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Executive Issues Seminar SeriesExecutive Issues Seminar Series
19981998
Law Enforcement Management Institute of Texas
Sam Houston State University
Last Year’s Program:Why the Drop in Crime?
• Social-demographic Trends
• Economic Conditions
• Drug Use Prevalence
• Incarceration Rates
• Police Programs.
5000
5500
6000
6500
7000
7500
8000
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Year
Rate
STATEWIDE UCR RATE
Myth: The Police Make No Difference
• Borne first of the lack of clear relationship between staffing levels and crime rates
• Reinforced by the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment and the Rand Criminal Investigation Study.
Crime-Specific Policing
• Clearly defined intervention strategies
• Targeted at particular offenses
• Committed by particular offenders
• At specific places
• At specific times.
Crime-Specific Policing is NOT:
Unfocused Strategies
• Non-Directed Patrol
• Simple Saturation Patrol
Change in Style
• New York City COMSTAT Program
• Houston Proactive Effort in 1992
However, Crime-Specific Policing is Not Necessarily:
• Focused upon only a single offense
• Conducted solely by Patrol
• Always a direct field based intervention
• Antithetical to Community Oriented Approaches
We Will Examine:
• Neighborhood Centered
• Targeted Enforcement
• Youth & Gang Programs
• Problem-Oriented Strategies
• Proactive Investigative Techniques
The 25 Year Research Legacy on Patrol
A Brief Synopsis• Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment (1973)
• San Diego Field Interrogation Experiment (1975)
• Directed Patrol in New Haven and Pontiac (1976)
• Split Force Patrol in Wilmington (1976)
• Newark and Flint Foot Patrol (1981)
• Minneapolis Repeat Call Address (Recap) (1988)
• Kansas City Gun Reduction Experiment (1993)
Other Research(examined later)
• Problem Oriented Policing in Newport News
• Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment and Its Replications
• Investigative Effectiveness Research
Preventive Patrol Experiment
R e a c tive B e a ts(5 )
P ro a c tive B e a ts(5 )
C o n tro l B e a ts(5 )
S o u th P a tro l D is trictF ifte e n B e a ts
Generalizing the ResultsResults
• No effect on crime
• No effect on citizen perceptions
• No effect on traffic accidents
However
• Routine Preventive Patrol is Non-directive
• Activity varies by Dept./Shift/Officer
• Only about 2 hours of an 8 hour shift
• Results apply only to beat level perceptions
San Diego Field Interrogation
Three Areas
• Control
• Specially Trained Officers
• “No” Field Interrogations
Time
• Pre - 7 months
• Experimental - 9 months
• Post - 5 months
Measured Suppressible Street Crime
• Part I offenses of robbery, burglary, auto theft, street rape, street theft
• Other offenses included other sex crimes, vandalism, and disorderly conduct.
Effect on Crime in Experimental Areas
75
63
104
83 81
63
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
PRE-EXP. EXPER. POST-EXP
Other Results
• No change in control or specially trained areas
• About one month lag time in effect
• No effect on community relations
• In San Diego, 17% of all arrests attributed to FIs, but less than 2% of FIs result in an arrest
• About 3% of all citizen complaints result from field interrogations.
Directed Patrol in New Haven & Pontiac
• Use of crime analysis to direct non-committed patrol time to problem locations
• Direction by dispatchers proved problematic
• Reduction in criminal incidents (but lacked control areas)
Wilmington Split-Force Concept• Bifurcated patrol, 70% in
Basic, 30% in Structured
• Structured concentrated on problem areas and follow-up
• Patrol’s arrest rate up 4%, clearances up 105% - however, detective division clearances down 61%, department as a whole down by 28%
• Abandoned after one year.
Newark & Flint Foot Patrol• No impact on crime in Newark, 9% reduction in Flint
• Decreases in fear of crime in both cities
• Significantly improved satisfaction with police services in both - 33% of Flint residents knew officer by name, 50% of remainder could recognize the beat officer
• Newark research beget the “Broken Windows” perspective
• Flint research beget the community oriented perspective.
Minneapolis Recap Experiment• 3% of 115,000 addresses
accounted for 50% of CFS• 5% of addresses generated
64% of all CFS• Special unit of 5 officers
assigned 125 residential & 125 commercial addresses
• After 6 months, target addresses had 15% fewer CFS, but erased after one year.
Kansas City Gun Reduction Experiment
• July 92 to Jan 93 two extra patrol units in Beat 144 during evening
• Beat 144 is an 8 x 10 block area with homicide rate of 177/100,000 - 20 times national average
• Beat is 92% nonwhite, but 66% home ownership• Gun seizures increased by 65%, gun crimes declined by 40%.
No change in Control Beat, no displacement• Drive by shootings & homicides dropped significantly• Saturation generated 29 more guns seized, 83 fewer gun crimes,
55 patrol hours invested per gun crime prevented, traffic stops most productive - one gun seized for every 28 stops.
Efficacy of Crime-Specific Approaches
• San Diego Field Interrogation Experiment
• Problem Oriented Policing in Newport News
• Flint Foot Patrol
• Minneapolis Recap
• Kansas City Gun Reduction
Crime-Specific Policing
• Clearly defined intervention strategies
• Targeted at particular offenses
• Committed by particular offenders
• At specific places
• At specific times.
A Final Note
• In 25 years we have learned a great deal
• However, we still know relatively little about what works in policing.