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EuropeanInvestmentBank
The PPP Premium in European Roads Projects
Hugh GoldsmithPPP Coordinator, Projects Directorate
Frederic Blanc-Brude & Timo Välilä
5th Conf. On Applied Infra Research (INFRADAY)Berlin, 6-7 October 2006
2
A road, is a road, is a road… except when it’s a PPP!
Does it cost more to build infrastructure as a PPP than via traditional procurement?
Agenda:
1. Theory
2. Practice
3. Data
4. Analysis
5. Interpretation
6. Conclusions
3
Theory – Value for Money
Does PPP deliver VfM?
We’ll only know once large sample of projects have completed life-cycle
1. Full cost-benefit comparison
2. Ex-ante use of PUBLIC SECTOR COMPARATOR
Cost to Govt of PPP
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Cost to Govt of Traditional Procurement
4
Theory- Benefits & Costs
Benefits
Bundling Life-cycle approach
Innovation Depends on scope in
tender dossier
Risk sharing Better risk management
Private asset ownership Cost saving innovation &
more efficient contracting
Costs Transaction costs
Bidding, negotiation, monitoring Renegotiation over life-cycle
Private finance costs
Pursuit of cost efficiency may impact service quality
Institutional and administrative capacity requirements in public sector
VfM VfM
Scope for VfM varies across sectorsScope for VfM varies across sectors
5
Theory – Construction Costs
Ownership + Incentives + Bundling (Hart, 2005)[a(i*) - α(e*)] + [b(i*) + β(e*)] > i + e
Higher construction costs expected due to:+ Greater investment for Lifecycle cost savings+ Pricing of risks (more efficient contracting)+ Higher transaction costs for complex contractsLower construction costs expected due to: – Design innovation responding to output based
specification
Cost of making cost-saving investments
Improved productive efficiency benefit
Impact on allocative efficiency (quality)
6
Practice - Contracting
SPVSPV
EPCEPC O&MO&M
GovtGovt
XX
GovtGovt
EngineerEngineer ContractorContractor
OperatorOperator
TraditionalTraditional PPPPPP
XX XX
Cost to buildCost to build
Ex-ante = Price of construction contractEx-ante = Price of construction contract
7
Practice – Risk Allocation
Sponsors EquityDebt
Taxpayers
Design & Construction
Operating Risks
Force MajeureUninsurability
Payment Market rates
Sub-contractors SPV Public sector
““Allocate risks to the party best able to manage them”Allocate risks to the party best able to manage them”
8
The Sample
EIB financed roads projects 1990-2005
Projects divided into “sections” or “lots”
Different technical characteristics (length, terrain, proportion bridges/tunnels, no. lanes)
Motorway & non-motorway standard roads
Both public & private projects
Large variety of procurement routes
9
FI 6
FR 8
DE 12
GR 12
IR 4IT 5
NO 9PT 38
SP 23
SW 14
DK 16UK 12 BE 3
Data – Country Coverage
FR 6
DE 2
GR 3
IR 3
NL 4
PT 14
SP 22
FI 1AT 1UK 9
65 PPP162 Non-PPP
227 EIB-financed road sections in 15 countries
10
At face value, cost of a PPP road higher and more variable
Construction cost/km, in millions of 1999 €
Full sample PPP non-PPP
Observations 227 65 162Mean 12.2 15.5 10.9Median 5.8 6.8 5.1St. deviation 19.6 25.9 16.3
11
Outliers are mainly fixed links
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
NONPPP PPP
median
mid-50% ofobservations
Construction cost/km, in millions of 1999 €
most outliers are fixed links
12
Unit costs vary with project characteristics
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
LogLength
Lo
gU
C19
99
road
motorway
13
Estimation methodology
OLS Regression Dependent variable: Unit costs (1999 million €/km) Explanatory variables: Economic; Technical; Countries Dummy variables for:
PPP Urban terrain, Mountainous terrain No. lanes (avoiding dummy trap) Countries
General to specific methodology 10% significance threshold
Diagnostic & robustness testing
14
Robustness Testing
Alternative samples Motorways only Cost range € 20 to 300 million Observations +/- 1.5 x Stdev Only countries with both PPP and non-PPP No fixed links (< 50% bridges or tunnels)
Alternative specifications With/without country dummies
Common sense: Sign & magnitude of coefficients Unit cost benchmark: 4.9 million €/km (1999 prices)
15
Results
PPP dummy coefficient significant in all samples & specifications
Sample N PPP coefficient Adjusted R2 DiagnosticsMotorways
full sample 156 0.29 0.74 OKTotal cost (20, 300) Eur million 117 0.33 0.76 OKDependent variable w/in 1.5 stdev 138 0.29 0.64 OKOnly countries with both PPP and trad projects 120 0.23 0.77 1/
All roadsfull sample 227 0.31 0.82 OKTotal cost (20, 300) Eur million 168 0.33 0.80 OKDependent variable w/in 1.5 stdev 201 0.27 0.69 OKOnly countries with both PPP and trad projects 175 0.28 0.79 OK
1/ There is evidence of residual non-normality at 5% level.
16
Sample Bias Adjustment
Different data quality due to timing of appraisal Ex-ante cost data:
PPP = EPC contract price Non-PPP = variable timing/quality
Adjustment:
PPP Premium = 100 x {exp(PPPcoef) –1} – 10%
Median estimate Sample bias
17
PPP Premium estimates
31 estimates of PPP premium
Distribution of PPP Premium estimates
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
< 10% 10-15% 15-20% 20-25% 25-30% 30-35% 35-40% > 40
PPP Premium range
Re
lati
ve
fre
qu
en
cy
18
Good fit for preferred modelMotorways without fixed links
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
0 5 10 15 20 25Observed unit construction cost (mill 1999€)
Pre
dic
ted
un
it c
on
stru
cti
on
co
st
(mill
19
99
€)
Perfect fit line
PPP Premium = 23%
19
Cost Overruns in Traditional Procurement
Previous Studies: Flyvbjerg (2002) for European roads: + 22% Mott MacDonalds (2002) for UK roads: + 21%
Interpretation: Systematic “optimism bias” PPP Premium = Expected Cost Overrun under
traditional procurement Is there any additional investment for quality
enhancement & lifecycle cost savings?
20
What are we getting for the PPP Premium?
Construction on-time and on-budget Higher transaction costs? Construction companies taking out profits
upfront? Better quality?
“The road was built to a higher standard than normal motorways (in the country), because the contractor new he was fully liable for maintenance over 20 years”
EIB. EV Report on PPPs June 2005
Better lifecycle performance? … too early to tell !
21
Conclusions
PPP Premium in European roads is 20 to 25% Significant and robustly estimated Close correspondence with “optimism bias” of
traditional procurement Rational construction risk pricing by contractors
PPP delivery success = cost + time certainty VfM: Too early to judge about long term lifecycle
costs & quality
22
The road ahead …
PPP here to stay: Challenge is to do it well … … by learning from mistakes
& successes at EU level EIB public policy role:
Support the development of EU-wide best practice
On-going research Questions:
Why are some countries cheaper?
How to achieve Lifecycle VfM?
http://www.eib.org
Address : 100, Boulevard Konrad Adenauer, L-2950 LuxembourgContact : Hugh Goldsmith
Email : [email protected] : 00352-4379-2783Fax : 00352-4379-2860