to do so have often lead to disqualifications of the used scientific knowledge atpolitical level and in public debate. %ith uncertain knowledge, particular assumptions must

be made as to whether particular consequences pose in fact a threat to us or not. !or e$ample)

do we see 1, or three degrees temperature rise as unacce$tableconsequence in terms ofclimate changeG 0o we think a ; percent increase on public and private investments in

science and technology by -1- would make our economy sufficiently competitiveG These

assumptions represent Ltransformable norms, as their acceptability changes in the light of

ongoing new scientific findings. !or instance, an initially assumed acceptable normativetarget of a global two degrees temperature rise may turn unacceptable when new scientific

findings indicate to more serious consequences than previously thought. 5ew knowledge

about these issues leads to continuous reframing, making foresight and monitoring practices

necessary partners.

1


16/23


Table 5 !eliberation levels involving the $rogressive invocation' a$$lication and im$lementation of;foresight< 3nowledge with its normative boundaries.

normative boundary

of deliberation level

Type of

operational

normative

rationale

!actors>normative considerations

to be taken into account

5ormative

decision modi

&road political

debate

2olitical

consensus on

long term

planning

&nvocation of ForesightThreats>challenges>opportunities

: normative reference points)

Three pillars of Sustainabledevelopment> Disbon>&arcelona

/arly

anticipation>identification

(hoice of

Sustainable

0evelopment

targets and

challenges

3im at high level

of protection

3im at

sustainable

growth

'mprove quality

of life

6igh Devel of protection

Sustainable growth,

competitiveness

0efining>mapping

Threats and (hallenges

2olitical>societal (hoice of policy

framework

&m$lementation offoresight

3llocation of tasks to

!oresight

institutions>involvement

of parties

&road policy

debate

cost>benefit

analysis

impact analysis

6ealth>environment takes

precedence over economic

considerations

2riority setting>selection

e.g. minimalising costs,

ma$amilising benefits,

priority to health etc

Type of measures /nabling

Monitoring

practice

2roportionality requirement measures to enable

Monitoring practice,

Dearning practice

development ofindicators>benchmarking

5ormative

qualification of

the scientific

debate

'dentification of

state of affairs in

science>normative

qualification of

knowledge

'dentification of

knowledge gaps

2articular threats>challenges>

opportunities

A$$lication of foresight

5ormative qualification

of available information.

+elating the quality of

available information to

'mportance of challenges

etc

5ormative

approach to

dealing with

threats>challenges> opportunities

'dentification of

transformable

standards, ;

percent target, etcscientific and

technological

options

"Endefined# normative standards

for acceptability, safety etc of

products>processes

Ethical deliberation

(hoice of ethical

principles,

(hoice of transformable

standards) growth rates,sustainability targets,

e.g.reduction of

biodiversity, acceptable

levels of temperature

rise , levels of use of

renewables etc

1@


17/23

WORKING DO!"ENT

6. D()7(#&)$ $ ( &(*'$$/)(+! $&(*'$$/" *$(#/)/

&(*'$$/)(+

'n this section ' will use the e$ample of nanotechnology to illustrate the deliberation levelsdescribed above. 't can give us an indication how those deliberation levels should further

materialise in the case of nanotechnology in the future.

3mong others, the following ethical issues of nanotechnology and converging technology

have been identifiedA)

+espect for fundamental ethical principles "/E charter for !undamental +ights etc#

+ights of access to information, protection of personal data "in the conte$t of medical

and security applications#

0ual use of technology "e.g. military use, use by terrorists#

'ssues of human dignity) of '(T implants in the human body which raises) non

therapeutic human enhancement, shifting selfimages of human beings once theborderline between machine and human biology may fade in future manmachine

interactions.

Surveillance society issues "availability of nanotractors, nanocameraCsG#, balance of

privacy, limits to personal freedom, and security

5ondiscrimination and equity) The ethical principle that everybody should have fair

access to the benefits under consideration. The fear for a nanotechdivide with the

developing world

/arly identification for the susceptibility for diseases without prospects of cure or

medication The ethics of riskassessment) which risks are deemed to be acceptable in terms of

ha9ards for human health and environmental pollution, how do distinguish between

risks, individuals voluntary take and collective risksG

The issue of particular technologies, presented as a =hype= in the public sphere, "and

its consequences for the funding of research and research priority setting# and theoften associated technological optimism that particular problems can be solved

"only# by technological means

My point on the ethics of knowledge assessment becomes now more concrete while applying

it to the issue of nanotechnology and converging technologies. ' don not want to go here in

AThis =list= is obviously not =complete=. 3 more comprehensive overview of all ethical issuesconcerning nanotechnology is discussed in the working document reporting on the outcomes of the

clustering workshop on the ethics of nanotechnologies of the overnance and /thics Enit of 0research" see also footnote A# "forthcoming early --#. &ut see also the e$cellent work of 3lfred

5ordmann in this field) 3. 5ordmann, 0avis &aird and 4oachim Schummer "eds.# !iscovering the0anoscale "3msterdam) 'HS 2ress, --B, ;1pp.# and 3. 5ordmann, 4oachim Schummer and 3stridSchwar9 "eds.# 0anotechnologien im Konte+t# Philoso$hische' ethische und gesellschaftlichePers$e3tiven "&erlin) 3kademische *erlagsanstalt, --A, B;;pp.#

-


18/23


taking position on the substance of those issues. The overriding ethical issue here is perhaps,

not the substance behind each of above mentioned issues, for instance on how we will define

the issues of privacy and confidentiality, but the crucial question will be who will decide'under which $rocedures' on what issue and within which timeframe= Furthermore# how theethical issues will be addressed under those $rocedures and seen as relevant for the further

RT! $rocess owever' in order to establish the relevance of the ethical issues' it is ofcrucial im$ortance that our ;foresight< 3nowledge concerning the develo$ment of technologyis ade.uate or more ade.uate=

Therefore, it is necessary to have deliberative procedures in place which allow for

comprehensive, democratic decision making at the right point in time. &elow ' will tryoutline in an admittedly sketchy manner, where we are, when it comes to =feeding= the

different deliberation levels as they are mentioned in the overview with regard to

nanotechnology.

' believe that in comparison with earlier technological developments such as nucleartechnology and even biotechnology, the =political deliberation level= was initiated at a

relative early point) The need of addressing ethical and societal implications of nanomedicineis stated in the E> strategy on nanotechnology adopted by the /uropean (ommission in--B. The aforementioned 0ocument advocates that)

0anotechnology must be develo$ed in a safe and res$onsible manner Ethical $rinci$lesmust be adhered to and $otential health' safety or environmental ris3s scientifically studied'also in order to $re$are for $ossible regulation

Ethical $rinci$les must be res$ected and' where a$$ro$riate' enforced through regulationThese $rinci$les are embodied in the Euro$ean *harter of Fundamental Rights and otherEuro$ean and other international documents ;?< The relevance of such $rinci$les towardshuman and non/human a$$lications of nanotechnology should be understood &n addition'

certain a$$lications' eg miniaturised sensors' may have s$ecific im$lications for the$rotection of $rivacy and $ersonal data

The 3ction 2lan =5anosciences and nanotechnologies) 3n action plan for /urope --8

--@= "(HM"--8# B;#.adopted by the /( in the th 4une --8# states that)

The *ommission will#

a< Ensure that *ommunity funded R9! in 090 continues to be carried out in a res$onsiblemanner eg via the use of ethical reviews Possible ethical issues for 090 include eg non/thera$eutic human enhancement' invasion of $rivacy due to invisible sensors Theintegration of ethical concerns' innovation research and social sciences into 090 R9! willhel$ build confidence in decision/ma3ing related to the governance of 090 ;See

ft$#::ft$cordislu:$ub:nanotechnology:docs:nano@action@$lan2B@en$dfncertainty and!ecision (a3ing. 0ordrecht) Fluwer 3cademic 2ublishers.

Schomberg. + von, 3. uimaraes 2ereira and S !untowic9 "--8#, !eliberating ForesightKnowledge for Policy and Foresight Knowledge Assessment, 3 working document from the/uropean (ommission Services, 0irectorate eneral for +esearch, &russels

Schomberg, +. von "--A#. =The precautionary principle and its normative challenges= in)

&m$lementing the Precautionary Princi$le Pers$ectives and Pros$ects /lisabeth !isher,4udith 4ones and +ene von Schomberg, (heltenham, EF and 5orthampton, M3, ES)

/dward /lgar, --A.

E5/S(H "--A#. The ethics and $olitics of 0anotechnology, 2aris

*aughan, 0 "1@@A#. The *hallenger 1aunch !ecision# Ris3y Technology' *ulture' and!eviance at 0ASA, (hicago) Eniversity of (hicago 2ress.

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Ethics of Knowledge Policy

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