EU Enlargement From Rules for Accession to a Policy Towards Europe

(Wallace, Pollack and Young, Policy-Making in the EU, Chapter 17)

Rosa Amann 4013R002-1, 1st Year MA, 11.11.2013

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EU-Enlargement

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Agenda

1. The Origins and Development of Enlargement Policy2. The Three Stages of Enlargement Policy3. Conditionality and Enlargement as a Foreign Policy Tool4. Conclusions and Summary5. Personal Comments6. Brain Teasers

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1.The Origins and Development of Enlargement Policy Decisions about the conditions under which new members can join the EU.

1957: Treaty of Rome (Creation of EEC and EURATOM by six founder states)

Founders‘ desire to create „an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe“ called „upon the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts“.

Art. 237 EEC (Today Art. 49 TEU):

„Any European State (…) may apply to become a member of the Union.“

Reference to „Europeanness“, but no sophisticated rules for accession. Terms for accession were left to negotiations.

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However: Demand for accession was limited (Iron Curtain, remaining authoritarian regimes in Europe (e.g. Spain, Portugal, Greece etc.)

→ Enlargement was restricted to discrete episodes and ad-hoc bargaining

Note: - 7 other European countries (DK, GB, Norway, AUS, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland) were not interested in integration or sovereignty transfer and founded EFTA instead

- GB applied for EC membership as early as 1963, but France vetoed

1973: 1st „Northern“ Enlargement Round:

Denmark, Ireland, UK joined the EC (Norway had a negative referendum)

Denmark, UK left EFTA (EFTA was weakened)

1978: Declaration on Democracy:

„respect for and maintenance of representative democracy and human rights in each Member State are essential elements of membership“

1981: Greece joins (Commission is against it, but Council doesn‘t follow its opinion)

1986: Portugal and Spain join

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1987: Single European Act (SEA) (single market policy; added the requirement that EP give its assent to enlargement decisions)

1989: Fall of Berlin Wall – marked the end of the Cold War1990: German Reunification

→ Political Situation in Europe changed considerably

→ EFTA members already engaged in membership bids and had similar ideological/political convictions and geographical proximity → But how to manage relations with potential applicants that were post-communist and at various stages of transition?

→ EU-enlargement and policy was/is support for the transitions to market economies and democracy

Since 1989, this framework has developed considerably and now goes far beyond Art. 49 TEU and includes every single step.

From the first day a country declares its desire to join until the day of accession and beyond.

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2. The Three Stages of Enlargement PolicyNote: - Before 89, application for membership was the start of the process Today, it starts a lot earlier and doesn‘t necessarily stop with accession

- The three stages are overlapping

1. Association Agreements

Europe Agreements (EAs):

- template for CEECs- contains free trade area for industrial products, political dialogue on foreign policy, PHARE, economic and cultural cooperation)

Problems: no clear link to future membership, limited market liberalization in sensitive sectors (agriculture, textiles, coal and steel) Amendments were implemented to cater to CEECs needs, but still dissatisfaction

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Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAAs):

- template for the Western Balkans and most successor states of Yugoslavia- after NATO‘s military intervention in Kosovo, the Council endorsed a „Stabilization and Association Process“ (SAP) → supporting economic, democratic transition, regional cooperation, CARDS, explicit preparations for eventual accession Difference to EAs: more political conditionality

European Economic Area Agreement (EEA):

- alternative to accession (created out of concern that some countries onlywanted economic benefits by joining EU)- some voice but no votes- enables EFTA states to participate in internal market (except agriculture)

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1992: Maastricht Treaty (EMU, CFSP, PJCC)1993: Council of Copenhagen (Copenhagen Criteria)

1995: 2nd „Northern“ Enlargement Round:Sweden, Finland, Austria join→ EEA became residual arrangement for Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway→ Switzerland didn‘t ratify; it‘s membership application became dormant

1997: Amsterdam Treaty (reference to Article 6 was included – values of the EU like liberty, democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms)

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2. Pre-accession alignment and (potential) candidate status parallel to accession

- Most aspirants were/are not ready for membership- Checklist of necessary preparations (mainly concerning adjustment to the

acquis communautaire) → pre-accession both a tool to accelerate or slow down enlargement- Regulatory alignment to the acquis aided by TAIEX

- (Potential) candidates set up National Programmes for the Adoption of theAcquis (NPAAs)→most important: - measures essential to the functioning of the single market (e.g. reduction of trade barriers)

- measures aiming at other EU policy objectives (e.g. in the social realm)- 1st: European Partnerships (EPs) = Potential Candidate Status- 2nd: Association Partnerships (APs) = Candidate Status

The criteria for the granting of „candidate status“ are not very explicit

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Copenhagen Criteria (European Council 1993)• stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and

respect for and protection of minorities;

• a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope withcompetitive pressure and the market forces within the Union;

• ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union;

• the EU‘s capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration

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• Speed of alignment is largely left to the candidates, but no progress = no financial aid and possible delay• Commission supervises entire process and gives Annual Regular Reports• Council decides (QMV) and EP gives its assent on the priorities and objectives

contained in individual APs submitted to candidate countries

3. Accession

- Commission Opinions- Annual Regular Reports

→ possibility to delay→ „prospective readiness“→ inclusive vs. merit-based approach in Commission and Council

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Accession negotiations:

• Conducted by the Council Presidency on behalf of the member states• Bilateral• Screening by Commission is carried out beforehand• Both sides submit their negotiation positions• Chapters are opened and closed accordingly (acquis is not negotiable,

certain benefits can be withheld if it is not yet fully implemented)

→ discrimination against new members by applying strict concessions (e.g. restrict movement of workers; cap receipts from structural funds)• If agreement is reached, accession treaty is signed by all governments• If there are violations, accession can be postponed by one year, amongst other

possible sanctions

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Three Stages of Enlargement Policy

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3. Conditionality and Enlargement as a Foreign Policy Tool• Anchoring fragile democracies in a prosperous and democratic

international community• The EU‘s strategic use of the incentive of membership in order to

induce or preserve specific policy changes in non-member states• Copenhagen Criteria are only the basis:

→ depending on the specific situation, more conditions can be required→ considerable leverage for various interest groups to influence the process

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• Effectiveness of conditionality depends on: - domestic situation in respective country

- credibility of conditionality:

→member states might send contradictory signals →candidate country has reasons to doubt that it will succeed, even if all criteria are met

• Insertion of other intermediate steps or benefits as rewards for compliance (e.g. lifting visa requirements)

• After accession: continued monitoring and possible sanctions

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European Neighborhood Policy (ENP):

• Template for successor states of the Soviet Union• Formerly „Partnership and Cooperation Agreements“ (PCAs)

now replaced by Association Agreements• Since 2009 „Eastern Partnership“ (EaP)• Contain e.g. potential free trade zone, gradual visa liberalization

Problems: no reference to eventual future membership or military security → effectiveness??

EaP may be effective in dealing with specific topics, by offering rewards,but not in changing prevalent political situations

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4. Conclusions and Summary

Enlargement Fatigue

- EU‘s absorption capacity (budgetary, institutional impacts)- Inclusion of Romania and Bulgaria premature?- Ukraine (is it even European?)- Turkey (EU‘s ambiguous stance, human rights issues, etc.)- ……….- Previous trouble with Lisbon Treaty ratification- Financial Crisis 2008

→ less significance of enlargement as a foreign policy tool (member states‘ opinions diverge, domestic adjustement costs are becoming higher)

Three Overlapping Stages of Enlargement underpinned by increasingly demanding conditions, diverse procedures and dynamics

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Association Stage – Community Level

Pre-accession Stage – Community Level

- Commission as the key player - Council has the final say - EP gives its assent

Accession Negotiations – Intensive Transgovernmentalism

- Member states decide EU‘s positions (mindful of their own national interests!) - Commission can identify compromises - If we regard enlargement as a part of Foreign Policy (even if it is traditionally transgovernmental), the Commission has a bigger role in it now

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5. Personal comments on the reading• Compared to the other reading (Andi), the Sedelmaier one is very

detailed (maybe a little too much) • No chronological order of events, jumping back and forth

in time and events

• But provides a lot of detailed informationand some analysis

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6. Brain teasers

• Think of examples like Hungary, Bulgaria or Romania or even Italy. Do you think enlargement is really an effective way to shape domestic policy-making? What do you think is necessary to ensure democratic principles are being followed in the long run?

• Do you perceive the EU as a credible actor in foreign policy matters?If yes, why? If no, why not?

• Do you think the financial crisis is a valid argument against enlargement?

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Thank you for your attention.