Evolving Public Perceptions of Spaceflight in American Culture

8/3/2019 Evolving Public Perceptions of Spaceflight in American Culture

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Available online at www.sciencedirect.comSCIENCE DIRRCT.

PERGAMON Acta Astronautica 53 (2003) 823-831www.elsevier.corn/iocate/actaastro

EVOLVING PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF SPACEFLIGHT IN AMERICAN CULTURER.D. Launius*National Aeronautics and Space Administrationwashitlgtoxl, DC

AbTctThere s a belief that exists n the United Statesaboutpublic support or NASAs activities. Thebelief is almostuniversally held that NASA and thecause f spaceexploration enjoyedoutstandingpublic supportand confidence n the 1960sduring theeraofApolloandthatpublicsupportwanedinthepost-ApolIora, only o sink o quiteow depths nthe decade f the 1990s.Thesebeliefs are predicatedon anecdotal vidence hat shouldnot be discounted,but empirical evidencegleaned %om ublic opinionpolling datasuggest hat someof theseconceptionsare otally incorrect and othen are either ncompleteor morenuanced han previously believed.This paperexploresevolution of public support or spaceexplorationsince he 1960s.Using polling data fromavarietyofsourcesitpresentstre&overtimeandoflbrs comments n the meaningof publicperceptions or the evolution of space olicy and thedevelopment f spaceexploration n the UnitedStates.Publishedby Elsevier ScienceLtd.

IfIhaveheardaonce,Ihavehearditah~times,ifNASAjusthadthepopularsupporttbatitenjoyedddngthe 1!%OsallwouldbeweUlhispaperp?eamts n analysisof public opinion polhngdataintheunitedstnteeikonlthrougboutthehiatoryoftheapaceage.Analyzingtbesepollsauowstheplottingoftrendsoverakmgperiodoftime.Thisstudyrevealsseveral-~ insightsaboutheevolutionofspace- For example,mostpeoplebelieve hatProjectApollo was-~bpopular,~*po~donotsupportthkcontentionGmsiithroughoutthe196OsamajorityofAmericansdidnotbelieveApollo wasworth the cost,with the oneexception othisbemgapolltakenatthet imeoftheApoU0 11 unarlanding n July 1969.And consistentlyhmughout hedecade4Sto60peramtofAmeriamsbelievedthatthagovernment asspending oo much on space.Clearly, his datadoes ot supporta contention hatmostpeopleappmvedof Apollo and hought t

l Chief Historian,NASA.0094-5765/03/$ - see front matter Published by Elsevier Science Ltd.doi: lO.l016/SOO94-5765(03)00119-X

@ottanttoexpknespace.ThedecisiontolxoceedwithApoUowasnotmadebeamseitwasenormouslyPogr-;w&P~3lhesearemanyotherobsetv&onsemagingtiomthisreview.Someoflhemareconhadictorytothe

genelaI~gs-aboveahoutsuppartfbrApollo. They nch& the followingl The American public has ong held generallypositive attitudes oward the space rogram butis not very fkmihar with its details.l Over the history of the spaceage,an average fmore han 60 percentof thosepolled rated hejob doneby NASA as either excellent orgoodl Most Amekans have shownsupport or spaceexploration and view it as mportantover theyears,but also believe hat federalmoney couldbe.better spenton other programs.l Most are also in favor of NASA as anorganimio~ hut are relatively unfamiliar withthe majority of its activities and objectives.l Thesepolls also suggest istorically closerelationshipsbetweenpublic perceptions fNASA and spa&light depictions n popularculture, especially ihn. These mages rompopular culture, coupledwith real-worldaccomplishmentsn spaceflight,work together ocreatepowerful visions afkting the publicconsciousness.

IheCiOOdNewSOverall there is very good news or NASA andthe causeof spaceexploration The public hasalways, nsothr as dataexists,accordedNASA aquite favorable ating. This is unusuaJor mostFederalagencies, s he ow opinion held by thepublic for such organirationsas he.hrtemal RevenueService, he EnvironmentalProtectionAgency, andHealth and Human ServicesattestFor example,while Americansmay not knowthat much about he space rogram, hey have alargely favorably opinion of it-over 70 percentWY

they have a fhvorable mpression, ompared o lessthan 20 percentwho hold an unfavorable mP~siOn.And this tracks over the entire life of question, rom


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824 R.D. Launius /Acta Astronautica 53 (2003) 823-8311978 o the pE!SXlt hl a set Of pOk COUdUCtCdll1gp5,1996, and 1997,an averageof 92 pementofthosepolled strongly agreedor somewhatagreedwith the statement: The U.S. spaceprogram ssomething his cotmtry can be proud ofn2The Yankelovich polling organ&ion asked hequestion, Please ell me how impormnt you believethe spaceprogram s to our country. Would you saythat it is extremely mportant, very impottan~somewhat mpor&@ not very important or not at allimportant? Figure 1 shows he percentwho saidextremely or tery important The percentofAmericanswho believed hat the spaceprogram wasextremely or very important o the country was 57percent n 1999, he last year hat this poll was aken.Although this chart showsconsistentsuppo& in 1995it depicts he beghming of consistentlyhigh marksfor spaceflightafter severalyears of steadydecline.This rise in 1995may have been he result of theShuttle/Mir docking missions hat began n July ofthat year as well as the releaseof theApolIo 13feature ilm in the summerof 1995.

Fiwre 1

(Ill ---so*! 1seaSa9 e0 99, 992se31994s95 * 1997e?aea9 /In compiling data rom severalsources n thequality of the work being doneby NASA between1988and 1999,as shown n Figure 2, an averageofmore than 60 percentof thosepolled rated he obbeing done by NASA as excellent or good.4 Allof this suggests hat the causeof spaceflight ngeneraland NASA in particular enjoys relativelypositive public perceptionsand has hroughout ts

existence.Two anecdotes tawn from televisionsituationcomedies uggesthis overall positive conception. irst,inthedecadeofthe l%Os,thespaceprogrampmvidedone of the eadingexamples f a government rogramthat worked. t impll public contidence n the &iiof government o accomplish mat ests.Evenasothergovernment nitiatives ailed, civilian space lightscontinued o sucwxi. Actor Carroll OConnorperhapssaiditbestbj.anepisodeofAllintheFmniIyin 1971.Portraying he character f Archie Bunker, he bigoted

workbg-classAmericanwhosePmpeCtiVe-Seremorecommoninoursocktythanmanyobserverswerecomfortablewith, OConnor - sd well howm0stAmeriC4mSrsp0xkiedt0thearhure0fcornpetencethatApolloengenderedHeobseavedthathe had a genuine acsiile of the Apollo 14 nsigniaThatsthe~dmtsetstheUSofAapartfiom...allthemother osers.5n very specific erms,ArchieBunkerencapsulatedor everyonewhat set he UnitedStatesapart6omeveryothernationintheworkl,successn space light At a basic evel Apollo providedthe impems or the perceptionof spaceflight sa greatpositive or thenation

2igure

II ,.-mm of-- lTbesecondanecd0te,madetbirtyyearslater,suggeststhatIH3tmudlhaschiingedInthe~

produces nightly cablespatr &rts Night,oneepisodeincludedsimplyasasidebaradiscumionofspaceexpkMli&Thefictkmalspmtssimwsexecutivepmducer,IsaacJa&e,playedbyrenownedactorRobertGuiUaume,wastecovering%mastrokeanddisengagedfiomthedaiIyhubbubofputtingtogetherthenightlyshow.Hisproduce,DanaWhit&r, playd by Felicity HufEnan,keptintemr@nghiminthisepisodeashewasreadingamagwine about space expknation. Ihe exchange istelling.IsaactellSk,TheyreEalklngab0utbio-e@M&lganimalsandteR&ormingMatS.WhetlIstartedreport@Geminimissi~justwat&iugaTiimcketlittoffwasasl&ttosee.Nowtheyre&G&aacisobsesshlg&uttllisandhe;;grees.soDallaaskswhy?Quietly,Isaacmsponsponds,BearuseIwont live to sea t. It is a touching conversation bouthopeandaspimtionsandmortalli&ations.Butmorethatltl@~JatTi%?i&kmshis-ihithhlthe impmanw of space xpknationand n NASA toconduct his importat mission. You put an Xanyplacen the So~System* he says, and the*engineersatNASAc&landaspacec&onit


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R.D. Launius /Acta Astronautica 53 (2003) 823431 825Nothing moreelTixtively stateshepublics coufidencein NASA to carry out an exceptiouallymportant ask.

At the same time, many Americaas holdseemi@&umtradictory attitudesonNASA audspaceexphnatim Most are n fivor of space xplorationaudviewitasimporBnt,butalsohekvethatFakalmoneycouldhebetterspentonotherpro@ams.MostarealsoinfhvorofNASAasauorgani&ou,butare&tively u&milk with the majorityof its act&it&and objectives.Exrkdiu~~ he ConceutoiPo~ultqslmm for Prokct A&lo/The belief hat Apollo enjoyed uthusiastic upportdmiugtbel%LkaudthatsomehowNASAhaslostitscompassthere9&rejorshroadappeaIrighttothepresentlhisiSall~cooception,fotWitbOUtthe adive agrement ofpolitical leaders odat leastpublicacqtamnoexplomtioneffortmayhesusta&dforauyiengthofthne.7PopularsupportfortheKennedydeciGntoumkt&etheMconIaudingsare,th@uf~paceivedassom&iugthatmustbegaiuedforlbepRsentspaceexphXationagellda.Repea@yacharusofremorse fbr the ukewarmwN-m=+iayedbypiesaaspace~-acZivitieSistb&wedwithaheavysighaudtheconclusion, if only our currenteffortshad he samelevel of cumu&eut enjoyedby Apollo, all would hewelLdWhilethereisreasontoheIievethisatsomebasic

level, it is at besta simplistic andultimatelyUIlSatiSfsCtOlYouclusiou. ndeed, he publics supportforspacefkiinghasnzminedrema&ablystableatappmmly 80 percent n litvor of the status uosiuce1%5,withonlyouesignikantdipiusupportinthe early 1970s.However, espom~ to fundingquestkms n public opinion polls areextremelyse&iv~toqnestionwordingandmustbeusedctauh~~ly.~For example, n the summerof 1965onethirdOftheW@f+=+JW&gthe-spaabudgct,whil~ckIy16perCentwantedto -it.overthenext tfneeandonehalf years, he mm&r for cuttingsp&cespendingwentupto4o~wilhthceeprekinganiu~~iugto14pacentAttheendofl%S,theNewYorkTimesreportedthatapoUcondllcted n sixAme&an citiesshowed ive otherpub& issues oldingpriority over&E&IS n outer space(Figure 3): Pollsconsistently ankedspaceflight earthetopofthoseprogmmstohecutiuthefederalbudget(Figmv 41,&Meets ofthese citiesprtdkcd doingsomahiagabout3andwaterpbll~~jobtraiuingfor unskilledworkers,nationalbeautification, udpmmy beforespeuding ederal imds m space. hefollowing yearNewsweek choed he Times tory,stating The U.S. space rogmm s in decline.The

Vietnamwar and he desperate ouditionsof thenationspoor and ts cities-which makespace lightseem, n comparison, ike an embarrassing ationalself-indulgence-have combined o drag down aproglamwhere he sky WILSo longer he ink3igure

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Nor did hmar exploration n and of itself createmuch of a groundswell of support from the generalpublic. The Americaupublic during the 1960s argelyshowedahesimqcytowcetheSovie@totbeMoou,as shown n Figure 5. Would you favor or opposeU.S.govemmentspe&iugtoseml~ tOtklLlOOtl?thesepollsasked,audiuvhtuaUyallcasesamajmityopposed oing so, evenduriug he height of Apollo. Atonly onepoint, C&tober1965,did eveu50 perceut fthe public supporthuman uuar exploration. n the post-Apollo era, heAl.nerican ublic has continued oquestion he validity ofundertakiug humanexpeditionsto the Moon. Figme 4 alsoshows he resultof there&utmtumtotheMoouwiththeClementiuespaceprobeiu1994,whichfollodevidenceofembeddediceatthepoles,andeveuthenthesupportforhumanexplorationwasessentially qually divided2

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Somemight concludekom theseopinionpollsthat even hough he fbtxricau public in the abstmctmay havebeenunsupportive f human unar


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826 R.D. Luunius /Acta Astronautica 53 (2003) 823-831e@)ration, that Reject Apolk- as t was n&ebosomofAmerkanvirtue,advoCatedbythemostwhoiesomeofas!ronauthemeqandhawl~edbyeveryone m jonndsts to Msdison Avenuema&eW+ajoyedcoitsistentpopularity.Thereissomeevideacetosuggest~butitis,onthemain,Imbue. j+ure 5

i sHouLDTHE GOVERWYNT FUND II HUW TRIPS TO THE WON?( ,m -. . ---.-- .-_--_. -..-__ . ._ -.._-.-_ I!

I -1 cad5 o&5 WI m-70 .hcTs dd.sI Jd.6 /, p-u-J IAsshominthetoptrendlineinFigure6,whenasked f* appved of Reject Apollo during the196OsbetweenS8and78pacontofthepubtieroutinelysaidyes.lIh?knvpohltscumein1%3-1964wbentfiGsOvietUtlkRlpUblkaIllWW&thatitwaSllOtS&itlgtOtXCC?tklJ&dStStL?StOthSM~biild-liUX?dlkItSittUlUCdOUtfiUYtlwnsbchev--andinearly1%7-1%8aRertheiIlvestigatioIlsoftheApouo1fkethattookthelivesofttKeeastRXMsbecame ublic and &owed how dedic$ the NASAsafetyprogm~~beglillassmingquality.Tbehigllpqint&~,wneatthethnewhenmajor--===wreached,w=wtf=fktIUlZUkKiillgiIl1969.BUtwkllaskadifApollowasworfhthecosfbetween35and45percent0ftbepublic believed hat t was hmugh most of the historyof the program.

The only point at which the opinion surveysdemomtrate that mm than 50 percent of the publicbelievedApollo wasworth its exgmsecame n 1969at

the time of the Apollo 11 unar anding.And even henonly a me&y 53 percentagreed hat he result ustifiedtheexpense,despiithefkctthattbelandingwasperhaps he most momentous vent n humanhistorysinceithecamethefirstinslaqeinwhichthehuaumracebecame i+netary.The%slalidcsdonotdemonstrate aullqafiedsuppmtforNASAsef@ttorrachtheMooninthe196hTheysuggesfinsteild,tilatthepoliticalclisisthatlnwghtpublicsuppoRtotileinitialhmarlJmdingdezisionwasfleetingandwithinashortpekdthemalitionthatarmamcedithadtorec4msidertheirdeckiiItalsosuggeststlmtthepublicwasneverenthusiic abouthnman unar explomtioq andespeciallysboutthecostsassociatedwithit.Whatcmthusiasmt may haveenjoyed wanedover ime, untilbytheendoftheApollopmgmminDecemk1972onehastheimageoftheprogramassom&ingakintoalimpingmamthonersbaikgwitheverymuscletoreach he !inish line beforecollapsing.

Whither he &ace Shuttle?InconhasttothelukewarmsupportthepublicshowedfortheefWstolamiAmericansontheMoon,asshowninFigureS,thepublichasco~M&+~agmedthattheSpaceShuttleisagoodinvestment(seeFigure7).3 -hat doesnot directly tlatlslate, however, nto

williQWontk~oftlqublictoflyin~,asshown n Figure 8.Fiasue7

6 TIE SP ACE sIwl nEAQooDWVEST*ENT? I,

While it is not specifically tied to thesepublicperceptions, ome ntemting conclusionsmay beoffered about he SpaceShuttle program basedonthesesourcesandotberdataFirst,andcertaiolymostsignificant, most agree hat the SpaceShuttle s amagnificent machine.A massively complexsystem-with more&an 200,OOi) eparatecomponents hat must work in synchronizationwith


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RB. Launius /Arm Astronautica 53 (2003) 823-831 827

eachother and to specifications more exacting hanany other echnological system n humanhistory-the SpaceShuttle must be viewed as a triiumph ofengineeringand excellence n technologicalmanagement.Fiaure 8

WBlJc wuJNGNEss lo TRAvELIn SPACE Ii )O I

Beta* of ita techuological magnificence, heSpaceShuttle has becomean overwhehn&lycomma&@ symbol of American exceRe&ceor theworld community. Ask almost anyoneoutside heUnited Stateswhat ingrediits they believedemonstrateAmericas superpowerstatus n theworld, and hey will quickly mention the SpaceShuttle-as well as NASAs larger spaceexplorationprogram-asaconstantremhtderofwhat Americanscanaccomplishwhentheyputtheirmindstoit6Secur& the SpaceShuttle has been e4nahblyreliable over the course of its opuational history. Oneexceptionally c&s@ophic accidenf the Chailengefexplosion that killed the crew of sevenon January28,1986, uins an othemise exceptional eliabilityreami. Without minim&g that ttagic accident oneis compelled to conchale hat the vehicle has beensignificantly improved since 1986as NASA engineersworked to coma design laws and developmoreeffective opmationalprocdms. Upgradeso manycompmem of the SpaceShuttleand#onalchangestothemanagementsystemhaveledtotheimplementa&m of a st&ngly more reliablevehiclethanwasflyingin1986.Ilteslmttleisthemostreliablelaunchsystemnowinserviceanywhereintbewoild,withasucceas-@ ailure ratio of greater han99.Thit@theSpaceShuttJeisalsoamaturesystematthispointinitsaueerandthatisanimpor&nt&torinthequalityofitspetfomtance over he ast severalyears.At the end of the twentieth centmy, the SpaceShuttle appropriately enjoys many of the sameplaudits and suffers from some of the samecriticismsthat have beenmade clear since not long after theprogram first began. t remains he only vehicle in theworld with the dual capability to deliver and return

large payloads o and ffom orbit. The design,uowmore than wo decades ld, is still state-of- the-art nmany areas, ncluding computerized light control,ahfiame design,electrical power systems, hermalprotection system,and main engines.tsFinally, the SpaceShuttle has proven tself oneof the most flexible spacevehicles ever flown Mostassuredly, he ange of possibilities for operationson-orbit expanded ramatically with the launch ofColumbia in I 98 1. With its large payload bay,satellite deployment,captureand return to Earth, andrepair and edeploymentall for the first time becamepossibilities once he shuttle first flew. Requirementsto perform these asks have ensured bat the crew ofevery shuttle mission has a much broader angeofrequiredactivities itthan the pioneering astnma& ofthe M-y& Gemini, Apollo, and even he SkylabPrograms.Despiithis, formostoftheshuttleera-1981to the present-the public has believed that roboticspaceflightshould be pmmredmore aggressively hanthe humanpmgmm that relied on the shuttle.Between 1989 nd 1997severalpolls asked hequestion, should the U.S. spaceprogmmconcultrate on mmanned missions like planetaryprobesOrOlltllFUUlCdprognrmssuchaSthCspaceshuttle? Consjstentlyu&l 1995 he answercameback that more Americans thvored robotic missionsover the shuttle lights. This changes uddenly n thesummer of 1995and the public has favored humanmissions over probessince hat time. Thistransformation s depicted n Figure 9.20What actcountsor this transformation?Severalpotential explanationsarepossible. One may be thatforthefirsttimeinthesummerof1995dreSpaceShuttle dockedwith the Russianspacestation, Mir,aud begana s&s of cooperativemissions. Theexcitementof the Shuttle&fir program has sparkedarecognition of importance of human exploration nopening he high &ontier of space.*But thereseems o have beenmore to it than heShuttleMir program.The pollsmts suggestedhatthere seems o have beena close relationship betweenpublic pemeptious f NASA and spacetlightdepictions n popular cultme. For example,Apollo 13seems o havebeenan important factor in the shift infavor of humanspaceflight over robotic missions in1995.Coming out in the summer of 1995, t excitedthe public as he reality of human spaceflight haddone or many years. Near-term science iction filmsseem o havehelped sustainpublic enthusiasm orhuman spacefligh~ e.g., Armageddon, Deep Impact,Contact, Space Cowboys. These images from popularculture, coupledwith real-world accomplishments nhumanexplorationand developmentof space,worked together o createpowerful visions for the


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828 R.D. Launius /Acta Astronautica 53 (2003) 823-831

~enty-first entllry. hW is eallyOtIling VCQJunusualabout his connection.Political scientistHoward E. McCurdy and sociologist ConstancePenley, amongothers,havedrawn ight couuectionsbeween ?A t&r culture and public perceptionsofspaceflight.Figure 9

I wlwTsHouloEETHE PtUHARYEWMASS !oFNAsAPRoGRms?

70.

Workinn for a Livine in SoaceIn the Stateof the Union Addressof 1984PresidentRonaldReagau hallenged he nation tobuild a space tation.Reagan old Congress nd henation Yhat spdcliugecwomy spurs uitiatives,sumiseindu&es,andmakesolderonesmorecompetitive.He addedNowhereisthismmimpomutthauournextiiontierz space. owheredo we so effkctivetydemo&de ourtechuological e&rGp andabilitytomakelikbe3ter4mEarihTheSpaceAgeisbarelyaqmuterofacentmyoldButaheadyweve pushed ivil&ion forward withOWi3dWCCSiIlSCieoceand~Ology.OgprWties and obs will multiply as we crossIKW 8xes~kls of lmowledgcanti reachdeeperiutotheunhown....America hasalways beengmatestwhenwedaredt0.begre-a Wecanreachforw agaiu.We can ollow our dreams odistantstars, iving and working in space orpeace@,economic,and scientific gainTonight, I am dimcting NASA to developapemmmmUymatmedspacestationaudtodoitwithiuadecade.Aspacestationwillpermitquautmnleapsiuourmaearchiuscierrce,communications,nmetals, and n lifesavingmedicineswhich could be manufactured nly inspace.=And, as hey say n sports, the crowd goeswild.Almost from the outset, he space tationprogram wase~ntroverGaLMost oftk debatecentered n its costs ersus ts benetits. One NASA

official remembered hat I reached he scream evelat about 59billion, referring to how much U.S.politicians appearedwilling to spendon the station.24As a result,NASA constantlysought o reduce hecost of the station, but this proved o be a losingbattle that led to constantcoritroversy, eviews,redesigns, nd political hijhrks.zWith thesediBiculties over he space &dim onewould expect hat the public would turn agaiust heprojectSuch~notseemtobethecase.WhilethepoRiugdataisnottoosophistka@Figure10sugges&thatevendmiugveaypublicproblemswiththeprogmminthemid499Osthatthepublicsuppo@dthe effix Fiaure 10SUPPORT FOR SPACE SlATtON

Whetlaskedabouttherealityofcoopa;ltionwitbthefonaerSovietUnioninbuildingthespacestatiou,thereiseVenmOresupportFlXKtlthepoitlttMttheSovietUnionbegantocolIapseinthemid19gOs,thepublic consistent& avored argecooperativeprogramswiththeRu&aus,asshowuiuFigmell.n

11iaure

ShouldWeGotoMam?Clearly, Apollo was he penultimate of *excitement or the !Qaceagedking its first foItyyears.Landing humanson the Moon had neverbeendone before n human history and certainly that great


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R.D. Lmnius /Acta Astronautica 53 (2003) 823-831 829accomplishment as asting mportance.Spaceenthusiastsike to point to the bold decisionof JohnF. Kennedyand say something ike, If we ust had apresidentwith the vision and oresight of John F.Kennedy o ammuncea bold space nitiative, and tosupport hat kitiative, all would be well withNASA. The assumption s that JFKs Apollodecisionwas he normative process n policyformulation and could and shouldbe re~&ated byaxeding p&dent?This s always nvoked wheyver advocates fMars explorationconsider he political ciFarmstancesuderwhichtheycvpenuion.whattheyfailtomcognbzaretheverynalco16warobjedivesthatledKennedytohisdecision.Abseutthatcri&hewouldneverhavecow&edtoPrqjectApollo.Jntheendauniquec&hmnceofpohticalnece&ty,perxmallll&lWtd~~~ti6cltnd~lOgid%ity ,econon&prosp&y,andpublicmoodmadepossiblehe 1961decision o carry out a f-d-kxkinglunarhlndingp.~For thoseadvocatinga humanMars mission hepoUthI chdenge is datmting.For one hing, t ismuchSntherandmomdil5culttoreachthantheMoon.WebavealsonotyetsenthumanstoMars,and he challenge hat entds makes t emmnouslymote problematical.The track record of roboticmissionstoMars,outlhmdinFigure12,suggesmthemagnibde of hnpediments o the effort It is at leastan order of magnimdegreater n cotnghxity, risk,and cost han returning to the Moon.

RoboticsMi!islcmsto~. K%o-2002

HumanMatsmissionshaveaJsonevereqioyedmuchsupport6umtheAme&anpublic.cbnsistcmly,asshowninFii13,morepeopkpouedhaveopposedthemissionthansuppc&~itWiithat1uk~supporttbe~selectedleadaswUl

Accord@&, the advocates fhumanexplorationof Mgrs must appreciate he historicalissuesat play with the JFK decision o move forwardwith Apollo. And using Apollo as a model-addressed s t was o a very specific political crisisrelating o U.S./Sovietcommor+one question orthoseseekinga decision o mount a human

expedition o Mars is quite simple. What political,military, sociak economic, or culturaJ hallenge,sceriario,or emergencycan hey envision o whichthe best aponse would be a natiortal commitmentonthe part of the presidentand other electedofficials tosendhumans o Mars? The answer o that questionwill go far toward infotming the public debateandthe presidentialcotnmitment to a &ture aggressivespacee~loration effort to go back o the Moon or ontoMars. ,13iwre

SHOULD THE GOVERNblENT FUND HUMANTRIPS TO MARS?

onetinalobsavatiooiiomthisteviewofpohingdatadates to the evel of spending or NASApmgrams.Withtheexceptionofaibwye8rsduringtheApollo~tbeNASAbudgethashovetedataboutonepercentofallnKmeyexpen&dbytheu.s.tmasmy.AsshowninFigure14,stabiihasbeenthenonnastheannualNASAbmigethas&emema&goaeupordownill&?tiontothat~be&maPBlltthepublicspaoeptionofthisisquitedi&?e@asshown n Figme 15. Forexample, n 1997 he averageestimateof NASAs shareof the federal budgetbyth0sepo11edwas20percentHadthisbeentrue,NASAs budget n 1997would have beenS328billion. of course, f NASA had hat amountofmoney t would have beenable to go to Mars.It seems bvious that most Americanshavelittle conceptionof the amountof funding availableto NASA. As a result there s a generalJackofunderstanding hat NASA has ess han one percentof the Federalbudget eachyear, and that its shareof


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830 R.D. Lamius /Acta Astronautica 53 (2003) 823431the budget has been&inking since the early 1990~.Most Americans seem o believe that NASA has a lotof money, much more than t auuually receives.Turning around hose alse perceptionsoffimdiug isperhaps he most seriouschallenge acing thosewhowish to gain greaterpublic support for spaceexploration.

Figure 14

Fimue 15NASAS ESTYATED WARE OF THE

FEDERAL BUDGET

In a set of Yankelovich polls conducted or theBoeing Company betweenMay 1978and December1997 he question was asked,To Agree: I approveof Americak current civilian spaceprograa Onaverage68 percent of thosepolled agreedwith thestatement Polls available n NASA HistoricalReferenceCollection, NASA History Office,Washington, DC.2 bid Ibid4 Sourcesare ABUWP, CNN/uSAT, CBSNYT,Gallup, Media Geueral,and Yankelovich polls from1988 o 1999.Copies available n NASA HistoricalReferenceCollection.

li Carroll OConnor Obituary, On Moruing Edition,National Public Radio, June 22,200 1. This report byAndy Bowers is available on-hue athrrtxt iwww nnr.orq, access& July 2,2001.6 The SweetSmell of Air, SpovrsNight, iirst airedJanuary25,200O.StephenJ.Pyue,Space:AThirdGmatAgeofDiswvery," &ace Policy 4 (Au8ust 1988):187-99.81hisissuehasbeeudissectediuJamesL.k&tan,&?liing outer space: &??medy, he Mea?& andFudngfw Project ApolIo, 19614963 (I-Uu.iversityofAlabamaPmss, 1994);MarkE. Bymes,Politics andSpaaz image Making by NASA (Newyo?k, Aaeger, 1994).9 StephanieA. Roy, Elaine C. Gresham,and CarissaBryce Christensen, The Complex Fabric of PublicOphion on Space, AF-99-P.3.05, presemed t theIuterua!io~IAsmmamdcaiFe&atiouammalmeeting, Amsterdam, The Netherlands,October 5,1999.Thesechiutsaretheresultof researchover timecompiling polls iiom various sourcesshowing hepublics perceptionof NASA. While one mayquestion he validity of polls, they tend o showseveral rends@atoffer veristilitude. Copiesof allpolls are available n the NASA Historical RefmnceCollection, NASA History Office, Wash&mu, DC. The Gallup PoiI: Public Opinion 19354971, m:1959-1971, p. 1952,2183-84,2209;New YorkTimes, December3,1%7; Newsweek s quoted nAd . ve History of NASA, chap. I, p. 48,NASA Historical RefereuceCollection.I2 This analysis s basedou a set of Gallup, Harris,NBC/A.smchd FWs, CBS/New York Times, andABC/USA Today polls couducted hmughout he196Os, opies available u the NASA HistoricalReferenceColkctiou.ThBa&ysisisbasedouasetofHarris,MediaGemal, NBUAssocii Press,NBC, Gallup,CBS/New York Times, and ABCIWP pollsconductedbetween he 1980sand the present,available in the NASA Historical ReferenceCollection. This maIysis is based op a set of NBC/AssociatedPress,NBC,CBsMewYork T~~~s,ABCAVP,Harris, and Gallup polls conductedbetween he1980sand he present,available in the NASAHistorical [email protected] SeeT.A. Hepperkii, ?%eSpace htmleDecision: NASA s Questfw a Reusable paceVehiclecwashington,DC NASA SP-422 ,1 999),andT-A.Heppeuheimer,Deveiopmerrtof the SpaceShuttle,1972-1981 History of the SpaceShuttle, Volume2)(Washingtou,DCLSmithsonian Institution P&s,2002).


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R.D. Launius/Acta Astronautica 53 (2003) 823-831 831I6RogerD. Launius, Twenty Years On-Orbit: TheSpace ShuttleLegacy, Space Times: Z?teMagazineof theAmerican Astronautical Society 40 (May-June2001): 7-10. B. PeterLeonardand William A. Kisko,Predicting Launch Vehicle Failure, AerospaceAmerica, September 1989, pp. 3638,46; Robert G.Bramscher, A Survey of Launch Vehicle Failures,Spac&ight 22 OJovernber -December 1980): 5 i-58;JamesA. Vedda, Long-tetm Visions for U.S. SpacePolicy, backgroundpaperprepan+ for theSubcommiaee n National cSecmi& nternationalAffairs, and Criminal Justiceofthe HouseCommitteeon GovernmentReform and OversightMay 1997,copy n authors possession;Roger D.Lamius and Lori B. Garver, Between a Rocket anda Hard Place:Episodes n the Evolution of LaunchVehicle Technology, IAA-oo-IAk22.02, paperpresented t 5 1 IJntemationalAstronauticalCongress,Rio de Janeiro,Brazil, Get 2-6 2000.Is JohnM. Logsdon, The SpaceShuttle Program: APolicy Failure, science 232 (30 May 1986): 1099-1105; RogerD. Launius,NASA:A H&tory of the US.Civil Space Program (Malabar, FLz Krieger Pub. Co.,1994),pp. 114-15.I9The rangeof thesemissions s discussed n DavidM. Harland, TheSpace Shuttle: Roles, Missions andAccomplkhments (Chicester,Englaud: Wiley-Praxis,1998).OThis anaiysis s basedon a set of Yankelovich,ABUWP, and Gallup polls conductedbetween he1980sand he present,available n the NASAHistorical ReferenceCollection The Shuttle-Mir program has eceivedconsiderable istorical discussion.An ilhrstmtedhistory, containinga CD/ROM with oral histories,documents, nd multimedia materials, s ClayMorgan, Shuttle-Mir: The U.S. andRussiaShareH&tory s Highest Stage (Washington, DC: NASA SP-2001-4225,2001). ryan Butroughs Dragonry:NASA and the Crisis aboard the Mir (New York:Ballinger Pub. Co., 1998),provides a ournalisticanalysisof the American-Russiancooperation nspace n the mid-1990sabout he Mir spacestation. Itwas a dress ehearsal or the two countriesparme&p iu a new InteanariooalSpaceSmtion heywere building back on Earth. On the summerdockingmission seeRgger D. Launius, Making History inSpace,PointingDirections or the Future: A Review ofthe RecentAUantisMir Docking Mission, SpaceTimes: Magazine of the American AstronauticalSociety 34 (september-odober 1995):4-8.* SeeHowardE. McCurdys study, $mce and the

American Imagination (Washington, DC: Smithsonianinstitution Press,1997);ConstancePeniey,NAWTREK: Popular Science andseX in America(New York: Versa, 1997).zz Stateof theUnion Message, anuary 5,1984,Public Papers of thePresiakn& of the UnitedStattxRonatd Reagq 1984 (Washington, DC: GoxmnentPrinting Offie, 1986),pp. 87-95.24Quoted n HowardE. McCmdy, 27zepace StationDecision: incremental Politics and TechnologicalChoice @Itbore.. MD: JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress 1990), . 171.zsSeeMarcia S. Smith, Congressional esearchService, NASAs SpaceStationProgram:Evolutionand Current Status, estimonybefore he HouseScienceCommittee,April 4,200l; NASA AdvisoryCouncil, Report of the Cost Assessment ndValidation TaskForce on the InternationalSpaceStation, April 21,1998, both in NASA HistoricalReferenceCollection. This data s from a set of Yankelovichpollsconducted or the Boeing Companybetween1995and 1997.Polls available n NASA HistoricalReferenceCollection.27This is based n a set of Harris, NBC/AssociatedPress,Rockwell, and ABCiWP polls available n theNASA Historical ReferenceCollection.2sOn Kennedysdecision see,JohnM. Logsdon,7%eDecision to Go to the Moan: Project Apollo and theNationaI Interest (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,1970); David Baker, Keunedy and he Moon Goal: AReassessmenfpace 36 (Octok 1994):347-49; JohnM. Logsdon, An Apollo Perspective,Astronautics & Aeronautics, December 979,pp. 112-17.29RogerD. Launius, Apollo 11at Twenty-Five,Space Timex Magazine. qfthe American btronauticaiSoci~ 33 (May/June1994): 12-15.j Asif A. Siddiqi,Deq Space Chronicle: RoboticExp1oration Missians to the PIaneLv WaSh&tOQ DC:NASA SP-20#2-4524,2002). RogerD. Lauuius, The Next-GenerationSpaceRace:What LessonsCan FuturePresidents earnfi-omJFK? essay n Space.com,October24,2000,availableon-line athttp://www.space.com/opinionscolumns/opielection_leaders.html, ccessed uly 21,2002.R This 0-n is basedon calculations sing hebudgetdata ncluded n the annualAeronautics andSpace Report of the President (Washi~@~r~,DC:NASA Report 2002), which contains hisinformation for eachyear since 1959.

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Evolving Public Perceptions of Spaceflight in American Culture

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