DEE
PER
NEW
SD
EEPE
RN
EWS
The Mont Fleur ScenariosWhat will South Africa be like in the year 2002?
with a new introduction by Mont Fleur facilitator, Adam Kahane
VOLU
ME
7 N
UM
BER
1V
OLU
ME
7 N
UM
BER
1
DEE
PER
NEW
S EDITORS
Jenny BeeryEsther EidinowNancy Murphy
ART DIRECTOR
Pete Allen Cocke
ADDRESS
Global Business Network5900-X Hollis StreetEmeryville CA 94608
PHONE
510.547.6822
FAX
510.547.8510
URLhttp://www.gbn.org
COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS
Nancy [email protected]
The Mont Fleur ScenariosDEEPER NEWS® (formerly pub-lished as THE DEEPERNEWS®) is a series of articlespublished by Global BusinessNetwork
DEEPER NEWS and THE DEEPERNEWS are registered trade-marks of Global BusinessNetwork
Scenario thinking as a way of approaching thefuture is increasingly being used as a tool forstrategizing in private and public sector organi-
zations. The “Mont Fleur” scenario exercise, undertak-en in South Africa during 1991–92, was innovativeand important because, in the midst of a deep con-flict, it brought people together from across organiza-tions to think creatively about the future of theircountry. This Deeper News presents the Mont Fleurscenarios as they were originally published in theSouth African newspaper The Weekly Mail & TheGuardian Weekly, in July 1992. We hope this newintroduction will provide a useful overview of the pro-ject, reflecting on its effects and the broader insights ithas provided.
Context and Participants
The historical context of the project is important tounderstanding its impact. It took place during theperiod between February 1990, when NelsonMandela was released from prison, and the AfricanNational Congress (ANC), Pan African Congress(PAC), South African Communist Party (SACP), andother organizations were legalized, and April 1994,when the first all-race elections were held. Duringthese years, dozens of “forums” were set up in SouthAfrica, creating temporary structures that gatheredtogether the broadest possible range of stakeholders(political parties, civic organizations, professional bod-ies, government departments, trade unions, businessgroups, etc.) to develop a new way forward in a par-ticular area of concern. There were forums to discusseducation, housing, economic policy, constitutionalmatters, and many other areas. They ranged frominformal, off-the-record workshops to formal, publicnegotiations. The Mont Fleur project was one type offorum that, uniquely, used the scenario methodology.
The purpose of Mont Fleur was “not to present defin-itive truths, but to stimulate debate on how to shapethe next 10 years.” The project brought together adiverse group of 22 prominent South Africans—politicians, activists, academics, and businessmen,from across the ideological spectrum—to develop anddisseminate a set of stories about what might happen
in their country over 1992–2002. (For a full list ofparticipants and their affiliations at the time, see page21 of this Deeper News.)
Summary of the Scenarios
The scenario team met three times in a series ofthree-day workshops at the Mont Fleur conferencecenter outside Cape Town. After considering manypossible stories, the participants agreed on four sce-narios that they believed to be plausible and relevant:
• Ostrich, in which a negotiated settlement tothe crisis in South Africa is not achieved,and the country’s government continues tobe non-representative
• Lame Duck, in which a settlement isachieved but the transition to a new dispen-sation is slow and indecisive
• Icarus, in which transition is rapid but thenew government unwisely pursues unsus-tainable, populist economic policies
• Flight of the Flamingos, in which the govern-ment’s policies are sustainable and the coun-try takes a path of inclusive growth anddemocracy
The group developed each of these stories into a brieflogical narrative. A fourteen-page report was distrib-uted as an insert in a national newspaper, and a 30-minute video was produced which combined cartoonswith presentations by team members. The team thenpresented and discussed the scenarios with more thanfifty groups, including political parties, companies,academics, trade unions, and civic organizations. Atthe end of 1992, its goals achieved, the project waswrapped up and the team dissolved.
What the Project Was and Was Not
The ideas in the Mont Fleur team’s four scenarioswere not in themselves novel. What was remarkableabout the project was the heterogeneous group of
DEEPER
NEW
S
1
Learning from Mont FleurScenarios as a tool for discovering common ground
important figures delivering the messages, and howthis group worked together to arrive at these messages.The approach was indirect and the results subtle:
• Mont Fleur did not resolve the crisis inSouth Africa. The project, along with other,non-scenario forum processes, contributedto the establishment of a common vocabu-lary and mutual understanding. The sharedlanguage of Mont Fleur extended beyondthe negotiating elite, and was thus able toinclude such dialogues as an exhortation toFlamingos in a Sunday church sermon and aconcern raised about Lame Duck on a ruralradio phone-in. This kind of commonunderstanding, together with many otherfactors, promoted agreement upon a settle-ment to the crisis.
• The participants did not agree upon a con-crete solution to the country’s problems.They reached a consensus on some aspectsof how South Africa “worked,” on the com-plex nature of the crisis, and on some of thepossible outcomes of the current conditions.More specifically, they agreed that, given theprevailing circumstances, certain stronglyadvocated solutions could not work, includ-ing armed revolution, continued minorityrule (Ostrich), tightly circumscribed majorityrule (Lame Duck), and socialism (Icarus). Asa result of this process of elimination, thebroad outline of a feasible and desirable out-come emerged (Flamingos).
• The process was not a formal, mandatednegotiation. Rather, it was an informal,open conversation. At the first workshop,some of the participants expected toencounter difficulties in agreeing on any-thing. Over the course of the meetings,they talked until they found areas of sharedunderstanding and agreement, several ofwhich were relevant to the formal negotia-tions which were occurring simultaneously.
• It did not deal with the differences amongthe participants. Negotiation tends to focuson identifying the positions and interests of
the parties and then finding a way to narrowor reconcile these differences. The MontFleur process, in contrast, only discussed thedomain that all of the participants had incommon: the future of South Africa. Theteam then summarized this shared under-standing in the scenarios. The aim of suchnon-negotiating processes is, as MarvinWeisbord, an organizational consultant, hasstated, to “find and enlarge the commonground.”
Results from the Project
The Mont Fleur project produced several differenttypes of results: substantive messages, informal net-works and understandings, and changed ways ofthinking. The primary public output of the projectwas the group of scenarios, each of which had a mes-sage that was important to South Africans in 1992:
• The message of Ostrich was that a non-nego-tiated resolution of the crisis would not besustainable. This was important because ele-ments of the National Party (NP) govern-ment and the business community wishedto believe that a deal with their allies,instead of a negotiation with their oppo-nents, could be sufficient. After hearingabout the team’s work, NP leader F.W. deKlerk was quoted as saying, “I am not anOstrich.”
• Lame Duck’s message was that a weak coali-tion government would not be able to deliv-er and therefore could not last. This wasimportant because the nature, composition,and rules governing the Government ofNational Unity (GNU) were a central issuein the pre-election negotiations. The NPwanted the GNU to operate subject tovetoes and other restrictions, and the ANCwanted unfettered “winner takes all” rules.Lame Duck explored the boundary in aGNU between compromise and incapacita-tion.
• Icarus warned of the dangers of a new gov-ernment implementing populist economic
DEE
PER
NEW
S
2
policy. This message—coming from a teamwhich included several of the left’s mostinfluential economists—was very challeng-ing to the left, which had assumed that gov-ernment money could be used to eradicatepoverty quickly. The business community,which was worried about Icarus policies,found the team’s articulation reassuring. Thefiscal conservatism of the GNU was one ofthe important surprises of the post-electionperiod.
• The simple message of Flight of the Flamingoswas that the team believed in the potentialfor a positive outcome. In a country in themidst of turbulence and uncertainty, a credi-ble and optimistic story makes a strongimpact. One participant said recently thatthe main result of the project was that “Wemapped out in very broad terms the outlineof a successful outcome, which is now beingfilled in. We captured the way forward ofthose committed to finding a way forward.”
The second result of Mont Fleur was the creation ofinformal networks and understandings among theparticipants—an influential group from across thepolitical spectrum—through the time they spenttogether. These connections were standard for thisforum period, and cumulatively provided the basis forthe subsequent critical, formal agreements.
The third result—the least tangible yet most funda-mental—was the change in the language and thoughtof the team members and those with whom they dis-cussed their work. The Mont Fleur team gave vivid,concise names to important phenomena that were notwidely known, and previously could be neither dis-cussed nor addressed. At least one political partyreconsidered its approach to the constitutional negoti-ations in light of the scenarios.
Why the Project Produced These Results
How can such a simple story-telling process producethese kinds of results? A scenario conversation has sev-eral characteristics that make it powerful:
• The scenario process is logical. There is noplace in the core of a scenario conversationfor positions or values. Instead the discus-sion is about facts and logic: can you con-vince your fellow team members that thestory you are putting forward is plausible?In the first Mont Fleur workshop, a storyabout the Chinese Red Army helping to lib-erate South Africa fell away on thesegrounds, rather than on the basis of prefer-ences.
• The process is open and informal. Buildingscenarios can be creative because the processis “only” about telling stories, not aboutmaking commitments. This allows people todiscuss almost anything, even taboo sub-jects. Early in the Mont Fleur process, oneof the ANC members proposed a storycalled “The Chilean Option: Growththrough Repression” (a play on the ANCslogan, “Growth through Redistribution”).This precipitated an important discussionwhich would not have had a place in a nor-mal left-wing party political debate.
• The process is inclusive and holistic. A storyabout the future has to be able to encom-pass all aspects of the world: social, political,economic, cultural, ecological, etc.Moreover, the process of telling several sto-ries encourages people to surface and listento multiple perspectives. In discussing a fun-damentally unpredictable future, there is noone truth; this accords respect for the pointsof view of all of the participants (in a con-flict, one or more parties is usually not beingheard) and it allows everyone to see more ofthe world. Poet Betty Sue Flowers says thatworking with a set of scenarios is like havingthree or four different pairs of glasses, andthat practicing putting them on and offmakes it easier for an individual also to seethe world a fifth and sixth way.
• The process elicits choices. One of thepremises of scenario thinking is that thefuture is not predetermined and cannot bepredicted, which means, therefore, that the
DEEPER
NEW
S
3
choices we make can influence what hap-pens. In a situation where people feel sweptalong by overwhelming, inevitable currents,this is an empowering world view. Duringits transition, South Africa was haunted byapocalyptic visions; the scenario storieshelped people rationally think through theiroptions.
• The process is constructive. A scenario con-versation turns the attention of a groupaway from the past and present—where thedebate is often mired—toward the future. Itshifts from looking for The Solution toexploring different possibilities, and fromthe separate interests of the parties (as innegotiation) to their common ground (thefuture in which they all will live).
Pierre Wack, who pioneered scenario planning atRoyal Dutch/Shell, said that scenario work involves“the gentle art of reperceiving.” These characteristicsmean that a scenario process can facilitate shifts inlanguage, thinking, and action. Each of these refram-ings provides for a more constructive basis for work-ing on difficult issues.
Conditions Necessary for a SuccessfulScenario Effort
The most important element required for the successof this type of scenario project is proper timing: arepublic leaders ready to talk together about the future?If there is readiness, then two other things becomecritical: how the process is led and how the team iscomposed.
The process must be:
• Credible. The people who convene and leadthe project must be broadly respected. Theymust be seen as advocates of the process andnot of any particular position or outcome.
• Informal and reflective. A scenario exercise isa “Track Two” process, which must be sepa-rate from (parallel or prior to) “Track One”formal negotiations. The power of scenariowork comes from its status as an exercise in
reflection and imagination, which is notdirectly linked to action. Therefore,although it is possible to follow on fromconstructing scenarios (what might happen)to creating a vision (what we want to hap-pen), and then to planning action (what wewill do), these processes must be carefullyinsulated from one another.
• Inclusive. The value of these projects is thatthey build the common ground among dif-ferent perspectives and parties. It is thereforeimportant to be as inclusive as possible. TheMont Fleur project was unfortunatelydiminished by its failure to include theInkatha Freedom Party, which has been animportant dissenter in South African poli-tics.
The team needs to be:
• Respected—composed of leaders who areinfluential in their own communities orconstituencies. They need not hold “official”positions.
• Open-minded (in particular, not fundamen-talist) and able to listen to and work withothers.
• Representative of all the important perspec-tives on the issues at hand. Any stakeholdermust be able to see their point of view rep-resented by someone on the team, thoughthey need not be formal representatives ofthese groups or positions.
Conclusion
The Mont Fleur exercise demonstrated the informal,indirect scenario approach to be an innovative andproductive method for a society in conflict toapproach the future. This approach is different fromand complementary to negotiation. As this projectdemonstrates, it is a promising tool for futureattempts to reach public consensus.
DEE
PER
NEW
S
4
Adam Kahane
Adam Kahane is a member ofGlobal Business Network. An expert in thedesign and facilitation of processes that helppeople work together to anticipate and effectchange, Adam served as the facilitator for theMont Fleur scenario project. He has worked asa strategy consultant to public and privateorganizations and governments, companies,political organizations, NGOs, and multi-stakeholder forums in more than thirty coun-tries around the world. He has held planningand research positions in private companies,academic institutions, and international agen-cies, in Cape Town, Tokyo, London, Paris,Vienna, San Francisco, Vancouver, andToronto.
DEEPER
NEW
S
5
What will South Africa be like in the year2002? In this supplement to The WeeklyMail & The Guardian Weekly, the Mont
Fleur Team identifies four possible pathways intoSouth Africa’s future. The idea is not to present defini-tive truths but stimulate debate about how to shapethe next 10 years.
Plotting Pathways into the Future
A successful outcome for South Africa is still possi-ble—though there is no quick fix or panacea, con-cluded the Mont Fleur scenario team.
They also concluded thatmuddling through is dan-gerous. A decisive democra-tic settlement is imperative.For South Africa to reverseits decline and take off,government policies willhave to be sustainable andsupport socio-economicgrowth and development.
These are the findings ofprobably the first scenarioexercise in the world of thisbroad scope undertaken bya left-of-center group.
Scenarios have generally been the planning preserve ofbig business. Political scenarios are far less common.
The Mont Fleur scenario exercise was sparked in mid-1991 by a request to economist Pieter le Roux toorganize (yet another) major conference on SouthAfrica’s economic future.
Le Roux, director of the Institute for SocialDevelopment at the University of the Western Cape(UWC), felt it was time for a different approach.
He put together a multi-disciplinary team of 22 peo-ple to work on possible scenarios for South Africa. Todo this he worked with Vincent Maphai, UWC polit-
ical science head, and consulted members of the ANCand PAC.
The team included political office bearers, academics,trade unionists, and business people. It met for thefirst time at Mont Fleur near Stellenbosch inSeptember 1991. Adam Kahane of Shell Internationalin London, a recognized expert on scenario planning,acted as facilitator and the exercise was funded by theFriedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Swiss DevelopmentAgency.
After two further meetings at Mont Fleur (inNovember 1991 and March 1992) and a lot of work
in between, the teamreached consensus on theessential elements of fourcore scenarios South Africamight follow between1992–2002.
After further refinement,the scenarios were launchedin August 1992. They havesince been presented to awide range of audiences,including the national exec-utive committees of theANC and PAC, theNational Party, key govern-ment departments, major
corporations, and financial institutions.
The team analyzed South Africa’s social, political, andeconomic crises and compiled 30 possible “stories”about the course of events during the next decade.These included stories of revolution, economic growththrough repression, right-wing revolts, and free-mar-ket utopias. The 30 stories were carefully scrutinizedand sifted in terms of criteria such as plausibility andinternal consistency. Nine stories survived and thesewere pared down to four by the end of the secondmeeting.
The scenarios describe what might happen to SouthAfrica. They are not blue-prints, but possible futurespresented to stimulate debate and to emphasize that
DEEPER
NEW
S
7
“Based on my experience in strate-gic planning, this is one of the mostmeaningful and exciting scenarioplanning exercises ever undertaken.The project has shown that a groupof experts and leaders with very dif-ferent perspectives and back-grounds can develop a commonunderstanding of what is going onnow in South Africa and might (andshould) go into the future. Thisseems to me to be a very positivesign for the future of the country.”
—Adam Kahane,Mont Fleur Facilitator
The Mont Fleur Scenarios by Pieter le Roux, Vincent Maphai, et al.
South Africa’s future will be shaped by the decisionsand actions of the major players.
The name “Mont Fleur scenarios” was selected toindicate that the scenarios belong to the group thatmet at Mont Fleur and not to a specific institution ororganization. Team members participated in their per-sonal capacities.
The word “scenario” is often misused to mean “event”or “situation.”
In fact, scenarios describe alternative pathways intothe future. They project a range of possible outcomesand enable people to think about the future in differ-ent ways. They do not predict what will happen butidentify what may happen.
Plausible scenarios must be internally consistent andbased on credible interpretations of present trends.Scenarios are a strategic planning tool. They identifywhat has to be done to secure a desired outcome.Scenarios imply the future is not fixed but can beshaped by decisions andactions of individuals, organi-zations, and institutions.
Scenarios are used to:
• Avoid being caught offguard
• Challenge conventionalmental maps about thefuture
• Recognize signs ofchange
• Test strategies for sustain-ability in different cir-cumstances
There is no standard methodof developing scenarios. It is acreative process that harnessesthe expertise of the peopleinvolved (see above). For a
successful scenario planning exercise it is important toset up a skilled team who can:
• Understand the present• Identify the predictable elements about the
future• Identify plausible possible pathways into the
future• Take cognizance of divergent views
DEE
PER
NEW
S
8 8
What Scenarios Mean
“Scenarios encourage disci-plined, systematic thinkingabout the future. A criticalrole of scenarios is to pre-sent different possible path-ways into the future to chal-lenge conventional thinkingand to encourage debate ina process of learning.”
—Koosum Kalyan, Shell
The Scenario Process
First team workshop September 1991
Second team workshop November 1991
Third team workshop March 1992
Team members’ ideas
Brainstorming 30 initial ideas
9 preliminary stories
Assessment
Consultation Consultation
Research Research
4 draft scenarios
4 final scenarios
Refinement
Dissemination, debate, and use
Agreement on the nature of South Africa’s crisis wasnecessary before the team could consider possiblefuture outcomes.
The team concluded that South Africa’s current crisishas three main dimensions: political, economic, andsocial.
The main elements of the political crisis are:
• The present system’s lack of legitimacy• Widespread mistrust of the security forces• A lack of faith in the judicial system• Repression, intimidation, intolerance, and
political violence• Increasing exploitation of ethnic and regional
divisions• The collapse of black local authorities and
the breakdown of services in many areas
South Africa’s economic crisis is characterized by eco-nomic stagnation, declining investment, falling realper capita incomes, growing unemployment, and largeincome disparities.
These in turn are rooted in:
• The unsustainability of South Africa’s tradi-tional growth path based on primary exports(gold and minerals) and cheap labor
• Failure to develop a broad-based manufac-turing sector
• Limited production of capital goods (such asmachinery) needed for manufacturing
• South Africa’s isolation from the internation-al technological revolution
• Lack of investor confidence
The clearest symptom ofthe social crisis is the disin-tegrating social fabric inmany communities, result-ing from:
• High unemploy-ment
• Escalating politicaland criminal vio-lence
• Inability of thehealth and educa-tion systems tomeet the demandsmade on them
• Collapse of manyrural communities
• Rapid urbanization• Alienation among
the youth
DEEPER
NEW
S
9
It’s a Fine Mess
Average Annual Growth Rates in Gross Domestic Product and Fixed Investment
Logic of the Scenarios
Lame Duck
Flight of the Flamingos
Incapacitated government
Macro-economic populism
Inclusive democracy and growth
Icarus
Non-representative government
Ostrich
Current Negotiations
NO
NO
NO
YES
YES
YES
Is a settlement negotiated?
Is the transition rapid and decisive?
Are the government’s policies sustainable?
The political, economic, and social elements of thecurrent crisis are locked in a downward spiral ofmutual cause and effect. Simultaneous intervention atall three levels is needed to reverse it.
The team argued that if the trends of the past 10 to15 years cannot be reversed, South Africa’s problemsare likely to be insoluble before the end of the decade.A political settlement and a new growth path are pre-requisites for progress.
The Mont Fleur team’s point of departure was thecurrent negotiation process.
Underlying these scenarios is the assumption that themajor parties are engaged in negotiations partlybecause they understand the dangers of irreversibledecline, and partly because the international climatestrongly favors a negotiated settlement in SouthAfrica.
The team foresaw four possible outcomes (see graph-ic) depending on the answers to three crucial ques-tions.
• Will negotiations result ina settlement? If not, anon-representative gov-ernment (Ostrich) willemerge.
• Will the transition berapid and decisive? Ifnot, there will be anincapacitated govern-ment (Lame Duck).
• Will the democratic gov-ernment’s policies be sus-tainable? If not, collapseis inevitable (Icarus); ifthe new governmentadopts sustainable poli-cies, South Africa can
achieve inclusive democracy and growth(Flight of the Flamingos).
The images were chosen to make fairly abstract politi-cal and economic concepts accessible.
DEE
PER
NEW
S
10
Possible Future Paths
Neg
otia
tions
Lame Duck
Flight of the Flamingos
Sett
lem
ent
No
Sett
lem
ent
Incapacitated government
Macro-economic populism
Inclusive democracy and growth
Icarus
Non-representative government
Ostrich
“It is understandable thatbusiness would prefer a longtransition. However, theunintended consequence ofthis is that it prolongs uncer-tainty of what a future gov-ernment will do. For theeconomy to take off a deci-sive political settlement fol-lowed by good government isimperative.”
—Johann Liebenberg,Chamber of Mines
Four Possible Pathways
As a result of the steps taken by the De KlerkGovernment and the outcome of the white referen-dum, the international community becomes moretolerant towards white South Africa, and theNational Party in particular.
In light of this, the Government hardens its negotia-tion position. At the same time the liberation move-ment is perceived to be too radical and loses supportinternationally. The liberation movements maintaintheir bottom line. A stand-off results and constitu-tional negotiations break down.
The government decides to form a new “moderatealliance” government which is unacceptable to the lib-eration movements. This results in mass resistancewhich the State suppresses by force.
Although large-scale sanctions are not reimposed, theeconomy remains in the doldrums because of massiveresistance to the new constitutions. This resistanceleads to escalating repression and violence, and thebusiness climate worsens. This in turn leads to eco-nomic stagnation and decline, accompanied by aflight of capital and skills.
The government also fails to deliver on the socialfront. Resistance and unrest render effective socialspending impossible and large outlays are requiredmerely to maintain the status quo. Because society’smajor inequalities are not addressed, the vicious cyclecontinues. Eventually the various parties are probablyforced back to the negotiation table, but under worsesocial, political, and economic conditions than before.
Possible outcomes of Ostrichinclude a “Lebanonization” ofSouth Africa, with differentwarlords controlling variousregions; or, eventually, a suc-cessful insurrection. But thesepossibilities were given lessweight than a return to nego-tiations under conditionswhere the downward cyclemight have rendered manyproblems insoluble.
Any observer will immediate-ly recognize elements of thisscenario in South Africa’scourse of events since May1992.
However, Ostrich was piecedtogether a mere 10 days afterthe overwhelming yes-vote in
DEEPER
NEW
S
11
Stuck in the Past
Ostrich Scenario
Non-representative Government
STAND OFF
International community “too radical”
Liberation movement maintains the bottom line
Negotiations break down
“Moderate alliance” government
Resistance
Repression and violence
Negative business climate
Economic stagnation
The crisis worsens
Back to negotiations
No social delivery
International community tolerant
Government inflexible
The first scenario, Ostrich, depicts a government thatdoes not want to face realities. An ostrich supposedlyhides its head in the sand when danger threatens. Theostrich does not want to see, cannot fly, but has to liftits head in the end.
the white referendum, when most observers were con-vinced an interim government was only months away.
If it had been presented as a possible outcome at thatstate, it would probably have been rejected by mostaudiences as implausible and inconsistent with thefacts. That the team felt Ostrich was still plausiblepoints to one of the major advantages of the scenarioplanning method. Instead of trying to forecast thefuture (usually within a particular ideological para-digm or mindset) the scenario method points to anevaluation of all significant possibilities even if itrequires what might seem to be counter-intuitivethinking.
DEE
PER
NEW
S
12
“Political compromises areneeded to arrive at the polit-ical settlement which is aprecondition for economictake off. However a settle-ment which seriously inca-pacitates the democraticgovernment will lead to thelame duck.”
—Tito Mboweni, ANC
“There is an urgent need fora comprehensive politicalsettlement and for sustain-able economic policies inSouth Africa, otherwise wewill add South Africa to thealready dismal economicdevelopment record ofAfrica.”
—Mosebyane Malatsi, PAC
Various forces and considerations drive the major par-ties towards a negotiated settlement. The present gov-ernment, for example, recognizes the necessity orinevitability of extending full political rights to thedisenfranchised but fears irresponsible government.This fear is shared by some of the major internationalactors.
On the other hand, the liberation movements fear thereturn to repressive minority rule if they do not makesignificant compromises. Such considerations lead to atransitional arrangement with a variety of sunsetclauses, slowly phasing out elements of the presentsystem, as well as minority vetoes and other checksand balances aimed at preventing “irresponsible” gov-ernment.
Such a long transition of enforced coalition is likelyto incapacitate government because of the probabilityof lowest common denominator decision-making,resulting in indecisive policies. It purports to respondto all, but satisfies none. In consequence, the socialand economic crisis is inadequately addressed.
Even if the transitional government succeeds in beinggoal-directed and effective, it will still be incapacitatedbecause of the logic of a long transition. Uncertaintywill grow on the nature of the government to emergeafter the transition. Regardless of how moderate thedeclarations of the majority parties in the coalitionmay be, fears of radical economic policies after theperiod of long transition will remain. Investors willhold back, and there will be insufficient growth anddevelopment.
Ironically, the unintendedconsequence of a long transi-tion is to create uncertaintyrather than to enhance confi-dence in the future.
DEEPER
NEW
S
13
Lame Duck Scenario
Insufficient growth
The vicious circle of political, economic and social crises worsens
Lowest common denominator decision-making· Indecisive policies · Purports to respond to all, satisfies none
Uncertantity because of long transition Investors hold back
Social crisis inadequately
addressed
Long transition· Political settlement · All party coalition · Sunset clauses
The second scenario, Lame Duck, envisages a formal, protracted transi-tion lasting for most of the coming decade. The image is that of a birdwith a broken wing. No matter how hard it tries, it cannot get off theground, and thus has an extremely uncertain future.
The Lame Duck of a Long Transition
Icarus was the son of Daedalus, an Athenian crafts-man of noble ancestry, renowned for his ingenuity.King Minos of Crete asked Daedalus to build a
Labyrinth from which no exit could be found. Whentheir friendship turned to enmity, King Minos impris-oned Daedalus and Icarus in the Labyrinth. Hoping toescape, Daedalus crafted two pairs of feathered wingsand he attached them to their shoulders with wax.Daedalus warned his son not to fly too close to the sun,but Icarus, exhilarated by his flight to freedom, flewhigher and higher. The wax melted and he plummetedto his death into the sea.
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@?h@?e@?@@@@@@@?@?@@@?@?f@?@?@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@?@?@?@?@?@?@?@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@?@?@?f@?@?@?@?@@@@@@@?@@@?@?h@?e@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?
@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?e@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@? @?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@?f@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
@@@@@@@@@@@@?h@@?@@@@@@@?@@?@?f@?@@?@?@@@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@@@?@?@@?@?f@?@@?@@@@@@@?@@?h@@@@@@@@@@@@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@?@h?@?@@@?@@@@@@@?@?@?@?@f?@?@?@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@?@?@?@?@?@?@?@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@?@?@f?@?@@@?@?@@@@@@@?@?@h?@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@ ?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@e?@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@?@@@?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f?@?@f@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@?@@@@@
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@@@@@@@@@@@@?h@@?@@@@@@@?@@?@?f@?@@?@?@@@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@@@?@?@@?@?f@?@@?@@@@@@@?@@?h@@@@@@@@@@@@
@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@@?@?g@@?@@@@@@@?@@?g@?@@?@@@@@?@?@@?@?e@?@?@@?@?@?@?@?@@?@?@?e@?@@?@?@@@@@?@
Fly Now, Crash Later
The government embarks on a massive spending spreeto meet all the backlogs inherited from the past. Itimplements food subsidies, price and exchange con-trols, and institutes other “quick fix” policies.
The initial results are spectacular growth, increasedliving standards, improved social conditions, little orno increase in inflation, and increased political sup-port.
But after a year or two the program runs into bud-getary, monetary, and balance of payments con-straints. The budget deficit well exceeds 10 percent.Depreciations, inflation, economic uncertainty, andcollapse follow. The country experiences an economic
crisis of hitherto unknown proportions which resultsin social collapse and political chaos.
Either the government does a 180-degree about-turn(while appealing to the International Monetary Fundand the World Bank for assistance) or it is removedfrom office. The likely result is a return to authoritari-anism and an abandonment of the noble intentionsthat originally prevailed.
Perhaps the most sobering aspect of this scenario ofspectacular boom and bust is that the very peoplewho were supposed to benefit from the program endup being worse off than before.
As in the case of Lame Duck, the Icarus (fly now, crashlater) scenario is bedeviled by unintended conse-
DEE
PER
NEW
S
14
Icarus: A Myth with a Message
The third scenario is one of macro-economic populism. The team called it Icarus, after theGreek mythical figure. This is the scenario of a popularly elected democratic governmentwhich tries to achieve too much too quickly. It has noble origins and good intentions butpays insufficient attention to economic forces.
quences. The government’s inten-tion is to provide rapidly for thesocial and economic needs of thepeople. However, because macro-economic discipline is not main-tained, this strategy leads to eco-nomic collapse, and in the endthe government is able to give farless social support than wouldhave been possible had it notattempted to fly so high so fast.
As in the case of many LatinAmerican countries, it is quitepossible that some form ofauthoritarian regime couldemerge from this conflict. Right-wing armies often stage coupsunder such conditions, claiming aneed to restore law and order. Thedemocratic government itselfcould become more authoritarianonce its ability to buy supportthrough populist policies is eroded, or it could bereplaced at the next election by a more conservativegovernment. The group did not attempt to predictthe composition of the government which would fol-low in the wake of Icarus policies, except to speculatethat it will be authoritarian.
Icarus Crashes
When governments spend more money than theyreceive, huge deficits induce an exhilarating spurt ofhigh economic growth.
This artificially-induced growth rate is not sustainable.More goods are demanded than are produced andmore imports are bought than the country can affordto pay for out of the money earned by exports.
Price controls and strict foreign exchange controls,brought into being to put a lid on these pressures, fail.Soon prices explode, the value of the currency fallsdramatically, and the economy slumps.
The most dramatic illustration of the catastrophicconsequences of such populist macro-economic poli-cies are provided by some Latin American countries.
The steeper the initial artificial growth spurt, thesteeper the eventual economic collapse seems to be.Inflation skyrockets to as much as 100 percent amonth.
Learning from Nicaragua
Progressive regimes often try too enthusiastically tochange everything overnight.
Quite aside from macro-economic problems, theyattempt more than they can accomplish.
DEEPER
NEW
S
15
Icarus Scenario
Macro-economic populism (fly now, crash later)
Popular government
Capacity constraints and imbalances
Some form of authoritarian rule?
Massive social spending spree
Economic and social collapse
In an interview in 1986, Dora Maria Tellez, Ministerof Health in the Sandinista government, admitted theNicaraguan government had tried to move too fast.
“Perhaps our greatest error, if it canbe called an error...is that webelieved we could do more than waspossible in this period...We thoughtwe could build more hospitals andschools than we have built, and pro-duce more than we have produced.
“There was a little romanticism...Later we realized that things taketime, and that in a country which hasbeen squeezed for decades likeNicaragua, you cannot fix everythingin seven years.”
Michael Manley, former Jamaican president, com-mented:
“There are a lot of things we seemuch more clearly now. Numberone, in determining how much youcan try to accomplish, you just haveto look at what your capacity is, yourmanagerial capacity, your capacity toorganize. And we were frankly over-enthusiastic. We just tried to do toomany things and we stretched thewhole system further than it couldgo.”
DEE
PER
NEW
S
16
A decisive political settlement, followed by good gov-ernment, creates conditions in which an initially slowbut sustainable economic and social take-off becomespossible. The key to the government’s success is itsability to combine strategies that lead to significantimprovements in social delivery with policies that cre-ate confidence in the economy.
Access to world markets and relative regional stabilityfacilitates the flamingos, but South Africa does notreceive massive overseas investments or aid on thescale of a Marshall Plan.
The government adopts sound social and economicpolicies and observes macro-economic constraints. Itsucceeds in curbing corruption in government andraises efficiency levels.
It makes well-targeted socialinvestments which lead to adecrease in violence and givepeople confidence that many of the social needs willbe met in the longer term.
Once business is convinced that policies will remainconsistent in the years ahead, investment grows andemployment increases. Initially this growth is slow,because confidence does not return overnight, butover the years higher rates of growth are attained, andan average rate of growth of close to five percent isrealized over the period.
The overall income of the upper income groups growsbetween one and three percent a year, and that of thepoorer classes by an average of between six and ninepercent a year, mainly because of the increase in for-mal sector employment.
Although the growth rates areslower at the outset than thatof Icarus, the Flamingos soondeliver more.
From the outset processes aredeveloped which facilitatebroad participation. Theseprocesses create the condi-tions under which it is possi-ble to find a sound balancebetween social reconstructionand sustained economicgrowth. In spite of conflictbetween different groups andclasses there is substantialagreement on broad objec-tives.
The team agreed to differ onthe ultimate destiny of Flightof the Flamingos. Some
DEEPER
NEW
S
17
Flight of the Flamingos
Political Settlement
Inclusive Democracy and Growth
· Regional stability · Access to world markets
Facilitating international environment
· Clear and consistent policies · Efficient not corrupt · Observes macro-economic constraints
Good government
· People have a sayBroad participation
· More social investment · Decrease in violence
Social reconstruction· Business is confident · Investment is high · Employment increases
Sustained economic growth
The Flight of the Flamingos
This is the scenario of inclusive democracy and growth.Flamingos characteristically take off slowly, fly high, andfly together.
believed it would pave the way for a more radicallyleft-wing program; others saw it creating conditionsfor a more radically free market economy. Othersbelieved that Flight of the Flamingos could prove to beso successful that South Africans may choose not todeviate from it.
Necessary Conditions for Take-off
There are a number ofdifferent blueprints, someof a more conservativeand some of a more radi-cal nature, that couldpotentially realize Flight ofthe Flamingos. The teamdid not attempt to devel-op its own blueprint, butconsidered the necessaryconditions that need tobe met in the political,economic, and socialspheres by all the poten-tially successful blue-prints.
A culture of justice, abreak from authoritarian-ism, a bill of rights, and proportional representationwere seen as the necessary elements of the politicalsystem. In addition, it was agreed that effective partic-ipation is a basic element, but the group disagreed onhow this was to be brought about. Some favored theSwiss referendum system. Others saw tripartite negoti-ating forums as an essential element.
Although a market-oriented economy (not a freemarket economy) was accepted as a necessary condi-tion during the next decade, more radical memberssaw this as a means of keeping the socialist projectalive in the longer term.
Monetary and fiscal discipline is a prerequisite for suc-cessful economic development.
Foreign exchange earnings must also be increased bygrowth in exports and in tourism.
It was generally agreed that more efficient delivery sys-tems would be the cornerstone of increasingly effec-tive service provision. It would enable a governmentto deliver more at the same cost to the treasury.Further funding for social investments would have tobe provided by economic growth and redistribution.
Some members of the team accepted that, given thehistory of apartheid, some degree of redistribution was
necessary in order toequalize social spendingon whites and blacks, butin the longer run theyfavored free market-ori-ented policies. Othermembers of the teamfavored more radicalforms of redistribution.
It is obvious that thecurbing of violence, bet-ter training and schoolingand, in particular, betterprimary schools, as wellas increases in publichealth and nutrition arebasic elements of arestructured social sys-
tem. The empowerment of women is a prerequisitefor dealing with social problems such as rapid popula-tion growth, educational reconstruction, and thespread of AIDS.
Flamingos Don’t Always Have a Smooth Flight
Five general points about Flamingos need emphasis.
• The scenario is not a blueprint. In fact, whileteam members generally agreed on thebroad conditions required for success, theydiffered substantially on the detail.
• The team recognized that it would be utopi-an to expect all the necessary conditions tobe fully met. Rather, the team believed thatthe outcome would depend on the degree ofprogress towards meeting the conditions.D
EEPE
RN
EWS
18 18
“The Flamingo scenario sketches thebare bones of a successful nationaldemocratic project of the kind that isfeasible under prevailing conditions inSouth Africa. The gains implied underthis scenario—redistributive programsand some empowerment and involve-ment of working people in decisionmaking—could incrementally changethe balance of forces in society andthus create favorable conditions for thekind of broader and deeper transfor-mations socialists would favor. There isby now enough experience worldwidewhich points to the need to take seri-ously the lessons implied by the otherscenarios.”
—Rob Davies, UWC
• The third point, therefore, is that the futureis not predetermined. It can be shaped bythe decisions and actions of the major play-ers.
• The team was fully aware that various groups(such as the right wing, alienated youth, a cor-rupt bureaucracy, trade unions, and disinvest-ing businessmen) each have the power to pre-vent the flock from becoming airborne.
• Finally, it should be emphasized that eventhe most positive outcome is not a smoothflight.
DEEPER
NEW
S
19
“South Africa can attain a decisive politi-cal settlement and an economic take-off,once all significant groups realize that wewill either fly together or crash together.Although many of the recent internation-al examples of economic success wererealized under conditions of politicalsuppression, there are a number of caseswhere political compromise has led tosocio-economic success. The most inter-esting amongst these are Sweden andMalaysia.
“From 1920–1970, Sweden (which start-ed with a per capita income and unem-ployment rates similar to those of pre-sent-day South Africa) experienced eco-nomic growth second only to Japan. Thesocio-economic transformation wroughtin Sweden during this period is hithertounparalleled.
“During each of the past three decadesthe average annual rate of growth of the
Malaysian economy varied from 5.2 per-cent to 8.3 percent. This was attained inspite of the fact that Malaysia, at the startof the period, was also a primary goodsexporter. In addition, there were severetensions between the Chinese, who dom-inated the economy, and the indigenouspopulation. Political compromise andeconomic restructuring have led to a dra-matic increase in the indigenous popula-tions share in the economy, to a morethan six-fold increase of real incomes ofall, and to Malaysia developing into amajor exporter of high-tech manufac-tured goods.
“South Africa will clearly have to find itsown route. The point is, though, that thehistory of these countries teaches us thata political settlement born from compro-mise combined with the correct econom-ic and social policies could potentiallysucceed. “
—Pieter le Roux, UWC
“While it is impossible tomeet all people’s demandsimmediately, once people areconvinced that there is light atthe end of the tunnel, theirdemands become temperedwith reason.”
—Vincent Maphai, UWC
DEE
PER
NEW
S
20
The boundaries between Flight of Flamingos and Lame Duck on the one hand, and Flamingos and Icarus onthe other, may be quite blurred.
Two boundary questions are particularly difficult toanswer. Which compromises and sunset clauses arenecessary to bring about the political settlement need-ed for the Flamingo scenario, and which will entrenchLame Duck? Secondly, when will social spending over-step the level needed for social reconstruction andland us in the Icarus scenario?
No political settlement will emerge if certain compro-mises are not made. However, sunset clauses that pro-long the uncertainty of the nature of the post-transitiongovernment for most of the decade will not get SouthAfrica on to a new growth path. Similarly, constitution-al stipulations that lead to indecisive and incoherentpolicies will favor Lame Duck.
The Flight of the Flamingos cannot take off withoutsignificant social reconstruction. However, whenattempts are made to deliver far more than the econo-my can sustain such policies will lead to Icarus. Thelevel of budget deficits sustainable over the long rundepends on the specific circumstances of a country. Itis not clear how far South Africa could go before itcrashes disastrously.
Borderline Questions
DEEPER
NEW
S
21
DOROTHY BOESAKAdministrative coordinator for MontFleur Scenarios
ROB DAVIESResearch professor and co-director of theCenter for Southern African Studies at theUniversity of the Western Cape
HOWARD GABRIELSProject officer at Friedrich Ebert Stiftung;previously with N.U.M.
ADAM KAHANEA world expert in scenario-based strategicplanning
KOOSUM KALYANManager of social, political, communica-tions, and media department of Shell inCape Town
MICHIEL LE ROUXManaging director of Distillers Companyin Stellenbosch
PIETER LE ROUXProfessor in development studies and direc-tor of the Institute for Social Development,University of the Western Cape
JOHANN LIEBENBERGSenior general manager, external relations,of the Chamber of Mines
SAKI MACOZOMAMember of the National ExecutiveCommittee of the ANC; Head of themedia liaison unit of the Department ofInformation and Publicity of the ANC
TITO MBOWENIEconomist in the department of economicplanning of the ANC
GABY MAGOMOLAEx-director of FABCOS and presentlychairman of Inter-Africa Group
MOSEBYANE MALATSIPAC economist; senior policy analyst atthe Development Bank of Southern Africain the Center of Policy and StrategicAnalysis
THOBEKA CIKIZWA MANGWANATeaches social planning at the Institute forSocial Development at University of theWestern Cape
TREVOR MANUELMember of the National ExecutiveCommittee and the National Working ofthe ANC Committee; Head of the ANC’sdepartment of economic planning
VINCENT THABANE MAPHAIAssociate professor and head of thedepartment of political studies, Universityof the Western Cape
PHILIP MOHRProfessor of economics and head of theeconomics department, University ofSouth Africa
NICKY MORGANAssociate professor and dean of the facultyof economic and management sciences atthe University of the Western Cape
PATRICK NCUBESenior research fellow at the University ofCape Town and research consultant ineconomics at the University of theWestern Cape
GUGILE NKWINTIDirector of the Eastern CapeDevelopment and Funding Forum inGrahamstown; regional secretary (EasternCape Region) and member of theNational Executive Committee of theANC
Those Who Took Part
BRIAN O’CONNELLDirector of the Peninsula TechnikonSchool of Education in Cape Town
MAHLOMOLA SKOSANAFirst assistant secretary general ofNACTU
VIVIENE TAYLORDirector of the Southern AfricanDevelopment Education Program(SADEP) at the University of the WesternCape
SUE VAN DER MERWEMember of the Black Sash NationalExecutive Committee
DR. WINFRIED VEITDirector of the South African office of theFriedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) in CapeTown
CHRISTO WIESEMember of the Economic AdvisoryCouncil of the President; executive chair-man of Pepkor
DEE
PER
NEW
S
22
With grateful thanks to the following:
The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung for funding the exerciseSwiss Development Agency for funding supportAdam Kahane for facilitating the processShell South Africa for technical support with view graphs
GBN would like to thank
Pieter le Roux for permission to reprint the “Mont Fleur Scenarios” as a DEEPER NEWS
Acknowledgments
G L O B A L
B U S I N E S S
N E T W O R K
