7/28/2019 Evidence 6 10

1/23

.R. No. 180507 November 20, 2008

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelleevs.NESTOR BAJADA y BAUTISTA, VICTOR CALISAY y LOYAGA, and JOHN

DOE, accused-appellants.

D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Facts

An information dated January 21, 2000 was filed against accused-appellantsNestor Bajada y Bautista, Victor Calisay y Loyaga, and John Doe which accused

them of committing robbery with homicide and serious physical injuries

On December 22, 1999, around 11:30 p.m., while 81-year old Villamayor was athome with his 24 year-old live-in partner, Anabelle Asaytono, they heardsomeone call for Villamayor asking for coffee. The caller introduced himself as"Hector," Villamayor's grandson, but Asaytono recognized the voice as Bajada's.

As Villamayor opened the door, the caller, "Hector," pushed the door open withthe barrel of a two-foot long gun. Asaytono recognized "Hector" as Bajadabecause of his average physique, repulsive smell, the black bonnet which heoften wore at work, the deep-set eyes, mouth, a lump on his cheek, and thegreen shirt which was given to him by Villamayor. Asaytono likewise recognized

one of the men as Calisay, noting his hair cut, eye bags, and voice. Calisay worea red handkerchief across his face and carried a 14-inch knife in his right hand.The third unidentified man, John Doe, wore a bonnet and carried a 2 foot longgun with a magazine.5

Upon entering the house, John Doe said, "There are many people in Calumpangwho are angry at you because you are a usurer engaged in 5-6, so give me PhP100,000 right now." John Doe made Villamayor sit down but when the latterrefused, John Doe made him lie face down on the floor and kicked his backseveral times. Meanwhile, Bajada pointed his gun at Asaytono and demanded for

money. Asaytono denied having any money. She was then made to lie facedown on the ground and was kicked. John Doe asked from Villamayor the key tothe cabinet which was a meter away from the latter. Villamayor brought out a keyfrom his pocket and handed it to Bajada. Asaytono, who was able to stand up,saw the three accused unlock Villamayor's cabinet and took out its contentswhich consisted of documents and clothes. Accused-appellants also opened the

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/nov2008/gr_180507_2008.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/nov2008/gr_180507_2008.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/nov2008/gr_180507_2008.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/nov2008/gr_180507_2008.html#fnt5

7/28/2019 Evidence 6 10

2/23

7/28/2019 Evidence 6 10

3/23

Bajada would get money from Villamayor. Calisay, however, testified that he didnot see any ill motive on the part of Asaytono when she testified againstaccused-appellants.

RTC- GUILTY

CA=DISMISSED THE APPEAL

Issues: Won statements of a witness prior to her present testimony can be serveas basis for impeaching her credibility

WON the defense of alibi is meritorious in this case

HELD:

The inconsistencies in the sworn statements and testimony of the prosecutionwitness, Asaytono, referred to by accused-appellant Bajada do not affect hercredibility. The details which she supplied to the police and to the investigating

judge are trivial compared to the testimony she gave in open court. What isimportant is that in all three statements, i.e., sworn statement before the police,sworn statement before Judge Bercales, and testimony in open court, Asaytonoconsistently and clearly identified accused-appellants as the perpetrators. Theessential facts do not differ: three men entered and robbed the house ofVillamayor and stabbed him and Asaytono, and Asaytono witnessed the stabbingand recognized two of the accused because she was familiar with the latter'sphysical attributes.

Also, the Solicitor General correctly pointed out that the defense counsel did notconfront Asaytono with these alleged inconsistencies. In People v. Castillano,Sr., we held that:

Before the credibility of a witness and the truthfulness of his testimony canbe impeached by evidence consisting of his prior statements which areinconsistent with his present testimony, the cross-examiner must lay thepredicate or the foundation for impeachment and thereby prevent aninjustice to the witness being cross-examined. The witness must be given

a chance to recollect and to explain the apparent inconsistency betweenhis two statements and state the circumstances under which they weremade. This Court held in People v. Escosura that the statements of awitness prior to her present testimony cannot serve as basis forimpeaching her credibility unless her attention was directed to theinconsistencies or discrepancies and she was given an opportunity toexplain said inconsistencies.

17

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/nov2008/gr_180507_2008.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/nov2008/gr_180507_2008.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/nov2008/gr_180507_2008.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/nov2008/gr_180507_2008.html#fnt17

7/28/2019 Evidence 6 10

4/23

This is in line with Section 13, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court whichstates:

Section 13. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistentstatements.Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has

made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony,the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the timesand places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether hemade such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If thestatements be in writing, they must be shown to the witness before anyquestion is put to him concerning them.

More controlling is our ruling in People v. Alegado where we held thatinconsistencies between the sworn statement and the testimony in court do notmilitate against the witness' credibility since sworn statements are generally

considered inferior to the testimony in open court.18

In any case, Asaytono was able to sufficiently identify Bajada as one of theperpetrators to the satisfaction of the trial court. Asaytono's familiarity with Bajadacannot be denied; she has known Bajada and Calisay for more than a year priorto the incident. The two accused were also frequent visitors at the victim's house.Hence, Asaytono was acquainted with Bajada's physical features. The trial courtfound her testimony to be credible, frank, straightforward, and consistentthroughout the trial.

Bajada's alibi likewise deserves no merit. For alibi to prosper, it must be shownthat the accused was somewhere else at the time of the commission of theoffense and that it was physically impossible for the accused to be present at thescene of the crime at the time of its commission.

20Bajada himself admitted,

however, that the travel time from Bayate, Liliw, Laguna to the crime scene isonly 15 minutes by jeep. Hence, it was possible for him to be at the crime sceneat or around the time the offense was committed.

WHEREFORE, the February 7, 2006 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.01043 is AFFIRMEDIN TOTO. No costs.

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/nov2008/gr_180507_2008.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/nov2008/gr_180507_2008.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/nov2008/gr_180507_2008.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/nov2008/gr_180507_2008.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/nov2008/gr_180507_2008.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/nov2008/gr_180507_2008.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/nov2008/gr_180507_2008.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/nov2008/gr_180507_2008.html#fnt18

7/28/2019 Evidence 6 10

5/23

G.R. No. 91646 August 21, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.ROMIL MARCOS Y ISIDRO, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Emerito M. Salva & Associates for accused-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J .:

Appellant Romil Marcos y Isidro was charged with the crime of Violation ofSection 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as theDangerous Drugs Act of 1972:

The trial court summarized the buy-bust operation leading to the arrest of theappellant as follows:

After receiving the information from the civilian informant named"Bobby" that the accused and another person was selling marijuanaat Talon-Talon more particularly at Lucy's Store, the Narcom Agentsconducted a surveillance in said place riding on two motorcycles aday before the raid. They saw the accused selling marijuana. The

following day, again, the Narcom Agents held a conference andeach of them was briefed by their team leader. One of them whowas Sgt. Amado Ani was to act as poseur buyer while others,namely: Sgt. Jesus Belarga, Sgt. Bernardo Lego and Sgt. JulietoVega as arresting officers. The following day, June 7, 1989, at about11:00 a.m., said team consisting of Narcom Agents proceeded to theplace. Three were left at a vulcanizing shop, namely, Sgts. Belarga,Lego, and Vega; while Sgt. Amado Ani, the poseur buyer,proceeded to the Lucy's store. There he met the accused RomilMarcos who asked said poseur buyer how much he was buying and

the latter answered him P10.00 worth. The accused entered thestore, gave the P10.00 marked money given by Sgt. Ani to hiscompanion Ballena and the latter gave the accused Romil Marcosthe six sticks of marijuana cigarettes which were wrapped. Sgt. Aniexamined the same and upon verifying that it was marijuana, heproceeded to the street and made the pre-arranged signal by wipinghis face with a handkerchief. The three Narcom Agents rushed to the

7/28/2019 Evidence 6 10

6/23

place where Sgt. Amado Ani was. However, after Sgt. Ani gave thesignal, he returned to where the accused Romil Marcosand alias Ballena were, introduced himself as Narcom Agent andgrabbed the accused Romil Marcos but the latter was able toescape. While escaping, the Narcom Agents saw him throw a stick

of marijuana cigarette which Sgt. Belarga retrieved. Later, theyapprehended Romil Marcos and brought him to their office at UpperCalarian, this City. He was turned over to the chief investigator Sgt.Mihasun together with the six sticks of marijuana cigarettes thatwere sold by the said accused Romil Marcos to the poseur buyer,Sgt. Ani. The Five sticks were examined by the PCCI and found thesame to be positive of marijuana (Rollo, p. 24)

ROMIL ASSERTS:

. . . That on June 7, 1989, past 11:00 o'clock in morning, he was atLucy's Store waiting for a jeep going to Sta. Catalina to find outwhen he was going to work at the Peninsula Construction Companybecause he was temporarily laid off. That while he was at the Lucy'sStore, a motorcycle stopped in the store. Immediately, the people onboard said motorcycle chased a certain Ballena who is his neighbor.That Ballena's complete name is Romeo Ballena who is known asMimi or Mi. Then he heard a shot when they were chasing Ballenabut does not know who fired the same. The people on board themotorcycle were not able to catch up with Ballena, so they returned

to the store. Upon returning to the store, one of them pointed at himand said that he was a companion of Ballena at the same timehandcuffing him. At that time there were many people at the Lucy'sStore numbering about thirty; that there were three CAFGUs whoarrived in the place and one of them asked the people who wereriding earlier in the motorcycle what were those shots for. One ofthem in the motorcycle answered that they must not interfere as theyare Narcom Agents, and the CAFGU did not interfere. After that theyplaced him between the motorcycle driver and the other person andtook him with them to Calarian; that the persons who took him werethe same people who chased Ballena; that while on their way toCalarian, one of the two persons who chased Ballena in amotorcycle told him that he must act as witness against Ballena.However, said accused told them that he would not like to testifybecause he does not know what was that about. They said that theyare going to place him in jail because he does not want to be awitness against Ballena.

7/28/2019 Evidence 6 10

7/23

ISSUE:

A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDBASED ON TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSESWHICH WERE NOT PROPERLY OFFERED IN EVIDENCE AND

ON REAL EVIDENCE CONSISTING OF SIX (6) STICKS OF

HELD:

the appellant contends that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Sgt. JesusBelarga, Sgt. Amado Ani, Jr. and Mrs. Athena Elias Anderson were not formallyoffered, hence, the trial court erred in considering their testimonies. He citessections 34 and 35, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to prove his point, to wit:

Sec. 34. Offer of Evidence. The court shall consider no evidence

which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which theevidence is offered must be specified.

Sec. 35. When to make offer. As regards the testimony of awitness, the offer must be made at the time the witness is called totestify.

xxx xxx xxx

Contrary to the assertion of the appellant, Sgt. Amado Ani's testimony wasformally offered by the prosecution. Hence, when Sgt. Ani was called to testify for

the prosecution, Prosecuting Fiscal Deogracias Avecilla said that Sgt. AmadoAni's testimony was being offered "to the effect that he was the poseur-buyer ofthis case."

As regards the other mentioned prosecution witnesses, we agree with theappellant that their testimonies were not formally offered at the time the saidwitnesses were called to testify. However, the records reveal that the testimoniesof the prosecution witnesses were offered during the formal offer of documentaryevidence by the prosecuting Fiscal. The appellant did not object to such offer. Insuch a case we rule that the appellant is now estopped from questioning the

inclusion of the subject testimonies by the trial court in convicting him of thecrime charged.

At any rate, the appellant was not deprived of any of his constitutional rights inthe inclusion of the subject testimonies. The appellant was not deprived of hisright to cross-examine all these prosecution witnesses.

7/28/2019 Evidence 6 10

8/23

The record reveals that when the prosecuting Fiscal offered the prosecution'sdocumentary evidence among these offered was Inhibit "E" which was describedas "the wrapper containing the six (6) sticks handrolled cigarette which were soldby the accused Romil Marcos to the poseur-buyer Sgt. Ani, and as part of thetestimony of the Forensic Chemist Athena Anderson and Sgt. Belarga and also

Sgt. Mihasun" Marcos alleges that nowhere in the offer of documentary evidenceis there a mention as regards the six (6) sticks of marijuana sold by the appellantto Sgt. Ani during the buy-bust operation. Under these circumstances, theappellant argues that the appellant should be acquitted for failure of theprosecution to offer the six (6) sticks of marijuana sold by the appellant to Sgt.

Ani.

This argument is not well taken.

We rule that Exhibit "E" does not refer to the wrapper alone but also refers to the

six (6) marijuana sticks sold by the appellant to Sgt. Ani during the buy-bustoperation. It is to be noted that Exhibit "E" was offered as evidence in relation tothe testimonies of Sgt. Belarga, Forensic Chemist Athena Anderson and Sgt.Mihasun. The record is clear to the effect that in their testimonies, Sgt. Belarga,Forensic Chemist Athena Anderson and Sgt. Mihasun referred to Exhibit "E" asthe six (6) sticks of marijuana sold by the appellant to Sgt. Ani during the buy-bust operation conducted by the Narcom agents led by Sgt. Belarga at Talon-Talon, Zamboanga City on June 7, 1989.

judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED SO ORDERED.

7/28/2019 Evidence 6 10

9/23

G.R. No. 84951 November 14, 1989

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.SUSANA NAPAT-A y MACABIO, accused-appellant.

The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Jimmy R. Pablito for accused-appellant.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:

The accused-appellant, Susana Napat-a, was convicted of drug-pushing

On February 3, 1985, the Narcotics Regional Unit in Baguio City receivedinformation that a certain Susana Napat-a was looking for a buyer of marijuanaleaves. Acting on this report, Captain Emmanuel Manzano formed a groupcomposed of CIC Leo Quevedo, A2C Serafin Artizona and Pat. MaximianoPeralta, to conduct a buy-bust operation. The group proceeded to the publicmarket on Magsaysay Avenue. There, the informer introduced to the appellanthis companion, CIC Leo Quevedo, as an interested buyer of marijuana. Pat.Peralta, who was then posted at a strategic distance, heard Quevedo order three(3) kilos of dried marijuana leaves for the price of P800 per kilo set by Napat-a.

accompanied by Quevedo and the informer, rode on a jeep to Brookside, BaguioCity, Artizona and Peralta took a taxi and followed them. Upon reachingBrookside, Peralta and Artizona posted themselves near a store. They observedQuevedo and the informer standing at the junction of lower and upper Brooksidewaiting for Susana Napat-a The latter soon reappeared carrying a brown cartonbox which she handed to Quevedo who thereupon made the pre-arranged signal.On seeing Quevedo's signal, Peralta and Artizona rushed to the scene. CICQuevedo held Susana by the arm and placed her under arrest.

The contents of the brown carton box were referred to Lt. Carlos Figueroa, a

forensic chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory in Camp Bado Dangwa, forexamination. In his Chemistry Report No. D-019-85 (Exh. G), Lt. Figueroaaffirmed that a qualitative examination of the specimens taken from the browncarton box showed them to be marijuana.

In her defense, the appellant claimed that she was a vegetable vendor in themarket; that on February 3, 1985 at about 10:30 A.M. she went home to

7/28/2019 Evidence 6 10

10/23

Brookside to cook food for her children. On her way back to the city market, shemet Naty Doguiwen, who was also a vegetable vendor. Naty Doguiwen washolding a small box. While they were waiting for a ride, a man approached Naty.The two talked (which appellant could not hear), then Naty handed to the manthe box she was holding. Suddenly two men approached Naty who speedily ran

way. The two men gave chase but were unable to catch her. To Susana'ssurprise, the two men came back and arrested her. She was brought toheadquarters where she was investigated. She submitted her counter-affidavit tothe City Fiscal

On cross-examination, appellant admitted she signed Exhibit "I" for theprosecution which shows that her rights were read to her before the investigation.She was informed of her right to remain silent and to have counsel. All this tookplace on February 3, 1985 in the presence of her counsel, Atty. RicardoTangalin, of the IBP Legal Aid Office. During the investigation, she signed a

receipt for the property that was seized from her and marked as Exhibit "J". Sheadmitted that the brown carton box containing four bundles of dried marijuanaleaves weighing about three (3) kilos, were seized from her at M. Roxas,Brookside, Baguio City on February 3, 1985, at 2:30 P.M. During the custodialinvestigation, she waived her rights under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,so the investigation could continue (Exh. K).

In this appeal, appellant impugns the receipt (Exh. J) she signed. She allegesthat the receipt is inadmissible as evidence against her because herconstitutional right against self-incrimination was violated when she was made to

sign it without being informed of her rights to counsel and to remain silent.

ISSUE: WON the receipt is inadmissible as evidence against her because herconstitutional right against self-incrimination

WON trial court erred in convicting her in view of the prosecution's failure topresent to the Court the brown carton box (Exh. B) and its contents (driedmarijuana leaves) (Exhs. C, D, E and F)

HELD:

This contention has no merit. Appellant admitted at the trial that she was assistedby counsel when she signed Exhibit "J" (t.s.n. March 7, 1988, p. 17). She alsosigned the Investigation Report dated February 3, 1985 (Exh. I) which states thatduring the custodial investigation, she was informed of her right to remain silentand to counsel, and that she was assisted by Atty. Ricardo Tangalin of the IBPLegal Aid Office (t.s.n. March 7, 1988, p. 15).

7/28/2019 Evidence 6 10

11/23

Appellant questions the non-presentation of the poseur-buyer (Quevedo) whodied before the trial, and the informer, as witnesses at the trial. But, as the trialcourt pointed out, the death of Quevedo did not destroy the case of theprosecution, for the sale and actual delivery of the marijuana by appellant toQuevedo were witnessed by Pat. Peralta and A2C Artizona, who testified at the

trial (t.s.n. Nov. 7, 1986, pp. 3-4).

In support of her denial, appellant cited the testimony of A2C Artizona that he didnot see her handing the brown carton box to Quevedo (t.s.n. August 27, 1987, p.9). However, Peralta testified that he saw her give the illegal package to theposeur-buyer (t.s.n. November 7, 1 986, p. 5). The positive Identification of theaccused as the seller of the marijuana prevails over her denials.

Her defense that she was framed up by the NARCOM team is the usual story ofdrug pushers or sellers, which does not impress us (People vs. Agapito, 154

SCRA 694). The law enforcers are presumed to have performed their dutiesregularly in the absence of proof to the contrary (People vs. Natipravat, 145SCRA 483; People vs. Asio, G.R. No. 84960, September 1, 1989).

Appellant's contention that the trial court erred in convicting her in view of theprosecution's failure to present to the Court the brown carton box (Exh. B) and itscontents (dried marijuana leaves) (Exhs. C, D, E and F) is not well taken. CarlosV. Figueroa, Forensic Chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory, testified that the boxand its contents were presented, Identified and marked as exhibits in court (t.s.n.November 6, 1985, pp. 3-8). The subsequent loss of these exhibits did not affectthe case for the trial court had described the evidence in the records (t.s.n. April13, 1988, p. 2). In People vs. Mate, 103 SCRA 484, we ruled that "(e)ven withoutthe exhibits which have been incorporated into the records of the case, theprosecution can still establish the case because the witnesses properly Identifiedthose exhibits and their testimonies are recorded." Furthermore, in this case,appellant's counsel had cross- examined the prosecution witnesses who testifiedon those exhibits (t.s.n. November 6, 1985, pp. 8-9).

WHEREFORE, we affirm the decision of the trial court finding appellant SusanaNapta-a guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having violated Section 21(b), ArticleIV, in relation to Section 4, Article 11 of R.A. No. 6425, \

7/28/2019 Evidence 6 10

12/23

G.R. No. 91628 August 22, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.MACARIO SANTITO, JR., ALLAN CABALLERO, DIOSCORO CANDIA,

BENJAMIN CAPANGPANGAN and WILLIAM NARCISO, accused-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Rolindo A Navarro for accused-appellants.

REGALADO, J.:p

At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of that day, thirteen-year old EmmanuelRosario and his father, Paulino Rosario, were accordingly at the church plaza inBalamban, Cebu, to get their three cows which were pastured there. Emmanuelnoticed the presence of appellants Allan Caballero, Dioscoro Candia, WilliamNarciso, Benjamin Capangpangan and Macario Santito, Jr. who were sitting nearthe statue in the place where the cows were tied. After Emmanuel had untied theropes of the cows, appellants approached them and encircled Paulino. AllanCaballero "wrestled" the neck of Paulino while Macario Santito, Jr. grappled withthe latter. The three other appellants attempted to help Caballero and Santito, Jr.by trying to participate in the wrestling. Out of fear, Emmanuel ran away andwent to the store of his brother-in-law, Jovil Pesquera, to report the incident and

obtain help.

Forthwith, he and Jovil ran to the plaza and saw appellants still around Paulinowho was lying unconscious. Allan Caballero, Dioscoro Candia and BenjaminCapangpangan were holding the body of Paulino while William Narciso andMacario Santito, Jr. were standing by. As Emmanuel and Jovil approached theplace appellants ran away toward the rear of the rural bank. Emmanuel went tohis father and noticed that his face was covered with blood. 4Jovil ran afterappellants but failing to catch up with them, he went back to the place where hisfather-in-law was and told Emmanuel that he knew the said assailants. They

checked the pockets of Paulino which they noticed were turned inside out andfound out that the P10,000.00 in the left pocket of his trousers was missing. 5 Allthe aforesaid facts and events were visible and known to them as the scene ofthe crime was lighted by a nearby mercury lamp and two fluorescent lamps. 6

Emmanuel and Jovil then went to their mother and to the Philippine Constabularydetachment to report the incident. Sgt. Cueva and Sgt. Cabarrubias

7/28/2019 Evidence 6 10

13/23

7/28/2019 Evidence 6 10

14/23

It is doctrinally entrenched that the evaluation of the testimony of witnesses bythe trial court is received on appeal with the highest respect because it is the trialcourt that has the direct opportunity to observe them on the stand and detect ifthey are telling the truth or lying in their teeth.

It is the contention of appellants that the testimonies of the prosecution witnessesare belied by Entry No. 08 dated January 21, 1987 in the Police Blotter of theBalamban Police Station. They make much of the fact that the said entry is notcompletely consistent with the prosecution witnesses' testimonies in open court,although there is no indication as to who supplied the data appearing in saidentry. The pertinent part thereof which is relied upon by appellants is as follows:

... Investigation conducted revealed that Paulino Rosario togetherwith his son got their cows which were pastured at the church plaza.The son went ahead leaving his father. But because Paulino Rosario

have (sic) not yet returned, his son went back and his son found outthat Paulino Rosario was struck at his head and it was furtherdiscovered that the money amounting to P8,000.00 capital forpurchase of livestock was lost. In this connection, investigationrelative to the incident is going on. 22

A police blotter is a book which records criminal incidents reported to thepolice. 23Entries in official records, as in the case of a police blotter, areonlyprima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. They are not conclusive.The entry in the police blotter is not necessarily entitled to full credit for it couldbe incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes from either partial suggestions or forwant of suggestion or inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may beunable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for thecorrection of the first suggestion of his memory and for his accurate recollectionof all that pertain to the subject. It is understandable that the testimony during thetrial would be more lengthy and detailed than the matters stated in the policeblotter.24

Even assuming that the same had been identified in court, it would have noevidentiary value. Identification of documentary evidence must bedistinguished from its formal offer as an exhibit. The first is done in the

course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking of the evidence asan exhibit. The second is done only when the party rests its case and notbefore. The mere fact that a particular document is identified and markedas an exhibit does not mean it will be or has been offered as part of theevidence of the party. The party may decide to formally offer it if it believesthis will advance its cause, and then again it may decide not to do so atall. 27

7/28/2019 Evidence 6 10

15/23

In the case at bar, the defense did not identify or formally offer the saidentry in the police blotter as evidence for appellants. Section 35, Rule 132of the Rules of Court provides that the court shall consider no evidencewhich has not been formally offered; and it could not have been offeredwithout being identified and marked as an exhibit. Hence, contrary to the

desperate gambit of appellants, the said entry cannot be given anyconsideration at all.

Moreover, the imputed inconsistency in the testimonies of the prosecutionwitnesses on minor details reinforces rather than weakens their credibility 28 forthe reaction of persons when confronted with a shocking incident varies, 29 aswhat happened to the obviously excited and agitated prosecution witnesses inthis case when they reported the incident to the police. Testimonial discrepanciescould be caused by the natural fickleness of memory which tend to strengthen,rather than weaken, credibility as they erase any suspicion of rehearsed

testimony. It would have been more suspicious if complainant had been able topinpoint with clarity or describe with precision the exact sequence of events. Themost candid witness oftentimes makes mistakes but such honest lapses do notnecessarily impair his intrinsic credibility. 30

It is true that there was no eyewitness to the actual killing of Paulino Rosario inthe mortiferous robbery subject of this case. However, the prosecutioncircumstantiates the guilt of appellants through the testimonies of its principalwitnesses, Emmanuel Rosario and Jovil Pesquera, whose testimonies arepositive, straightforward and clearly revelatory only of the truth of the facts they

witnessed, without any dubious motive shown why they would bear false witnessagainst appellants.

Essential in the success of the prosecution of an offense is the proof of theidentity of the offender. In lieu thereof, the prosecution endeavors to gather allother evidence that will lead to the inescapable inference of one's culpability.Necessity justifies and both jurisprudence and law consistently accept resort tocircumstantial evidence which consists in the piecing together of tiny bits ofevidence with a view to ascertaining that the accused is the person responsiblefor the commission of the offense. 31 To technically require eyewitness testimonywould be, in some cases, placing a premium against crime detection and

granting a passport of immunity to a malefactor.

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to convict where the circumstances point tothe accused as the culprits. The following circumstances are sufficient toestablish the culpability of appellants in this case beyond reasonable doubt: (a)appellants were all present and recognized by Emmanuel Rosario when he andhis father arrived at the church plaza to get their cows; (b) appellants were the

7/28/2019 Evidence 6 10

16/23

ones who approached Emmanuel and his father; (c) appellants concertedlyencircled Paulino, "wrestled" his neck and held him; (d) they were still there whenEmmanuel ran away from the place to seek help from his brother-in-law; (e)when Emmanuel and Jovil Pesquera returned to the church plaza, appellantswere clustered around and holding the body of their father, whose face was

covered with blood; (f) when appellants saw Emmanuel and Jovil, they ran awaytoward the rear of the rural bank; (g) they were the same persons who werechased by Jovil; and (h) the stone and the broken hollow block near the body ofthe victim were the probable and logical instruments used in the infliction of thecranial injuries on the victim.

In a similar case, it was held that direct evidence of the actual stabbing is notnecessary when circumstantial evidence sufficiently establishes that fact. Aresort to circumstantial evidence is, in the very nature of things, anecessity. 32 Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if (a) there is

more than one circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inference is derived areproven, and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce aconviction beyond reasonable doubt. 33 All the aforementioned requisites arepresent in the case at bar.

Furthermore, Emmanuel and Jovil easily identified appellants because the placewhere the crime occurred was sufficiently lighted. Where considerations ofvisibility are favorable and the witness does not appear to be biased against theaccused, his or her assertions as to the identity of the malefactor should benormally accepted. This is more so when the witness is the victim or his near

relative because such witness usually strives to remember the faces of theassailants. 34

The same considerations hold true for the component of robbery in thecomposite crime charged. The untraversed evidence shows that the moneyreturned by his son-in-law to the victim was placed in the latter's pocket and henever gave the same to any person or passed by any other place to leave theamount there; the victim went directly to the church plaza to get his cattle,presumably in a hurry to do so because of the lateness of the hour; he was thenset upon and overpowered by appellants; when help came, he was lying bloodyand unconscious, surrounded and his body being held by appellants and all his

pockets turned inside out, all empty and with the money gone; appellants ranaway upon the approach of the victim's son-in-law; and the money was neverfound or recovered. It bears further mention, for both the killing and the robbery,that the only interval of time in the entire series of events which did not have thebenefit of an eyewitness was the few minutes from the time Emmanuel Rosarioran away from where his father was being ganged upon up to the time when heand Jovil Pesquera returned to the crime scene to rescue the victim.

7/28/2019 Evidence 6 10

17/23

Finally, the defense interposed by appellants was properly disregarded by thetrial court. Their alibi is unavailing due to the positive identification by theprosecution witnesses. Alibi is admittedly and consistently considered theweakest defense an accused can concoct. In order to prosper, it must be soconvincing as to preclude any doubt that the accused could not have been

physically present at the place of the crime or its vicinity at the time of itscommission. 35 Appellants failed to show that they could not have gone tothe locus criminis from the place where they claimed to be at the time the crimewas committed.

Thus, appellant Candia claimed that he was then watching a betamax show atAsturias, but Asturias and Balamban are just adjoining municipalities. AppellantCaballero alleged that he was watching a game in a mah-jongg den right in Sta.Cruz, Balamban barely a kilometer away. Appellant Capangpangan wassupposedly in Cebu City to pay rentals on a house rented by his sister; but

although the alleged receipts of payment were marked as exhibits, the samewere not even presented in evidence. Appellant Santito, Jr. testified that he wasin their house at Prensa, Balamban, around three kilometers away. AppellantNarciso claimed that he was then working in Pasil, Cebu City, carrying fish fromthe fishing boat to the market but although he had allegedly been working assuch since 1986, he could not give the names of the pumpboat owner., any of hisco-workers or the fish vendor for whom he carried the fish. 36 These facts werenot denied. Furthermore, categorical declarations of witnesses for theprosecution on the details of the crime are more credible than the denials anduncorroborated alibi interposed by the accused. 37

The Court is satisfied from its evaluation of the evidence that the trial court actedcorrectly in finding appellants guilty as charged. That appellants acted inconspiracy in the commission of the special complex crime is evident from theirproven coordinated acts before, during and after the perpetration of the offense.

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED,with the modification that the indemnity for the death of the victim is increased toP50,000.00 consonant with the present policy of the Court.

7/28/2019 Evidence 6 10

18/23

G.R. No. 85423 May 6, 1991

JOSE TABUENA, petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIANO TABERNILLA, JR., respondents.

Ramon Dimen for petitioner.

Dionisio A. Hernandez for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:p

ISSUE: The petitioner faults the decision of the trial court, as affirmed by therespondent court, for lack of basis. It is argued that the lower courts should nothave taken into account evidence not submitted by the private respondent inaccordance with the Rules of Court.

The subject of the dispute is a parcel of residential land consisting of about 440square meters and situated in Poblacion, Makato, Aklan. In 1973, an action forrecovery of ownership thereof was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Aklan bythe estate of Alfredo Tabernilla against Jose Tabuena, the herein petitioner. Aftertrial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant wasrequired to vacate the disputed lot. 1

As the trial court found, the lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. sometime in 1926 toAlfredo Tabernilla while the two were in the United States. Tabernilla returned tothe Philippines in 1934, and Damasa Timtiman, acting upon her son Juan'sinstruction, conveyed the subject land to Tabernilla. At the same time, sherequested that she be allowed to stay thereon as she had been living there allher life. Tabernilla agreed provided she paid the realty taxes on the property,which she promised to do, and did. She remained on the said land until herdeath, following which the petitioner, her son and half-brother of Juan Peralta,Jr., took possession thereof. The complaint was filed when demand was madeupon Tabuena to surrender the property and he refused, claiming it as his own.

The trial court rejected his defense that he was the absolute owner of the lot,which he inherited from his parents, who acquired it even before World War IIand had been living thereon since then and until they died. Also disbelieved washis contention that the subject of the sale between Peralta and Tabernilla was adifferent piece of land planted to coconut trees and bounded on three sides bythe Makato River.

7/28/2019 Evidence 6 10

19/23

Tabuena appealed to the respondent court, complaining that, in arriving at itsfactual findings, the trial court motu proprio took cognizance of Exhibits "A", "B"and "C", which had been marked by the plaintiff but never formally submitted inevidence. The trial court also erred when, to resolve the ownership of the subjectlot, it considered the proceedings in another case involving the same parties but

a different parcel of land.

The said exhibits are referred to in the pre-trial order as follows:

Plaintiff proceeded to mark the following exhibits: Exh. "A", letterdated October 4, 1921 addressed in Makato, Capiz, Philippines;Exh. "A-1", paragraph 2 of the letter indicating that the amount ofP600.00the first P300.00 and then another P300.00 as interestsince October 4, 1921; Exh. "A-2", is paragraph 3 of the letter; Exh."B", a Spanish document; Exh. "C", deed of conveyance filed by

Tomasa Timtiman and Alfredo Tabernilla in 1923; and Exh. "C-1",paragraph 4 of Exh. "C".

In sustaining the trial court, the respondent court held that, contrary to theallegations of the appellant, the said exhibits were in fact formally submitted inevidence as disclosed by the transcript of stenographic notes, which it quoted atlength. 2 The challenged decision also upheld the use by the trial court oftestimony given in an earlier case, to bolster its findings in the second case.

We have examined the record and find that the exhibits submitted were not theabove-described documents but Exhibits "X" and "T" and their sub-markings,which were the last will and testament of Alfredo Tabernilla and the order ofprobate. It is not at all denied that the list of exhibits does not include Exhibits"A", "B" and "C". In fact, the trial court categorically declared that "Exhibits "A-1,"A-2", "B", "C" and "C-l," were not among those documents or exhibits formallyoffered for admission by plaintiff-administratrix." This is a clear contradiction ofthe finding of the appellate court, which seems to have confused Exhibits "A," "B"and "C" with Exhibits "X" and "Y", the evidence mentioned in the quotedtranscript.

Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides in Section 35 thereof as follows:

Sec. 35. Offer of evidence.The court shall consider no evidencewhich has not been formally offered. The purpose for which theevidence is offered must be specified.

The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit does not meanit has thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. It is true

7/28/2019 Evidence 6 10

20/23

that Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" were marked at the pre-trial of the case below, butthis was only for the purpose of identifying them at that time. They were not bysuch marking formally offered as exhibits. As we said in InterpacificTransit, Inc. vs.Aviles, 3 "At the trial on the merits, the party may decide toformally offer (the exhibits) if it believes they will advance its cause, and then

again it may decide not to do so at all. In the latter event, such documents cannotbe considered evidence, nor can they be given any evidentiary value."

Chief Justice Moran explained the rationale of the rule thus:

. . . The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest hisfindings of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon theevidence offered by the patties at the trial. 4

We did say in People vs. Napat-a5 that even if there be no formal offer of an

exhibit, it may still be admitted against the adverse party if, first, it has been dulyidentified by testimony duly recorded and, second, it has itself been incorporatedin the records of the case. But we do not find that these requirements have beensatisfied in the case before us. The trial court said the said exhibits could bevalidly considered because, even if they had not been formally offered, one of theplaintiffs witnesses, Cunegunda Hernandez, testified on them at the trial and waseven cross-examined by the defendant's counsel. We do not agree. Although shedid testify, all she did was identify the documents. Nowhere in her testimony canwe find a recital of the contents of the exhibits.

Thus, her interrogation on Exhibit "A" ran:

LEGASPI: That is this Exh. "A" about ?

A The translation of the letter.

Q What is the content of this Exh. "A", the letter of thesister of Juan Peralta to Alfredo Tabernilla?

Court: The best evidence is the document. Proceed. 6

She also did not explain the contents of the other two exhibits.

The respondent court also held that the trial court committed no reversible errorin taking judicial notice of Tabuena's testimony in a case it had previously heardwhich was closely connected with the case before it. It conceded that as ageneral rule "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudicationof cases pending before them, of the contents of the records of other cases, even

7/28/2019 Evidence 6 10

21/23

when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, andnotwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actuallypending b before the same judge. 7 Nevertheless, it applied the exception that:

. . . in the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to

all parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the originalrecord of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a casepending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party,reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or insome other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or whenthe original record of the former case or any part of it, is actuallywithdrawn from the archives by the court's direction, at the requestor with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of therecord of the case then pending. 8

It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, "in the absence ofobjection," "with the knowledge of the opposing party," or "at the request or withthe consent of the parties," the case is clearly referred to or "the original or part ofthe records of the case are actually withdrawn from the archives" and "admittedas part of the record of the case then pending." These conditions have not beenestablished here. On the contrary, the petitioner was completely unaware that histestimony in Civil Case No. 1327 was being considered by the trial court in thecase then pending before it. As the petitioner puts it, the matter was never takenup at the trial and was "unfairly sprung" upon him, leaving him no opportunity tocounteract.

The respondent court said that even assuming that the trial court improperly tookjudicial notice of the other case, striking off all reference thereto would not befatal to the plaintiff's cause because "the said testimony was merely corroborativeof other evidences submitted by the plaintiff." What "other evidences"? Thetrouble with this justification is that the exhibits it intends to corroborate, to wit,Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", have themselves not been formally submitted.

Considering the resultant paucity of the evidence for the private respondent, wefeel that the complaint should have been dismissed by the trial court for failure ofthe plaintiff to substantiate its allegations. It has failed to prove that the subject lot

was the same parcel of land sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. to Alfredo Tabernilla andnot another property, as the petitioner contends. Even assuming it was the samelot, there is no explanation for the sale thereof by Juan Peralta, Jr., who was onlythe son of Damasa Timtiman. According to the trial court, "there is no questionthat before 1934 the land in question belonged to Damasa Timtiman." JuanPeralta, Jr. could not have validly conveyed title to property that did not belong to

7/28/2019 Evidence 6 10

22/23

him unless he had appropriate authorization from the owner. No suchauthorization has been presented.

It is true that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, as wehave held in many cases. However, that rule is also not absolute and yields to

the accepted and well-known exception. In the case at bar, it is not even disputedthat the petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest have possessed the disputedproperty since even before World War II. In light of this uncontroverted fact, thetax declarations in their name become weighty and compelling evidence of thepetitioner's ownership. As this Court has held:

While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations ofownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence ofownership they become strong evidence of ownership acquired byprescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the

property.9

It is only where payment of taxes is accompanied by actualpossession of the land covered by the tax declaration that suchcircumstance may be material in supporting a claim of ownership. 10

The tax receipts accompanied by actual and continuous possessionof the subject parcels of land by the respondents and their parentsbefore them for more than 30 years qualify them to register title tothe said subject parcels of land. 11

The Court can only wonder why, if Alfredo Tabernilla did purchase the propertyand magnanimously allowed Damasa Timtiman to remain there, he did not atleast require her to pay the realty taxes in his name, not hers. The explanationgiven by the trial court is that he was not much concerned with the property,being a bachelor and fond only of the three dogs he had bought from America.That is specious reasoning. At best, it is pure conjecture. If he were really thatunconcerned, it is curious that he should have acquired the property in the firstplace, even as dacion en pago. He would have demanded another form ofpayment if he did not have the intention at all of living on the land. On the otherhand, if he were really interested in the property, we do not see why he did not

have it declared in his name when the realty taxes thereon were paid by DamasaTimtiman or why he did not object when the payments were made in her ownname.

In comparison, all the acts of Damasa Timtiman and Jose Tabuena indicate thatthey were the owners of the disputed property. Damasa Timtiman and herforebears had been in possession thereof for more than fifty years and, indeed,

7/28/2019 Evidence 6 10

23/23

she herself stayed there until she died. 12She paid the realty taxes thereon in herown name. 13Jose Tabuena built a house of strong materials on the lot. 14 Heeven mortgaged the land to the Development Bank of the Philippines and to twoprivate persons who acknowledged him as the owner. 15 These acts denoteownership and are not consistent with the private respondent's claim that the

petitioner was only an overseer with mere possessory rights tolerated byTabernilla.

It is the policy of this Court to accord proper deference to the factual findings ofthe courts below and even to regard them as conclusive where there is noshowing that they have been reached arbitrarily. The exception is where suchfindings do not conform to the evidence on record and appear indeed to have novalid basis to sustain their correctness. As in this case.

The conclusions of the trial court were based mainly on Exhibits "A", "B" and "C",

which had not been formally offered as evidence and therefore should have beentotally disregarded, conformably to the Rules of Court. The trial court also erredwhen it relied on the evidence submitted in Civil Case No. 1327 and took judicialnotice thereof without the consent or knowledge of the petitioner, in violation ofexisting doctrine. Thus vitiated, the factual findings here challenged are as anedifice built upon shifting sands and should not have been sustained by therespondent court.

Our own finding is that the private respondent, as plaintiff in the lower court,failed to prove his claim of ownership over the disputed property with evidenceproperly cognizable under our adjudicative laws. By contrast, there is substantialevidence supporting the petitioner's contrary contentions that should havepersuaded the trial judge to rule in s favor and dismiss the complaint.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed decision is REVERSEDand SET ASIDE, with costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered.

Narvasa, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Footnotes