The EU Peacebuilding Framework: Potentials & Pitfalls in the Western Balkans & the Middle East

By Annika Björkdahl, Oliver Richmond & Stefanie Kappler

JAD-PbP WORKING PAPER SERIES NO. 3 | JUNE 2009

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The EU Peacebuilding Framework:

Potentials and Pitfalls in the Western Balkans and the Middle East

By Annika Björkdahl, Oliver Richmond and Stefanie Kappler

JAD-PbP Working Paper No. 3, June 2009.

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Previous working papers in JAD-PbP working paper series Evaluating and Comparing Strategies of Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice, No. 1 May 2009 What will jus post bellum mean? Of new wine and old bottles, No. 2 May 2009.

Editorial Team

Karin Aggestam and Annika Björkdahl, Lund University

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction 4

2. EU approach to Peacebuilding 6 2.1 The EU peacebuilding Consensus 7

3. An Overview of the Emerging EU Peacebuilding

Practices 9

3.1 The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 9 3.2 The Meda Program 9 3.3 The European Neighbourhood Policy 10 3.4 Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) 10

4. The EU Peacebuilding Framework: Peace

Dynamics and Evaluation 11

5. Critical Assessment of the EU Peacebuilding

Framework 13

5.1 The Critique 13 5.2 Relating the Critique to the EU Peacebuilding Framework 15 5.3 Key Problems 16

6. Criteria for Evaluation of the EU Peacebuilding

Framework 19

6.1 From the EU perspective: top-down in terms of EU core values 19 6.2 From the local perspective: bottom-up in terms of rights and needs 20

7. The Context for the EU Peacebuilding Framework22

7.1. The Role of the EU in the Middle East 22 7.2 EU Peacebuilding in the Western Balkans 22

8. Conclusion: Strengths, Weaknesses, and Potential

of the EUPF 25

Annex: relevant EU Documents (Extracts)

Bibliography

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1. Introduction

The EU is now the world’s biggest donor and is emerging as a major actor in regional and global peacebuilding, though its peacebuilding project is subject to some significant and familiar contradictions.1 In regional terms, its framework for peace is unsurpassed especially in its social, economic, and political potential. In practice its peacebuilding capacities have not been as impressive. For these reasons, it has become increasingly imperative that a critical development of our understanding of emerging EU peacebuilding practices (giving rise to an EU peacebuilding framework) - in normative and practical terms- is theorised, and one that is empirically grounded, commensurate with the EU’s apparent vision of ‘peace’, and also with its political, material, and geographic experiences, not to mention the historical legacy of the politics of Europe. This debate is what this paper attempts to begin to formulate and contribute to. This paper outlines the course the EU has taken towards developing a peacebuilding framework (EUPF) via its institutional developments and policies. This is set into a critical relief via recent research on developing a more sophisticated form of locally relevant peacebuilding in contradistinction to the evolving, global (and fragile) ‘peacebuilding consensus’ and statebuilding project.2 We illustrate the guiding norms and principles for peacebuilding represented by the Union. The paper then situates the EUPF in the context of the limitations of the global and EU peacebuilding project and evaluates it against third and fourth generation peacebuilding theory. Against this background, the paper develops an analytical and methodological framework for evaluating and comparing the EU’s peacebuilding strategies in the context of its own work in the Western Balkans and the Middle East. Finally, it assesses how the EUPF contributes to the notion of a just and durable peace, and how an EU contribution to just and durable peace might be enhanced. The EU and its peacebuilding and peacekeeping engagements, it has been argued, are part of a normative commitment to a sophisticated form of peace- both self-announced and identified in scholarly circles. This means that the EU has developed- at least in rhetorical terms- a normative and ideal version of the just and durable peace it promotes, based to a large degree on the post-war experience of its core members. It can be held to account for these self-projected objectives, as we will show in our case studies, but we also question how far such policies actually represent a viable just and durable peace.

A ‘just peace’ is often taken to be an idealist and utopian goal, even in pro-EU circles. An ‘ereinist’ perspective, based on critical research agendas, shows this very clearly.3 This is not to argue that the EU is an inherently ereinist4 construction but more that it has the potential to develop a more balanced politics between security, active intervention and a more sophisticated notion of peace, perhaps even moving beyond the model offered by the UN and certainly beyond the neoliberal model developed by the US and their agencies in their statebuilding endeavours by learning from the failures of such projects. This is despite its practical failings and difficulties such as in the Balkans during the 1990s. Indeed, it is obviously the latter ambitions for a more complex engagement where its current

1 About the authors. Associate Professor Annika Björkdahl (Annika.bjorkdahl@svet.lu.se), Lund Unviersity and Professor Oliver Richmond (opr@st-and.ac.uk), and Stefanie Kappler (sk368@st-andrews.ac.uk) PhD. candidate at St. Andrews University. With contributions from Adrian Hyde-Price, Bath University and Sarah Anne Rennick (Jordan Instiute of Diplomacy). 2 Oliver P. Richmond, 2004. “The Globalisation of Responses to Conflict and the Peacebuilding Consensus”, Cooperation and Conflict, 39 (2). 3 Oliver P. Richmond, 2009. “Eirenism and a Post-Liberal Peace”, Review of International Studies, 35 (3); Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific man vs. power politics, Chicago, IL; London: University of Chicago Press, 1965, c1946. 4 I.e. it focuses on peace as its primary function and goal.

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strength is, in the realms of ‘normative power’ rather than the former focus on security and ‘hard power’. Given the tendency towards social democracy within many EU countries, this is perhaps more than the UN (which is more classically and conservatively liberal in its construction).

Comparing the practical experiences and developments within the global peacebuilding project since the end of the Cold War (i.e. a third generation approach increasingly oriented towards neoliberal statebuilding) and critical theoretical developments in relevant fields (proposing a fourth generation approach to peacebuilding),5 it becomes clear that the embryonic EU ‘peacebuilding framework’, if it is to have any added value, should transcend the problems that have emerged with other approaches. In addition to providing for security, human needs and human security, as well as aiding in the development of the institutions of liberal statehood, such a framework needs to engage with culture, identity, society, welfare, and associated factors to retain its social legitimacy in post-conflict situations. It needs to avoid the common sovereignty trap in territorial conflicts, as well as recognition games. It should focus on individual and community rights, needs, and agencies. We argue that the EU has an opportunity to develop its capacity and tools to produce a more balanced and far-reaching version of the ‘global peacebuilding/ statebuilding’ project than what has so far been practiced.

Drawing on the broader issues that have arisen in peacebuilding and statebuilding around the world since the end of the Cold War, any EU framework for a just and durable peace through peacebuilding would need to engage with the following: It would need to respond to both the social experiences of insecurity, rather than merely physical and institutional instability. It would need to engage with the general tendencies of deadlock in the liberal institutions constructed in post-conflict states, of economic stagnation, of ethnic nationalism, of weak civil societies, of human insecurity, of poverty, lack of welfare, and a lack of social justice- in liberal terms a lack of a social contract. Effectively, we argue that the EU’s normative vision implies a localised engagement with issues effecting peace and security. This is where most post-conflict issues have arisen in the context of peacebuilding and statebuilding, and where, with sufficient attention, a just and durable peace (i.e. a fourth generation approach) may be located.

The prospects for this, given the EU’s increasingly close focus on ‘hard’ political issues and problem-solving, often in the form of neoliberal responses, as well as an epistemic basic derived from positivist forms of social science, are in the balance. This is no more evident than in the Balkans where integrationism is predominant (though it is partially founded upon the use of force by NATO in the mid and late 1990s), but the EU is increasingly being seen as a technocratic and governmental institution rather than a ‘community’. The EU has historically often been seen as a community- a habitus indeed6 and has pioneered an internal post-sovereign politics which offered recognition, participation, identity, and security- in other words, a balanced politics. But it has also been seen to be held back by conceptions of national interest and limited military capacities, though in humanitarian, aid, and peacebuilding terms a significant capacity is now developing. This is still significantly fragmented, of course.

The heavily securitised, risk oriented, institutionally oriented, version of peacebuilding increasingly associated with its global form has depicted a negative ‘peace’ in which people are subjects rather than citizens, and national interests are played out with little regard for norms. This can be juxtaposed with the ‘habitus’ view where peacebuilding may bring about a just, durable, and positive form of peace. The tension between theses alternate agendas, most clearly reflected in aspects of the role of the UN in various peacekeeping operations, and of course recently with the role of the current US administration in statebuilding in Iraq, is far from being a new dynamic. One would expect any EU peacebuilding strategy to be aware of the risks inherent in this debate. The risks of orthodox IR, or orthodox liberal and neoliberal thinking as evident in the evolution of statebuilding since the triumphal end of the Cold War are now very evident, and the EU should be wary of this course if it is aimed at producing a just and durable peace.

5 Oliver P. Richmond, 2002. Maintaining Order, Making Peace, London: Palgrave. 6 See, for example, Pierre Bourdieu, 1989. “Social Space and Symbolic Power”, Sociological Theory, 7(1), pp. 14-25.

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2. EU approach to Peacebuilding

The EU has been historically conceived as a peace project.7 The text of the Lisbon Treaty, which states explicitly the connection between the EU and peace, and its promotion,8 as well as prevention and security, is reflective of this. This approach to peacebuilding rests on some key notions such as sustainable peacei, human securityii and ‘Responsibility to Protect’iii, ‘effective multilateralism’iv, partnership and local ownershipv, as well as national capacityvi. In addition, the EU has put particular emphasis on the promotion of democracy and human rights and strengthening civil society through dialogue with civil society actors in third countries.9 Yet, while the promotion of peace and stability has been a subject to a wide consensus in the EU, it is an inherently complex structure made up of a variety of members, bodies, and hence discourses. This raises issues about both the nature of the EU as a peacebuilding actor as distinct from others, as well as problems of co-ordination among various approaches represented by its constituent members. The EUPF follows that of the UN as outlined in Agenda for Peace, Development and Democratisation, the Millennium Development Goals, Responsibility to Protect, and the High Level Panel Report. Overall the EUPF has complied with the general promotion of the liberal peace and its key components as a long term approach to building peace (including its neoliberal aspects promoted by the International Financial Institutions). At the same time, the EUPF is not a single, static and coherent model, but is fragmented, ill-coordinated, and represents complex negotiating processes and even dissensus over its objectives.

The EU’s overall goals are to prevent violent conflict, and to facilitate the construction of the liberal state, of a social contract, of democracy, rule of law, security, human security, and prosperity, as ways of building a just and durable form of peace. These have both national and regional dimensions. Its theatre of engagement are the EU region, connected regions, and other areas where members have interests, or where conflict issues are pressing and other international peacebuilding actors have called for assistance.

The European Union’s strategy to peacebuilding can be divided in very general terms into both non-military and military approaches. Non-military policies and activities include both short-term tools for immediate conflict management as well as medium and long term tools that are designed to promote structural stability – the necessary social, economic, and political reforms to minimize the root causes of conflict.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is often taken to be one of the key areas here. It was established as the second pillar of the European Union in the Maastricht Treaty in 2001. Its goal reaches from strengthening the security of the EU, as well as international security, to international co-operation, and to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, as well as respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.10 The European Council is to define the principles and general guidelines for the CFSP and to decide on common strategies, while the Commission is responsible for external policies of the EU for humanitarian aid, development assistance, rehabilitation and reconstruction. In addition, the EU maintains a political presence in areas of crisis or conflict

7 Nathalie Tocci, 2008. “The European Union, Civil Society and Conflict Transformation”, MICROCON Policy Briefing 3, June. 8 Title I, Article 3-1 9 See European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: The European Union’s Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratisation in Third Countries”, Brussels, 2001. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/human_rights/doc/com01_252_en.pdf (30/03/09). 10 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html (03/06/09).

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through its special representatives (currently in place for the Great Lakes (Africa), Middle East, Stability Pact, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ethiopia/Eritrea and Afghanistan). Within this wing, in 2000 the European Commission created a Conflict Prevention and Civilian Crisis Management Unit as well as adopted a Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict in 2001, under the umbrella of the CFSP. This unit is responsible for a number of conflict-related policies and mechanisms, including the deployment of the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) for immediate crisis management as well as policies related to non-proliferation, disarmament, and sanctions. These tools are complemented by others designed to promote long term stability and a culture of collective security. These are also managed by the European Commission’s External Relations Directorate and fall under the External Cooperation Programmes (development aid, partnership agreements, etc) and the Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO). In addition, under the CFSP, a military wing of the European Union – the ESDP – has been created to deal with crisis management. It has been widely assumed that the move towards producing an EU foreign policy and the CFSP have enabled the development of an EUPF. Many have seen this pillar of the EU as a ‘civilising force’ which might be used to propagate a common EU identity. The CFSP represents an epistemic set of legal rules, institutional structures, and norms which follow the liberal peace model closely, specifically in the context of human rights, civil society and the EU’s vision of its civilian/ normative capacities.11 All member states are expected to coordinate their foreign security policies along these lines, following on from the development of the ESDP and its various committees, responsible for crisis management. This has been translated into a highly securitised agenda for liberal state building and reform, which is reflected by various aspects of the EUPF. This has become notable in particular in the Bosnian context, where the EU has become heavily involved in statebuilding. But these processes, as Bono has pointed out, have replicated the same problems of statebuilding elsewhere, in that they represent elite level projects through the European Commission, Parliament and Council in collaboration with selected national elites, despite their claims to focus on civil society and everyday needs.12 Integration supposedly brings elites and society together, of course. The EU’s role in launching new peacekeeping operations rests on this understanding, as the EU’s autonomous Operation Althea in Bosnia suggests. Implicitly, such processes are seen to be ‘civilising’ forces, deployed for those who are not, idealising the European self.13The adopting of the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect is indicative of this problematic position- of both its ambitions and risks. It is not clear whether EU peacebuilding operations aim at building ‘peace’ rather than at building states, given that both Stabilisation and Association Processes (SAPs) and Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs) include elements of statebuilding that might not necessarily be conducive to a more peaceful situation in a fragmented or violently divided society. In this context, peacebuilding, democratization and statebuilding have taken on different priorities, varying according to region, actors, national interests and issues at stake. As a result, it is not always easy to separate these elements of the peacebuilding process from each other, given that they are closely intertwined. This is particularly difficult in contexts in which various peacebuilding actors operate, compete, or make use of synergies in order to achieve common goals.

2.1 The EU Peacebuilding Consensus

Peacebuilding within the broader EU is made up of disparate activities by disparate bodies. For example, security, policing and the promotion of the rule of law are taken care of by ESDP-missions; democratisation, welfare and human rights promotion by the Commission; the diplomatic role of the

11 Giovanna Bono, 2006 . “The Perils of Conceiving of EU Foreign Policy as a ‘Civilising Force’”, Internationale

Politik und Gesellschaft, 1 pp.150-163. 12 Ibid., p.154. 13 Ibid., p.157.

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Council Secretary/High Representative and various EU Special Representatives is framed in the context of the CFSP, apart from the broad role of EU institutions in creating transitional administrations, and the role played by the EU as a donor. These constitute more a contribution to human security, rather than traditional security.14 They also revolve around the creation of stable liberal states with an emphasis on social dynamics rather than the market, with their own territory, fixed boundaries, and self sustaining political, social, and economic institutions nested within the EU body of norms, or in its immediate geographic area, within its own institutions. This forms the nascent EU peacebuilding consensus, which is an extension of the international consensus on liberal peacebuilding. However, many EU members have their own strategies in these areas. This confused and overlapping approach also cooperates, supplements, and in some case competes with the role of the UN, World Bank, UNDP, and independent donor states. In regions where EU integrationary pull factors are not present, its peacebuilding capacity is potentially much less significant. The ability of the EU to resolve conflicts and contribute to post-conflict stabilisation and rehabilitation depends partially on material factors – i.e. aid and the promise of membership, not merely on the putative ‘normative power’ of the EU. Partly, the EU’s interest is normative, but partly it is also about competing with other international peacebuilding actors in ideological terms, and on the basis of stabilising EU connected regions and related interests. Also, the EU’s role as an instrument of collective milieu shaping in its near abroad on the part of its member states is bound up with their economic, geopolitical and strategic interests, and involves a significant element of security competition with Russia in the Caucasus and Eastern Europe. These developments mirror the core of the EUPB consensus, which follows closely on from the UN version of peacebuilding, but deviates slightly from the US version in its valuing of markets over society. However, the core system of the liberal state and assumptions about its transferability remain fully intact. The EUPB framework adds the regional frameworks of integration and association, which their relative social, political and economic benefits, where geographically possible, or reverts to the UN or US peacebuilding frameworks further a field.

14 HS is here defined according to the broad version rather than the narrow version of this concept, incorporating both traditional and institutional as well as socially emancipatory aspects of security.

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3. An Overview of the Emerging EU Peacebuilding Practices

3.1 The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

From The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), also known as the Barcelona Process, was adopted in 1995 on the basis of enhancing political, social, and economic relations between the EU and countries located along the Southern Mediterranean: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey, with Libya holding observer status. The EMP has three official objectives: guaranteeing stability and peace in the region through the creation of a political and security dialogue; the establishment of a free-trade area as a means of enhancing economies; and the increase in cultural and social understanding as well as exchanges between civil societies. The underlying ideology of the EMP was to promote conflict prevention by establishing a regional security organisation based on cooperative security, using the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)15 as a model;16 however, this did not prove feasible and instead bilateral and regional initiatives were enacted in order to meet the above-mentioned objectives.

With regards to its bilateral dimension, the EMP calls for the establishment of individual Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements between the Union and each Southern partner. These Association Agreements cover a wide variety of domains, including political dialogue, the establishment of a WTO-compatible free trade zone, economic cooperation in various sectors, and cultural, social, and environmental cooperation.

3.2 The Meda Programme

The The MEDA Programme is the primary financial tool of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, along with a contribution from the European Investment Bank, offering technical and financial support for economic and social programmes of development and reform, and to a lesser extent to regional, multilateral programmes. As stated above, the European Commission is responsible for implementing the MEDA programme, based on the objectives of the EMP and advice from EU member states. Moreover, MEDA resources are subject to programming as defined under the strategy papers established at national and regional levels.

The MEDA funds are distributed to a variety of technical operators – NGOs, private firms, cooperatives, public agencies, regional organisations - as well as local and national authorities for their use in specific programmes that contribute to the overall goals of the EMP. The distribution of these funds is undertaken through a formal public tender process. It is worth pointing out that the decision whether to fund a project or not remains at the discretion of the European Commission, although Southern partner states do participate in the defining of priorities and orientations of funding strategies at both national and regional levels.

15 The CSCE emerged in 1975 as a diplomatic conference to increase East-West dialogue during the Cold War. This eventually transformed into the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) which today comprises 56 states working in a cooperative manner for conflict prevention and crisis management. 16 Roberto Aliboni, et al., 2006. “Ownership and Co-Ownership in Conflict Prevention in the Framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership”, EuroMeSCo Paper No 54: October.

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3.3 The European Neighbourhood Policy

A complementary policy program to the EMP, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was launched in 2004 as a response to the EU enlargement from 15 to 25 member states. The objective of the ENP is to guarantee the stability and economic development of EU neighbour states in order to prevent the emergence of new economic and political “dividing lines” and as a means of improving overall security. As with the EMP, the European Neighbourhood Policy is based on the principles of democratisation and human rights, economic development and liberalisation, and social cohesion as key components in peacebuilding and security. The ENP targets all countries (with the exception of Russia) that are immediate neighbours of the European Union: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. As can be seen, the Middle Eastern countries incorporated into the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are all also included in the European Neighbourhood Policy, with the exception of Turkey who has been recognised as a candidate for EU membership and is thus tracked in the Accession and Stabilisation and Association processes. The ENP allows neighbour states to develop privileged, bilateral relationships with the EU through the definition of individualised Action Plans that outline steps for political and economic reform tailored to the needs of the neighbour countries. These reforms are carried out by joint initiatives, with the EU providing both financial and technical assistance to meet stated objectives.

3.4 Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP)

The Stabilisation and Association Process is the framework for EU negotiations with the Western Balkans, all the way to their eventual accession.17All the countries in the Western Balkans generally have the prospect of joining the EU. The SA-process helps the countries concerned to build their capacity to adopt and implement EU law, as well as European and international standards. It offers trade concessions, economic and financial assistance, assistance for reconstruction, development and stabilisation through the CARDS programme. Each country moves step by step towards EU membership as it gradually fulfils its commitments in the Stabilisation and Association Process. The countries will sign SAAs, which respectively represent a far-reaching contractual relationship with the EU, entailing mutual rights and obligations. Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania have in recent years signed SAAs. Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are a step a head and are considered “candidate countries”. As SAA countries and candidates to membership, the Western Balkan countries are eligible for the IPA (Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance) of the Western Balkans in the period of 2007-2013. The IPA will have two components (institution-building and a transition facility on the one hand, and cross-border cooperation on the other).

17 Communication from the European Commission, “The Western Balkans on the road to the EU: consolidating stability and raising prosperity”, (2006) 27, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0027:FIN:EN:PDF (03/06/09); Report from the Commission, “The Stabilisation and Association process for South East Europe Second Annual Report - Annex 1” (2003), http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/sap/85349_en.pdf (03/06/09).

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4. The EU Peacebuilding Framework: Peace Dynamics and Evaluation

The normative system and the related praxis of peacebuilding that is emerging in an EU context reflects both global liberal order (i.e. the liberal peace) and a regional commitment to a just and durable peace. Given that these are its keys dynamics this allows for an assessment of whether the EUPF creates the possibility of a just and durable peace in theoretical terms, and whether its praxis meets such claims in our case studies. The more ambitious view of EU contributions to peacebuilding revolves around a wide range of peace dynamics that the EU has reproduced in certain local contexts, which transcend the security and institutional aspects of the recent global ‘neoliberal/ liberal peace project’. There are important lessons now emerging, not just about the EU’s role in reproducing a just, everyday, and empathetic form of peace- beyond conflict management and securitised discourses- not just locally within its geographic ambit, but also further a field. Of course, this raises the important question of whether a ‘just peace’ can be created by the EU without the union becoming involved and complicit in the broader global statebuilding blueprint for peace in diverse contexts, with all of its shortcomings. Can a more sensitised form of peace evolve? This also touches on the debate over whether the EU is a normative power, and can therefore influence international relations without material input of a more Weberian nature. Some would argue that if the EU does not develop this capacity it is avoiding its responsibility as a major international player. In this vein, the lesson of the evolution of peace in a situation such as Northern Ireland is taken to be that a peace process is only possible once a military stalemate between the security services and terrorists has been created, and once the main parties accept the need for a political solution. The IRA realised it could not win militarily, and the security services realised they could not inflict a decisive defeat on the IRA. The peace process followed from this stalemate, while the EU’s social and normative network was marginal to the subsequent peace process in this view. Of course, in Northern Ireland- perhaps the most successful post-war peace project ever seen- in the different sectors of civil society and governmental institutions, there is widespread agreement on the facilitative role of the EU. This is in terms of membership it the conflicts key states, but in particular this significance of its ‘Peace Funds’18, which were developed exactly to support a grassroots form of peacebuilding aimed at a just and durable peace.19 This model has not been developed for use in other post-conflict environments in any coordinated fashion though the EU has supported an African Union Peace Fund and one has emerged recently in the Middle East, aimed at the Palestinian Authority and territories.20 In the light of this, and guiding the discussion in the remainder of this paper, the EUPF can be assessed on three bases: 18 See http://www.eugrants.org/: http://www.seupb.org/prog.htm 19 Cynthia Irvin, Eyob Fissuh and Sean Byrne, 2008. "The Role of the European Union Peace II Fund and the International Fund for Ireland in Building the Peace Dividend in Northern Ireland" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th Annual Convention, Bridging Multiple Divides, Hilton San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, USA, Mar 26. 20 Cf. “EC assistance to the Palestinian people in 2008”, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/occupied_palestinian_territory/ec_assistance/ec_aid_to_pa_2008_en.pdf (03/06/09); European Commission, “The European Union’s Pegase Mechanism: At the Service of the Palestinian Population, Open to all Donors”, Jerusalem, 2009, http://www.delwbg.ec.europa.eu/en/funding/pegas/EU%20pegase%20-%20gaza%20report%20t5.pdf (03/06/09).

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1. Its capacity to provide traditional and human security. 2. Whether or not it lives up to its own (liberal and civil) normative rhetoric. 3. Whether it offers a just and durable peace, more specifically for individuals, communities, and the most affected by conflict. To summarise, the implied ontology of the EU’s emerging framework for peacebuilding reflects that of the UN, but diverges significantly from the recent statebuilding praxis that has emerged. It emphasises rights and needs of peoples in a social and cultural context, within integrated or associated states, though it is also concerned with its ‘hard power’ issues. To a degree it values difference rather than merely integration and assimilation, and reflects a deep concern with social justice, and social equality rather than merely freedom and self-help. Such a normative approach to European politics has modified a purely rational, interest based political and economic approach. At a practical level, EU documentation, and the policies of some member states now appear to be adopting the problem-solving line associated with the liberal statebuilding project more closely, even now when it is under so much intellectual and political pressure. This it partly because it also rests upon the liberal institutionalist move, which is imbued with a great deal of responsibility and authority. EU policy mechanisms, policies, and statements imply that it is through liberal institutions such as democracy, the rule of law, a free media, human rights, free markets, and development, that the ‘just peace’ the EU seeks would be achieved. Yet, through the various programmes aimed at social development (such as the Peace Funds) it also rests on a vibrant civil society, social justice and equality.

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5. Critical Assessment of the EU Peacebuilding Framework

The sections above have outlined the basic concepts and values inherent in the EU’s emerging peacebuilding framework. Those have, however, not remained unchallenged and are subject to critiques that this paper will take up, aiming at a critical evaluation of the EUPF.

5.1 The Critique

To evaluate and assess the EUPF with respect to its ability to create just and durable peace, it is necessary to situate the EU’s peacebuilding ambitions and policies within a broader critique of the liberal peace. This in turn allows for a more nuanced understanding of the Union’s emerging peacebuilding strategies in terms of how they link to global peacebuilding practices as well as how they connect with local context and societies. Equally, the critique takes peace dynamics and change into consideration by offering a scale along which international actors are moving in their aims of building peace in war-torn societies. The global peacebuilding project has emerged through the following processes, and led to a typology of the liberal peace, which the EU is also heavily implicated in. The EU has generally followed this project but has the opportunity also to improve upon it. There are four main strands of thought within the liberal peace framework, including the ‘victor’s peace’, the ‘institutional peace’, the ‘constitutional peace’, and the ‘civil peace’.21 In practice, the first three dominate the global project of peacebuilding from the perspective of the US/ UK, UN, and major agencies, donors, and NGOs. In practice the liberal peace has tended to focus on security, institutional intervention, and constitutional reform and has generally failed to offer social justice, welfare, development, or political stability, at least in the short to medium term in the wide range of contexta- from Mozambique to Cambodia, from Timor Leste to Afghanistan, where it has recently been practised. Following on from these intellectual strands, the liberal peace project can be broken down into several different graduations. These are conservative, orthodox, and emancipatory. The conservative model of the liberal peace is mainly associated with top-down approaches to peacebuilding and development. The militarisation of peace in this context, especially as it has been seen in Somalia, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq, represents a hyper-conservative model, heavily informed by the victor’s peace in the preliminary stages of intervention. The focus here has been on security as a basis for creating a liberal state. This graduation has mainly been pursued by the US and UK independent of the UN system to a large degree. The next discourse is provided within an orthodox model of the liberal peace in which actors are more wary and sensitive about local ownership, participation and culture, but are mainly focused on institutions and the reform of governance framework. This framework is dominated by consensual negotiations at the elite level. However, it represents a bottom-up approach, peacebuilding via grassroots and civil society-oriented activities, as well as a top down-approach, through which peacebuilding is led by the UN, some states, donors, officials, and the IFIs. It focuses upon and contests needs-based and rights-based activities. However, top-down peacebuilding activity tends to dominate particularly through the conditional models and practices of donors, organisations, and institutions, as do the interests of major states and donors. This model is exemplified by the UN family’s practices of peacebuilding and governance reform, which started at the end of the Cold War and culminated in UN sovereignty for a time over East Timor. Thus, the orthodox graduation offers significantly more engagement with its subjects over a broader range of issues, denoting a broader potential for a just and 21 This is a summary of Oliver P. Richmond, 2005. The Transformation of Peace, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, especially conclusion.

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durable peace. In the context of the EU, regional integration, harmonisation, and standardisation might be placed within this orthodox graduation of the liberal peace, given these strategies’ goal of reforming and transforming potential member states. This transformation process also connects with the final graduation of the liberal peace, which has not been achieved in post-conflict environments of the post-cold war environment as yet (perhaps with the exception of Northern Ireland, in which the EU played a significant role). This is provided by a more critical form of the liberal peace, the emancipatory model, concerned with a much closer relationship of custodianship and consent with local ownership, and tends to be very critical of the coerciveness, conditionality and dependency that the conservative and orthodox models operate through. This is mainly found within the bottom-up approach, and tends to veer towards needs-based activity and a stronger concern for social welfare and justice. This approach equates to the civil peace, and generally is not state-led, but shaped by private actors and social movements. The evolution of the EUPF might at a stretch represent this type of liberal peace in both its normative claims and social justice aspirations. The EU has been particularly focused upon the development of the orthodox and emancipatory graduations, through association and membership, and through its normative and social justice aspirations respectively, of peacebuilding as its own contribution to the liberal peace, but it has also been very concerned with its failings at the conservative end of the liberal peace spectrum. This ‘global project’ of peacebuilding has recently been heavily criticised. In many post-conflict environments different groups, often locally constituted, perceive the liberal peace project to be ethically bankrupt, subject to double standards, acultural, unconcerned with social welfare, and unfeeling and insensitive towards its subjects. It is tied to the state, to institutions, to the elites that control them, and not to the local context, to civil society, or the deeper society beyond this artifice. This is particularly so in its most conservative, militarised forms, as practices in Afghanistan or Iraq show, and to some degree even in its orthodox, more institutionalised forms as in Kosovo, East Timor, or Bosnia illustrate. In extreme cases it is now associated with ‘liberal war’,22 with an associated grey and black economy. Its post-Cold War moral capital, based upon its emancipatory claims, has been undermined as a result, as well as its basic goal of a liberal social contract. Certainly, since 9/11 attention has been diverted into other areas and many, perhaps promising, peace processes have regressed. Instead, so it has been argued, liberal peacebuilding in post-conflict environments has effectively begun to reinstate social and economic class systems, undermine democracy, cause downward social mobility, been built on force rather than consent, failed to recognise local cultural norms and traditions, and has created a virtual peace in its many theatres. An extension of this critique aimed at coordination and efficiency problems in particular related to problem-solving approaches to peacebuilding, may be found in more critical literatures. This argues that the liberal peace framework and its graduations converge on a notion of a biopolitical peace-as-governance.23 This is the most common form of peace applied through a methodological peacebuilding consensus in conflict zones, in which a reordering occurs in the distribution of power, prestige, rules and rights. Peace-as-governance in state building terms focuses on the institution of the state as the basis for the construction of the liberal peace. For the security and political sectors it focuses on introducing the necessary separations of powers and checks and balances in a constitutional framework. For NGOs and agencies, it focuses on the governance of society. In terms of bottom-up peacebuilding, different actors

22 See Andrew Williams, 2006. Liberalism and War: the Victors and the Vanquished, London: Routledge. 23 See Oliver P. Richmond, 2005. Op Cit, esp. conclusion. See also Kofi Annan, “Democracy as an International Issue”, 2002. Global Governance, 8 (2), pp. 134-142; A. Bellamy, and P. Williams, 2004. “Peace Operations and Global Order”, International Peacekeeping, 10 (4); David Chandler, 2002. From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and

International Intervention, London: Pluto,; Jarat Chopra and Tanja Hohe, 2004. “Participatory Intervention”, Global

Governance, 10 (3) pp. 289-305; Duffield, M, 2001. Global Governance and the New Wars, London: Zed Books,; Paris, R., 2004. At War’s End, Cambridge: CUP; Pugh, M., 2002. “Peacekeeping and Critical Theory”, Conference Presentation at BISA, LSE, London, 16-18 December,

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contribute to the liberal peace model by installing forms of peace-as-governance associated with the regulation, control, and protection of individuals and civil society. But this process represents the superior technology of political liberalism, and its ‘hegemonic reach’ rather than local consensus, agency, or patterns of politics, and this depolicises the very actors it is designed to empower through peacebuilding.24 In the EU’s context this adds a notion of integration as a form of biopolitical governance, but only in conflict environments where regional integration is geographically plausible. However, the goal of a just form of peace, which engages with the local, the cultural, welfare, the environment and so on then leads to the social contract inherent in a potentially liberal state, which is clearer in the EU’s normative and socialised perspective of peacebuilding than it is in that of the practices of the UN system, and of the US/UK versions of statebuilding more recently.

5.2 Relating the Critique to the EU Peacebuilding Framework

It is clear that EU’s contributions to peacebuilding have significant added value in integration areas, in a way never seen before in developing a liberal version of a just peace. Representing an emancipatory paradigm of peace, this approach builds on the original integration and functionalist theories of Mitrany, Deutsch, Monnet, and others who provided the basis for the theoretical and conceptual development for placing integration in the context of peacemaking.25This generally connects with pre-war liberal internationalist and idealist thinking, as well as the Kantian position, as interpreted in the twentieth century on the democratic, free trade, and normative prerequisites for peace. As with the development of orthodox theory and methodologies in the twentieth century, emphasis was placed on institutional frameworks and technical processes in problem-solving modes, leading to the governance and pacification of populations within states, but also to a situation in which states are themselves closely governed and bound up within an embedded liberal regional mechanism, as Ruggie might argue.26 But European politics remain strongly wedded to a state and a regional social contract, which emphasises the rights and needs of populations over that of national interests. However, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) indicates an aspiration towards peacebuilding and conflict resolution beyond the EU, and certainly amongst its neighbours on the Mediterranean. Thus, it is clear that the EU has an aspiration towards a socially and politically sophisticated fourth generation approach to peacebuilding, as opposed to the UN’s third generation approach inherent in its own peacebuilding projects, which is more focussed on security and the state and the provider of rights and needs.27 This is based upon an underlying ontology that violence is not endemic to human societies, and that mutual conflict resolution can occur- this being the founding basis of the EU’s representation of itself as concerned with a more complex and sophisticated form of peace than merely that of strategic approaches. This fourth generation approach had been alluded to from its early days, and along with the OSCE, and other regional organisations, includes democratisation, the rule of law, sustainable

24 Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” 1997. in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds.), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, Chicago: Chicago University Press, pp. 87-104. 25 See David Mitrany, 1996. “A Working Peace System”, reprinted in Brent F. Nelsen and Alexander Stubb, (eds.) 1998. The European Union. Readings on Theory and Practice of European Integration, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,; Karl W. Deutsch, et al, 1969. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization

in the Light of Historical Experience, New York: Greenwood Press,; Jean Monnet, 1962. “A Ferment of Change”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 1 (1). 26 Friedrich Kratochwil, and John Ruggie,1986. “International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State”, International Organization, 40 (4). 27 Oliver P. Richmond, 2002. Op. Cit.

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development, human and minority rights, social solidarity, and a vibrant civil society.28 The fourth generation approach extents this into the terrain of social justice. This is a step beyond the ESDP and the rather orthodox approaches to peace-keeping and peace-building missions that it envisages, and involves a much deeper and more sensitised engagement with conflict areas. These aspirations for the EUPF require normative legitimacy, a capacity to deal with discursive and identity concerns, to engage with cultural issues, as well as material support, financial assistance, and standards for human rights, the rule of law, democracy, and society, that resonate widely at the local and regional level.29 Competing with or replicating the global and increasingly neoliberal peacebuilding project on the other hand, would be indicative of an old style neo-colonial project, which would not suit a fourth generation approach, nor would this fit with the EU’s claimed politically pluralist and cultured rather than militarised contemporary EU. The lessons learned from a longer term perspective of liberal (read humanitarian) interventionism, peace enforcement, and pre-emptive war should be taken as a salutary lesson for EU-wide goals and interests in peacebuilding. What the EU can offer is important, but it should not be assumed that what has so far been achieved in the ‘old’ and ‘new’ EU in the areas of peacebuilding can also be achieved in the far abroad, even if its capacity is increased in military and other material aspects. Indeed its localised contributions are based on a more sophisticated and nuanced approach to conflict resolution. This strength, although limited to integrationary areas, needs to be more fully understood in comparison to the role and efficacy of global forms of peacebuilding and statebuilding. The EU’s peacebuilding projects have been criticised for not taking into account the failures of the global peacebuilding consensus that relies on the imposition of a standard set of policy prescriptions to post-conflict societies. Though there is an aspiration to a fourth generation approach to peacebuilding, in practice. Equally, the EUPF includes the usual liberal peace prescriptions of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and development as well as free markets, being envisaged not just for member states but also in the European ‘neighbourhood’ without little regard for differences in local context, despite the contextuality a fourth generation approach would suggest. A move in the ‘far abroad’ and under pressure to adopt a more heavyweight form of political intervention would exacerbate this contradiction. Demands for the EUPF to focus on neoliberal statebuilding would reproduce the difficulties of this project that have recently emerged30rather than drawing upon the EU’s added value as a social community that transcends the formal state.31

5.3 Key Problems

Disagreements and a lack of policy coherence are key features of the EUPF, which has raised problems as far as the development of a more unitary European peacebuilding model is concerned. This mirrors its still embryonic character, while also leaving space for a consideration of fourth generation approaches to peacebuilding. Key issues are:

28 Vincent Kronenberger, and Jan Wouters, 2005. The European Union and Conflict Prevention: Policy and Legal

Aspects, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 29 See, among others, Thomas Diez, 2001. "Europe as a Discursive Battleground: Discourse Analysis and European Integration Studies", Cooperation and Conflict, 36 (1), pp. 5-38. 30 E.g. see George Robertson and Paddy Ashdown, “We must beef up the UN and the EU”, The Times, 12 June 2008. For an interesting discussion see Kirchner, Emil J., 2005. “The Challenge of European Security Governance”, Journal

of Common Market Studies, 44 (5), pp. 947-968. 31 See J Habermas 2001. The Postnational Constellation: Political

Essays, MIT Press,

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1. Peacekeeping aims and capacity: so far aims have tended to overrun limited capacity (as has been the case with the UN). 2. Material capacities, finances, personnel, coordination, and sequencing: these have also been problems for UN peacebuilding, and given that EU peacebuilding is far less developed these are more significant. 3. The geographic areas of interest: clearly the focus has been where integration and association are possible, or where member states’ interests are significant. 4. A tendency to rely on liberal peacebuilding blueprints specifically with respect to democratisation processes, marketisation, rule of law, and DDR/ SSR, rather than to build contextually sensitised programmes. 5. Limitations or failures in the regions of multi-ethnicity, and dealing with social issues or welfare in post-conflict environments as in Bosnia. The ability to use the carrot of membership, and thus the stick of conditionality, is often seen as the crucial variable determining the EU’s ability to address potential conflict issues and to engage in collective milieu shaping. The attractive nature of memberships has so far held post-war settlements in parts of the Western Balkans – amongst others - together in an uneasy ‘conflict management’ situation.32 Partly for this reason, in these contexts the EU along with other actors such as the UN or the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia has become involved in prolonged trusteeship style processes. In the EU’s case this has revolved around discussions on the acquis while attempting to influence reform in deadlocked local politics. Increasingly, the EU in Bosnia has behaved techno-cratically rather than politically to avoid the very negative local de-politicisation that surrounded the formerly active role of the OHR. This has been the general approach, though there have been exceptions. In Kosovo the EU has acted politically, challenging Russian concerns and approaches, and imposing its own political solution on the region in collusion with the US. In such circumstances, the EU’s role in building a just and durable peace looks flimsy, and security in more traditional terms is also very fragile. Thus, little has changed about local politics in these parts of the Balkans as the EU’s role has shifted, but the lure of the EU still keeps politics relatively calm. It might be said that without such a lure these states would more resemble Somalia than Denmark.33 In the Middle East there has been limited discernible impact of the EU's more distant role, though quietly there has been a gathering and very important engagement (not least in the financial support for the PA). The same bounded logic applies and the EU's peacebuilding role becomes vaguer and more dependent on the global peacebuilding consensus as it moves further a field (i.e. a third generation approach), but more clearly connected to a fourth generation approach for potential EU entrants. On an institutional level, it is necessary to examine the troika and its activities, the Commission and its activities, and ESDP-missions (civilian and military). This raises the following issues: 1. Is the EU building a just and durable peace, the liberal peace (and if so which graduation of the liberal peace?) or building liberal member or non-member states? 2. To what extent are peacebuilding, democratisation and statebuilding viewed as separate or related issues, how are they sequenced and which factors determine their respective priorities in a specific context?

32 Oliver P. Richmond, 2002. Op. Cit. 33 Fukyama’s famous comment, in Francis Fukuyama, 2004. Statebuilding: Governance and World Order in the

Twenty-First Century, London: Profile,.

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3. What are the potential synergies between the EUSRs and the SG/HR and their activities (especially in BiH, Macedonia, and Kosovo)?

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6. Criteria for Evaluation of the EU Peacebuilding Framework

Taking the debates outlined above into account, we now develop criteria according to which the EUPF can be evaluated, while identifying the major weaknesses and strengths of the Union’s peacebuilding efforts. We take the critique outlined above into consideration in order to investigate to what extent this framework manages to create a more emancipatory form of peace. Therefore, we deploy a two-level top-down and bottom-up approach:

6.1 From the EU perspective: top-down in terms of EU core values

One potential way of assessing the EU peacebuilding framework is to evaluate if the peacebuilding efforts reflect and are guided by the core values of the EU. Along those lines, one can question to what extent the EU stays true to its own core principles when it comes to developing and implementing peacebuilding programmes. Ian Manners has identified a core set of values that can be regarded as key to an EU Peacebuilding Framework.34 These core values are as follows: 1. Sustainable peace: The normative principle of sustainable peace requires the EU to engage with the roots of conflict. Addressing causal factors ensures that war ‘becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible’. In this context, “…emphasis is placed on development aid, trade, interregional cooperation, political dialogue and enlargement as elements of a more holistic approach to conflict prevention.”35 2. Social freedom: According to Article 2 of the Reform Treaty, “The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime.”36 3. Consensual democracy: This requires formal liberal state institutions, but which do not take precedence necessarily over EU norms and obligations, and “include[s] proportional representation (PR) electoral systems, coalition governments and power-sharing among parties.”37 4. Associative human rights: via accession to ECHR. This requires individual and collective HR. 5. A rule of law: “The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organizations which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations.”38

34 Ian Manners, 2008. “The normative ethics of the European Union”, International Affairs, 84 (1), p. 46. 35 Ibid., p. 48. 36 Treaty of Lisbon, Article 2, esp. Chapter 61, 2007. 37 Manners, 2008. Op. Cit., p.50. 38 Treaty of Lisbon, Article10a, 2007.

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6. Inclusive equality: as opposed to exclusion and discrimination, and especially ethnonationalism. 7. Social solidarity: This implies an internal market (in a globalised context), which also has the capacity for redistribution and welfare, as well as care for the environment. 8. Sustainable development: this requires a concern with the long term social, political, economic, and environmental consequences of development and market strategies, as well as common policies and actions; resource management. 9. Good governance: this requires the international promotion of good governance values:39 the promotion of good governance is to be achieved through as least three different practices involving participatory democracy, openness and transparency; multilateralism; and good global governance.40 This may be taken to represent internal EU standards, and normative expectations for non-members. Of course, while the EU’s soft internal borders and the logic of integration are conducive to the grander goals of conflict resolution outlined above in terms of human needs, human security, and a just peace, the external boundaries of the EU represent more old fashioned sovereign borders with all that this entails.41 This reflects a more traditional approach to security, and as a consequence, limits its capacity for peacebuilding even in view of its normative goals.

6.2 From the local perspective: bottom-up in terms of rights and needs

Not only is it important to look at the successes and failures of peacebuilding operations from the perspective of the EU, but in order to estimate the potential success of a mission it is equally important to take local people’s perspectives into account. In this context the question arises whether there are needs to be addressed through EU peacebuilding strategies, how corresponding tools can be locally defined and by whom in terms of who is considered as the “local”. Therefore, it is essential to ask how evaluation tools can be created that adequately “measure” steps and developments toward peace and whether those tools are opposed to already existing early warning measures that aim at decreasing political exclusion and human rights abuses, combating unemployment, nationalistic rhetoric, party politics, marginalization, sporadic outbreaks of violence, riots and demonstrations, increased political networking as well as preventing refugee returns to areas where the latter would be the minority. As a further step towards evaluating the EU Peacebuilding Framework from a local perspective, we propose to focus specifically on the following areas: 1. To what extent is the EUPF conducive to the reduction of violence in terms of preventing the relapse into violence? 2. Is the EUPF capable of addressing human insecurity? (i.e., does it ensure freedom of movement, the absence of personal or group threats and does it provide for safe access to resources?) Does the EU take into account local understandings of human security?

39 Manners, 2008. Op. Cit., p.55. 40 See Treaty of Lisbon, Articles 8b, 10a, 21a, and the right to good administration in the citizen’s rights title of the Charter. 41Oliver P. Richmond, 2000. "Emerging Concepts of Security in the Post Cold War Order: Implications For Zones of Conflict at the Fringes of The EU", European Security, 9 (1).

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3. If at all, how does it keep “peace spoilers” in check? (In particular, with a focus on the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants into civilian life) Which actors are identified as spoilers by the EU, and does that correspond to local perceptions? 4. To what extent does it address people’s (social, cultural and material) needs and rights? 5. Whom does it empower and how? 6. In what ways does the framework rest on local ownership and build local capacity? 7. How does it transform relationships and contribute to reconciliation? (In particular, specifically looking at how mechanisms are developed to restore inter-personal and inter-communal relations to contribute to psychosocial and trauma healing and reconciliation). 8. Does it reduce incentives for actors to benefit economically from war, manage socio-economic vulnerabilities, physical reconstruction, support socio-economic development (ensure the rebuilding of houses and infrastructure, as well as the creation of job opportunities and alternative ways of earning an income)? 9. Does the framework restore political democratic institutions with peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms and ensure legitimacy for the peace-building process? 10. Whenever there is local resistance to the promotion of the liberal peace, what are the reasons for this? How can the EUPF respond to local resistance? 11. To what extent is the EUPF commensurate with the vision of the affected people of a just and durable peace, and can potential discrepancies be reconciled for the benefit of all? In order to investigate local dynamics we might adopt an approach similar to that proposed by Escobar in his seminal critique of the Western, and particularly, World Bank, development and peacebuilding strategies.42 This ‘institutional ethnography’ entails an interpretive and reflective ethnography of institutional discourses from the perspective of the local communities who receive its practices, and also from ethnographic perspectives inside such organisations. This would entail the deployment of such strategies within the EU organisations, institutions and agencies, both centrally and locally deployed in our case study areas, foregrounding the views and analyses of local voices- both official and unofficial- and their views on just and sustainable ‘peaces’, perhaps in contradistinction or complementary to the EU agendas. This is of course not to negate the standard problem-solving approach and orthodoxy that is also significant, but to counterbalance its priorities and reductionism.

A key ambition in an ethnographic approach is to include a bottom-up perspective- as local ownership has been a ‘buzzword’ in the rhetoric of peacebuilding since the late 1990’s. The question is whether the EU has been better than the rest of the international community in translating this rhetoric into practice by designing peacebuilding strategies that in fact address the needs and rights of the locals, hence using ‘local ownership’ beyond its rhetorical value. Indeed, local reactions to international efforts at building peace are often still missing in assessments of peacebuilding activities. The EUPF’s evolving framework could depart from the conventional global peacebuilding consensus inherent in the UN’s role in that its strategic peacebuilding framework may have the potential to more contextually address the rights and needs of people living in societies under reconstruction.

42See Arturo Escobar, 1995. Encountering development: the making and unmaking of the Third World, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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7. The Context for the EU Peacebuilding Framework

7.1. The Role of the EU in the Middle East

The political nature of intra-state and inter-state relations in the Middle East is complex and includes both violent conflict at the state and regional level as well as slowly-boiling regional tensions and complicated alliances that are always a potential threat to regional stability. Although the types of conflicts present in the Middle East are varied and have led to outright warfare in numerous occasions, the European Union has not deployed any military conflict resolution policies to the region. In terms of non-military peacebuilding activities, the European Union has generally favoured longer-term mechanisms designed to create a culture of cooperative security and prosperity rather than shorter-term mechanisms of immediate conflict management. Moreover, the extent of these policies and the implication of the European Union as an actor in Middle East peacebuilding are largely dependent on the proximity of the countries to the EU. As such, it is possible to break down the strategies towards the Middle East into two subcomponents: the Southern Mediterranean Middle East (North Africa and the Levant) and the Gulf States (GCC, Iraq, and Iran).

The guiding strategic principle behind the European Union’s peacebuilding strategy in the Southern Mediterranean Middle East is the ideological belief that democracy and multilateralism can best promote stability, non-violent conflict resolution, and the internal security of the Union. As such, the EU has taken the strategic approach to promote dialogue and partnership, cooperative security, and constructive engagement with third countries as a means of pursuing “structural stability:” sustainable economic development, democracy and respect for human rights, good governance and political structures, and “healthy” social and environmental conditions.43 This strategic approach focuses largely on conflict prevention as opposed to crisis management and does not currently include a strategic focus on military intervention. Nonetheless, the European Union has recognized the limits of this approach in the context of the Middle East: the enduring Arab-Israeli conflict has been rightly deemed to be the central obstacle to a broader peace in the Middle East and as such its resolution – through non-military means - has been declared a strategic priority for the EU in the region.

Through this strategic framework, the European Union has developed a series of instruments designed to build structural stability and promote conflict prevention in third countries. These tools include trade and other economic partnerships, political dialogue and diplomatic gestures, arms control, environmental protection, humanitarian-crises responses, and development technical assistance. The combination of a strategic approach and instruments for action has led to the adoption of two overarching policies for the zone: the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, with the complementary European Neighbourhood Policy, and the Middle East Peace Process.

7.2 EU Peacebuilding in the Western Balkans

An important lesson from the extensive peacebuilding efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Eastern-Slavonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Kosovo is that extending the European zone of peace to the Western Balkans is no small challenge. States might be built which resemble the liberal state, but in actual fact internationally directed, dependent on donor support, and failing to enable local populations to reach accommodation or reconciliation with each other. The obstacles confronting the 43 Roberto Aliboni and Yasar Qatarneh 2005. “The Future of the EMP in a Changing Context of Transatlantic and Regional Relations”, EuroMeSCo Paper: September 2005, No. 46.

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EU peacebuilding efforts are numerous. Broadly speaking, the war-torn societies in the Western Balkans emerged from the secessionist conflicts disintegrating Yugoslavia as ethnically divided, politically fragmented, economically broke, and traumatized communities searching security among their ethnic kin. More importantly, in this post-conflict era no shared “home-grown” vision of a self-sustainable and just peace emerged. The peace agreements, like the Dayton Agreement, the Erdut Agreement and the Ohrid Agreement that settled some of the conflicts emerged from extensive international pressure and internationally mediated elite negotiations. Hence, these agreements required international commitment and supervision and in some places also long-term presence on the ground to ensure security and stability in order to create space for their implementation. This has focused on security, institutions and rights, placing needs, welfare, and reconciliation at the local level as a secondary set of goals. The communist past meant that the people in the Western Balkans had little or no prior experience of democracy and lacked a democratic culture. Consequently, the international community’s blue print for peace in the Balkans based on the notion of liberal democratic peace in multiethnic societies initially failed to resonate with the local communities. The General Framework for Peace in Bosnia-Hercegovina, commonly called the Dayton Peace Agreement, for example, had the ambitious goal of reconstructing Bosnia as a single multiethnic country.44 Yet, the internationally drafted constitution outlined in the Dayton agreement failed to create conducive conditions for other than nationalist parties to successfully compete in general elections and, as a consequence, cementing ethnic cleavages, undermining moderate forces and non-nationalist politics. By recognizing post-war demographic “realities”, such as the partition of Bosnia into two entities (the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska and the Bosniak-Croat Federation), the internationally designed political institutions of Bosnia-Hercegovina in effect codified the subordination of minorities. Rather than reversing the politics of wartime ethnic cleansing these political institutions contributed to the prevailing problem of minority status. The international community’s ambition to “protect minority rights”, could in fact imply the right of the ethnic majority to control the state.45 The long-term problem of minority return is a case in point. In her recent research on reconstruction in Bosnia, Paula Pickering demonstrates that the internationally designed institutions often fail to assist people’s efforts to reintegrate and rebuild normal lives.46 The experience from Kosovo with the March 2004 riots is another case in point. The riots were partly focused on the international community’s representation in Kosovo and reflect the distrust of UNMIK by ordinary Kosovars and how their patience eventually ran out with the international community’s ‘standards before status’ approach. Given the persisting problems, such as a lack of security, people’s distrust in the political situation and prevailing tensions between the various ethnic groups, the huge presence of international actors in the region has not been able to create a just and durable peace, which would be acceptable for the people on the ground. Against a background of poverty and social exclusion conditions conducive to a more peaceful living together were unable to take hold.47 Many international and local actors are now hoping that the EU association, integration, and stabilising processes will enable these conditions to emerge, fulfilling the advanced logic of the EU as a normative power, and a more sophisticated peacebuilding. However, the current situation indicates that the EU has taken a similar approach to the UN or OHR- that of a combined trusteeship and the deployment of liberal conditionalities in an effort to induce local cooperation. This has mainly been focused at the elite level, while social, economic and

44 Richard Holbrooke, 1998. To End a War, New York: Random House, p. 362. 45 Franke Wilmer, 2002. The Social Construction of Man, the State, and War: Identity, Conflict, and Violence in

former Yugoslavia, New York: Routledge. 46 Paula Pickering, “Peacebuilding in the Balkans: The View from the Ground Floor,” paper presented at the Center for Russia, East Europe, and Central Asia, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, February 22, 2007. 47 United Nations Development Program, 2007. “National Human Development Report 2007. Social Inclusion in Bosnia and Herzegovina”.

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identity issues at the local level continue to provide fertile grounds for ethno-nationalism that undermines the broader liberal peacebuilding project, and that of the EU. As the most advanced cases of EU peacebuilding, Bosnia and Kosovo in particular offer fertile grounds for the investigation and evaluation of how the EU has contributed to a top-down and bottom-up approach, and how this has been implemented.

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8. Conclusion: Strengths, Weaknesses, and Potential of the EUPF

As Diez et al have outlined, the integrationalist logic for peace is a significant advantage of the EU through the four pathways they have outlined (these include compulsory/ enabling/ connective/ and constructive pathways).48 But this means far more than a narrow interpretation of peace via the CFSP and ESDP, and also not necessarily falling into line with the global neoliberal- liberal peace orthodoxy. Much of the documentation and practice related to the emerging EUPF indicates that there is not a significant difference between UN and EU practices of peacebuilding (i.e. see various checklists on root causes / early warning, and institutional and governmental responses, or references to UN documentation such as RTP)49 other than in instances where the integration ‘carrot’ is applicable (i.e. see Bosnia and Kosovo and the EU’s very close compliance with the broader liberal peace model, with all of its failings). Furthermore, there are serious doubts in locations where the association and integrationist logic cannot apply that the many EU agencies and institutions are able to act independently of the global liberal peace mechanisms. There are some general lessons to be borne in mind from the development of an EU peacebuilding consensus and the EUPF. It should be wary of carelessly following the ‘global’ liberal peacebuilding consensus and its related problem-solving and institutional neoliberal methodologies and technocracies (though the ethical position that liberalism suggests for peacebuilding is far more positive). This may lead the EUPF into the pitfalls which arose for recent global practices of peacekeeping and peacebuilding: ‘humanitarian intervention’ being locally perceived as neo-colonial. Careful thought is required to avoid this pitfall and the trap of assuming trusteeship because of local non-compliance with the liberal peace model. However, there may be circumstances where, with local consent, special processes of integration and direct EU peacebuilding support may be enacted for local welfare, rights, needs, and for regional stability. The EUPF should also commensurately be wary of becoming over securitised and merely becoming what Pugh has called ‘global riot control’.50 It should be careful of reproducing what Chandler has pointed to as the depoliticisation of the population and state,51 what Duffield has argued is the production of uninsurable populations by failing to provide for post-conflict needs,52 and of failing to address the broad range of issues required to create an emancipatory social contract.53 It might need to consider the possibilities of politics beyond the state, and investigate new or hybrid political forms more able to resolve local conflict in a just and durable manner. In this sense, and although the EU is currently searching for a peacebuilding role mainly by emulating the global peacebuilding consensus, it has the opportunity to renegotiate a form of peacebuilding in response to both the benefits and flaws of the

48 Thomas Diez, Stephan Stetter, Mathias Albert, 2006. “The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Transformative Power of Integration”, International Organization, 60 (3), pp. 563-593. 49 See, for instance, Commission of the European Communities, “Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Towards an EU response to situations of fragility - engaging in difficult environments for sustainable development, stability and peace -”, Brussels, 2007. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0643:FIN:EN:PDF. (03/06/09). 50 Michael Pugh, 2004. “Peacekeeping and Critical Theory”, International Peacekeeping, 11 (1), pp.39-58. 51 David Chandler, 2006. Empire in Denial, London: Pluto, p.36. 52 Mark Duffield, 2007. Development, Security, and Unending War, Cambridge: Polity, p.234. 53 See for example, Oliver P. Richmond, 2009. “Eirenism and a Post-Liberal Peace”, Review of International Studies, 35 (3).

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model that has generally been in use by the UN since the early 1990s, of which a sophisticated understanding is now emerging. With these caveats in mind, if the EU is to be more ambitious and also effective in developing a just peace, it should aim at developing a fourth generation approach to peacebuilding that is less hegemonic, but much more sensitive towards local people’s needs and contexts. Such an approach would allow for forms of local and regional pluralism and create legitimacy on the ground by being inclusionary in character as well as caring about a just distribution of political, social and economic resources.54 This would be in line with a more emancipatory form of peace, taking the critique outlined above into account and using the ‘local’ not only as a buzzword or rhetorical device to create a sheen of legitimacy, but it would engage with local dynamics in depth and care about local responses to the peacebuilding project. It becomes clear that, due to its diversity and complex institutional structures, the EU cannot achieve this through one centralised approach. However, the variety of inputs originating from diverse member countries and organisational bodies that constitute the EU might help find a way towards a plural nature of peace that is able to deal with difference, whether it is in society, politics, economics or culture. In this effort, the following should be taken into account: 1. The emerging EU-framework for peacebuilding should build on an understanding of the type of actor the EU is in peacebuilding in practical terms; 2. It should identify the EU’s aspirations for peacebuilding and identify gaps between aspirations and actual practice; 3. It should learn from the experience of the evolution of the global project of UN peacekeeping, peacebuilding and latterly US neoliberal statebuilding; 4. It should engage with the local context, inclusively, as well as local reactions and responses to the peacebuilding efforts; 5. Any ‘strategic’ peacebuilding approach of the EU needs to rest on the core values that guide the activities of the EU member states and societies internally, but which the EU also needs to be true to in its external actions in order to strengthen and uphold these values internally; 6. Perhaps more importantly, EU peacebuilding must also be able to engage with the non-EU ‘local’, and to enable its own localised agency to elucidate its needs and rights, and to negotiate and construct these with the EU; 7. In achieving points 5 and 6 it should avoid undermining the political agency of populations in receipt of its EUPF; 8. This means that EU peacebuilding, whether inside or outside its geographical area may be underpinned by hybridity and social justice rather than a single argument or identity on the nature the security and the institutions of the state, relating reductively to democratic norms, the rule of law, economic, and human rights institutions, processes and norms; 9. This raises significant questions of whether the EU well-positioned to be able to take up this challenge, especially where others have failed?

54 Oliver P. Richmond, 2002. Op Cit.

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10. Are EUPF core values in fact already integrated in the EU peacebuilding framework, and how far are they transferable globally? 11. How far will the EU be tempted to fall back on traditional notions of security rather than this more ambitious agenda? 12. Are EU peacebuilding strategies and activities either exporting or supporting these values in countries where the EU is contributing to building a just and durable peace? Would this entail following the US/ UK/ UN’s recent line in Afghanistan of distinguishing between different categories of peacebuilding (a scale from “light/ heavy foot prints” and “local ownership” to international trusteeships, “governing by decree” and “assuming sovereignty”)? These questions are particularly pressing in the Western Balkans and the Middle East, where a just and durable peace has not been achieved, and might not even be in sight. The extent to which the EU’s tools have (not) been appropriate to address local problems demand efforts to think about how those tools could be modified for the benefit of the people on the ground. If the latter come to consider the tools and values brought in by the EU to be legitimate, the chances for a long-term improvement of the respective conflict- for a just and durable peace- will be much higher than they have been until now. So far, the reality of the EU peacebuilding policy is that it is under-theorised, often overlapping with the global project, and it is uncertain how the norms of the EU can be maintained in a wide range of different post-conflict contexts. It is not enough for the EU to promote local political agency solely in rhetorical terms, but it also must be sure not to inscribe the very violence it seeks to prevent in arbitrary and normative peacebuilding praxis-55 as has been a common unintended consequence of the liberal peace project. Normative power, cross border solidarity, and post-sovereign political arrangements are still deeply controversial (not to mention ambiguous) in many post-conflict contexts. What is clear is that a form of peacebuilding focused on social and political agency, in a context marked by cultural, methodological, and theoretical pluralism, would be more suited to the EU’s strengths and normative ambitions than the current global version of the liberal peace. Thus, cautious involvement in peacebuilding in the far abroad is necessary to avoid the dangers of ‘mission creep’. The lessons learned from a longer-term perspective of liberal (read humanitarian) interventionism should be taken as a salutary lesson for EU-wide goals and interests in peacebuilding in the further development of an EUPF. What the EU can do here is important, but it should not be assumed that what has so far been achieved in the ‘old’ and ‘new’ EU in the areas of peacebuilding can also be achieved in the far abroad, if only its capacity was increased in military and other material aspects. This is not the case - indeed its localised successes are based on a far more sophisticated and nuanced approach to conflict resolution, derived from political and social norms that engage with identity and social justice, and aspire to be agonistic and pluralist in the nature of the ‘care’ and ‘empathy’ they propagate as peacebuilding.56 In so reaching for a fourth generation approach to peacebuilding in more localised forms, a just and durable process of peace may become plausible.

55 Michael Merlingen, 2007. “Everything in Dangerous: A Critique of Normative Power Europe”, Security Dialogue, 38 (4), p. 436. 56

Ibid., p. 450: William Connolly, 1991. Identity/ Difference, Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, esp. conclusion; Oliver P. Richmond, 2009. Op. Cit.

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Annex : Relevant EU Documents (Extracts)

Civil Society

Barcelona Declaration adopted at the 1st Euro-Mediterranean Conference (27 and 28

November 1995):

“they recognize the essential contribution civil society can make in the process of development of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and as an essential factor for greater understanding and closeness between peoples; (…) they recognize that current population trends represent a priority challenge which must be counterbalanced by appropriate policies to accelerate economic take-off;”

Council Regulation (EC) No 1658/98 of 17 July 1998 on co-financing operations with

European non-governmental development organisations (NGOs) in fields of interest to the

developing countries:

“The Community shall co-finance operations in the field with European non-governmental development organisations (NGOs), as defined in Article 3, to meet the basic needs of disadvantaged people in developing countries. Priority shall be assigned to proposals for operations based on an initiative by partners in developing countries. Such operations shall be proposed by European NGOs and conducted in cooperation with their partners in the developing countries and shall be aimed at poverty alleviation as well as at enhancing the target group’s quality of life and own development capacity. (…) The agents of cooperation eligible for co-financing under this Regulation shall be NGOs

satisfying the following conditions:

— they must be constituted as autonomous non-profit-making organisations in a Member State in accordance with the laws of that State, — they must have their headquarters in a Member State and the headquarters must be the main centre for decisions relating to the co-financed operations, — the majority of their funding must originate in Europe.”

Improving the Coherence and Effectiveness of the European Union Action in the Field of

Conflict Prevention. Report Presented to the Nice European Council by the Secretary

General/High Representative and the Commission, 2000:

“14. Non-governmental organisations have an increasingly influential role to play in conflict prevention. Many are well-placed to work with the victims of conflict and to identify and address root causes at an early stage. Others have done valuable work on policy elaboration and conflict mediation. Experience in Serbia demonstrates that a strong and active civil society and independent media are themselves important factors for democratic change and long-term stability. The growth in the number of civilian victims of conflict underlines the increasingly important role of the International Committee of the Red Cross in promoting and upholding humanitarian law.

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(…) 23. The Union should also strengthen its support for non-state actors which play a role in developing a culture of democracy, tolerance and peaceful resolution of conflict, through support for projects and programmes which assist independent media, civil society, local NGOs, women’s groups etc.” Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 8

May 2001 - the European Union's role in promoting human rights and democratisation in

third countries:

“Civil society makes an important input into policy-making for all regions with which the EU has relations. The Cotonou Agreement formally gives to civil society including NGOs an enhanced role. The Commission will build on experience and continue the dialogue on human rights and democratisation issues with civil society and NGOs both through its delegations and in Brussels, including through the Human Rights Contact Group meeting in the European Parliament. These exchanges provide useful information for both sides and strengthen mutual understanding. They should take place in the framework of the Commission’s overall approach to dialogue with civil society. Dialogue with Commission policy-makers should be made easier, for example through greater transparency of Commission policy-making and use of the Internet. At local level, the Commission will use its co-ordination role to hold occasional roundtables with civil society- and member states. These could both cover policy issues and identify areas where the EC and member states could potentially provide support to strengthen civil society. (…) A flourishing civil society, able to draw on an independent and impartial legal system, plays a fundamental role in holding governments accountable and denouncing human rights abuses. Strengthening and empowering individuals and civil society, including through education, training and awareness raising, and enabling effective advocacy for all rights, including social, economic and cultural rights, are essential complements to our assistance programmes with governments, particularly those involving good governance, institution-building, the rule of law and poverty reduction. EIDHR support should not duplicate existing mainstream programmes carried out with government, although the activities undertaken may provide an input to future programmes with governments. Locally managed microprojects are a particularly useful tool to fulfil this priority. Where civil society is weak and needs strengthening - for example, under, or in the aftermath of a dictatorial regime - local NGOs are unlikely to have the capacity to apply for funding from Brussels.”

Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament,

“Reinvigorating EU actions on Human Rights and Democratisation with Mediterranean

partners. Strategic guidelines”, 2003:

“Civil society plays an essential role in the implementation and monitoring of any Human Rights and democratisation policy. Within the Barcelona process and through the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights the Commission has supported the efforts of NGOs and other Non-State Actors, both those of the region and those working from Europe, to improve their effectiveness in identifying problems and lobbying for improvements. Actions have focussed on training and sharing of best practice in this field. The issues have been addressed in all the meetings of the Civil Forum (bringing together NGOs and other representatives of civil society from the EU and the Mediterranean partners) which have preceded the Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers' Meetings.”

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Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the

Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “Civil Society Dialogue

between the EU and Candidate Countries”, 29 June 2005:

“The enlargement of the European Union to ten new member States on 1 May 2004 further strengthened the unity of the European continent and enhanced peace, stability and security. However, one of the lessons that can be drawn from the previous enlargement is that citizens in EU Member States were not sufficiently informed nor prepared. Any future enlargement of the EU needs to be supported by a strong, deep and sustained dialogue between the societies of the candidate countries and in the EU member States, as well as with the EU institutions. This would help to bridge the information gap, achieve better mutual knowledge and bring citizens and different cultures, political and economic systems closer together, thus ensuring a stronger awareness of the opportunities as well as the challenges of future accessions. (…) Although the concept of civil society can be defined in many ways, the broadest and the most inclusive definition possible will be employed by the civil society dialogue6. Civil society would thus include: the labour-market actors, i.e. the social partners (trade unions and employers federations); organisations representing social and economic players at large (consumer organisations for instance,); non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community-based organisations, i.e. organisations at grassroots level through which citizens participate in local and municipal life (e.g. youth or family associations); religious communities and media.” Communication from the Commission: Report on the International Fund for Ireland

pursuant to Article 5 of Council Regulation (EC) No 177/2005, 2006:

“The IFI and EC Programme PEACE have complementary priorities and objectives4. The strategic aim of PEACE - namely to reinforce progress towards a peaceful and stable society and to promote reconciliation - is one of IFI’s principle objectives, while both initiatives share a number of complementary areas on which they focus: The IFI Regulation requires that in the allocation of the EC contribution priority shall be given to cross-border or cross-community projects, complementing activities or funding from PEACE II. However whilst all projects seeking assistance from PEACE need to demonstrate how they intend to develop cross-community reconciliation and mutual understanding, the cross-community dimension is only explicitly required for some IFI programmes. (…) The objectives of the IFI over the final five years will include: • building and realising the vision of a shared future for Northern Ireland and both parts of the island; • promoting understanding between the different communities in Ireland; • facilitating integration between the communities; • building alliances with other agencies, ensuring the long term work of the IFI beyond 2010 and sharing the expertise with peace builders in other regions.” Joint declaration by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member

States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on the

development policy of the European Union entitled "The European Consensus" [Official

Journal C 46 of 24.2.2006]:

“The EU supports the broad participation of all stakeholders in countries' development and encourages all parts of society to take part. Civil society, including economic and social partners such as trade unions, employers' organisations and the private sector, NGOs and other non-state actors of partner

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countries in particular play a vital role as promoters of democracy, social justice and human rights. The EU will enhance its support for building capacity of non-state actors in order to strengthen their voice in the development process and to advance political, social and economic dialogue. The important role of European civil society will be recognised as well; to that end, the EU will pay particular attention to development education and raising awareness among EU citizens.” Commission Communication of 27 January 2006: The Western Balkans on the road to the

EU: consolidating stability and raising prosperity, COM(2006) 27:

“The Commission now proposes to extend civil society dialogue to all Western Balkan countries. In addition to the proposals presented in its Communication for candidate countries, the Commission will put particular focus on dialogue between Western Balkan societies. A special effort should be undertaken to encourage civil society development in each country and a culture of civil society consultation.” Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on European neighbourhood

policy (2006/C 309/20), 2006:

“The EESC urges all the institutional players to recognise in practice that the principle of joint ownership implies a strong reference to democratic values, which must be respected and promoted and not merely formally shared: joint ownership must be the guiding principle of relations not only between the EU and the partner countries but within the EU itself, and between national administrations and civil society representatives in the partner countries. An effective and adequate representation of the ENP can only be achieved by systematically involving civil society organisations, and social and socio-occupational players in particular, whose consultative role and negotiation skills need to be explicitly recognised and promoted. (…) Often the difficulties which civil society organisations have in accessing programmes and related resources arise at least in part from inadequate knowledge of the regulations and procedures. Access to a Community programme or to the measures of a policy promoted by the EU cannot be regarded in the same way as a tendering procedure in which the competitors must provide themselves with the knowledge and organisation needed for participating. The Community institutions must take on a precise responsibility and support the social and socio-occupational organisations in their efforts to develop adequate capability and professionalism. Such action was carried out up to a few years ago by the Commission which held courses for ‘planners’ at an accessible cost. Recently these costs have tripled and are becoming prohibitive for most of the people who need this sort of help. In the EESC's view, the spread of this type of know-how among civil society organisations is as essential as the capacity building of the ENP partner countries' administrations; it must therefore be regarded as an essential service to be provided free of charge if civil society is to contribute to implementing the ENP.” Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament,

Thematic Programme for the promotion of democracy and human rights worldwide under

the future Financial Perspectives (2007-2013), 2006:

“The general aim under this strategic objective would be to develop the political space within which civil society may develop, contribute to pluralism in society and promote human rights and democracy. The focus would be on situations where there is a serious lack of fundamental freedoms, where civil society operates with difficulty and where there is little room for political pluralism. Some countries suffer from state repression, in others fundamental freedoms and human rights are endangered as a result of state weakness, collapse or violent conflict. These situations may arise in countries with which the

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EU may not yet have entered into a contractual relationship, or partner countries with which general cooperation may have been partly or fully suspended, and in other fragile states and difficult partnerships. The main emphasis would be on promoting fundamental freedoms of expression and association and the protection of human rights defenders, since these are the preconditions for normal civil society activity and any advance towards democracy. Action should where possible take a holistic approach, insisting on the links between the different freedoms underlying an open society and the basic principle that “all human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated”. All action should be conflict prevention orientated and may, according to the specifics of each country, also refer to particular human rights issues. At national level, civil society activity under this objective might range from awareness raising or education and training, to dialogues with key stakeholders in the country concerned or to more specific advocacy related to human rights defenders. The specific aim may be ratification of international conventions and changes in legislation, issues of enforcement and judicial process, electoral integrity or much broader issues of law and order. Such issues may have been the subject of a concerted EU response to a crisis situation (as foreseen under the proposed Instrument for Stability), where the thematic programme might support a more sustained intervention by civil society in the field of conflict prevention and resolution. (…) At national level, the emphasis would be to support civil society dialogue and cooperation, for example: • cooperation among CSOs to work in mutual support, build broad coalitions across different regions, communities and identity groups and engage socio-economic actors in supporting common agendas for human rights and democratic reform. This may include joint campaigning or education activity, cooperation on monitoring human rights and political reforms, etc. Themes need not be predetermined since they would derive from local priorities but they should seek to include cross cutting issues such as gender equality, core labour standards, rights of indigenous peoples, children and other vulnerable groups; • civil society dialogue in deeply divided societies, bringing together a wide range of stakeholders to analyse, debate and build consensus on controversial areas of policy (e.g. minorities, amnesty and reconciliation, religion and politics). Conflict prevention and gender dimensions would be very important in this context; • initiatives by civil society to develop dialogue with political parties, elected representatives and institutions, e.g. with the view to enhancing political representation and participation (including the empowerment of women and other underrepresented groups), responsiveness and accountability. A multiparty approach, including all major parties professing a democratic commitment, would need to be the norm. Direct support for party development would not be envisaged. At regional or transnational level, the emphasis would be on cooperation to add value and improve effectiveness to action at national level. This might be focused on issues such as: • cooperation among CSOs from specific regions plagued by conflicts with transnational implications (e.g. Great Lakes, Manu river region, Western Balkans); • cooperation and dialogue on deeply divisive political issues that may be best opened up for discussion at transnational level (e.g. religious minorities and secularism, reconciliation and justice); • capacity building support which can provide distinct added value and effectiveness for transnational CSO networks (e.g. working together to produce materials in common regional languages). At local level, there would be a grant facility for small scale initiatives by local CSOs, as with the current provisions for micro projects, though more accessible to small CSOs. This could contribute to strengthening the representivity of civil society, for example by supporting activities of new CSOs formed by groups whose interests were hitherto underrepresented, or otherwise contributing to the empowerment of such groups (whether from remote areas, minority or disadvantaged groups etc). The particular needs and priorities for civil society dialogue could be defined more precisely in consultation

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with civil society representatives on the ground. This could also facilitate complementarity with geographical programming as well as enhance local ownership of the democratization process.” Thematic programme: Non-state actors and local authorities in development. Strategy paper

2007-2010, 2006:

“While it is partner country governments who determine their country cooperation strategies together with the Community, the complementary role of non-state actors and local authorities is recognised as a fundamental principle of EC development policy. The most wide-ranging participation of all segments of society must be encouraged. The EU supports participatory approaches to ensure ownership of the development strategies by the populations and to promote in-country dialogue on good governance. (…) Key areas of activity include networks of social organisations and movements campaigning for sustainable development, human rights and social rights and democratisation. Future priority areas should include sharing of experience at regional and international levels as well as lobbying and advocacy activities, environment, more specific interventions in the areas of social vulnerability or the issue of land rights and management.”

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of

5 March 2008 - Western Balkans: enhancing the European perspective, COM(2008) 127:

“Civil society is an essential element of democratic public life. Its active involvement in the process of political, social and economic reform in the Western Balkans strengthens democracy and reconciliation. Despite some positive steps, civil society organisations remain weak and need training to adapt to present circumstances. It is, therefore, important to create conditions conducive to further growth of their activities.

EU assistance for civil society development and dialogue in the Western Balkans has been provided under previous instruments and will be given special attention under IPA. A broad range of organisations have received support, in particular in the areas of inter-ethnic relations, protection of minority rights, including Roma, poverty reduction, environmental protection and social development. (…) The Commission will initiate a dialogue with churches and religious groups, considering their potential for driving reconciliation. This will familiarise these groups with the structures and procedures of the EU and will allow an exchange of views.” Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament,

Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2008-2009, 2008:

“People-to-people contacts make the European perspective tangible for citizens. (…) Increased participation of civil society organisations in the reforms undertaken in the enlargement countries is a strong determinant for the pace and quality of the accession process, as well as in attaining public support for accession. Further capacity building and networking projects will be funded as part of the new Civil Society Facility, including the 'People 2 people' visitor programme, the setting up in the first half of 2009 of technical support offices in each country, and support schemes to civic partnerships in the areas such as environment, energy efficiency, health and safety at work, as well as the fight against corruption, organised crime and trafficking. Under IPA 2009

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support schemes to civil society partnerships will give priority to sectors such as culture, minorities and business associations.” Conflict Prevention

Improving the Coherence and Effectiveness of the European Union Action in the Field of

Conflict Prevention. Report Presented to the Nice European Council by the Secretary

General/High Representative and the Commission, 2000:

“1. Conflict prevention is at the heart of the European Union which is in itself a strikingly successful example of how reconciliation, stability and prosperity can be promoted through closer cooperation and understanding. The process of enlargement aims to extend these benefits to a wider circle of European states. Preserving peace, promoting stability and strengthening international security worldwide is a fundamental objective for the Union, and preventing violent conflict constitutes one of its most important external policy challenges. (…) 6. The European Union is well placed to engage in conflict prevention. Its capabilities include trade policy instruments, cooperation agreements, development assistance and other forms of economic cooperation, social and environmental policies, humanitarian assistance from both ECHO and member states, civilian and military crisis management capabilities, diplomatic instruments and cooperation in the area of Justice and Home Affairs. In many of these areas the Union has very considerable influence. It is the world's largest provider of development and humanitarian assistance and the biggest trading partner. (…) 8. Moreover, the coherence of conflict prevention policies cannot be separated from the broader issue of how the EU sets priorities in the area of external relations. While some regions, including those close to the EU's own borders, will remain a high priority, the Union must be ready to engage elsewhere when confronted with a clear risk of violent conflict. The work under way since Evian on improving coordination of EU external assistance will also serve to improve our ability to address situations of emerging conflict. (…) 16. Building effective partnerships with such a broad range of actors sets specific challenges for the European Union: first, to establish a focussed dialogue with agreed contact points based on mutual priorities; second, to incorporate their input into our own policy formulation; third, to establish practical cooperation on operational issues and fourth, to support mandate based organisations in playing their role for conflict prevention to the full. The principles guiding our approach to partnership should include those of added value, comparative advantage and mutually reinforcing institutions (…) 30. Effective action by the EU in the area of conflict prevention will require sustained political will and should become a priority. Future work should acknowledge our failures but also build on our successes. The Union has, for example, made a very substantial contribution to the establishment of permanent stability in Central and Eastern Europe. The rapid delivery of political and financial support to Montenegro was important in stabilising a potential conflict situation while our support for democratic forces in Serbia and the recent Zagreb Summit with its emphasis on the Stability and Association Process have opened up new prospects for lasting peace in the region. It can build also on successes further afield. After a decade which has seen many failures, the wider international community has, for example, acted to address the spiral of conflict in East Timor and has stepped in to provide the support and security necessary for the re-establishment of public authority and civil society.”

Commission Communication of 11 April 2001 on Conflict Prevention, COM(2001)211:

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“The enormous cost in resources and in human suffering caused by violent conflicts calls for major efforts in preventing conflicts. This is above all a moral and political imperative, but it also makes economic sense. It is a lot cheaper to channel conflict into dialogue and constructive action than to deal with the consequences once it has degenerated into violent confrontation. Given the importance of the EU on the international scene, its interests and ambitions and the considerable resources it has committed to assistance and co-operation, there is no doubt that the EU should play its part in these efforts. The EU is in itself a peace project, and a supremely successful one. It has underpinned the reconciliation and peaceful development ofWestern Europe over the last half century, helping to consolidate democracy and to assure prosperity. Through the process of enlargement, through the Common Foreign and Security Policy, through its development co-operation and its external assistance programmes the EU now seeks to project stability also beyond its own borders. (…) The European Union has a duty to try to address the many cross-cutting issues that generate or contribute to conflict. (…) The list of EU instruments directly or indirectly relevant to the prevention of conflict is long: development co-operation and external assistance, economic co-operation and trade policy instruments, humanitarian aid, social and environmental policies, diplomatic instruments such as political dialogue and mediation, as well as economic or other sanctions, and ultimately the new instruments of ESDP (including information gathering for anticipating potential conflicts situations and monitoring international agreements).” Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament,

Thematic Programme for the promotion of democracy and human rights worldwide under

the future Financial Perspectives (2007-2013), 2006:

“Concerns with security and the fight against terrorism have tended to dominate international agendas, but they have also begun to highlight root causes of violence and the importance of ensuring human rights, rule of law and inclusive democracy to avoid alienating communities and creating conditions of insecurity. Conflict prevention has thus added a new dimension to development strategies and work with civil society.” Democratisation

Treaty of Maastricht, 1992, Article 6:

“1. The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States.” Regulation (EC) No 1889/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20

December 2006 on establishing a financing instrument for the promotion of democracy and

human rights worldwide, 2006:

“The promotion, development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, and of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms constitute a prime objective of the Community’s development policy and economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries (6). A commitment to

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respect, promote and protect democratic principles and human rights is an essential element of the Community’s contractual relations with third countries (7). (…) Democracy and human rights are inextricably linked. The fundamental freedoms of expression and association are the preconditions for political pluralism and democratic process, whereas democratic control and separation of powers are essential to sustain an independent judiciary and the rule of law which in turn are required for effective protection of human rights. (…) Furthermore, whilst democracy and human rights objectives must be increasingly mainstreamed in all external assistance financing instruments, Community assistance under this Regulation will have a specific complementary and additional role by virtue of its global nature and its independence of action from the consent of third country governments and other public authorities. This makes possible cooperation with civil society on sensitive human rights and democracy issues, including migrants’ enjoyment of human rights, rights of asylum seekers and internally displaced persons, providing the flexibility to respond to changing circumstances or to support innovation. It also provides a Community capacity to articulate and support specific objectives and measures at international level which are neither geographically linked nor crisis related and which may require a transnational approach or involve operations both within the Community and in a range of third countries. It provides the necessary framework for operations, such as support to independent EU election observation missions requiring policy coherence, a unified management system and common operating standards.” Communication from the Commission to te Coucnil, the European Parliament, the

European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Towards an

EU response to situations of fragility - engaging in difficult environments for sustainable

development, stability and peace, Brussels, 2007:

“Promoting democratization requires prioritising needs. Elections are necessary but not sufficient for moving towards democratic development. An upstream work to promote an inclusive political society and functioning multiparty systems, with a focus on institutional development is needed as well as downstream work to promote effective functioning of newly elected institutions. Moreover focusing exclusively on electoral process may be counterproductive if it leads to an early donors' disengagement. In the most extreme cases, the central government is not committed to democratic governance. Engaging with other actors, such as civil society, local authorities or parliaments is necessary. In complement, dialogue on less controversial issues, such as service delivery or employment generation, should continue with central governments, to progressively build political will for reform. Restoring basic service delivery and job creation are priorities in fragile situations, where there is often tension between objectives of building institutional capacities and ensuring access to services, and substitution cannot be avoided.” Communciation from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council,

Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean, 2008:

“The partnership has also overseen efforts to strengthen democracy and political pluralism by the expansion of participation in political life and continues to promote the embracing of all human rights and freedoms. However, the aim of advancing and reforms and engaging more decisively in the process of strengthening governance and participatory democracy, has been tempered by global and regional events. (…)

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During the consultations and contacts held by the Commission it has become clear that all countries agree on the need to build a stronger partnership that should come through greater co-ownership of the different processes. Two proposals have received overall support from partners: the establishment of a co-presidency and the setting-up of a joint secretariat.” Development

Barcelona Declaration adopted at the 1st Europ-Mediterranean Conference (27 and 28

November 1995):

“The participants emphasize, the importance they attach to sustainable and balanced economic and social development with a view to achieving their objective of creating an area of shared prosperity. (…) The participants decide to facilitate the progressive establishment of this free-trade area through: * the adoption of suitable measures as regard rules of origin, certification, protection of intellectual and industrial property rights and competition; * the pursuit and the development of policies based on the principles of market economy and the integration of their economies taking into account their respective needs and levels of development; * the adjustment and modernization of economic and social structures, giving priority to the promotion and development of the private sector, to the upgrading of the productive sector and to the establishment of an appropriate institutional and regulatory framework for a market economy. They will likewise endeavour to mitigate the negative social consequences which may result from this adjustment, by promoting programmes for the benefit of the neediest populations; * the promotion of mechanisms to foster transfers of technology.”

Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999 laying down general provisions on

the Structural Funds:

“(6) Whereas cultural development, the quality of the natural and the man-made environment, the qualitative and cultural dimension of life and the development of tourism contribute to making regions economically and socially more attractive in so far as they encourage the creation of sustainable employment; (7) Whereas the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) is the primary contributor to attaining the objective of promoting the development and structural adjustment of the regions whose development is lagging behind and economic and social conversion of areas facing structural difficulties; (…) (14) Whereas the areas undergoing economic and social conversion should be defined as those which include areas undergoing socio-economic change in the industrial and service sectors, declining rural areas, urban areas in difficulty and depressed areas dependent on fisheries; whereas this assistance should be properly concentrated on the most seriously affected parts of the Community; whereas these areas should be designated by the Commission acting on a proposal from the Member States and in close concertation with them; (…)

(37) Whereas there should be provision for operations of Community interest carried out at the initiative of the Commission to supplement those implemented under the priority objectives; (…)

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The regions covered by Objective 2 shall be those with structural problems whose socio-economic conversion is to be supported in accordance with Article 1(2) and whose population or area is sufficiently substantial. They shall include in particular areas undergoing socio-economic change in the industrial and service sectors, declining rural areas, urban areas in difficulty and depressed areas dependent on fisheries.”

Région de l’Afrique Centrale. Communauté Européenne. Document de stratégie de

coopération régionale et Programme indicatif regional Pour la période 2002 – 2007:

“Dans le contexte régional, l’article 28 de l’Accord présente la stratégie générale de coopération et d’intégration régionale. «La coopération contribue efficacement à la réalisation des objectifs et priorités fixés par les États ACP dans le cadre de la coopération et de l’intégration régionale et sous-régionale. (…). Dans ce cadre, la coopération doit viser à: a) encourager l’intégration graduelle des États ACP dans l’économie mondiale; b) accélérer la coopération et le développement économiques, tant à l’intérieur qu’entre les régions des États ACP; c) promouvoir la libre circulation des populations, des biens, des services, des capitaux, de la main d’oeuvre et de la technologie entre les pays ACP; d) accélérer la diversification des économies des États ACP, ainsi que la coordination et l’harmonisation des politiques régionales et sous-régionales de coopération, et e) promouvoir et développer le commerce inter et intra-ACP et avec les pays tiers.» (…) La CEEAC n’a pas, pour l’instant, des réalisations concrètes en matière d’intégration économique. Après la relance de ses activités, elle poursuit des actions visant l’établissement d’une zone de libre échange et l’union douanière ainsi que l’harmonisation des politiques dans d’autres domaines clé de l’intégration (transport, communication, agriculture…). (…) La stratégie de réponse s’articule au tour de trois secteurs de concentration principaux : l’appui à l’intégration économique régionale et au commerce, le secteur des transports et la gestion rationnelle des ressources naturelles renouvelables. En complément de ces secteurs, un appui est envisagé à la prévention des conflits et au dialogue politique et au secteur de la pêche.“ Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the

European Economic and Social Committee, “EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African

pact to accelerate Africa’s Development”, 2005:

“Over the last few decades, wars and violent conflicts in Africa have destroyed millions of lives and decades of economic development. It is now universally recognised that there can be no sustainable development without peace and security. Peace and security are therefore the first essential prerequisites for sustainable development. The EU should step up its efforts to promote peace and security at all stages of the conflict cycle, from conflict prevention, via conflict management to conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. (…) Macroeconomic stability, the creation of regional markets and an appropriate private investment climate are crucial preconditions for sustained economic growth. However, this pro-growth framework needs to be accompanied by appropriate measures to boost and diversify production and to establish the necessary infrastructure and networks. The EU should target specific support on increasing the competitiveness and productivity of African agriculture.“

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Joint declaration by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member

States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on the

development policy of the European Union entitled "The European Consensus" [Official

Journal C 46 of 24.2.2006]:

“Combating global poverty is not only a moral obligation; it will also help to build a more stable, peaceful, prosperous and equitable world, reflecting the interdependency of its richer and poorer countries. In such a world, we would not allow 1,200 children to die of poverty every hour, or stand by while 1 billion people are struggling to survive on less than one dollar a day and HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria claim the lives of more than 6 million people every year. Development policy is at the heart of the EU's (1) relations with all developing countries (2). (…) The MDG agenda and the economic, social and environmental dimensions of poverty eradication in the context of sustainable development include many development activities from democratic governance to political, economic and social reforms, conflict prevention, social justice, promoting human rights and equitable access to public services, education, culture, health, including sexual and reproductive health and rights, as set out in the ICPD Cairo Agenda, the environment and sustainable management of natural resources, pro-poor economic growth, trade and development, migration and development, food security, children's rights, gender equality and promoting social cohesion and decent work. (…) The EU is committed to the principle of ownership of development strategies and programmes by partner countries. Developing countries have the primary responsibility for creating an enabling domestic environment for mobilising their own resources, including conducting coherent and effective policies. These principles will allow an adapted assistance, responding to the specific needs of the beneficiary country.”

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of

5 March 2008 - Western Balkans: enhancing the European perspective:

“The Commission supports the efforts of the Western Balkan countries for reform and regional cooperation through its Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance. It has taken a new initiative in the area of donor coordination, involving the international financial institutions and bilateral donors. This is intended to leverage the maximum amount of support possible for the region's modernisation and development needs, bringing together grants and loans.

(…)

Increasing competitiveness, reducing high levels of unemployment, fostering human development and labour market participation, building infrastructure and ensuring social cohesion are major challenges throughout the Western Balkans. The Commission supports efforts to promote sustainable development and to become acquainted with the objectives of the Lisbon strategy. This strategy aims to enhance growth and job creation and prepare the EU to face the challenges of globalisation, ageing and climate change. Agriculture and rural development are also central, and due attention should be paid to their role in the region's economic and social development. The Commission cooperates closely with IFIs and other donors to address the basic needs of the region in terms of economic and social development.”

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Human Needs

Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the

European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Reinforcing

EU Disaster and Crisis Response in third countries, COM(2005) 153:

“The sole aim of Community humanitarian aid is to prevent or relieve human suffering. The Community’s humanitarian response is determined by the needs of victims alone and is not based on or subject to, political considerations. It is delivered according to international humanitarian law and by the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and non-discrimination. These established principles are now enshrined in the Constitution. They are key operational considerations for the effectiveness of aid and for the safety and protection of both aid workers and victims.

(…) In a major disaster good coordination and reliable and rapid evaluation of needs are key factors for the effectiveness of the humanitarian response. The Commission will, therefore increase its assessment capacity, building on its existing network of 69 humanitarian aid experts and 250 local staff located in regional field offices across the world. These experts are specialised in key relief and humanitarian sectors (such as health, water and sanitation, provision of food, shelter and housing) and can already be deployed within 24 hours to the site of any disaster. It will improve the interoperability of EU assessment capacity with the UN and Red Cross systems.”

Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 25

January 2006, "Investing in people":

“Human and social development is about peopleii. People’s needs drive and people’s opportunities determine development, growth, security and poverty reduction. It is a key strategic element of “The European Consensus” and strongly emphasised in the EC's international commitments such as those under the Millennium Declaration and those agreed at the Cairo International Conference on Population and Development, the World Summit for Social Development, the Beijing Platform for Action on gender equality and the September 2005 UN Summit. (…) Thematic programmes have proven useful to intervene in fragile states and difficult partnerships, particularly in supporting programmes implemented by non-state entities. On the other hand, the thematic programmes and budget lines have demonstrated certain weaknesses. They are currently extremely numerous and fragmented. The narrowly defined thematic focus, once determined by a legislative act, limits the flexibility to adapt to new needs. Parallel implementation of numerous thematic programmes and the country programme poses managerial challenges and leads to loss of efficiency. By nature, action in non-Community countries funded under thematic programmes creates problems of coherence with country and regional strategies. (…) Action should, as far as possible, take account of imbalances and needs of disadvantaged groups, including ethnic minorities and indigenous people and people with disabilities, in accordance with the differing needs between more dynamic and evolving countries, regions within countries (e.g. in middle income countries) and least developed countries.”

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Human Rights

Barcelona Declaration adopted at the 1st Europ-Mediterranean Conference (27 and 28

November 1995):

“respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and guarantee the effective legitimate exercise of such rights and freedoms, including freedom of expression, freedom of association for peaceful purposes and freedom of thought, conscience and religion, both individually and together with other members of the same group, without any discrimination on grounds of race, nationality, language, religion or sex”

Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 8

May 2001 - the European Union's role in promoting human rights and democratisation in

third countries:

“The basis for European Union (EU) action is clear. The European Union seeks to uphold the universality and indivisibility of human rights - civil, political, economic, social and cultural - as reaffirmed by the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna. (…) Since 1992, the EC has included in all its agreements with third countries a clause defining respect for human rights and democracy as ‘essential elements’ in the EU's relationship. This clause is unique in bilateral agreements. (…) To promote human rights and democratisation objectives in external relations, the EU draws on a wide-range of instruments. These derive themselves from the EU's commitment to protect fundamental rights as reaffirmed by the proclamation of the Charter. Some constitute traditional diplomacy and foreign policy, such as démarches and interventions in UN Fora, and sanctions. Others include financial co-operation instruments, and the bilateral dialogues, which complements them. Some are more innovative, and potentially underused, namely Community instruments in policy areas such the environment, trade, the information society and immigration which have the scope to include human rights and democratization objectives. These tools should be used in a coherent manner, to achieve synergy and consistency and to ensure maximum effective use of resources to promote sustainable development and respect for human rights and democratisation world-wide. The Commission, which shares with the Council a Treaty obligation (Article 3 TEU) to ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole, should work to ensure that these different instruments are used coherently and effectively. This effort needs to be made both internally, and with the Commission's main institutional partners, the European Parliament and the Council. (…) To be effective, respect for human rights and democracy should be an integral, or 'mainstream', consideration in all EU external policies. This means including these issues in the planning, design, implementation, and monitoring of policies and programmes, as well as the dialogue pursued with partners both by the Commission and the Council. (…) The chief responsibility for democratisation and promoting respect for human rights lies with governments. But on the basis of the objectives it has set itself in this Communication, the Commission will regularly evaluate whether progress is being made, and the extent to which EU activity has contributed to that progress, and report on this.” Communication of 21 May 2003 from the Commission to the Council and the European

Parliament "Reinvigorating EU actions on Human Rights and democratisation with

Mediterranean partners. Strategic guidelines:

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“Human Rights and fundamental freedoms form an integral and essential part of the framework governing relations between the European Union and its Mediterranean partners, both within the regional context of the Barcelona process/Euro-Mediterranean partnership, and through the bilateral Association Agreements concluded or under negotiation with all the Mediterranean partner countries. (…) The EU is committed to the promotion of democracy, good governance and the rule of law as well as the promotion and protection of all Human Rights: civil, political, economic, social and cultural. The Council has approved a number of important documents which guide EU action in specific thematic areas in the Human Rights field10. In particular, the EU places great importance on: the abolition of the death penalty, the fight against torture and inhuman treatment, combating racism, xenophobia and discrimination against minorities, the promotion and protection of the rights of women and of the child and the protection of Human Rights defenders. The EU fully recognises the crucial role played by civil society in the promotion of Human Rights and democratisation.” Communication from the Commission from the Commission to the Council and the

European Parliament, Thematic Programme for the promotion of democracy and human

rights worldwide under the future Financial Perspectives (2007-2013), 2006:

“The present Communication relates to the thematic programme on the promotion of democracy and human rights worldwide. It draws on comments received in the course of a public consultation, which was organised by the Commission2. Consultations will continue for subsequent stages of programming. In cooperation with the European Parliament, the Member states and partner bodies working with the thematic programme, the Commission will also seek to promote wider reflection and debate about the European role in democracy assistance and the promotion of human rights. (…) Issues of democracy and human rights have become a systematic feature of EU foreign policy and external action through political dialogues and conditionalities, by mainstreaming these issues in cooperation programmes, and with specific projects. Comprehensive human rights based approaches to development5 are becoming more widespread, as is support for state building, “good governance” and civil society development. It is a principle of development policy to ensure ownership by the partner country of the development and democratization process, engaging governments and all leading local stakeholders, including parliaments. (…) However, democracy and human rights are par excellence issues of global concern and relevance. Hence the need for an EC capacity to articulate and support specific objectives and measures at international level, which are neither geographically linked nor crisis related26. Furthermore, global campaigns relating to human rights and democracy require a transnational approach and may involve operations both within the EU and in a range of partner countries27. For operations such as EU election observation, a single thematic programme is required to ensure policy coherence, a unified management system and common operating standards.”

Treaty of Lisbon, 2007, 4

“In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable

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development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.”

Human Security

Benita Ferrero-Waldner. European Commissioner for External Relations and European

Neighbourhood Policy: Human Security and Aid Effectiveness: The EU’s challenges, London:

2006:

“That recognition is encapsulated for me by the notion of human security, an idea of security which places people at the heart of our policies. Different definitions of human security have developed since the early 1990s, from the UN’s Commission on Human Security to the Canadian, Japanese and Swiss contributions. People converged on human security from different angles – development, protection, prevention. Crises like Bosnia were instrumental in provoking new thinking about the international community’s approach. But despite the different routes which brought us here, and the difference of emphasis from one approach to another, opinion has converged around what for me is the clearest and most useful definition: the comprehensive security of people, not the security of states, encompassing both freedom from fear and freedom from want. (…) Integrating the human security approach into our crisis management activities would be an important starting point - one idea would be to train all staff who participate in civilian response teams under the EU’s European Security and Defence policy (ESDP) in human security. This would be a major contribution to bridging the gap between short term humanitarian crisis interventions and long term prevention and development activities. (…) The challenge is finding a global long-term solution which is technically feasible, economically affordable and morally just. The EU can make an important contribution, and its leaders committed themselves to doing just that at their Summit in Lahti last weekend.” Guaranteeing human security by achieving the Millennium Development Goals and

establishing good governance 2008/05/28. Speech 06/2008:

Louis Michel, European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid: “The new dangers that beset the path towards our common objectives are now well known. Climate disruption, the food crisis, energy supplies, access to water, and phenomena as complex as migration all have to become essential parameters of our development and poverty-reduction strategies.

I am not wishing to be fatalistic or to predict failure. Rather, to meet these major global challenges we must mount a determined and offensive response.

(…)

This collective mobilisation calls for:

strong commitments in terms of the volume of aid; more effective aid as a result of a better division of labour; a sustained focus on policies for consolidating and strengthening States, so as to ensure better governance;

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a capacity for much more rapid and much more flexible reaction so as to support countries emerging from conflict; resolute support for economic development in partner countries, without which development policy will be mere emergency charity work.

On top of this must come the conviction that development aid can support and stimulate the efforts made at national level, but can never replace the political responsibility of a country’s own authorities.

(…)

Peace and security, democratic governance and human rights, trade and regional integration, the Millennium Development Goals, energy, climate change, migration and employment, science, and information and communication technology are the central themes of what amounts to a genuine contract.”

Peacebuilding

Improving the Coherence and Effectiveness of European Union Action in the Field of

Conflict Prevention. Report Presented to the Nice European Council by the Secretary

General/High Representative and the Commission, 2000:

“The most effective way for the Union to use its cooperation instruments in conflict prevention is by integrating long-term peace-building measures into its country cooperation strategies. In countries in unstable situations, specific projects and programs within the cooperation sectors included in the Country Strategy Papers should be dedicated to supporting a peaceful resolution of conflict and strengthening the democratic state. These should support political dialogue and mediation efforts, democratic institutions, the rule of law and the administration of justice, an effective and impartial police force, and, for countries emerging from armed conflict, the demobilisation and reintegration of excombatants, including child soldiers. Furthermore, in traditional sectors of development cooperation (infrastructure, health, education etc.), the reduction of existing imbalances in a society, whether ethnic, regional, or economic, must be taken into account in allocating funds to specific sectors.“

Report from the Commission to the Council of 11 June 2002. Review of progress of working

with indigenous peoples:

“The European Union believes that building partnerships with indigenous peoples is essential to fulfil the objectives of poverty elimination, sustainable development, and the strengthening of respect for human rights and democracy. The EU has in recent years significantly enhanced its policy framework and positive actions in promotion and protection of the rights of indigenous peoples, and the European Parliament and the Council have played an important role in the development of this support. (…) The Resolution acknowledges the importance attached by indigenous peoples to the shaping of their own social, economic and cultural development and cultural identities: their ‘selfdevelopment’. It underlines the positive contribution of indigenous peoples to the development process, but also their particular vulnerability and the risk that development programmes may disadvantage them. The Resolution calls for integrating concern for indigenous peoples as a cross-cutting aspect of all levels of development cooperation, including policy dialogue with partner countries. It further proposes enhancing the capacity of indigenous peoples’ organisations to take an effective part in the planning and implementation of development programmes. A central recommendation of the Resolution is that

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the Commission develops practical ways of implementing the comprehensive policy set out in the Working Document. (…) The Commission has made extensive efforts to develop a participatory approach in its polices and procedures. The Human Rights Communication highlights the need to use participatory approaches in programme design and to build the capacity of civil society actors engaged in dialogue and implementation of programmes.” Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy, 2006: “The premise of the European Neighbourhood Policy is that the EU has a vital interest in seeing greater economic development and stability and better governance in its neighbourhood. The responsibility for this lies primarily with the countries themselves, but the EU can substantially encourage and support their reform efforts. It is therefore in the best mutual interest of both the EU and its neighbours to build a much stronger and deeper relationship. The ENP remains distinct from the process of EU enlargement - for our partners, considerably enhanced cooperation with the EU is entirely possible without a specific prospect of accession and, for European neighbours, without prejudging how their relationship with the EU may develop in future, in accordance with Treaty provisions. (…) This may in the first instance largely remain a bilateral approach, bilaterally between the EU and each partner, in order to take account of the great differences between partner countries’ situations. It will allow the most advanced countries to move faster without being held back by others. However, the concept is fully consistent with a longer-term vision of an economic community emerging between the EU and its ENP partners. Elements of this are already being developed around the Mediterranean through the Agadir Agreement. In the longer-term, working towards a broader Neighbourhood economic community would include such points as the application of shared regulatory frameworks and improved market access for goods and services among ENP partners, and some appropriate institutional arrangement such as dispute settlement mechanisms. (…) Whether in Moldova or the Southern Caucasus, the Palestinian Territories or the Middle East more generally, or the Western Sahara, the Union’s neighbourhood has suffered the effects of such conflicts for many years. The ENP can never substitute for the regional or multilateral efforts underway to address these issues. But the EU must be prepared to play a more active role here, whether through full participation in such efforts (as is the case in the Quartet), or indeed through case-by-case participation in civil or military monitoring or peacekeeping operations.” Treaty of Lisbon, 2007, Preamble:

“DRAWING INSPIRATION from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law” 3): “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.” 4):

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“1. The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations.” Peacekeeping

Treaty of Lisbon, 2007, 49):

“The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.” 50): “The tasks referred to in Article 28 A(1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.” Regional cooperation

Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 11

April 2007 - Black Sea Synergy - A new regional cooperation initiative, COM(2007) 160:

“There are significant opportunities and challenges in the Black Sea area that require coordinated action at the regional level. These include key sectors such as energy, transport, environment, movement and security. Enhanced regional cooperation is not intended to deal directly with long-standing conflicts in the region, but it could generate more mutual confidence and, over time, could help remove some of the obstacles that stand in the way. Given the confluence of cultures in the Black Sea area, growing regional cooperation could also have beneficial effects beyond the region itself. (…) The European Union’s presence in the Black Sea region opens a window on fresh perspectives and opportunities. This requires a more coherent, longer-term effort which would help to fully seize these opportunities, to bring increased stability and prosperity to the region. Greater EU engagement in Black Sea regional cooperation will contribute to this objective.”

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European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument - Cross-border cooperation strategy

paper 2007-2013, Strategy Paper 2007-2013, Indicative Programme 2007-2010:

“Cross-border cooperation on the external borders of the EU is a key priority both in the European Neighbourhood Policy and in the EU’s Strategic Partnership with Russia. The adoption of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) has considerably enhanced the scope for cross-border cooperation, both qualitatively and quantitatively.” Rule of Law

Presidency Conclusions: Santa Maria da Feira, European Council, 19 and 20 June 2000,

Appendix 3:

“Intensified work on police must necessarily be accompanied by work in other areas that are felt as necessary if a positive outcome of a police mission is to be ensured. The area most specifically concerned is assistance for the re-establishment of a judicial and penal system. The following measures could be considered:

(i) Member States could establish national arrangements for selection of judges, prosecutors, penal experts and other relevant categories within the judicial and penal system, to deploy at short notice to peace support operations, and consider ways to train them appropriately;

(ii) the EU could aim at promoting guidelines for the selection and training of international judges and penal experts in liaison with the United Nations and regional organisations (particularly the Council of Europe and the OSCE);

(iii) the EU could consider ways of supporting the establishment/renovation of infrastructures of local courts and prisons as well as recruitment of local court personnel and prison officers in the context of peace support operations.”

Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament,

Thematic Programme for the promotion of democracy and human rights worldwide under

the future Financial Perspectives (2007-2013), 2006:

“The general aim under this heading is to continue to contribute, as EIDHR has done, to the effectiveness of international instruments in accordance with EU policy priorities. In so far as not covered by other financial instruments and programmes, this new programme may assist the functioning of: • core human rights instruments, through the appropriate UN agencies, bodies and mechanisms such as OHCHR, CEDAW, ILO etc.; • international criminal justice mechanisms such as the International Criminal Court.38 • regional human rights instruments; • regional networks for the training of specialists from developing countries in the application of international human rights instruments; • specific international instruments designed to support democracy building initiatives. This may extend to joint initiatives with regional organisations such as the Council of Europe; • civil society campaigns on specific human rights issues, especially in so far as they relate to UN initiatives (e.g. World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance).”

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Security of the EU

Treaty of Maastricht, 1992:

“The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence. (…) WEU Member States agree on the need to develop a genuine European security and defence identity and a greater European responsibility on defence matters. This identity will be pursued through a gradual process involving successive phases. WEU will form an integral part of the process of the development of the European Union and will enhance its contribution to solidarity within the Atlantic Alliance.” Franco-British summit: Joint declaration on European defense. Saint-Malo, 4 December

1998:

“The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage. This means making a reality of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which will provide the essential basis for action by the Union. It will be important to achieve full and rapid implementation of the Amsterdam provisions on CFSP. This includes the responsibility of the European Council to decide on the progressive framing of a common defence policy in the framework of CFSP. The Council must be able to take decisions on an intergovernmental basis, covering the whole range of activity set out in Title V of the Treaty of European Union. (…) Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks, and which are supported by a strong and competitive European defence industry and technology.”

Treaty of Nice, 2001, 2):

“The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.”

A secure Europe in a better world - European security strategy. Brussels, 12 December 2003:

“Europe still faces security threats and challenges. The outbreak of conflict in the Balkans was a reminder that war has not disappeared from our continent. Over the last decade, no region of the world has been untouched by armed conflict. Most of these conflicts have been within rather than between states, and most of the victims have been civilians.

(…)

Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important. It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe.

(…)

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In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective. (…) The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation. The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.” Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament,

Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2008-2009:

“Enlargement serves the EU's strategic interests in stability, security and conflict prevention. It has helped to increase prosperity and growth opportunities, to improve links with vital transport and energy routes, and to increase the EU's weight in the world. The present enlargement agenda covers the Western Balkans and Turkey, which have been given the perspective of becoming EU members once they fulfil the necessary conditions.“

Welfare and Social Justice

Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999 laying down general provisions on

the Structural Funds:

“Whereas in its efforts to strengthen economic and social cohesion the Community also seeks to promote the harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic activities, a high level of employment, equality between men and women and a high level of protection and improvement of the environment; whereas those efforts should in particular integrate the requirements of environmental protection into the design and implementation of the operations of the Structural Funds and help to eliminate inequalities and promote equality between men and women; whereas the Funds' operations may also make it possible to combat any discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnic origin, disability or age by means in particular of an evaluation of needs, financial incentives and an enlarged partnership;”

Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 25

January 2006, "Investing in people":

“Human and social development is about peopleii. People’s needs drive and people’s opportunities determine development, growth, security and poverty reduction. It is a key strategic element of “The European Consensus”iii and strongly emphasised in the EC's international commitments such as those under the Millennium Declaration and those agreed at the Cairo International Conference on Population and Development, the World Summit for Social Development, the Beijing Platform for Action on gender equality and the September 2005 UN Summit. In the context of external action, including development policy, the thematic programme Investing in people will focus on the core themes good health for all, knowledge and skills, culture, employment and social cohesion, gender equality, children and youth. It will reflect the internal policies of the EU and contribute to the coherence of the EU’s external policies. (…)

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The lessons learnt point to a need for a holistic and coherent thematic approach to human and social development, which is firmly anchored in the comprehensive approach formulated by the EU in its new development and external policies and which will complement and add value to country programming in different focal areas. Consequently, the programme is innovating by going beyond the present strategy, which has been centred on health, gender and basic education.“ Joint declaration by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member

States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on the

development policy of the European Union entitled "The European Consensus" [Official

Journal C 46 of 24.2.2006]:

“The EU will contribute to strengthening the social dimension of globalisation, promoting employment and decent work for all. We will strive to make migration a positive factor for development, through the promotion of concrete measures aimed at reinforcing their contribution to poverty reduction, including facilitating remittances and limiting the 'brain drain' of qualified people. The EU will lead global efforts to curb unsustainable consumption and production patterns. We will assist developing countries in implementing the Multilateral Environmental Agreements and promote pro-poor environment-related initiatives. The EU reconfirms its determination to combat climate change.”

Treaty of Lisbon, 2007, 4)

“The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific and technological advance.

It shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child.”

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2007/C 303/01), Art.34:

“1. The Union recognises and respects the entitlement to social security benefits and social services providing protection in cases such as maternity, illness, industrial accidents, dependency or old age, and in the case of loss of employment, in accordance with the rules laid down by Union law and national laws and practices.

2. Everyone residing and moving legally within the European Union is entitled to social security benefits and social advantages in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices.

3. In order to combat social exclusion and poverty, the Union recognises and respects the right to social and housing assistance so as to ensure a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient resources, in accordance with the rules laid down by Union law and national laws and practices.”

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i Sustainable peace’ refers to the stress the EU places on addressing the root causes of complex conflict situations rather than just managing the symptoms of violent conflict See for example, European Commission, “Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention”, Brussels, 2001. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/news/com2001_211_en.pdf (30/03/09). ii Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, “A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities”, Presented to EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, Barcelona, 2004. Available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Publications/HumanSecurityDoctrine.pdf (30/03/09); Kaldor, Mary/ Martin, Mary and Selchow, Sabine, “Human security: a new strategic narrative for Europe”, International Affairs, Vol.83(2), 2007. iii The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ is derived from the concept of human security within the UN framework. Here it is the global as well as the human security paradigm that is in focus for peacebuilding efforts rather than national security. It is generally assumed that the EU’s peacebuilding activities are guided by and support this emerging norm. See Oxfam International, “The Responsibility to Protect and the European Union”, 2008. iv Effective multilateralism is a key approach in the EU discourse on peacebuilding because of its close relationship with local and regional legitimacy. Multilateralism is the key to what distinguishes post-conflict peacebuilding efforts from nationally-led, self-interested engagements, as well as from historic, European colonialism and contemporary neo-colonialism. Cf. EU MEMO/05/312, “EU-UN Relations“, Brussels, 2005. v See, for instance, European Commission, “Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention”, Brussels, 2001. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/news/com2001_211_en.pdf (30/03/09). vi The recent EU strategy for the Western Balkans emphasizes the need for the EU to support national capacity to fulfil the various criteria set up by the EU for the SAA (Stabilization and Association Agreement), perhaps candidate status and eventually membership. Cf. “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Western Balkans: Enhancing the European perspective”, Brussels, 2008.

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Just & Durable Peace by Piece

What is Just and Durable Peace? The research project Just and Durable Peace by Piece (JAD-PbP 217488) is funded by the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Commission. It aims to shed new theoretical and con-ceptual light on the problematique of building just and durable peace. It examines the effectiveness of general peacebuilding strategies and evaluates to what extent they enhance self-sustain-able peace. In addition, it analyses and compares EU’s peacebuild-ing strategies in the Western Balkans and the Middle East. JAD-PbP applies an interdisciplinary approach, drawing on insights in peace and conflict research, international law, political science and international relations in order to make contributions to sci-ence, policy-making and the causes of just and durable peace.

The project comprises seven partners: Lund University (coordinator), Bath University, Hebrew University, Jordan Institute of Diplomacy, Uni-versity of St Andrews, University of East London, Uppsala University.

For more information:www.justpeace.se

Contact:Department of Political Science, Lund University, Sweden.Karin.Aggestam@svet.lu.se Annika.Bjorkdahl@svet.lu.sePhone: +46 46 2224923, alt. +46 46 2220162