Evans-pritchard - The Intellectualist (English Interpretation of Magic)

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CONTENTSPage

EDITORIAL NOlJ lETHE INTELLECTUALIST (ENGLISH) INTERPRETATIONOF MAGIC ' 123Sil E.E. Evans-Pri tchard, Emeri tusProfessor of Social Anthropology,University or Oxford.IS BELIEF POSS IBLE? 143Lawrence C. Melton. School ofOriental and African Studies.'BEHAVIOUR' : A SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL CRITICISM .. 152Edwin Ardener, Institute of SocialAnthropology, Oxford.ILLUSIONS OF FREEDOM: A COMMENT ON BARTH'S INDIVIDUALS . 155Wendy James, Insti tute of SocialAnthropology, Oxford."IN THE SHADOW OF THE GOLDEN BOUGH": IN RESPONSETO LIENHARDT 168Brian Street, Insti tuta of SocialAnthropology, Oxford.SOI'iE REFLEC'I'IONS ON THE DECENNIAL A.S.A. CONFERENCE 176Maeolm Crick, Insti tute of SocialAnthropology, Oxford.REVIEW ARTICLE: ~ O D E S OF THOUGHT .. 180Paul Heelas, Insti tute of SocialAnthropology, Oxford.BOOK REVIEWS:Korn: Elementary Structures Reconsidered:

L ~ v i S t r a u s s on Kinship. - by Peter R i v i ~ r e 185Wagner: Habu: The Innovation of Meaning in .Dariki Religion - by Martin Cantor 1 8 6 Wood: In the Life of a Romany Gypsy .by John Hil l . lil ; 0 I ' 0' D .188Sandford: Gypsies - by Judith Okely 189Firth: Symbols : Public and Prjvateby Malcolm Crick . . . . 190

INDEX - Va 1 IV 0 Il D 0 0 0 0' e , 0 0 0 0 ; 0 191

,ci Journal


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(i i)EDITORIM NOTE

The idea for this Journal has como from the graduate students atthe Insti tute of Social Anthropology in Oxford. Papers given at graduateseminars and ideas' arising from work for dipolomas'and higher degrees veryoften merit wider circulation and discussi on without ne cessarily beingready for formal publication in professional journals. Thero obviouslyexists a need in social anthropology for serious cri t ical and theoreticaldiscussion; JASO sees this as i t s main purpose.The editors would like to express their deep regrot at the death ofProfessor Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard, who did so much for the Journal.In this issue we are glad to republish what was probably his f irst major

theorotical contribution to anthropology. \[e hope to continue publishinghis works on the history of our discipline.The editors will welcome anyfurthor remarks on the ASA conferencein reply to Mr. Crick's art icle. They would also like to express theirthanks and appreciation to Mr Crick, who has resigned his post as editor.Thanks are also due to Richard and Stephen Healas who have helped with theproduction of tho Journal.

Fom1ATThe journal is published throe times per yoar. Articlos are

welcome from students of anthropology and from people in other disciplines.t is preferred that the main emphasis should be on analytical discussionrather than on description or ethnography. Papers should be as short asis necessary to got the point over. As a general rule they should notexceed 5,000 words. They should follow the conventions for oitations,notes and reforences' used in the 1\: S .A. monographs. Comments will alsobe welcome. Communications shOUld be addressed to the Journal Editors,Insti tute of Social Antluropology, 51 Banbury Road, Oxford.B CK ISSUES

Ive have a stock of back issues. Single ,issues are, available at35p. in tho n ~ l abroad. Complete volumes (I (1970), (1971),(1972) and IV (1973) are each available. at the follovling rates:U.K. - 1.00 to individuals, 1.25 to institutions; abrol3 d - 3.00 toindiViduals, 3.50 to institutions. The subscription for Vol. V (1974)is tho sarno. (All pricescovorpostage).Chequos should be made outto the Journal of the Anthropological Society of Oxford, and sent to theJournal Editors at 51 Banbury Road, Oxford. We regret the r ise inprices which is caused by the increased' size:of tho 'Journal.


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The Intellectualist (English)Interpretation of a ~ i c

All scientific theory is eclectic for a scientist t ~ ~ e s the hypothesesof his predecessors and examines them by logical tests and checlffi.them byobservation. By these means he selects what he finds to be valid in eachhypothesis and works them into a co-ordinated system. He 'adds his ownobservations and il1ferencesand these in turn serve as hypotheses t i l l theyare verified by independent workers ,and are recognised as true by theconsensus of specialised opinion. I have \'TOrked for several years on thesubject of magic both by reading and by repeated observation of magicaloperations among savage peoples in the Anglo-'Bgyptian Sudan and havetherefore had occasion to acquaint myself with most theories of magic andto test them by direct observation.. r i t e ~ s about magic may be. roughly _ d i v i ~ e d i ~ t o three s c h o o l ~ o f 1~ n t e r p r e t a t ~ o n the n t e l l e c t u a l ~ s t the b m o t ~ o n a l ~ s t and the S o c ~ o l o g l c a l ,though v,e might include a fourth, the Historical. The constructions of theseschools overla.p and Some writers find t;lernselves in all three but a divisionof this. kind enables me more easily to define the main vimvpoints from",hich the subject of magic has been treated and to select the probleJJls whichwe have to investigate. I propose in ti1is paper to make a digest, analysis,and criticism, of what itte may call the Intellectualist school of interpretation in England, chiefly represelned by Tylor and Frazer.

Tylorand Frazer approached the problems of nagic from an intellectualiststandpoint. They considered that primitive i:lan had reached his conclusionsabout the efficacy of magic from rational observation and deduction inmuch the same ray as men of science reach their conclusions about naturallaws. Underlying al l magical ritual is a rational process of thought.The r i tual of magic follows from i ts ideology. I t is true that the deductionsof a magician are false - bad they been true they \'ou1d have been scientificand not magical - bUt they are nevertheless based on genuine obser:vation.For classif icat ion of phenomena by the similari t ies vThich exist bet1


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Tylor surveyed the facts of llHl{;ic us a logician. na:;ic vla to him"One of the iiJO:Jt l lemicious d e l u s i o ; ~ 1 s thatevet ' .vexed mankinrl"l but nt the same time.he sau t lu t i t c o n t i n ~ d a logical scheme of thought v1hich can be vlell understood by civi l ised ;;1en of the. twentieth century. "'rhe principal key to the understanding of OccultScience J S to

consider i t as based on the ~ ~ s s o c i t i o n of Ideas, a faculty 1'1hich l iesat the v e ~ J f o u n d ~ t i o n o f h ~ d n r e a s o n but in no small degree of humanu.nreason also. E a n a s y e t in a lou intel lectual cond1.tion,h:w:l.ngcometo associate in thought those things which he found b y e x l ~ r i e n c e to beconnected in fac t proceeded erroneously to inver t th is action, ' and to cOllclude that association in thought l i lU t involvesiiJ!ilar connexion in real i ty .He thus attenpted to discover, to fo re te l l and to cause events by mel1nsof processes Hhichl1e can n vl see to have only an ideal significance. 12Nevertheless Tylorpo1.ntedout th.J.t th is ideal or subjective as::;lOC-ia t ion of phenoruena is not haphazard but res ts on a rat ianal aJpreciation . of the similari t ies which exist betll'een phenomena, ull appreciation llhich

t a l ~ e s the form ofana logy or sylilbolism. lience He can generally see liLtonCe .\Therein the ai1alogy 9f magical symbolism l i e s in ;lh,J.t consists thesyrubolic 2rinciple of ma{;ic,as Tylor cal ls i t .

"Fanciful as these notions are i t should be borne in mincl, that they come fa i r ly under definitementdl law, clepending as they do on a principle of ideal association, of 'i1hich ~ T e c a n quite understand the nental act ion, l;ho1.1g11 l le deny i t s practical results ,3. 'Houever, not a l l symbolism is of th is C1.i:cect and obvious Idndbut some of i t eLlbodies assocLltions vl11ich have been arbitr.: lri ly invented to f i l l in gaps in the Llagical system and never has any ra,tionnl sense or o f }Thich the rat ionalaense had been forgotten.

. Tylor thus implici t ly, for he does not explici t ly discuss the questionsrecognises that the difference bet'clean 1Jlagic and s c i e ~ c e is the differencebetween a false associat ionof phenomena in whiCh the l ink i s of a subjective,symbolic, and ideal , nature, on the one hand, and ffi1 associat ionofphenomena in 1'1hich the l ink i s ofan objective, and rea l nature, on theother hand. In the same . T:1aY he does not attellpt to Lii:1ke a qlear theoretical dis t inction between magic and Religion but is content to claim l ias a minimum'. def ini t ion ofae l ig ion the belief in Spiri tual Beiugsii4 and to leave therest of the supernatural to m a g i c ~

I t is eviclent from Tylor' s treatmentof the subject t : ;a t jle ~ e a l i s ~ d that the province of ~ l g i c a n d r e l i g i o n thus loosely defined, must cont inual ly overlap since there is often a no t ion of animism in the .E1?-ter:b,a .medica of magical r i tes . That he believed the terms l1ere best employedl 1i thout too great rigidity is shoi'm by his statei.lent ,tllat i'lhilst d.rea1l1s aremore .properly.t reated under the heading of r e l i g i o ~ l sincethey are a ~ t r i b u t e d

2. ~ c h r r d B. lJ.'ylor. ~ t v CuI ~ pp. 115-116.' ' rhesame type ofexplanation is given in Ilis ear l ie r 110rk i?w..egrches into the I l a r l ~ pistory of I ~ r u c i n d 1870. p. 129.3. Id. p. 119.4. I d . p . 424.


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to spir i tual intercourse nevertheless the of oneiromancy, the ar t oftal' ..ing omens from dreams by analogical interp:retat ion,.( e.g. the dream,e ofJ o ~ e p h , maybe t reated under the' headlllg of magic

Tylor 's theory of animism, the substratum of a l l rel igious experience,is typical of his in tel lectual is t bias in examining the beliefs of p : ~ l U i tiveman and may be compared \iith his discussion of DlHg lC when i t will be clearerfrom an[,analysis of his treatment of rel igion how he came to reach hisconclusions about magic than i f ie read his views on magic. alone. Tylorwas of the opinion tbat mankind cam,e to believe in the human soul and, byextension, in the souls of animals and plants and even of objects ihichie ca l l inanimate objects , through an effort to account rat ionally for suchphenomena as l i f e and death, waking and sleeping, disease and t rance,dreams and visions. l

His treatment of rel igious facts throughout t;J.\m follo'i'IS the saT,lemethod of rat ional is t ic interpretation as his treatment of magical facts.This is well i l lu,s trated when lle asks how i t . is that mankind has for so longplaced implici t fai th n lithe whole monstrous farrago of sylilbolic ma::icn w'hich there i s no t ruth whatever, EXplaining the logic of magic,as Tylor does, by interpreting i t as a rat ional , i f mistaken,inference from natural phenomena, he feels the need to account n a siIne'Uarmanner for the fact that primitive man did not perceive i t s falsehood. :1eexplains what appears to us as unaccountable density of intel l igence onthe grounds t ~ J a t magic is not obviously fu t i le since 1) the arts of hlagicare associated often with commonsense behaviour; the cunning and knOWledgeof the magician achieving vtllat his r i tual fa i l s to achieve: (2) i t isdiff icul t to perceive the fal lacy of the magic ar t when 1,vhut i t sets outto achieve so o ~ t e n follows i t s practice; nature performing what the magicappears to perform: (3) vnlen a magic r i te f a i l ~ , i t s fai lure i s not attr ibutedto fu t i l i ty of the r i te but to neglect of one of the p l ~ s c r i p t i o n s orprohibit ions which. accompany performance: {4) there are always host i leforces ativork 'vhich rnay counteract a magic r i t e r ival practi t ioners iKparticu,lar f u r n i ~ l i n g a useful excuse for fai lure: (5) the plas t ic i ty such notions as success and fai lure allow that what seems to some peoplea complete fai lure may seem to others a comparative or partia' l success.People every\Jhere find i t . hard to appreciatei,Widenceand one .successoutweighs in their minds and memories many fai lures: (6) the vGry 'Heightof authori ty behind maeical practice forces to accept what adds supportand confirmation and to reject i n s t ~ L c e s which contradict i t s claims.

The two posit ive contr ibut ions rnade by ' rJlor to a study of magicwere the unravell ing of i t s symbolic principle or i t s idealocical logicand his analysis of the causes which have prevented i t s exposure as afraud. Both have the merit that they are oaF-able of ps;}rchological andsociological i n v e s t i g ~ t i o n and can therefore be scient i f ical ly rejectedor accepted . Tylor s account also in my opil')ion, contaiIied a negativevirtue, a vir tue a l l the more to be commended when his bias towards evolut ionary interpretat ion of culture is taken. into account. j ' lhilst t r a c ; i ~ the development of magical and animistic ideas both in the mown chronologyof history and n the logical s t ra t i f ica t ion of cultural types he made noattempt to build out of his facts a hierarchy of his toric stages of m a g ~rel igion, and scienoe, an error into i'fhich Frazer was to fa;Ll. Tylorcontented himself ,1 ith demonstrating beyond doubt that whether i1e cQnSiderthose cultures whose history we know, and compare the earl ier forms oftheir cultures with the l a t e r fOrl:1S of their development, or i we compare

1. rd. p . 428.


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the more primitive societies in the world, today , l i th the more advanceds o c i e t i ~ s we shal l find the s ~ m broad .statement to hold true, that everyllherethere is magic and rel igion and science but that in the la ter stagesof development or in the more advanced societ ies magical and animistic ideasplay a lesser part in the thought and behaviour of men than in the ear l ierstages of development or n the more primitive .societies . In moderncivi l isat ion they tend to become i4eal isedor to survive as s u p e l ~ t i t i o nthough a tinGe of pessimism sUffuses lylor' s thought when he consi ders thehuman psyche and, i t s l imitations and makes him conscious that nothingsurvives '1hich does not spring from deep-lyi:p.g mental causes whose operat ion continuesail lays andrnay at any moment change what al)pears to pe alanguishing survival' into a flourishing revival. lie may perhaps, therefore, p l ~ e s e n t Tylor's scheme o development in a simple diagranmatic form,as I'le may imagine he .iQuld have presented t himself.

mAGIC SC,IIiITfCE RELIGION HIGEERSTAGES OFCULTUlLE .

LOCiERSTAGES OFCULTURE~ _ _ ~ _... MAGIC SCIElNCE JlliLIGION

Frazer added l i t t l e that was new to Tylor's brief survey of magic but heexpanded the sal ient points of the survey and made a deeper analysis ofthei t meaning. Argwuerits implicit in Tylor 'saccount are developed asexpliCit theses i l lua t ra ted by a lavi'sh catalogue of examples, by Frazer.But i f F r ~ z e r has' buil t s u b s t a n ~ i a l l y on the foundations la id by Tylorhe has also fal len into som:e. pits which his cautious predecessor avoided.\ e , li11 discuss his contribution under five headings: 1) his analysisof thelol7id of magic, (2) his theory of the relationship of magic toscience, {3) his theory' of the relationship of m8 g:LC to religion,(4) his chronological scheme of development of )Hagic to religion and fromreligion to science, (5) his observations on the part played by magic inpoli t ical development.

(1) \'lhilst '.[lylor shovred tha.t there is, a false association of ideas'I.1nderlying the id.eology of Illagic he did not -then proceed to classify intotYVea the analogies 'upon which i t is based. This task Frazer has ac60mplishedin hiE . olden Bough vThich r ight ly ranks among the great achievements ofn g l i s ~ I l t e r a t ~ e and scholarship. He writes: '

I{weanalyse the principles of thought upon which magic is based,they wilY prObably be found to resolve themselves into two f i r s t that l ikeprodUCes l ike, 'or that an effect resembles i t s cause; and, s e ~ o n d thatthings which have' once been in contact .d th each other cOntinile to act oneach other a t a distance af ter the physical contact has been severed. Theformer principleniay be called thl3 La'i of S:Lniilarity, the l a t t e r the Lawof Contact or Contagion. From the f i r s t of these principles, namely theLaw of Similar i ty, the magician infers that he can produce any effe.ct hedesires merely by imitating i t : from the second. he infers that 1fhatever


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he does to a material object loTi11 affect equally the person lith whom theobject was once in' contact . whethern formed part of his body or not.Charms based on the Law of Similar i ty m y be cal led Homoeopathic or ImitativeMagic. Charms based on the La1 1 of Contact or Contagion may be calledContagious Hagic. ,,1And again he says:

IIIf my analysis of the' magician's logic i s correct i t s h l greatprinciples turn out to be merely two different misapplic


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to do, but ~ l S o : That to leaye undone. ,The posi 1;ive 11recepts are charms:the n e g a t i v e r e C ~ J t l are, ,taboos. In fact the whole doctrine of taboo, ora t a l l events a largepal'1i Of i t would seem to be only a special applicat ion of sympathetic j , lUgiC, with i t s t ~ l O great lal'iS of similari ty andcontact. Though these lavls are certainly not formulated in so many Hordsnor even conceived in the abstract by the savage, they are noverthelessimplici t ly believed by him to regulate the course of nature quite independently of hUJuan wil l . He thinlcs that 'i"l'hen he acts in a certain vray, certain

c o n s e q u e n c e ~ wil l inevitably follow by virtue of one or other of these laws;and i f the consequences of a part icular act appear to him l ikely to proved i s a g r ~ e ~ p l e or dangerous, he is naturally careful not to ac t i n that wayles t he should. incur tilem. In other words, he abstains from doing thatwhich, accordance with his mistaken notions of cause and effect , hefalsely believes i-niluld injure him; in short, he subjects himself to a taboo.Thus taboo is so fa r a negative application of pract ical magic. Positivemagic or sorcery say 'Do this in order that so and so may h a p p e n ~ ,Negative magic Or taboo say -Do not do this l e s t so and so should happen.'The aim of positive magic or sorcery i s to prod.uce a desired event; the 'aim. of negative magic or taboo is to avoid an tU1desirable one. But bothconsequences, the desirable nd the Ul1desirclbIe , are supposed to be broughtabout in accordance vlith the lai'l6 of similari ty and contact.::

Thus 11ith the inclusion of taboo in his analysis of magic Frazerpresents ,his conception . of the theory ,and practice of rJ.agic in the' followingdiagram:

~ I G I

t -_ ~ tTheoretical Practical(magic as pseudo-soience) (mao-icart as apseudq-

Positive magic Negative magicorSorcery , or. Taboo

vlh n Frazer asks himselfwby the beliefs and experiments of magic arenot at once detected as fraud by the sensible ,savage, he anSi.,ers by I 'P-vingone of the several reasons enumerated by Tylor to account for suchsupineness, namely that the end aimed 3t in a luagical r i te is actuallyattained soonGr or la ter by processes o.f nature. Hence the ve'r'J fa;i.lureb IJ prliritiv'e man to detect the fal lacies of magic is tr ibute to hisrat ional and enq,uiring mil'ld which is able to obsej:'Ve that magic r i tes andsuch happenings as rain fall ing, vlind blowing, sun rising; man dying, ha.vea teFlporal sequence vlhich laay fa:i.rlybe considered a cfi.usal s e q u e n c e ~ Hence the primi ve philosopher iIJB.Y point .to .the ' evidence of his sensesas proving to any intel l igent man that magic is a sensible belief. Nore-,over i t is part of Frazer 's argtUilent that the more in tel l igent minds didat least perceive the futil ,i ty of magic .

(2) The analogy between the basic ideas of magic. and tllose of scienceWhich we find merely sketched by Tylor is presented to us as a finishedpicture by ]'razer. To him magic represents a -\Jeltanschauung in every waycomparable to the \1feltanschauUIlg of scienue. Both view nature as a series


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of events o u r r i ~ i n an invariable order without the intervention ofpersonal agency .l In a well known passage r z ~ r has statetl his theoryof the intel lectual kinship of magic .to scienoe."Fo '. the same' prtnciples which the magician applies in the practiceof his ar t are implicitly believed by him to regulate the operations ofinanimate nature; in other words; he tac i t ly assumes that the Laws ofSimilar i ty and Contact are of universal application and are not l imitedto human actions. In short, magic is a spurious system of natural lawas well as a fallacious guide of oonduct; i t is a false science as wellas an abortive ar t . Regarded as a system of natural law, that i s asstatement of the rUles which determine the sequence of events throughOutthe world, i t may be called Theoretical Magic; regarded as a set ofprecepts which human beings observe in order to compass their ends, i t may

be called Pract ical riagic. At the same time i t is to be born in mind thatthe primitive magician knows magic only on i t s practical side; he neveranalyses the mental processes on which his practice is based, never ref lectson the abstract pr inciple involved in his actions. \lith him, as l i th thevast majority of -men logic is implici t not explici t ; he reasons just ashe digests his food in complete ignorance of the intel lectual and physiological processes which are essent ial to the one operation and to theother. In short, to him magic is always an ar t never a science; the veryidea of science is lacking in his u n v l o p ~ ~ mind. I t is for the philo~ o p h i student to trace the t rain of thought which underlies th6 magician spractice; to draw out the f vl simple threads of which the tangled skeinis composed; to disengage the abstract principles from thei r COncreteapplications; in short, to discern the spurious science behind the bastardart.; .

And again:Uherever sympathetic magic occurs in i t s pure unadulterated form,i t assumes that in nature one event folloWs another n s s ~ r i l y and in -variably without the intervention of any spiri tual or personal agency.Thus i t s fundamental conception is ident ical with that of modern science;underlying the whole system is a faith, implicit but real and firm, inthe order and uniformity of nature. The magician does not doubt tha t thesame' causes will always produce the same effects , ' that the performance ofthe proper ceremony, accompanied by the appropriate spell , wil l inevitably

be attended by the desired results unless, indeed,h is incantations shouldchance to be thwarted and foi led by the more potent charms of anothersorcerer. He supplicates no higher power: he sues the favour of no f ickleand wayward 'being:. he abases h;imself before no a\'1ful deity ,,3

Magic assumes a sequence of events determined by 1aw .4 Sciencediffers from magic not in i t s assumptions and approach to rea l i ty but inthe val id i ty of i t s concepts and the efficacy of i t s ar t .

1. Sir J . G. Frazer, The Golden Bough, 3rd ed. , 1922, vol. I p. 51.2. Id . pp. 52-53.3. Sir J . G. Frazer, The Golden Bough, 3rded. '1922, Vol. I p. 220.4. Id . p. 221.


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-130(3) Frazer 's dist inct ion between magic'and science by the tes t ofobjective validi ty clearly will not hold as a means of differentiat ingmagic from religion, betweehv1hich Frazer Sa , a fundamental. dis:t;inctionand even opposition of principle. ,,1 Magic i s to him something differentin kind to religion ald not merely the earl ies t . phase in the development

of i t s thought. He differentiates between them in mue}; ; the saw.e manneras Tylor. Tylor considered belief ' in spir i tual beings to constitutereligion and recognised' that belief invariably leads to cul t . Frazerstresses the cult rather more than Tylor; othe.rWise their theories areidentical . Religion according to Frazer isA propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to man 1;lThichare believed to direct and control the course of nature and of human l i feThus defined, religion consists of two elements, a theoretical and a prac-t ica l , namely, a belief in powers higher than man and an attempt to propit iateor please them.,,2 . .

Hence religion assumes that n a t t ~ e i s under the control of spir i tsand that these spir i ts can' al ter i t s course as they please. Frazer con-t ras ts th is notion of a plastic and variable nature with the notion ofnature subjeot to immutable' laws as postulated by magic and science.

The d i s t i n c t i o n b e t ~ 1 e e n t h e t l f O conflicting views of the universeturnS on their answer to the crucial question. Are the forces which governthe world conscious and personal, or unconscious and impersonal? n e l i g ~ o nas a conciliation of the superhuman powers, assumes the former, of the a l-ternative. For al l conciliation implies that the being conciliated is aconscious or personal agent, that his conduct is in SOL1e measure uncertain,and that he can be prevailed upon to vary i t in the desired direction bya judicious appeal to his in teres ts , his appetites , or his emotions.Conciliation is never employed towards things which are regarded as inanimate,nor tm1ards persons whose. behaviour in the particula r circumstances isknown to be determed with absolute certainty. Thus in so far as religionassUmes the world to be directed by conscious agents v1ho may be turned fromtheir purpose by persUasion, i t stands in fundamental antagonism to magicas I'lell as to science, both of which take for granted that the course ofnature is determined, not by the passions or -caprice of personal beings ,but by the operation of ixbmutable laws acting mechanically . In magic,indeed, the assumption iS 'only implicit , but in science i t is explicit. , ,3Frazer recognises the problem of reconciling th is definit ionwi threcorded knowledge of barbaric cultures in which the gods are influenced

by magic or are even themselves magicians. Are not magic and r e ~ i g i o n asFrazer defines them, in such cases an insoluble compound of r i tual andbelief? From his in tel lectual is t position Frazer says that they are notinsoluble for in such cases i t is eusy to see whether mankind. t reats thego s in the same way as he t reats inanimate objects, as sUbjectto;hisspells which they are bound to obey through the same immutable laws as

1. Id . , Preface, xx.2. Sir J . G. Frazer, The Golden Bough, 3rd ed. , 1922 vol. I , p,. 2223. Id. p. 223.


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of sympathetic magic remains e v e r ~ f l h e r e and at a l l times substantial lyalike in i t s principles and practice. Among the' ignorant and superst i t iousclasses of modern Europe i t is very much tvhat i t was thousands of years agon Egypt and India, and what is now among thelmvest savages surviving in

the remotest corners of the. "l'J"Orld. I f the tes t of t ruth lay in a show ofhands or a counting of heads, the system Of magic might appeal, with fa rmore reason than the Catholic Church, to the proud motto,. ~ l f o d semper,guod ubigue. guod ab omnibus," as the sure and cer tain credential of i t sown infa.llib i l ity . t I . .Frazer then proceeds to enquire about the process of mental change'

from an exclusive bel ie f n magic to a belief in rel igion. also. Hethinks. that he can do no more than "hazard a more or less plausibleconjecture" abou,tthis change , in orientation of, belief . Thiscbnjectureis that the 'shrewder intel l igences began t a s e e that magic 'did' not real lyaccomplish "l'lhat it se tou t to accomplish and f e l l back on the belief ' thatthere were beings, l ike themselves who directed the course .of nature and"l'lho must be placated and cajoled into graritil'ld man what he had hither tobelieved himself able to bring o u ~ throughmagic.on hismm ini t ia t ive.

The shre''fder intel l igences must in t:iIIie have come to perceive thatuagical ceremonies and incantations did not real ly .effect. ' the rel3U1t s . ' . .l'lhich they. "l'lere designed to produce, and which the maj ori ty of their simplerfellows s t i l l believed that they did actually ' produce. This great discoveryof the in-eff icacy of magic must have ,'fraughta" radical t h o ~ l g h probablys ~ o w revolution in the minds of those who had the sagacity toruake itThe,discove'ry amounted to this" that men for the f i r s t time recognisedtheir inabi l i ty to manipulate at pleasure cer tain natural forces whichhitherto they had believed to be completely ...' i thin their control. It wasa confession of human ignorance and weakness. tian sa,'i that he ,had takenfor causes. what were no causes, and that a l l his efforts to !'1Ork by meansof these imaginary causes had been vain. His painful to i l had been wasted,his curious 'mgenuity had been' squandered to no purpose. He had 'beenpulling a t str ings to which nothing was attached; he had been' hlarching,as he thOUght, straight to the goal, l'diile in real i ty he r..ad only been '.. treading in a narrow' circle . Not that the effects which he had str ivenso h i ~ d to produce did not continue to manifest themselves .. They weres t i l l produced, but not by him. The rain s t i l l f e l l on the th i rs tyground: the sun s t i l l pursued his daily, and the moon her nightly' journeyacross 'the sl0.f: the si lent procession of the seasons s t i l l moved in l ightand shadow, in cloud and sunshine across the earth: men were s t i l l bornto labour and sorrow, and s t i l l , af te r a brief sojourn here ,were gatheredto their fathers in the long home hereaf ter . All things indeed went onas be.fore, yet a l l seemed different to him from whose eyes the old scaleshad fal len. For he could ;no longer cherish the pleasing i l lus ion that i t,vas he who guided the ear th and the heaven in their courses, and that they1'10uld cease to perform their great revolutions were};le to .take his feeblehand from the \'1heel. In the death' of his enemies and his friends he nolonger saw a proof of the res i s t less potency of his own or of hosti le .enchantments; he now knew that friends and. foes alike had succumbed to aforce stronger than any that he 90ufd wield, ffi1d, in obedience to a destinywhich he was powerless to oontrol." 2 . .

1. Id . , pp. 235-6.2. Sir . J., G. Frazer, The Golden Bough, 3rd ed. , 1922, Vol. I , pp. 237-8.

,- ...... '- ,


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-133 In the end magic is suppressed by rel igion and eventually comes underthe ban of the priesthood as a black art . So a t a la te period in the develop

ment of huraan thought we f ind a distinctiondrawri between rel igion:andsuperst i t ion, magic being classed as a ~ u p e r s t i t i o n .But tlhen,' s t i 11 la te r , the concept ion of the element 8J f o r c e ~ aspersonal agents is giving "lay to the recognition of natural la11; thenmagic, based as it implici t ly i s on the idea of a necessary and invariablesequence of cause and effect , independent o;fpersonaL.will , reappears

from the obscuri ty and discredi t in tol lhich it had fal len, and by in- 'vest icat ing the causal sequenc.es in nature, direc t ly prepares the way forscience. Alchemy leads up to chemistry. ,,1(5) Final ly ]Irazer rounds off his account of magic by showing thepart i t has played in ):li.story of pol i t ical development. ~ l g i i spract ised in primitive societ ies not only by private individuals for the i r

own private purposes but also by public functionaries on behalf of theT'lhole community and these men are ab.le to gain g".l'eat .wealth and reputeand may acquire rank and authority by the i r : i : ' i tualfunctions. Moreoverthe profession of public magician se lec ts the ablest , m08t mnbitious, andmost un.scrupulous, men in society since it sets a premium on knavishimposture That 'public m a g ~ c i s often a road to pol i t i ca l influenceand social prest ige and private affluence Frazer shows by many actual.examplesfrom Austral ia , New Guinea, rvIelanesia, and Africa, and he jus t ly concludestha t :in point of fact magJ.cJ.ans appear to have often developed in to chiefs andIdngs. Not' that magic i s the only or perhCll)S even the main road by vThich

~ e l have t ravel led to a throne .,,2 .In th is progress from magJ.cJ.an to king the fear inspired by r i tua lp01ver i s backed by the wealth the magician i s able to amass in the exerciseof his profession. The profession of magician appears to be the ear l ies tprofessional class in human society and the f i r s t sign of social dif fer -

en t i a t ion .F raze r then brings his thesis of pol i t ical development intoconnexidn ilith his theory of the chronological sequence of rJagic to rel igion.For he believes tha t the eVolution of the magician-chief goes hand in handwith the breakdm1n of magic and the bir th of rel igion. Hence tho magicianas he gains pol i t ica l supremacy tends at the same time to emerge as thepries t .

"Hence the king. s tar t ing as a magJ.cJ.an, tends gradua 11y to exch angethe pract ice of magic for the priest ly functions of prayer and sacr i f ice .And while the dis t inc t ion between the human and the divine i s . s t i l limperfectly.drawn, i t i s often imagined tha t men may themselves a t ta in togodhead not merely a f t e r the i r death, but in the i r l i f e time, through thetemporary or perm 3-nent possession of the i r 'vhole mi ture bya great andpowerful spi r i t . 3tlhile Tylor traced the changes which have taken place in the formand functions of magic, rel igion, and science, through the ages and kepthis conception of their growth and decay within the l imits se t by knowledge

1. Sir J . G. Frazer , The Golden Bough, 3rd ed. , 1922, Vol. 1 p. 374.Z Id . , p. 332.3. Sir J. G. Frazer, The Golden Bough, 3rd ed. , 1922, Vol. I . , p, 372.


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-134 -derived from history and a comparative study of cultures, Frazer tracedthe progressofhw1an thought through strat ified grades of unilinear development, each grade representing a steporiwhichmankind has everywhererested awhile on his path of upward progress He may therefore presentFrazer 's ~ c h e m e d i g r k ~ t i c l l y to compare i t with the diagrammaticpresentation which we have dravITl to demonstrate Tylor'sviewpoint.

HIGHERSCIENCE CULTURESRELIGION

LOJERMAGIC CULTURES

Having summarised the theories of ~ r o r and Frazer I shal l nm 1 tryto sort them out and class them as hypotheses capable of inductive proofand in accordance with present knonledge, hypotheses 1'lhich cannot beproved ind.uctively but which have heuristic value, and hypotheses 'l'lhichare useless either because they are contrary to ascertained facts or beingbeyond proof or disproof by inductive enquiry lack also even heuristicvalue. Into the last class come Frazer's theories about the affectiveand ideational similarity between magic and science, about the developmentof thought through stages of magic, religion, and science, and the greaterpart of his analysis of magical symbolism.Tylor and Frazer were both dominated by the v o l u t i o n ~ ideas oftheir time and tended to see different types of behaviour as representativesof historic" stages Frazer especially arranged his types i n a temporalsequence "\ilhich llas hardly justif ied by his methods of investigation. Hecould have shown the historical development of magic and science, asThorndike, for inst ance, has done, in a definite culture of t"1hich we havehistorical knowledge, or he could have carefully defined cultural typeson a consensus of cultural t ra i ts and demonstrated the correlation betweenthese types and modes of thought. He used neither of these methods withthe resul t that his theory of evolutionary progress of manlcind through stagesof magic, religion, and science, has earned Marett 's t i t le of a platonic

myth and t i spos sible that Frazer would have been' content , 1i th thisdescription and regarded his scheme as a convenient framework on which toweave his vastaosortment of facts. There is nothing in Frazer 's argumentswhich proves a chronological priori ty for magic over religion and empiricalknol"11edge. Frazer's argument that the Australians, '''ho have the simplestmaterial culture we la1ow, show much magical and l i t t le religious behav.liurfa l ls to the ground on the impact of cri t ical analysis. t has been pointedout that other, peoples who may' be considered as low in the cultural scaleas the Australians, have l i t t le magic.; that the Australians cannot betaken as a cultural unit since they differ lr1idely among themselves; andthat moreover many Australian tribes have. pronounced animistic beliefs andcults. Frazer's plea that animals make mental associations betweenphenomena and that this is also the ess$nce of magical beliefs is a veryremote and superficial analogy. Magic is a system of r i tual t echni'lues andnot simple mental associations between phenomena. Moreover .evolutionary,theory suffers from the same drawback as others of i t s kind, namely that


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- 135i t i s qUite beyond proof or disproof. I f anyone had been present vrhen menperformed the i r f i r s t r i t e s he might have recorded the i r nature and v ecould then have classi f ied them as rel igion or magic according to oursev ral formulae. Frazer ' s . theory of how mankind changed from l3 magicalto a rel igious view of the universe i s hardly presented as a serious thes isand i s not t reated as one here.

Nevertheless the pr io r i ty in time of magic over rel igion, though tcannot be inductively proved might tave been ~ e d u c t i v e l y concluded i fFrazer had made an exhaustive survey of the facts by the method of correlat ion such as was employed by Tylor, Steinmetz, aild Hobhouse, Ginsberg and

~ h e e l e r I t might be possible to sllov. tha t magic is spe9ial ly prominentin those societ ies with a low technological equipment and lmdeveloped .poli t ical organisation and that ' l l-en vIe exanine types of society ui th moree f f i c i e r ~ technology and more complex social orgmlisation we find a greaterabsence of magical r i t es and a greater number of rel igious ones andthat f inal ly rIa reach socie t ies of greatest technical eff iciency and mostcomplex social l i f e in which magic is almost absent and re l ig ion lessprominent than in the second type l 1hile behav iour and thought are becomingmore and more exclusively empirical .

An analysis of the kind suggested here, par t icular ly of the correlat ion of magical and empirical thought ui th forms of social behaviour i l ouldbe le l l north the labour that i t would cost. There can be no doubt tha tmagic as a dominant form of social behaviour i s res t r ic ted to savage andbarbarous peoples. This does not mean tilat a l l uncivi l ised societ ies aremagic-ridden nor does i t lilean that magic i s to tal ly unlmo m. in civi l isedcommuni t ies . 1 Hhat i t means is tha t i f vIe t race. the changes which have .taken place in those civi l isat ions for which we possessur i t t en historywe shal l f ind that there is a slow and cumulative increase in empiricallmorlledge and a slOWly diminishing body' of magj.cal knml1edge and tha t alsoi f \ e compare societ ies ,rl.thout the art of uri t ing and Hithout advancedtechnology with those tha t possess the art of lvri t ing and are technologicallyadvanced Te shal l f ind that on the v{hole the technique of magic i s lessprominwt a mode of behaviour in the l a t te r than in the former. .Ie maysay therefore that magic i s a technique character ist ic of simple societ iesand tends to disappear with the advancement of c i v i l ~ s t i o n a point ofview advanced by Tylor and s t r ik ingly developed by Levy-Bruhl in the .provoking contrast he makes betl'leen Primitive Mentality and Civil isedr:lental i ty.

I f we mean by science an elaborate system of knowledge, the resultof experimentation in the hands of specia l i s t s , such as, Ie think of when we speak about science today, there is l i t t l e dif f icul tyin assigning to t an histor ica l stage in the development of human thought.But i f we mean any correct knoi'lledge of natural processes and acquaintancewith technological methods t l ~ n i t i s clear ly improper to place science a tone end and magic a t other end of a ser ies of developmental stages, asFrazer has done, since i t is evident that no peoples could possibly havel ived in a s tate of cul ture suff ic ient to engage in r i tua l unless they f i r s thad sufficient technological knOWledge to master the i r enviro'nment. Youcannot have agr icul tura l or hunting magic unless you have agricul ture and

1 . A vast l i terature could be ci ted on magical r i tes pract ised by thepeasantry of Europe.


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hunting. Moreover, most primitive societies of today are always foundto be equipped with a s o ~ d knowledge of nattU'e. The difference betweenscient if ic knowledge used n the f i r s t sense and scient i f ic knowledge usedin the second sense i s one of degree but i t may be generally stated thatthe f i rs t usage means that you understand that cer tain things do happeninvariably and that the second usage means that you understand hm 1 andwhy they happen. In tlle f i rs t case you Imovl that i you plant maize seedsin a certain type of ground at a certain time of the year maize wil l grow.In the second case Y ~ k n V vThy the seeds grovT at al l , l 1hy they grOl l inone soi l and not in,a.nother, and why they grO l l at onetime of the year anrlnot at another. But even here there are many degrees of knowledge and theempirical shades into the scientif ic.

I t is never clear w hat Frazer means by science for he uses the tiordn o ~ in one sense n01: 1 in another but on the vlhole h seems to mean theconscious str iving after knOWledge, the systems of crit icism and controls,and the use of logic and experiment, l 1hich the ~ f o r d implies in ordinary ,

u s ~ today. Used in th is sense the analogy which he drmls between scienceand magic is unintel l igible. He says that science and magic both. visualizea uniform nature subject to invariable l a ~ s and that the scient is t and themagician have a l ike psychdlogical approach to nature. I t i s clear fromaccounts of savages that they have no conception of nature as a systemorganized by la,lS and in any case the uti l isat ion of magic to influence thecourse of nature i s surely in direct opposition to the sc ient i s t s conception of the universe. You cannot both believe in natural law and thatyou can delay the sun by placing a stone in the fork of a t ree . I f thereare ar.y regular i t ies and uniformit i es .of thought they are in the \ 1orkingsof magic and not of nature. But the whole discussion seems rather pointless for you have to be a scientis t to note regulari t ies and uniformitiesand organise them into a conscious theory of the universe. Indeed Frazerhimself speaks of the magical vie , of the universe subject to law andexpressing uniformity as implicit and not explici t and i t i s difficult tosee any sense in theoretical magic which is not explici t . All t canLleanis that i f , 1e used magic in the same vray as the savage uses i t l 1e .110uld have a 'theory that the world was sufficient ly regular in i t s vlorkingfor us to rely on magic to control i t since i t may be expected always toreact in the same manner to the performance of the same spell or r i te .Ue should generalise our experiences in this manner because we are scienti-fical ly orientated but since v e are scient if ical ly orientated ,, 1e shoUld a tonce perceive the fallacy of magic. lilith regard to the supposition thatthe man 0:1: science and the man of magic both approach thei r task withqUiet confidence and masterful assurance and that thei r psycholog'J contrastsWith the nervous apprehension and humility of the man of rel igion i t canonly be said that Frazer produces no facts in support of his contention.

The apparent fu t i ty of Frazer 's analogy between science and magicis due to the fact that he sees both as modes of thinking and not as. learntmodes Of technical behaViour ,'lith concomitant speech fonns. I f he hadcompared a magical r i te in i t s entirety with a scient if ic performance ini ts entirety instead of comparing uhat he supposes to go on n the brainof a magician with what he supposes to go on in the brain of a scient is the would have seen the eSsential difference betl 1een science and magic.This difference i s most str ikingly shOlm in the experimental standpointon the t, iO modes of behaviour. Science experimep. ts and is open to experience and ready to make adjustments in i t s notiolW of real i ty whereasmagic i s relat ively non.;.experimental and the magician is iW,pervious toexperience, as science understands the term, since he employs no methodsof test ing or control. I f moreover Frazer had not brought the scientif ic


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-1 57

specialist on to the scene in order to compare him with the ~ a g i c a l s p e c ~ a l i s t but had compared magical knm-lledge and behaviour v th scient i f ic k n o w l ~ d ~ e and behaviour, that i s to say had compared those forms of knowledge whichaccord with objective real i ty ~ n t h those which distort objective real i tyand those forms of behaviour which achieve thei r purpose with those formsof behaviour which are only believed to achieve their purpose, and hadcompared them as types of thought and behaviour in the same cultural conditions instead of in total ly different cultural conditions, his investigations would have been of greater value. 1,Iemight have compared empiricalbehaviour with magical behaviour among the savages of Australia and observedtheir interaction, their l;Iocial inter-relat ions, and the i r concomitant .psychological states witn some chance of reaching valid conclusions aboutthe differences which exist between them . L ~ v y ~ B ~ l who took an exactlyopposUlsl..point oifi view, holding that magical thought and scientif icthought stand to each other as bla,ck to white ,made the same mistake ofcomparing our science with savage magic instead of comparing savageempiricism with savage magic. .

Besides suffering from the influence of current psychological andevolutionary theories Frazer s e ~ o s i t i o n a l s o suffered from current methodological deficiencies. He used w hat is knotmas, the comparative methodand th is does not mean the conviction that any s cientific generalisationmust res t on a comparative study of similar phenomena, a conviction commonto al l men of science and an essential part of their methodology, but apartiCUlar way of comparing phenomena which was extensively used by al lanthropological writers at the end of the last century. I t consisted inselecting from a ,vast mass of data, ,uneven and often poor in quality,Whatever pheriomena appeared to belong to the sanie type. This proved tobe a very dangerous proceeding because the selection of facts was madeon the grounds of similari ty between ppenomena in virtue of a single commonquali ty. The quali t ies which were different in each instance t 1ere neglected.This i s a perfectly sound method of scient i f ic analysis so long as conclusions are res t r ic ted to the part icular q u a l i ~ J abstracted and i t is notthen assumed that because phenomena are alike i n respect to this singlequality that they are alike in other respects If/hibh have not been subjectto cr:tical comparative analysis. In a study of social facts the procedUreis a l l the more hazardous for these are defined by their i n t r ~ r l t i o n s and i f they are abstracted from, thei r f10cial milieu i t is essential toreal ise that they are only comparable in a l ini ted number of r e s ~ J 9 c t s a n d not as complete social facts By use of the comparative method Frazer wassuccessful in demonstrating that the ideology of magic restsupon fundamental

l ~ l s of thought for i t i s possible to isolate the ideologicala 3sociationsof a vast number of magical r i tes and to compare them simply as examplesof evident notions which are the raw material of a l l human thought. Butwhen Frazer then proceeds to find a similari ty between magic and sciencemerely because the scientist and tlJ e magician use the processes of a l lthought building, sensation, a b s t r a ~ t i o n and comparison, the procedureis clearly inadmissible because it does not follow from the fact that bothmagic and science display in thei r ideologies the most elementary processesof thought that there i s any real similar i ty bet1l1een scient i f ic and magicaltechniques and systems of thought. This ]a rs pro toto fallacy is againshol T:I:1in Frazer s argument that because magic and science both disregardspi r i tual beings they are similar n virtue of this absent association.This is equivalent to saying that x is not y and z is not y and t h a ~ therefore x and z are the same. . I conclude therefore that Frazer s theoriesof the similari ty between magic nd science and of their historic stagesare unsupported by either sound evidence or logic and that they have l i t t l eheurist ic value. Indeed they are formulated in such a manner that i t is


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-138 diff icul t to present them in a scient i f ic form a t a l l and consequently theyim:pede rather than assist us in our quest I t i , useless to attempt tosolve the queries which Frazer raises. Ue have to .formulate the problemsanew if we are to conduct a scient i f ic enquiry.. . .

Of what value i s the whole Tylor-Frazer conceptiqn of magic as amistaken association of ideas? Here we may distinguish between twoproposi tions:., (1). in the \vords and actions of magic lTe can discern the operationof certain elemen'j;;ary laws of thoUght. The associations which l ink the

r i t e and i t s objective are so simple that they are evident to us who arefar. removed from the c;ultures ' which magic f lourishes. They are fOundto rest .on pe4:'ception afpos i t ion and perception of similari t ies.(2) These. associations are to us no more than memory images ofquali t ies of things which have an ideal relat ionship in our minds but thesavage mistakes these ideal relations for real relations in the world

around him. \J e and savages both think in the same way insofar as perceptionand comparison of Clensationa are conce,rned' but the savage thenleaves us behind and goes a s tep fur ther by believing that because twothings are a s o ~ i a t e d toget}:i.er i l ih i s memorY image that they are objectivelyassociated He ~ l i e v e s t h a t because things are l ike each other they u i l lact on each other since they are,.bound by an invisible l ink.vIe can accept the fi:rst 'proposi t ion 11ithout hesi ta t ion. I t tmsclear ly enunciated by Tylor and abundantly i l lustra ted by Frazer. \le canadopt the terminology of the Golden Bbugh and speak of Homoeopathic Bagicand Contagious r;ragic. But i t is surprising that Frazer made no deeperanalysis, for to t e l l us that magical thought rests on percept ion of posit ion and similari t ies is not to t e l l us much since these are the elementarypr


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-r.39 associations; and other l ines of enquiry could be suggested.

The second proposition is most misleading ffild is i l lus t rat ive ofone of those perilous leaps bacIDruards and forwards in the dark fromobservable social behaviour to individualpsycholog,ical processes whichd i ~ t i n g u i s h anthropological gymnastics. Frazer 's argument runs as follows:to the Greek peasant jaundice and gold are of the same colour and sincethings Which are alike react on one another gold i f used according tocertain rules ~ l l cure jaundice. I would prefer to state the propositionas follows: gold and jaundice produce the same sensations of colour andthis similari ty is culturally indicated by thoi r association in magicalbehaviour. I t is the middle expression in Frazer's thesis to which objection is taken. In his account he frequently informs us that in savageminds like produces l ike and that cOiltiguous things remain in contact uhenthei r contiguity ceases to be objective and remains, as we would say,only a memory image. i/e are told that the magician infers that he canproduce any effect he desires merely by imitating i t and that "homoeopathicmagic makes the mistake of assuming that ~ h i n s which resemble each otherare the same.

.Ie mayfi.rst note in criticism of this point of view that i t isalways uncertain what Frazer means by his statements because the inferenceshe refers to are only implicitly believed or tacit ly assumed". Butbeliefs and assumptions are judgments, they are conscious processes inuhich the middle term between two associated images is laaown to thethinker. Apart from this terminolc;gical haze which hangs ovei: the \Tholediscussion and which alone serves to obscure a l l issues there is a hopelessjumble of psychological and sociological problems in which psychologicalconcepts are used where t l ~ y are quite irrelevant. e must keep our problems distinct i f we are to find our way through this labyrinth of vaguegeneralisations. Sensations and abstractions and simple comparison of abstractions are psychological processes common to al l mankind and in asociological study of magic they do not concern us psychological facts.Tie are also not concerned \iTith the question why magical associations embodynotions of position and resemblance. I t is inconceivable that they shouldnot. The problem which concerns us is related to the social value orsocial indication which is given to objects and quali t ies. This valuemay be empirical, that is to say i t may at tr ibute to a thing, and uti l ise,the quali t ies Which i t really possesses. For e ~ l p l e a stone is consideredto be hard and is therefore used as a tool. ' Or the value may be mystical,that is to say i t may at tr ibute to a thing quali t ies which i t does notpossess and which are not subject to sensory impressions. For example astone l:la,y be used in magical r i tes or be considered the dwelling place ofa spir i t . The perception of similar colouring in gold and jaundice is apsychological fact which requires a psychological explanation. Theembodiment of this perception in a social technique is a sociological factand requires a sociological explanation. I t is not our business to explain the sensations 'l'Thichthe physical quali t ies of an object produce inmen but i t is our task to explain the social qualities with which meninvest. the object. The tendency of Tylor and Frazer to explain socialfacts in terms of individual psychology have been just ly cr i t ic ised byDurkheim and his school. Either this means that a pattern of thought canbe explained in terms of psycho-physical functioning of an individual 'sbrain which appears to be absurd i f only because the pattern existed beforethe individual was born and he inherited i t as part of his social heritage,even vlhen i t involves sensations which have to be individually experienced,or i t means that a pattern of thought can be explained by an individual 'smental content which i s , of course, no explanation at al l .

/


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-140Even the simpiest associations i f they are to anything more thanpassing images are creations of social usage, of language, of technology,of magic, and so on. This is rhy in experiments on association there i s

real ly so l i t t l e free association and ,rl1y the responses evoked in so manysubjects are so often of the same' type. One is not surprised tha t aGreek peasffilt can see a resemblance between the colour of culd and the colourof jaundice but the problem i s why he should associate .these tvro thingstogether n magical performances vnl n he does not s s o i t ~ them togetherin other s i tuat ions and why he associates these par t icu lar things and notother things which have the sanie .qual i t ies of colour. It,would neveroccur to us to associate gold and jaundice together so why should theGreek peasant associate them together? The answer can hardly e avoidedthat he associates them together in certain s i tuat ions because he learnsto do so when he learns to speak and behave as other members of his societylearn to speak and behave. But one presumes that the Greek peasant doesnot always make th is association and that i t i s possible for him to thinkof and use gold \rithout thinking of jaundice and even that he can thinkof jaundice \'1ithout associating i t with gold. I t is also pertinent to askwhy he should associate gold ffi1d not something else trith jaundice, and inposing th is question a whole range of problems present themselves. We .ask l lhether there are other things llhich in their culture fu l f i l the condit ions of COlour and adaptibi l i ty to the requirements of magical usagg;we ask uhat is the social value given to gold in other sitoot ions, v e as1


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of .a r i t e to produce rain. Hence there is no mistaken association ofi d ~ s 'rhe association betw2en a certain Ciuality in one thing and thesame quality in another thing is a correct and universal association.I t does not violate thelaVTs of logic for i t is a psychological process

~ l t o g e t h e r outside their sphere. I t would certainly be a mistake were .the savage to 1101d that because things are alike they .can, in virtue ofthei r l ikeness alo1).o, act on one another at a distance or that by merely ...imitating an act he can produce i t . But here again the savage makes nosuch mistake. He believes that certain r i tes can produce certain resultsand the mimetic or homoeopathic. elements in the r i t e are the manner in whichthe purpose of r i t e is expressed. I t is the r i t e i tse lf , the p e r f o r ~ mance of standardised movements and the utter-lng of standardised 'fIOrds andthe other sterotyped conditions of r i tual , which achieves the resul t .The savage does not say IIWhatever I imitate will happen so that i f I thrO\'lwater into the a i r rain 1'1111 fa l l vlhat he says is "There is no rain atthis season of the year when there ought to be rain and i f we get the rainmaker to perform a r i t e rain vlill fa l l and our crops 1'1ill be saved".\lhy r i tes so often take a mimetic form is a psychological problem which weshall not discuss here. Harett has put fonTard a bri l l iant hypothesisbut t is possible to advance other t h e o r i e s . ~ e rr,ust therefore make theobjection with Freud "dass die Assoziationstheorie der fIlagie bloss die HegeaUfklart , welche die Uagic geht, aber nicht daren eigentliches \Jesen,u&mlich nicht das Missverstandnis, welches s ie psychologische Gesetzean die Stel le naturl icher setzen heiss t" . l

I f I have cr i t ic ised Frazer severely I render homage to his ooholarship. The Golden Bough is an essentia l source-book for a l l students ofhuman thought and the fai thful way in which he has treated his authorit iesis an assurance that we drink at an undiluted stream. His writings haveabmys been, and no less today than in the past, a stimulus to those ,fOrkingin the same f ie ld and every crit icism is a t r ibute . But w'e can go far therthan making these acknowledgments - we must take over from Tylor and Frazermany sound ideas and use them in the foundations of any theory of magicwhich is to stand the t es t of cri t ic ism and research. As we are, as i twere, taking these ideas away with us, they may be l i s t ed as briefly aspossible since in future Olri t ings they wil l be ut i l i sed, ''1hEe those ideaswhich v e believe to be erroneous and to ;'1hich 1e have devoted lengthycrit icism are being je t t isoned once and for a l l .

(1) Tylor 's exposition of the variat ions of magic as a form ofsocial behaviour ui th variations in cultural development.(2) Tylor 's bri l l iant analysis 0 f the mechanisms lihich compel andmaintain fai th in magic among savage and barbarous peoples.(3) Frazer ' s observation, cautiously stated, of the oft foundidentity of the pUblic magician with the pol i t ical chief.(4) The division of r i tua l into rel igion and magic on the formalbasis of presence or absence of bel ief in spi r i t s with attendant cul t , putforward by Tylor and adopted by Frazer, is an acceptable tenJinologicaldevice. So much time and labour has been expended in a fut i le endeavourto define the respective spheres magic and religion in the abstract. that i,t is necessary to sta te that sociology studies' social behaviour anddistinguishes between one type f behaviour ,and ~ o t h e r and whether apart icular type of behaviour is labelled with one term or with another term is of minor in te res t . - , lha t sot importance i s that a l l studentsin the same f ie ld should use key terms like. ,magic' arid religion with the same-meaning Magic a n d r ~ l i g i o ~ a r e c l e a r l y what we define them

1. Totem und TabU, p. 111


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-142them to be in terms of behaviour. lIe do not " allt a discussion about there la t ion of abstractions to one another in a cultural vacuum but we ''1anta discussion about the relations between magical behaviour and. religiousbehaviour in specific cultures. Tylor and Frazer defined religion muchmore clear ly t h ~ they defined magic and t ~ i r division has, been acceptedby ,many scholars and may be: used as a convenient s tar t ing 'point for moreintensive re.search. .

(5) Frazer1s diviSion of magic into "homoeopathic" and contagious"likewise i s a step in advance of Tylor1s analysis and serves' as a basisfCir s t i l l further analysis of the s y ~ o l i s m of magic

.EoE. EvansPritchard.

1. ' 'ro mention only one: 1:1. H. H Rivers, Medicine, Nagicand Religion,Kegan Paul,1927, p. 4 and passim. This writer does not consider,hm'1ever, that primitive peoples have the . concept of the natural" andtherefore not of the supernatural .


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,'-'. . "-r, , ""J ,.,:.,-:

-143~ s e l i e f P o s s i b l ~ ?

A n o t e w o ~ t h y conclusion of Needham's Belief, LqngYAge and E x p e r i e n ~ is that: "Indifference to the constrain:t of possibil i ty is a curious propertyin a psychological verb, but t is certainly a distinctive' mark of thenotion of belief" (Needham, 1972; 66). While this statement is not thekeystone of Needham's argument, it is sti1.l0ne of the more suggestivepoints on which his conclusion i s founded, and for that reason provides anopportunity f o r r e ~ e x a m i n i n g i t s more important implicationJ;l. Needbam';3conclusion that belief is indifferent to possibil i ty comes by reflectingon Tertull ian 's paradox; an alternative approach s to corlsider the natureof possibil i ty , which i s , after a l l , a notion of some importance in thewri tings of Needham's aclmovl1edged inspiration, Ludwig \ ~ i t g ~ n s t e i n Thecomplexity'of lrfittgenStein's writings is such that a 4e4idated adherentcan +,ind himself in the odd si tuation of disagreeing' on almost every matterof philosophical importance with one who is equally entit led, to wave hisbanner. This is the case concerning Needham's treatment of the possibil i tyof belief, for while one must admire his handling of Wittgenstein 's la terwritings, he makes not a single :teference to the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Indeed, this work is not even l is ted n his bibliography.

Wi t tgenstein ' s own repudiation' of the TractatAA has contributed toi t s unpopUlarity, but since a reader 's opinion of a book need never be thesame as i t s author 's , t is possible to see l ' l ittgenstein's several publishedvolumes as parts of a whole. Naturally,. some parts of the Tractatl. . aremore conVincing than others, but there are, to use iJit tgenstein's own metaphor,enough overlapping threilds from one book to the next to string the i,deaetogether. One of the arguments begun in the Tractatus that persists throughthe la ter writings i s a certain notion of possibil i ty . The argument of th isessay i s , in part , that had Needham used the word "possibi l it y l1 in the senseimparted to i t by o t tgenstein in the ' r ractatus, his statement concerningthe possibil i ty of bel ief loJ Ould be reversed, and that this would in turn 'al ter his reflections on the universality of belief.

Wittgenstein 's idea of possibil i ty can be seen in the followingstatements both from and about, his work:, ;jlhoJlght can be of. ,v'hat is hot the case. (PhilosophicalInvestigations, 1195 .ThOUght i s surrounded by a ralo. - I t s essence,logic, presents an order, in fact the a priori orderof the world: that i s , the order of possibi l i t ies ,which must be common to both world and thought.(Philosophical Investigati ons 97)I t is essential to things that they should be possibleconstituents of states o affai rs . (Tractatus, 1/2.011

i f a thing occur in .a sta te of affa irs , thep o s s i i l i ~ of the sta te of affairs must be writteninto the thing i t se l f . (Tractatus, 1 2.012A thought contains the possibility of the si tuationlirl which i t is the thought vlhat i s thinkable ispossible too. (Tractatus" I 3.02)The limits of my l anwge mean the l imits of my world. ,

~ r a c t a t u s ? 5.6) , . . . ,


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-144v e cannot think what we cannot think so That wecannot think we cannot say either. (Tractatus, # 5.61)Just as the only necessity that exists is log;lcalnecessity, so t.oo th,e only impossibilit tha,t exis tsis logicat impo'ssibility. (Tracta.ty,s, 16.375 . .'Possible' is for Wittgensteinwhat expressiblein language. (Maslow, 1961;25) .An impossible thought is an impossible t h o ~ g h t (5.61) and that is Why i t is not possible to sarwhat it. is thatcannot be thought. (Anscombe, 1959; 163) ,. . . . . . 'possibi l i ty ' must here be taken as exoludingboth certainty; and impossibility. (Anscombe, 1959; 157)

These quotations need l i t t l e elaboration. Thought, possibi l i ty andlanguage are related. VJhat can be ' thought can be put into lazlt, 'Uage,' ''1he,tcan be put into language is possible. llithin the scheme of the TractatUB,none of these terms h s anYthing to do loTithreality, the world, or -the \1I'aythings are. "Possibility" is a logical constraint. One can say of astatement whether it is possible or impossible before one holds i t upagainst experience to see whether or not i t is part of the world. I flogical, then thinkable and hence possible. Examples are few, since i t isdiff icul t to think of things that are unthinkable. Suffice i t to say thatany abrogation of the rules of logic is an unthinka'Qlestate of affairs ,The round square, the three-dimensional t r iangle, the bounded infini ty,are al l logically contradictory. They defy conception; .there can be nogeneral notion of what they would be i f they were ,the case . Here, then,arele:gitimate uses of the words "possible", il;i.mpossible , "possibi l i ty", ."imposSibility". Considering this definition, what can Needham mean bysaying that "to believe" shows an "indifference to the constraint ofpossibili ty"?

Putt ing the question "is belief possible" i r r l o ~ l i t t g n s t i n rs term :inology is to say: does believing describe a sta te of affairs? Is there apicture of what would be so i f believing were the.case ., ~ . . . : Is the English concept"believing tr thinkable? There are several approaches t9 these ~ s t i o n sbut before elaborating them, i t is expedient to consider their generalnature, and,as a consequence, the nature of any statement that could be asat isfactory answer. The f i r s t point is quite obvious, that each of thesequestions is posed in the same language, and.therefore, that any answerto them will only be relevant to that one language, and only be valid forthat one cult-ure. These are general questions about a specif ic language,or fJTay of thinking, and any answel'S to them will not n e ~ e s s a r i l y ref lecton othe r languages. . . , , ,The next consideration i s 'even more important: that these are questionsof conceptualization, not fact . Every question here encountered is so framedthat reference to the gross facts of language would be inappropriate Thegenerality of the statement sought as an anS'fJTer demands the application ofdeduotive reasoning. Thus, partioular uses, or l 1isuses.,of "to believe" donot signify. , c ~ c : .,S : 'The problem is not whether every use of lito believe". d$scribes.

a state of affa i rs , but whether use of the verb .describes a state ofaffairs , which is to say whether or not there isa .possible, use of "tobelieve" that describes a state of affai rs ; this af ter a l l i s the problem:is bel ief possible? Such questions express no interest in examples ofbelieving l'1here other words can be substituted, but rather in those'1-There :.


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"believing" seems to f ind no subst i tute.Because th is essay f l i r t s with the idea of meaning? it is essentialto recognize that in order for a w'ord to have ~ meaning,' i t need not haveone meaning, or even a single clear meaning. Indeed? one can imagine fe"llioras ,'lith even remotely clear meanings. Likewise, .a word n ~ e d not picturea clear sta te of affa i rs for it to describe a 's ta te of affai rs . After a l l ,

t h e re1s nothing self-contradictory, i . e . impossible, about vague, fUzzy,strange, pI'eposterou3, fan tas t ica l , ' o r even s i l l y meanings; they aremeanings nonetheless. Furthermore, that "belief maybe anllodd';'job" wordis not a problem. Being an odd..job word would frustrate any attempt todefine the essence of a word. But one can !hardly imagine a lexicographerdenying: a l'lord dictionary space" because i t s meanings are unrelated. Words"dth ent i re ly different meanings are s t i l l thinkable.

Now, on to the question: I s belieVing a s ta te of affa i rs? The mosttempting an6weriS one which begs the question yet deserves consideration. 'Insofar as one can only think about the i Torld through the media of thelanguage which one has received more or less passively? and the conceptionof bel ief is a part of the English-speaker's l 'Torld?would i t ever be possibleto think of a worldvri thout belief? . I f . English lacked "bel ief ll and i t s

r e l a t e d ~ conceptions, That would the 1vorld be l ike, and hOvlwould one thinkabout i t ? Or, i f i t l laS no meaning, Why do people use i t These are questionsthat an;y-one whocla:i1asthat believiilg has no meaning must ansvler. One "lioulddo vTell to heed 'the admon!t ion of J . L. Austin: our common s tock of words embodies' a l l the distinctionsmen have found worth drawing? and the connections they havefound worth markil1g, in ' the l i fe t imes of many generations:these surely are l ike ly to be more numerous, more sound,since they have stood up to the long tes t of the survivalof the f i t t e s t , and more subtle , a t leas t in a l l ordinaryand reasonably pract ical matters, than any that you or Iare l ikely to think up in our armchairs of an afternoon -the most favoure'd alternative method. (Austin, 1961: 182)

From th is , one could also say that because people use and understand"believe" it obviously has a meaning; or. that people who use the word seemto Imow what t means. Thus, the argument that IIbelief" has a meaning gainsweight from the iner t ia of c u 1 t ~ e . Because it is, used so . f ~ q t l e n t l y and.because t is a t the foundation of many important Western idea ls , becauset would be dif f icul t to think about-certain tl l inGsat a l l Without i t , itis tempting to claim tha t i t s meaning is obvious. Thus, a Dr. Johnson, ofthe ideal is t persuasion might argue. ' ,But, of course;. th i s is no proof at. 'a l l . In fac t , th is argl1lllent is only l ikely to convince those who stand .in avTe of language. Philosophers who see the i r task as purifying, or cleaning .up- lallt,C?Uage, as do many in the i t tgenstein t radi t ion, would not sympathiseHith th is . Nevertheless, the English language 'limps along, ignorant 9 f theprunings and amputations of philosophers. ' I f not awe, respect for lang1,lagei s vi t a l . Cleaning up language can be likened to sweeping a dir t f loor; thedebris and dust are pushed away, but nothing i s rea l ly changed; sweepingforever wil l not f ind the floorboards. So, one must find. a meaning betvleenthe urge to destroy the mystifying elements of langtlaee and the ple,asure ofbeing awed by i t s venerable majesty. '

The only substantia l answer to the t i t l e of th is essay is that believingdoes describe a s ta te of af fa i r s . This is certainly not easy to describe,for believing i s unquestionably a difficul t conception. Nevertheless, tobegin l Ti th the obvious, "belief" ' i s a word tbat never appears alone. Someonemust always believe something. Only people bel ieve, and ~ never believe


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-146 .'in f . l c : \ ~ : : : j - r : { c So, believing always : an object; i t is a relational conceptiol1.. 'I:' l...-i l16cessit",,-.;es a distinct ...on be"CiieenthQ believing i ~ 8 e l f beinga state of affairs and i t s object being' one. Sometimes b e H e 7 ~ _ : - g l l e ~ e m s not to describe a state of affairs because i t coupled v1ith an inappropriateobject. trlhenone believes in the Loch Ness Monster, the Abominable Snowman,or a f lat earth, i t i s more less c+ear what one believes, after all peoplewrite books about these ,things; but i t is not 91e8.:l:.' ''11l:J.at one believes lmenone believes, n a spatial object o u t ~ i d e of,space. , Although one could saythat the, sentertQe lIhe believes in a round squarell has no :meaning, th is snot a comment on the verb, b e c a u s ~ i t is not the "believing" but, the "roundsquare" that is absurd. ' A- purple cow is a state, of affairs, a purplegreen-spot is , not . ' Thus the question "doe13 bali ?ving describe a state ofaffairs" can only be answered in the context of a complete and legitimate,,use of' the word in a sentence t bearing in mind that for this, to be so' i tmust have an object i"1hich is i t se l f a state of affairs. The question, then,becomes: what is the state of affairs described by the relation of a believerto any possible object of belief? This state of affai rs will define theverb.

A way into the idea of believing is through further consideration ofJehe things that form i t s possible objects. ' What sort of things can onebelieve? Do they fom a class? Certainly, one would not say of everythingthat he believed or disbelieved i t , even i the 'Hord were being used veryloosely. And, evenwhen the lfOrd is used V8ry s t r ic t ly , there are not many' things which the ordinary speaker would be inclined to believe or disbelieve.Only some things then are possible beliefs,. About what sort of things canone say that one believes them? To what do belief statements apply? key to tIns is found in Needham's ownpages,where he l i s t s as an attr ibuteof believing i t s independence of "canons of reality" (Ne,edham, 1972; 71).This s supported by a quotation from vlittgenstein to the effect that i fthere liere e,Vidence bearing on matters of be,lief, th, is, would destro thewhole business" (vlittgenstein, 1966; 56, quoted in Needham, 1972; 71). Here,then, is the nature of the words, which one believes. The objects of beliefstatements' have but a tangential relation to th.e l"rorld. One does not holdan object of belief up against the,world to see i f , i t exists or not; nordoes comparison with i;heworld render a belief statement true or false.Hence, the inevitable failure of attempts to hold an idea of God up againstthe world, Or to infer a conception of God .from the world. And due to thenature of believed objects, the adherent of the f la t earth theory rejectsa l l evidence. Also from this comes the sense of a believer saying, "thoughI cannot prove God, nor can you disprove Him". ' Likewise, one wil l neverprove ti1at the Loch Ness Monster does not eXist. The objects of beliefmake no claim against reali ty, ra,ther, to put i t another W'ay, tp.eymakeonly a claim against language, and, therefore, not against our lvorld, butagainst 'our conception of a l l possible worlde. In t is way, belief sta,temerits and their objects are radically different from o r d i n a r ~ r discOl.:j.rse.In ' thinkirigabout, belief statements one cannot make a simple hop frOIIllanguage to verifiable real i ty . Belief statements are a projection Ofthe possibili t ies of language onto a voidbeyoJ:ld what one can conceive ofas world. I f one could make correspondences between beliefs'and real i ty ,one could be related to them in someway besides believing; i f that werethe case, beliefs could be experienoed, known,proven, verified, dismissed,'or refuted. I t is because of thenatu:re Of b ~ i i e f s t b e m s ~ l v e s that the onlyrelation one can have to them is to believe, or, disbelieve. They are metaphysical. '

In what state of affai rs is the believer caught up? The relation ofa believer to the non-exper!,ential states of affairs called beliefs is thathe is convinced of theirt ruth,existence, or value. ' Because a legal proofis necessarily an after the fact interpretation o:('a.n episode, a jury' never


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knows that a man is guilty; and they n e v e r ~ e n d a man to prison beoausethey lfth:l.nkrt he is guilty, but they would cerb.inly do so i f they "h-?lieved"in his gi,lilt. This is a cotnmon situation llh6r t wre is no alternative toconvictions strong enough to be labled b e l i e f ~ These convictions mayormay not be persistent, in evidenc.e, the cause of action or the' subject ofdoubt. These are quali t ies of bel ief that nay be i n s ~ p a r a b l e f ~ 9 m i t butare not a necessary part of' i t s 'conception and hence have no bearing on i t sexistence as a state of a f f a i r s ~ Althou.gh Belief, LanguagE and Efjperience(PP. 89-92) rejects conviction" as a cri terion of belief, this seems to bebased on a confusion of essence with at tr ibute. Admitting the t ru th of whatNeedham says, the p r o b l ~ m s he finds n the lord "conviotion lt make i t diff icul tto t e l l how firmly a'person may believe something, or even whether in f cthe does believe i t , but they do not make i t inconceivable that people dbhave convictions, and thus are irrelevant to the question of whether or notbelieving is sta te of affai rs . Throwing these objectiom aside then, thesta te of affai rs described by believing is that of a man having convictionsabout nbn-eXperiential s tates of affa irs . This is a simple picture of whati t means to believe; but i t is strong e n o v ~ to suggest that b ~ l i e f isindeed possible.

What follows from the conclusion that believing i s a sta te of affairs?Considering what s tates o f a f f a i r s a r e ~ no concrete revelations could beexpected. Belief i s s t i l l an obstreperous word, both difficult to explainand diff icul t to dp without. I t is hard to imagine that philosophers wil lpurge i t either f:eom the English 1anguage, or from the attempt of,socialscience to p r o d u ~ technical languages. But i f the argument t;hat; beliefs possi ble is able to disClose but a small. p.;trt of the substance of tha,tidea, i t dbes have the pOi"l'er to suggest the reasons for both th;epersistenceand vagueness of the word. "Believinglt i s one of many non-experientialstates of affa irs . In fact , language s strewed with lOrds describing whatis beyond empirical experience, and few speakers ever notice the peculiari tyof these conceptions. There ar.e sound reasons for this being so, and theyare suggested by reflecting on the nature of language and i l'orld and theintuit ive semaIttic theory through which they are ,related. .

The difference between experiential and non-experiential states ofaffairs suggests a similar dist inct ion between factual and conventional disco1.U'se.The Tractatus i s ljJittgenstein's attempt to define factual discourse.Hence, his preoccupation with truth and the resultant development of the .theory ver i f iabi l i ty . "Facts ll as the Tractatus describes them, areproduced by confirmation of propositions about the world which are derivedfrom states of affai rs . The "world" i s the total i ty of known facts. Onecan think about s tates of affai rs that are not facts, but , in vli t tgenstein 'sscheme, when one speaks of "knowledge", one refers to facts, sta tes ofaffa i rs that actually are the case . Thus, the alternat ives a.re to speak offacts, factual discourse, or to speak of states of affai rs that, are notfacts. The term "conventional discourse s being suggested for the la t terarrangement of speech. In the Tractatus, vlittgenstein sets out to define,the l inlits of factual discourse, t.o par t i t ion what can be said from What cannot be said. In his treatment, factual discourse e o m e ~ o e x t e p s i v e withthe language of science, Following from this, Vlittrrenstein argues that whatcan be known i s equivalent to the ,sum of a l l pro.positions of natural science.Beyond natural science, one knows .nothing; about which one knows nothing,one may not think; where there i s no thought there can be no s.peeoh; and,finally, the concluding statement of the Tractatus.: nYlhat we cannot speakabout vi must pass over in ,silence" (Wittgenstein,. 1921, 1 7,, . Thel a ~ U a g e ,of science, or factual discourse encompasses only a f.raction ofl inguistic :phenomena,and the theory of meaning ill vvi ttgenstein s Tractatusis i-nten:ded to refer exclusively to this small part of the whole. Thatttgens te in recognized the l imita t ions 0 f his endeavour is. clear = "Vie feel


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-148that everivlhen.!!! J Q ~ ~ soientif ic questl.Jnshave been a n s T : T e r e ~ I thoproblems of l i fe rema:L1 completely untouched'(Wittgens JG0in, 1921. ;16.52).

The diffiCulty of understanding belief statements is obviously notsusceptible to 'allY solution that i s solely concerned withsQientificdiscourse. Belie':t' statements aboutnon":'experiential sta tes ,of affairs arenot verifiable in the same way as 'Vlittgensteins "facts" . "Are you atr initarian?" i s of, a d i f f e r ~ l 1 t o r d e ; r than "ls that book red?". Thela t te r question is art iculated to the phYs1calworld and i s answered onthe ba.sis of sensory experience. ,The former is not art iculated to thephysical ,-rorld and senSory experiences no help in answering i t . :Butthe puzzle of belief statements is tha.t questions of th is f.orm areanswered. How is th is posSible? "

Assuming that belief statements are in the realm of 'conventional discourse, the problem is to define that realm. How does i t dif fer fromfaqtual discourse: lfuat semantic principles operate in this non-sciEmtificdOmain? The statements of conventional discourse are neither true norfalse, since there is no "thing" to which i t s words can be correlated.Conventional discourse floats free of the world. Evan to verify the assert ion "he is married" one must fi:rst of all know where "he" l ives and whatpeople n that oountry, think about marriage. ' Or,. to put i t another way,one must know what the conventions are that deal with marriage. :Knowingthe convention, one' could compare the history-of the person concerned tosee whether he had committed. those actions deemed necessary for marriageto be n effect. The nature, of a coment ion i s obvious from the wordi t se l f . A convention i s an agreement 0I4Y people make, a g r e e ~ i 1 e n t sAgreements are often broken; they are easily changed. Thus, conve11-tionsare human creations; words that havei conventional meaning are artificia:J.,both n the Sausauriansense' and in' a more absolute. sense . '"Dog" is ahuman creation insofar as the same class of objects can just as easily becalled IlHund , but only the word i s a r t i f ic ia l . Language permits' thestatement "a dog is a oatil, but the world' intervenes with thiS,staterilentand contradicts i t . Inoonventional discourse the ' thing i t se l f i s art i f ic ial ;i t is created and dispelled by human contract. A criminal may be called bysome other' equally arbitrary name, "Verbrecnar." for example bu t also. thething that is criminal today may not be criminal tomorJ;'Ow.Language permitsthese statementS: , lI Murder is crimiJ.'I.al", "Priests are criminain.L"Property ,owners are criminal II , "Students 'are criminal II ; but concemUJg the. validityof each, the wor;td is mute. r.rbil;l;Ls the oddity of conventional discourse,that the world i t se l f changes a t man's tolhim. Or, to reverse W i ~ t g e r ~ s t e i I l saphorism, the' conventional 'forld does depend' on maIl's will .

statements made n the conventional domain are precisely those. l',l.'boutwhich \ l i t tgenstein advises us to be si lent . Yet conve.ntionaldiscourse isa remarkably large part of what'lleopledo with speech, and the "efforts oflogical 'positivism have not yet prevailed against i t . What then are thesemantic principles of this segment of dil3cOUr13e,. orrT do peoplethi:nl>:about conventional discourse? :Oddly enOUgh, ' l 'littgenstein himself gives theansw'er to this , albei t by implication. .This is n fact a question that answers i tself One does not thinlcabout conventional discourse as i f i t were different from factual discourse.Indeed, one does not 'usually think of convent:ionaldiscourse at al l ; i t . is .a term whipped up for the purposes of this essa.y, not a. standard English.

conception at, a l l . But even when one does ponder language, one does notmake this division and erect one semantic theory for one kind of l ~ g u ~and another theory .for the other. The truth is that people, philosophersincluded, think about conventional things as i they Ttlere physioa 1 things.Conventional discourse operates as i f i t were factual discourse. The two


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-149

are very different , but that people often lose sight of the art underlyingtheir words; agreements and institutions is a common errore. Even in theAge qf Reason, constitution builders ' did not ~ p p r e c i t e this fact . Thetheory of natural law has gone hand in hand with the theory of socialcontract for precisely this reason (see Sir Ernest Barker, 1946). In t

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Evans-pritchard - The Intellectualist (English Interpretation of Magic)

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