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European FunctionalismSven Rosenkranz aa ICREA, Catalan Institute for Research and AdvancedStudies University of BarcelonaPublished online: 12 Apr 2010.

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EUROPEAN FUNCTIONALISM

Sven Rosenkranz

Functionalism about mental phenomena must account for their multiplerealizability. According to standard doctrine, this can be achieved by allowingour folk theory’s realization formula to be multiply satisfied by distinct

physical properties. If at all, uniqueness can then be restored by suitablerelativization to populations or worlds. Recent arguments suggest that this is adead end. Here the attempt is made to devise a novel type of functionalism

that accounts for multiple realizability but rejects the standard doctrine andthus proves immune to those arguments. The distinctive feature of this noveltype of functionalism is its use of plural quantification in ramsification, which

allows it to retain uniqueness of satisfaction despite multiple realizability whilerespecting naturalness requirements on physical properties.

1. Introduction

Contrary to what the reasons for its inception suggest, proponents offunctionalism are hard-pressed to account for the idea that mentalphenomena such as pain are multiply realizable. An attempt is made onbehalf of the functionalist to meet this challenge, leading to the formulationof a new variety of functionalism compatible with physicalism. One of theupshots of the discussion is that it would be mistaken to link the thesis thatpain is multiply realizable to the idea that our theory about pain yields anopen sentence that is possibly multiply satisfied (or multiply satisfied acrosspossible worlds or populations). The variety of functionalism to beproposed respects this insight without violating any sensible naturalnessrequirements on physical properties.

The purpose of this paper is not to defend functionalism as such, butrather to argue that in the light of certain objections challenging its potentialto account for multiple realizability, a hitherto unconsidered variety offunctionalism fares better than any of its extant forms. The variety offunctionalism to be proposed faces challenges of its own. After stating theview, I accordingly set out to address these challenges. A sustained defenceof the view would require much more than the available space permits. But Ihope that, by the end of the paper, enough will have been said to warrant theconclusion that this novel type of functionalism is a serious contender and isbetter suited than any other type to accommodate multiple realizability.

The structure of the paper is as follows. In x2, I first introduce AustralianFunctionalism and its attendant account of ramsification (x2.1). Then I state

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Vol. 89, No. 2, pp. 229–249; June 2011

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

ISSN 0004-8402 print/ISSN 1471-6828 online � 2011 Australasian Association of Philosophy

http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals DOI: 10.1080/00048401003720566

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the thesis of multiple realizability (x2.2) and argue that it presents a primafacie problem for the Australian Functionalist’s account (x2.3). In x3, I firstshow how this problem can be solved by making the ramsified theoryspecies-relative (x3.1). This relativization gives rise to two objections, firststated by George Bealer. I argue that while the first of these may successfullybe answered on the Australian Functionalist’s behalf (x3.2), the secondcannot (x3.3). Finally, I show that, in the light of the second objection,American Functionalism does not fare any better, as both views alikeconstrue multiple realization in terms of multiple satisfaction of theramsified theory’s open formula (x3.4). In x4, I first argue that any attemptto overcome the problem by positing disjunctive properties violatesnaturalness requirements on properties (x4.1). I then introduce EuropeanFunctionalism with its non-standard account of ramsification according towhich multiple realization is no longer a matter of multiple satisfaction ofan open formula (x4.2). After that, I show why this view is immune to theproblem diagnosed by Bealer (x4.3). In xx5–7, I then set out to defendEuropean Functionalism against two prima facie objections which it islikely to invite. The first objection comes in two versions. Answering thefirst version (x5.1) forces me to come clean on certain epistemologicalissues (x5.2), while answering the second (x6.1) forces me to refine the viewso as to accommodate contingent natural laws (x6.2). The second objectionalso comes in two versions. While dealing with the first version isstraightforward (x7.1), the second is trickier (x7.2) but can ultimately beanswered, once it is admitted that multiple realizability is likely to imposecertain limitations on any functionalist story (x7.3). x8 concludes thediscussion.

2. Australian Functionalism and Multiple Realizability

2.1 Australian Functionalism

Let T be our folk theory about pain. T may be scientifically informed or itmay not be. In any case, T is best conceived as equivalent to a conjunctionof universally closed sentences characterizing the phenomenon, including,for example, quantified conditionals such as

If one is in pain one tends to writhe.

If one is subjected to extreme heat one tends to be in pain.

If one knows that contact with a kind of thing tends to effect that one is inpain, one tends to avoid that kind of thing.

Some of the conditionals that form part of T will connect the condition ofbeing in pain with other mental conditions. The third conditional above is acase in point. A full-blown functionalism about the mental will accordinglyconsider a larger theory also comprising sentences not about pain. But we

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here will confine attention to functionalism about pain and so treat all otherterms for mental phenomena as being already defined [Lewis 1983a: 79].Nothing essential will depend on this limitation of focus. Our considera-tions, suitably rephrased, will carry over to full-blown functionalism aboutthe mental.

Exporting the quantifiers and simplifying a little, we may for all ends andpurposes assume that T is of the form ‘8y( . . . y is in pain . . . )’. Therealization formula of T is then obtained from T in two steps. In a first step,T is reformulated in such a way that all occurrences of ‘is in pain’ areuniformly replaced by some predicate with a further argument place such as,for example, ‘has PAIN’ where ‘PAIN’ functions as a name for the property ofbeing in pain. Call the resulting regimented version of the theory ‘T(t)’,where t is the term filling the new argument place (e.g. ‘PAIN’). In a secondstep, all occurrences of t are uniformly replaced by a suitable variable. Theresulting open sentence, ‘T(x)’, is the realization formula of T or, moreaccurately, of T(t) [Lewis 1983a: 79–81]. Binding the free variable by asuitable existential quantifier then completes the process typically referred toas ‘ramsification’ (after F. P. Ramsey).

According to Australian Functionalism, made prominent by David Lewis,t denotes iff the realization formula of T is uniquely satisfied by someproperty, e.g. the physical property of having one’s C-fibres fire. Since T(t)is true only if t denotes, and T and T(t) are assumed to be equivalent, T istrue just in case its realization formula is uniquely satisfied by some suchproperty [Lewis 1983a: 84–5].

2.2 Multiple Realizability

One advantage functionalism is claimed to have over the identity theory isthat, unlike the latter, it can do justice to the idea, suggested by both a prioriintuition and empirical findings, that mental kinds such as pain are multiplyrealizable. Applied to the case of pain, the thesis of multiple realizability canbe put as follows:

(MR) There is a species S and a physical property f such that f realizes painin members of S and, possibly, there is a species S0 distinct from S and aphysical property f0 distinct from f such that f0 realizes pain in

members of S0.

Modulo the assumption that C-fibre firing does in fact realize pain inmembers of the human species, (MR) is equivalent to

(MR0) Possibly, there is a non-human species S and a physical property fdistinct from C-fibre firing such that f realizes pain in members of S.

Modulo the assumption that, were they to exist, Martians would lackC-fibres, (MR0) is implied by

(M) Possibly, some Martian is in pain.

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In fact, the philosopher’s interest in Martians goes no further than herinterest in (MR0). So, for all ends and purposes, we can here and in whatfollows treat (M) as a stand-in for the more general thesis (MR0), inasmuchas reference to Martians just is reference to one of those possible non-humanspecies of which (MR0) is supposed to hold.

2.3 Multiple Realizability and Causal Role

According to standard doctrine, for a given physical property to realize painis for it to be such as to satisfy the realization formula of T. Assume this tobe so. Then it follows that if (M) itself forms part of T and, duringramsification, the occurrence of ‘is in pain’ in its embedded clause is replacedby ‘has x’, no physical property ever realizes pain in the actual world. Forsuppose that humans tend to undergo C-fibre firing whenever subjected toextreme heat, tend to writhe whenever they undergo C-fibre firing, etc.,while if Martians were to exist they would lack C-fibres. Accordingly, therewould then be no physical property which is such that humans tend to haveit whenever subjected to extreme heat, tend to writhe whenever they have it,etc. and which is such that possibly Martians have it too. Given standarddoctrine, it would follow that C-fibre firing does not realize pain in humansafter all and that physicalism is consequently false.

Arguably, however, Australian Functionalists with physicalist leaningsare not forced to admit (M) as one of the conjuncts of T. Thus, as Lewissuggests, T merely specifies the causal role essential to being in pain, andvery plausibly (M) is not part of any such specification [cf. Lewis 1983a:124–5]. Accordingly, it would seem that the realization formula of T mayafter all be uniquely satisfied by C-fibre firing in the actual world, even ifMartians lack C-fibres.

Still, in order to account for the truth of (M), Australian Functionalistsare bound to say that there is a possible world inhabited by Martians inwhich some physical property of Martians, e.g. the property of havinginflated feet-cavities, uniquely satisfies the realization formula of T.Accordingly, t is taken to be a non-rigid designator [Lewis 1983a: 125–6].1

This line of defence is unconvincing. In order to specify the causal role ofbeing in pain, the conditionals contained in T must be in the subjunctivemood. Thus, the second conditional mentioned above should be read asbeing equivalent to ‘If one was to be subjected to extreme heat, one wouldtend to be in pain’. Since it is possible for Martians to be subjected toextreme heat without undergoing C-fibre firing, already because they are notnaturally endowed with C-fibres, it would seem that the realization formula

1If t is non-rigid, it would seem that including (M) in T does no harm after all, since the occurrence of ‘is inpain’ in its embedded clause will then no longer allow quantifying-in, even after its replacement by ‘has t’.However, there would then be an occurrence of t in the realization formula that remained unaccounted for,and there would then be no more reason to include (M) in T’s realization formula than to include ‘Thereare occasional snowfalls in Minnesota’ or ‘If lakes and rivers had been filled with XYZ, the watery stuffwould have been XYZ’. This strongly suggests that, on the Australian Functionalists’ account, (M) shouldnot be included in T.

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of T cannot even be uniquely satisfied by C-fibre firing in the actual world,never mind whether T is thought to include (M).

To this it might be replied that Martians inhabit worlds far enough fromthe actual world, so that their failure to undergo C-fibre firing whensubjected to extreme heat does not undermine the truth of the subjunctiveconditional in question. But this response should carry no weight, for tworeasons. First, the consequent of a subjunctive conditional that underwritescausal laws should hold in all nomologically possible worlds in which theantecedent holds; and who is to say that were Martians to exist, the relevantcausal laws would be different? Secondly, there are arguably non-humancreatures inhabiting the actual world that are capable of experiencing painwhile being constituted radically differently, e.g. cephalopods.2

Things do not get any better if the aforementioned subjunctiveconditional is replaced by ‘If humans were to be subjected to extreme heat,they would tend to be in pain’. For, if this subjunctive conditional is part ofT and so subject to ramsification, there will then be nothing in the Martianworld that satisfies T’s realization formula in that world, contrary to whatLewis assumes: if, in the Martian world, ‘T(x)’ is satisfied by feet-cavityinflation, if it is satisfied by anything at all, then inclusion of ‘If humans wereto be subjected to extreme heat, they would tend to have x’ will imply that‘T(x)’ is not satisfied in the Martian world. For, ex hypothesi humans do nothave any cavities in their feet to be inflated, although they may still besubjected to extreme heat.3

3. Species-Relativity and Bealer’s Challenge

3.1 Australian Functionalism Relativized

There is the option of retreat to a theory about human pain rather thanMartian pain or pain in cephalopods. Even if this line is taken, however, itwill still have to be explained what makes human pain, Martian pain andmollusc pain all cases of pain. One central motivation for functionalism wasprecisely to come up with a characterization of pain that would explain whatthese cases have in common, i.e. the causal profile of properties respectivelyinstantiated by humans, Martians and cephalopods [cf. Lewis 1983a: 123,126]. Once other species come into view, however, general worriesimmediately arise as to the universality of the causes and effects of painwhich T encodes. May not Martians be heat-resistant or rigid so that, forthem, writhing is out of the question? We will come back to these worries

2For Lewis, ‘nonrigidity might begin at home’ so that t might designate different states for differentpopulations inhabiting the same world [Lewis 1983a: 126]. But unless the range of ‘y’ in ‘8y( . . . y hast . . . )’ is restricted to members of a single population, this thought alone is of no help. See x3.1.3Considerations of the kind mentioned in the last but one footnote also apply here: if, in ‘If humans were tobe subjected to extreme heat, they would tend to have t’, the occurrence of t is ‘sealed off’ and so cannot bereplaced by a suitable variable on Mars, then this subjunctive conditional adds nothing to the specificationof the pain-role that Martian functionalists aim to give. As long as humans and Martians can agree on thatspecification, as they must in so far as the causal role of pain is supposed to be the same everywhere, thissubjunctive conditional should then likewise drop out of the specification of the pain-role that humanfunctionalists aim to give on Earth.

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later. As we shall then see, they particularly affect those versions offunctionalism that take T to be accessible a priori. For the time being, andfor argument’s sake, however, let us set these worries aside and assume thatT can be formulated at such a high level of generality that, apart from thoserelating to their internal constitution, differences between species do notmatter.

Then the suggested relativization can be made more precise as follows.4

Recall that T(t) was of the form ‘8y( . . . y has t . . . )’. Let ‘T(y,t)’ be thecorresponding open sentence and let ‘H’ denote humankind. The newregimented theory about human pain can then be identified with ‘8y(ybelongs to H ! T(y,t))’, or TH(t) for short. Note that t now takes on arather different significance: since on the Australian Functionalist’s account,TH(t) is meant to be equivalent to the claim that its realization formula,‘TH(x)’, is uniquely satisfied, and since pain is assumed to be multiplyrealizable, t will now be said to have the same extension as ‘HUMAN PAIN’.We can give a similar treatment of Martian pain and pain in cephalopods byletting TM(t0) and TC(t00) be the corresponding functionalist theories aboutthem.

Against this backdrop, it would seem that we can nonetheless say whathumans, Martians and cephalopods have in common when they are inhuman pain, Martian pain and mollusc pain respectively: each belongs to aspecies S and instantiates a property f such that, for any member y of S, yhas f just in case y has the property that uniquely satisfies ‘TS(y,x)’. In otherwords, each of the creatures satisfies ‘9!S9!f(y belongs to S & y has f &TS(f))’. Since the latter is meant to be what humans, Martians andcephalopods are said to have in common when in human pain, Martian painand mollusc pain respectively, this open sentence should accordingly beunderstood to denote the condition of being in pain.

3.2 The Overkill Objection

But now note that if what a given human and a given cephalopod have incommon when they are in human pain and mollusc pain respectively is thehigher-order property denoted by the open sentence ‘9!S9!f(y belongs to S& y has f & TS(f))’, then this property should be what ‘PAIN’ denotes so thatit would then be perfectly legitimate to replace the original T by‘8y( . . . 9!S9!f(y belongs to S & y has f & TS(f)) . . . )’. But whatever‘PAIN’ denotes, what it denotes also satisfies ‘TH(f)’, where ‘H’ denoteshumankind. Yet, if the property of having one’s C-fibres fire also satisfies‘TH(f)’, as it ex hypothesi does, then there evidently is no unique property fsuch that the human in question has f & TH(f). Since the point generalizesin obvious ways, the open sentence ‘9!S9!f(y belongs to S & y has f &TS(f))’ fails to denote any property. But then given that this open sentencedenotes whatever ‘PAIN’ denotes, no one of us ever has the property of being

4What follows is at least one way to flesh out Lewis’s talk of a state occupying the causal role of pain for agiven population [Lewis 1983a: 126].

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in pain because there is no such property. Martians and cephalopods can beshown to lead painless lives along similar lines. In its essentials, thisobjection is due to George Bealer [1997]. Let us call it the overkill objection.

Does the overkill objection refute Australian Functionalism? No. For, onthe one hand, Australian Functionalists may have sound independentreason to deny admission of any such higher-order property into theirontology. On the other hand, they may explicitly restrict their uniquenessrequirement on the satisfaction of species-relative realization formulas tofamiliar first-order properties.

3.3 The Generality Objection

However, the trouble does not end here. For, if T is a theory about pain ingeneral, then this generality will be inherited by ‘T(y,x)’, never mind to whatextent we restrict the domain over which the subject variable ‘y’ ranges. AsBealer has forcefully argued, sentences such as ‘If one is in pain one tends tobe self-consciously aware that one is in pain’, ‘If one is self-consciouslyaware that one is in pain one tends to be in pain’, or variants thereof, arelikely to form part of T, with the effect that the corresponding opensentences form part of ‘T(y,x)’. Yet, if humans have such occurrent beliefsabout pain they have beliefs re a condition that Martians and cephalopodscould also satisfy, even if the only way for humans to be in pain is for themto have their C-fibres fire [Bealer 1997]. For instance, assume that a givenhuman subject is in pain and, on that basis, comes to believe that she is. Ifshe also believes in (MR), then it will be perfectly rational for her toconclude that were a Martian visitor to be in pain, she would not be the onlyone around here being in pain, and that, for all she knows, she and somecephalopod are both in pain so that at least two creatures of distinct speciesare. However, if her first-person beliefs are construed as beliefs exclusivelyabout human pain, as they will have to be on the modified Australianaccount, the subject must be accused of equivocating and her inferencesmust thence be deemed fallacious. A theory that thus invalidates the mostinnocuous of inferences based on acceptance of (MR) seems no better offthan a theory that rejects (MR) right from the start [Bealer 1997: 77n.;Bealer 2000]. Call this objection of Bealer’s the generality objection.5

3.4 All Quiet on the Pacific’s Eastern Shore

Even if its proponents might find a way to fend off the overkill objection,Australian Functionalism lacks the resources to answer the generalityobjection. Does American Functionalism fare any better? According to

5As I understand it, Bealer’s objection against functionalism is not that the relevant states of self-consciousawareness, or beliefs, create intensional contexts that resist quantifying-in, but rather that the predicativecomponent of their de re contents has a more inclusive extension than any predicate denoting one of therealizers of pain. Otherwise, his remark, that one way out of the impasse is to accept the identity theory,would hardly be intelligible [Bealer 1997: 80; 2000]. See x4.3 for my take on what Bealer perceives hisobjection to establish.

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American Functionalism, to be in pain is to have some physical propertysatisfying the realization formula of our folk theory about pain, while thereneed be no unique such property in order for that theory to be true.6

Evidently, this relaxation of constraints is no help at all in face of Bealer’sgenerality objection: even if neither (M) nor any corresponding claim aboutcephalopods forms part of that theory, no specific physical pain-realizersuch as C-fibre firing can be taken to be what the relevant states of self-conscious awareness are about.

Australian Functionalists and American Functionalists alike acceptstandard doctrine and thus hope to account for (MR) in terms of themultiple satisfiability of the realization formula of our folk theory aboutpain, i.e. the formula obtained by the two-stage process described in x2.1.The only difference is that Australian Functionalists try to restoreuniqueness by relativizing, in one way or other, satisfaction of that formulato individual species or populations, while American Functionalists forgoany such attempt. In the light of Bealer’s generality objection, neither formof functionalism would seem appropriate, because no specific physical pain-realizer would seem apt to satisfy the realization formula of our folk theoryabout pain. Only properties that share their extension with the property ofbeing in pain (if any) are sufficiently general to do so, yet the latter cannotthen be defined as the higher-order property of having some specific physicalproperty that satisfies that formula.

4. European Functionalism

4.1 Disjunctive Properties, Anyone?

A tempting response to this family of problems is to allow quantificationover disjunctive physical properties. There is nothing per se wrong withcountenancing disjunctive properties in one’s physicalist ontology. Thus it isa physicalistically sound strategy to quantify over determinable propertieslike having mass, while, arguably, such determinable properties aredisjunctive in kind. However, in the present case there would not even bea single dimension, save at most a purely mentalistic one, of which C-fibrefiring and feet-cavity inflation could be seen as determinations. Ontologicalcommitment to properties such as having one’s C-fibres fire or one’s feet-cavities be inflated is commitment to the existence of highly non-naturalproperties, in Lewis’s sense of ‘natural’ [Lewis 1983b],—unless, that is, oneregards the individual disjuncts’ being determinations of pain as one of their

6I take American Functionalism to be the view others call ‘role functionalism’. Role functionalism issometimes rather misleadingly glossed as identifying pain with a certain causal role (as opposed to whatfills that role). The only sense I can attach to the idea that ‘pain is a causal role’ is one in which someonewho is in pain has some property that fills that role and hence one in which attributions of pain areattributions of the higher-order property of having some property that fills that role. This is preciselywhat American Functionalism contends. Australian Functionalism can correspondingly be identifiedwith the view which goes by the name ‘specifier functionalism’ and according to which pain is what fillsthe pain-role. On either view, the pain-role is supposed to be specified by the realization formula of ourfolk theory about pain, obtained by replacing occurrences of ‘PAIN’ by a suitable variable in the waydescribed in x2.1.

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irreducible higher-order properties. However, the latter is clearly at oddswith physicalist thinking.7

4.2 Reconceiving the Realization Formula

Whither now? Recall that formulation of the realization formula of Tproceeded in two steps, a regimentation of T that makes T amenable toquantification into what, on the surface, seems like predicate position, andthe subsequent replacement of occurrences of t by a suitable variable. I nowsuggest that, in the light of (MR), we should conceive of the first step in away that crucially differs from the way in which Lewis conceives of it.

Lewis replaces ‘is in pain’ by ‘has PAIN’, where ‘PAIN’ is the relevant t thento be replaced by a suitable variable in the second step. Instead, I claim, weshould proceed as follows. First, we uniformly replace all occurrences of ‘isin pain’ in T in accordance with the following equivalence:

— is in pain : 9x( — has x & x is one of the pain-realizers),

where ‘the pain-realizers’ denotes a collection and now functions as our t.We thus obtain the regimented version of T, i.e. T(t). In order to obtain therealization formula of T, we then uniformly replace all occurrences of t inT(t) by a variable of the kind familiar from plural quantification. To saythat the realization formula of T is satisfied is to say that there is a collectionof properties that renders ‘9XT(X)’ true. As physicalists, we are free toconceive of any such collection as a collection of nothing but physicalproperties. Since plural quantification is designed to avoid ontologicalcommitment to anything over and above the things belonging to thecollections one quantifies over, physicalists who accept ‘9XT(X)’ need not

7A defender of the disjunctive property response to multiple realizability, Lenny Clapp [2001], concedes thatin order for there to be a property denoted by a disjunctive predicate, any two objects, each of whichsatisfies one of the individual disjuncts to the exclusion of any other, must have something in common. Heargues that in the case that presently interests us, objects that satisfy ‘x has its C-fibres fire _ x has its feet-cavities inflated _ . . . ’ by satisfying one of the disjuncts indeed have something in common, viz. theproperty M, where M is the property supposedly denoted by ‘PAIN’ [Clapp 2001: 126]. But on the viewunder discussion, M just is the disjunctive property (if any) denoted by ‘x has its C-fibres fire _ x has itsfeet-cavities inflated _ . . . ’; and in order to allay worries about the legitimacy of admitting disjunctiveproperties, it is no good saying that what objects satisfying such a disjunctive predicate have in common(indeed, what physical feature they have in common) is the disjunctive property denoted by that predicate!Admittedly, Clapp has more to say about what the alleged disjunctive property M is. Thus, later on in thepaper, Clapp suggests conceiving of properties as sets of causal powers and then invokes the followingprinciple:

Predicate P designates a property P if and only if there is some nonempty set of causal powers p suchthat (a) if a particular o satisfies P then o possesses every power in p, and the converse (b) if aparticular o possesses every power in p, then o satisfies P.

[Clapp 2001: 127]

But adoption of this principle would commit us to a panoply of conjunctive properties designated bypredicates such as ‘x is smooth & x is heavy’, ‘x is oblong & x is black’, or their conjunctions; and while itmay be uncontroversial that there are sets of causal powers corresponding to such predicates, it seems hardto believe that in virtue of being a heavy oblong object with a smooth black surface, a particular has notonly four, but fifteen, distinct properties. On such a deflated notion of property, there would, ratherevidently, be no reason whatever to have qualms about admission of disjunctive properties. But then, thismerely suggests that the worries extend to Clapp’s conception of properties.

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thereby countenance any non-natural or higher-level properties [Boolos1984: 448–9].8

Against the backdrop of this plural conception, we can now reaffirm thecentral tenets of Australian Functionalism, suitably rephrased:

(I) 9Y8X(T(X) : Y¼X) [ T(t)

(II) *9XT(X) [ *9Y(Y¼ t)

(III) 9XT(X) & *9Y8X(T(X) : Y¼X) [ *9X(X¼ t)

where 8X8Y(X¼Y : 8z(Xz : Yz)). (I) says that if the realization formulaof T is uniquely satisfied, it is satisfied by the pain-realizers; (II) says that ifthe realization formula of T is not satisfied at all, there are no pain-realizers;and (III) says that if the realization formula of T is multiply satisfied, thereare, again, no pain-realizers [cf. Lewis 1983a: 85]. We now define the pain-realizers as the unique collection X such that T(X).

4.3 Bealer’s Challenge Answered

Note that (III) is perfectly consistent with the multiple realizability of pain,and so with (M), (MR0) and (MR) which now may even form part of T,since the unique collection of physical properties satisfying the realizationformula of T may comprise more than one natural physical property.

Similarly, we can now successfully answer Bealer’s generality objection.To recall, the problem diagnosed by Bealer was this: T essentially containssentences about first-person pain-beliefs and the circumstances under whichthey are held. The contents of these beliefs are general (and not species-specific) in the sense that they concern a condition that may be met bymembers of different species. This condition is expressed by the phrase ‘is inpain’. If we ‘ramsify’ into these belief contexts, as we must do if we wish togive a complete account of the functional role of pain, then accordingly nospecies-specific realizers can serve as suitable values of the realizationformula’s free variable. But that they can do so is precisely what bothAustralian Functionalists and American Functionalists alike assume whenthey conceive of (multiple) realization in terms of (multiple) satisfaction ofthe realization formula and thence take that formula’s free variable to rangeover individual properties. By contrast, if in regimenting T, we replace ‘is inpain’ by ‘has one of t’ (rather than ‘has t’) and thus arrive at a realizationformula whose free variable is plural, then the satisfier of that formula willbe a collection. Consequently, (multiple) realization can no longer beconceived in terms of (multiple) satisfaction of that formula. Now, to believeof a collection of properties that one has one of them is evidently to hold a

8To this end, at least, physicalists do not need to countenance sets of properties either, which may be a goodthing. Still, as far as Bealer’s generality objection goes, our present purposes may be served equally well byreplacing ‘is in pain’ in T by ‘has a member of t’, where t now denotes the set of pain-realizing properties.See the discussion of Bealer’s objection about to follow.

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more general belief than one does when one believes, of one of the propertiesin that collection, that one has it. It is to hold the belief that one meets acondition which, in the light of (MR), differently constituted creatures canalso meet. Accordingly, Bealer’s generality objection has been met head-on.

According to Bealer, lest it gives way to the identity theory, functionalismcannot but treat being in pain as the higher-order property of having somefirst-order property satisfying the realization formula of T. He then arguesthat since the aforementioned beliefs are about pain, the process by whichthe realization formula of T is obtained must after all recognize being in painas a first-order property, while disqualifying any property distinct frompain, e.g. C-fibre firing, as a candidate for satisfying that realization formula[Bealer 1997: 73–80].

The view here proposed still may (but need not) countenance pain as aproperty and consequently identify it with the higher-order property ofhaving one of the pain-realizers. But even if it does so, the view woulddisprove Bealer’s assumption and invalidate the inference he draws. Thehigher-order property of having one of the pain-realizers is not the propertyof having some first-order property that satisfies T’s realization formula;and while in some sense of ‘about’, the aforementioned beliefs are about thehigher-order property of having one of the pain-realizers, this property is nocandidate at all for what satisfies the realization formula of T. The reason isthe same in both cases: the free variable ‘X’ of T’s realization formula occurswithin contexts of the form ‘9x( — has x & Xx)’ and ranges over collectionsof first-order properties.

Let us term the resulting view European Functionalism, or EF for short.EF shares with Australian Functionalism its commitment to a uniquenessconstraint on satisfaction of the relevant realization formula, and it shareswith American Functionalism its ambition to account for species-unspecificpain while doing justice to (MR). Yet, unlike either of these establishedviews, EF is free of the misguided idea that the multiple realizability of painconsists in the multiple satisfiability of some realization formula.

In the remainder, I address two objections that may be levelled against thesuggested reconciliation of functionalism with (MR) which EF hopes toprovide: the objection from crossworld chauvinism and the objection fromunwanted realizers. Since the first of these objections forces the proponent ofEF to come clean on certain vital epistemological issues and also calls for animportant modification of the European Functionalist’s story itself, itsdiscussion will take considerably more space than discussion of the secondobjection.

5. Crossworld Chauvinism (Part One)

5.1 The Case of D-Fibres

The objection from crossworld chauvinism accuses EF of unduly ruling outgenuine possibilities. It can be put as follows: ‘Ex hypothesi to be in pain isto have one of the physical properties that realize pain, P1, . . . Pn. But it is

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surely possible that some a instantiates Pj, with 1� j� n, although Pj doesnot realize pain in a but only in members of other species. In particular, it ispossible that some a instantiates Pj without this making a inclined to writhe,although Pj does have that effect on members of other species. EF rules outsuch genuine possibilities, since in virtue of possessing Pj, a would have tocount as being in pain, while T implies that a cannot be in pain without thismaking a inclined to writhe.’

To address this objection,9 we can distinguish two kinds of cases,respectively exemplified by the following examples which will be discussed inturn:

(a) D-fibre firing does not realize pain in humans but does so in some

possible lifeforms.

(b) Some possible lifeforms undergo C-fibre firing, and yet C-fibre firing does

not realize pain in them.10

Consider (a). Even if it is being admitted that pain is multiply realizable, thisis not yet to admit any old physical property as a possible realizer of pain.Physical properties differ according to their causal profiles. Ex hypothesi, Tspecifies the causal role of being in pain. T is designed to leave room forthere being different pain-realizing properties in that its specification of therelevant causal role is not as fine-grained and parochial as it would have tobe in order to rule out (MR). Even so, this specification will exclude manyphysical properties from the range of pain-realizers because not all physicalproperties share the causal profile it specifies.

All this is clear with respect to, say, increased grease production inhair follicles. But the example of D-fibre firing was chosen precisely becauseC-fibre firing and D-fibre firing are, in some broad sense, of the same kind.Both C-fibres and D-fibres are part of the brain’s neural network; hairfollicles obviously are not. So can D-fibre firing really be excluded as apotential pain-realizer on the same grounds? To undergo C-fibre firing, orD-fibre-firing, is to be in a neurophysiological state of some kind. Excitationof fibres in a petri dish, if feasible at all, will not yet make for firing of theappropriate kind. This is not to deny that C- or D-fibre firing is, broadlyspeaking, physical. It merely highlights that either is, at bottom, relational.Thus, the respective fibres must be hard-wired in a certain way, e.g. in orderto ensure that they are polymodal, must conduce electric impulses at acertain velocity, etc. In order to discharge their neurophysiological function,these fibres must have certain intrinsic physical characteristics that supportthe causal profile that goes with that neurophysiological function. Either C-and D-fibres differ in their respective intrinsic physical characteristics orthey do not. If C-fibres and D-fibres differ in their relevant intrinsic physical

9It should be clear that the species-relative versions of Australian Functionalism described in x3.1 are notbeset by this type of problem, since the range of subjects they concern is restricted to members of a singlespecies.

10In either case, what is at issue is what happens to the representative majority of the relevant population.Thus, for the purposes of the objection, mad monsters should be ignored.

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characteristics, e.g. those responsible for their conductivity, it would bemiraculous that either can discharge the same neurophysiological functionafter mere neural rewiring. If, on the other hand, they do not differ in theirrelevant intrinsic physical characteristics but only in their location within theneural network, then, after appropriate rewiring, the firing of D-fibreswould be a case of C-fibre firing. Either way, there is no evident reason toinclude D-fibre firing in the collection of pain-realizers.

True, which causal profile a given physical property has crucially dependson the prevailing natural laws, while these laws may, for all we know, differfrom world to world. Yet, even if natural laws are not metaphysicallynecessary, which after all they may well be [Shoemaker 2003; Bird 2005],there is no reason to believe that if any number of them was different, silicondecay or certain movements of the people of China could suddenlydischarge the causal role of being in pain. More importantly, there is noreason whatsoever to believe that any of the properties which, say, humanscan de facto instantiate, and that are no pain-realizers for them, arenonetheless properties that, in some worlds in which the natural laws aredifferent, are pain-realizers for other, merely possible creatures.

In other words, a rather complicated pattern of inflation of intricatelyconnected feet-cavities may be what realizes pain in Martian organisms, but nometaphysical fantasy need convince us that D-fibre firing or an overproductionof grease in hair follicles, from which humans may in fact suffer, could realizepain for some merely possible creatures. This may not be ruled out byarmchair reflection, but then so be it. What is possible need not benomologically possible, but it surely must be possibly nomologically possible,and we are unlikely to have any a priori insight into the scope of the latter. Inparticular, we do not know a priori whether laws that enable the evolutionof D-fibres are laws that likewise enable the evolution of creatures in whichD-fibre firing has the characteristic causes and effects C-fibre firing has inhumans. Leaving room for multiple realizability cannot mean, as case (a)suggests it does, opening the floodgates to rampant speculation.

5.2 An Epistemology for European Functionalists

In the light of such scepticism, one might start to wonder, though, on whatgrounds (M) was ever thought to state a genuine possibility to be reckonedwith. Thus, for those who take modal claims such as (M) and (a) to be basedon a priori intuitions, if on anything at all, there would seem to be no groundfor discounting (a) that would not, at the same time, undermine confidencein (M). Thus, if (M) is taken to state a genuine possibility just because this iswhat we intuit our concept of pain to leave room for, there would as yet beno sound reason for scepticism about (a). As far as our a priori intuitions go,(a) can claim equal right to be something for which our concept of painleaves room.

The European Functionalist would thus seem forced to deny that belief in(M) is solely based on a priori intuitions. But then, on what more may it bebased? As indicated in x2.2, (M) is just a stand-in for the more general thesis

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(MR0) and so, modulo certain uncontroversial assumptions, ultimately for(MR). Since EF considers (MR) as part of T, this raises the broaderquestion of what, on this view, it takes to be part of T.

To begin with, note that EF is compatible with the idea that we have apriori knowledge of certain central planks of T and that we have thisknowledge already in virtue of being competent users of the concept of pain.So a priori intuitions about conceptual possibilities may well be taken to playan important role on this view. However, as I now suggest, EuropeanFunctionalists had better claim this a priori knowledge to be both world- andspecies-bound and argue that, in the light of (MR), T will also contain claimsconcerning other species and worlds that can only be arrived at a posteriori.

The key thought here is that the pain-related beliefs we must hold in orderto qualify as competent users of the concept of pain are principally beliefsabout circumstances in which, given the natural laws and other environ-mental conditions that actually prevail, members of our species are in pain.After all, those are the environmental conditions under which we acquire theconcept, and the counterfactual scenarios we chiefly care about are ones inwhich we might easily find ourselves. That our a priori pain-related beliefsare principally about us shows in our frequent indecision as to whether, andif so when, it is correct to apply the concept of pain to members of otherspecies. Thus our anthropocentric a priori knowledge does not straightfor-wardly extend to cases that involve multiple realization, and knowledgeabout the latter must therefore have another source.

Given a suitable externalism about the identity of concepts, the idea thatwe gradually uncover the nature of pain as a multiply realizable kind bylearning more about other species, and by extrapolating to more remotecounterfactual scenarios, need raise no issues of systematic ambiguity, illicitanthropomorphism or the like. Such a posteriori insights might stilllegitimately be regarded as bearing on what our concept of pain does, ordoes not, leave room for.11

We do not, qua competent users of the concept of pain, have any a priorigrasp of the more specific causal antecedents and consequences pain wouldhave, were it to be realized in members of other species or in far-off worlds,nor thence of the properties, if any, that would realize pain in those cases.Such knowledge will rather have to draw on results furnished by empiricalscience. Thus, once we have identified C-fibre firing as the property thatrealizes pain in us, thereby deploying our anthropocentric a prioriknowledge about the causes and effects pain typically has in us, we mayconsequently learn that C-fibre firing has a certain survival value formembers of our species, that given the physical make-up of cephalopods,activation of rather different nociceptors have that value for them, and thatactivation of those nociceptors is triggered by specific impacts on molluscorganisms and gives rise to specific types of mollusc behaviour. Similarly,once we know the survival value that C-fibre firing has for us in our worldand have studied the mechanics of evolution, we may conceive non-actualbiological designs evolved in non-actual environments and properties whose

11That conceptual knowledge need not be a priori is argued by Yablo [2002].

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instantiations would have that same survival value for creatures of thosedesigns in those environments. General considerations concerning therelation between mental kinds and survival value, furnished by evolutionarypsychology, as well as other theory-assisted hypotheses about the inner livesof advanced organisms, may then lead us to endorse (M) and (MR) asstatements of genuine possibilities, thereby redeeming what our less thanknowledgeable intuitions might already suggest. The same set of empiricalconsiderations may also help us to abstract away from the idiosyncrasies ofour species and to arrive at a more general characterization of the causalrole of pain, applicable across species.

Thus far, our hypothetical and counterfactual reasoning need not concernscenarios in which the natural laws differ from the ones that actually prevail,the less so since it is likely to be guided by our knowledge of the latter.Changes in one natural law, if metaphysically possible at all, would requirechanges in others. So, the question of what would follow, rather than whatmight fail to follow, if a given natural law were to slightly differ is anintricate one, and its answer, if scrutable at all, would have to draw on aconsiderable amount of scientific knowledge.

In neither of the cases considered will a priori intuitions concerning claimsabout other species and worlds be deemed sufficient for the latter’s inclusionin T; and while we have some empirical basis for including (M), we have nocorresponding empirical basis for including (a). For, unlike (M), (a)envisages a scenario in which a property that has actually evolved toperform a certain function (viz. D-fibre firing) has evolved to perform acertain distinct function (viz. the one C-fibre firing actually performs).Neither empirical findings about other species in the actual world nornomologically conservative extrapolations to merely hypothetical beings intheir counterfactual habitats lend any support to the idea that this scenariopresents a genuine possibility.

Admittedly, this is themerest sketch of the type of empiricist epistemologyEFfavours. Moreover, nothing of the foregoing shows that the scenario envisagedby (a) is metaphysically impossible. But this at most makes EF a controversialthesis, not a false one. What has been shown is that, given EF’s favouredepistemology, (M) can reasonably be considered as in good standing, whilenothing comparable can be said about (a). So, unless this epistemology canindependently be faulted, the burden is on the objector to show that the scenarioenvisaged by (a) is a genuine possibility to be reckoned with.

6. Crossworld Chauvinism (Part Two)

6.1 Normal Pain in a Mad World

So far we have merely answered that version of the objection fromcrossworld chauvinism which proceeded from the assumption of

(a) D-fibre firing does not realize pain in humans but does so in somepossible lifeforms.

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We next must address the other version proceeding from the assumption of

(b) Some possible lifeforms undergo C-fibre firing, and yet C-fibre firing doesnot realize pain in them,

which calls for a rather different line of response. It was granted thatwhether C-fibre firing discharges its familiar causal role depends on theprevailing natural laws. Alter the laws and C-fibre firing may no longermake anyone writhe.12 Whether C-fibre firing discharges its familiar causalrole also depends on other factors such as a subject’s ‘circuit diagram’, asLewis’s madman illustrates [Lewis 1983a: 122, 127]. Lewis is able to accountfor the madman’s pain by making him the exception from the norm set byhumankind at large. EF cannot account for the possible lifeforms postulatedby (b) in just that way. The problem is not merely that it does not makesense to compare the size of populations of possibilia in order to determinewho are the normal guys and who are the exceptions. The problem is thatthere is no clear sense in which our laws could set the standards of normalityfor what goes on in other worlds. Fortunately, however, there is anotherway.

First recall that to have one’s C-fibres fire is to be in a neurophysiologicalstate. No one can be in such a neurophysiological state unless their ‘circuitdiagram’ has certain specific features in common with that of anyone beingin that state. If having one’s C-fibres fire is a way of being in pain, thenanyone in that same state should also be in pain, never mind whether theyconsequently writhe. At least for those with C-fibres, the brain is the musclethat matters. Thus, we do not hesitate to ascribe pain to someone whose C-fibres fire, yet who cannot writhe because they are quadriplegic. Why shouldwe then hesitate to ascribe pain to someone whose C-fibres fire, yet whocannot writhe because the causal laws do not permit them to?13 Theobjection assumes that the possible lifeforms that undergo C-fibre firingwithout any tendency to writhe are not in pain. This is nothing theproponent of EF should concede. The discussion of case (a) in x5 made plainthat refusal to make this concession will not in turn force the proponent ofEF to admit that those of us who suffer from D-fibre firing, or increasedgrease production in hair follicles, are in pain.

Second, if there are worlds in which the natural laws are such that havingone’s C-fibres fire is caused by the characteristic pain-inflicting conditions,and causes the characteristic kind of pain behaviour, then this should beenough to show that having one’s C-fibres fire is a way of being in pain. Thefunctional specification of pain, as given by T, allows us to identify theproperties that realize pain in worlds in which the prevailing natural laws

12Some deep-sea creatures disintegrate when getting nearer the water surface because of a decrease in thepressure that holds them together. Who knows whether a change in natural laws that would disable some ofthe effects of C-fibre firing, would not have a similarly destructive effect on the brains in which such firingwould have to be said to occur? For the sake of argument, I will not pursue this line of thought. Suffice it topoint out that considerations of the kind driving the present objection are highly speculative.

13Note, though, that it is anyway an unargued-for assumption of the objection that if the laws had alwaysbeen different so as to prevent the characteristic causes and effects of C-fibre firing from occurring, C-fibreswould nonetheless have evolved and function neurophysiologically the way they actually do.

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cooperate. This identification can succeed even if the properties identified donot permit such an identification where and when the prevailing natural lawsdo not thus cooperate.14 Anyone who has one of the pain-realizers soidentified but would not writhe even if the natural laws did cooperate willcount as mad, no matter how the world they inhabit happens to benomologically speaking. But even so, nomological differences do not makefor madness.

6.2 Catering for Contingent Laws

T was meant to be a general theory about being in pain and not just a theoryabout being in pain where and when the laws cooperate, even if it was onlymeant to apply to the normal folk. It follows that, unless the laws aredeemed necessary, we must reformulate T in such a way as to make itspredictions conditional on whether the laws do co-operate. The idea must,roughly, be this: if someone normal has one of the pain-realizers, then ifcertain laws prevail, he will have the tendency to writhe; and if someonenormal is subjected to extreme heat, then if certain laws prevail, he will havethe tendency to be in pain. Which laws are relevant inter alia depends onwhat the pain-realizers are and cannot, therefore, be determined indepen-dently from T itself.

We are familiar with the notion of a world proposition, i.e. a maximal,complete world description. Call that part of such a world proposition thatmentions all and only the natural laws holding in the world it describes abody of law. Different world propositions may share the same body of law.Now let l denote a collection of sets of bodies of law, which sets we may callthe enablers, and let d(t, l) be a function that takes us from each of the pain-realizers to one of the enablers. Say that a set belonging to the collectiondenoted by l prevails just in case one of the bodies of law in that set is true.

We now systematically reformulate the open conditionals of ‘T(y,t)’ ineither of the following two ways, depending on whether the predication of‘9x(y has x & x is one of the t)’ occurs in their antecedent or in theirconsequent. Thus any open conditional of the form ‘9x(y has x & x is one ofthe t)! F(y)’, where F specifies some familiar consequence of being in pain,will be replaced by an open conditional of the form

9x(y has x & x is one of the t) ! 8z((z is one of the t & y has z & d(t, l)(z)prevails) ! F(y)).

By contrast, any open conditional of the form ‘F(y)! 9x(y has x & x is oneof the t)’, where F specifies some familiar pain-inflicting condition, will bereplaced by an open conditional of the form:

F(y)! 9w(w is one of the l & (w prevails! (9x(y has x & x is one of the t) &8z(z is one of the t & y has z ! d(t, l)(z) prevails)))).

14See previous footnote.

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The universal closure of the conjunction of all these conditionals is our newregimented theory, T(t,l). We obtain the corresponding realization formulaof this new regimented theory in the familiar way by uniformly replacing alloccurrences of t and l by plural variables ‘X’ and ‘Y’ respectively. We maythen impose the same kind of uniqueness constraints on satisfaction ofT(X,Y) which were already imposed on the original theory’s realizationformula in x4.2. Since not all combinations of laws make for bodies of law,and since bodies of law do not allow any old property to discharge thecharacteristic pain role and, conversely, certain properties require certainbodies of law in order to be instantiated and to function in the way thetheory demands, the hope is that the theory will have enough critical mass torender those uniqueness constraints justified.15

Needless to say, modification of T along these lines will be uncalled-forshould it turn out that the natural laws are metaphysically necessary. In anycase, the modified theory can no longer be accused of ruling out genuinepossibilities, without any questions being begged. I conclude that, once thesuggested theoretical modifications have been made, the objection fromcrossworld chauvinism poses no serious threat to EF.

7. Unwanted Realizers

7.1 Necessarily Uninstantiated Properties

Let us next turn to the objection from unwanted realizers. This objectioncomes in two versions. The first version can be put thus: ‘Assume that it ismetaphysically impossible for anything to have human wings. Theregimented theory T(t), in which t designates the collection of pain-realizers, specifies sufficient conditions for being in pain and necessaryconditions for being in pain. Now consider the collection designated by t*which consists of the properties in the collection designated by t as well asthe property of having one’s human wings flap. Then given that the latterproperty goes necessarily uninstantiated, it is necessary that a subject hasone of the properties in the collection designated by t iff it has one of theproperties in the collection designated by t*. But then given that t is definedto designate the unique collection X such that T(X), it follows that thecollection designated by t¼ the collection designated by t*. So the propertyof having one’s human wings flap turns out to be one of the pain-realizers,which is absurd.’

This objection can be forestalled by demanding that each property in thecollection of pain-realizers can be instantiated by some member in thedomain of subjects T quantifies over. Since we already had to modify T

15Note that the modified T will acquire even more critical mass if the conditionals it contains respect species-specific differences, i.e. if T can be seen as modifying an original theory that contains conditionals such as‘If humans are in pain, they tend to groan’, ‘If Martians have their feet tickled, they tend to be in pain’, etc.This will make formulation of T hard to come by on purely a priori grounds. But as argued in x5.2, thisneed be no reason for concern. Since the enablers must enable whole mental lives, and not just pain, criticalmass will be further increased once T is incorporated into the larger to-be-ramsified theory which full-blown functionalism is after.

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quite considerably in response to the objection from crossworld chauvinism,this further wrinkle should give no reason for concern.

7.2 Truncated Causal Profiles

The second version of the objection from unwanted realizers is prima faciemore forceful and can be put as follows: ‘Consider the collection designatedby t** that consists of all the properties in the collection designated by t aswell as a property P with the following features: there is a possible species,capable of being in pain, such that all members of that species show thecharacteristic pain-behaviour whenever they instantiate P but do notinstantiate P whenever subjected to the characteristic pain-inducing stimuli;and no members of other species ever instantiate P. Since the envisagedcreatures have one of the pain-realizers, say Q, whenever they are thusstimulated, and show the characteristic responses whenever they instantiateP or instantiate Q, nothing seems to prevent EF’s equation of the collectiondesignated by t** with the collection designated by t. But since ex hypothesiinstantiation of P only displays part of the causal pattern characteristic ofpain, we must conclude that EF gets matters wrong.’

To illustrate this abstract structure, assume a possible kind of organismthat has its C-fibres fire when subjected to extreme heat or any otherfamiliar pain-inducing stimuli, and that writhes and shows all sorts ofother familiar pain behaviour when its C-fibres fire, yet which also showsthis pain behaviour when its thyroid gland produces certain hormones, buton no condition has its thyroid gland produce these hormones whensubjected to heat or any other kind of familiar pain-inducing stimuli.Instead assume, for dramatic purposes only, that this kind of organismwill have its thyroid gland produce those hormones, and will consequentlywrithe and show all sorts of familiar pain behaviour, whenever it looks ata starry night sky. According to EF, having one’s thyroid gland producethose hormones would seem to qualify as a pain-realizer, even ifinstantiation of that property discharges only part of the causal rolecharacteristic of pain.

7.3 Output Beats Input

Despite its speculative overtones, the objection points to an important issue,viz. whether more pride of place should be given to reactions to pain than tocauses of pain when it comes to the task of identifying pain across species.As already suggested in x5, which conditions inflict pain is likely to differfrom species to species. These differences should accordingly enter into acomplete specification of the causal role of pain. In so far as T aims at such acomplete specification, it will be hard to formulate and far from anythingordinary folk may already know on the basis of their understanding of ‘is inpain’. Of course, even the specific reactions to pain are likely to vary fromspecies to species. But necessary conditions are easier to come by than

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sufficient conditions: one can be less specific on the former than on the latterand still say something true.

In the light of Bealer’s generality objection, the motivation for EF wouldremain intact even if T no longer contained any conditionals of the typeexemplified by ‘If one is subjected to extreme heat, one tends to be in pain’that were discussed in x2. Subject to their reformulation along the linessuggested in x6.2, conditionals such as ‘If one is in pain, one tends to be self-consciously aware that one is in pain’ would still be included in T and pose aproblem for Australian and American Functionalism alike. Moreover, Tmay still contain conditionals of the form ‘If humans are subjected toextreme heat, they tend to be in pain’, ‘If Martians have their feet tickled,they tend to be in pain’, etc. Recall that, on the more familiar versions offunctionalism, this type of conditionals could be accounted for only byrestricting the theory (see x3.1). EF has no need for any such restriction. Theonly possible reason I can see for not including conditionals of such a type isthe claim that the proper formulation of T must be available a priori. Yet, asargued in x5.2, this claim is highly controversial and anyway forms no partof EF.

Thus, maybe the best response to the second version of the objection fromunwanted realizers is to say that it fails to mention any clearly unwantedrealizers since, for all we can tell, the envisaged organisms, if possible at all,do experience pain when they look at a starry night sky because doing somakes them instantiate a property whose instantiation makes them writhe,avoid glances at starry night skies, etc. According to this suggestion, thecontravening idea—that the envisaged organisms do not experience painwhen looking at a starry night sky—could be substantiated only if, underthe same natural laws, some normal creature could have its thyroid glandproduce hormones of the relevant kind without thereby being caused towrithe or show any other sort of pain behaviour. But in order for theobjection to work, production of the relevant hormones must be specific toorganisms that normally do display the behaviour in question. Otherwise,EF could exclude thyroid hormone production from the collection of pain-realizers already because normal organisms which suffer from it may notwrithe, even if the natural laws stay the same.

The response is not ad hoc. After all, why should Martians ever besensitive to extreme heat? Maybe the cavities in their feet do not inflate whenthey are subjected to fire but rather when their feet are tickled. Lewisintended to separate Martian pain from the madman’s pain by making theformer a matter of actual causal role being realized by something else in apossible mind, while making the latter a matter of actual realizer gonecausally haywire in an actual mind [Lewis 1983a]. But if Martian pain isfeet-cavity inflation, then Martian pain may well not be caused by heat,irrespective of which bodies of natural laws prevail, while there is not theslightest sign of Martian madness in that.

The second version of the objection from unwanted realizers thus fails toshow that EF is beset by any problems which its Australian and Americancousins did not already face. What it does show is that T must either be lessspecific than originally thought or await its proper formulation until all

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possible properties capable of causing pain behaviour have been identified.It is hard to see how the latter can be achieved from the armchair. But then,as was argued in x5.2, unlike other forms of functionalism EF is not weddedto the idea that a full specification of the causal role of pain can be arrived atby a priori means.

8. Conclusion

Nothing has here been said about whether one should or should not be afunctionalist. But, I believe, enough has been said to warrant the conclusionthat if one wants to be a functionalist about pain and has physicalistleanings, one had better opt for European Functionalism, rather than forany of its two Australo-American cousins, as soon as one tries to accountfor multiple realizability.16

ICREA,Catalan Institute for Research andAdvanced Studies Received: June 2009University of Barcelona Revised: February 2010

References

Bealer, George 1997. Self-Consciousness, The Philosophical Review 106/1: 69–117.Bealer, George 2000. Fregean Equivocation and Ramsification on Sparse Theories: Response to McCullagh,

Mind and Language 15/5: 500–10.Bird, Alexander 2005. The Dispositionalist Conception of Laws, Foundations of Science 10/4: 353–70.Boolos, George 1984. To Be is to be a Value of a Variable (or to be Some Values of Some Variables), The

Journal of Philosophy 81/8: 430–49.Clapp, Lenny 2001. Disjunctive Properties: Multiple Realizations, The Journal of Philosophy 98/3: 111–36.Lewis, David 1983a. Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Lewis, David 1983b. Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Shoemaker, Sydney 2003. Causality and Properties, in Identity, Cause, and Mind, expanded edition, Oxford:

Oxford University Press: 206–33.Yablo, Stephen 2002. Coulda, Woulda, Shoulda, in Conceivability and Possibility, ed. Tamar Szabo Gendler

and John Hawthorne, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 441–92.

16I am grateful to the following colleagues and friends for helpful discussions of earlier versions: FabriceCorreia, Manuel Garcıa-Carpintero, Max Kolbel, Øystein Linnebo, Teresa Marques, Manuel Martinez,Olaf Muller, Alex Oliver, Francesc Perena, Josep Luis Prades and Ralph Wedgwood. I would also liketo thank two anonymous referees for their critical feedback and suggestions for improvement.

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