EVENT: IBRD Capstone Exhibition DESCRIPTION: Day #2 WHO: Mike Midgley DATE: 9/22/2010 I want to show you a quick video. I think it is appropriate and relevant after Mr. Manning's comment about the challenges and difficulties of coordination among different agencies. Either at the federal level or across the inter-agency. Stacy, can you keep that up for us? [ Participants are watching the video. ] [ section missing ] I am not interested in her. He is quite the salesman. One of his many talents. Subject approaching. IBRD Capstone Exhibition - 9/22/2010 - Day#2 Seattle Page 1 of 29
Transcript
EVENT: IBRD Capstone ExhibitionDESCRIPTION: Day #2WHO: Mike MidgleyDATE: 9/22/2010
I want to show you a quick video. I think it is appropriate and relevant after Mr. Manning's comment about the challenges and difficulties of coordination among different agencies. Either at the federal level or across the inter-agency. Stacy, can you keep that up for us?
I need to talk to you about something. Would you like to get some copy? We can go down the street.
Third, -- Sir, we need an emergency contact. Just give us a name.
We are going to lose them.
I will come back later.
Everybody down. I am going.
Police, drop your weapon X. commission point -- job your weapon ! INS! FBI!
Secret Service.
Wasn't one of those guys supposed to be a terrorist?
So that get the in the mood for talking about federal an interagency coordination. We know that never happens at the federal level. Just a little laughing moment here. Again, this is going to be a panel talking about the federal perspective on the approach to recovery. And specifically help different federal agencies approach this and specifically recovery from a biological incident. I will run through introductions of each of the panelists myself because I know that all of our experts here are very
modest. I want to give you an idea of their background. First, to my left, Charlie Axton is the director for recovery for FEMA in region 10 here in Washington. That includes Oregon and Washington. He is responsible for post-disaster assistance. For state and local governments and certain nonprofit organizations. Miss Erika Kanser works in the office of emergency management and event coordinator for biological perforation and response. She works on these interagency an internal eligible planning which includes enhancing the effectiveness of the program. As well as responding to and recovering from a biological event. She leads the planning following an anthrax attack and is actively involved in creating EPA response.
Mr. David Kerschner is a regional emergency coordinator. As well as ASPR. He is retired as a captain after 30 years of uniformed service. His previous duty assignments include Medicare and Medicaid services for region 10. And certification branches as a nurse consultant and branch manager. He was also detailed to the Indian health service on reservations in eastern Arizona and eastern Oregon as a health services director. He has responded to several event such as the Northridge earthquake and satellite reentry, anthrax, hurricane Katrina and Rita and the deep horizon oil spill.
At the end of the table, Lieutenant. Colonel. Derek Remington Colonel. His primary response ability is acting as the Chief of Staff for personnel and helping build synergy with FEMA that and state emergency responders and state generals and joint force headquarters staff and potential they sort -- support. He coordinates and collaborates with Army, etc. on the regional and
state levels to maintain awareness for all regional 10 resources and assist the coordinating office to prepare and support federal and state emergency management earners, in the event of a natural or man-made disaster. He served in the Army for 26 1/2 years both in listed and commissioned.
As we proceed into this, I am going to, as I have noticed some of the discussions that happened this morning, and throughout the event, I'm going to ask our panelists and audience as we get to the question-and-answer session at the end to try to keep the session and AFE. Acronym free environment. If we could. I know we have some of our NATo -- NATO folks here. If we could spell out some of our acronyms. We know we can get carried away with that. We will do our best with that. As I mentioned, we will out for questions at the end of the program. For the last 15 minutes or so. For me get started, we heard this morning from our regional partners about some of the key assumptions that the decision makers and planners are using to build recovery plans.
Key to this assumption any scenario like this like a widespread anthrax attack is that the federal government will play a significant role in terms of resources and technical advice. And that it -- and batted -- Embedded in their comments are the things are lacking. At the federal level, as do with this program, we also made some key assumptions. They included the fact that the recovery of Seattle, in a scenario such as this, that would be a national priority. In other words, when the federal perspective, simply shrinkwrapping the city and walking away is not considered an option. We further maybe assumption that the department defense, from their perspective, continuity ofthe
military mission and Joint Base Lewis-McChord would also be a critical priority. This is important. As a plan, you have to allow for big assumptions like that in order to move forward to do you can buy for solutions. As has been a challenge in our discussions the route this program, we try to stay focused on recovery. It is very easy for all of us to move into the response oriented discussion. Wrinkly, that is what we are used to and that is what we do.
It is easy to do with these types of questions. Keep that in mind when we get into discussion this afternoon. Some other key assumptions which will come up and I will try to save the tough question that Derek may have, at Department of Defense, they would be here at the point in this area at -- at the point in the scenario that we are talking about. It would already be handling the situation. How long before is like that would stick around is I think the big question. And we can get into that a little bit more.
I will start off by asking our panel of our first question. And allow them to expand. And we will start your with you -- here with you, Charlie. What asses or capability would you are agency bring to a wide response? And what do you view as the key challenges that your organization is going to face in a situation like this?
The best answer that I can answer from the must is what we bring to the table for the recovery environment is primarily the effort -- the coordination effort that is necessary at the federal level. There are three main things that we would be looking at establishing the route the duration a recovery. One is an awareness of the local goals and objectives in their recovery. To -- and working in partnership with state -- with the state. To support
the governor's recovery goals. To is to take our existing patent -- capabilities and programs at the federal level and tailor them and adjust them so they can support those collective goals that are established. In the early days and in the many months and years that followed during the recovery. Lastly, to establish a framework that we can collectively work in to deliver that over the course of the entire recovery. I think the biggest challenge that we would have and getting to the point is simply the scope of the event and the size of the event. The level of complexity that is necessary in the recovery. And the types of nontraditional partners that would be critical in this. That you would see in a flood or maybe in another quick.
Ericka?
As far as what we would bring, those of you not familiar with us, you have over 250 on scene coordinators that are spread out throughout the country. In a situation like we are talking about with IBRD , it is likely that they would come from other regions to support Seattle. We also have three special teams that would probably have quite a roll. What is our national counter terrorism response team. We hope they would think up with the FBI. What is critical to the EPA early on is that it is transferred from early response to the remediation phase. What did the FBI find?
With all of the data that they collected. We have the evidence to sync up with them. We have the environmental spot seemed. And we have a national sponsor team. BBA can also respond not to technical agencies. We have the national Homeland security resource Center that does all sorts of research projects on rhesus
mention and efficacy of the con technique. And we can have them on call to provide some technical consultations with the locals and the state and the regional planners that are involved with figuring out this path forward. As far as the key challenges that the EPA would face, they spent the entire remediation spectrum. When you get into characterization, we have issues regarding how you care to write a massive outdoor area. How do you determine where the hot and -- hot zone ends and the warm begins. We also all have issues with decon capacity whether fumigation or surface decon. We will have to employ a lot of different things and that will box. The capacity just isn't their. We saw what happened on Capitol Hill. When we are talking about hundreds of buildings, that would generally be one of the challenges we are faced with.
Left capacity also falls on that list. They will have a lot on their hands with clinical and print the examples. Where do environmental examples fall? When you get to clear it, I personally think that is one of the biggest challenges. We don't have a risk threshold yet for how clean is going. And past president -- whether we can use that again, in a wide area, that remains to be seen. If we want to decrease our overall remediation guidelines which would be our overarching guideline. We need to get it down to what we said -- six months before business owners do not come back. That is a highlight some of the major challenges. My point is really that there is a ton of them and they're across the whole remediation spectrum.
One of the things that Health and Human Services brings is one thing they didn't have tenures ago. Post-Katrina, the office of --
the assistant secretary for preparedness and response was developed formulated. There are a number of different agencies under that umbrella. What that does is allow for a coordination of all of the Health and Human Services assets and capabilities. That office is responsible for coordinating for help in human services response. For any natural disaster or terrorist attack. One of the division under that is the office of emergency operations. As a part of that, HHS now has a regional emergency coordinator and all of the coordinators. I am one of the coordinators for region 10. That provides a capability that we didn't have a number of years ago. On a day-to-day basis, we work with local and state emergency planners, both in public health and emergency management.
We identify approaches to all kinds of a disasters in the area. And what the resources and capabilities are. And what they expected needs ID from the federal government. And then formulate ways to coordinate those assets that come in to support a supplement state request. Those would be very active during the response phase. In addition to that, we as regional coordinators would be here, not only through the response but the recovery phase. We would have someone who is consistent through the whole process, representing Health and Human Services, along with original director at our regional health initiator it would take on more growing responsibilities as we transition from a response to recovery mode.
What we bring is an understanding of the capabilities and resources of the state and what we can bring to the fight. A lot of things that we bring initially to the response may not be
necessary during recovery. But there are a number of things that still need to be available. The need for subject matter experts which we can provide. And issues around resupply of medications and countermeasures. And antivirals. And replenishing the national stockpile and making them available to many responders as they respond to cleaned out areas. And psychosocial support.
Both with teens and grant and other organizations. To help support the growing need for those efforts. Critically when individuals start returning to what were contaminated areas and dealing with anxiety associated with that. We also have medical teams that may still be necessary as responders are still cleaning up the area. The capability of the state may need to be supplemented to help support those efforts. Challenges. I think that will be maintaining a unified command. So we can continue to make the transition from her response which may be primarily ICS structure to a more coordinated effort among agencies. The transition may be very critical to long-term recovery process. And then consistent messaging. As a response turns into recovery, there is still going to be a continued effort for messaging to the public. And we need to make sure that is consistent throughout all the efforts. Over a widespread effort, that will make sure that it is consistent.
Good afternoon. I think one of the first things that I would like to talk on, Mike and I talked about the concept of how the federal side of the uniform show up? I think we have a couple of folks in the crowd that are the subject matter experts on the state that. For title 32. They will be the first response with military uniforms on. To save some acronyms, there are several levels of units that
are based -- they will come to bear first at the governor's behest. And as we get through the process, if this were an event as large a scale as reported, it will take a very short period of time or money have gone from an initial response of the local level to and all state and federal response where they are calling for a decoration. We get to that point, but whatever level, whatever agency is involved at that time, it could be IMA -- FEMA or EPA or Health and Human Services, whoever is in charge, that could be the trigger. The federal agency turns to the federal coordinating officer or the principle or knitting officer to say that we need DOD involved.
That is when we will be activated and deployed and eventually show up at the joint you old office. In and of itself, we do not bring anything to the fight other than the fact that we are a nine person element that is a coordination for all things DOD. My boss, the defense were Nader Isabella but -- bellybutton, if you will, for requesting DOD assets. We do not help with the response recovery. Help coordinated and we serve the customer, whatever federal agency is running the show. In terms of what will DOD bring? Part of that definition is based on when the president says to the secretary of defense that you are at a go to bring forces to bear come a the joint chiefs of staff at the Pentagon -- Pentagon level look at what they have available and see what they can bring that may not already be deployed? Or recently deployed with the that is broken. They may have lost people. Or left equipment time for the next group to fall on. That may not be what we want in the full spectrum of what would be a reasonable response. If you look at what the Department of Defense has, this is in terms of different aspects, it looks good on paper but a lot of it boils down to if they are themselves available quick to do
they have enough people who are trained in a to run the equipment? Essentially, can they be brought in without leaving the rest of that particular region or country to bear for the analogy of a judge of different kids chasing the soccerball. If something happens over there, we chase potential event. If we just focus on Seattle. What we would bring it was the title 32 folks have the effective date or through emergency management or assisted contracts or interstate assets, they may bring more of these elements in to run under a joint task force at state levels. At the behest of the state general. When we are asked to bring what we have been, we would bring in a to start command and joint task force that will support and that will be the ministry the an operational control and element for anything and everything that the customer wants that we can possibly bring in. It may be something like search and rescue.
It could be casualties in medical evacuation units. Or ground forces. Anything that can answer the question of what I can do to help you. If the answer is, I need, we will see if we can bring in. -- bring it in. Our biggest thing that we can bring is whatever agency is involved, whether it be the National Guard or the Northern command or the states, we will spread out and the liaison officers to make sure we can be the communication from the federal ordination office down to those agencies and, in turn, come back through joint force headquarters in the joint field office. Becker mitigation is always running. A coordination is always running. People who need to ask the question of what I can bring and how fast can I get it is typically is the quickest response is possible. I am probably running over. Typically, by doctrine, we show up when the local forces do all of the state and interstate forces have been overwhelmed and they need someone
else to come in and help hold down the fort to be began between what is happening and what is available. Was the locals catch up, typically, the Department of Defense is excuse and we go about our way. However, if you look at the horizon oil spill, the forces were kept on even in the small amount that longer than what is typically anticipated.
Sometimes, if we have specialized skills or units, we might still be able to provide response above and beyond what is typically expected of us.
Great. We had an opportunity to talk about that a little bit more earlier. As far as DOD being the last in and the first out. And in a catastrophic event such as this, there are other signals that are indicating a longer present. Especially with your specialized types of DOD assets. Whether it is sampling or lack testing or stuff like that. -- or lab testing or stuff like that. You talk about coordination and tying it, you're talking about command and control of your own forces and in supporting FEMA or whoever the lead federal agency is going forward. Is morning, they talked about command and control and how it is not a good term to use. Coordination is a more applicable term. I would offer this or ask a question here. Thinking of recovery, and maybe you can discuss how the response to recovery transitions as far as a coordination occurs. Whether physically -- you mentioned a joint field office. Is there a joint field office two years out? Is it called that? Is it doing the same thing? Or is it something else? I would be interested in hearing their perspective of how your organization is tying into actually getting that coordination done. We know what you can
bring. Have you actually get the coordinated with the local and regional players? I will start with you, Charlie.
Is the question is would there be a joint field office 24 months into an event such as this, probably the most rational office is likely there still will be. Otherwise, it would be something very similar. We have seen large event without the complexity of a biological event that is open for six months to nine months after the event. It is reasonable JFO to say that a with stay open -- reasonable to say that a JFO with stay open for lease 24 months. It another what makes most sense for the communities. The main objective is to have the interagency effort with the technical expert at the federal level. And the whole team that has the federal capabilities, that they are working together in support of what the governors objectives are. And working partnership with the state to meet the various recovery requirements. I think a lot of us who have been in this business for a long time, that issue a win and then when recovery begins, I think there is an art form how we address that. I think that most of us have been around. Or coverage begins at the beginning. As soon as someone is displaced from their homes, potentially before landfall, of a hurricane or immediately after an event such as this Emma their recovery to get back into permanent housing is something that they're thinking about as they are working out the door.
Is really about how we currently do the response and recovery in a way that is consistent and supports the governors objectives in the governors response goals. And recovery goals. And it becomes very seamless as to how that transitions.
Just as a follow-on to that. You are dealing with the governor and state coordinating officers. But in the state like this, it is a home rule state. Every thing is down at the lower level. Are there any challenges are complex or tensions for this interaction? Especially something like this that is so big? It I think there is often a reflect of the federal level, at least from the female perspective to try and go in and solve the local problem. Directly without the state involvement. I think that is a wrong reflects to have. Every time we see that, it doesn't work. Regardless of how any particular state works. They're all different as we all know. The best approach is to latch up with the state in every step of the way. Whether it is the initial phase. In dealing with bridge replacement and whatever it may be. We always need to come back to that operational model which is for FEMA on the stateside, it would be right side-by-side with the state.
Ericka?
As far as EPA is concerned, we really rely heavily on this command system. And we want that set up during the response phase. Issue just transition over as you get into remediation and recovery. As I said earlier, the recovery could last years upon years until we get better at this. But the incident command structure is likable and scalable and I can see it scaling up in the beginning and then scaling down into something that can be around for quite a few years while we work our way through this. What is really critical that as a federal agency, we maintain those links that you really talk about what the state and locals. We will be relying heavily on them for things like hired as Asian. What do they think needs to have our attention first in terms of
remediation? That is a lot of what tran4 did to have the state and locals come together. When you have multiple jurisdictions that are impacted by this, how are you prioritizing these limited resources. That is just one example of what we would be relying on for the incident command structure to provide and continue to provide as a remediation progress is. -- Progress is -- progresses.
And other area would need to be self remediation guidance. That is another topic that came out of tran4. -- That came out of tran4 -- that came out of IBRD. All of those people want to get back in. It is just another reason why the PA needs to stay within and work with the local government.
It is not really clear right now what recovery might look like. I know there is a national framework in developed. And how this might look. A lot of this will depend on the federal government and how they want to set up. At the least, as they see it moving from an incident man structure to a more of a coordination group recently, made up of federal partners for Health and Human Services, as I mentioned, and the regional health director. And the regional director. Those federal agencies that are in the region that are part of HHS. And the local agencies. Those groups will work together collectively to identify any needs that still might be in met. That might require federal assistance. And then we would work to try to acquire those asses. Pre-much the same way that we would normally do.
The flavor might change a little bit depending on what kinds of things are there. And how we may support it may change from actually providing mental health teams to making sure that grants
are provided to the state. To acquire the resources necessary to support psychosocial issues. I see it transitioning to more of a coordination group.
I think probably the shortest answer I can give you on this one is that the department of defense or title X involvement or whatever event is going on, regardless of the type and scope, we will stay as long as the lead federal agency teams are assistance necessary. Essentially, as a complexion of the event changes and it goes from response changes. And how you go from response to recovery and when that actually changes over, that may be immaterial. As long as how the progression of event as a proof, how they change, what is requested of the department of defense may also change. When you start off, we may all be looking at search and rescue etc. Things that are more immediate responses for vital need for like for preservation. As we start getting into more of the maturation of the event, this mail change. What this boils down to, regardless of whether it is a local or county or federal request for assistance, it will also do the operation section of the joint field office and they will look at these requests for assistance and if it looks like it is a request for assistance the Department of Defense may have the available response for, if we have the answer to the question, then they will turn it over to us to be validated.
If we can come up with a viable validation of that, we will turn to the defense coordinating office and say that we concur that this is a good and valid request. And then he goes to the secretary of defense and it comes back down. If it is available, it can be found and brought to bear. And it will show up and be used for the
assistance to mitigated -- mitigate the event. The point I want to make is that only the lead federal agency has the power to go to Northern command. Which is basically the boss for our higher headquarters. U.S. Army North. The lead federal agency has the power to say that we keep them that they still need them. Or that we don't need them anymore, thank you for your services, you may send them home again.
The only be done if the lead federal agency believes that is appropriate to turn us loose. We will stay as long as needed.
Great. I heard it mentioned here. And it is obviously the big issues that we have looked at during the four-year program. Opposition for limited resources -- competition for limited resources. We all know there are only a certain number of devices that exist right now. To do decontamination. Or there is capacity for laboratory and sampling. And so forth. That competition in the prioritization becomes a challenge. I assume FEMA -- do you see anything unusual in this scenario? And you can't reach out to the many people? And how you reach out to the local and regional layers? Maybe you have the regional department that has their priorities. How is that reconcile? That has been -- how is that reconciled? That has always been an issue.
I think this is the scenario where a lot of those have been -- it is greater than the availability. You really have to go back to what are our existing mechanisms and use them and lead on them. There were need to be some tough decisions made. But hopefully as FEMA as an agency for response will for coordination, we can bring all the right players to the table, whether that be the
governor or collection of mayors or other cabinet officials at the federal level. To look through all the facts and look through all of the logistical challenges and make those decisions together. It certainly is not something that FEMA will overdo the isolation. And having this mechanisms in place to get to them establishing -- astonishing a process, that is the best we can you.
Ericka, we talked about interdependencies and other agencies and your response for limitations. Maybe you can expand on that, whether it is federal or regional. Who you depend on.
As far as interdependency is concerned, it is federal, state come a regional and local. To touch on a few, at the federal level, working with the FBI, for example, they will have some kind of intel and they will have some samples. Any example the -- information they can provide, we rely on that. And the CDC. That will impact how soon are on-site coordinators can be on-site and coordinate the response. When the local perspective, I know that Seattle is a home rule state. They cannot force an evacuation. Some places might force in evacuation as a shelter. All that will play into how the PA can go in and do characterization and decontamination. It will be a lot easier to do it at the public isn't living there amongst our people trying to do the work. Another example is the civil support teams. Me work with the DOD. And some of our EPA regions, we rely very heavily on the CSTs for this characterization. Even using some of their labs. If there are things going on in the rest the world, they may not be available. All of those interdependencies are critical. That is another area where IBRD has been critical. To bring them together and work on those issues.
Yes, I think that is where and what we are all about. We spend a lot of our time in the region building those relationships. And coordination between the state and public health and regional and public health. An understanding with his knees maybe. There is a critical relationship them are even more portly during response for recovery. This kind of things that you don't want to exchange business cards during the disaster. We take that to heart and we spent a great deal of time building those relationships. Within HHS, we have a number of agencies to draw. And having those kinds of working relationships are important, particularly with easy. We have working relationships in the region. And with the Department of Defense and with FEMA. These are all very critical. We rely a lot on the VA and the PA for technical expertise. We have to function with those kinds of relationships. That is the way we get our job done for the state and local folks. It is critical that we maintain those. We are very dependent on those relationships.
At this point, we are about 15 minutes or 20 minutes out. I want to open it up for questions from the audience. For the panelists. Based what we have heard. Just sir?
-- Yes, sir?
I have two concerns. They talked about the 10 mile is first in Seattle. If that occurs, the terrorist will probably be sufficiently
intelligent to do something someplace else like New York or Chicago or saved Cisco -- saved Cisco -- San Francisco. My second concern is that they are really smart, they will do it in Las Vegas, Disneyland -- where there isn't a residency and business. Where is it is vacation or is -- vacationers. The hotel will be contaminated. And there will be any place to put them. Are there plans to have relocation centers in those areas where they could just be moved out into the desert and put into tents? Able to stay in Las Vegas. There would you want to be home. But if they are contaminated, you don't want them going home because there was a scary the contamination. Airports will be closed, obviously. It will be able to get out. Those are two major concerns that I have. I'm sure you have certainly planned for those scenarios. What are those plans?
Do you want to take that Charlie or.? -- or Ericka?
As far as resources available, with the anticipation that they will have multiple cities, one thing that we would do in the PA in conjunction with the security office is that all of the cities that you listed, like a -- likely we are to have a program set up. We would increase that filter. If something were to happen, we would be aware of it a lot sooner than we would have otherwise. We will also be working closely with the FBI. Any Intel that they're hearing, when I said that we had 250 on scene coordinators, that is where the rubber meets the road. But they all have contract teams that are just as much expert as the OSCs that support them. We wouldn't bring all 252 them to Seattle. We have been throughout the country. I don't need to make it sound like it would be easy. We know that it wouldn't. We learn that with the
Vice President -- the BP spill. The planning is taking place but we have a lot of work to do.
I agree. What we do -- one of the early decisions is how you utilize resources. ASPR Is working hard -- is working hard to make sure we have those resources. The national scenarios expect that there will be cultural tax in multiple cities. While our initial response may target one, the expectation is that we may be doing that in multiple. We are working with them I am medical advanced research and development Ranch to increase our capability to provide medical countermeasures. To support response teams and we are constantly looking to increase our capabilities there whether it be a federal medical station to help support folks if they have medical issues or medical teams. We are looking to increase those as much as we can't. Regionalization -- as much as we can. Regionalization is key. While I am here in region 10, there are regional coordinators in other regions who also have those relationships with the state. Who understand what the resources are. And very quickly we can transmit that information to our planners. So they can make those kinds of decisions as quickly as possible. And what those resources are and where they will be utilized.
Go ahead.
Something to help you out. While all the technical processing is going on with the lead agency in what they're doing, they're more than likely going to be coming to us for things to include in helping to set up that city. We will be coordinating with the National Guard because the state and federal agencies that have
these characteristics that can do decon. Security, medical, logistics and keeping track of who is in and who is the notified next of kin. There is a piece of mind. -- peace of mind. All of that is a byproduct for when they ask us for assistance. We can bring you back in peace. We can bring in the SF3 assistance and help build this place. Engineering battalions. Whatever it takes. We will assist behind the scenes with whatever is needed. They will come up any -- with eight need and we may have at. So we will make sure that the DCO will do whatever he can to make sure that request is validated and goes up the chain and comes back down. We should either fly or drive or rail the forces that are required. But to start command will show up -- take care of the support that shows up and get it to you. Similarly, we talk about basic support installation which is 10 -- title X. We can stage the forces that are coming to help. From the FEMA standpoint, the incident staging base, the logistics base, sometimes their two things at the same place. Wherever we can find installation where we can park whatever the federal agency needs, to bring the building supplies, for example. We are helping them facilitate whatever is required in the event.
Great, thanks. I might have mentioned earlier, you have heard that it is set it we are webcasting this panel. We do have a question from the Web. I will throw this out to the panelists. What is the largest technology gap the panel feels would currently hinder the rapid recovery process with the -- recovery process?
I don't think there is one technology gap that would hinder it. They are so related. The lack of lab capacity and the
characterization stage, that will impact the overall timeline. But the lack of decon capacity will also impacted just as much. One of the things that we talked about doing an EPA is on the elections able to. If you know that a building is already in the hot sun, why would you take 100 samples? But the lack of decon capacity, this is me personally, that will have a tremendous impact on how clean is clean. And how you would do your job. What clearance sample we take? But part of that is having more confidence. All of these gaps are related. If you saw one, you will still not solved the problem.
David, any thoughts on technology?
Probably our capability for having sufficient countermeasures available in a timely manner and getting those things out as quickly as possible in developing the means to do that. That is probably one of our biggest obstacles right now but we are working on. The quicker we can get those things out, the faster we can save lives. Also, maintaining sufficient stockpiles of medications for long-term treatment and possible response to other instances.
Anyone else? Other questions from the floor? Yes, sir?
Considering that there is a malicious release a large amount of, both the DOD and DOJ have spent a great deal of resources developing technologies for detection. After the event, are we going to have confidence in our ability to detect first? Or will the
detection be a manifestation of the disease itself. Are people dying. And then we will know?
Which would come first? The detection based on real-time detectors or sensors? Or the medical aftermath?
I think there are a number of triggers that we plan on. In R. response planning. One has to do with those kinds of detectors and finding incidents. And combining with a credible threat from intelligence. Were cases showing up are a nether trigger. We may pull the trigger for a number of different reasons. Anyone or a combination of those may be involved. But we are not just looking at one source to make those initial moves.
Just about everyone has referenced the need to make really hard decisions throughout this process. I'm curious, notwithstanding the focus being here on consequence management, lots of decisions made earlier in the face of the event are going to have significant impact or applications on how effectively -- applications -- implications on how effectively we can address this. At the outset, there will be concerns about another attack. And fatalities occurring throughout the country. And request for assistance from literally every state and metropolitan area of the country. The federal government response or the efficacy or perceived competence on the part of the public, particularly the most impacted population, will have just a tremendous tie to how effective we can achieve these goals. If you look at the emergency support functional plans of these agencies, even a cursory understanding reveals a lot of gaps and misalignments. How comfortable are you all that the federal piece of the
equation, from the initial response all the way through is well understood, choreographed, practiced, and the constant -- context of a catch-up -- of a catastrophic event? And are there plans at the federal level to get more real about how that might unfold?
Do want to start it?
That is a great question. Again, I think it is a great challenge is to how you take an exercise in an emotional environment and create a catastrophic event. One of the things that have often seen in exercises is what happens is, and need comes up from the state and we identify how best to fill it. And we kick it over to the applicable emergency support we. We go through the process. Ones that is issued, that is the end. Those of us who have been in a real response issue know that that is a -- just the beginning. Even if it is a simple meaning -- mission, there are a lot of unknowns. And a lot of changes that occur in the time the request is made to the time the resource arrives. How to simulate that with all of the appropriate players is an unbelievably challenging process. I think the best we can say that we would you trying to do it. Keep getting the players involved in a classroom setting and at the table top type of exercise. And try to make sure that the full-scale exercise, that we are all fortunate to be able to participate in are in fact substantively meaningful. As far as learning collectively how we interrelate and how the process works. That is the best answer I can give to that. That is a very good question.
Just to give our two cents worth. For how we can play into that, as the best we can, technically, we are facilitators for the customer. That doesn't still answer -- that still doesn't answer the question for how we prepare -- prepare for the event whenever each region has this offense coordinating element, that is part of the small team that works with FEMA to do the facilitation. When they get a new kernel, a new leader, the bursting we do to the first 90 days is to send them in a -- three certification exercise. We will go down to the training office and they will run it through a 24-hour exercise. Technically, it is a national level event catastrophic focus. We will do that for five days. So we can get it right. So that we can certify the region is something happened. We work with the state exercise planners to try to tie into anything that is going on on a periodic basis, just to try to keep the skills of. What I really didn't mention is that we have another project -- cadre a people which is our reservists. We have the emergency preparedness liaisons and they are at all service levels. We are constantly pulling them in to play with us to augment to make sure that the tools that we use our in-house or our remote so that they are sharp and we can communicate. And we can go somewhere and work with a potential or real joint force -- joint field office in practice what we preach. And be able to do what we need to if it is a real event. Likewise, whether it be in firefighting or in her can support, our region, for example, will go and actually practice this for real if we are required so that we can leverage at least on an annual basis with the regions that we would support. In case we have to get called up, for example a hurricane that hit Louisiana and Texas. We would be down the running an office. While the host region is working the other stayed. To do whatever we can to make sure that we are the best we possibly can be if something happens for real.
Health and human services, it is not necessarily an advantage, but because we have ASPR at the system to respond, we have had opportunities, whether good or bad, to use those capabilities quite a lot. Every hurricane season, we have the experience of standing up and preparing, along with the state, to respond to maybe multiple storms approaching US territories or the states themselves.
In multiple regions. And utilizing resources and deciding which resources go where. And implement state lands well before the tropical storm arrives. We have had not only exercise experience the practical experience running multiple potential disaster at the same time. We are actually also supporting natural and other disasters like Deepwater Horizon. As it is, we have had some real practical experience every time that happens, we get better at organizing how we will respond and how our resources will be utilized. And our regional representatives, every opportunity we get, we work with the state ring exercises and drove so that we understand how the mechanisms worked there so we can integrate more effectively.
Just to piggyback on what David said. We do have the real world practical experience. Most recently with the BP oil spill. We have several agencies that had worked together for those tough decisions. When you are talking about a wide area anthrax attack US comfortable I am with how well this response will work? That is an extreme you difficult question. I saw how difficult it was to respond to oil when people were not dying. When it is critical and people are dying, I'm actually hoping for things like IBRD that
bring people together and as it expands and becomes ICBRD, that we will be more confident. I am more confident that if that happens Seattle, I more competent even what we are doing here. In no way do I think it will be perfect but I think that because of the critical age or of everyone dying am a people might be able to make those tough decisions a lot quicker and a lot easier than in a circumstance where they didn't have it additional pressure added to it.
Great, thank you. We are at 15 minutes before the next session. This is a good stopping point. I would like to thank our panelists for their contributions. [ Applause ].
