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European IntegrationVol. 30, No. 1, 153–168, March 2008

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ARTICLE

European Foreign Policy: the End of French Europe?

BASTIEN IRONDELLE

CERI-Sciences Po, Paris, FranceTaylor and Francis LtdGEUI_A_296121.sgm10.1080/07036330801959556Journal of European Integration0703-6337 (print)/1477-2280 (online)Original Article2008Taylor & Francis301000000March 2008BastienIrondelleirondelle@ceri-sciences-po.org

ABSTRACT After 9/11, the Iraq war and the French and Dutch rebuttal of theConstitutional Treaty in 2005, some have observed that EU member states have tendedto de-Europeanize or renationalize foreign policies. In such a context, does France seeits foreign policy future within the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) oroutside it? Despite the inherent contradictions of the traditional French model ofEuropean foreign policy (intergovernmentalism, Europe puissance, EU as a powermultiplier), France’s commitment to a strong European foreign policy remains power-ful. But the French allegiance to CFSP is less based on a political project for Europe andfor its role in the world than motivated by necessity, as France is less and less able to actalone in the world. Thus, French policy vis-à-vis the EU in general and CFSP–Europeansecurity and defence policy (ESDP) in particular has become increasingly pragmatic andflexible. This trend will most likely continue under President Sarkozy’s leadership.

KEY WORDS: France, ESDP, French foreign policy, French European policy, European power, European Union

Introduction

On 29 May 2005 almost 55 per cent of the French voted against the ratifica-tion of the European Constitution during the referendum. This vote revealsthe profound malaise in the relations between France and the EuropeanUnion. According to Helen Drake (2006), the failure of the referendumconfirmed that the “golden age of the Europe à la française” is over. ForSteven Kramer, “the end of French Europe” is coming (Kramer 2006). Assoon as 2002, “France is on the defensive regarding European integration.The European child, for the most part its child, is escaping its grasp”(Moreau-Defarges 2002, p. 953). Yet, such a narrative overlooks the one area

Correspondence Address: CERI-Sciences Po, 56 rue Jacob, 75 006 Paris, France. Email:irondelle@ceri-sciences-po.org

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where institutional and policy progress has been fairly steady: the Europeanforeign and security policy, which is the heart of French European history.The paradox is obvious: a crisis between France and the EU has broken outto a point where many proclaim the death of French Europe at the same timeas one of France’s long-term objectives finally takes shape. Since the begin-ning of the European foreign policy (EFP) developments with the Europeanpolitical cooperation and, more notably, since the Maastricht Treaty andthe creation of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), France hasbeen the pivotal player and the most constant and powerful promoter of aEuropean foreign and security policy. Brzezinski (1997, p. 61) wisely said“France seeks reincarnation as Europe”, reincarnation of its rank in theworld. But France also seeks incarnation: it wants to embody Europe on theworld stage, with the tendency of French leaders to speak in the name ofEurope and also to shape Europe according to French ideas.

This model is in peril. First, after 9/11 and the Iraq war, some observedthat EU member states have sought to de-Europeanize or renationalizeforeign policies (Hellman 2006, Hill 2004). In the French case, for example,African policy was characterized by a return to national involvement in crises(Chad, Ivory Coast). Secondly, the reluctant French attitude concerningsuccessive enlargements of the EU, the increasing complexity of decisionmaking, the French “no” in the 2005 referendum, and the growing under-standing that the idea of Europe puissance is not shared by the other memberstates, indicate the end of a French Europe in foreign policy as well. At theEU level, divisions within Europe over the Iraq war and over the future of theEU have raised questions about the future of an effective EFP. In such acontext, does France see its foreign policy future within the European frame-work or outside it? Is the European foreign and security policy still a usefulinstrument for French foreign policy? Is there a renationalization of Frenchforeign and security policy? Is this the end of the French ambitions forEurope as a global strategic actor?

By answering these questions, this article evaluates the specific Frenchinfluence on the future of EFP, in order to understand how it reflects Frenchforeign policy interests. The article focuses on the period since 1999 and doesnot include President Nicolas Sarkozy’s policy since May 2007. It is too earlyto analyse the consequences of the coming to power of Sarkozy since he hascommissioned a committee to write a White Paper on national security thatwill define the French grand strategy, most notably the “evolution of our alli-ances … with a particular attention to the strengthening of the Europeandimension of our defence and security policy and to our role to the securityof the Atlantic Alliance at whole”, according to the words of the Letter ofMission from the President.1 A second committee is elaborating a WhitePaper on French foreign and European policies.2

The paper argues that European cooperation remains essential for France’sforeign and security policy. Europe is considered instrumentally as a powermultiplier that can be ignored or marginalized when strategic interests areinvolved. But the ‘French Europe’ project of Europe puissance has weakened.The French commitment to European foreign and security policy is less based

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European Foreign Policy: the End of French Europe? 155

on a political project for Europe and for its role in the world than motivatedby necessity since France is less and less able to act alone in the world. Thus,French policy vis-à-vis the EU, in general, and common foreign and securitypolicy (CFSP)–European security and defence policy (ESDP), in particular,has become increasingly pragmatic and flexible in order to ‘manage’ Frenchdilemmas and European tensions that characterize the European foreign andsecurity policy.

The article proceeds as follows. The next section evaluates to what extentthe legacy of Franco-European relations is put into question. The secondsection underlines that European cooperation remains a fundamental dimen-sion for French foreign and defence policy. The last section highlights thenew pragmatic approach adopted by France.

Tensions in the French Model of European Foreign Policy

The conception of Europe concerning defence and foreign affairs thatinspires French leaders with some inflections and that they try to promotehas rested on three principles (sovereignty, independence and global role),which are the cornerstones of the French foreign and defence policy model.This Gaullist legacy (Gordon 1993) took root progressively in France, to thepoint that it produced a ‘national consensus’ which remained particularlystable, especially under Francois Mitterrand. French foreign and defencepolicy is based on the dogma of French sovereignty and political indepen-dence: France must be ‘the master of its fate’ in terms of security, as a nuclearpower, and must be able to conduct its own foreign policy, as a permanentmember of the United Nations Security Council. The sovereignty principle istranslated in the primacy of the executive power in what is the preserve ofthe French president (Cohen 1994, Koenig-Archibugi 2003). The politicalprinciple of national independence rests on the requirement of autonomousdecisions — what, in France, is called the sacrosanct ‘strategic autonomy’ inforeign and security issues (Hofmann and Kempin 2007).

These principles have major consequences for EFP. The traditional Frenchmodel for EFP rested on two pillars: the model of Europe as a global strategicpower and intergovernmentalism. There is a transferral of the French worldambitions to the European level with the notion of Europe puissance. Whatdoes Europe puissance really mean? French officials have never given a precisedefinition. It implies a global power able to have its own foreign policy, todefend its values and promote its interests in the world. Thus, Europe puis-sance is supposed to be, according to French officials, a ‘European Europe’free of US dominance. It is a great power in a multipolar world able to standup to the USA if European and American interests diverge or if European lead-ers disagree with specific US policies, not only concerning climate change orworld trade issues, but even in global political and security matters. Accordingto Jacques Chirac in 1996, it is a Europe “capable of defending Europeaninterests worldwide with the whole spectrum of power”. Indeed, the Frenchconception is quite specific as it rests on the primacy of the military dimensionof EFP. To be a Europe puissance implies that Europe should be able to

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guarantee its own security and behave as a strategic and global actor in worldpolitics, ultimately with nuclear deterrence. For French decision makers,French policy is intergovernmental by nature and should stay strictly inter-governmental in order to protect French sovereignty in foreign and defencematters. Intergovernmentalism is the institutional solution cherished byFrance to conciliate sovereignty and national independence with Europeancooperation and joint actions. European defence is considered as the final andlogical step in the ongoing European integration process since a politicalunion — l’Europe politique in the French discourse — is unconceivable with-out a common defence.

Indeed, this model fits with a coherent French strategy set on two comple-mentary pillars. On the one hand, France views European integration ingeneral and CFSP–ESDP in particular as a springboard for French splendourin the world, the French grandeur in the Gaullist legacy, and on the otherhand as a power multiplier (Treacher 2001). In his essay, entitled Is Francestill a great power?, Pascal Boniface (1998) clearly illustrates the dominantopinion of French experts and officials: “France can only be in the forefrontcollectively, through the European multiplier”. In her book, Power andEurope, Nicole Gnesotto (1998, p. 93) confirmed: “Europe is to France whatthe US is to Britain, the optimum multiplier of national power”.

To What Extent is This Model in Peril?

France’s policy is characterized by three main dilemmas.

• First, the US and NATO dilemma: how to maintain distant relations withNATO and competitive relations with the USA, despite transatlantic rela-tions and Atlanticist European partners?

• Second, France promotes an autonomous European policy, but Frenchforeign and security policy is anchored in a Gaullist legacy. Its cornerstoneis strategic independence for a nuclear power and permanent member ofthe UN Security Council.

• Third, France is in favour of a ‘strong’ European power but remainsattached to sovereignty. Therefore, France wants a strong Europe withweak institutions, according to the well-known Gaullist paradigm. Howto combine national sovereignty with the pooling of power in Europe?

Fundamentally, the French vision of Europe puissance, representing one polein a multipolar world, naturally resting on a military capability, is not sharedby any other member state. A number of member states, particularly theneutral states and, to a lesser extent, Germany, are attached to the civilianpower (soft power) status of the EU. A second fundamental divergenceconcerns the ESDP. France promotes a European defence policy that impliesthe capacity to guarantee its security, to manage conflicts at its periphery,such as the one in Kosovo in 1999, and to promote its interests in interna-tional affairs. By contrast, most of the other states understand the ESDP as ameans to endow the EU with a capacity to manage crises, centred on peace-keeping and stabilization operations more than on coercion. For the UK, an

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operation of the Kosovo scale is unthinkable without the active support ofthe USA. The differences bear both on the identity of Europe as a strategicactor and on the definition of what European defence is. This double ‘onto-logical’ tension can be found in many areas. Concerning institutional aspects,during the constitutional treaty negotiations, the opposition of the Swedishand Finnish representatives and, more generally, by the neutral countries,reduced the ambition of enhanced cooperation in defence. These same coun-tries, together with the UK, Poland, the Czech Republic and the Baltic coun-tries, refused a strictly European mutual defence clause that would riskduplicating NATO or threatening neutrality (Schoutheete 2004). A numberof member states opposed the French conception of a European defence asindependent as possible from NATO. The notion of autonomy, in the SaintMalo declaration, is interpreted in very different ways in France and in theUK (Howorth 2000, 2003–2004). Many states, particularly the new memberstates, give priority to NATO and worry mostly that the ESDP will deterio-rate the relationship with the USA. On 14 November 2006, the Dutchdefence minister, echoing many of his colleagues, complained about MichèleAlliot-Marie’s introduction to the EU defence ministers’ meeting, because shehad talked about citizens expecting security provisions from the EU withoutmentioning NATO. Henk Kamp pleaded that NATO is the main securityprovider in Europe. This friction is a tell-tale sign of the persistent tensionsbetween France and most EU member states concerning NATO’s place andits primacy. During his first hearing in the National Assembly, the newMinister of Defence, Hervé Morin underlined that “many European coun-tries remain deeply attached to NATO and consider suspiciously initiativestaken to deepen European common defence”.3

With the successive enlargements of the EU, France is confronted with the‘dilution’ of EFP. For French officials, enlargement cannot be a truly positivefactor for the non-European issues of CFSP/ESDP since it increases the heter-ogeneity of diplomatic interests, the diversity of strategic cultures betweentwenty-seven members. It also multiplies the risk of Euro-paralysis becauseof the necessity to attain consensus and unanimity with twenty-seven equalpartners. From a more general point of view, France has not digested the 2004enlargement. France, in particular at the time of Maastricht, has always priv-ileged deepening European integration rather than enlarging. The negotiationof the Nice Treaty showed the decreasing ability of the Franco-German rela-tionship to set the tone of European developments. In 2003, the restoredParis–Berlin axis did not lead to a united, or even coherent, European positionon Iraq or for a European Security and Defence Union, but rather to a rejec-tion of the resurgent couple (Heisbourg 2004). French perceptions are thatFrance has lost its leadership based on the Franco-German motor in the EU.Its capacity to influence Europe decreases each time the EU is enlarged.

A Renationalization of the French Foreign and Security Policy?

The crisis affecting the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company(EADS), since the appointment of Noël Forgeard, imposed by the Elysée, has

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shown to what extent the clash of national interests can be harsh within theFranco-German couple, even in the great ‘European success story’ of Airbus,to the detriment of ‘European interests’. Some recent developments seem toindicate a renationalization trend of France’s foreign and security policy.Three instances are particularly relevant.

First, breaking the Europeanization of the arms exports policies (Bauer2001), France — Europe’s biggest arms exporter — is still blocking a new EUcode of conduct on arms exports until member states give the green light toreview the arms embargo on China. France is actively arguing for lifting theembargo set after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, but some Europeansand the USA are opposed to it. The new legally binding code, drafted in 2005,would replace the existing voluntary code.

Secondly, by contrast, with France’s new Africa policy adopted in 1997,which has sought to reduce military commitments (Utley 2002, Bagayoko-Penone 2003), France has renewed its national interventionism since 2002in the Ivory Coast, as French efforts to ‘multilateralize’ its intervention andfind international partners have failed, notably due to European defections.But French military actions in Chad and the Central African Republic in2006 have confirmed the return of unilateral interventionism. These opera-tions have raised questions and criticism about the return of the ‘Policemenof Africa’, in contradiction with the French policy of involving Europeanpartners for the crisis management of African conflicts, symbolized by thefirst EU military missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003(Artemis).

Thirdly, if more structural phenomena are considered, the French claimson burden-sharing in defence are another indicator. In 2004, while it wascriticized for not respecting the European Monetary Union (EMU) rules interms of public deficit, France, through the Minister of Defence, proposedthat defence spending be deducted from the amount of public deficit.

CFSP–ESDP: Becoming A ‘Vital Interest’ for French International Policy?

The fact that the French model of EFP is in danger does not mean that thearticulation between French and European foreign and defence policies isdecreasing. France’s involvement in favour of a strong EFP remains power-ful. Consequently, France remains a key player in CFSP–ESDP.

European Foreign and Defence Policy: Achieving a Long-Term French Interest

Despite divisions over Iraq, the rise and fall of the EU constitution and theFrench failure with the referendum, some long-term goals of the FrenchEuropean policy have begun to bear fruit, as can be seen from the rapiddevelopment of EFP and ESDP since 1999. Since the end of the Cold War,the European defence project has constantly been promoted by France, withmore or less intensity depending on the European and transatlantic context.The most important change during the 1990s resides in the fact that France

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pleaded for a defence embedded in the dynamic of European integration,first, in the form of bringing together the Western European Union (WEU)and the EU and then in the form of an EU policy with the ESDP. During theMaastricht Treaty negotiations, although the creation of the EMU was the“primordial objective” (Bozo 2005, p. 304), France made the developmentof a common foreign and security policy and, eventually, European defencea priority. In the context of the bargaining with Germany, which focused onpolitical union and transatlantic relationships around the new strategicconcept of NATO, the CFSP ensures the primacy of the European Counciland the intergovernmental logic of political union, while the German initia-tive was much more federalist, centred on reinforcing the powers of theCommission and the European Parliament (Mazucelli 1997, Bozo 2005).After the Franco-British Summit at Saint-Malo in December 1998, Franceplayed a decisive role in the launching and the development of the ESDP.France devoted itself to remaining leader in all European defence initiatives,sometimes with Germany, sometimes with the UK. Thus, ESDP is theachievement of a long-term goal of French EU policy and should be under-lined as such, with the federal-orientated European Defense Community(1950–1954) (Aron 1956, Furdson 1980), the intergovernmental-orientated‘Fouchet Plans’ (1960–1963) (Vaïsse 1998), the launching and developmentof the European Political Cooperation (Nuttal 1992).

ESDP and the military dimensions are the fundamental direction of EFP,according to France. One should remember that a ‘non-militarized’ CFSPwas possible with a mix of economic sanctions, aids, declaratory policies,humanitarian missions, which could have preserved the pure ‘civilian power’identity of the EU. Furthermore, the integration of the European defencepolicy within the framework of the EU is a long-term leitmotiv of FrenchEuropean policy, which had always argued in favour of the WEU becomingthe ‘military arm’ of the EU since 1990.

During the European Convention, French officials were major players indiscussions about defence policy (Shoutheete 2004, Norman 2005). Thisplayed an essential role in the creation and direction of the working groupdedicated to defence (group VIII) chaired by the Frenchman Michel Barnier,while he was European Commissioner. The proposals contained in thedefence group’s first draft of the report fairly largely reflected the views ofthe French government: updating the Petersberg tasks, creating a Council ofDefence Ministers, creating a European Defence Agency, inserting a solidarityclause against terrorism in the Treaty, opening the possibility for closer coop-eration amongst those member states that wish it (Working Document 22 WGVIII). On 22 November 2002, the French government took a common initia-tive on defence with the Germans. Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Dominiquede Villepin and Joschka Fischer, proposed a “European Union of Security andDefence”. Comprising a common security and solidarity clause (inspired bythe commitments treaty subscribed to in the framework of the WEU), theenhanced cooperation should be able to be triggered by a qualified majority.4

These proposals were largely taken up in the report of working group VIII.5

In fine, the treaty that resulted from the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC)

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marked real progress in the defence area, without precedent at the IGCsat Maastricht or Amsterdam: a European Minister of Foreign Affairs, aEuropean Defence Agency, the redefinition of the Petersberg tasks, the soli-darity clause in the event of a terrorist attack, extending reinforced coopera-tion to defence.

Furthermore, no development of the EFP and ESDP is incompatible orcontrary to French preferences. No ‘red line’ has been questioned: no feder-alist orientation in defence, no anti-nuclear clause, no ‘purely civilian’ orien-tation of ESDP, for example. The primacy of intergovernmentalism is notchallenged and many French officials hope for an ‘intergovernmentalist spill-over’, which would reassert the role of national governments on Europeanunification at the expense of supranational institutions via EFP.

A Social, Bureaucratic and Political Consensus

French citizens and elites retain a remarkably robust consensus on the desir-ability and importance of European policies and actions in defence andforeign affairs. There was no opposition during the referendum against ESDPor CFSP. Defence was not a major issue during the referendum campaign. Thetheme always remained secondary in speeches and in the arguments againstthe treaty. In a national context marked by a clear revival of anti-American-ism with the war in Iraq and the disputes over George Bush’s foreign policy,the principal theme of opponents was the criticism of a European defence thatwould be subjugated by the USA and NATO, according to the extremistparties from both the right (Front National, Mouvement pour la France) andleft (Parti communiste, Ligue communiste révolutionnaire). All governmentalparties, the neo-gaullist Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP), recentparties created from the dislocation of the centrist from the Union pour laDémocratie Française (UDF) and the leftist Parti socialiste appeared favour-able to the CFSP and ESDP and to the content of the Treaty in terms ofdefence and European foreign policy.

Eurobarometer polls testify to the large French support for the ESDP.It did not waver after the failure of the referendum. At the end of 2006,French public opinion is still very receptive to issues relating to ESDP andCFSP. At 81 per cent, support for the CFSP is higher than in the past: 10 percent higher than in 2002. Support for a common foreign policy has increasedfrom 60 per cent of people surveyed in 2002 to 70 per cent. Since the mid-1990s, a ‘European’ paradigm has been developed within the French deci-sion-making elites (government, military, diplomats) under the effects of theforeign military operations (Gulf War 1991 and ex-Yugoslavia conflicts) andfurther with the development of the ESDP (Irondelle 2003). The political andbureaucratic tensions between defence and foreign ministries were, even afew years ago, very strong over NATO and European defence. They have notdisappeared: soldiers remain less reticent towards NATO and more support-ive of ESDP, particularly under the leadership of the armed forces’ Chief ofStaff, rather than diplomats (Mérand 2003, Bagayoko-Penone 2006). Somemembers of parliament remain sensitive to the De Gaulle–Mitterrand

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orthodoxy concerning NATO (Michel and Rivière 2005). But these tensionshave smoothed out considerably in favour of a common conception of thepolicy community — diplomats, soldiers, senior civil servants, members ofministerial cabinets that manage European security matters — around theidea of an ambitious ESDP, as autonomous as possible with pragmatic rela-tions with NATO (Howorth 2004).

More Than ‘Different Tactics’: the Redefinition of French Interests

In 2005, Michel Barnier, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, called a longarticle on French foreign policy ‘The European Reflex’, meaning that Francecan no longer ignore the European dimension and CFSP when deciding itsforeign actions. It is certainly optimistic. But what can be observed is afundamental change in French foreign policy: there are not so many interna-tional issues where France could play a purely national card. And now thereis a high cost to breaking the European approach in foreign affairs whenthere is one. By contrast with other European policies (Common AgriculturalPolicy, Commercial Policy, European Central Bank, Competitive Policy),there has been no real crisis where France would have strongly opposedEuropean decisions or orientations.

France has insisted on the solidarity principles between Europeans andwithin the EU as far back as in 1996 when a Franco-German proposalsuggested the introduction in the EU Treaty of a “general political solidar-ity clause” (Knowles and Thomson-Pottebohm 2004). France supports thetranslation of this solidarity in political and legal bindings: the mutualdefence clause in the constitution, the solidarity clause in the case ofterrorism or natural disaster. This shows a considerable turn-around of theFrench strategic posture, which nowadays includes a European dimensionto the definition of its strategic interests. The case of nuclear deterrent isvery relevant here since French doctrine has known important shifts to‘Europeanize’ French deterrence on the basis that France’s vital interestsare increasingly inseparable from those of its European partners. Duringhis last speech on dissuasion, former President Jacques Chirac indicatedthat

the development of the ESDP, the growing interweaving of the interestsof European Union countries and the solidarity that now exists betweenthem, make French nuclear deterrence, by its very existence, a coreelement in the security of the European continent. In 1995, France putforward the ambitious idea of concerted deterrence in order to launch adebate at European level on this issue (Chirac 2006).

More fundamentally, the creation of a European defence policy is consid-ered as a part of French national interest. In a recent symposium on thefuture of French foreign policy, the general secretary of the Minister ofForeign Affairs concluded, “A French power inseparable from the EU”(Faure 2006) and the director of the planning staff of the Ministry of Defence

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entitled his article ‘France: a strategic and military power in and thanks toEurope’ (Ponton d’Amecourt 2006).

How to Punch Above France’s Weight? The European Imperative

French foreign and strategic policy seeks to allow France “to punch above itsweight” in world politics, to paraphrase Douglas Hurd’s words characteriz-ing British strategic policy. Such a policy rests on the European imperativeboth as a springboard and as power multiplier to compensate for Frenchproblems or manage the structural challenges of French international policy.The first problem is budgetary constraints and the lack of financial resourcesthat has entailed the “exhaustion of the national defence model” after theend of the Cold War (Irondelle 2003). Most actors in French defence policyshare the observation made by Louis Gautier (2006a), former aide ondefence matters for Lionel Jospin (prime minister 1997–2002): “no power onthe old continent can assure its external security alone”. France can no longerafford on its own most of the military systems and technologies for futureconflicts: a second aircraft carrier or spaced-based Command, Control andIntelligence capabilities (Helios, Galileo), for example. The second structuralchallenge is the growing multilateralization of international issues.Confronted with global issues, the French voice alone is less powerful andrelevant and its capacity to influence global agenda and outcomes is weakerthan with the ‘European lever’: the fight against proliferation of weapons ofmass destruction, world trade agreements, negotiations on climate changeare some of the best instances. France is keener to Europeanize issues wheremultilateralism is inescapable than issues where strong bilateral relations andinterests are engaged. The third challenge deals with international legitimacy.In many cases olicy is more legitimate and can avoid or diminish criticismagainst French policy. The Europeanization of African policy is a good exam-ple. Reports by official experts put forward the EU and ESDP as crucialresources for legitimizing French involvement and ending the ‘unilateralistdeadlock’ (Sadoux 2005, p. 69, Bergeron 2007, Dulait et al. 2006). SylvieBermann, then French ambassador in the Political and Security Committee(COPS), underlined in a 2005 hearing in the French Parliament, that theimplementation of European crisis management missions allowed France toshare not only the military risk but also the political risk and that this “addedvalue” of European missions is essential (Vinçon 2005, p. 42).

A More Pragmatic and Flexible Approach

Since the failure of France’s return to NATO’s military structures in 1996 andwith the launch of ESDP in 1999, France has developed a more pragmaticand flexible approach to its European policy in foreign and security matters.But there is no U-turn. French relations with NATO for instance were oftenmuch more pragmatic in practice than in political rhetoric (Bozo 1991, Bozoand Parmentier 2007), even if there were periods of ‘intense frictions’, nota-bly during Mitterrand’s second mandate (1988–1995) and in the context of

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the Iraq War in 2003. As Claudia Major and Christian Mölling (2007)recently wrote, “progress in ESDP only happens when France adopts a prag-matic approach, avoiding theological battles over the ‘finalité’ of the EU”.

As any EU member state, France has developed an ambivalent relation-ship with European unification. This is particularly the case concerningEFP since France is an international power, permanent member of the UNSecurity Council and member of the G8. France has not renounced its inde-pendent, national foreign policy. France plays permanently on two levels:multilateral cooperation, especially European foreign policy when it is to itsadvantage or needed, and the sovereign approach which it never renounced,notably when strategic interests are involved. But there is no clear borderbetween what these areas are. Nevertheless a line of distinction betweenforeign policy (war and peace, military operations, political dialogue, bilat-eral relations) and the management of international interdependence (trade,technical issues, global issues) tends to emerge (Védrine 2001). The choicebetween unilateral or multilateral action, and then the choice of the rightorganization (EU, UN, G8 NATO) for a multilateral approach depends onthe balance of power, the political context but also on questions of legiti-macy or path-dependent phenomena. The French conception, notablywithin the Ministry of Defence, is increasingly inspired by the idea thatESDP is a means of increasing the EU’s international capabilities, morethan the perspective of common defence policy. The French approach toEuropean foreign and security policy issues tends to resort more and more tocomplex and fluctuant ‘bilateralisms’ or ‘trilateralisms’ with different part-ners on different issues (terrorism, Mediterranean policy, ESDP institutions,industrial cooperation, military capabilities, nuclear issues). According toFrench leaders, this model of ‘free-floating coalitions’ would be compatiblewith an “avant-garde group”, such as the European Security and DefenceUnion proposed in the Tervuren declaration in 2003 with Germany,Belgium and Luxembourg.

This pragmatic approach is apparent in all major components of Europeanforeign policy, notably for humanitarian, civilian or military missionsabroad. France is one of the countries that most often uses force for militaryoperations abroad. The French government decides according to political,diplomatic, strategic and military parameters the framework in which it willdeploy its soldiers and military assets, be it within the EU, the UN or NATO.Strictly national missions concern notably African countries with whichFrance has special relationships under the form of defence agreements (IvoryCoast, Central African Republic, Chad). The French political direction isto develop EU missions under the mandate of the UN. UN missionscomprised missions in Lebanon in 2006, where France failed to encourage amore European response. EU missions include operations in Macedonia, inBosnia (Althéa), in Congo (Artémis) and numerous police and civilian oper-ations. Concerning foreign military operations, “in order to promote ESDP,priority is given to common efforts with European Union partners” (Patryand Gros 2007). France’s ability to be a ‘leadership country’ (nation cadre)in EU military missions (shared with the UK) and the permanence of its

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military primacy within the European armed forces, form a major part ofensuring France’s leadership in ESDP. The French government has thuspleaded for European action in Lebanon in 2006, or to launch a Europeanmission in Darfour in June 2007.

Although France had not returned to the NATO military organization in1996, France fully participated in NATO operations in Bosnia (IFOR andthen SFOR 1995–2004), in Kosovo (since 1999) and in Macedonia. In 2006,France deployed 1,200 troops for the International Security Assistance Forcein Afghanistan. Breaking a dogma, France has even placed its special forcesunder direct US command in the beginning of the US-led operations inAfghanistan in 2001. In 2005, France was the third largest contributor toNATO forces. French participation in NATO missions illustrates the newpragmatic approach to NATO relations that France has developed. Thismeans, at least for the moment, the end of ‘religious war’ with NATO.France supplied the NATO Response Force with 1,700 troops and is thefourth biggest contributor to the NATO budget. Thus, despite the 2003transatlantic crisis, France’s attitude towards NATO is characterized by acooperative approach, illustrated by French participation in the NATOTransformation and Multinational Interoperability Council. The focus oninteroperability shows that France, under the leadership of the Ministry ofDefence, has put the emphasis on capabilities, notably with the Battlegroups,rather than on institutions (Bozo and Parmentier 2007). Concerning institu-tions, France remains keen on intergovernmentalism, but it also promotes akind of centralization of European policy in the hands of a ‘Mr CFSP’ (HighRepresentative, EU Foreign Ministry). France advocated the development offlexibility in CFSP and ESDP by introducing enhanced cooperation possibil-ities. This points to the French preference for an ESDP avant-garde groupthat should allow some key member states to take the leadership in CFSP–ESDP. The EU-3 format to deal with the Iranian nuclear crisis is an illustra-tion. During the Convention, France accepted as a major concession toGermany, the introduction of qualified majority voting in CFSP matters. It isnecessary to underscore the importance of the introduction of qualifiedmajority, which is normally a taboo question for France in the defence sector.This major concession stems from the will to preserve the alliance withGermany but also to find institutional solutions to avoid paralysis linked tounanimity in the domain of defence.6 Thus, France has accepted that deci-sion-making processes inside the European Defence Agency rest on qualifiedmajority.

If Germany seeks to establish a European Security and Defence Unionand the UK is disposed to a more à la carte approach driven by capabilities(Longhurst and Miskimmon 2007), France seeks to remain the mainspring,relying at times on the UK for the improvement of European capabilities andthe rise of military spending, at others associating with Germany to developESDP institutions. But in a European Union with twenty-seven members, theFrench model of a European avant-garde needs a broader framework tooperate than the Paris–Berlin–London triangle, which is often feared bymany Europeans as a ‘Directorate’. France is very careful to preserve at the

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national level the military, industrial and technological capacities andcompetencies that are judged strategic. According to official sources, itconcerns notably nuclear weapons and technologies, and specific space assetsrelated to nuclear deterrent, for instance micro-satellite systems to detectelectromagnetic impulses. ESDP orientations in terms of military capabilitiesare coherent with French military planning (strategic autonomy, space assets,C4ISR — Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,Surveillance and Reconnaissance). France is developing its own commandand control structure, both at the strategic and tactical levels. Indeed all theFrench efforts in terms of planning, command and control of operation areguided by the aim to be a ‘leadership country’ able to lead a multinationalcoalitions and to contribute to the strategic autonomy of the EuropeanUnion. France strongly supported the project of a standing command struc-ture for EU autonomous missions at Tervuren (European Joint PermanentHeadquarter, EU planning structure).

Conclusion

Is this the end of a French Europe in European foreign policy, then (Kramer2006)? The crisis is more structural than contextual. France lacks a vision forthe future for Europe despite the leitmotiv of a Europe puissance. Isn’tEurope puissance chimerical with a European Union composed of twenty-seven members, where French influence is strongly declining? Deep down,French diplomacy seems very hesitant to take into account the post-2004enlargement’s political configuration. France is concerned about the‘European core’ and seeks to recreate the golden age of Europe à la française.Furthermore, effective European foreign policy implies reform or orienta-tions, such as, for instance, reasserting the transatlantic link and maybe theprimacy of NATO or implementing specialization and mutual dependence inmilitary capabilities (Fournoy and Smith 2005) or limiting intergovernmen-talism and prospecting for “transfers of competencies and delegations ofcommand to European institutions” (Gautier 2006b) that are not “France’scup of tea”. Meanwhile, Steven Kramer (2006, p. 135) underlined that theloss of France’s ability to lead the EU “is bad not just for France, but forEurope as well, for the EU cannot hope to make any real progress in areassuch as institutional reform or the forging of a common foreign and securitypolicy without France” (Major and Mölling 2007). Furthermore, CFSP andESDP are the main roads for the evolution of French foreign and securitypolicy but the tensions, notably between European cooperation and nationalambitions, between European autonomy and transatlantic solidarity aresharpening.

President Sarkozy will certainly strengthen the pragmatic approach ofFrench policy, in accordance with his policy style. One would expect that thenew French leadership will be more tempted by a mix of free-floating coali-tions and an ESDP ‘avant-garde group’, allowing some key member states tolead and develop ESDP and European foreign policy. The new French govern-ment insists quite strongly on the importance of the reduced treaty which

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preserves “enhanced cooperations, notably in defence matters, for Europeandefence will go forward by leaning on a core of countries which want to takeon their own security” (Morin 2007). Paradoxically, the ongoing pragmaticapproach adopted by France — leaving aside the theological debates aboutNATO, based on venue-shopping between EU and NATO or UN accordingto its needs, and strengthening European defence policy as far as possiblethanks to enhanced cooperation — is a reason to expect the decline of NATOand the rise of ESDP, at least in the near future (Duke 2008).

Acknowledgement

The author would like to thank Cornelia Woll, Erik Jones, Saskia VanGenugten and anonymous reviewers of the Journal of European Integrationfor their helpful comments on earlier drafts.

Notes1. Mission letter from Nicolas Sarkozy to Jean-Claude Mallet, Conseiller d’Etat (Président de la

Commission du Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale), Paris, 31 July 2007.2. The two White Papers are expected for the spring in order to prepare the French presidency of the

EU during the second semester of 2008.3. Audition de M. Hervé Morin, ministre de la Défense, Assemblée Nationale, 17 July 2007.4. Conv 422/02 of 22 November 2002.5. Doc Conv 461/02 16 December 2002.6. This concession was not devoid of tactical reasons, as France is sure that the proposition will not go

anywhere because of likely veto from other member states. Indeed, in the end the Convention andthe treaty did not really extend the use of qualified majority voting in CFSP matters.

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