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Eurosceptics in the RotatingPresidency’s Chair: Too Much AdoAbout Nothing?Cécile Leconte aa CERAPS (Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Administratives,Politiques et Sociales), Lille, FranceVersion of record first published: 14 Feb 2012.

To cite this article: Cécile Leconte (2012): Eurosceptics in the Rotating Presidency’s Chair: TooMuch Ado About Nothing?, Journal of European Integration, 34:2, 133-149

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Eurosceptics in the RotatingPresidency’s Chair: Too Much Ado

About Nothing?

CECILE LECONTE*

CERAPS (Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Administratives, Politiques et Sociales),Lille, France

ABSTRACT With the mainstreaming of Euroscepticism within established parties, theEU is facing a new challenge: that of soft Eurosceptic governments landing in the rotat-ing presidency’s seat. Albeit not opposing the EU as such, these governments wish toput a brake on developments in further integration and challenge the EU informalnorms of legitimacy and expected behaviour. On the basis of four case studies, this arti-cle illustrates the ability of the EU to adapt to this new situation — especially in thepost-Lisbon era, where presidencies’ ability to influence the EU agenda and direction isincreasingly limited. Indeed, on the whole, Eurosceptic governments live up to the roleof the presidency as manager of the EU day-to-day business. However, in this context,there is a risk that EU partners might neglect potentially authoritarian developments inthe country holding the chair, as the Hungarian presidency illustrated. Consequently,while the rotating presidency becomes less permeable to the turmoil of domestic poli-tics, its role as a ‘magnifying glass’ of domestic democratic shortcomings becomes lessrelevant.

KEY WORDS: EU Council, rotating presidency, Euroscepticism, (de-)politicization,Europeanization.

Introduction

The Hungarian presidency of the EU in the second half of 2011 has againhighlighted the question of the possible impact of domestic political polari-zation and/or instability on rotating presidencies. As several governmentsin the EU come to feel the socio-political consequences of the economic cri-sis, the question of how domestic political instability may affect futurepresidencies is likely to gain in significance in the near future. Certainly, asthe case of the Belgian presidency in the second half of 2010 showed,political instability (in this case, political leadership vacuum) can be

Correspondence Address: Cecile Leconte, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Lille, 84 rue deTrevise, F-59 000, Lille, Email: Cecile.leconte@sciencespo-lille.eu

European IntegrationVol. 34, No. 2, 133–149, February 2012

ISSN 0703–6337 Print/ISSN 1477–2280 Online/12/020133-17 � 2012 Taylor & Francis

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2012.641088

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compensated by a strong commitment of political elites to the success of thepresidency. What happens, however, when this political commitment islacking?Certainly, the rotating presidency of the Council can also provide Euro-

phile governments with a good opportunity to attempt further integration(as was the case of the Dutch presidency during the Maastricht Treatynegotiations, for example). Moreover, presidencies can boost the popularityof the EU in the country holding the chair, as argued elsewhere (Semetko,Van der Burg, and Valkenburg 2003). However, the rotating presidency(which is maintained by the Lisbon Treaty, except for the European Coun-cil and the External Relations Council) can also be a serious challenge forthe EU, when governments questioning the very legitimacy of the logicsunderlying integration (pooling of sovereignties, delegation of competencesto supranational institutions) come to preside over the EU destiny for a six-month period. In such occurrences, the EU presidency can be used as a tri-bune by Eurosceptic leaders or as a way for segments, within parties or thestate apparatus, to push forward Eurosceptic initiatives. In fact, historically,the increase in significance of the rotating presidency was one of the long-term consequences of a Eurosceptic’s initiative, as French President Charlesde Gaulle provoked the ‘empty chair crisis’, which resulted in the weaken-ing of the brokerage capacities of the European Commission (Vanhoonac-ker, Pomorska, and Maurer 2011). Similarly, the increase in thepresidency’s agenda-setting powers was fostered by member states in orderto counterbalance those of the Commission, suspected by governments ofbecoming less impartial and too ‘activist’ (Tallberg 2003, 5).The aim of this paper is to assess the actual room for manoeuvre of

Eurosceptic presidencies1 in shaping the EU agenda and to assess whetherthey have a real impact on policy outcomes. The paper will focus on thedifferent factors that constrain a presidency’s leeway — be they domestic(e.g., coalition politics) or European (e.g., peer pressure, interactions withother EU institutions). It will also assess whether these constrains inciteEurosceptic coalition partners or governments to tone down their Euro-scepticism, at least during the six months during which they chair theCouncil or whether it incites them, on the contrary, to display a confron-tational attitude towards Brussels, in the hope of pleasing an Euroscepticelectorate. In that respect, Eurosceptic presidencies are a good test case toassess whether the presidency acts, in Bengtsson, Elgstrom, and Tallberg’swords, as ‘amplifier’, strengthening ‘the always existing tendency to pro-mote national concerns’, or as ‘silencer’, inciting national governmentschairing the Council to ‘put a temporary lid on efforts to promote self-interests’ (2004, 12) and act in the Community interest.The paper will expand on the results of several case studies, including

the Italian (first half of 2003), Czech (first half of 2009) and Hungarianpresidencies of the EU (first half of 2011). The last French presidency (sec-ond half of 2008), although not deemed Eurosceptic, will also be included,as it illustrates how actors within the national decision-making system tryto use the presidency in order to push through Eurosceptic initiatives, evenwhen the general orientation of the incumbent government is pro-Euro-

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pean. All these presidencies — except the French one — attracted a lot ofnegative media coverage even before they began, raising concerns about apossible slowing down in the pace of integration or even a paralysis of theEU machinery. In that respect, the paper defends a twofold thesis.First, in the current period of European integration, Eurosceptic actors,

parties or party factions involved in the conduct of presidencies do notaim at scrapping the EU. Their Euroscepticism is rather composed of alack of attachment to the EU and of an alternative vision of its underlying,collective values, in which nationalism, some degree of authoritarianismand an exclusively Christian understanding of the EU combine with a con-frontational attitude towards supranational institutions and their allegedpolitical correctness. What is at stake is not the survival of the EU but itsidentity.Second, contrary to widespread beliefs, the room for manoeuvre of pres-

idencies in influencing the EU’s overall orientation is almost non-existent.What’s more, it is shrinking considerably, notably as a result of the imple-mentation of the Lisbon Treaty. This underlines the ability of the EU sys-tem to react to the challenge of Euroscepticism by becoming lessdependent upon developments in domestic politics. Besides, while presi-dencies in general are clearly constrained in their ability to influence theEU, Eurosceptic executives especially have a very small room for manoeu-vre; at most, they can slow down the pace of integration for a fewmonths. Moreover, while Eurosceptic presidencies are often mired bydomestic political struggles, as the most Eurosceptic elements within theexecutive try to take control of the presidency for domestic political pur-poses, the presidency itself has an impact on the domestic balance ofpower, by marginalizing the most Eurosceptic actors within governmentcoalitions. In that regard, anguished media and political reactions evenbefore the start of allegedly Eurosceptic presidencies (as was the case withthe Czech presidency in 2009) certainly seem exaggerated.After defining Euroscepticism and justifying the choice of case studies,

the paper makes a brief overview of theoretical debates about the impactof the presidency on the EU agenda. It then presents empirical evidence onthe basis of the four case studies, suggesting that the impact on the presi-dency of Eurosceptic actors within chairing executive has been limitedindeed and that presidencies tend to empower the less Eurosceptic actorswithin government coalitions or the state apparatus.

Defining Eurosceptic Presidencies

Certainly, presidencies are not uniform, homogeneous actors in terms ofpreferences related to European integration. They do not articulate onesingle discourse (except in official documents, like presidencies’ pro-grammes) but express the different — even diverging — EU-views ofdiverse actors (party leaders, factions, parliamentary groups, national civilservants, etc) which compete in order to leave their imprint on the presi-dency. Most of the time, presidencies crystallize struggles for influencebetween and within parties, between ministries or segments of the state

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apparatus, between executives and parliaments, etc. Nevertheless, whileevery presidency displays some degree of internal diversity in terms of EU-related preferences, some presidencies are more likely than others to beinfluenced by Eurosceptics, either because of the Eurosceptic record ofindividual heads of state or government, the level of party-based Euroscep-ticism within incumbent parties or the participation, in government, of astrongly Eurosceptic coalition partner. While Euroscepticism itself is ahighly normative notion, often strategically used in order to disparagepolitical adversaries, there are objective, strong differences among nationalgovernments as to the desired degree of integration within the Union.

Defining Euroscepticism

In their seminal definition, Taggart and Szczerbiak distinguish betweentwo forms of scepticism towards the EU. Whereas ‘hard Euroscepticism’refers to ‘principled opposition to the EU and European integration’ (as itis being articulated by those parties or actors advocating a withdrawal outof the EU or opposing EU accession), ‘soft Euroscepticism’ expresses a‘qualified opposition’ to the EU reflecting dissatisfaction with EU policiesor with the current EU trajectory, perceived to be contrary to the ‘nationalinterest’ (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002). While total rejection of the EUremains hardly compatible with government participation in today’s EU,the mainstreaming of soft Eurosceptic attitudes within established partiesand the increase in internal party divisions over integration issues since thelate 1980s (see Leconte 2010, 113–8), together with the (re-)emergence ofnon-mainstream parties have increased probabilities that rotating presiden-cies come to be performed by governments entailing Eurosceptic parties’factions and/or coalition partners. Besides, within the soft Eurosceptic cat-egory, varying degrees of dissatisfaction with the EU can be identified. Inthat respect, Flood and Usherwood’s six-point continuum of party posi-tions towards the EU, ranging from a ‘rejectionist’ position to a ‘maximal-ist’ position advocating a federal Europe (2007, 6) allows for a morenuanced analysis of different party positions.Indeed, the four presidencies analyzed in this paper display different

degrees of soft Euroscepticism: the parochial nationalism of Prime Minis-ter Berlusconi, which denotes indifference towards the EU, differs fromthe ‘harder’ Euroscepticism of President Vaclav Klaus, who opposed therejection of the EU Constitutional and Lisbon Treaties. Moreover, some ofthe leaders analyzed in this paper, like Prime Minister Viktor Orban, com-bine ad hoc criticism of the EU with a more general reluctance towardwider processes of Europeanization, which they see as detrimental to whatthey consider as their countries’ moral or religious identity. This can alsobe considered as Euroscepticism, as the EU is seen as one of the drivingengines of such Europeanization processes (on this type of Euroscepticism,see Leconte 2010, 63–4). Leaders like Viktor Orban, for instance, engagein strategies of highly selective Europeanization, combining a soft Euro-sceptic criticism of the EU with worldviews that are clearly incompatiblewith EU membership (see Korkut 2009). An illustration of this is Orban’s

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ethnic understanding of identity, which permeates the 2011 reform of theHungarian constitution and badly affects relations with neighbouring coun-tries (via the issue of Hungarian minorities). Finally, some of these leadersdisplay an ambiguous relationship with formal and informal norms of legiti-macy in the EU, thus pushing the limits of what is considered acceptablebehaviour at EU level. Prime Minister Berlusconi’s controversial address tothe European Parliament as President of the Council on 2 July 2003, inwhich he insulted a Social Democratic German MEP, was a case in point inthat respect (on this incident and the extent to which it violated informalnorms of legitimacy in the EU, see Downey and Koenig 2006).

Justifying the Selection of Cases

In a context where governments’ appetite for a further deepening of the EUseems to be limited, it may seem odd to qualify specific presidencies as Euro-sceptic. Indeed, rather than being analyzed as outliers, allegedly Euroscepticpresidencies can be analyzed as ‘amplifiers’ (in the sense of Bengtsson, Elg-strom, and Tallberg 2004), which exacerbate already existing tendencies,present, albeit in milder forms, among other EU governments. This beingsaid, three of the four cases under study here share strong similarities: at thetime of their presidencies, both the Italian and the Czech government coali-tions were deeply divided over European integration and included stronglyEurosceptic parties (as in the case of the Lega Nord) or factions (as in thecase of the Eurosceptic wing of the Czech ODS). What’s more, these presi-dencies occurred in times of intense domestic political polarization (betweenBerlusconi’s party and the leader of the opposition, Romano Prodi in Italy;between the two wings of the ODS in the Czech Republic; and between astrongly defeated left and a radicalizing right in Hungary).At the time of the 2003 Italian presidency, the main party in the govern-

ment coalition was Forza Italia (renamed Popolo della Liberta in 2009),whose stance on European integration is eclectic and unpredictable. Beyondthe widely reported Eurosceptic statements of some Forza Italia ministersagainst the Euro and EU enlargement (Leconte 2003, 471), two elementspredispose this party to soft Euroscepticism. First, Berlusconi’s own views(his admiration for Margaret Thatcher and his anti-regulation stance, asexpressed in his hostility to the Kyoto protocol) and the party’s hostility tomulticulturalism (as expressed in the defence of a ‘Christian society’; seeHooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002, 981), predispose it to soft Eurosceptic-ism. Second, and above all, Berlusconi’s stance towards the EU is made ofindifference and parochialism. The EU is seen as the prolongation of domes-tic politics and of the party’s vocal fight against the left (for instance, its criti-cism of the Euro was due to the fact that Italian participation in EMU islargely considered as an achievement of previous centre-left governments)(Quaglia 2003, 20). Moreover, beside Forza Italia itself, the governmentcoalition was deeply divided on its EU course, between the pro-EuropeanNational Alliance and the strongly Eurosceptic Lega Nord.In the Czech case, the main party in the government coalition at the

time of the presidency was the Civic Democratic Union (ODS), itself

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divided between a Europragmatist wing around Prime Minister MirekTopolanek and a fiercely Eurosceptic one, not represented among govern-ment ministers but led by Czech President Vaclav Klaus and well repre-sented in the Czech Senate. Described as ‘soft Eurosceptic’ (Taggart andSzczerbiak 2002, 14) or as simply ‘Eurosceptic’ in Kopecky and Mudde’stypology (2002, 217), the ODS combines a discourse on moral sovereigntywith economic ultra-liberalism and hostility towards EU-level regulations(Kopecky and Mudde 2002, 306). While the ODS refers to itself as ‘Euro-critical’ or ‘Eurorealist’ (as in its 2001 Manifesto of Czech Eurorealism),Klaus himself borders on ‘hard Euroscepticism’: not only does he under-stand the EU as a purely economic project and opposes any further delega-tion of competences to the EU, but he opposed the ratification of the bothConstitutional and Lisbon Treaties (Kral, Bartovic, and Rihackova 2009,13). In fact, as the Czech presidency started, the Lisbon Treaty had notbeen ratified by the Czech parliament.The Czech ODS shares strong similarities with its Hungarian counterpart

Fidesz (Hungarian Civic Party), which, together with the Christian-demo-cratic KDNP, composed the executive during the 2011 Hungarian presi-dency. While before Hungary’s accession to the EU Fidesz was described asEuroenthusiast (in Kopecky and Mudde’s typology 2002, 217) — and a ‘softEurosceptic’ according to Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002, 14) — it is perhapsbest described today as ‘Europragmatist’, in the sense of providing condi-tional support for European integration. As Korkut writes:

[Fidesz] pro-EU mission is conditioned by the realization of its ownconservative vision for the EU. This does not imply vigilant supportfor the comprehensive application of the requirements of integration– especially in the fields of gender rights and freedom of expression. . .Rather than that, Fidesz pays allegiance to the EU in a selective man-ner, without ascribing to it in full. (Korkut 2009, 11)

This ambiguous understanding of EU membership and Europeanizationwas well illustrated by the fact that, despite being pro-accession, Orban’sgovernments transposed EU directives at a slower pace than other, morepro-European Hungarian governments (Toshkov 2008, 398). Prime Minis-ter Viktor Orban’s statement at the start of the Hungarian presidency that‘We don’t believe in the EU, we believe in Hungary’ also hints at an under-standing of national and European identity as being mutually exclusive.Moreover, its government’s ethnic understanding of national identity,expressed in the controversial law concerning Hungarian minorities abroad,has badly affected relations with neighbouring countries, notably Slovakia.By contrast, the 2008 French presidency was widely recognized as a

case of successful presidency. Besides, the government was composed ofthe Conservative UMP (Union pour la Majorite Populaire), which has arather pro-European orientation. However, albeit being much more pro-European than its Gaullist ancestor, the UMP neither favours strongsupranational institutions, nor unequivocally embraces the free circulationof services or the independence of the European Central Bank (ECB), out

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of protectionist and interventionist traditions. President Nicolas Sarkozyhimself has often used a populist rhetoric against the ECB or the EuropeanCommission. Moreover, there is a Eurosceptic minority within the UMPwhich claims to stand for the Gaullist heritage and stands for a purelyintergovernemental and protectionist EU. Within the mainstream UMP,the majority has a selective and cautious approach to the transfer of com-petences, wants a ‘protective’ EU and professes a marked scepticismtowards its further enlargement (Flood and Usherwood 2007, 20). None-theless, the party remains on the whole pro-integration. The reason whythis case is included in the paper is that it illustrates how EU presidenciescan be used by segments inside governments or the state apparatus to pushthrough Eurosceptic initiatives. An illustration of this was the Mediterra-nean Union Initiative, launched by the French president on 13 July 2008,at the start of the presidency and which triggered considerable controversyin the EU. Initiated by Henri Guaino, advisor to French President NicolasSarkozy, this project initially aimed at revitalizing links between SouthernEU countries and partner countries from North Africa and the MiddleEast. Initially called the Mediterranean Union, it was conceived — andrightly perceived — as a rival to the existing Barcelona process (managedby the European Commission on behalf of the EU) and as a way to cir-cumvent EU institutions in a region of traditional French influence. More-over, it left out non-Mediterranean EU countries. The Eurosceptic‘flavour’ of this initiative was evidenced in the fact that it was promotedby a Gaullist advisor to the President, Henri Guaino, himself involved in afight for influence with the strongly Europhile State secretary for Europeanaffairs, Jean-Pierre Jouyet. Besides, the fact that the Mediterranean Unioninitiative was welcome by well-known Eurosceptic French politicians, likeJean-Pierre Chevenement or Philippe de Villiers, might confirm the Euro-sceptic motivations underlying it.As is explained below, these presidencies were not totally powerless in

their ability to express alternative views of the EU but were, however,strictly constrained as far as their practical input was concerned.

Assessing the Increasingly Reduced Room for Manoeuvre of Presidencies

Dismissing the Myth of Powerless Presidencies

Tallberg (2003, 6) distinguishes three ways in which presidencies can influ-ence the EU agenda: agenda-setting (i.e., putting new issues on the EUagenda), agenda-structuring (i.e., emphasizing or de-emphasizing specificissues) and agenda exclusion (remaining silent on an issue, barring someissues from the agenda or braking the pace of legislation by presentingunrealistic compromise proposals). While everyone agrees that presidencieshave a limited ability to influence the EU in terms of ‘pure’ agenda-setting,agenda-structuring (‘the true power of the chair’ according to Tallberg)can and has been used by Eurosceptic governments in order to try to pushforward their views on the EU — notably, in order to try to slow downthe pace of institutional reforms aimed at deepening the Union.

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In their study on Nordic countries and the presidency, for instance, Ben-gtsson, Elgstrom, and Tallberg note that, in 2002, institutional reform andthe debate on the future of Europe ranked low on the list of the Swedishpresidency’s priorities, while they had ranked high among the priorities ofthe preceding Belgian one (2004, 319). This also applied to the Danishgovernment, which, during its presidency, ‘gave lower priority to thedebate on the future European institutional architecture than many EUgovernments would have done’ (Bengtsson, Elgstrom, and Tallberg 2004,319). In a similar vein, institutional issues ranked last in the initial draftof the Czech presidency’s priorities in 2009 (Kral, Bartovic, and Rihack-ova 2009, 30) — before being barred from the presidency’s agenda alto-gether, following the first Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty. In thisregard, the Czech case illustrates how governments that are reluctant topush for ambitious institutional reforms can take advantage of the widerpolitical context in the EU in order to bar these issues from the agenda. Agood illustration of this was the British presidency of the EU in the secondhalf of 2005, following the rejection of the EU Constitutional treaty byDutch and French voters. While it was widely admitted that the non-ratifi-cation of the Lisbon Treaty did not prevent the piecemeal implementationof specific reforms, the British government, in a clear case of agendaexclusion, categorically ruled out any progress in the setting up of theEuropean External Action Service, which was well under way as the presi-dency started. At the same time, presidencies that want to push forwardambitious preferences in terms of institutional reforms, implying signifi-cant consequences in terms of power distribution and redistribution at theexpense of the member states, are seriously constrained by other EU part-ners, as the Dutch government experienced during the intergovernmentalconference preceding the signature of the Maastricht treaty.Beside agenda structuring, another resource at the disposal of Euroscep-

tic leaders during their country’s EU presidency is to use their address tothe European Parliament, during which they are expected to present thepresidency’s priorities, as a tribune in order to articulate their views onthe EU. A good illustration of this was the Czech President’s speech in theEP at the start of the Czech EU presidency on 12 February 2009, as hemade his case against political integration and the current EU institutionalsystem, in a speech strongly reminiscent of Margaret Thatcher’s 1988Bruges speech (European Parliament. 2009). In a similar vein, during hisspeech in the EP on 19 January 2011, Prime Minister Viktor Orbanclearly stated his views on the EU as a political community, as he dis-missed any foreign criticism against a domestic Hungarian law encroach-ing upon media freedom as illegitimate and criticized MEPs for meddlingin Hungarian domestic politics (Euractiv 2011a).

Factors Limiting the Room for Manoeuvre of Eurosceptic Presidencies

Although not totally powerless, though, presidencies in general have anincreasingly limited ability to influence the EU agenda according to theirpreferences. Five factors limiting their room for manoeuvre will be exam-ined successively: political culture within the Council structure, develop-

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ments in institutional practices regarding the working of presidencies, theevolution of inter-institutional relations, reforms resulting from the Lisbontreaty and formal and informal norms of expected behaviour applying tothe presidency. In this respect, the rotating presidency is indeed affectedby a more global trend towards the ‘communautarization’ (Fernandez2008) or supranationalization (Riedel 2010) of the Council, which cannotqualify as a strictly intergovernmental institution anymore.First, the Council’s prevalent political culture below the ministerial level

of the presidency prevents any direct influence of hard or strongly Euro-sceptic elements. Indeed, most of the Council’s work is prepared byCOREPER-level ambassadors and by the Council’s working groups andthus remains relatively immune to the turmoil of domestic politics. Despitebeing a diplomatic organ, the Committee of Permanent Representatives(COREPER) is permeated by a strong culture of compromise. Memberstates’ representatives share a commitment to ensuring the performanceand smooth functioning of the Council, which influences the defence ofnational interests (Lewis 1998). Similarly, the Council’s working groups,composed of national civil servants, have developed specific, transnationalcommunication networks which do not rely on a narrow definition ofnational interests (Beyers and Dierickx 1998). Finally, within the Councilstructure, other organs which assist presidencies in the fulfilment of theirtasks, such as the Council’s General Secretariat, may act as agents of the‘Europeanization’ of the Council (Mangenot 2010).Second, at presidency level, developments in institutional practices fur-

ther diminish the ability of specific presidencies to shape the EU agenda.Initiated by changes in the Council’s Rules of Procedures in 2006, theprinciple of the ‘trio’ presidencies foresees that ‘every 18 months the threepresidencies due to hold office prepare the agenda in cooperation with theCommission’. First used in 2007 with the German presidency, this newpractice ensures that agenda drafting remains a collective exercise. More-over, with the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the trio will haveto agree an 18-month programme with the European Council President —an obligation which first applied to the 2010–2011 trio (Spain, Belgiumand Hungary). Certainly, the extent to which the trio really constrainsindividual presidencies can be debated. While some observers suggest thatnational lists of priorities are considered more important than the commonprogramme (EPC and CEPS 2010, 74), others note that the socializationfunction of the trio is limited to the preparatory phase, before it takesoffice; afterwards, each presidency tends to ‘act on its own. . . and to “dis-appear” thereafter’ (Missiroli and Emmanouilidis 2009, 4). Nonetheless,the trio exercise may act as a safeguard dissuading governments from pro-moting national interests too blatantly. The evolution of the successiveversions of the Czech presidency’s list of priorities exemplifies this. As theyhad to be negotiated with French and Swedish presidencies, with theCouncil Secretariat playing a crucial role as broker (Kral, Bartovic, andRihackova 2009, 31), they were amended in order to minimize those pri-orities with clear domestic political motives, notably the final clause in theinitial version underlining the promotion of national interests during the

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presidency (Kral, Bartovic, and Rihackova 2009, 30). This highlights thepresidency’s ‘silencer role’, as it fosters the European policy orientation ofchairing governments (Bengtsson, Elgstrom, and Tallberg 2004, 312).Another factor which further limits presidencies’ leeway relates to pre-

valent logics of inter-institutional cooperation. First, presidencies’ abilityto influence the EU agenda is limited, at least in issues belonging to theformer first pillar of the EU, by the Commission’s monopoly on legislativeinitiative. Second, peer pressure and the wish to have a ‘successful’ presi-dency might deter them from taking initiatives that could harm the coun-try’s reputation. Third, other actors, such as the Council’s GeneralSecretariat, other national delegations, and the Commission, have to betaken into account by the presidency when it tries to broker deals (Schoutand Vanhoonacker 2006, 654). The generalization of the co-decision pro-cedure, for instance, implies good working relationship and connectionswith the EP. For instance, in their analysis of the Italian presidency, Qua-glia and Moxon-Browne show how the disastrous relations of the Italiangovernment with the European Parliament and the Commission negativelyaffected the overall performance of the presidency (2004, 18).More importantly, major institutional reforms resulting from the Lisbon

Treaty clearly diminish the risks associated with Eurosceptic presidenciesand act as ‘safeguards’ against Europhobic heads of state or government.First of all, the clear separation of the European Council from the Councilof the EU, as well as the creation of a semi-permanent president of theEuropean Council ends the possibility for heads of states or governmentto be President of the European Council. As noted elsewhere: ‘the PrimeMinister/head of state of the country holding the rotating presidency [is]the main loser under the new regime’ (EPC and CEPS 2010, 76). Thistends to weaken the link between domestic politics and presidencies andreduce incentives to use the presidency as a tribune for domestic politicalprofiling. Second, as it is removed from the chairs of the European Coun-cil and of the External Affairs Council, the rotating presidency hasexchanged its former political role for a functional one (EPC and CEPS2010, 72). Certainly, it will continue to chair all other Council configura-tions (notably the once central General Affairs Council), as well asCOREPER meetings. However, striped of its political dimension, therotating presidency will be increasingly assessed on its administrative skillsand ability to pass legislation. After the coming into force of the LisbonTreaty, two factors have reinforced this trend, by influencing initial inter-pretations of the text. To begin with, the Belgian presidency shaped therelationship between the rotating presidency and the European Councilpresident at the expense of the presidency’s influence (EPC and CEPS2010, 72). This ‘pro-European’ orientation of the Belgian presidency wasfollowed by a similarly Spanish ‘Europeanist presidency’ (Bergmuller2010), which consolidated the practices set under Belgium’s auspices. Thismay have resulted in a ‘path dependency’ logic, which shaped the institu-tional and political context in which the Hungarian presidency later hadto operate. Moreover, as a second factor, the Greek debt crisis (initially atleast) provided an opportunity for the president of the European Council

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to assert himself in crucial political debates about the EU economic gover-nance (EPC and CEPS 2010, 69). Again, one of the consequences of this‘de-politicization’ of the rotating presidency is that it will be less appealingfor governments to use the presidency for domestic politics purposes:

Since the rotating presidency no longer applies to the prime-ministeriallevel, it gives the head of government and its surrounding much lessopportunities to take advantage of the visibility effect. The charm/glamour of being the leader of the EU for six months can no longer begeared into domestic politics — for example as electoral engine. (Riedel2010, 15)

Thirdly, regarding the external representation of the EU, the fact thatthe rotating presidency does not chair the External Affairs Council any-more (although it swill continue to chair COREPERII meetings, as well asa few Council working groups in the field of foreign policy; see Vanhoo-nacker, Pomorska, and Maurer 2010, 9) will actually prevent the repeti-tion of scenario like the one that occurred during the Italian presidency, asPrime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, as chair of a Russia-EU summit, violatedcommonly agreed policy on the respect for human rights and climatechange (Quaglia and Moxon-Browne 2004, 16).Finally, when assessing presidencies’ room for manoeuvre, it is also

important to take into account formal and informal norms guiding thepresidency’s work. For instance, the presidency is supposed to abide bythe norms of impartiality and neutrality of the chair, which are thought tocondition its efficiency and are laid down in the Council General Secretar-iat’s Handbook on the presidency. Informal norms include the wish toappear to have conducted a successful presidency in the eyes of peers andbe perceived as ‘good Europeans’ (notably for first time presidencies).According to the existing literature, there are at least four variables thatmight affect the probabilities of norm violation by chairs: seniority in theEU and experience as a chair (as newcomers are supposedly less likely toviolate the norms), self-confidence in the performance of the ‘nationalmodel’ and strength of national identity (the more self-confident, the morelikely to violate the norms), state size (small states are allegedly less likelyto violate norms) and domestic political context (instability and polariza-tion are more likely to be associated with probabilities of norm violation).Regarding the last variable, the Hungarian presidency is a case in point, asit occurred in a context mired by the economic crisis and characterized bypopular discontent towards the EU and the International Monetary Fund.However, as the choice of cases suggests, the relevance of each variableneeds to be examined more closely.

Evidence from the Case Studies: Too Much Ado About Nothing?

As is evidenced below, Eurosceptic presidencies have had a very limitedimpact on EU business and trajectories. Moreover, the presidency had aclear impact on the balance of power inside government coalitions and

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between different branches of government, at the expense of the mostEurosceptic actors and/or factions.

Limited Practical Influence

Beyond the day-to-day EU business and legislation, Eurosceptic presiden-cies have had very little impact on EU institutional issues and externalrelations.As far as institutional reform is concerned, peer pressure and ‘path-

dependency’ logics limit the ability of Eurosceptic segments inside govern-ments to push their agendas. The Italian and Czech presidencies, forinstance, were scheduled at times when crucial decisions had to be madeon EU institutional issues: the first three months of the IGC on the EUConstitutional Treaty in 2003, and the deadlock over the ratification ofthe Lisbon Treaty following the first Irish referendum in 2008. In fact,both presidencies could only delay institutional reforms; they were notable to prevent them. While the Italian presidency tried to oppose signifi-cant institutional reforms during the 2003 IGC (the increase in the powersof the European Parliament in the adoption of the EU budget, the exten-sion of the scope of qualified majority voting (QMV) to judicial coopera-tion, etc; Quaglia and Moxon-Browne 2004, 19), it could only postponethem until the end of 2003, when the Irish government took over. Simi-larly, the Czech presidency in 2009 found itself in a paradoxical situation.It was expected to negotiate a deal with the Irish government in order toovercome Irish voters’ hostility towards the Lisbon Treaty, while CzechPresident Vaclav Klaus was using every possible means (including lodginga complaint before the Czech constitutional court) to block the ratificationof the treaty in his own country (Kral, Bartovic, and Rihackova 2009, 23–5). Eventually, the Czech government negotiated the deal which paved theway for a second referendum and the entering into force of the LisbonTreaty. This last example illustrates how upcoming presidencies may exertpressure on the incumbent one in order to perform. As was mentionedbefore, the Czech presidency finally managed to broker a compromise onlegal safeguards for Ireland before the Swedish presidency took over. Notonly was it widely expected that this issue would have to wait until theSwedish presidency took over but, even before the end of the Czech presi-dency, the Swedish government had signalled its intention to move for-ward with institutional issues (for instance, by announcing that it wouldconvene an important European council summit in order to discuss theappointment of the next Commission President). This may have exertedpressure on the new Czech caretaker government to negotiate a deal inorder to get out of the institutional impasse (Kral, Bartovic, and Rihack-ova 2009, 23).As regards to the EU external relations, the Mediterranean Union pro-

ject sponsored by the French presidency illustrates the difficulty, for Euro-sceptic actors or party factions, to spearhead projects outside of the EUinstitutional framework, as Charles de Gaulle found out with the defeatedFouchet plan. In fact, the French initiative was strongly criticized by othermember state governments (such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel,

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who warned against a ‘splitting’ of the Union) and received a frosty wel-come by the European Commission. As a consequence, the project had tobe amended to get rid of its most ‘Eurosceptic’ elements. It is now beingdeveloped within the existing EU framework of the Barcelona process andencompasses all EU members. This is a good example of how peer pres-sure and path dependency limit a presidency’s ability to circumvent theEU institutional system. While it is perceived as legitimate for presidenciesto try to provide leadership in their areas of expertise, e.g., by trying toenhance relations with specific regions, it is ‘important to justify the Presi-dency’s priorities in a European discourse’ (Vanhoonacker, Pomorska, andMaurer 2011, 25) — which the French presidency did not do initially. Inthis respect, the French case illustrates the relevance of the narrative of apresidency’, i.e., the ability of a presidency to communicate about its pri-orities and results and show their added value for the Union as a whole(Lequesne and Wessels 2009, 2).Finally, a closer look at presidencies’ balance sheets shows that a so-

called Eurosceptic presidency can bring about significant positive achieve-ments, as the Czech case makes clear. For instance, during its presidency,which coincided with the first months of the financial and economic crisisinitiated in September 2008, the Czech government successfully defendedthe acquis of the internal market against protectionist tendencies (articu-lated by the French President and British Prime Minister); it also broughtabout progress in specific sectors, such as energy and transport, and suc-cessfully managed the gas dispute between Russia and the Ukraine (Kral,Bartovic, and Rihackova 2009, 7–8).

The Marginalization of ‘Euro-hawks’ during Presidencies

As with European integration and Europeanization processes, the presi-dency also has an impact on the domestic balance of power, within gov-ernment coalitions and between different government agencies. As weargue below, presidencies empower those domestic actors who have strongEU expertise and extended EU level connections. While the start of presi-dencies can be overshadowed by disastrous EP addresses by Prime Minis-ters or heads of state (as in the Czech case), in the day-to-daymanagement of the presidency, more EU-oriented actors gain the upperhand.In the Czech case for instance, the presidency was a power struggle

between, on the one hand, President Klaus and the Eurosceptic wing ofODS and, on the other hand, Europragmatist government members suchas PM Mirek Topolanek, Deputy Prime Minister for European affairsAlexandr Vondra and Foreign Minister Karl Schwarzenberg (Kral, Barto-vic, and Rihackova 2009, 15, 21). Each side in this power struggle wastrying to use the presidency in order to gain in influence (at the expense ofthe other side). During the course of the presidency, not only did the latterplay an essential role in the day-to-day management of the chair; the no-confidence vote which tumbled Topolanek’s government actually benefitedthe Europragmatists. The new caretaker government managed to margin-alize the president, for instance by preventing his chairing of important

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international summits (Kral, Bartovic, and Rihackova 2009, 23), and thenew situation allowed the Permanent Representation and senior civil ser-vants to play a bigger role in the presidency. In the Hungarian case, PrimeMinister Orban has been playing a much more marginal role than other,more efficiency-oriented actors, such as Foreign minister Janos Martonyiand Secretary for European affairs Eniko Gyori. In these internal powerstruggles, public opinion and incumbent parties’ electorates might alsoplay a role. For instance, in the Czech case, the fact that ODS votersbelong to the most Europhile segment of the electorate (Drulak 2009, 12)may have helped swing the balance in favour of the Europragmatists. Inthat respect, observers of Czech politics noted that the presidency’s sloganat home, which was rather ambiguous and confrontational (‘We willsweeten it for Europe’, possibly also meaning ‘We will give Europe a hardtime’), was not positively echoed at a domestic level (Drulak 2009, 15).Finally, credibility is a crucial asset for the successful management of a

presidency. In this context, the replacement, by executives, of experiencedand trusted officials has backfired on their presidencies. For instance, inthe Italian case, the resignation of the largely pro-European and trustedForeign Minister Renato Ruggiero undermined the credibility of the Italiangovernment, one year before the start of its presidency (Leconte 2003,475). Similarly, the replacement, by the new Hungarian governmentelected in Spring 2010, of several senior civil servants in charge of thepresidency, as well as of the Hungarian Permanent Representative withthe EU, undermined trust in the Hungarian presidency even before itbegan (Kaczynski 2011, 3). In a similar vein, Prime Minister Berlusconi‘was widely perceived as not having a sufficient understanding of, andexpertise in, EU affairs, diplomatic skills and personal credibility to brokera deal in difficult negotiations’ (Quaglia and Moxon-Browne 2004, 14). Inthe same vein, leaders who are not well integrated in the dense web ofpart-networking at EU level may pay a heavy price for it during presiden-cies. For instance, it was argued elsewhere that the Czech political elites’lack of ties with their European counterparts has not allowed them toredress the image of an unsuccessful presidency (Kaczynski 2009, 1).

Conclusion

As a conclusion, it seems clear that presidencies’ ability to upload theirpreferences onto the EU level is very limited, if not non-existent. That thisholds especially for presidencies containing strong Eurosceptic elements isalso clear. In that respect, the latter often display several characteristicswhich further reduce their ability to be influential: political instability andintra-coalition infighting, lack of programmatic unity, poor relations withthe Commission, the European Parliament and other governments, etc.Whereas chairs under the influence of Eurosceptic elements can use theiragenda-structuring powers to de-emphasize specific issues (notably, inorder to brake processes of institutional deepening), they can only do sowhen the general political context at EU level allows it (as was the case,for instance, after halts in the ratification processes of the Constitutional

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and Lisbon treaties). What more, in the longer run, this foot-dragging atti-tude does not pay off, as solutions to institutional deadlocks are usuallyfound in order to overcome ratification hurdles. More generally, in theexisting EU system, no chair is able, on its own, to initiate a spill-backprocess in terms of integration.What is more, recent developments will greatly reduce the incentives,

for Eurosceptic actors, to try to use the rotating chair for domestic politi-cal profiling; they will also further diminish the room for manoeuvre ofindividual presidencies. First of all, the increasingly administrative natureof the tasks devoted to the chair makes it less enticing for governmentmembers to use the presidency for short-term, domestic political gains,which acts as a safeguard against a possible ‘parochialization’ of presiden-cies. By the same token, the fact that heads of governments do not holdthe presidency of the European Council anymore will prevent the presi-dency from being ‘taken hostage’ by Eurosceptic leaders. Second, therotating presidency now has to operate under strong collective constrains,resulting from enhanced inter-institutional cooperation and the suprana-tionalization of the Council. In this context, it has to live up to collectiveexpectations focusing on its ability to rise above the fray and silence nar-row domestic agendas (on this aspect, see Riedel 2010).As a consequence, presidencies increasingly follow a path-dependency

logic which prevents actors upholding alternative or revisionist2 visions ofthe EU from leaving their imprint on a presidency. In this respect, the UEseems to be quite successful at containing Euroscepticism, thus producinga situation which Stefano Bartolini (2001) described as the ‘internalizationof the pro-/anti-EU cleavage’:3 as Eurosceptic actors prove unable to formbroad, transnational coalitions at EU level, alternative visions of the EUremain mainly confined to the national level of representation and do notfind their way into the EU political system.This situation holds some risks for the EU. Indeed, at the domestic level,

alternative visions of ‘Europe’ can also lead some actors to question theunderpinning values and principles of the EU, while being perfectly inte-grated within the EU political system. The 2011 Hungarian presidency is agood example of this. While, at the EU level, the Hungarian governmentwas fulfilling its tasks as rotating presidency according to collective expec-tations, at domestic level, it was implementing, at the same time, a highlycontroversial law curtailing media freedom and, more crucially, a far-reaching constitutional reform,4 of which the European Commission forDemocracy through Law5 wrote that it was putting ‘the principle ofdemocracy itself. . . at stake’ (European Commission for democracy throughlaw 2010, point 24, 6). This illustrates the limits of the institutional devicesthat immunize the EU against Eurosceptic and/or non-mainstream ideolo-gies. Indeed, while a merely administrative, de-politicized evaluation of theHungarian presidency would lead observers to conclude that the Fidesz-ledgovernment is perfectly ‘Euro-compatible’, a more political and normativeperspective would point to the deeply illiberal vision underlying Orban’sinitiatives at the national level — a vision which clearly is at odds withthose values the EU claims to stand for. In that respect, the de-politiciza-

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tion of the rotating presidency resulting from the Lisbon treaty also has itsdownsides, as it implies that ‘in the Lisbon reality, whatever the develop-ments back home, as long as the presidency stays on course and the politi-cal leadership is dedicated and well-coordinated — the presidency can stillbe deemed successful’ (Kaczynski 2011, 4). Indeed, while the de-politiciza-tion of the Council further shields the EU from any direct influence ofstrongly Eurosceptic elements, it entails the risks that EU institutions andother governments neglect illiberal or authoritarian developments in thecountry holding the chair, at the expense of the Union’s normative acquis.In this respect, the EU-wide criticism surrounding the start of the Hungar-ian presidency was certainly not ‘too much ado about nothing’.

Notes

1. Although the article uses the general term ‘Eurosceptic presidencies’ for practical purposes, it actu-

ally deals with presidencies containing Eurosceptic elements, be they discourses, actors (for

instance, Eurosceptic factions within incumbent parties or Eurosceptic parties within government

coalitions) or strategies.2. According to Flood and Usherwood’s typology, a revisionist position consists of ‘wanting to return

to an earlier state [of integration], usually before a treaty revision’ (2007, 6).

3. He was sketching one of four possible scenarios as to the future impact of European integration

issues on the structure of national ideological cleavages.4. Whereas the controversy on the media law officially ended in March 2011, once the Hungarian

Parliament amended it in order to address the European Commission’s criticism (regarding the

incompatibility of this law with the acquis communautaire in terms of fundamental rights andInternal Market legislation), several MEPs condemned the fact that the Hungarian government got

away with a minima changes, without questioning the overall philosophy underlying this legisla-

tion (Euractiv 2011b). More importantly, there was no official EU-level reaction to the far-reach-

ing constitutional reform adopted by the Hungarian parliament on 18 April 2011 and whichshould go into force on 1 January 2012.

5. It is the Council of Europe’s advisory organ on constitutional matters.

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