EVALUATING THE MARCH 2001 DISTRICT ELECTIONS€¦ · "CONSENSUAL DEMOCRACY" IN POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA...

"CONSENSUAL DEMOCRACY"IN POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA

EVALUATING THE MARCH 2001DISTRICT ELECTIONS

9 October 2001

Africa report N°34Nairobi/Brussels

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....................................................................i

I. INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................................5

II. CONFLICTING ELECTION OBJECTIVES: DECENTRALISATION ANDCONSOLIDATION OF RPF POWER............................................................................................3

A. RPF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: TEACHING DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL UNITY AND IDENTIFYING THE“WISE MEN”.............................................................................................................................................3

B. BREAKING THE GENOCIDAL MACHINERY.................................................................................................5

C. PREPARING FOR THE 2003 NATIONAL ELECTIONS AND BEYOND .............................................................6

III. EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL CONSTRAINTS..........................................................................8

A. THE REGIONAL INSECURITY TRAP ............................................................................................................8

B. INTERNAL POLITICAL TENSIONS...............................................................................................................9

C. THE CHALLENGE OF LIMITED RESOURCES................................................................................................9

IV. THE CONDUCT OF THE DISTRICT ELECTIONS: MAXIMUM CONTROL FORMAXIMUM RESULTS? .................................................................................................................10

A. THE 1999 PRECEDENT ............................................................................................................................11

B. THE NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION: POLITICAL CONTROL AT ITS BEST .....................................121. Composition Of The NEC ..........................................................................................................................122. A Too Powerful Institution.........................................................................................................................143. Voter Registration ......................................................................................................................................14

C. THE RACE BEFORE THE RACE .................................................................................................................141. Problematic Candidacies ............................................................................................................................152. Campaign Controls .....................................................................................................................................16

D. VOTING AND RESULT .............................................................................................................................17

E. OBSERVATION OF THE ELECTIONS.........................................................................................................20

V. CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................................21

APPENDICESA. MAP OF RAWANDA.................................................................................................................................25

B. CHRONOLOGY ........................................................................................................................................26

C. NATIONAL DECENTRALISATION POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA (SELECTED ABSTRACTS OFOFFICIAL DOCUMENTS............................................................................................................................31

D. 1999 AND 2001 ELECTORAL STATISTICS ...............................................................................................34

E. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .........................................................................................36

F. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS....................................................................................................37

G. ICG BOARD MEMBERS ..........................................................................................................................41

ICG Africa Report N° 34 9 October 2001

"CONSENSUAL DEMOCRACY" IN POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA

EVALUATING THE MARCH 2001 DISTRICT ELECTIONS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Ever since the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)came to power in 1994 in the wake of a genocidein which 800,000 people died, its government hasmainly been assessed in relation to the way it hasfaced the legacy of the genocide and maintainedstability. Understandably, the Rwandan regime hasbeen preoccupied with its own security, especiallyas thousands of génocidaires reorganised in theCongo, initially supported by Mobutu Sese Seko,and then by both Laurent and Joseph Kabila. Andthere is no doubt that the threat posed by the ex-FAR and Interahamwe rebels in the DRC isserious, and that little has been done by theinternational community to counter it. However, itdoes not always justify the tight domestic politicalcontrol still exercised by the RPF dominatedgovernment in Rwanda.

The international community, burdened by its ownfeelings of guilt for failing to stop the genocide in1994 has accepted the RPF’s view that securityimperatives require military dominance and thatgenuine political liberalisation will have to wait.Combined with an assumption that the RPFrepresents a "new leadership" determined to inventa new political model rooted in Rwandan culture,this has produced an implicit internationalconsensus which gives the RPF almost unlimitedtime to achieve its proclaimed goals.

The RPF regime has consistently asserted itsintention to convert its highly militarised system ofgovernment into a civilian democracy rooted inethnic reconciliation, purged of ethnic stereotypesand hatreds, and equipped with a new constitution.

A time frame for the transition, originally set forfive years, has been extended to nine years, to July2003. The district elections conducted on 6 March2001 were seen by both the RPF and theinternational community as an important stage inthat transition process. This report examines indetail the conduct of those elections and drawssome conclusions about the direction in whichRwanda’s political reconstruction is proceeding.Those tentative conclusions will be tested infurther ICG reports on the transition process, to bepublished over the next several months.

The RPF and the Rwandan Government ofNational Unity (GNU)1 that it controls claim to beattempting to break from the country’s colonialand post-colonial political inheritance. SinceNovember 2000, they have been decentralisinggovernment institutions and power with thedeclared aim of destroying the political machinerythat facilitated the genocide. The administrativeorganisation of the country is being changed andnewly created districts are becoming the focus ofdevelopment efforts. Resources are to be allocatedto the new districts through collective decision-making at administrative levels that are closer tocitizens. The objective of this policy is said to belocal empowerment and mobilisation of people totake the destiny of their communities into their

1 Soon after the genocide and the RPF’s military victory,the new government was set up with the aim ofimplementing the program of the October 1993 Arushaagreement, which foresaw a government of NationalUnity.

“Consensual Democracy” in Post-Genocide Rwanda: Evaluating the March 2001 District ElectionsICG Africa Report N° 34, 9 October 2001 Page iii

own hands. The selected political model is called"consensual democracy".

There was also a more important goal in holdingthe March elections, which was to begin to developa new RPF "cadre" in the countryside and to buildthe party’s political base ahead of presidential andparliamentary elections in 2003. Great care wastaken, therefore, in the organisation of theelections. A RPF-controlled National ElectoralCommission (NEC) supervised the entire processand delivered superbly organised polls. Thenational participation rate was over 90 per cent,and very few electoral malpractices were registeredby local and international observers.

Yet, these elections were far from satisfactory byany democratic standards. The NEC abused itspowers to veto unwanted candidates and guaranteethat only supporters of government policies wereselected. Voters could choose between 8,175 NEC-screened candidates to fill slightly more than 2,700district counsellor positions. But the five seniorexecutives of each district, and the mayor of thecapital, Kigali, were chosen by electoral collegesrather than by popular vote. Eighty per cent ofthese electoral colleges were composed of cell andsector officials who themselves had gained theirpositions in rather undemocratic elections in 1999.And their choices for district positions heavilyfavoured the status quo: 81 per cent of thoseelected were incumbent heads of communes(bourgmestres), previously appointed by thegovernment.

The tight political control exercised over thedistrict elections is at least partly explained by thefact that Rwanda remains a country at war. TheRwandan civil war has been largely exported toCongo's territory since 1994 but the security threatis not only external. The Ex-FAR and Interahamwemilitias occasionally recruit inside Rwanda, andlaunch attacks across the border. Some segments ofthe population still share the “Hutu power”ideology that exploded seven years ago into thecampaign to exterminate the country’s minorityTutsi population. One of the screens exercised bythe RPF and government through the NEC wastherefore to ensure that only counsellors anddistrict executives who endorse the policy of“national unity and reconciliation” were elected.

But by constricting political freedoms under themotto of national unity and reconciliation, the RPF

risks eroding the very foundations of its ownpolicies and dampening hopes for Rwanda’srecovery. Rwandans have shown, for example bytheir acceptance of Community DevelopmentCommittees (CDCs), that they are willing to takeover management of their own communities whengiven the opportunity, training and resources. Butthe omnipotence of the security services and thepolitical control applied to basic political freedomsin the name of national goals have becomecounter-productive. They have driven governmentopponents outside the country, and risk feeding theexternal threat that the government claims to fightmost. In this context "consensual democracy" hasbecome the imposition of one party’s ideology.

It is time to look to look at governance issues inRwanda from a fresh perspective and toacknowledge that the focus on external securityhas restricted reform of internal politics. Of coursethe regional security context has to be taken intoaccount and the international community must domuch more to assist in the Disarmament,Demobilisation, Reintegration and Rehabilitation(DDRR) of the Hutu rebels. It should also exercisediplomatic pressure to speed up the peaceprocesses in the DRC and Burundi, both of whichhave important implications for Rwanda.

But nine years on, a change of course is necessaryif the transition is to succeed. Without theacceptance of opposition voices in the internaldebate and the eventual return and reintegration ofthe Hutu groups, political life in Rwanda willremain distorted and unhealthy. The ongoingwriting of the new constitution is a goodopportunity for the regime to show its willingnessto increase political freedom.

International donors, whose aid is vital to resource-poor Rwanda, can make an important contributionto Rwanda's political reconstruction. They need touse diplomatic pressure on Rwanda’s neighboursto improve its security but also to develop a criticaldialogue with the government on the central issueof political freedom, and to support Rwandanefforts with funds and technical assistance to laythe foundations for a more stable future.

“Consensual Democracy” in Post-Genocide Rwanda: Evaluating the March 2001 District ElectionsICG Africa Report N° 34, 9 October 2001 Page iv

RECOMMENDATIONS

To Rwanda’s international donors:

1. Pressure the signatories of the Lusakaagreement to comply with their commitmentto stop supporting and disarm the ex FARand Interahamwe and give strong financialand political support to DDRR processes.

2. Give financial and technical support to helpcreate an efficient election observationprogram capable of monitoring the 2003national polls.

3. Begin a critical dialogue with thegovernment of Rwanda on the issue ofpolitical freedoms in the country, settingclear democratic standards and benchmarksfor the continuation of financial support, andoffer assistance and expertise in reachingthese standards and benchmarks. Inparticular, encourage the government ofRwanda to:

a. Provide genuine autonomy to the newlocal government institutions and freetheir management from interference bythe military and the security services.

b. Urgently establish a legal frameworkto professionalise, define a role for,control the behaviour of, and make

accountable the community-basedLocal Defence Forces.

c. Review and amend the electoral law toguarantee the independence of theNational Electoral Commission.

d. Publicise in advance all election-related government activities to allowmonitoring by independent observers.

e. Liberalise political party activities upto the district levels to facilitatereconstruction of a genuine opposition.Allow full national political activity,including public rallies, at least sixmonths before the 2003 nationalelection.

f. Create the office of an independentombudsman with powers to offeradvice and recommendations in caseof conflicting interpretations of lawsand procedures between thegovernment and the citizens.

g. Include safeguards for politicalfreedoms and clear limits on the roleand influence of the security servicesin the future constitution.

Nairobi/Brussels, 9 October 2001

ICG Africa Report N° 34 9 October 2001

"CONSENSUAL DEMOCRACY" IN POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA

EVALUATING THE MARCH 2001 DISTRICT ELECTIONS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

For any government that follows the overthrow ofan authoritarian regime, the challenges ofpolitically liberalising are immense and divisive;Imagine, then the significant additional obstaclesfacing a political transition following genocide.The Rwandan government, dominated by theRwandan Patriotic Front, which came to power inthe wake of a genocide that resulted in the deathsof 800,000 people, faces just such a test.Unfortunately, if not surprisingly, its earlyelectoral efforts have not yet been equal to its ownrhetorical objectives of popular empowerment andtransparency, professed in its original "liberation"ideology.

Since the genocide, the government’s strategy hasbeen to develop a political system radicallydifferent from those of the first and secondRepublics, led by Grégoire Kayibanda (1964-1973)and Juvénal Habyarimana (1973-1994). Accordingto the RPF ideology, these leaders preached hatredbetween ethnic communities and practised thepolitics of division. National reconciliationbetween the Tutsi and Hutu communities,decentralisation of government and popularparticipation in the affairs of the country, wereidentified by the government as the three guidingprinciples of its policies2 that the district electionswere to set in train3.

2 Republic of Rwanda, Office of the President of theRepublic, “Report on the reflection meetings held in the

On 6 March 2001, Rwanda held the first localgovernment elections in the history of the country.The Rwandan population elected 2,765 sectorrepresentatives nationally. One week later, Districtbased Electoral Colleges selected 106 town anddistrict mayors, and an additional 424 new townand district executives. These multiple pollsfollowed the cell and sector polls of March 1999and were the most visible implementation so far ofthe official democratic decentralisation policy,which has been promoted since 1998 as one of thebuilding blocks of Rwanda’s politicalreconstruction.

These elections had a further objective, however.They provided the opportunity for the rulingRwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) to identify a newset of local leaders, whom it sought to co-opt inorder to entrench its power in the rural areas, andguarantee a parliamentary and presidentialmajority at the planned national elections in 2003.4The March 2001 vote was, therefore, an importanttest.

Office of the President of the Republic from May 1998 toMarch 1999 (detailed document)”, Kigali, GovernmentPrinters, August 1999, Chapter II, pp. 42-54.3 The decentralisation policy is not new to Rwanda though.It had been a central policy of the Habyarimana regime inthe late eighties and early nineties. Yet, it never bore fruitsbecause of the war and the unwillingness of centralgovernment to share its resources with the decentralisedauthorities.4 ICG interview, RPF cadres Kigali 24 August 2001 andformer RPF cadre, Brussels, 10 July 2001.

“Consensual Democracy” in Post-Genocide Rwanda: Evaluating the March 2001 District ElectionsICG Africa Report N°34, 9 October 2001 Page 2

However, the objective of consolidating of power,and the accommodation of conflicting politicalinterests to maintain tight political control riskundermining the elections' democratic potential.

The main justification remains the security threatof the ex-FAR and the Interahamwe. Afterobtaining refuge in the Congo in 1994, the rebelsregrouped and reorganised, first under thepatronage of Mobutu, then of Laurent DésiréKabila, now of his son Joseph Kabila. Theyattracted new recruits under the generic name ofthe Armée de Libération du Rwanda (ALIR). ALIRhas been trained and armed by the Congolesegovernment and its allies to fight Rwanda.

In addition to external threats, the government ofRwanda bears the scars of the genocide, a heavilytraumatised and divided society. The killing of800,000 people, the flight of another two million tothe Congo and Tanzania (of whom close to onequarter never returned) and the repatriation of onemillion more from all over the world have createda country of people who feel strangers to oneanother, although they speak the same mothertongue, kinyarwanda. In this environment, politicalaspirations tend to be inspired by revenge, fear orthe desire to enjoy the rewards of military success.The government also has extremely limitedresources with which to carry out its policies, andis heavily dependent on donor funding.

This mixture of regional insecurity, conflictingpolitical aspirations and limited resources largelyexplains why the RPF feels it must implement itspolicy of democratic decentralisation undermaximum control. The objectives are to establish acompetent and politically reliable localgovernment leadership that will guarantee the flowof aid; efficiently pursue the government’sdevelopment strategy; provide constant support fornational unity and reconciliation; and last but notleast ensure satisfactory political results for theRPF in 2003. The electorate’s genuine wishes andchoices are peripheral to this strategy.

It is now becoming increasingly evident that thefocus on external security has had serious politicalimplications on Rwandan internal politics. Theregime also hoped that a strong RPF leadership andthe war against a common enemy based outside thecountry would help reinforce national unity. Buteach stage of consolidation of RPF power to dealwith security concerns created tensions and

reinforced dissatisfaction about power andresource sharing. Accompanied by restrictions ofdebate and repression of any type of opposition,the opaque decision making process in the RPFmovement, led a number of opponents to believethat political debate could not take place inside thecountry and to seek support outside.

This report analyses the March 2001 districtelections as a case study of the actual resultsachieved by the government regarding the politicalreconstruction of the country.5 It shows that theRPF is implementing a decentralisation policy inthe name of democratisation, without giving it thechance to succeed. By restricting politicalfreedoms to a motto of "national unity andreconciliation" and co-opting leaders that will keepthe regime in place, the RPF is denying theRwandan society ways to express its pluralism. Asa result, it is failing to create the new system ofgovernance that the country so urgently needs, andis encouraging opposition to express itself outsidethe country, therefore feeding what it claims tofight most -- external insecurity.

5 This report is based on three weeks of ICG field work, byboth Rwandan and foreign researchers, focusing on theprovinces of Gisenyi, Gitarama, Kibungo and Kigali.While the sample is not definitive, we have found noevidence that suggests the trends uncovered by ICG inthese provinces were not reproduced in the rest of thecountry.. The communal elections are used as a test case toput into perspective the general political situation of thecountry.


II. CONFLICTING ELECTIONOBJECTIVES:DECENTRALISATION ANDCONSOLIDATION OF RPF POWER

A. RPF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY:TEACHING DEMOCRACY AND NATIONALUNITY AND IDENTIFYING THE “WISEMEN”

RPF views on Rwanda’s political reconstructionare based on its diagnosis of the Habyarimanaregime and of the currents that led to the 1994genocide. It identifies an overly centralised statestructure and ruthless dictatorship as the two rootcauses of the 1994 massacres According to theRPF, the Rwandan population was disempoweredand obeyed like automatons, blindly accepting thescapegoating of the Tutsi community and the Hutuinternal opposition. “In some communes, in 1994,almost the entire population had contributed to thegenocide. The majority were very docile, guidedby “power” leaders or greedy individuals eager toacquire the belongings of the victims (…)”explains RPF leader Tito Ruteremara. “Thepopulation now has to learn what it has neverknown”6. The genocide, showed how deeply ethnichatred had been cultivated by the leaders of thefirst and the second Republics, and it demonstratedthe extent to which mentalities have to change inRwanda.

Ethnic discrimination was the legitimising tool ofthe first two Republics, established afterindependence in 1964. Leaders built their regimeson the ideology that political majority rule equalsethnic majority rule, implying that democracymandated the empowerment of Hutu leaders andthe exclusion of Tutsis from all positions ofgovernment. The first Republic, under theleadership of Grégoire Kayibanda, claimed toimplement the policies of what is called in Rwanda“the 1959 social revolution” while pursuing thesystematic exclusion of Tutsis. Democracy becamea smoke screen for the domination of Hutu leadersfrom the centre of the country. Regular massacresand pogroms of Tutsi people throughout the 1960’sled to the flight of hundreds of thousands toUganda, Tanzania, the Congo and, in smaller

6 ICG interview, Tito Ruteremara, Kigali, 25 January2001.

numbers, to western countries. Infighting betweenHutu elites from the centre and from the Northwestof the country led to the overthrow of Kayibandain 1973 by General Juvénal Habyarimana, hischief-of-staff, originating from the Northwest.Habyarimana replaced exclusion of the Tutsis withethnic quotas in state institutions and schools. TheSecond Republic ended with Habyarimana's death,three months of genocidal killings and the RPF’smilitary victory in July 1994 over the ex-FAR andInterahamwe.

From its earliest days on, the RPF has professed adetermination to establish "true democracy",defined as political majority rule based on agenuine program uniting all Rwandans.7 Theoriginal RPF ideology proclaims indeed that itsmain objective is the eradication of ethnicity frompublic life, which was promoted by colonisers as a"divide and rule" policy, and then reinforced bypost-colonial rulers to consolidate theirauthoritarian regimes.

After the genocide, the Government of NationalUnity’s (GNU) program endorsed this as theguiding principle of its policies. Consensus washeld up as the best procedure to follow for itsadoption and implementation.8 National consensus,reached after consultation and debate with allconcerned parties, is defined as “the majority’sgood ideas”9. The RPF claims that this processreflects pluralism, which is defined as “thecombination of many opinions”10. It is intended torecreate a sense of community and belongingamong Rwandans, proving that they can transcendtheir regional, religious or ethnic divisions. It is, intheory, the embodiment of the "consensualdemocracy" that the RPF seeks to implement.

The March 2001 district elections must be seen inthis context. They aimed to create the conditionsfor consensual democracy within localgovernment, just as the government considers it

7 ICG interview, RPF Secretary general, Kigali, 15/03/01.8 Cf. ICG interview, Tito Ruteremara, Kigali, 25 February2001.9 Cf. Republic of Rwanda, Office of the President of theRepublic, “Report on the reflection meetings held in theOffice of the President of the Republic from May 1998 toMarch 1999 (detailed document)”, Kigali, GovernmentPrinters, August 1999, p. 43.10 Cf. Misser (F.), « Vers un nouveau Rwanda ? Entretiensavec Paul Kagame », Bruxelles, Luc Pire/Karthala, 1995,p. 133.


has promoted such conditions at national level. Asthe former Secretary General of the Ministry forLocal Government, Protais Musoni, argued at a“sensitisation” seminar in Ruhengeri: “We needunity and reconciliation. We need to feelRwandese, all equally. But it’s only possible whena community has common ideas, a commonauthority, the same government. After the Councilof Ministers is finished, and the decision-makingprocess is over, every Minister knows that thedecisions taken are not those of a Hutu or a Tutsi.It will be the same for the decisions taken at thelevel of sector committees. And in the end, theethnic issue will fade away”.11

Participation of the population in the decision-making process, genuine representation at localand national levels, popular control over leaders inorder to strengthen their accountability are thethree pillars of the government and RPFdemocratisation policy12.

But the RPF has also set limits to democratisation:“Elections are one manifestation of democracy,and because we committed ourselves to teach ourpeople what it was, we are doing it”13. It is doneonly in so far as it does not compromise nationalunity and reconciliation. First, elections are notregarded as democracy by themselves. Accordingto President Kagame, democracy needsdevelopment and must include “fundamentaldimensions and rights that are indispensable for thedignity of man”(i.e. among others: security -- theright to life, the absence of any socialdiscrimination, the right to equal opportunities, theright to a fair share of national resources, the rightto freedom of expression of opinion).14 Second,elections, and especially multi-party elections, areregarded as tending to promote divisions. This,according to Paul Kagame, justified the suspension 11 Cf. « Les échéances électorales de Mars 2001 », GrandsLacs Hebdo, 23/01/01. Musoni served as chairman of theNational Electoral Commission during the March 2001elections. See below.12 Cf. Republic of Rwanda, Office of the President of theRepublic, “Report on the reflection meetings held in theOffice of the President of the Republic from May 1998 toMarch 1999 (detailed document)”, Kigali, GovernmentPrinters, August 1999, p. 43.13 Interview ICG, Charles Murigande, Kigali, 2 March2001.14 Cf. Statement by H.E. Major General Paul Kagame,Vice-President and Minister of Defence to theDevelopment and Cooperation Committee of the EuropeanParliament, 20 January 1998.

of political party activities in 1995: “at the presentmoment, if you tried to organise elections, toauthorise the proliferation of parties likemushrooms and let them start competing, youwould create problems even bigger than those youalready have: you would divide divided people …Multi-partyism in African societies, what does itmean? I use any tactic to distinguish myself frommy neighbour in order to get more votes than him.In this game, it does not really matter if I lie. In thecurrent process, if you authorise elections, at thispresent time, you will never build that country.You will never have a united country. We won’thave democracy: people are going to rush on oneanother”15.

Seven years later, political parties are still barredfrom local elections. RPF Secretary-GeneralCharles Murigande explained that “so far, we can’tevaluate the contribution of political parties toreconciliation, even when they belong toinstitutions which are devoted to reconciliation.The immaturity of political parties in Africa issuch, that they build their following on ethnic orreligious lines; it convinced us that the populationshould be left alone to elect competent leaders”.16

The RPF regime considered the local districtelections a test to gauge whether the populationhad abandoned radical views and adopted the newregime's values:

For the past seven years, we have tried to teach theRwandan population new values. Rwandans mustbe judged on what they are capable to do, not onwhat they are by accident. This country belongs toall of us and positive values are necessary torebuild it. The issue [for the district elections] willbe to see whether the population agrees to this. Itreally is the central issue. If the population choosespeople who believe in these values, we will havesucceeded in our mission, even if the candidatesbelong to other parties. There is no differencebetween these people and the RPF. But if thepeople elected are sectarians, it will mean that thefuture is still uncertain. If few people of the RPFare not selected but many with positive values, Iwill easily recruit them. These elections are goingto show us to what extent the country has changed.

15 Cf. Misser (F.), « Vers un nouveau Rwanda ? Entretiensavec Paul Kagame », Bruxelles, Luc Pire/Karthala, 1995,p. 134.16 ICG interview, Kigali, 2 March 2001.


(…) If radicals and extremists are elected, we willbe able to say that we are still in danger17.

As these quotations show, the regime does not yetfully trust the population,. It doubts that voters are"enlightened" enough to choose the leaders bearing“positive values”, the wise men and women that itwill then seek to recruit into its ranks. Thedecentralisation program was designed in part toidentify these wise men and women and give thema chance to prove themselves, according to theRPF criteria.

B. BREAKING THE GENOCIDALMACHINERY

The second objective of the March 2001 electionswas to break the administrative machinery that hadfacilitated genocide and still inhibits the change inRwanda’s political culture.

In May 2000, the government published itsdecentralisation blueprint18, which identified threemodes of implementation: 1) a shift of centralgovernment services and functions towards localgovernment levels; 2) delegation of resources tolocal government; and 3) devolution of powers tolocal government institutions.19 Implementationover three phases will eventually result in thetransfer of all provincial responsibilities to thedistricts,20 which will become the focus of localgovernment. Other levels of administration willsimply support local and central governmentactivities.

This decentralisation process, if genuinelyimplemented, could change the face of Rwanda’sadministration. Its objective is to bury the prestigeand authority of the former Commune leaders, thebourgmestres, who bore much of the responsibilityfor implementing the genocide, and to set up a new 17 Interview ICG, Charles Murigande, Kigali, 2 March2001.18 Cf. Republic of Rwanda, Ministry for LocalGovernment and Social Affairs, National DecentralizationPolicy, May 2000; and Republic of Rwanda, Ministry forLocal Government and Social Affairs, ImplementationStrategy for National Decentralisation Policy, May 2000;Appendix 4: The National decentralisation policy of theGovernment of Rwanda (Some abstracts).19 Cf. Republic of Rwanda, Ministry for LocalGovernment and Social Affairs, National DecentralizationPolicy, op. cit. p. 5.20 Ibidem, p. 9.

political culture, based on participation, collectivedecision-making and accountability of the districtexecutive to the district council. Under JuvénalHabyarimana's regime, Rwanda was divided intoprefectures, communes, sectors and cells. Eachdivision had a head, appointed by the Office of thePresident. The commune became a strong unit ofidentification for the Rwandan population, and thebourgmestres had unchallenged authority overtheir fellow commune members, whom theyguided and coerced in all aspects of life.

The new framework is intended to break with thecolonial legacy both in form and substance. Itestablishes levels of collective consultation fordecision-making from the bottom level of the statepyramid, while the pyramid itself is substantiallyrevised, with changes of terminology andadministrative boundaries. The government hasrenamed most districts, often reverting to oldernames of socio-cultural administrative units, usedand institutionalised by the monarchy andthroughout colonisation21.

The implementation of the administrative reformtook place in December 2000 as the 154 formercommunes were transformed into 106 new units,consisting of 91 districts and fifteen towns.

However, the new indirect system ofrepresentation has been criticised for being bothtoo complex and open to manipulation22. TheNational Electoral Commission (NEC) chairman,Protais Musoni, admits that it was not very wellreceived by the population during its sensitisationcampaign23 and that Rwandans complained openlythat they could not elect their district mayordirectly. The RPF considers, however, that directelections would defeat the purpose of its policy,which aims to break down the personalisation ofauthority. The government wishes to weaken anydirect link between the population and its districtleaders in favour of a stronger collectiveaccountability that would increase popularparticipation in local government. Of course,indirect representation is by no means necessarilyundemocratic. Such systems are common at localand national levels in many democratic societies. 21 ICG Interview, Tito Ruteremara, Kigali, 25 January2001. For a full description of the changes and the newstructures, see Appendix 2 below.22 Human Rights Watch, “Rwanda Backgrounder”, 31January 2001.23 ICG interview, Kigali, 03 February 2001


In this respect, at least in theory, the Rwandansystem represents an interesting experiment inbuilding a new type of governance.

C. PREPARING FOR THE 2003 NATIONALELECTIONS AND BEYOND

Rwanda is now preparing for the end of a nine-year political transition. After the genocide and theRPF’s military victory, the new government wasset up with the aim of implementing the October1993 Arusha agreement24. The program includedorganisation of national elections, the writing of anew constitution, and the formation of a nationalarmy.25 The original five-year transition period,–extended to nine years in 1999 – has next on itsagenda the writing of a new constitution.

But before the deadline expires, the RPF mustevolve from a rebel movement to a genuinepolitical party. The March 2001 polls were seen,therefore, a crucial component of the RPF’sstrategy to retain power beyond the end of thetransition. They offered a useful technical rehearsalfor national elections and identified new localleaders who could strengthen the RPF’s politicallinks to the countryside. 24 The Arusha agreement between the Government of theRepublic of Rwanda and The Rwandan Patriotic Front wasnegotiated from July 1992 to October 1993 in order to putan end to the war started in October 1990 by the RPF.Reached under the facilitation of the Government ofTanzania, The agreement consists of five protocols and aceasefire agreement dealing with the different bones ofcontention which led to the war: 1. The restoration of therule of law; 2. Power sharing between the differentRwandan armed and non-armed political forces; 3.Therepatriation of Rwanda refugees and the resettlement ofinternally displaced persons; 4. The integration of botharmies in one army of national unity; 5. The practical stepsto be taken for its implementation. The Agreement neverhad the opportunity to be implemented before the RPFtook over Kigali. By April 1994, UN forces had beendeployed in Kigali and one RPA battalion had taken itsagreed position within Parliament premises, but recurrentkillings of Tutsi civilians by Interahamwe militias andultimately the beginning of the genocide, right afterJuvenal Habyarimana’s plane was shot down on 7 April1994, forced the RPF to restart the war. Since October1994 and the formation of the Government of NationalUnity, the Arusha agreements have been considered as partof the fundamental Laws of the country, even thoughmany of its provisions are not respected anymore.25 Cf. “Arusha Peace Accords between the Government ofthe Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandan PatrioticFront », mimeo, 1993.

The origin of the democratic decentralisationpolicy can be traced to the RPF’s February 1998Congress at Kicukiro. The main outcome of thatCongress is often seen as the rise of Paul Kagameto the RPF chairmanship, replacing the Ministerfor Interior, Col. Alexis Kanyarengwe. In addition,President Pasteur Bizimungu was elected vice-chairman and Charles Murigande, a professor ofmathematics and former rector of the RwandaNational University in Butare, secretary-general.26

This new team received a strong mandate: to takethe country through the transition period and toensure an RPF victory in the eventual nationalelection.27 Democratic decentralisation wasconceived as a road map for that national electoralvictory, with a number of steps that would allowthe RPF to build and test its capacity to win votes.

The strategy was to be implemented in three steps:policy formulation, establishment of the necessaryinstitutional set-up, and construction of reliableelectoral machinery. The policy formulationprocess was filtered through the UrugwiroSaturday meetings, which were convened byPresident Bizimungu from the end of May 1998until February 1999. Every Saturday, the presidentinvited members of the cabinet, the executivebureau of the Transitional National Assembly(TNA), presidents of TNA commissions, leaders ofnational organisations (parties, civil society),prefects, local wise men and sometimes clerics toconsult and achieve consensus on key policyissues. These meetings were aimed to test majorRPF policy initiatives with the other politicalforces of the country.28 The members of theSaturday sessions therefore agreed that, on anexperimental basis, and with a view to promotingdecentralisation, popular elections would be heldnation-wide.29

26 Economist intelligence unit, Rwanda report, 2nd quarter1998.27 ICG Interview, former RPF official, Brussels, 12 June200128 Looking at the conclusions of the Urugwiro sessionsreport, the Saturday meetings did not seem to leave muchroom to accommodate contrasting views though. Cf. Theunfortunate experience of the MDR leadership at the endof May 1998 is recalled in Reyntjens (F.), “Evolutionpolitique au Rwanda et au Burundi, 1998-1999”, inMarysse (S.), Reyntjens (F.), sld., Annuaire de l’Afriquedes Grands Lacs 1998-1999, Anvers-Paris, CEGL-L’Harmattan, 1999, pp. 127-128.29 Republic of Rwanda, Office of the President of theRepublic, “Report on the reflection meetings held in theOffice of the President of the Republic from May 1998 to


The RPF began to build its electoral machineimmediately after the February 1998 Congress.First, its corps of cadres was revived for “Politicsand Mass Mobilisation” (PMM). Cadres form theactive political arm of the RPF. They were firstset-up during the war to mobilise, recruit andspread the RPF philosophy in both “occupied” and“freed” territory inside Rwanda, and among theRwandan diaspora. From July 1994 onwards,cadres were in charge of the distribution of housesand the general political surveillance of foreignand national institutions. Cadres were posted at alllevels of the administration, both in Kigali and theprovinces, to control the actions of civil servants,ministers and politicians. They applied to work inUN agencies, local and foreign NGOs and keybusinesses to monitor attitudes towards thegovernment and general activities. They were alsoin charge of information and responsible forrunning the RPF-related institutions (RPFsecretariat, Rwanda Development Organisation,the Tristar group of companies, Rwanda NewsAgency, Office Rwandais d'Information, etc.).30

In July 1998, the RPF secretary-general organiseda meeting in Kicukiro and gave the cadres a newmission: electoral victory. RPF cells were to becreated in every administrative cell throughout thecountry with the duty of selecting three to fivecandidates for the March 1999 local elections.Cadres were also involved in the set-up of LocalDefence Forces (LDF)31, with the support of thearmy. Officers, who themselves had been trainedfor PMM, often gave the cadres logisticalsupport.32

In parallel, the February 1998 Kicukiro Congressput Aloysia Inyumba, the minister for Women andSocial Services, in charge of building up a nationalRPF network of women’s groups (Inzego Z'abarin'abategarugori), using funds for women’sempowerment allocated to her ministry. By the March 1999 (detailed document)”, op. cit., Chapter II, pp.42-54.30 Interview ICG, former RPF member, Brussels, 9 July2001.31 LDF are a community based security service, which issupposed to mobilise and protect the population againstinfiltrators. It has nevertheless come under heavy criticismfrom Human Rights organisation for its abuses and lack ofaccountability. Cf. among others, Human Rights Watch,“Rwanda: the search for security and Human Rightsabuses”, New York, April 2000, Vol. 12, N°1(A).32 Interview ICG, former RPF member, Brussels, 9 July2001.

first quarter of 1999, Catholic youth leaders wererecruited with the help of the newly createdNational Unity and Reconciliation Commission(NURC) to mobilise the youth constituency. Youthgroups were taken to Ingando (solidarity camps)for ideological training sessions and urged to electpro-RPF leaders who, like the leaders of thewomen’s groups, were promised positions withinthe future district councils or even seats inparliament if they supported the RPF.33 Similarly,cell and sector leaders were taken to NURCsolidarity camps to study civic education and RPFideology. The NURC solidarity camps became thetraining grounds for RPF political sensitisation,education and for the selection of electoralcandidates.34

What was therefore partly at stake in the March2001 district elections was RPF political capacityto win a parliamentary and presidential majority in2003.35 The close link between administrativereform and political process is also apparent fromthe redrawing of administrative boundaries. Theofficial purpose of the redrawing was to make thedistricts economically viable. Decentralisation toundersized administrative units, without a real taxbase, would indeed be counter-productive andunsustainable. The number of communes was,therefore, reduced from 154 to 106. But the newdistricts were also unofficially designed to becomeparliamentary constituencies.36 As confirmation,the national decentralisation policy states openlythat the future member of parliament from adistrict will have the right to attend councilmeetings and follow the council’s proceedings.

33 ICG interview, former RPF official, Brussels, 12 June2001 and youth district candidate, Kigali, 2 March 2001.34 ICG interview, Kigali, NURC official, 31 January 2001.35 For some insights see Shyaka Kanuma, “The secrets ofthe October poll”, Rwanda Newsline, Vol. 11, N°32,August 21-27 2000.36 ICG interview, western diplomat, Kigali, 9 March 2001and Rwanda Herald, 8 January 2001.


III. EXTERNAL AND INTERNALCONSTRAINTS

From the time it was launched, the RPF politicalstrategy described above has been overshadowedby the security agenda. In February 1998, themonth of the Mulindi Congress, ex-FAR andInterahamwe started re-infiltrating Rwanda fromthe Congo, jeopardising the RPF’s militaryachievements in the first Congo war. In that firststruggle in the Congo, Rwanda, allied withUganda, Angola, Zimbabwe, South Africa andBurundi, had brought Laurent Désiré Kabila topower in Kinshasa, and destroyed the Huturebellion's rear bases, significantly reducing the ex-FAR/Interahamwe threat. By January 1997, mostRwandan refugees had returned from Tanzania.Pockets of roaming fighters who had managed toescape the screening for returning refugees werefinally neutralised by the end of that year.37 But bythe beginning of 1998, Rwanda was under threatagain. Relations with Kabila deteriorateddramatically, and by August, the second Congowar broke out.

A. THE REGIONAL INSECURITY TRAP

Security has remained the first priority of theRwandan government since 1994. The governmentbelieves that, without security for Rwandancitizens, reconciliation and reconstruction policiesare meaningless. After the beginning of the secondCongo war, by early 1999, Rwanda’s territory wasagain secure enough for cell and sector elections tobe organised in March of that year. Security hasbeen restored by military campaigns,counterinsurgency tactics involving themobilisation of Hutu political leaders, theparticipation of local communities in the fightagainst the insurgents and the recruitment anddeployment of ex-FAR soldiers within the RPAunits of the Northwest.38

But the control of Rwanda’s territory by the RPAdid not mean that the security threat haddisappeared. First, the ideology of hating and 37 Cf. Economist Intelligence Unit, Rwanda reports, 1st to4th quarters 1997 and 1998.38 Cf. Prendergast (J.), Smock (D), “Post-genocidalreconstruction: Building Peace in Rwanda and Burundi”,USIP special report, 15 September 1999,www.usip.org/oc/sr/sr990915/sr990915.html

killing the Tutsi propagated by surviving Hutupower leaders remains strong in the Northwest ofthe country and has contaminated neighbouringcommunities across the Congo border in theKivus.39 The new recruits who have joined ALIRsince 1996 have been indoctrinated into the sameideology of Hutu power.40 Therefore, despite theRPA’s overwhelming military superiority over theALIR, the ideology of Tutsi extermination has notbeen eradicated and remains a genuine securityissue in the entire region. Moreover, the civil warin Burundi, where the ALIR is associated with theBurundian Hutu rebellion, is of genuine concern toRwanda. The Rwandan government cannot affordto have a hostile ALIR base on its southern borderwhile the war continues in the Kivus. The recentlydeclared hostility of Uganda, after three battlesagainst the RPA for control of the key Congo cityof Kisangani, also increases the pressure onRwanda’s government. It is highly unlikely thatUganda will wage war on Rwanda, but Kampalahas become a safe heaven for the RPF’s politicalopponents. Further, there are clear signs thatUganda is in close contact with the politicalopposition to the Rwandan regime based bothinside the country and abroad.

Rwanda, therefore, remains above all a country atwar and behaves as such. The government suspectsthat infiltration is also sometimes supported by thepopulation.41 Accordingly, the regime relies on anoversized army and powerful security services,42

39 The continued presence of Rwanda in the Congo isobviously more complex than the sole handling of asecurity threat as argued by the RPF. For background onRwanda's strategy in DRC, see ICG, “Scramble for theCongo. Anatomy of an Ugly War”, Central Africa ReportN° 12, 20 December 2000.40 ICG interview, Rwanda expert, Brussels, 17 July 2001.41 There are mixed signals sent by the Rwanda populationin this respect. In the case of the most recent May and Juneinfiltrations, Rwandans in Ruhengeri and Gisenyi wereinstrumental in stopping the ALIR quickly andsuccessfully. People informed the RPA of the infiltrator’spresence within their home areas. On the other hand, manyyoung fighters killed and captured by the RPA wereactually new ALIR recruits coming from Ruhengeri andGisenyi. This situation suggests that the adult generationof Rwandans is tired of the war and does not think ALIRcan bring a better future for Rwanda, but a number of Hutuyoungsters remain attracted by the ALIR. ICG interview,Rwandan security official, Arusha, 23 July 2001.42 On social and political trends within the RPF since 1994see Michael Dorsey, “Violence and Power-building inPost-Genocide Rwanda”, in Doom (R.), Gorus (J.), eds.,


which are regularly criticised by human rightsorganisations for their abuses.43 The Directorate ofMilitary Intelligence (DMI), the overall umbrellafor all security services, organises tightsurveillance for possible connections betweeninternal opposition and external threats andsystematically represses opponents. It hassucceeded in infusing the idea of its omnipresence,triggering self-censorship. In this context, it ishighly likely that the daily search for consensus inthe name of national unity and reconciliation is notgenuine and often succeeds only through fear.

B. INTERNAL POLITICAL TENSIONS

The current RPF strategy does not necessarilyenjoy unanimous support among the Tutsipopulation. At the upper level of government, therebuilding of a strong RPF political apparatusnecessarily implies a reduction of militaryinfluence on state decision-making and resourceallocation. At a lower level, Tutsi returnees, rightlyor wrongly, implicitly believed that the postgenocide and post victory power sharing dealwould include a bargain between the various Tutsigroups in Rwanda. Anglophone returnees fromUganda, controlling the upper tier of governmentand more specifically the army, would remainunchallenged in Kigali, while francophone Tutsireturnees from Burundi, Tanzania and the Congowould dominate the provinces and lesser offices atthe national level. The grooming of a newgeneration of Hutu leaders to take localgovernment positions undermines this unwrittenpolitical agreement at the expense of thefrancophone Tutsis, hence causing theirdissatisfaction, and of the survivors of thegenocide, who want justice a pre condition of anypolitical reform44.

In Kigali, a genocide survivor described the districtelections as “the return of the killers”.45 Accordingto him, the RPF is preparing a new generation ofHutu political leaders through the establishment oflocal authorities, in order to bury the hatchet with

Politics of identity and Economics of conflict in the GreatLakes Region, Brussels, V.U.B., 2000.43 Cf. among other reports: Human Rights Watch,“Rwanda: the search for security and Human Rightsabuses”, New York, April 2000, Vol. 12, N°1(A).44 ICG interviews, Burundi and Congo returnees, Kigali,February-March 2001.45 ICG interview, Kigali, 6 March 2001.

the Hutu masses ahead of national elections. Thegacaca judicial system, which for the genocidesurvivors will free most Hutu prisoners within twoyears, is part of the same strategy and is seen bymany as a betrayal. Moreover, some returnees donot understand why power and resources have tobe shared with the Hutus. Their ideal politicalsystem would be closer to the restoration of a strictTutsi dictatorship, similar to Burundi in the 1970’sand 1980’s, and for some, a monarchy. For them,either all Hutus carry collective responsibility forthe genocide and have to pay for it, no matter what,or power sharing is seen as a foreign imposedconcept that is unfair because it is now their timeto rule and benefit from state resources.

The entire reconciliation policy is based on thegamble that a new Hutu leadership can and willrise from the ashes of the former parties and of thepost-genocide repression, that new Hutu leaderswill adhere to RPF ideology while being “trained”and “enlightened” in the "ingando", (solidaritycamps), and that they will serve the RPF faithfully.It also assumes that they will understand the abuseof violence unleashed on suspected infiltrators andtheir accomplices since 1995, and that they willunderstand and support the demotion of mostsenior Hutu leaders since then (FaustinTwagiramungu, Seth Sendashonga, Pierre-CélestinRwigyema, Pasteur Bizimungu, Théobald GakayaRwaka, etc.).46 There are no such guarantees inpolitics, however and social perceptions can't bereformed through a top down process.

C. THE CHALLENGE OF LIMITEDRESOURCES

The Government of National Unity is also underpressure to fulfil its own promises to theinternational community. The ambitiousdemocratic decentralisation policy is based on theassumption that Rwandans are ready to participatefully in the management of their own affairs. Itdemands that people spend their own time andeffort without remuneration, to contribute to thenumerous meetings that the running of cell andsector committees necessitates. In this respect, thedecentralisation policy risks suffering from thesame problems that Uganda has experienced withits local government experiments: massiveabsenteeism and sometimes incompetence, which

46 Cf. the chronology in Appendix 1.


leaves the actual decision-making process in thehands of committee chairmen and secretaries.47

Implementation of the decentralisation policy,which has already started at sector level, showsthat the collective community involvement worksas long as there is adequate financial support,which in practice means adequate foreign financialsupport. Development aid policies focused atprovincial levels, inviting donors to concentratetheir funding on complementary projects within thesame area (ideally, at least one donor for eachprovince), have already produced satisfactoryresults. The sector level Community DevelopmentCommittees (CDC's), in particular, are consideredby many aid agencies as a success48. The CDC'shave shown that Rwandans can take overmanagement of their own communities when giventhe opportunity, training and resources. However,when no donor is available to finance developmentand infrastructure projects and promote capacity-building, the whole set-up becomes dormant, andthe consultative committees hardly meet.49 Thisraises the crucial issue of the sustainability of thedecentralisation effort in a country where resourcesare dramatically limited and too heavily consumedby security activities. Decentralisation can onlywork if there is a constant flow of financialresources to local government.

The tax base available to local authorities willremain extremely limited for the foreseeablefuture, even assuming that Kigali allows manyresources to be transferred -- a policy which hasalready met resistance in some key ministries.50

External financial support will therefore be key tothe success or failure of the decentralisationstrategy. Many expectations have already beencreated. There could be a serious political backlashif financial flows are not forthcoming.

47 ICG interview, Foreign local government technicaladvisor, Kigali, 11 March 2001.48 ICG interview, several Foreign Aid agencyrepresentatives, Kigali, 18 January 2001, 24 January 2001,9 March 2001; Western diplomat, Kigali, 23 January 2001.49 Ibid.50 ICG interview, several Foreign Aid agencyrepresentatives, Kigali, 18 January 2001, 24 January 2001,9 March 2001; Western diplomat, Kigali, 23 January 2001.

IV. THE CONDUCT OF THE DISTRICTELECTIONS: MAXIMUMCONTROL FOR MAXIMUMRESULTS?

The March 2001 District elections wereundoubtedly an administrative success. TheNational Election Commission (NEC) proved thatit could successfully conduct a poll on behalf ofboth the people of Rwanda and the Office of thePresident. But this so perfect orchestration of theevent made some observers and voters suspect thatthe results were not a genuine reflection of theRwandan people’s will.

The elections were described by the regime’sexiled opponents and even by some diplomats as afarce, controlled and manipulated by the RPF.51

Local and international human rights organisationsdenounced the complexities of the electoralsystem, the impossibility for political parties tocampaign, and the heavy control the RPF-dominated NEC exercised over the selection ofcandidates.52

The elections, however, were not a farce. Thesecret ballot was largely respected, and malpracticewas minimal. The population was given theopportunity to elect district counsellors, albeitthose cleared by the NEC, through a secret ballot.But they had to accept their mayors and otherdistrict executives chosen by an electoral collegecomposed mostly of the cell heads and sectorexecutives elected in 1999. As the RPF secretary-general explained, the Rwandan electorate wastested with a very limited mandate under tightpolitical control. The RPF took no chances but leftsome room for new “wise men” to be selected.This is a step for democratisation, as PresidentKagame himself argued53, but a very small oneindeed.

51 Cf. Organisation for Peace, Justice and Development inRwanda, “OPJDR rejects March 2001 Rwandan localelections”, 15 March, 2001 and ICG interview, westerndiplomat, Nairobi, 20 March 2001.52 Cf. Human Rights Watch, « No Contest in RwandanElections. Many Local Officials Run Unopposed », NewYork, 9 March 2001 ; LIPRODHOR, “Rapport sur lespréparatifs des élections au niveau des communes prévusen date du 6 mars 2001”, Gisenyi, 29 janvier 2001.53 Cf. Government of Rwanda, “Communal Elections asignificant step in Rwanda’s democratisation-President


A. THE 1999 PRECEDENT

The first step of the national decentralisationpolicy, the cell and sector elections held in March1999, was a preview of this year's event. Throughthese first elections, 80 per cent of the currentElectoral College was identified, which choose thenew district mayors in 2001. The March 1999elections were subjected to open political controlthrough use of the queuing system54 that firstbecame notorious when it allowed rigging of the1988 general elections in Kenya. The systemoriginated, however, in colonial times (1920’s)when chiefs and administrators told their Africansubjects to line up behind the ”right” candidates.Queuing denies freedom of choice and anysubsequent appeal since no material proof of thevote remains. The only advantage is that it ischeap, the main reason for its use in Rwanda in1999.55

There are few detailed accounts of the 1999elections.56 Reports from international observersappear strangely blind to the political manipulationinherent to the queuing system despite harshcriticism by human rights activists. Officially, ofcourse, the elections were called a huge successwith over 90 per cent participation and impeccablemanagement. International observers found noproblem with RPF-nominated bourgmestres andtheir assistants acting as the key organisers of thepolls in the countryside, or with the presence of upto ten soldiers posted on average at each pollingstation in Kigali-Rural, Butare, Gisenyi, Kibungoand Cyangugu. Under surveillance of theadministrative authorities and/or the army,candidates were supposed to announce theirrunning in the elections spontaneously at eachpolling station and give a brief speech introducingone another.

The human rights league LIPRODHOR’s accounton the voting process in Gisenyi and Ruhengeri Kagame”, www.rwanda1.com/government/, 7 March2001.54 With the queuing system, voters line up behind thecandidate of their choice.55 ICG interview, NEC executive secretary, 18 January2001.56 Cf. UNDP, “Summary of the observation of the localelections”, mimeo, 5 April 1999; LIPRODHOR,“Observation des elections locales, régions du Nord-ouestdu Rwanda”, mimeo, 6 April 1999; Economist IntelligenceUnit, Rwanda report, 2nd quarter 1999.

gives a realistic picture of what actually happened.In Karago commune of Gisenyi, for instance, thearmy was deployed by 8:00 a.m. to push people tothe polling stations. In some sectors, the number ofvoters was larger than the registered adultpopulation. Sick people and teenagers would notrisk being accused by RPA patrols of notexercising their “constitutional right”. Voting waseffectively compulsory, and 50 people werearrested in Umutara for not participating.Government officials acknowledged that thosewho did not turn up for voting were asked why andhad to provide good reasons, such as illness.57

Electoral committees often picked the candidates,who then were given an opportunity to state theirnames, level of education and age. The electorate,however, was strictly forbidden to make any loudcomment or even talk to one another about thecandidates. When the signal was given, electorswere told to line up behind the “candidate of theirchoice”58.

The electoral committees consisted of equalnumbers of military personnel and civilianadministrators. Other members of the military incivilian clothes also checked on the movements ofthe population on voting day. Under thesupervision of the prefects and their deputies, thebourgmestres organised voting operations in eachcommune. According to LIPRODHOR, 70 per centof incumbent counsellors were re-elected inGisenyi and Ruhengeri (the actual figures are 54.2percent and 59.4 percent), provoking mixedreactions from the population. Some complainedthat the exercise was a facade to legitimiseillegitimate leaders, while others were genuinelyhappy and threw the winners into the air whilesinging their praises. In Karago Commune, onereluctant candidate who had refused the honour ofbeing chosen by the electoral committee, wasjailed for two days. Interestingly, LIPRODHORconcluded that the population tended to choose themost highly educated candidates, even if in someinstances communal authorities complained thatthese were people sympathetic to armed groups(i.e. Hutu rebels).”59 Prior to the elections, therewere reports that the RPF establishment wasnervous about the possible election of “bad Hutu

57 Economist Intelligence Unit, Rwanda Report, 2nd quarter1999.58 LIPRODHOR, “Observation”, op. cit.59 Ibid.


leaders”60. But, the impeccable organisation of thepolls did not allow this to happen.

B. THE NATIONAL ELECTORALCOMMISSION: POLITICAL CONTROL ATITS BEST

The 1993 Arusha agreement stipulated that anindependent electoral commission had to guaranteethe organisation of free and fair elections inRwanda after a transition period. This commissionwas indeed set up by the RPF government tosupervise the district elections. However, in two ofthe main areas of the commission’s responsibility –selection of commissioners and of candidates – itsneutrality, transparency and independence wasdoubtful. At the national level, the permanentsecretariat, directly nominated by the Council ofMinisters, was extremely powerful. At theprovincial level, the bourgmestres participated inselection of commissioners, which meant that they,as future candidates, helped pick their own judges.NEC control over candidacies and close links withthe provincial administration made it extremelydifficult for non-RPF supporters to become districtcouncil executives, let alone, district mayors. Thisprobably explains why there were many single,unopposed candidacies throughout the country (28per cent for general candidates)61. The patronisingway in which the RPF controlled the electionsresulted in a significant number of rural elites,Hutu and Tutsi alike, deciding not to apply to becandidates, and in effect ignoring local governmentstructures.

1. Composition Of The NEC

The electoral commission that conducted theelections was composed of a permanent secretariatnominated by the executive and of a college ofcommissioners elected by Parliament only for theMarch vote. Both the president of the commission,Protais Musoni, and the executive secretary,Christophe Bazivamo, are powerful RPFpoliticians. Musoni, a secretary-general of the RPF

60 ICG interview, western diplomat, Kigali, 9 March 2001.61 There were three types of seats and therefore three typesof candidates for the elections. The general candidatesqualify for the “general seats” and can be men or women,old or young, whereas there are specific seats reserved forthe representation of traditionally disempoweredmajorities, such as the youth and women.

in the early 1990’s,62 was a prefect for Kibungo,Kigali and was also the former secretary-general ofthe Ministry for Local Government. Bazivamo is aformer prefect of Gitarama.63

Each political party presented twelve candidates toparliament for election to the college ofcommissioners. Six were chosen to form thedecision-making caucus of the commission. Thesewere in office for 60 days before the start of theelections and 30 days thereafter. The oppositionparty Mouvement Démocratique Républicain(MDR) was absent. It claims that it was not giventhe opportunity to make timelynominations.64However, political interests withinthe college were officially “balanced” between theRPF, the Parti Démocratique Islamique (PDI), theParti Social Démocrate (PSD) and the PartiLibéral (PL). This balance was supposed toguarantee the objectivity of the commission. Alldecisions reached by the commission weresupposedly taken either by consensus or by two-thirds of the commissioners elected. However,“mutual understanding” between all members ofthe commission insured that almost all decisionswere made by consensus65.

In place since August 2000, the executive secretaryand his team began supervising the elections fourmonths before the electoral commissioners wereappointed by parliament. In areas where thedecisions and authority of the commission heldmost sway, namely the appointment of district andprovincial commissioners and acceptance ofcandidacies, the permanent secretariat’s role wasdecisive.

Christophe Bazivamo was nominated executivesecretary of the NEC by the Council of Ministerson 20 June 2000, five months before the NEC wasofficially and legally established66. The permanentsecretariat of the commission supervised theelections from the very beginning, under theauthority of the permanent secretary of the

62 Cf. Dorsey (M.), “Violence and Power-building in Post-Genocide Rwanda”, op. cit.63 ICG interview, Rwanda political analyst, Kigali, 31January 2001.64 ICG interview, MDR Interim President, Kigali, 8 March2001.65 ICG Interview with college commissioner, Kigali, 14March 2001.66 The six members of the commission were nominated on14 December 2000.


Ministry for Local government, future NECchairman Protais Musoni. Upon consulting withthe Council of Ministers, the executive secretarynominated five assistants at the beginning ofAugust. Once formed, the permanent secretariatsupervised and selected commissioners at theprovincial and district levels and started publicawareness campaigns three months before the legalbasis for the commission was approved. By the endof August, the secretariat had chosen fourcommissioners for each of Rwanda’s 12 provinces,four months before the college of commissionerswould officially approve them. Meanwhile, thesecretariat appointed and trained members of thecommission at the provincial and district levels andsubsequently checked whether their activities weresatisfactory before presenting their names to thecollege for approval at the end of December. Ineffect, the decision on whether or not to confirmprovincial and district commissioners was madeentirely by the RPF dominated permanentsecretariat.

The selection of provincial and districtcommissioners was a key element of the elections.33561 commissioners and representatives of thecommission were dispatched throughout thecountry from the cell level to the commissionheadquarters in Kigali67. Commissioners wererequired to be “persons of integrity, uprightcitizens sufficiently well considered and acceptedin society that their opinion is valued throughoutthe province or district”68. In order to find potentialcandidates for the local commissions, thepermanent secretariat relied on prefects to findsuitable candidates for the provincial commission.Similarly, the newly formed provincialcommissions relied on the district authorities, theburgomaster and his team, to propose a list ofcandidates for the district commission. The tiesbetween the administration and the commission atthe grassroots level were in some cases very tight.

In the north-western province of Gisenyi, there wasno test for the recruitment of members of thecommission, only the word of the local authorities.In many cases, the local burgomaster activelysearched the district for someone suitable for thepost. Théoneste Marijoje discovered that he hadbeen picked to be part of the Gasiza districtelectoral commission during what he thought was a

67 Source: National Electoral Commission.68 ICG interview, 14 March 2001.

local administration meeting69. The prefect ofGisenyi invited a selection of influential peoplefrom the various districts of the province based ona list established by the local administration andbourgmestres. These were then informed, withoutchoice, that they were to be members of theirdistricts’ electoral commission. Members of theprovincial electoral commission were present butdid not make the final decision70.

Local electoral commissioners wielded significantpower in so far as they were the first authorities toaccept or reject candidates in their district. When,as in most districts, the outgoing bourgmestrechose to run for district mayor, he effectivelypicked the judge who was going to supervise hisefforts at being re-elected. Moreover, results oflocal investigation indicate a strong possibility thatin most districts of the province of Gisenyi at leastone member per commission was part of theDirectorate of Military Intelligence71. In thatprovince, both the president of the provincialcommission and the presidents of the commissionof Gasiza and Cyanzarwe districts were confirmedto be part of the DMI. In Gisenyi town, theassistant to the outgoing bourgmestre becamepresident of the electoral commission, furtherunderlining the links between local administrationand the commission. In Gitarama (Buringa,Ntongwe, Taba, Musambira, Nyamabuye districts)and Kibungo (Kabarondo, Rusumo districts)provinces, local members of the commission werealso chosen by the local authorities72. In thesecases commissioners could no longer be seen asobjective and impartial, but liable to favourcandidates backed by local or governmentalpolitical interests. In Gisenyi’s Kanama district, thecommission backed the candidature of one of theex-bourgmestres of the commune, IgnaceUwamungu. The commission subsequentlycontacted friends of the outgoing burgomaster,Augustin Mfitimana, urging them to dissuade himfrom running in the elections.73 Since thegovernment nominated all prefects andbourgmestres as well as the permanent secretariatof the commission, commissioners were invariablyin line with the interests of the RPF dominatedgovernment. 69 ICG observation report, Gisenyi, March 2001.70 Ibid.71 Ibid.72 ICG observation reports, Gitarama and Kibungo, March2001.73 ICG observation report, Gisenyi, March 2001.


2. A Too Powerful Institution

The law gave the NEC an essentially technicalrole. It instructs the commission to prepare,supervise and conduct the elections. In practice,however, the commission ruled on whichcandidacies to accept and which to reject whilesupervising all electoral campaigns. Districtelectoral commissions were the first to performthese tasks. Candidates were required by law to behighly educated and “persons of integrity”, anelusive criteria that the NEC alone could assess74.In fact, the law established guidelines that thecommission was supposed to implement. Thecommission was also to fill jurisdictional gaps andcomplement the law via “instructions of thepresident of the commission”. In its interpretationof the law on candidacies, the commission was thesole institution deciding whether or not to acceptpotential candidacies. The appeal to the SupremeCourt provided by the law was interpreted by theNEC as only relating to cases of ballotmanipulation, not to its own judgements. Noauthority existed to check the potential abuse ofNEC power in the district except the will of anindividual to lodge a challenge. In practice, thismeant appealing to the district level, thenprovincial, then to the NEC and, if the plaintiff wasstill dissatisfied, as a last resort, to the SupremeCourt. Given the determination needed for anindividual to pursue this process, and its sheerlength, successful complaints against the NECwere extremely rare .

3. Voter Registration

The NEC’s first achievement was almost universalvoter registration. In Kigali, the region with thehighest figures the NEC asserted that more than126 per cent of voters registered! An inaccuratepopulation census used as the basis of thecalculations explains that unrealistic figure.Nevertheless quasi-obligation to register produceda national registration rate of 98.36 per cent.75

These figures do not necessarily demonstrateenthusiasm. Popular belief was that, just as in1999, registration and voting were mandatory, andthat the military would expect citizens to carry 74 Art 10, Chap 3, N42/2000 of 15 December 2000, Lawinstituting the organisation of elections of leaders at thegrass-roots level in Rwanda75 See Appendix 5 for detailed regional statistics ofregistration levels.

their voters’ cards at all times. The lawambiguously mentioned that registration on theelectoral list was “an obligation for all Rwandanswishing to vote”.76 The first three days of theregistration period were devoted to “intensivemobilisation”. From 5 January to 8 January 2001,registration officers were sent to all cells of thecountry, accompanied by members of the LocalDefence Forces, to take people’s details. Only thendid citizens have the opportunity to registervoluntarily in the commission’s offices at districtlevel. To be registered, potential voters had to beeighteen years old and hold a national identitycard. Foreigners could also vote provided that theyhad resided in the country for at least a year.

C. THE RACE BEFORE THE RACE

The electoral law favoured either educatedindividuals or experienced administrators. To beelected a counsellor at the district level, acandidate had to hold at least a secondary schoolcertificate or diploma. But candidates willing to beelected administrator (mayor, or holder of one ofthe other district executive positions) had either tobe university graduates, have completed secondaryeducation with at least ten years of workexperience, or have completed six years ofsecondary education and have been burgomasterfor at least five years78. Such conditions wereimpossible for many would-be district mayors tosatisfy. In particular, they disadvantaged manyrural leaders.

Outgoing bourgmestres who were too unpopular orpolitically doubtful were frequently removed fromtheir positions ahead of the elections. In total, 59bourgmestres – more than one-third of the entirecorps – were replaced by decree before theelections (26 in 1999, 33 in 2000).79 These wereofficials who either were accused by the

76 Art 14, Chap 4, N42/2000 of 15 December 2000, Lawinstituting the organisation of elections of leaders at thegrass-roots level in Rwanda77 Cf. LIPRODHOR, “Rapport sur les préparatifs desélections au niveau des communes prévus en date du 6mars 2001”, Gisenyi, 29 janvier 2001.78 Art.11 and 12 Chap.3, N42/2000 of 15 December 2000,Law instituting the organisation of elections of leaders atthe grass-roots level in Rwanda79 Annexe to the decree from the Prime Minister’s officelegalising the replacement of the bourgmestres, mimeo,October 2000.


population of corruption80 or incompetence, weretoo unpopular or had been appointed by FaustinTwagiramungu or Pierre-Celestin Rwigyema. Theywere replaced by freshly trained RPF cadres.81

It would have been impossible, however, for theNEC to control all sector nominations. The greatmajority of candidates, who posed no threat for theelection of the district executives, were onlyscreened by the NEC, which, after all, was seekingto identify genuine future leaders who could laterbe recruited into the government82. While controlover candidacies for the 530 most senior executivepositions on district councils was probablyabsolute,83 the electorate was asked to chose morethan 2,700 representatives.

1. Problematic Candidacies

Prospective candidates had at least to havecompleted secondary education.84 Most people inrural areas apart from schoolteachers could notmeet this requirement. This goes a long way toexplaining the high numbers of unopposedcandidates, especially for positions reserved foryouth and women. Candidacies were also low forother reasons. Gitarama, for instance, registered 44per cent single candidacies for the general posts.85

Butare, a city and district known as the“intellectual capital of Rwanda” and dominated byfrancophone Tutsis, registered 52 per cent singlecandidacies for general posts – the highest in thecountry. The lack of qualified candidatesparticularly affected the counsellor posts set asidefor women. In Kigali, 36 sectors (84 per cent) hadjust one woman candidate.86

80 A complaint expressed directly to Paul Kagame by thepopulation, for instance, while touring Kibungo provincein August 2000. Cf. Grands Lacs Hebdo, N°209, 24-30août 2000.81 Interview ICG, former RPF Cadre, Brussels, 9 July2001; western diplomats Kigali, 25 January 2001.82 All elected counsellors shall go to solidarity camps onceelected and ICG interview, Rwandan political analyst,Kigali, 31 January 2001.83 Five executive positions for every districts.84 Art 11, Chap 3, N42/2000 of 15 December2000, Lawinstituting the organisation of elections of leaders at thegrass-roots level in Rwanda85 Cf. POER press statement 5 March 200186 The reluctance of Rwandan women to participate inpublic affairs has traditionally been ascribed to lack ofself-confidence.

The lack of volunteers sometimes forced theadministration to recruit candidates. On 22January, two days after the closure date forcandidates to submit their papers, the total numberof candidacies was 7,256. A week later the figurehad risen to 8,431. The final figure of acceptedcandidacies was 8,175, some 900 more than whenapplications were officially closed. Many of theselast minute candidates were not given the option ofrefusing to stand. In many cases, localbourgmestres recruited them. In Gitarama, thelocal prefect dispatched an assistant to Tabadistrict to recruit candidates in schools, whereteachers were simply told to write their namesdown and that the rest of the necessary informationwould be collected later.87 Other candidates weresummarily informed that they had been chosen torun.88

The only people to have completed secondaryeducation in rural areas were often teachers andtherefore constituted the overwhelming majority ofcandidates. All candidates in the district of Muturain Gitarama were teachers except for the outgoingburgomaster.89. In Buringa sector, the communaladministration dispatched the school inspector tocomplete the candidate list. The inspectorsummoned the teachers she believed were suitable,who then discovered that rather than being calledfor a school meeting they had been chosen to standfor election in their respective sectors.90 InRuyumba district in Gitarama, sector counsellorsdirectly intervened at the sector level to find youthand women candidates. All the youth and womencandidates for Birambo, Gihembe and Nyarukabasectors were picked by their respective sectorcounsellors.91

87 ICG observation report, Gitarama, March 2001.88 In the Ntongwe district of Gitarama, faced with a similarproblem, the local burgomaster convened an urgentmeeting of all sector counsellors and urged them to recruitpeople in their respective sectors who fulfilled theeducation criteria in order to get them to run in theelection. Approximately half all candidates in the districtput their names down on the last day, 20 January. Youthcandidates for Rutabo and Gitovu sectors confirmedhaving put their names down following the orders of theirsector counsellors.89 In the Mutura district of Gitarama, four teachers wereconstrained to put their names forward in the election:Ngirumpatse, Christophe Kabera, PascasieNyirabariyanga, and Anastase Nyirimpeta.90 ICG observation report, Gitarama, March 2001.91 ICG observation report, Gitarama, March 2001


The local administration’s role in the selection ofcandidates was not limited to cases wherecandidates were too few. In some instances, sectorcounsellors actively sought candidates because thevolunteers were deemed unsuitable, not popularenough, or unresponsive to Kigali’s priorities.Alice Mukamana in the Bimomwe sector ofRuyumba district was made to stand againstTriphine Mukankusi, a genocide survivor who wasnot deemed popular enough in her sector by theadministration.92

The great majority of candidates in Gisenyi wereRPF members.93 The military was directlyimplicated in forced recruitment to the party RPF.Théogene Mudahakana, the burgomaster of Karagocommune, compelled the candidates of Mutura,with the help of the 47th battalion of the RPA, tojoin the RPF. Meetings took place in militarycamps, presided over by military officers.94 Thesoldiers from those brigades later went on to votein the elections. Similarly, in January and February2001, the prefect of Kibungo, Eugene Barikana,visited all the communes of the province in orderto find candidates who would accept RPFideology. Three months before the elections,Barikana replaced six bourgmestres in differentcommunes of the province.95 It was made clear tothose removed that they were neither expected norallowed to participate in the elections. FrancoisBizimana, who had been burgomaster ofKabarondo commune, was ordered not to run inthe election during a meeting of the local branch ofthe RPF.96

In the end, political interference was very high inRuhengeri and Gisenyi, and very significant inGitarama, Kibungo and probably other provincesof the country. It did not guarantee that theinfluence of Kigali was respected in all thedistricts, as local politics often have a life of theirown, but whether engineering from above or at thedistrict level, the RPF was insistent. The only levelat which it was caught relatively unprepared andforced to innovate at the last minute to findadditional candidacies was for the elective 92 Ibidem93Christophe Kabera, Ambroise Gasabaganya and MarieBugenimana in the district of Mutura are all part of theRPF.94 ICG observation report, Gisenyi, March 200195 In the communes of Rusumo, Nyarubuye, Birenga,Sake, Mugesera and Kabarondo.96 ICG observation report, Kibungo, March 2001

positions (actually the great majority) whichinvolved deliberative functions but no decision-making. Many rural opinion leaders hadunderstood that the elections for executivepositions were arranged in advance and refused tosupport the system by seeking relativelyinconsequential district counsellor positions.

2. Campaign Controls

The electoral law required candidates to campaignunder the supervision of the electoral commissionand prohibited any party involvement. This wasalso aimed at limiting influence of wealthy andpowerful candidates, who were potentiallysubversive. Commissioners made repeatedderogatory reference to the “methods of the past”,by which they meant such practices as candidatesbuying rounds of drinks in the local bar.97

The local commissions allotted candidates an equallength of time – normally five or ten minutes – topresent their projects and ideas. All werescrupulously timed. The local commissions alsodevoted considerable effort to educating the publicin the voting process and the electoral system.Restrictions on campaigning, and the NEC’s closesupervision facilitated the re-election ofincumbents as district mayors or their nominationto district executive committees since they werethe only candidates already widely known. Thecommission guarded against the appearance of anypolitical or ethnic sectarianism in electionplatforms, strictly forbidding candidates to runalong ethnic lines. Indeed, each candidate wasthoroughly briefed on what was and was notallowed. They were told that they were forbiddento raise ideological or political issues but wereinstead expected to advocate personal projects forthe benefit of the population with a emphasis onsuch local issues as the education or availabilityand access to water or education.

The electoral law was not universally respected.The outgoing burgomaster for the commune ofMugina in Gitarama, Donat Nshimyumukiza, wasaccused by the electoral commission ofcampaigning illegally in sectors of theneighbouring commune that were to be annexed tohis commune to form Mugina district. Pressed bythe burgomaster of the latter commune, the

97 ICG observation report, Gitarama, district Kamonyi,March 2001.


commission refused Nshimyumukiza’s candidacyin Mugina district. However, Nshimyumukizasubsequently ran in the elections in Ntongwecommune. He explained to the local burgomasterthat he had been sent by the RPF and called officialmeetings of the sector committees following whichcounsellors were taken to a cabaret and told who tovote for.98

The entire local administration apparatus was attimes mobilised to ensure the election of selectedcandidates by organising and financing campaigns.In Gisenyi, the local prefect authorised outgoingbourgmestres to deduct a certain amount of moneyfrom the communal fund to finance theircampaigns, which people outside theadministration were then employed to run. Thecommission was aware of this, but did not act.99

Only one new burgomaster was elected in Gisenyiprovince, Cleophas Ntarisoba, a Hutu mayor ofKanama district, who beat Ignace Uwamungu – theformer Tutsi burgomaster of the commune –despite the illegal campaign that the administrationfinanced and ran on Uwamungu’s behalf.100

In some cases, local political groups with a vestedinterest in maintaining the status quo organisedillegal campaigns parallel to those supervised bythe NEC. When, as in Rusumo, Kibungo, both theprefect and the military leant their weight to theselocal political interests, there was little theadministration could do.101

While illegal campaigning was tacitly condoned insome parts of the country, in others, individualsrisked imprisonment if they openly questioned acandidate’s credentials. In Cyeru district, sectorNdago, of Ruhengeri province, a former counsellorwas imprisoned for twelve days for publiclycriticising the candidacy of the outgoingburgomaster. The outgoing burgomaster wasextremely unpopular in the district. He had servedsince 1994, and was accused of failing to protectthe population against raids by ex-FAR andInterahamwe militias between 1996 and 1998.102

Despite his record, the members of the ElectoralCollege, sensitised by the local districtadministration, voted him back in., and the criticalcounsellor was punished by the sector committee 98 Ibid.99 ICG observation report, Gisenyi, March 2001100 Ibid.101 ICG observation report, Kibungo, March 2001.102 ICG interview, Ruhengeri, 12 March 2001

for pursuing a counter-campaign in violation of theelectoral law.

D. VOTING AND RESULT

People voted on 6 March in impressive numbers.The technology involved - i.e. the printing ofcandidate photos on ballot papers - was masteredremarkably well, and very few irregularities werereported by national and international observers.103

The national participation rate was 96.08 per cent,with the lowest figure in Kigali town at 90.08 percent. The NEC moreover prides itself that 86,9 percent of the newly elected counsellors had noprevious relations with the provincialadministration104. In the respect, the RPF objectiveof identifying a new generation of new ruralleaders has probably been met. Their electioncarries no risk since most of them only haveconsultative powers in the new district assemblies,where their behaviour will be further tested forRPF recruitment.

Nevertheless, legitimate reservations can be raisedabout the democratic quotient in the elections.According to a local observer, the peopleconsidered the elections the “ordinary run of stateaffairs”. It was accepted that some candidates wereto be voted in, others not. Both voters andcandidates were aware of the role they wereexpected to play.105

People feared being arrested or menaced if they didnot vote, particularly in provinces like Gisenyiwith a strong military presence. Soldiers made itclear to citizens that they were expected andrequired to vote. President Kagame himselfdeclared to Radio Rwanda on 18 February 2001,that voting was not compulsory but if you did notvote: "you'd better have a good excuse"106. Manybelieved that it would henceforth be compulsory to

103 Cf. POER, « Rapport intérimaire sur les élections auRwanda », mimeo, mars 2001 ; Coordinateur PNUD,« Rapport préliminaire de l’observation électoraleinternationale », mars 2001.104 République rwandaise, Commission électoralenationale, “Elections des autorités administratives desdistricts et des villes au Rwanda du 6 au 13 mars 2001 :résultats sommaires », mai 2001.105 ICG interview, local observer, Kigali, 7 March 2001106 POER, "Rapport sur les élections de mars 20001",op.cit., p. 7.


carry the card bearing the “Yatoye” stamp as proofof having voted107.

Eighty-six of the 106 district mayors elected wereincumbent bourgmestres. Skilful lobbying, theadept use of Rwanda’s highly centralised localadministration and a favourable electoral systemcontributed to this impressive figure. In mostdistricts, members of the Electoral College hadbeen “sensitised” into voting for a particularcandidate -- usually the burgomaster with whomthey had been working for the past year or two. Inshort, there was little room for surprises in thissecond stage of the elections. The new districtmayors had presided over the cell and sectorexecutive elections of March 1999, over theselection, that is, of the officials who were now toelect them and who would themselves shortly beseeking new mandates.108 The system in place was"incestuous" and naturally favoured the status quo.

Since the vote was secret, there were no absoluteguarantees that the incumbents would be elected.Still, the promotion of one burgomaster by anotherwas often enough to ensure victory. Bourgmestresfrom communes that had been incorporated intolarger districts following the re-drawing ofelectoral boundaries often entered intoarrangements with the neighbouring commune’sburgomaster or were forced to do so by higheradministrative authorities. In the north-westernprovince of Gitarama, for example, the communeof Taba was integrated in Kamonyi districtfollowing the electoral re-drawing. The localburgomaster withdrew from the elections after theprefect backed the outgoing burgomaster from thedistrict of Runda. Similarly, in Kigali rural, theoutgoing bourgmestres of the former Tare andMbogo communes agreed between each other notto compete for the position of mayor of Rulindodistrict, a new district incorporating both theirformer communes. The Tare burgomastereventually ran in the election in another newly

107 The local observers stress that during the sensitisationcampaign, some provincial administration leaders hadannounced that voting was a "civic duty". In Kinyarwanda,the word "ugomba" was used, which does not differentiatebetween "duty" and "obligation". In the end the right toabstain was not recognised. Cf. POER, "Rapport sur lesélections de Mars 2001", op. cit., p. 7.

108 Cell and sector executives were initially elected onlyfor two years and should have sought a fresh mandatebefore the district elections. Now, the cell and sectorexecutive elections have been postponed to 2002.

formed district, Kabuga, on the invitation of itsformer burgomaster, Théogene Kalinamaryo, whohimself then ran in the Kanombe district of the cityof Kigali, part of which had formerly stood withinhis commune109. Kalinamaryo then convenedcommunal meetings in his former commune topromote his candidate, the Tare burgomaster. Since154 outgoing bourgmestres were competing for 91district mayor posts and fifteen mayoral seats, theprobability that incumbents would dominate theelection was very high.

When local political interests were in competition,collaboration with the national RPF leadership wasnecessary. This was most strongly felt in the north-western province of Gisenyi, which saw some ofthe worst fighting during the 1997/98 raids byHutu infiltrators and ex-FAR and retains aconsiderable military presence. RPF committeesand followers in Gisenyi directly forced candidatesto step down in favour of their candidates, forciblyenrolled candidates into the RPF, or recruitedpotential RPF sympathisers as candidates. RPFcommittees recommended the election of theburgomaster of the former Karago commune,Théogene Mudahakana, over that of theburgomaster of Giciye commune, ValentinNizeyimana. Nyirabagoyi, another rival ofMudahakana’s, was also forced to step down110. InRwerere district, Gisenyi, the districtadministration simply called for a meeting of allsector committees and circulated a list of the fivemembers of the executive committee for whomthey were requested to vote.

But local and national political interests sometimesdid not necessarily coincide. In the province ofKibungo, the state's decentralisation policies rancounter to Eugene Barikana’s efforts to establish anetwork of personal supporters. The localadministration did everything in Rusumo district tore-elect the outgoing burgomaster, HenryRwagasana. He was unopposed to succeed himselfas district mayor in Kirehe sector because themilitary and local defence forces intimidated otherwould-be candidates.111Despite having beenrecruited by the RPF to stand in that election,Balthasar Mukezabera, a Hutu returnee, receiveddeath threats that forced him to withdraw.Mukezabera was Kigali’s best choice, a new Hutu

109 ICG observation report, Kigali rural, March 2001110 ICG observation report, Gisenyi, March 2001111 ICG observation report, Kibungo, March 2001.


leader who could have boosted the popularity andoutreach of the system. Rwagasana, however, wasbacked by both the prefect and the militarycommander for the Kibungo, Byumba and Mutararegion, Colonel Gashayija, who were presentduring the vote of the Electoral College toencourage his victory.112.

The bigger the stakes, the less the risk theadministration was willing to take. Thus, themayor of Kigali was elected via a doubly indirectsystem. Counsellors-elect voted for representativesof their district at the city council who then wenton to run for mayor or assistant mayor. This votewas taken in a gathering of all cell representativesand sector counsellors city-wide. The law statesthat the election should take place only once alldistrict and city counsellors have been sworn induring a public oath-taking ceremony.113 Theelapsed time between the elections of districtadministrators and the mayor guaranteed anopportunity to lobby as further insurance that the“right” candidate would win. Jeanne Gakuba, amember of the newly elected city council who wasbelieved to aspire to the mayor’s office, wascontacted directly by the secretary general of theRPF, Charles Murigande, who urged her not tostand for mayor, but offered her instead the post ofgender and women’s development secretary.Gakuba had little choice but to accept, and she wonthe proffered position on election day with 95 percent of the vote.114 .

Théoneste Mutsindashyaka, ex-secretary general ofthe Ministry of Labour and Public Function, waselected Kigali’s mayor. His rival, opposition partyMDR secretary Christian Marara suspected aconspiracy to prevent him from running. He hadprivately declared that while it was possible totrick the twenty individuals on the district council,one could not trick or influence the 800 on thecapital’s Electoral college and that he logicallyexpected victory. But Mutsindashyaka won withover 90 per cent of the vote.115

The co-ordination of all participants during thesecond stage of the elections was such that therewas hardly any hesitation when candidates stepped 112 Ibid.113 Art.66 Section 2, Law N07/2001 of 19 January 2001establishing the organisation and administration of the cityof Kigali114 ICG observation report, Kigali, March 2001.115 Ibid.

up for posts on the district executive committees orcity councils. In Nyarugenge and Nyamirambodistricts in Kigali, two prominent local figureswere easily elected as mayors, respectivelyAugustin Kampayana, outgoing burgomaster forNyarugenge, and Gervais Dusbemungu, theoutgoing under-prefect of Kigali. City counsellorswere elected directly and only by the members ofthe newly chosen district council. The scope forpolitical pressure thus increased as the size of theElectoral College decreased. During the electionfor city counsellors in the Nyamirambo district ofKigali, three candidates stood for three places.Prior agreement was clear, despite the significantpolitical gamble of risking a place on the districtexecutive committee for a possible one on the citycouncil. Generally, the biggest political playersapplied for the posts.116

Since only 106 of 154 districts remained in thecountry after the re-drawing of the electoralboundaries, 48 bourgmestres could not be re-elected. In many cases, these went on to be chosenfor the second most important position on the localcouncil, secretary of finance. In Gisenyi, twobourgmestres lost their districts after the re-drawing. The burgomaster of Karago commune(merged with Giciye commune) became Secretaryof Finance in the district’s new administrationwhile the Giciye burgomaster became mayor. Inthis case, the candidate backed by the authoritiesfailed to get elected but the choice remained in thehands of prominent local politicians without scopefor real change.

In the second stage of the elections, the secrecy ofthe ballot was respected, but in the overwhelmingmajority of cases the candidates that were expectedto go through did, and most with very littlecompetition. In the Cyanwarze district of Gisenyi,the identity of four out of five of the newly electeddistrict executive committee was known before theelections, as well as the identity of the mayor forKigali. All the newly elected mayors in Gisenyiand Ruhengeri were part of the RPF. Despite thesecret ballot, the “right” candidate still won. Thiswas partly explained by the rigorous selection ofcandidates, partly by lobbying, and partly by thedisinterest and lack of motivation among

116 Sheh Abdul Karim Harelimana, Ex-Minister of theinterior, Antoine Mugesera, prominent member of theNGO IBUKA, and Christian Marara, secretary general ofthe main opposition party MDR.


Rwandans who did not believe the election couldinfluence the system. Through their cell andabakazi representatives, voters were aware ofwhich candidates the most influential localpersonality – often a RPF member - would back,and mostly they voted for that individual.

The voters' choice is understandable. Rwandansare tired of conflict. They tend to prefer candidateswho are likely to bring dispensaries, roads andschools to their impoverished localities, andappease the security apparatus, rather thanopposition candidates, who risk bringing nothingbut trouble.

E. OBSERVATION OF THE ELECTIONS

International observers concentrated on whetherthe elections could be described as “free and fair”.The international community did not give itself themeans, however, to evaluate the credibility of thepoll fully. It loosely co-ordinated observers under aUNDP umbrella, marginally funded local effortsand provided some guidelines on what to look for.A consultant endeavoured to ensure that diplomaticobservers were dispatched throughout the country.But international observation was essentiallypassive, concentrated on the events of 6 Marchrather than on the earlier activities of the electoralcommission. It did not assess the commission’sindependence, observe the registration of voters orthe selection of candidates.117. Despite theirconcerns over human rights abuses inside thecountry and the military intervention in the Congo,most donors are convinced that “this government isgoing in the right direction.” Since “it has achievedtremendous results since 1994”, many are ready tosupport it without asking too many questions.118 Ifthey sometimes privately agree that some thingsare going seriously wrong, there is a generalconsensus to give the government a smooth rideand an opportunity to sort out its securityproblems, at least until the end of the transitionperiod in 2003.

Local observers faced a more challengingenvironment. The NGO Ligue pour la Défense desDroits de l’Homme dans les Grands Lacs (LDGL) 117 Cf. “Rapport préliminaire de l’observation électoraleinternationale”, préparé par le consultant coordinateurPNUD, 10 March 2001.118 ICG interviews, diplomatic corps, Kigali, February-March 2001.

brought together six civil society groups to form anelection monitoring civil society caucus in October2000, the “Programme d’observation des électionsau Rwanda” (POER), based on the prescriptionsenshrined in the Arusha accords of 1993. Duringthe course of the elections, POER sent 96 membersinto the field, grouped in twelve teams to cover allof Rwanda’s provinces.

The combination of the haste with which theelectoral law was passed and POER’s late startproduced incomplete observation. Though plannedin October 2000, POER did not take off untilFebruary 2001, only weeks before the start of theelections. To begin, it had to gain legal recognitionfrom the Ministry for Local Government(MINALOC). Though the relationship with thegovernment was often labelled “good”, theadministration did little to facilitate POER’sexistence or work. Authorisation from NEC toobserve the elections was received only when therewas in effect little left to observe. The campaignbegan on 15 February but the commissiondistributed official observation credentials only on2 March, a mere two days before the end of theperiod.119

According to the Fédération Internationale de laligue des Droits de l’Homme (FIDH),120 theRwandan secret services infiltrate human rightsgroups in order to quell dissident voices, ratherthan directly persecuting them. The infiltrators aretasked to report on the ideological and politicalpositions of NGO members, and in some casesthey are able to change the political orientation ofthe groups. Such tactics have largely succeeded inbreaking up the Rwandan local NGO networksince 1996.121 Within POER, the powerfulgenocide survivors association IBUKA vetoedpress statements before release.122 Its executivesecretary, who had become executive secretary ofPOER in February 2001, made sure the localobservers stayed in line. It is not surprising,therefore, that the local observers were docile. Itdid not, and perhaps could not act, as the guarantorof free and transparent elections that it stated wasits purpose. Nevertheless, it made a good firstattempt that emphasised the importance of similar 119 Ibid.120 Fédération Internationale de la ligue des Droits del’Homme, Rapport annuel 1999, p. 60.121 ICG interview, Human Rights activist, Kigali, 13March 2001122 ICG interview, POER member, Kigali, 12 March 2001.


operations being undertaken during future nationalcontests.

V. CONCLUSION

As this report has shown, the March 2001 electionswere far from being free even though they werefair in terms of the ballots cast. The people ofRwanda had little to do with the choice of districtmayors or of the Mayor of Kigali, contrary to whatthe government claims, but in most sectors, theydid freely chose their representatives within thetight framework set by the electoral commission. Anew generation of “wise men”, fitting the RPFdefinition of good leadership, had the opportunityto come forward and contest for a limited mandate.

Were these elections meaningful in terms ofdemocratisation? They were politically meaningfulfor the RPF regime as an element of its politicalstrategy, but the tight political control applied tothe entire process undermined its democraticpotential. In the end the elections allowed littlemeaningful expression of views, even at locallevel, outside the proscribed framework of nationalunity and reconciliation. Their result was “virtual”,an image of near perfection rather than a reflectionof the diverse social reality of Rwanda.

This "electoral experiment" sends mixed signalsabout democratisation to the people of Rwandabecause it also happened in a context of politicalrepression of the opposition. The RPF has beenbusy recruiting new members and officialsthroughout the country, but all other parties havefound themselves in trouble for attempting to doso. Conveniently, the RPF dominated governmentis also the sole judge of political behaviour,according to the spirit of national unity andreconciliation. Opposition political figuresperceive this as a clear indication that theauthorities do not intend to permit them to make agenuine challenge in free and fair elections whenthe transition period comes to an end in two yearstime.

The demotion and departure of Minister ThéobaldRwaka Gakwaya, followed by Supreme CourtMagistrate, Col. Cyiza, were only two of the latestdevelopments in this respect. Both were accused ofrecruiting supporters for the Parti DémocrateChrétien (PDC) in secret meetings in Cyangugu inSeptember 2000, and were under pressure from theRPF to fall into line. Similarly, the ExecutiveBureau of the Mouvement DémocratiqueRépublicain (MDR) was suspended by the Minister


for Local Government, Desire Nyandwi, afterattacks by some of its members against its interimleader, Célestin Kabanda. This is the latest episodein a long series of systematic moves to destroywhatever credibility the party had kept as apossible opposition force in the coming nationalelections. Other parties, including the Parti SocialDémocrate (PSD) and the Parti Libéral (PL) havebeen similarly destroyed through the tightsurveillance of the parliament-based “Forum ofpolitical parties,” led by RPF Secretary-GeneralCharles Murigande. Former President PasteurBizimungu and his aides, have also been subjectedto intimidation123.

By restricting political discourse to the rubric of"national unity" and "consensual democracy", theRPF leaves little option for opponents but exile, orclandestine operation. By controlling all politicalactivities and refusing to countenance the slightestelectoral defeat, the RPF suggests that it does notbelieve it can achieve its goals within theinstitutional framework it purports to be building.To many Rwandans, initiatives like the 2001district elections and the decentralisation reformsappear a charade, conducted largely for the benefitof the international community.

Certain contradictions in the RPF’s philosophy areapparent. Its favoured manner of conducting adiscourse on national unity and reconciliation istop-down – inconsistent in procedure at least withthe professed principles of decentralisation. Aclose examination of the March 2001 electoralprocess suggests that it will be at least verydifficult for the authorities to both imposeconsensus from above and reflect the country’sdiverse interests. The government must ask andfind answers to a number of questions before therecan be much optimism that the national elections in2003 will truly seal Rwanda’s transition to stabilityand democracy. These include: how do Rwandansperceive their own government? Are there genuinechannels of communications in place between thecitizenry, which is 95 per cent rural, and thecountry’s leadership? How can the oppositionexpress itself non-violently inside the country?Where do the external threat stop and the internalone begin?

123 ICG will publish a more thorough report on thecomplex issue of political pluralism in post-genocideRwanda within the next three months.

A change of political course is needed to rebuildtrust and confidence in the government. Theconstitution-making process ahead and theupcoming national polls give the RPFopportunities to liberalise political activity. It iscritical that the decentralisation policy succeeds.Bringing accountability and responsibility for themanagement of their own affairs to thecommunities could be Rwanda’s true revolution124.It would change the face of administration and helpestablish democratic governance in the rural areas.For this policy to work, Kigali must actually givefinancial, political and administrative autonomy tothe districts. Simple administrativedeconcentration, which leaves power in the handsof provincial administrations, would be counter-productive. If devolution is not supported by thecreation of a specific administrative corps, forinstance, specialising in local government policymanagement and independent of the centralgovernment, it will largely remain a paperexercise. According to the new law, the districtexecutive secretaries, who actually run the districtadministrations, are appointed by “the districtcouncil after a competitive examination”125 buttheir relation to the provincial executive secretaries– themselves members of the central government –and to the security services remains unclear.

Moreover, the administrative chain of authority --from the Office of the President, to the hills -- isunder control of an omnipresent security apparatus,which shadows the official system.126 This over-centralised structure is also incompatible withdemocratic decentralisation. As long as localgovernment has no capacity to implement policiesautonomously, accountability will remain directedtowards the president, and the people of Rwandawill find themselves burdened by a new array of 124 The first social Revolution brought down in 1959 theTutsi monarchy, which, under the influence and theauthority of colonial powers, had become an instrument ofdomination of the Hutu masses and had degenerated into aruthless and extremely oppressive social institution. Thesocial revolution degenerated itself very quickly into anoppressive movement. It lead to recurrent ethnic pogromsand was used as a justification for the Hutu dictatorshipsof the 1st and 2nd Republics, forcing hundreds of thousandsof innocent Tutsi families to seek refuge out of thecountry.125 Art. 79 of the Law N°04/2001 establishing theorganisation and functioning of the district, published inthe Rwanda gazette on 13 January 2001.126 ICG interview, Rwandan Human Rights activist, Kigali,18 January 2001.


useless elected counsellors, prone to endlesspoliticking, abuse of office and corruption.127

The tight intelligence and security grip can andshould be loosened. Not all of Rwanda’scommunes are threatened by militia infiltration.The military, including the DMI, should havenothing to do with management of civiliangovernment or vetting of candidates. The newdistricts need to be freed from military interferencein their affairs. If the Local Defence Forces are tobecome the local police, supporting theenforcement of district regulations andimplementing gacaca decisions, they should beprofessionalised and separated from the military.

The NEC, as it operated in the March elections, isboth too powerful and too partisan. Its closeconnections with the ruling establishment, both atnational and local levels, make it a tool of politicalcontrol, not an independent and transparentinstitution. The initial law should be reviewed toset up a truly autonomous NEC on a permanentbasis. The recruitment of staff, both nationally andlocally, should be open and transparent, withoutinterference from the authorities, including thesecurity services. It must build trust in its neutralityand commitment to organising elections that willbe fair to all political forces. A permanentindependent monitoring mechanism of the NECshould also be immediately set up and funded bythe international community.

Election observation cannot be efficiently handledon an ad-hoc basis. It requires technical expertiseand intimate knowledge of the political field,capacity building and constant monitoring ofgovernment departments. Local and nationalelections usually follow each other at two to three-year intervals. Preparations start six to twelvemonths in advance. There is, therefore, a good caseto establish a countrywide network of electionobservers, with training and organisation supportedby the international community. Such a networkwould be vital to the long-term strengthening ofdemocracy.

Political differences are not necessarily divisive ifspace is provided for free debate. But theconsensus methodology adopted by thegovernment, however, operates in an oppressivemanner. It is urgent, therefore, for Rwanda to 127 As in Kenya for instance.

liberalise the activities of political parties, themedia and civil society. If opposition parties arenot given the opportunity to rebuild themselvesand present a fair challenge to the RPF well inadvance of the 2003 national elections, the entiredemocratic logic that the government says it wantsto institutionalise will be crushed. Such restrictionson political activities that are retained should applyequally to all. The political playing field shouldbecome level, and the RPF should no longerbenefit from being the sole legal political operativein the country.

Rwandan society is still largely traumatised bypolitical conflict and the genocide. This does notmean, however, that all political freedoms shouldbe sacrificed in the name of national unity andreconciliation. The opening of political partyactivities and restoration of basic politicalfreedoms can be gradual, involving first therestoration of freedom of association and freedomof the press and only later freedom of publicassembly for mass political rallies. The office of anindependent ombudsman should be created to offeradvice and recommendations--and possiblymediation-- to Rwandan citizens in case ofconflicting interpretations of laws and procedureswith the government. At least six months beforethe presidential and parliamentary elections,opposition parties should obtain the right tocampaign openly if the democratic transition is tobe genuine and an independent national electoralcommission should be created to superviseelectoral procedures.

The international community should take theopportunity of the constitution-making process todiscuss with the government what guarantees willbe provided for political freedom and whatlimitations will be set on the political role of thesecurity services. It should support financially andpolitically capacity building for the establishmentof a permanent, independent election observationprogram. An election observation program iscentral to the credibility and legitimacy of nationalelections in 2003.

Rwanda is now at a crucial stage of its postgenocide reconstruction and reconciliation process.Having been now in power for seven years, theRPF has the responsibility to be accountable to thepeople of Rwanda, and not simply to itself, itsmilitary leadership or its own ideology. Otherwise,its runs the risk of being seen as performing solely


for the financial resources of the internationalcommunity, betraying the original aims and beliefsthat motivated the sacrifices of its supporters, tostay in power. After seven years in office, anddespite legitimate needs for safeguarding nationalsecurity, the political trend evident in the 6 Marchelections demonstrates that the risk of such a

betrayal is real. A warning from the internationalcommunity is warranted to prompt the RPF todeliver on its own political promises.

Nairobi/Brussels, 9 October 2001


APPENDIX A

MAP OF RWANDA


APPENDIX B

CHRONOLOGY

19901 October-Beginning of the war launched by the RPFagainst the rule of Juvénal Habyarimana, inpower since 1973.

1992June-Adoption of a new constitution legalisingthe multiparty system of government. Soonafter the enactment of the new Law onpolitical parties, the MouvementDémocratique Républicain (MDR), PartiSocial-Démocrate (PSD) and the PartiLiberal (PL) are launched.

July-Beginning of the Arusha negotiationsbetween the RPF and the government ofRwanda.

1993January-Massacres of Tutsi populations andopponents to the MRND regime in theprefectures of Gisenyi, Ruhengeri, Kibuye,Byumba and the Bugesera region of Kigalirural. The RPF retaliates by breaking thecease-fire and attacking Byumba andRuhengeri prefectures. Close to one millionInternally Displaced People (IDPs) surroundKigali.

October-Signature of the Arusha agreement.

1994April-7: The plane transporting President JuvénalHabyarimana and President CyprienNtaryamira from Burundi is shot down overKigali. Genocide against Rwanda’s Tutsipopulation is unleashed by the Interahamwemilitias and Forces Armées Rwandaises(FAR). Close to 800,000 people are killed inthe following hundred days, including

thousands of Hutu opponents to theHabyarimana regime.

July-The RPF takes over Kigali.

October-A government of National unity includingopposition party to the Habyarimana regimeis formed in Kigali with the objective toimplement the programmes of the 1993Arusha agreement.

1995August:-Dismissal of MDR Prime Minister FaustinTwagiramungu, Minister for justiceAlphonse-Marie Nkubito (independent) andRPF Minister for Interior Seth Sendashonga.Pierre Célestin Rwigyema (MDR) becomesPrime Minister and Alexis Kanyarengwe(RPF) Minister for Interior.

1996April:-A previously unknown organisation,“Peuple en Armes pour la libération duRwanda” (PALIR) claims to be launching awar against the RPA from the prefecture ofCyangugu and puts a price on the heads ofall US Citizens inside the country, inretaliation to their government militarysupport to the RPF regime.

July:-Human Rights Watch and the InternationalFederation for Human Rights accuse theRPA of killings judicial and governmentlocal officials in addition to numerouscivilians in their blind reprisal operationsagainst Hutu militias still roaming the hills.-Seth Sendashonga (former RPF HomeAffairs Minister) and Faustin Twagiramungu(former MDR prime Minister) launch theirown opposition movement, the “Forces derésistance pour la démocratie” (FDR).-Beginning of the first Congo war.


September:-Two Rwandan exiles, including Col.Théoneste Lizende, an ex-FAR who haddefected to the RPA in 1994 but fledRwanda in 1995, are assassinated in Nairobi.The Kenyan government closes the Rwandanembassy.

November1996 to January 1997-One million and two hundred thousandRwandan refugees come back: approx.700,000 from Zaire (now DRC), and 500,000from Tanzania, Uganda and Burundi. In theweeks following their return, crimes againstsurvivors and witnesses of the genocide byHutu militias increase dramatically, followedby merciless reprisals on the population bythe RPA.-Froduald Karamira, former Vice-presidentof the MDR-power faction is sentenced todeath by the Rwandan courts.

1997January-Beginning of the government's villagisationpolicy to improve rural communitiessecurity, the provision of basic services, andcontrol over movements of population.

March-Extensive reshuffle and final break with thedistribution of positions set-up by theOctober 1993 Arusha Agreement. Col.Joseph Karemera is appointed Minister forEducation, Patrick Mazimpaka leaves theMinistry for national rehabilitation to beappointed without portfolio in the office ofthe President and Alexis Kanyaregwe, RPFchairman leaves the Ministry for interior.

April-The “Law on the Control of the Executive”,reinforcing parliament’s powers against thegovernment is voted amidst protest ofpresident Pasteur Bizimungu (RPF) andTransitional National Assembly speakerJuvénal Nkusi (PSD). The latter is voted outand replaced by Joseph Sebarenzi Kabuye(PL).

1998February

-RPF national congress at Kicukiro. Major-general Paul Kagame is elected President ofthe RPF in place of former Minister forinterior, Alexis Kanyarengwe. Rwandapresident Pasteur Bizimungu becomes RPFVice-President, replacing Minister PatrickMazimpaka, and Prof. Charles Murigande,rector the Rwanda National University inButare takes the seat of secretary general,previously held by Théogene Rudasingwa.

April-Twenty-one men and one woman sentencedto death by Rwandan courts for crimes ofgenocide are executed in public on four sitesthroughout the country. Froduald Karamira isone of them, executed in Nyamirambostadium, Kigali, site of some of the worstcollective massacres during the genocide-Beginning of the Hutu militias insurgency inthe north-western provinces of Ruhengeriand Gisenyi.

May-Beginning of the Saturday meetings at theUrugwiro village (Kigali) between membersof the cabinet, the executive bureau of theTNA, the presidents of TNA commissions,leaders of National organisations (civilsociety, parties), prefects and other localwise men or clerics. The objective of thesemeetings, which are going to take placealmost every Saturday until March 1999, isto achieve consensus within leaders of thecountry on key issues for future policies.-UN secretary-general Koffi Anan on officialvisit to Kigali. The official dinner isboycotted by Rwanda’s president, vice-president and Foreign Affairs Minister due tothe UNSG refusal to apologise for the UNresponsibility in the genocide.-The UN Human Rights mission issuspended.-Former Minister for Interior SethSendashonga is assassinated in Nairobi.

July:-Prime-Minister Pierre Célestin Rwigyema(MDR) revokes MDR President BonaventureUbarijoro, who will be arrested six monthslater for his role in 1960’s anti-tutsi pogroms,when he was director of the secret policeunder Grégoire Kayibanda. He will then bereleased a few months later. Rwigyema


becomes the new MDR president, MPStanley Safari the Vice-president andMinister for Foreign Affairs AnastaseGasana, leader of the committee are chargedwith re-formulating MDR’s ideology so as topromote national unity.-Creation of the Rassemblement desrwandais démocrates (RRD), undergroundopposition political movement inside thecountry.

August-Beginning of the second Congo war.

November/December-General election of the people’srepresentatives at the nyumba kumi (tenhouseholds) level.

1999March-Election of counsellors and populationrepresentatives at cell and sector levelthrough the queuing-system of voting. 95%turn-out but voting was de-facto compulsory.The election is labelled “open andtransparent by the UN”.-A new discipline committee of the TNApurges 10 MPs out of 70 appointed. Themembership and terms of appointment of thiscommittee are not revealed. Among these tenMPs are three MDR who had criticisedheavily Pierre Célestin Rwigyema’s move tounseat their party President, BonaventureUbarijoro, in July 1998. The three MDR MPsrefuse to resign and are backed by TNAspeaker Joseph Sebarenzi. The chargesbrought against the ten MPs range from“participation in the genocide” to“insufficient support for reconciliation”.

April-Augustin Misago, the Catholic bishop ofGikongoro is arrested and charged withgenocide.-Prime Minister Pierre Célestin Rwigyemaapologises to the people of Rwanda on behalfof the MDR for the party’s role in thegenocide. He is nevertheless accused byfellow MDR leader Anastase Gasana to beinsufficiently committed to the partyreforms. Gasana calls for a thorough purge ofthe party leadership.

-Launch of the National Unity andReconciliation Commission (NURC)destined to guide all Rwandans towards theeradication of ethnic hatred and ethnicdiscrimination.

May-Six more MPs are removed from the TNAby its disciplinary committee on charges ofabsenteeism, incompetence and genocide.Speaker Joseph Sebarenzi Kabuye protestsagain against the lack of legal basis for thecommittee’s actions.-The Rwanda Human Rights Commission iscreated with a three year mandate. Its chairis Gasana Ndoba, a respected human rightsactivist.

June-A committee including representatives of allthe parties present in the TNA agree toextend the transition process by fouradditional years, up to 2003. The decision isratified by the Cabinet a few days later.

October-The TNA forces the resignation of threegovernment ministers over corruptionfollowing the completion of a commission ofinquiry in a government vehicle procurementdeal in 1997.-The Ministry for information is abolishedand its function transferred to the InteriorMinistry. The supervision of the media isattributed to the Rwandan Information Office(ORINFOR), which is also their directcompetitor. Joseph Bideri replaces Lt-ColWilson Rutayisire as the head of ORINFOR.

December-Prime Minister Pierre Célestin Rwigyema(MDR) is absolved by the TNA of anyserious wrong doing in the management ofWorld Bank allocated funds for the Ministryfor education despite the results of acommission of inquiry led by RPF MP MajorRose Kabuye.

2000January-Resignation and exile of TNA speakerJoseph Sebarenzi Kabuye (PL) after a votecalling for a debate on his alleged


incompetence and dictatorial tendencies ledby a fellow PL party member. Sebarenzi isaccused both of dictatorial tendencies, andcomplicity in a royalist plot to recruitmembers of the RPA for the return of KingKigeri V. He is replaced by Vincent Biruta(PSD) former Minister for Public Works.-Announcement of the creation of a 3,500strong national police force under thecommand of the Ministry of Interior, anddisbandment of the gendarmerie which wasunder the Ministry for Defence.

February-Arrest of a popular Rwandan singerRutabana and three RPA soldiers in Burundiand Tanzania for complicity in the Sebarenziplot. Dr Josue Kayijabo, Sebarenzi’s brotherand former vice-president of Ibuka, managesto leave the country under Belgian protectionand after official American protest over hisinitial arrest. Anastase Murumba, executivesecretary of Ibuka, leaves also the country.-Resignation of Prime Minister PierreCélestin Rwigyema (MDR) who had beenunder pressure for several months by MDRrival MP Stanley Safari over his allegedinvolvement in the genocide and by aparliamentary commission of inquiry overembezzlement of funds at the Ministry forEducation. He flees Rwanda for the USA inJune and is replaced by Célestin Kabanda atthe head of the MDR in August. The positionof Prime Minister is given to formerAmbassador to Germany Bernard Makuza(MDR).

March-Resignation of president Pasteur Bizimungu(RPF). Vice-President and Minister forDefence Paul Kagame becomes actingPresident. An extensive reshuffle follows inwhich Minister in the Office of the PresidentPatrick Mazimpaka, among others, loses hisportfolio.-Assassination of president Bizimunguadvisor and former prefect of Kibuye, AcielKabera

April-The TNA and the Cabinet elect PaulKagame President of Rwanda by 81 votes to5, for RPF secretary general Prof. Charles

Murigande. Ex-FAR Col. EmmanuelHabyarimana becomes Minister for Defence.

June-Bishop Augustin Misago is acquitted of allcharges of genocide by a Rwanda court.

September-Return to Rwanda of former Minister forJustice Faustin Nteziyayo who had fled thecountry in January 1999 after intenselobbying against him organised by genocidesurvivors. He is appointed vice-governor ofRwanda’s Central Bank.

October-National Summit of the National Unity andReconciliation Commission.

December-Administrative reorganisation of thecountry. Communes become districts and arereduced from 154 to 106, including thecreation of 15 towns.

2001:January-Beginning of the work of the Legal andConstitutional Commission-Former Rwanda King Jean-BaptisteNdahindurwa Kigeli V expresses his wish toreturn to Rwanda and calls for a referendumon the re-establishment of the monarchy, onemonth after consultations with Laurent-Désiré Kabila in Kinshasa over the bilateralrelations of both countries.

February-An MDR faction led by former ForeignAffairs Minister Anastase Gasana claims tohave taken over the leadership of the partyfrom acting President Célestin Kabanda.Gasana appoints himself President and Jeande Dieu Ntiruhungwa Vice-President.Ntiruhungwa will be appointed InteriorMinister a month later.-Launch in Brussels of the Monarchistmovement of Joseph Ndahimana “Nation-Imbaga y’Inyabutatu Nyarwanda".

March-District elections are held throughout thecountry.


-Minister for Interior Théobald RwakaGakwaya (PDC) is sacked over his allegedpromotion of illegal political activities inCyangugu.-A new political organisation, l’ « AllianceRwanda's pour la renaissance de la nation »(ARENA) led by Joseph Sebarenzi Kabuyeis formed in the USA

April-A former national political commissar in theRwandan government, Maj. AlphonseForum, flees to Uganda alleging politicalpersecution-Publication by State Prosecutor GerardGahima of the updated list of categories. 1suspects of genocide. The new list includesthe names of former Prime Minister PierreCélestin Rwigyema and Gikongoro bishopAugustin Misago.-President Kagame in a meeting with ICTRprosecutor Carla del Ponte, guarantees fullco-operation of the Government of Rwanda

for the prosecution of RPA officerssuspected of war crimes and crimes againsthumanity in 1994.-Rwanda re-opens its embassy in France.

May-Former President Pasteur Bizimungu is heldbriefly under house arrest as he prepares tolaunch his own political party. The party isinterdicted and his privileges of formerPresident are withdrawn. Bizimungu issubsequently accused by Parliament to be theleader of the insurgents and attacked by thesurvivors association IBUKA to have incitedethnic violence.

June/July-Following renewed infiltrations of Hutumilitias and combat in Ruhengeri andGisenyi districts, the GoR announces thatmore than 1000 rebels have been killed and1300 captured.


APPENDIX C

NATIONAL DECENTRALISATION POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA(SELECTED ABSTRACTS OF OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS)128.

128 Republic of Rwanda, Ministry of Local government and Social Affairs, "National Decentralisation Policy", Imprimerienouvelle du Rwanda, May 2000.

“The current political, economic and socialsituation of Rwanda is a direct consequence of therecent political and administrative history of thecountry the apex of which was the cataclysmicgenocide of 1994 – a genocide planned andeffectively executed by the communities andagents of the State.

The inappropriate, highly centralised dictatorialgovernance of the colonial as well as postindependence administration of the countryexcluded the Rwandan population fromparticipating in the determination of their political,economic and social well-being. (…)

From a political and administrative view, theRwandan system is largely centralised and thefollowing problems still persist:

(i) Inadequate participation of the majority ofthe population in the making of decisionsthat concern their livelihood

(ii) Inadequate financial resources and others inInter, Akarere and lower levels. It is true thatthe Rwanda Government has limitedrevenue, but the little there is, remainsconcentrated at central government level.

(iii) Management structures at localadministrative levels that support lack ofaccountability and transparency.

(iv) Accumulation of powers in one person, bothat the central and local level, for example, atAkarere level, the persons are centralised inone person, the Burgomaster.

(v) Passivity, lack of initiative and dependencysyndrome on the part of the majority of thepopulation, caused especially byovercentralization and exclusion fromparticipation.

(vi) Inadequate capacity (human, systems,structures, institutions, networks, attitudes,etc.) at both central and local levels.

(vii) Officialdom which erodes further thepeople’s say in the management of theiraffairs, the system being generallyaccountable to central government instead ofbeing accountable to the people.

(viii) Little presence of women and youth in therunning of the political economic andadministrative systems and affairs ofRwanda.

A political and administrative system whereproblems such as the above prevail cannot supporteconomic and social development preciselybecause the concerned people’s energies are notadequately mobilised to initiate, plan andimplement development action based on locallyidentified needs. (…)

Decentralisation will provide a structuralarrangement for government and the people ofRwanda to fight poverty at close range and toenhance their reconciliation via the empowermentof local populations. There has already beenelections at the Akagari and Umurenge levels in1999 as part of the democratisation process.

The District council organises its work throughthree commissions: economic and technical affairs;political administrative and legal affairs; welfareand cultural affairs. Moreover, in order to preparedistrict development plans, the district executivecommittee has to establish a Community andDevelopment Committee (CDC) composed of itssecretary in charge of finances and economicdevelopment, acting as chairperson, a womenrepresentative, a youth representative, and thesecretaries in charge of development at sector


level. Finally, a district executive secretaryappointed by the Central government heads thedistricts administration and manages their technicalunits, being the secretary to both the executivecommittees and the council.

At provincial level, the Umuyobozi (provincialcommissioner) heads the deconcentrated units ofcentral government and guarantees the cohesion ofadministrative management through a co-ordination committee including heads ofdepartments and the district mayors. He/she issupported among others by a provincial executivesecretary who is the direct authority of all civilservants and among them, the district executivesecretaries”.

The new administrative and political frameworkset up by the decentralisation policy intends tobreak with the old regime and with the coloniallegacy both in form and substance. It establisheslevels of collective consultation for decision-making right from the bottom level of the Statepyramid, while the pyramid itself is substantiallyreviewed with name and administrative boundarychanges. Proper Rwandan names are given to thenew administrative units, while the older ones,which were of colonial origin and simply adaptedto the Kinyarwanda phonetics, are abandoned129.

Level Formername

New name

1. NyumbaKumi / Tenhouse unit

Nyumba Kumi / Ten-house-unit

2. Serire /cell Akagari / cell3. Segiteri /

sectorUmurenge / sector

4. Komine /commune

Akarere / district

5. Prefegitire /prefecture

Intara / province

Both lower administrative levels, cells and sectors,have a council which is supposed to elect and 129 In its effort to cut any symbolic link with the previousregime, the RPF has renamed most districts. These nameshad been given in the early seventies at the time of theadministrative reform implementing the social revolutionpolicies. The wish of the RPF was to reverse to oldernames of socio-cultural administrative units, which wereused and institutionalised by the monarchy and throughoutthe colonisation. ICG Interview, Tito Ruteremara, Kigali,25/01/01.

supervise an executive committee made of tenrepresentatives (one mayor and nine secretaries:executive secretary; economic development;security; education, culture and communitymobilisation; health and social affairs; youthaffairs; gender and women development; finance;information).

The first council, at cell level, is supposed to beconstituted of all citizens resident aged 18 andabove. At sector level, the council is composed ofthe executive committees’ chairs of the cell level,two women representatives, two youthrepresentatives and two persons of integrity. Theyare supposed to work with the technical support ofits two sub-committees, the Political andAdministrative Committee (PAC) and theCommunity Development Committee (CDC). Atdistrict level, the council is composed of onerepresentative of each sector, elected throughdirect universal suffrage, and one third of thewomen and youth representatives elected at sectorlevel through universal suffrage. Executivecommittee members at sector level have torelinquish their positions if they are electedcounsellors at district level. The districts’ mayors -successors of the Communes Bourgmestres - andfour other secretaries (finance and economicdevelopment; social services; gender and women’sdevelopment; youth, culture and sports) are electedfrom among the elected counsellors over theirinaugural meetings, by an electoral collegecomposed of: 1. The directly elected counsellorsthemselves; 2. The executive committee membersof the sectors; 3. The chairs of the cells’ executivecommittees130.

Finally, in order to control efficiently the growth ofurban centres and maximise the administrationcapacity to deliver services to the population, thedecentralisation policy sets up urban localgovernment by creating towns and a City ofprovincial status, Kigali, which is itself dividedinto districts, sectors and cells. The towns benefitfrom the same local government mechanisms asthe rural districts. The actual implementation of theadministrative reform took place in December2000, as the 154 former communes weretransformed into one hundred and six new units: 91districts and fifteen towns.

130 Cf. Summarising table and explanatory example inAnnexe.


Explanatory diagram summarising the local government electoral system.

March 2001 Electoral diagram for a district including 12 sectors and 60 cells

1. Sector levelElection through universal suffrage of three persons:

1 representative of the general population 1 women representative 1 youth representative

2. District level (12 sectors)12 representatives of the general population12 women representatives12 youth representatives

a) District council = 20 people

12 representative of the general population1/3 of women representatives = 41/3 of youth representatives = 4Total = 12 + 4 + 4 = 20

b) Election of the district mayor and other executives among the 20 members of the District council

Electoral college = 200 people20 members of the district council12 x 10 = 120 sector executive committee members60 cell heads

Total = 20 + 120 + 60 = 200

Source: National Electoral Commission, January 2001.


APPENDIX D

1999 AND 2001 ELECTORAL STATISTICS

Table 1: Summary of the March 1999 results per prefecture.

Prefecture Number ofsectors

Numberof cells

Registeredvoters

Turn-out(%)

Percentageof re-electedincumbents

Percentageof teachersamongelectedcounsellors

Percentageof farmersamongelectedcounsellors

01. Gitarama 171 1097 386995 75.9 73.5 4.1 93.402. Kibuye 101 638 154786 91.0 22.6 7.6 85.303. Kibungo 119 690 250267 90.6 60.6 2.7 95.304. Gikongoro 126 861 187436 87.3 10.3 3.9 88.805. Umutara 74 425 128301 88.5 97.6 4.1 91.406. Gisenyi 135 865 296728 89.4 54.2 0.2 94.807. Cyangugu 115 691 215041 87.6 63.1 5.8 84.708. Ruhengeri 177 945 328400 90.6 59.7 3.8 94.109. Butare 205 646 268646 93.8 55.1 5.9 81.310. Byumba 140 800 284566 84.4 61.0 5.1 84.711. P.V.K. 20 91 528849 90.0 54.0 8.0 15.012. Kigali-Ngali

160 1363 372317 87.0 60.0 3.0 84.0

Source: Republic of Rwanda, national electoral commission statistics, March 1999 elections.


Table 2: Summary of the March 2001 district election results per provinces.

Provinces Numberofdistricts

Numberofsectors

Number ofGeneralcandidates

Number ofyouthcandidates

Number ofWomencandidates

Totalnumber ofcandidates

Incumbentburg.maintained

Turn-out(%)

01.Gitarama

10 166 306 286 251 843 9 96.76

02. Kibuye 6 102 233 202 167 602 5 96.8203.Kibungo

10 120 266 214 214 694 6 96.53

04.Gikongoro

7 125 244 220 197 661 6 99.03

05.Umutara

8 80 160 121 97 378 8 94.68

06.Gisenyi

10 135 266 228 183 677 9 96.25

07.Cyangugu

7 115 218 157 123 498 6 96.75

08.Ruhengeri

11 177 420 395 359 1174 11 97.57

09. Butare 10 211 386 328 293 1007 9 96.5210.Byumba

9 137 279 227 188 694 8 96.38

11. P.V.K. 8 43 162 97 97 378 2 90.0812.Kigali-Ngali

10 139 252 187 167 606 7 94.94

Total 106 1550 3192 2662 2321 8175 86 96.06Source : Republic of Rwanda, National Electoral Commission, Elections results, May 2001.


APPENDIX E

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (ICG) is a private,multinational organisation committed tostrengthening the capacity of the internationalcommunity to anticipate, understand and act toprevent and contain conflict.

ICG’s approach is grounded in field research. Teamsof political analysts, based on the ground in countriesat risk of conflict, gather information from a widerange of sources, assess local conditions and produceregular analytical reports containing practicalrecommendations targeted at key internationaldecision-takers.

ICG’s reports are distributed widely to officials inforeign ministries and international organisations andmade generally available at the same time via theorganisation's internet site, www.crisisweb.org ICGworks closely with governments and those whoinfluence them, including the media, to highlight itscrisis analysis and to generate support for its policyprescriptions. The ICG Board - which includesprominent figures from the fields of politics,diplomacy, business and the media - is directlyinvolved in helping to bring ICG reports andrecommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers around the world. ICG is chaired by formerFinnish President Martti Ahtisaari; former AustralianForeign Minister Gareth Evans has been Presidentand Chief Executive since January 2000.

ICG’s international headquarters are at Brussels, withadvocacy offices in Washington DC, New York andParis. The organisation currently operates fieldprojects in eighteen crisis-affected countries andregions across three continents: Albania, Bosnia,Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia inEurope; Algeria, Burundi, Rwanda, the DemocraticRepublic of Congo, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe inAfrica; and Burma/Myanmar, Cambodia, Indonesia,Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in Asia.

ICG raises funds from governments, charitablefoundations, companies and individual donors. Thefollowing governments currently provide funding:Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,Germany, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, theNetherlands, Norway, the Republic of China(Taiwan), Sweden, Switzerland and the UnitedKingdom. Foundation and private sector donorsinclude the Ansary Foundation, the William andFlora Hewlett Foundation, the Charles Stewart MottFoundation, the Open Society Institute, thePloughshares Fund, the Sasakawa Foundation, theSmith Richardson Foundation, the Ford Foundationand the U.S. Institute of Peace.

July 2001


APPENDIX F

ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS

AFRICA

ALGERIA

Algeria: The Press in Crisis, Africa Report N°8, 11 January1999Algérie: La Crise de la Presse, Africa Report N°8, 11 January1999The People’s National Assembly, Africa Report N°10, 16February 1999Assemblée Populaire Nationale: 18 Mois de Législature, AfricaReport N°10 16 February 1999Elections Présidentielles en Algérie: Les Enjeux et lesPerspectives, Africa Report N°12, 13 April 1999

The Algerian Crisis: Not Over Yet, Africa Report N°24, 20October 2000La Crise Algérienne n’est pas finie, Africa Report N°24, 20October 2000La concorde civile : Une initiative de paix manqueé, AfricaReport N°24, 9 July 2001

BURUNDI

Burundi: Internal and Regional Implications of the Suspensionof Sanctions, Africa Report N°14, 27 April 1999Le Burundi Après La Suspension de L’Embargo: AspectsInternes et Regionaux, Africa Report N°14, 27 April 1999Quelles Conditions pour la reprise de la Coopération auBurundi? Africa Report N°13, 27 April 1999Proposals for the Resumption of Bilateral and Multilateral Co-operation, Africa Report N°13, 27 April 1999Burundian Refugees in Tanzania: The Key Factor in theBurundi Peace Process, Africa Report N°19, 30 November 1999L’Effet Mandela: Evaluation et Perspectives du Processus dePaix Burundais, Africa Report N°20, 18 April 2000The Mandela Effect: Evaluation and Perspectives of the PeaceProcess in Burundi, Africa Report N°20, 18 April 2000Unblocking Burundi’s Peace Process: Political Parties,Political Prisoners and Freedom of the Press, Africa Briefing,22 June 2000Burundi: Les Enjeux du Débat. Partis Politiques, Liberté de laPresse et Prisonniers Politiques, Africa Report N°23, 12 July2000Burundi: The Issues at Stake. Political Parties, Freedom of thePress and Political Prisoners, Africa Report N° 23, 12 July 2000Burundi Peace Process: Tough Challenges Ahead, AfricaBriefing, 27 August 2000Burundi: Ni guerre ni paix, Africa Report N° 25, 1 December2000

Burundi: sortir de l'impasse. L'urgence d'un nouveau cadre denégociations, Africa Report N°29, 14 May 2001Burundi: Breaking the Deadlock, The Urgent Need for a NewNegotiating Framework, Africa Report N° 29, 14 May 2001Burundi: Cent jours pour retrouver le chemin de la paix, AfricaReport N°33, 14 August 2001

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

How Kabila Lost His Way, DRC Report N°3, Africa ReportN°16, 21 May 1999Africa’s Seven Nation War, DRC Report N°4, Africa ReportN°17, 21 May 1999The Agreement on a Cease-Fire in the Democratic Republic ofCongo, Africa Report N°18, 20 August 1999Kinshasa sous Kabila, à la veille du dialogue national, AfricaReport N°19, 21 September 1999Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War, AfricaReport N° 26, 20 December 2000From Kabila to Kabila: Prospects for Peace in the Congo,Africa Report N°27, 16 March 2001Disarmament in the Congo: Investing in Conflict Prevention,Africa Briefing, 12 June 2001

RWANDA

Five Years after the Genocide: Justice in Question, AfricaReport N°11, 7 April 1999Cinq Ans Après le Génocide au Rwanda: La Justice enQuestion, Africa Report N°11, 7 April 1999Uganda and Rwanda: Friends or Enemies? Africa ReportN°15, 4 May 2000Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda: l’urgence dejuger, Africa Report N°30, 7 June 2001

SIERRA LEONE

Sierra Leone: Time for a New Military and Political Strategy,Africa Report N° 28, 11 April 2001

ZIMBABWE

Zimbabwe: At the Crossroads, Africa Report N°22, 10 July 2000Zimbabwe: Three Months after the Elections, Africa Briefing,25 September 2000Zimbabwe in Crisis: Finding a way Forward, Africa ReportN°32, 13 July 2001

* Released since January 1999


ASIA

BURMA/MYANMAR

Burma/Myanmar: How Strong is the Military Regime?, AsiaReport N° 11, 21 December 2000

INDONESIA

Indonesia: Keeping the Military Under Control, Asia ReportN°9, 5 September 2000Aceh: Escalating Tension, Asia Briefing, 7 December 2000Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku, AsiaReport N° 10, 19 December 2000Indonesia: Impunity Versus Accountability for Gross HumanRights Violations, Asia Report N°12, 2 February 2001Indonesia: National Police Reform, Asia Report N°13, 20February 2001Indonesia's Presidential Crisis, Indonesia Briefing, 21 February2001Bad Debt: The Politics of Financial Reform in Indonesia, AsiaReport N° 15, 13 March 2001Indonesia’s Presidential Crisis: The Second Round, IndonesiaBriefing, 21 May 2001Aceh: Why Military Force Won’t Bring Lasting Peace, AsiaReport N° 17, 12 June 2001Aceh: Can Autonomy Stem the Conflict? ICG Asia Report No18, 27 June 2001Communal Violence in Indonesia: Lessons from Kalimantan,ICG Asia Report No 19, 27 June 2001Indonesia-U.S. Military Ties: Asia Briefing, 18 July 2001The Megawati Presidency, Indonesia Briefing, 10 September2001Indonesia: Ending Repression in Irian Jaya: ICG Asia ReportN° 23, 20 September 2001

CAMBODIA

Back from the Brink, Asia Report N°4, 26 January 1999Cambodia: The Elusive Peace Dividend, Asia Report N°8, 11August 2000

CENTRAL ASIA

Central Asia: Crisis Conditions in Three States, Asia ReportN°7, 7 August 2000Recent Violence in Central Asia: Causes and Consequences,Central Asia Briefing, 18 October 2000Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security, Asia Report N°14,1 March 2001Incubators of Conflict: Central Asia’s Localised Poverty andSocial Unrest, Asia Report N°16, 8 June 2001Central Asia: Fault Lines in the Security Map, Asia Report N°20, 4 July 2001Central Asia: Uzbekistan at Ten – Repression and Instability,Asia Report N°21, 21 August 2001

Kyrgystan at Ten: Trouble in the Island of Democracy, AsiaReport N°22, 28 August 2001Central Asian Perspectives on 11 September and the AfghanCrisis, Central Asia Briefing, 28 September 2001

BALKANS

ALBANIA

The State of Albania, Balkans Report N°54, 6 January 1999Albania Briefing: The Refugee Crisis, 11 May 1999Albania: State of the Nation, Balkans Report N°87, 1 March2000Albania Briefing: Albania’s Local Elections, A test of Stabilityand Democracy, 25 August 2000Albania: The State of the Nation 2001, Balkans report Nº111,25 May 2001Albania Briefing: Albania’s Parliamentary Elections 2001, 23August 2001

BOSNIA

Brcko: A Comprehensive Solution, Balkans Report N° 55, 8February 1999Breaking the Mould: Electoral Reform in Bosnia &Herzegovina, Balkans Report N° 56, 4 March 1999Republika Srpska: Poplasen, Brcko and Kosovo – Three Crisesand Out? Balkans Report N°62, 6 April 1999Why Will No-one Invest in Bosnia and Herzegovina? BalkansReport N°64, 21 April 1999Republika Srpska in the Post-Kosovo Era: Collateral Damageand Transformation,Balkans Report N°71, 5 July 1999Rule over Law: Obstacles to the Development of anIndependent Judiciary in Bosnia and Herzegovina, BalkansReport N°72, 5 July 1999Balkans Briefing: Stability Pact Summit, 27 July 1999Preventing Minority Return in Bosnia and Herzegovina: TheAnatomy of Hate and Fear, Balkans Report N°73, 2 August1999

Is Dayton Failing? Policy Options and Perspectives Four YearsAfter, Balkans Report N°80, 28 October 1999Rule of Law in Public Administration: Confusion andDiscrimination in a Post Communist Bureaucracy, BalkansReport N°84, 15 December 1999Denied Justice: Individuals Lost in a Legal Maze, BalkansReport N°86, 23 February 2000European Vs. Bosnian Human Rights Standards, HandbookOverview, 14 April 2000Reunifying Mostar: Opportunities for Progress, Balkans ReportN°90, 19 April 2000Bosnia’s Municipal Elections 2000: Winners and Losers,Balkans Report N°91, 28 April 2000Bosnia’s Refugee Logjam Breaks: Is the InternationalCommunity Ready? Balkans Report N°95, 31 May 2000War Criminals in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska, Balkans ReportN°103, 02 November 2000


Bosnia’s November Elections: Dayton Stumbles, Balkans ReortN°104, 18 December 2000Turning Strife to Advantage: A Blueprint to Integrate theCroats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Balkans Report N° 106, 15March 2001

No Early Exit: NATO’s Continuing Challenge in Bosnia,Balkans Report Nº110, 22 May 2001Bosnia's Precarious Economy: Still Not Open For Business;Balkans Report N° 115, 7 August 2001The Wages of Sin: Confronting Bosnia’s Republika Srpska:Balkans Report N° 118, 8 October 2001

KOSOVO

Unifying the Kosovar Factions: The Way Forward, BalkansReport N°58, 12 March 1999Kosovo: The Road to Peace, Balkans Report N°59, 12 March1999Kosovo Briefing: Atrocities in Kosovo Must be Stopped, 29March 1999Kosovo Briefing: The Refugee Crisis, 2 April 1999Kosovo: Let’s Learn from Bosnia, Balkans Report N°66, 17May 1999The New Kosovo Protectorate, Balkans report N°69, 20 June1999Kosovo Briefing: Who Will Lead the Kosovo Albanians Now?28 June 1999The Policing Gap: Law and Order in the New Kosovo, BalkansReport N°74, 6 August 1999Who’s Who in Kosovo, Balkans Report N°76, 31 August 1999Waiting for UNMIK: Local Administration in Kosovo, BalkansReport N°79, 18 October 1999Violence in Kosovo: Who’s Killing Whom? Balkans ReportN°78, 2 November 1999Trepca: Making Sense of the Labyrinth, Balkans Report N°82,26 November 1999Starting From Scratch in Kosovo: The Honeymoon is Over,Balkans Report N°83, 10 December 1999Kosovo Albanians in Serbian Prisons: Kosovo’s UnfinishedBusiness, Balkans Report N°85, 26 January 2000What Happened to the KLA?, Balkans Report N°88, 3 March2000Kosovo’s Linchpin: Overcoming Division in Mitrovica, BalkansReport N°96, 31 May 2000Reality Demands: Documenting Violations of InternationalHumanitarian Law in Kosovo 1999, 27 June 2000Elections in Kosovo: Moving toward Democracy? BalkansReport N°97, 7 July 2000Kosovo Report Card, Balkans Report N°100, 28 August 2000Reaction in Kosovo to Kostunica’s Victory, Balkans Briefing, 10October 2000Religion in Kosovo, Balkans Report N°105, 31 January 2001

MACEDONIA

Challenges and Choices for the New Government, BalkansReport N°60, 29 March 1999Toward Destabilisation? Balkans Report N°67, 21 May 1999

Macedonia Briefing: Government Holds Together, Eyes Fixedon Upcoming Presidential Poll, 11 June 1999Macedonia Briefing: Update of Recent Political Developments,14 June 1999Macedonia: Gearing up for Presidential Elections, BalkansReport N°77, 18 October 1999Macedonia’s Ethnic Albanians: Bridging the Gulf, BalkansReport N°98, 2 August 2000Macedonia government expects setback in local elections,Briefing Paper, 4 September 2000The Macedonian Question: Reform or Rebellion, BalkansReport N°109, 5 April 2001Macedonia: The Last Chance for Peace, Balkans Report N°113, 20 June 2001Macedonia: Still Sliding, Balkans Briefing, 27 July 2001Macedonia: War on Hold, Balkans Briefing, 15 August 2001Macedonia: Filling the Security Vacuum, Balkans Briefing, 8September 2001

MONTENEGRO

Montenegro Briefing: Milosevic to Move on Montenegro, 23April 1999Montenegro Briefing: Calm Before the Storm, 19 August 1999Montenegro: In the Shadow of the Volcano, Balkans ReportN°89, 21 March 2000Montenegro’s Socialist People’s Party: A Loyal Opposition?,Balkans Report N°92, 28 April 2000Montenegro’s Local Elections: Testing the NationalTemperature, Background Briefing, 26 May 2000Montenegro’s Local Elections: More of the Same, BriefingPaper, 23 June 2000Montenegro: Which way Next? Balkans Briefing, 30 November2000Montenegro: Settling for Independence? Balkans ReportN°107, 28 March 2001Montenegro: Time to Decide, Balkans Briefing, 18 April 2001Montenegro: Resolving the Independence Deadlock, BalkansReport N°114, 1 August 2001

SERBIA

Sidelining Slobodan: Getting Rid of Europe’s Last Dictator,Balkans Report N°57, 15 March 1999Milosevic’s Aims in War and Diplomacy, Balkans Report N°65,11 May 1999Yugoslavia Briefing: Wanted for War Crimes, 1 June 1999Back to the Future: Milosevic Prepares for Life After Kosovo,Balkans Report N°70, 28 June 1999Transforming Serbia: The Key to Long-Term Balkan Stability,Balkans Report N°75, 10 August 1999Serbia’s Embattled Opposition, Balkans Report N°94, 30 May2000Serbia’s Grain Trade: Milosevic’s Hidden Cash Crop, BalkansReport N°93, 5 June 2000Serbia: The Milosevic Regime on the Eve of the SeptemberElections, Balkans Report N°99, 17 August 2000


Current Legal Status of the Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) andof Serbia and Montenegro, Balkans Report N°101, 19September 2000Yugoslavia’s Presidential Election: The Serbian People’sMoment of Truth, Balkans Report N°102, 19 September 2000Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Sanctions Briefing, BalkansBriefing, 10 October 2000Serbia on the Eve of the December Elections, Balkans Briefing,20 December 2000A Fair Exchange: Aid to Yugoslavia for regional Stability,Balkans Report N° 112, 15 June 2001Peace in Presevo: Quick Fix or Long-Term Solution?, BalkansReport N°116, 10 August 2001Serbia’s Transition: Reforms Under Siege, Balkans ReportN°117, 21 September 2001

REGIONAL REPORTS

War in the Balkans, Balkans Report N°61, 19 April 1999Balkan Refugee Crisis, Balkans Report N°68, 1 June 1999Balkans Briefing: Stability Pact Summit, 27 July 1999After Milosevic: A Practical Agenda for Lasting BalkansPeace, Balkans report N°108, 26 April 2001Milosevic in the Hague: What it Means for Yugoslavia and theRegion, Balkans Briefing Paper, 6 July 2001

ISSUES REPORTS

HIV/AIDS as a Security Issue, ICG Issues Report N° 1, 19 June2001Eu Crisis Response Capability: Institutions and Processes forConflict Prevention and Management, ICG Issues Report N° 2,26 June 2001The European Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO): CrisisResponse in the Grey Lane, ICG Briefing Paper, 26 June 2001


APPENDIX G

ICG BOARD MEMBERS

Martti Ahtisaari, ChairmanFormer President of Finland

Stephen Solarz, Vice-ChairmanFormer U.S. Congressman

Gareth Evans, PresidentFormer Foreign Minister of Australia

Morton AbramowitzFormer U.S. Assistant Secretary of State; former U.S.Ambassador to Turkey

Kenneth AdelmanFormer U.S. Ambassador and Deputy PermanentRepresentative to the UN

Richard AllenFormer Head of U.S. National Security Council andNational Security Advisor

Hushang AnsaryFormer Iranian Minister and Ambassador;Chairman, Parman Group, Houston

Louise ArbourSupreme Court Judge, Canada;

Former Chief Prosecutor, International CriminalTribunal for former Yugoslavia

Oscar Arias SanchezFormer President of Costa Rica; Nobel Peace Prize,1987

Ersin AriogluChairman, Yapi Merkezi

Paddy AshdownFormer Leader of the Liberal Democrats, UnitedKingdom

Zainab BanguraDirector, Campaign for Good Governance, SierraLeone

Alan BlinkenFormer U.S. Ambassador to Belgium

Emma BoninoMember of the European Parliament; formerEuropean Commissioner

Maria Livanos CattauiSecretary-General, International Chamber ofCommerce

Eugene ChienDeputy Secretary General to the President, Taiwan

Wesley ClarkFormer NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Jacques DelorsFormer President of the European Commission

Uffe Ellemann-JensenFormer Foreign Minister of Denmark

Gernot ErlerVice-President, Social Democratic Party, GermanBundestag

Mark EyskensFormer Prime Minister of Belgium

Yoichi FunabashiJournalist and author

Bronislaw GeremekFormer Foreign Minister of Poland

I.K.GujralFormer Prime Minister of India

Han Sung-JooFormer Foreign Minister of Korea

El Hassan bin TalalChairman, Arab Thought Forum

Marianne HeibergSenior Researcher, Norwegian Institute ofInternational Affairs

Elliott F KulickChairman, Pegasus International

Joanne Leedom-AckermanNovelist and journalist

Todung Mulya LubisHuman rights lawyer and author

Allan J MacEachenFormer Deputy Prime Minister of Canada

Barbara McDougallFormer Secretary of State for External Affairs,Canada

Matthew McHughCounsellor to the President, The World Bank


Mo MowlamFormer British Secretary of State for NorthernIreland

Christine OckrentJournalist

Timothy OngChairman, Asia Inc magazine

Wayne OwensPresident, Center for Middle East Peace andEconomic Co-operation

Cyril RamaphosaFormer Secretary-General, African NationalCongress; Chairman, New Africa Investments Ltd

Fidel RamosFormer President of the Philippines

Michel RocardMember of the European Parliament; former PrimeMinister of France

Volker RuheVice-President, Christian Democrats, GermanBundestag; former German Defence Minister

Mohamed SahnounSpecial Adviser to the United Nations Secretary-General

William ShawcrossJournalist and author

Michael SohlmanExecutive Director of the Nobel Foundation

George SorosChairman, Open Society Institute

Eduardo SteinFormer Foreign Minister of Guatemala

Pär StenbäckFormer Minister of Foreign Affairs, Finland

Thorvald StoltenbergFormer Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norway

William O TaylorChairman Emeritus, The Boston Globe

Ed van ThijnFormer Minister of Interior, The Netherlands; formerMayor of Amsterdam

Simone VeilFormer Member of the European Parliament; formerMinister for Health, France

Shirley WilliamsFormer British Secretary of State for Education andScience; Member House of Lords

Grigory YavlinskyMember of the Russian Duma

Mortimer ZuckermanChairman and Editor-in-Chief, US News and WorldReport

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