ADDP 00.2
EXECUTIVE SERIES
ADDP 00.2
PREPAREDNESS AND MOBILISATION (PROVISIONAL)
Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 00.2 is issued for use by the Australian Defence Force and is effective forthwith. This publication supersedes Australian Defence Force Publication 4—Preparedness and Mobilisation, edition 2.
P.J. COSGROVE AC, MCGeneralChief of the Defence Force
Australian Defence HeadquartersCanberra ACT 2600
December 2004
© Commonwealth of Australia 2006
This work is copyright. Apart from any use as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part may be reproduced by any process without prior written permission from the Department of Defence.
Announcement statement—may be announced to the Australian Government Department of Defence, its contractors and their equivalents in United States, United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand.
Secondary release—may be released to the Australian Government Department of Defence, its contractors and their equivalents in United States, United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand.
All Defence information, whether classified or not, is protected from unauthorised disclosure under the Crimes Act 1914. Defence information may only be released in accordance with the Defence Security Manual and/or Defence Instruction (General) OPS 13–4—Release of Classified Defence Information to Other Countries, as appropriate.
ADFP 4First edition 1995Second edition 2000
ADDP 00.2First edition 2004
Sponsor Chief Capability Development Group
Developer Director-General Capability and PlansCapability Development GroupDepartment of DefenceCANBERRA ACT 2600
Publisher Defence Publishing ServiceDepartment of DefenceCANBERRA ACT 2600
Defence Publishing ServiceDPS: March 2006
ADDP 00.2
FOREWORD1. Australian Defence Doctrine Publications (ADDP) and Australian Defence Force Publications (ADFP) are authorised joint doctrine for the guidance of Australian Defence Force (ADF) operations. ADDP are pitched at the philosophical and high-application level, and ADFP at the application and procedural level. Policy is prescriptive as represented by Defence Instructions, and has legal standing. Doctrine is not policy and does not have legal standing, however it provides authoritative and proven guidance which can be adapted to suit each unique situation.
2. Aim. The aim of this provisional publication is to provide guidance on preparedness and mobilisation issues.
3. Level and scope. This publication is the basic doctrinal reference regarding preparedness management and mobilisation planning at the whole-of-Defence level, and, for mobilisation, to identify some issues and guidance at the whole-of-Nation/Government level.
4. This publication is designed to provide an overview of preparedness and mobilisation, and, where possible, to provide a framework for the development of capability development and planning strategies. The ability to mobilise sectors or the entire nation for a common cause is a measure of preparedness and provides a measure of deterrence. Mobilisation is a diverse and potentially all encompassing activity aimed at harnessing and focussing the nation's resources. There are direct relationships with logistic support and it is the desire of this publication to highlight key logistic areas and direct readers to relevant detailed logistic doctrine where appropriate. It is designed for use by:
• commanders and their staffs in headquarters and units,
• strategic Defence planners,
• relevant government agencies, and
• elements of the national support base.
5. Authority. ADDP 00.2 is an executive level document within the ADDP series. As a consequence it is authorised by COSC.
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6. Associated publications. While designed and published as a stand-alone document, ADDP 00.2 should be read in conjunction with other publications and documents, in particular:
• ADFP 04.1.1—Glossary
• ADDP–D—Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine
• ADFP 2—Division of Responsibilities within the Australian Defence Force (withdrawn—to be reissued as ADDP 00.1—Command and Control)
• The Australian Defence Force Future Joint Logistic Concept
• ADDP 4.0—Defence Logistics
• ADFP 4.2.1—Civilians in Support of Australian Defence Force Operations
• ADDP 4.1—Capability Support (to be published)
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AMENDMENTSProposals for amendment of ADDP 00.2 may be initiated in either of the following ways:
• By Minute to:
Director Doctrine and TrainingAustralian Defence Force Warfare CentreRAAF BaseWILLIAMTOWN NSW 2314
• By directly entering comment into the Joint Doctrine Development Environment (JDDE) found on the Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre (ADFWC) Defence Restricted Network (DRN) web site (see http://defweb.cbr.defence.gov.au/adfwc). Select JDDE on the ADFWC homepage and open either the ADDP or ADFP block as required. Open the relevant publication and utilise the ‘Add Comment’ function button of the summary page for each publication.
Note
The second option is a proposed addition to encourage feedback from the wider ADF, as well as encouraging use of the JDDE in general.
This publication is current as at December 2004.
This publication will be periodically reviewed and amended. The latest version of this publication is available on the ADFWC DRN web site http://defweb.cbr.defence.gov.au/adfwc.
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AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS
Abbreviation SupersededADFP No
Title
CAPSTONE DOCTRINE
ADDP–D N/A Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine
ADDP–D.2 N/A Force 2020
ADDP–D.3 N/A Future Warfighting Concepts
ADDP–D–3.1 N/A Enabling Future Warfighting: Network Centric Warfare
ADDP–D.4 N/A Joint Warfighting
0–EXECUTIVE SERIES
ADDP 00.1 2 Command and Control
ADDP 00.2 4 Preparedness and Mobilisation
ADDP 00.3 N/A Coalition Operations
ADDP 06.1 3 Rules of Engagement
ADDP 06.2 3 Sup 1 Rules of Engagement—Operational Rules
ADDP 06.3 3 Sup 3 Combined Rules of Engagement for Australian and United States Military Forces
ADDP 06.4 37 Law of Armed Conflict
1–PERSONNEL SERIES
ADDP 1.0 N/A Personnel
ADDP 1.1 N/A Personnel Support to Operations
ADDP 1.2 53 Defence Health
2–INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERIES
ADDP 2.0 19 Intelligence
ADDP 2.1 N/A Counterintelligence
ADDP 2.2 N/A Security
ADDP 2.3 N/A Geospatial Information and Services
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3–OPERATIONS SERIES
ADDP 3.0 6 Operations
ADDP 3.1 11 Offensive Support
ADDP 3.2 12 Amphibious Operations
ADDP 3.3 13 Aerospace Battle Management
ADDP 3.4 15 Operations in a Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Environment
ADDP 3.5 24 Electronic Warfare
ADDP 3.6 N/A Joint Personnel Recovery
ADDP 3.7 29 Collection Operations
ADDP 3.8 35 Peace Operations
ADDP 3.9 39 Airborne Operations
ADDP 3.10 43 Evacuation Operations
ADDP 3.11 44 Civil-Military Cooperation
ADDP 3.12 45 Special Operations
ADDP 3.13 N/A Information Operations
ADDP 3.14 23 Targeting
ADDP 3.15 N/A Airbase Operations
4–LOGISTICS SERIES
ADDP 4.0 N/A Defence Logistics
ADDP 4.1 N/A Capability Support
ADDP 4.2 20 Support to Operations
ADDP 4.3 N/A Supply
ADDP 4.4 14, 21 and 22 Movements and Transport
ADDP 4.5 N/A Equipment Engineering and Maintenance
ADDP 4.6 N/A Infrastructure Engineering and Maintenance
Abbreviation SupersededADFP No
Title
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5–PLANS SERIES
ADDP 5.0 9 Joint Planning
ADDP 5.01 N/A Joint Planning (Provisional)
ADDP 5.1 9 Sup 1 AUS–USA Planning Manual
6–COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS SERIES
ADDP 6.0 10 Communications and Information Systems
7–DOCTRINE AND TRAINING SERIES
ADDP 7.0 N/A Doctrine and Training
Abbreviation SupersededADFP No
Title
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ADDP 00.2
CONTENTSPage
Foreword iiiAmendments vAustralian Defence Doctrine Publications viiContents xiList of Figures xviiList of Tables xix
Paragraph
CHAPTER 1 CAPABILITY AND PREPAREDNESS CONCEPTS
Introduction 1.1MILITARY CAPABILITYFUNDAMENTAL INPUTS TO CAPABILITYLEVELS OF MILITARY CAPABILITYFORCE STRUCTUREPREPAREDNESSREADINESSTimings 1.18Proficiency 1.24SUSTAINMENTCONCURRENCY
Annex:A. Classes of supply
CHAPTER 2 THE PREPAREDNESS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
Introduction 2.1PREPAREDNESS AS PART OF MILITARY
CAPABILITYTHE PREPAREDNESS MANAGEMENT
SYSTEM IN OVERVIEWDEVELOPMENT OF PREPAREDNESS
OBJECTIVESStrategic appreciation 2.13Capability directives 2.15AUSTRALIA’S ILLUSTRATIVE PLANNING
SCENARIOSDEFENCE DEFICIENCY DATABASEOperational deficiencies 2.25Capability deficiencies 2.26
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Agreed deficiencies 2.27DEPARTMENTAL DIRECTIVES AND
AGREEMENTSIMPLEMENTATION OF PREPAREDNESS
OBJECTIVESREPORTING AND REVIEW OF
PREPAREDNESSReporting 2.37Review 2.43
CHAPTER 3 MOBILISATION
Introduction 3.1MOBILISATION CONCEPTSMobilisation and preparedness 3.3Levels of mobilisation 3.7Surge and mobilisation 3.8MOBILISATION PRINCIPLESClear objectives 3.11Unity of effort 3.13Flexibility 3.14Timeliness 3.16NATIONAL MOBILISATIONStrategic planning 3.20National mobilisation management hierarchy 3.23MILITARY MOBILISATION PROCESSMobilisation phases 3.26The preparation phase 3.28The work-up phase 3.30The operations phase 3.35The reconstitution phase 3.36Defence mobilisation management hierarchy 3.37Planning processes 3.40Mobilisation planner 3.43
Annexes:A. Coordination of the national effort for the
defence of AustraliaB. Defence Mobilisation Committee—
mobilisation functions and responsibilitiesC. Mobilisation planner format
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CHAPTER 4 SUSTAINMENT
Introduction 4.1SUSTAINMENT CONCEPTSSustainment 4.3Sustainment period 4.5Levels of sustainability 4.7Elements of sustainment 4.10The relationship between sustainability and logistics 4.11Accountability for sustainment 4.13Sustainability planning 4.15Sustainability planning guidance 4.17Scenarios and sustainability planning 4.18STOCKHOLDING POLICYReserve stocks 4.20SUSTAINABILITY FACTORSSOURCES OF SUPPORT
CHAPTER 5 LOGISTIC RESOURCE MOBILISATION
Introduction 5.1RESOURCE MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORKGeneral 5.7Period of contingency 5.8Activity levels and usage rates 5.10Resource allocation priority 5.13Stockholding 5.15RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ELEMENTSEquipment and facilities 5.19Impressment powers 5.20Infrastructure 5.21Production/adaptation 5.25Movements and distribution 5.28Maintenance 5.32Information management (strategic communications) 5.34Health 5.36Liaison 5.40Science and technology 5.43International support 5.46
CHAPTER 6 MOBILISATION—LEGAL ISSUES
Introduction 6.1LEGAL CONSTRAINTSThe Constitution and Defence power 6.4Commonwealth powers in time of war 6.8
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Commonwealth powers in times of tension 6.9EMPLOYMENT OF PERSONNELEmployment of Reservists 6.10Employment of women 6.14Recruitment and employment of members under 18 years in
the Australian Defence Force 6.16Use of civilians 6.19Compulsory military service 6.21REQUISITION POWERSSiting of Defence facilities 6.24CIVIL CONSIDERATIONSDefence and civil cooperation (State emergency powers)6.25Civil defence 6.28Aid to the civil authority 6.29
CHAPTER 7 WORK FORCE MOBILISATION AND ITS SUSTAINABILITY
Introduction 7.1ESSENTIALS OF WORK FORCE
MOBILISATION AND SUSTAINABILITYOVERALL PROCESSManagement of personnel resources 7.9Management of additional work force resources 7.11Work force mobilisation and sustainability responsibilities7.15RESERVE FORCESNature of Reserve service 7.16Categories of Reserve service 7.18Preparedness 7.21Differing obligations for Reserve service 7.22Mandatory training requirements 7.24Preparedness planning: Reserve characteristics 7.25Defence Reserve Service (Protection) Act 2001 7.26PREPARATIONPermanent Forces 7.29Reserves 7.30Defence civilians and contractors 7.31Training 7.32Resources 7.33WORK–UPOPERATIONSRECONSTITUTION
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MOBILISATION CONTINUUMBROADER MANPOWER OPTIONS
Annex:A. Reserve categories: terminology and
definition
CHAPTER 8 FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF MOBILISATION
Introduction 8.1The costs to be captured 8.3PROCESSES FOR OBTAINING FUNDINGCosting and funding requirements 8.5Shift of emphasis and pace 8.7FUNDING PROCESSESTypes of contingencies 8.9Shorter notice contingencies 8.10Longer notice contingencies 8.12Internal sources of funding 8.13External sources of funding 8.17
Annex:A. The Defence Budget process
Glossary
Acronyms and Abbreviations
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LIST OF FIGURESFigure Title Page
1–1 Components of military capability 1–21–2 Fundamental inputs to capability relationships 1–41–3 Relationship between levels of capability 1–13
2–1 Preparedness management system: overview 2–32–2 Preparedness management system: detail 2–62–3 Established requirement and deficiency reporting 2–132–4 Implementation of preparedness. This figure
shows the flow of tasks for the implementation of preparedness. 2–15
2–5 Reporting rectification of preparedness deficiencies 2–192–6 Review process 2–20
4–1 F–111 maintenance by civil contractor and Royal Australian Air Force technicians, Amberley 4–14
8–1 Net additional cost of Defence activities 8–7
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LIST OF TABLESTable Title Page
2–1 Defence hierarchy at the Group level 2–1
3–1 National mobilisation management hierarchy 3–163–2 Defence mobilisation management hierarchy 3–22
4–1 Levels of sustainability and associated accountability 4–8
7–1 Manpower resources 7–14
8A–1 Indicative timetable of key events for the Defence Management and Finance Plan 8A–6
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CHAPTER 1
CAPABILITY AND PREPAREDNESS CONCEPTS 1
Introduction 1.1
1.1 The Australian Defence Force (ADF) mission is to ‘Defend Australia and its National Interests’. To achieve this mission, Defence develops military capabilities that provide Government the option to apply military power when required. This military power should be timely and appropriate for the situation and should be derived from capabilities maintained at the necessary preparedness levels within both the indicative ranges of strategic warning time and the limits of currently available financial resources.
1.2 Military capability is achieved by developing a force structure appropriately prepared for a range of potential operations. Preparedness is core business for Defence, and Defence must be able to manage it effectively and communicate its status to Government.
1.3 Purpose. The purpose of this chapter is to describe preparedness within the context of military capability.
DURABLE DEFENCE PERSPECTIVES
The last six years have witnessed a momentous change in the balance of power in the East ... all point to the Indian Ocean, the Northern Pacific, and the China Sea as the probable scene of the future struggle for commercial supremacy. Australia cannot in such an eventuality remain unconcerned. It may be assumed, therefore, that Australia will determine not only to defend her soil, but to take steps also to defend those vast interests beyond her shores upon the maintenance of which her present existence and her future prosperity must so largely depend.
Two factors, therefore, may be considered as governing the future organisation and administration of the Military Forces of the Commonwealth, namely:
The defence of Australian soil.
The defence of Australian interests wherever they may be threatened.
MAJGEN Sir Edward Hutton Inaugural Commander Commonwealth Military Forces 1902
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MILITARY CAPABILITY 1.4
1.4 Capability is the power to achieve or influence an effect. In Defence it usually refers to the power to achieve a particular operational effect. Military capability is the combination of force structure and preparedness, which enables the nation to exercise military power (figure 1–1). Preparedness is further refined within the context and combination of readiness and sustainment—the ability to undertake military operations. The effective generation of military capability consists of a range of inputs that are fundamental to success. Readiness denotes a force’s ability to be committed to operations within a specified time. Readiness refers to the availability and proficiency/serviceability of personnel, equipment, facilities and consumables allocated to a force. Sustainment is the provision of personnel, logistic and other support, including recovery and reconstitution required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment of the mission.
Figure 1–1: Components of military capability
The Minister has spoken convincingly of the globalisation of security (along with economics). Army does not view the defence of Australia, contributions to the security of the immediate neighbourhood, and support of wider interests as separate problems. The ability to operate both onshore and offshore is defence of Australia. They are not separate strategic problems, arbitrarily defined by geography. We can no longer hide secure behind a Maginot Line defined by a sea/air gap.
LTGEN Peter LeahyChief of Army 2002
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FUNDAMENTAL INPUTS TO CAPABILITY 1.5
1.5 The fundamental inputs to capability (FIC) are those more tangible inputs considered fundamental to the development and delivery of military capability. They have been consolidated into a single check list to ensure consistency across Defence in establishing and reporting levels of preparedness. As such, use of the FIC ensures that non-financial resource management can be linked to available financial resources and that Defence can approach its core business in a holistic manner. The FIC are a guide that may be used to quantify and evaluate capability. The application of a single input will influence, but not create, capability in its own right. Each application is present in some manner, or proportion, and facilitates the evaluation and reporting of levels of capability. Capability must be funded: such funding permeates all facets of the FIC and, as such, is considered as a separate entity (see figure 1–2). The FIC are:
• Personnel. Having the right people for the task is fundamental to Defence. This input incorporates recruiting, conducting individual training, developing and retaining the necessary people with appropriate core skills to meet needs. It is inclusive of all people within Defence, both military (permanent and Reserves) and civilian, although additional criteria are imposed upon military personnel. Positions must be filled with individuals who satisfy the necessary individual readiness requirements. These requirements include medical and dental standards, physical fitness and availability. Within Defence, each individual must have the competencies to perform the functions of their positions and the motivation to apply those competencies to achieve the required organisational performance standards. This category incorporates all conditions of service and employment, including entitlements, salaries and wages, superannuation and allowances.
• Organisation. Every Defence agency needs to ensure it has the appropriate personnel establishment, appropriate balance of competencies and correct structure to accomplish its tasks and to ensure appropriate command and control. This provides the underpinning structure for Defence. At the outcome level, consideration must be given to developing flexible functional groupings that can meet contingency personnel rotation requirements and continual force improvement requirements. This input also includes those critical organisations that directly support the ADF effort.
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• Collective training. Collective training applies across combined, joint, single-Service and unit levels. To enhance performance, organisational elements must undertake a comprehensive and ongoing collective training regime validated against the preparedness requirements for operations, derived from Government guidance. Frequency and depth of competency in skills are to be defined in individual group capability directives, where particular emphasis should be placed upon long-term readiness critical war fighting skills.
Figure 1–2: Fundamental inputs to capability relationships
• Major systems. These systems include significant platforms, fleets of equipment and operating systems designed to enhance Defence’s ability to engage military power. Major systems are those that have a unit cost of A$1m or more, or have significant Defence policy or joint Service implications, including ships, tanks, missile systems, armoured personnel carriers, major surveillance or electronic systems, and aircraft. While major systems can be classed as Class Seven supplies, they are core components of capability, often comprising systems of principal items in their own right, that regularly require more detailed reporting and management.
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• Supplies. Supplies must be available for units and force elements (FE) to achieve the necessary training activities and ongoing administrative tasks to achieve operational level of capability (OLOC). Stocks must also be able to be supplied within readiness notice (RN) to achieve the operational viability period (OVP) and ongoing sustainment of tasks required by the operational preparedness requirement (OPR). This may necessitate the holding of reserve stocks where provisioning lead times are beyond RN. Classes are described in greater detail in Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 4.0—Defence Logistics and ADDP 4.2—Support to Operations. For many items, there is a need to identify more than just quantities (eg serviceability, configuration status, and operational viability resources) and reserve stockholdings. The 10 classes are shown in annex A.
• Facilities. Facilities includes buildings, structures, property, plant and equipment, areas for training and other purposes such as exercise areas and firing ranges, and utilities and civil engineering works necessary to support capabilities, both at the home base and at a deployed location. This may involve direct ownership or leasing arrangements.
• Support. Infrastructure and services that are integral to the maintenance of Defence effort. It is a widely-embracing category that encompasses the wider national support base within Australia and deployed or obtained offshore. It includes, but is not exclusive to, training/proficiency support, health services, personnel support, materiel/maintenance support, supply support, movement and transport, infrastructure support, research and development, communications and information technology support, and administrative services. Agencies that could provide this support include:
– other outputs;
– output enablers;
– owner support agencies;
– civil/private industry/contractors;
– other government agencies (eg AusAID and Emergency Management Australia); and
– international support base agencies.
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• Command and management. This includes the responsibilities, defined command and control mechanisms, doctrine, processes and procedures to enhance the military effectiveness of Defence. Command and management underpins Defence’s operating and management environments through enhanced command and decision-making processes/procedures and management reporting avenues. Command and management processes at all levels are required to plan, apply, measure, monitor and evaluate the functions an agency performs, with due cognisance of risk assessment and subsequent risk management. Command and management includes written guidance such as regulations, instructions, publications, directions, requirements, doctrine, tactical level procedures and preparedness documents. Consideration must be given to the adequacy of current written guidance. Command and management also includes funding not readily attributable to any other FIC element (eg discretionary funding) and encompasses the processes to ensure the correct and adequate allocation of resources to meet demands.
LEVELS OF MILITARY CAPABILITY 1.6
1.6 There are three levels of capability employed in Defence: the OLOC, the directed level of capability (DLOC) and minimum level of capability (MLOC). All three levels serve differing purposes relating to the development, monitoring and reporting of capability and are detailed in the following paragraphs. Two capability levels are used at the portfolio level and they are derived from the concept of maintaining forces at a level of preparedness commensurate with available financial resources while recognising operational resource requirements. Forces must be ready to work-up to an appropriate higher-level of capability, in a given time frame and with the necessary resources, in order to conduct specified operations effectively. These two levels of capability are the OLOC and DLOC. OLOC is an FE requirement designed to recognise the total resources needed to achieve operational success. OLOC is mission-specific and does not normally require the total capability to be brought to the highest state of readiness. DLOC, on the other hand, is an organisational requirement providing the mandatory link to annual financial resources. DLOC represents an agreed and funded level of capability based on Government strategic and financial guidance. A third level, the MLOC, is employed by the Outcome Executives (OE) to assist with
FIC requirements for operations will vary. Factors that influence the FIC include, threat levels, rate of effort, operation type and likely duration, location, including distance from support, physical environment and the demand, duration, distance and destination.
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the development of DLOC and the management and internal reporting of capability. MLOC is the level of capability that will allow OLOC to be achieved within RN1.
1.7 Operational level of capability. OLOC is the mission-specific level of capability required by a force to execute its role in an operation at an acceptable level of risk. OLOC is achieved and maintained at high cost. It is not realistic to maintain all forces at high-levels of preparedness for all possible contingencies. Consequently, only those elements required to deal with short notice contingency requirements are maintained at this level. Other units are maintained at lower-levels of readiness and plan against what is required to reach operational status for specific roles and operational outcomes in a designated time period, including that required for lead-up training. Maintenance programs need to be current and processes in place for sustaining effort. All necessary resources to sustain operations for defined periods must be either available or readily accessible. As a consequence, OLOC is a significant factor in deliberate planning considerations.
1.8 Directed level of capability. DLOC is the funded average level of capability maintained during a specified budget period, normally a financial year. It is formally agreed in organisational performance agreements (OPA) between the Secretary/CDF and each of the OE and provides the mandatory
Australia’s military strategy (AMS) and the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) Preparedness Directive (CPD), promulgate the military strategic effect, military strategic objective and the military response options (MRO) for each part (Defending Australia, contributing to the security of the immediate neighbourhood, supporting wider interests and peacetime national tasks). The Joint Operations Command (JOC) OPR promulgates the requirement in terms of FE, their role and operational outcome to meet each MRO. A force, unit or element is at OLOC when it has attained the necessary levels of the FIC for a specified operational requirement. Whilst the focus is often placed upon combat operations and personnel, equal consideration must be given to ensuring sustainment through supplies and support, and enabling FIC inputs such as collective training and facilities.
1 RN is the nominated time an FE will take to complete its work-up from MLOC to OLOC for a mission-specific type of operation.
The ability of units to ‘surge’ to meet a need in a compressed time frame is vital. The capacity of people is the greatest variable and is dependent upon factors such as posting cycles, individual competencies and experience. Plans need to take into account such variables and risk management strategies invoked to reduce potential problems.
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link between activities and annually allocated financial resources. DLOC is represented in Schedule 2A of the OPA. DLOC agreements establish the levels of capability, which are to be maintained to meet preparedness, ongoing operations, Defence international engagement program tasks and known national task requirements within financial guidance. The agreement is the level of capability at which the organisation is funded and resourced. It considers both financial and non-financial resources required to achieve OLOC within the specified time frame. RN is the term used to describe this time and takes account of strategic warning time of a requirement, resources required and work-up training needs. It assumes the training activities associated with the maintenance of core skills and safety and professional standards within DLOC constraints. DLOC provides the linkage between an agreed level of preparedness and an agreed price for that level. A balance of risk management, strategic warning time and the resources available to maintain preparedness will contribute to the formulation of DLOC. As a consequence, DLOC is a significant factor in immediate planning considerations given that it represents current funding.
1.9 Minimum level of capability. MLOC is employed by the Outcome Groups for internal capability derivation, assessment and planning, monitoring and reporting. MLOC is the level of capability an FE can have and still achieve OLOC within warning time. It is an essential building block in the delivery and management of preparedness by the OE. It is the mechanism by which the outcomes can negotiate and prioritise capability within their respective OPA. MLOC is FE or platform-specific, whilst DLOC has a broader application across the FEG in that it is a contractual requirement (vested in the OPA) to provide a prescribed number of FE at a specified level of preparedness. MLOC is an unresourced but measurable level of capability and enduring baseline measure that allows various agencies to manage assets and provide Corporate Services and Infrastructure Group and Defence Materiel Organisation with a support requirement liability. As a consequence, MLOC is a significant factor in deliberate planning considerations. MLOC is not formally reported at portfolio level.
DLOC is a stable level, within a given financial year, from which plans to meet OLOC are based. As an FE will often have a range of operational tasks assigned to it, OLOC requirements and RN will vary. For example, a major fleet unit may have a notice to move (NTM) of 24 hours for search and rescue, yet an RN of 28 days for under sea warfare. An individual ship’s DLOC is defined by the force element group (FEG). A brigade group may have an RN of 28 days for peace support operations, but 90 days for mid-level peace enforcement. NTM is allocated once an FE has reached OLOC.
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1.10 General. JOC conducts a joint military appreciation process (JMAP) against each operational preparedness objective (OPO) to derive the FE assignments and RN to achieve the OPO task and to sustain it for the time nominated in JOCOPR. These FE assignments, including redundant FE required to meet rotations in the times specified in the JOCOPR, are completed without regard to budget constraints. The resulting OLOC/MLOC assignments are an ideal case, noting that the OPO are the most difficult task of each aggregated military response option grouping, and the best course of action (COA) is chosen from the JMAP. When the budget constraints are applied against the current strategic circumstances based on the quarterly strategic review, the preparedness of ADF FE can be reassessed to meet the most likely tasks of the OPO and the most cost-effective COA from the JMAP, where this is risk assessed as more realistic. This resulting preparedness construct is then agreed and funded as DLOC. In the Defence Performance Summary to the Defence Committee (DC), Headquarters (HQ) JOC report preparedness against the OLOC/MLOC construct, while the OE (HQJOC, Navy, Army, Air Force, Intelligence and Security, and Strategy) report against DLOC. In this way the ideal preparedness of the ADF is monitored by JOC, while the most likely preparedness requirement is monitored by the outcomes. In many cases DLOC may be the same as OLOC or MLOC.
FORCE STRUCTURE 1.11
1.11 Force structure relates to the type of force required, including personnel, equipment, facilities and military doctrine, to achieve the level of capability necessary to conduct operations effectively. Force structure is the force-in-being (FIB)—including Reserve forces, linked to Government guidance, which would be required to achieve a desired effect. It is based upon OLOC and can be described in terms of the FIC. In the medium to long-term, military capability will vary due to changes in force structure generated by the capability development (CD) process.
1.12 Force structure is the more constant component of military capability, although it is adjusted to meet developing needs through the CD process. The level of capability available for operations is determined by Defence’s management of preparedness of the current force. Force structure is influenced by all elements of the FIC. Force expansion through various levels of mobilisation, preparedness and force structure, are linked. The maintenance of a large number of FE to meet a wide range of potential contingencies is not practical nor an effective use of limited resources. However, what must be maintained is sufficient structure and organisation to generate forces within the appropriate strategic warning times and at an acceptable level of risk across all phases of the mobilisation continuum.
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HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—SOUTH–EAST ASIA TREATY ORGANISATION PLAN FOUR
As part of the Free World, South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) was established to shore up the potential dominos of South-East Asia. One contingency taken seriously was a Chinese invasion of Thailand. Plan Four was drawn up and forces allotted, including an Australian, New Zealand (NZ) and United Kingdom (UK) (ANZUK) Division of Australian and NZ brigades and the British contribution of the Far East Strategic Reserve brigade consisting of Australian, NZ and UK battalions.
This was a serious commitment, dominating Australian force structure after the Middle East bias of the 1950s. Army’s order of battle provided the units, regular and reserve, to build up the ANZUK division to an Australian division and its support; New Zealand also planned a division. The materiel system was directed to providing the equipment and supplies to support this SEATO operation. Storehouses bulged with ammunition, vehicles and plant, Defence stores, petroleum pipeline and pumps, prefabricated buildings and hangars, material for airstrips, plus unit equipment-table items to bring the units to their war establishment. Today’s Royal Australian Navy heavy landing craft were designed and built to self-deliver to Thailand and conduct ship-to-shore operations.
This was a serious commitment, with regular planning conferences in Bangkok. It gave a direction to Australian Navy, Army, and Air Force planning very different from the post-World War II (WWII) ideas of a Middle East re-run of WWII, or leaning on Korea or the Malayan and Vietnam jungles and counter-insurgency, or the indefinite threat scenarios in the following decades. Each field force unit of the Army, regular and reserve, had a specific role in this plan, a set readiness objective in D+ times, with equipment and stores earmarked in depots.
Units on up to 60 days readiness had their war stores palletised, movement requisitions prepared, their members equipped, trained, inoculated, ready to meet their notice. Formation commanders and their staff conducted regular readiness inspections and exercises. It was an unmatched era of certainty not seen before or after in the military forces, but it was one not called on to fight its planned operations. However, its serious execution was a contrast to more recent supposed ‘ready’ units caught with preparedness deficiencies.
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PREPAREDNESS 1.13
1.13 Preparedness is a measure of the state of the FIB to undertake military operations to achieve the required effects. It describes the combined outcomes of readiness and sustainability. Defence’s management of preparedness determines the level of capability that could be made available for operations. It provides a basis for the types of capabilities needed and informs the deliberate planning process. It also provides the framework for enhancing elements of military capability, such as contractual support for base support, particularly for more benign or low-threat operations. To enable Defence to manage its preparedness effectively, preparedness concepts, described in this chapter, and the preparedness management system, described in chapter 2—‘the preparedness management system’, have been developed and implemented, noting that this is an evolutionary process.
1.14 Preparedness aims. Preparedness aims for the ADF are to ensure that:
• The preparedness of FE is maintained at levels consistent with current guidance to allow Government credible military options to issues affecting national interests.
• Suitable arrangements are in place to provide, in a timely manner, the resources required to work-up forces for specified operations, deploy them and sustain them in operations and reconstitute them at the conclusion in readiness of further requirement. A component of such arrangements will be the holding of sufficient resources, in reserve, to maintain operational activities until support can be provided to cope with the continuing contingency demands.
• Sufficient recognition of all required resources is established to ensure that deficiencies can be identified.
HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—(cont)The maxim that you never fight the war you plan for held true. However, the structure, equipment and expertise so generated were invaluable in meeting the real contingencies which did arise in South-East Asia and subsequently. Force structures need to have this flexibility—to have within their capabilities the skills and resources to respond to a wide range of contingencies as they arise.
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• Comprehensive periodic reporting of performance is conducted to ensure that appropriate resource management and deficiency remediation action can be identified and achieved.
1.15 Phases of operations. Preparedness evolves over phases that reflect operational or activity periods, as shown in figure 1–3. The components are: preparation—ensuring the appropriate frameworks and mechanisms are established; work-up—when appropriate training is undertaken to move to OLOC; operations—involving force assignment, deployment and employment for that FE; and, reconstitution—being the period required to revert an FE to DLOC in a specified time. The cycle is not complete until reconstitution to a directed level has been achieved, including immediate maintenance, rest and recuperation, and redistribution of supplies and systems if necessary. These phases equate to the framework of the mobilisation continuum described in detail in chapter 3—‘Mobilisation’.
1.16 Each phase has a distinct resource requirement. Operations are often sustained beyond a single engagement as reflected here, requiring detailed planning to overcome effects such as concurrency, and to provide sufficient warning for force rotation. FE at lower levels of readiness will generally require fewer resources to sustain this level in the latent period and will have a wider gap between OLOC and DLOC. Therefore, resources will need to be identified and made available within appropriate times to allow for work-up when assigned for operations. Resource allocation will be maintained at a level consistent with the rate of effort during the operations phase, and sustainment requirements identified and applied if required. Reconstitution may require the application of significant resources, particularly if capabilities are required quickly for further operational tasking.
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Figure 1–3: Relationship between levels of capability
READINESS 1.17
1.17 Readiness denotes a force’s ability to generate a desired effect within a specified time. Readiness is the physical application of the FIC to meet an operational requirement as illustrated in figure 1–3. Particular emphasis is placed on availability for a specific mission and role within a designated time in order to make the most of available resources. These timings will be developed further, but rely upon adequate indication, warning and appropriate decision-making to trigger the desired response.
Timings 1.18
1.18 Strategic warning time. Strategic warning time (SWT) is that period when the indication of the possible application of military capability is identified. SWT will vary according to the level and type of threat or requirement. It considers the time needed to analyse the threat, conduct feasibility studies of the options available, receive approval, provide estimates and directives, plan in detail for a specific response, obtain funding where appropriate and prepare forces. This time may vary considerably within the strategic environment and result in capabilities being maintained, practised and ready at very short notice, through to maintaining some skills and organisations to meet less likely, but nevertheless possible, contingencies with a very long lead time. Accurate and thorough intelligence is essential for
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the review of SWT and to analyse changes within the strategic environment that may affect it. Accurate reporting on the effectiveness of capabilities is critical in order to ensure that resources and effort can be adjusted to compensate, and that the appropriate capabilities are available in the required time frame. It should be noted that many agencies and elements of Defence may be required to prepare forces for deployment. Therefore, early identification of the possible use of Defence assets is critical.
HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—HMAS SYDNEY DEPLOYING ON A READINESS EXERCISE, 1964
The ex-aircraft carrier was an effective expedient means of deploying men and equipment; here loaded with 1st Logistic Support Force for a deployment exercise. The expertise gained in these operations was put to good effect from 1966 to 1972 in transporting successive battalions and replacement equipment to and from the Republic of South Vietnam.
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1.19 Bands. The CPD places MRO from AMS into bands that are based on SWT. Band Four generally equates to those skills required by FE contributing to and within the longer-term ‘raise, train and sustain’ function, and are shown as Readiness Level Eight within the JOCOPR Preparedness Tables. They are also addressed in the ‘Outcome Ready Deployment Force’ table in Schedule 2A of the DLOC agreement in the OPA. These bands are:
• Band One: 0–28 days.
• Band Two: 29–90 days.
• Band Three: 91–365 days.
• Band Four: Greater than 365 days.
1.20 Readiness notice. RN is the nominated time an FE is permitted to complete its work-up from DLOC/MLOC to OLOC for a specific type of operation (illustrated in figure 1–3). It incorporates the collective requirements for training as well as preliminary ‘moves’ and collation of resources necessary for a particular operation. In short warning situations, RN may be reduced from that planned time. It will often be defined in hours rather than days. Consequently, opportunities for collective training could be reduced and would need to be considered in training programs. In these circumstances, stockholdings and usage will be commensurately high which, in turn, will incur increased cost. RN may vary for different elements within an FE and elements being sustained on high preparedness will need to be rotated during the latent period to allow for relief and the necessity to retain and develop wider skills. This will impact on those FIC elements necessary to sustain higher-levels of capability. RN needs to accurately depict the period of time an FE needs to reach OLOC for a specific mission and be made available to Deputy Chief of Joint Operations for operations. This depiction needs to recognise all FIC deficiencies in order to achieve that degree of accuracy.
1.21 Preparedness table. The readiness and availability of an FE is divided into eight RN categories for ease of management and to ensure that FIC requirements are correctly calculated. Preparedness categories and the forces assigned are detailed in the preparedness tables within the JOCOPR. The preparedness table is developed after funding has been agreed upon within the OPA based on DLOC. Should strategic circumstances dictate or forces be actually committed, the CDF may direct that the integrity of the preparedness table is to be maintained and that there is a requirement for additional FE preparedness to be increased. If such an increase incurs additional resources, these may become available by restructuring the preparedness table, or if there is a significant chance of concurrent activities, may be provided via Government supplementation. The tables utilise the concepts of MLOC and OLOC to determine if an FE is employable and sustainable. OLOC is mission-specific and in the context of the preparedness
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tables this means the ability to undertake all roles and operational outcomes (worst case), has the materiel and personnel to sustain itself through the OVP and is ready to deploy.
1.22 Notice to move. NTM is effective when a force or element has achieved a mission-specific OLOC. The period is operation-specific and usually expressed in terms of hours or days. The full definition is defined in the glossary. For planning, those units/FE that are permanently sustained at OLOC, may be allocated an NTM rather than RN for tasks at very short notice (eg counter-terrorism and bushfire assistance). This will place considerable strain on people and resources due to the need to rotate, reassign and train for responsibilities.
1.23 Changes to readiness. The single-Services/components manage their FE to ensure that there are units available to meet the ADF preparedness tables at all times in accordance with the JOCOPR. The OPA may reduce the individual OE concurrency and force availability requirements, however, the agreed reduction within the DLOC is for the life of the OPA and does not alter the JOCOPR requirement. Forces will change their preparedness levels, however, the minimum requirement must always be met. Before adjusting an FE’s RN and thus DLOC, the resources necessary to facilitate the change (reduction in RN), must be identified and made available. The ability to meet a nominated sustainment period (SP) may have an impact on RN.
Proficiency 1.24
1.24 Skills. Everyone requires certain skills, developed to a specified level of proficiency and exercised at a frequency to ensure those skills are maintained and retained. Standards are described in increasing detail through the hierarchy of preparedness and CDs, encompassing force, unit, team and individual skills. Commanders at all levels are to ensure the appropriate balance is maintained between skills required for the range of operational outcomes within the spectrum of operations and the adaptation of warfighting competencies to peace support applications. The Australian Joint Essential Tasks List has been developed in conjunction with the OPO in the JOCOPR to assist commanders in achieving this balance.
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SUSTAINMENT 1.25
1.25 The ability to sustain effort is essential. It occurs across all phases, from preparation to reconstitution and decisions of commitment and priority will affect issues of sustainability leading to potential mobilisation. This issue is dealt with in some detail in chapter 1—‘Capability and preparedness concepts’. In essence, sustainability denotes a force’s ability to continue to conduct directed tasks. It is measured in terms of the FIC and is determined by adequate resources and demands caused by issues of concurrency.
1.26 The actions within the preparedness cycle: preparatory, work-up, operations and reconstitution, are not exclusive. During sustained operations, involving subsequent individual or element rotations, each phase may be conducted concurrently and involve different FE. An operation’s SP may extend over several years, even though individual elements are only committed to a set period within this time frame. Therefore, the capture of resource requirements will be complex and variable.
CONCURRENCY 1.27
1.27 There are two dimensions to concurrency. The first concerns competing demands for resources. The second concerns competing demands to meet simultaneous operational requirements. One or both of these dimensions will usually require the establishment of priorities of effort. Concurrency of current commitments is relatively easy to measure. However, quantifying all possible capability requirements against operational likelihood requires judgement. The JOCOPR preparedness tables provide guidance on what is required from a deliberate planning perspective. Decisions will be required on whether readiness levels of uncommitted FE need to be modified to meet short notice requirements when others are committed. Decisions on adjusting preparedness are to be incorporated in the execute order for all operations. Such decisions will be made by the CDF on advice from the DC or Chiefs of Service Committee and will have preparedness, and therefore, resource implications.
1.28 Effort. The capabilities of the ADF will continue to be in high demand. Whilst changes to the strategic environment may be anticipated, actual triggers of events may come with little warning and in dispersed locations. Combined with ongoing commitments, additional activities will place burdens upon resources and capabilities. Consequently, planning must consider the likelihood of concurrent actions and the impact of concurrency in sustaining effort. Capability limitation is a reality and the need to maintain a range of responses to meet Government demands, means that Defence will often have small numbers of specialised capabilities that may be difficult to duplicate in the short-term.
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1.29 Demand. As previously noted, some capabilities are in high demand and are required to support a range of simultaneous operational tasks. Therefore, concurrency requirements will play a significant role in determining an appropriate force structure to meet immediate demands as well as long-term requirements (projections). Options need to be developed to provide alternatives to some capabilities during sustained operations, without necessarily duplicating an FE. This will usually involve the engagement of national or allied resources, without committing to higher-levels of expansion or mobilisation.
1.30 Reconstitution. Elements will need to be reconstituted at the conclusion of operations. In some cases the requirement for maintenance and repair to equipment or systems will be extensive, in others the redistribution of stores may be all that is required. The reconstitution period will encompass the use of a wide range of resources that are not limited to equipment. These may include medical facilities, maintenance and repair agencies, transport, logistic infrastructure and personnel leave and training. The reconstitution period concludes when an element reverts to a nominated DLOC and is prepared for further tasking.
Annex:A. Classes of supply
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CLASSES OF SUPPLY A
CLASS DESCRIPTIONClass 1 Subsistence, including foodstuffs, gratuitous health, welfare
items, and water when this is provided in a packaged form through the supply system.
Class 2 General stores, including clothing, individual equipment, tentage, tool sets and kits, hand tools, stationery and other general administrative and household items.
Class 3 Petrol, oils and lubricants, including other hazardous liquids, chemicals and gases such as liquid petroleum gas and hexamine.
Class 4 Construction items, and materials and all fortification and barrier materials, excluding explosive devices.
Class 5 Ammunition, including precision-guided munitions, pyrotechnics, propellants and fuses.
Class 6 Personal demand items, including canteen supplies and non-scaled military items.
Class 7 Principal items. This excludes major systems as described earlier. This class constitutes a combination of end products ready for their intended use, such as most vehicles, small arms, communications equipment and training equipment.
Class 8 Medical and dental stores.
Class 9 Repair parts and components.
Class 10 Miscellaneous, also known as materiel support to non-military programs.
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CHAPTER 2
THE PREPAREDNESS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 2
Introduction 2.1
2.1 Defence is an outcome-focused organisation, and the Outcome Groups, through their Executives, are responsible to the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) and the Secretary for the provision of capabilities necessary to defend Australia and its national interests (see table 2–1). The Enabler and Owner Support Groups are tasked with supporting the provision of these capabilities. Preparedness planning focuses on the preparation of the force-in-being (FIB) including all support arrangements necessary for it to be able to undertake military operations to achieve the required effects in accordance with Government guidance. Preparedness planning is undertaken to ensure that the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is able to:
• effectively work-up the FIB, or elements of it, to conduct military operations;
• maintain core warfighting skills;
• maintain safety standards and undertake any peacetime national tasks that may be directed by the Government;
• sustain forces committed to operations or peacetime national tasks; and
• maintain its regional credibility as a defence force.
Table 2–1: Defence hierarchy at the Group level
Outcome Groups Enabling Groups Owner Support GroupsVice CDF/Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS)
Corporate Services and Infrastructure
Capability Development (CD)
Navy Headquarters Defence Materiel Organisation
Chief Finance Office (CFO)
Army Headquarters Defence Personnel Executive
Air Force Headquarters Defence Science and Technology Organisation
Strategy Chief Information Office
Intelligence and Security
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2.2 Purpose. The purpose of this chapter is to describe and provide subsequent guidance and direction of the preparedness management system (PMS).
PREPAREDNESS AS PART OF MILITARY CAPABILITY 2.2
2.3 Government strategic policy defines Defence requirements for the defence of Australia and its national interests, and provides the basis for the conduct of strategic appreciations and the development of operational plans. Government resource allocation provides Defence with the means to develop ADF capabilities and maintain the preparedness of the FIB. The establishment of effective military capability involves the development of the optimum force structure for the future and the maintenance of appropriate levels of preparedness of the FIB. The CD process develops the force structure for the present and future, and the PMS provides the mechanism to ensure that the FIB maintains appropriate levels of preparedness, including appropriate support arrangements.
2.4 There is a direct relationship between the CD process and the PMS. Changes to force structure usually impact on the preparedness of the associated forces. For example, the introduction of a new capability, retirement of an old capability, or capability enhancement, will directly impact on all elements of the fundamental inputs to capability (FIC) as they relate to the force elements (FE) involved.
NATIONAL STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS
As long as Great Britain is unconquered, the world can be saved.
Prime Minister R.G. Menzies June 1941
Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom.
We know the problems that the United Kingdom faces. We know the constant threat of invasion. We know the dangers of dispersal of strength, but we know, too, that Australia can go and Britain can still hold on. We are, therefore, determined that Australia shall not go, and we shall exert all our energies towards the shaping of a plan, with the United States as its keystone.
Prime Minister John Curtin December 1941
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THE PREPAREDNESS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IN OVERVIEW 2.5
2.5 The management of preparedness involves the allocation of resources to the FIB to execute strategic objectives in a specified time within policy guidance. The PMS, illustrated in figures 2–1 and 2–2, involves four distinct phases:
• development of the requirement through operational preparedness objectives (OPO);
• implementation of preparedness levels, by the assigning of forces to the OPO;
• determining and subsequently reporting the performance of those forces against the OPO; and
• reviewing performance against current guidance and reviewing guidance against the strategic environment to ensure both remain relevant.
Figure 2–1: Preparedness management system: overview
2.6 The cycle begins with Government guidance. This is usually in the form of a Government Defence White Paper that provides a policy framework, but may be reviewed on a more frequent basis as the strategic situation dictates. The White Paper elaborates the key Defence tasks (these are: defending Australia (DA), contributing to the security of the immediate neighbourhood, supporting wider interests and peacetime national tasks, and
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are followed by a strategic level analysis resulting in the development of Australia’s military strategy (AMS). The AMS amplifies the key Defence tasks and develops the strategic response options table (SROT). This table describes, through cascading strategic objectives and effects, a list of military response options (MRO), (not plans), available to the Government consistent with that guidance. A hierarchy of documents then follows which develops preparedness objectives and, within financial guidance, formulates overarching plans and determines preparedness levels. These documents flow through and from the Outcome Executives (OE).
2.7 In the implementation phase, capability managers are to raise, train and sustain FE appropriate to achieve the requirements agreed in their individual organisational performance agreement (OPA)/directed level of capability (DLOC) agreements, while recognising those deficiencies stopping them from achieving the total requirements of the Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC) Operational Preparedness Requirement (JOCOPR). Capability managers should provide for the further development of their forces recognising those deficiencies listed in the JOCOPR and taking into account improvements in technology and techniques through the Defence Capability Planning Guide (DCPG) process.
2.8 The reporting phase links the PMS to mandatory reporting processes, the most significant being the Defence Performance Summary to the Defence Committee (DC). It also ensures that the senior Defence committees are able to monitor the performance of the sub-outcomes contributing to the Defence outcomes and to manage resources according to changing priorities. An integral part of this phase is a robust deficiency reporting system. Deficiencies are recorded on the Defence Deficiency Database (DDD), and are addressed later in this chapter and in figure 2–3.
2.9 The review phase looks at current required performance levels and compares these to changing strategic circumstances to determine whether these levels need to be adjusted. Responsibility for this rests with Capability and Plans Branch (C & P Branch).
2.10 The AMS precedes the development of the CDF Preparedness Directive (CPD) by providing the generic MRO for Defence and ADF in particular. The CPD provides strategic guidance on the preparedness requirements for all OE and Enabling Groups supporting preparedness, and serves as the principal executive document in the PMS.
2.11 CDF, through the CPD, directs Deputy Chief of Joint Operations (DCJOPS) to develop the JOCOPR. This document promulgates details of the role and operational outcomes for each FE and supporting elements’ preparedness requirements assigned for the entire range of MRO. The JOCOPR achieves this by assigning OPO to each of the aggregated military response options (AMRO) and then assigning FE and detailing support
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elements (AMRO are discussed further in paragraph 2.16). Service Chiefs are then responsible for the raising, training and sustaining of capability, and the allocation of resources attributed to their respective Service outcomes in accordance with their OPAs (DLOC agreement). OE Capability Directives (OECD) are produced to detail that Outcome Group’s requirements necessary to generate the nominated FE at the required and agreed preparedness levels promulgated in the JOCOPR. Other executives should then direct the activities of their particular group towards ensuring that they are prepared to support the provision of this capability for the defence of Australia and its national interests.
2.12 Financial guidance for Defence is derived from Government forward estimates and contained in the Defence Management and Financial Plan (DMFP). This allows the OE to match the level of capability they are able to provide, against the total requirement as laid down in the JOCOPR, with the funds available. The Outcome Groups’ OPAs, between individual group executives and the Secretary and CDF, record the DLOC, including preparedness performance levels, to be provided in the nominated period, with a prediction of the performance that could be expected out to ten years. OPAs provide the framework for the development of the OECD. This ensures that preparedness objectives can be met and properly managed within a defined time frame. The reporting and review of preparedness provides the framework for regular feedback in the process, and that preparedness objectives, and therefore levels, are refined as necessary. The management of preparedness is a dynamic process. The FIB is prepared for operations against this planning background.
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Figure 2–2: Preparedness management system: detail
DEVELOPMENT OF PREPAREDNESS OBJECTIVES 2.13
Strategic appreciation 2.13
2.13 The preparedness management cycle (figure 2–2) begins with a strategic appreciation by Strategy Group staff. The strategic appreciation involves an analysis of the national strategic objectives (NSO), often referred to as Defence tasks (DA etc), that are specified in Government guidance, usually through a White Paper. The principal product of the strategic appreciation process is the development/refinement of military strategies to achieve the NSO.
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HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—PREPAREDNESS IN THE FAR EAST 1941
Prime Minister William Hughes declared at the 1921 Imperial Conference:
For us, the Pacific problem is for all practical purposes the problem of Japan … she wants both room for her increasing millions of population, and markets for her manufactured goods. And she wants these very badly indeed being faced with the great problem which has bred wars since time began … this is the problem of the Pacific… for which we must find an answer. Talk about disarmament is idle unless the causes of naval armaments are removed.
At the Washington Conference in 1922, the major powers sidestepped the problem with the palliative agreement on limiting naval strengths—Japan to accepting a tonnage less than that of the United Kingdom (UK) and United States (US) on an undertaking by them not to establish bases east of Singapore or west of Hawaii. So was born the Singapore naval strategy, relying on a naval base in Singapore to which a fleet could be dispatched in time of threat.
Japan’s failure to accede to the London Naval Treaty of 1936, which replaced the 1922 agreement, its intrusions into Manchuria and China, and silence on the now-lapsed embargo on bases in the Pacific, led to futile requests at the 1937 Imperial Conference for a fleet stationed at Singapore. The obvious risk that Australia was likely to face trouble precisely when the UK was in trouble at home, was epitomised by Opposition Leader Curtin in 1936:
The dependence of Australia upon the competence, let alone the readiness, of British statesmen to send forces in our aid is too dangerous a hazard upon which to found Australian Defence Policy.
In 1941, the British fleet was totally committed in the West, its air and land forces similarly tied down, and Australia’s mainstream Defence resource committed there also. With Japan on the brink of war, Australia sent a token division, aircraft and ships to help defend the fleet-less naval base. And as well as the lack of naval and naval air cover, the Far East air force was well below planned strength and poorly-equipped, while the ground forces also were similarly deficient in numbers, equipment and training.
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2.14 For preparedness planning, the key outputs of the strategic appreciation process are a range of objectives, effects and options derived from the military strategies. These provide the foundation for the development and conduct of the PMS.
Capability Directives 2.15
2.15 Preparedness management derives its authority from a succession of Defence Capability Directives. Each provides more specific guidance and detail for stakeholders (not just OE) as it cascades downwards. These directives are derived from the AMS, which is in turn derived from the Defence White Paper and other government guidance. White Papers are produced at the direction of Government when it assesses that the strategic circumstances have changed sufficiently to require formal review or confirmation of the direction of Defence. White Papers, by the nature of their longer-term perspective, are infrequent and publicly available.
2.16 Australia’s military strategy. The AMS is a classified document that applies the guidance from the White Paper into more specific direction for development, maintenance and subsequent employment of Defence capabilities. The AMS develops the tasks from the Defence White Paper and defines military strategic objectives (MSO) and military strategic effects (MSE). It provides a range of MRO in the SROT that describe desired effects across the strategic tasks. Interpretation of the MSO, MSE and MRO enables the operational planning required to achieve each task. AMS guidance includes strategic warning times and broad direction on sustainment. The AMS is periodically reviewed by the Chiefs of Service Committee (COSC):
HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—(cont)Inability to provide the necessary resources to sustain the Far East plan in time of crisis, foreseen by the Australian chiefs of staff in 1923, became painful reality. British resources were simply insufficient to meet the always overly-optimistic plan. Australia’s forces were always insufficient to replace them, and the US had its own problems in the Pacific and Philippines. Mobilisation and preparation plans not based on achievable reality, as noted by John Curtin, are not only worthless but also a placebo—a danger in themselves.
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• MSO describes the desired outcome of ADF operations within specified strategic circumstances and provide the basis for operational planning.
• MSE describes the effect we seek to have on an adversary, such as change of will or neutralisation of offensive operations.
• MRO describes how effects may be pursued either individually or in combination.
• AMRO are aggregated on the basis of achieving a common effect.
2.17 Chief of Defence Force Preparedness Directive. The CPD places each MRO into one of four bands based on strategic warning time. The CPD is produced approximately triennially and provides direction and designates responsibility to the Service Chiefs and other OE and provides direction for enabling outputs. As such, the CPD is the executive document of the PMS. The CPD may be reviewed at any stage if there is a significant change in the strategic environment. It outlines ADF key priorities to address potential concurrency issues, and identifies stockholding policies in general, and ammunition reserve stocks in detail, to address sustainment. These are reviewed by COSC through the Quarterly Strategic Review (QSR) process. Recommendations for changes flowing from COSC’s consideration of the QSR are submitted to the CDF for decision.
2.18 Defence International Engagement Strategic Plan. A consideration within the preparedness construct is the Defence International Engagement Strategic Plan (DIESP) which in itself provides the framework for the Defence International Engagement Plan (DIEP). The DIEP articulates the objectives of using Defence assets as an instrument of diplomacy and its requirements need to be considered for availability and budgeting. The Program of Major Service Activities reflects DIESP requirements and enabling activities for effective performance of operational preparedness objectives.
2.19 Joint Operations Command Operational Preparedness Requirement. DCJOPS is directed in the CPD to specify the operational requirements of the ADF. The JOCOPR is normally issued annually and provides guidance on ‘the what’ of possible ADF operational tasking. The JOCOPR selects the worst case MRO within each AMRO to provide further guidance on required FE (by type, not unit), readiness notice (RN), rotation requirements, sustainment period, operational viability period and operational outcomes. When populated with these details the AMRO are designated as the OPO. Each of the 24 OPO (noting that there are also 24 AMRO) details the minimum requirements single-Services and OE are to meet to ensure that the ADF can undertake operations to meet the MRO with appropriate notices
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to move and RN. OPO are the foundation of ADF operational preparedness. Any inability to meet any of the requirements is reported via the deficiency reporting system.
2.20 Individual OPO are planning tools, not plans, to meet the MRO. They provide a menu of FE to meet every probable scenario, geographic area, meteorological condition and adversary. OPO also provide planning guidance on capability deficiencies (with a risk assessment of the possible impact), training requirements (through notification of RN), sustainment, availability, and capability provided (operational outcome). The preparedness tables, within the JOCOPR, provides a summary of FE required to meet all the OPO in addition to addressing the issue of concurrency. This provides specific guidance to Service Chiefs when formulating their own directives.
2.21 The preparedness tables. The preparedness tables are initially made up by aggregating the minimum requirement to meet all the OPO ie a single FE could fulfil the minimum requirement for several OPO. This minimalist approach does not take into account concurrency ie the ability to undertake one or more OPO at the same time. To address concurrency the OE provide the average availability when other FE (same type) can be made available to be brought to operational level of capability (OLOC) to conduct operations. These are placed in preparedness bands from R1 to R7 within the JOCOPR. The preparedness tables form the basis of DLOC. The OPA reflect the preparedness tables however, the table within the OPA has an additional column (P8) so that all FE can be listed including those in mid-life updates, conversions, etc which are not reflected in the JOCOPR. The OPA promulgates the changes in FE availability from the JOCOPR preparedness tables.
2.22 The preparedness bands do not mirror the RN to provide additional flexibility to the OE. However, the required FE role and operational outcome is aligned, therefore, FE in preparedness bands P1–P5 are only required to be able to meet Band 1 roles and operational outcomes. P6 can be worked up to meet Band 2 roles and operational outcomes within the strategic warning time, and so on. This provides specific guidance to Service Chiefs when formulating their own directives. The JOCOPR is normally issued annually in March or April to fit in with the DMFP, OPA and DLOC cycle.
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AUSTRALIA’S ILLUSTRATIVE PLANNING SCENARIOS 2.23
2.23 Australia’s Illustrative Planning Scenarios (AIPS) assist planning staff by providing a specific interpretation of strategic guidance. The significance of the AIPS is that they are endorsed by the COSC. The AIPS are intended to supplement other sources of strategic guidance such as the White Paper and the AMS. Typical applications which might benefit from the scenarios including assessment of:
• The broad structure of Defence, including the balance and priorities for certain capabilities.
• Specific capability shortfalls in the current or future force and the options to address them.
• New developments in doctrine, strategy, warfighting concepts and technology.
• Preparedness requirements of the ADF, including logistics and work force aspects.
• Options to draw on the national infrastructure.
• Strategic guidance and the implications of balancing Government aims and resource availability.
DEFENCE DEFICIENCY DATABASE 2.24
2.24 Operational, agreed and capability deficiencies are entered into the DDD. OE are to highlight any inability to meet the requirements of the JOCOPR. CJOPS makes an assessment of their consequences on the affected OPO and makes recommendations in regard to any actions that may need to be taken in order to maintain directed preparedness levels. C & P Branch is responsible for the day-to-day management of the DDD as part of the Preparedness Management Information System (PMIS). The PMIS and the DDD in particular, inform the consideration of preparedness states and immediate planning in contingency responses and underpins the Defence Performance Summary (DPS). While the DDD forms a key part of CJOPS internal assessment of OPO viability, and is managed on a day-to-day level by C & P Branch, its utility in informing the CD cycle dictates that Chief Capability Development Group will retain ownership of it.
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Operational deficiencies 2.25
2.25 Operational deficiencies are raised with respect to the FIB. The JOCOPR provides the guidance for the Outcome and Enabling Executives to raise, train and sustain forces in accordance with the requirements specified in the CPD. Operational deficiencies against the JOCOPR tasks are reported by the FE Groups, Commander Joint Task Force or formations, to their component command or DCJOPS as appropriate. If DCJOPS or the component command is unable to remediate the deficiency, it is reported for consideration at the strategic level. This consideration may involve senior Defence committees allocating resources for remediation if appropriate through the DCPG/Defence Capability Plan Process.
Capability deficiencies 2.26
2.26 Current capability deficiencies acknowledge those capabilities required for achievement of the JOCOPR, but which are not available in the inventory that is, these capability deficiencies will not be from the FIB and will require subsequent capital investment. Current capability deficiencies represent planning limitations and are therefore listed in the JOCOPR DDD so that DCJOPS can be made aware of these deficiencies. Raising of new current capability deficiencies should occur at the JOC Theatre Planning Group with outcomes raised to the appropriate OE. This will enable the deficiency to be addressed at the strategic level, as well as being exposed to the operational planners as a planning limitation.
Agreed deficiencies 2.27
2.27 These are ongoing shortages in the FIC, primarily logistic support or personnel shortfalls, that impact on the ADF’s ability to meet the JOCOPR. Agreed deficiencies that result in an inability to meet the requirements of the JOCOPR are raised as deficiency reports (DR) and are addressed during annual OPA negotiations. Following recognition as an agreed deficiency in the OPA, the DR will no longer be reported within outcome DLOC reports, but will be maintained within HQJOC as a planning limitation. DR identified as agreed deficiencies will still be included in DCJOPS monthly operational preparedness assessment report to the DC but will be identified as ‘agreed deficiencies’.
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Figure 2–3: Established requirement and deficiency reporting
DEPARTMENTAL DIRECTIVES AND AGREEMENTS 2.28
2.28 Outcome Executive Capability Directives. These directives were previously limited to single-Service capability directives. This is now inappropriate as each outcome has responsibilities for the concept of ‘raise, train and sustain’ for their particular areas. The OECD now embrace all Defence outcomes. These directives are issued as required and provide specific guidance to their outcomes on what is required to meet the CPD and JOCOPR. The directives contain, among other things, detail on training and operational priorities, resource allocation and responsibilities. The OECD informs the process by which OE direct their group to allocate resources for the maintenance of core skills that are required for the longer readiness requirements as well as provide the basis of direction on support to other groups. Outcomes have the responsibility for identifying the resources required from the enabling and supporting organisations. These in turn will be formalised as OPA and Customer Supplier Agreements (CSA).
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2.29 OE issue directives to: implement their DLOC to meet agreed preparedness requirements; to outline their raise, train and sustain requirements; and set out their inputs from owner support and enabling executives. OECD are also to combine related strategic and preparedness policies, detail preparedness requirements across the FIC and address related force generation, mobilisation and sustainability aspects stemming from the provision of these capabilities within the RN specified. These details, when combined with the delivery of outputs to external agencies, are encapsulated in OPA and fund OE delivery of their DLOC.
2.30 By implication, a greater proportion of OECD will focus on the enabling functions within the FIC, as opposed to the contingency planning focus in the JOCOPR. OECD reflect this preparation, maintenance and support focus in their CSA required to meet DLOC, and in the subsidiary agreements forged with Corporate Services and Infrastructure Group (CSIG) and the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) as a prescribed agency.
2.31 Similarly, Intelligence and Security Group and Strategy Group articulate their support to JOC and the Service Groups in meeting the requirements of the JOCOPR in their OPA, while seeking to capture their own support requirements from the Enabling Groups via the CSA. Contributions by these groups, in particular to the external agencies as part of national tasking requirements, are outlined and the resources used, are captured through these mechanisms.
2.32 While contingency planning and the ability to respond to immediate crises are the focus of much of the ADF’s effort, the maintenance of corps skills and competencies are the basis for successful future operations. Military response requirements over the longer-term (more than 12 months) are the ADF’s principal force structure determinants and form the basis for the maintenance of core skills, professional competencies and much of the ADF exercise program. OECD must reflect this reality where appropriate within their OPA/DLOC budget.
2.33 Organisational performance agreement. OPAs are individual, annual agreements between each Outcome Group Head and Secretary/CDF, which set the funded performance that each group will deliver. As such they:
• Are the source of the performance compendium attached to the DMFP.
• Provide the baseline for the financial and non-financial performance reporting to the DC.
• Are the groups’ budgetary and performance submissions to build the operating budget.
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• Align groups’ activities and resources with whole-of-Defence goals, and provide the foundation for developing timely, robust and costed performance and resourcing options to Government.
• More explicitly integrate performance information into budgetary deliberations and permit the DC and Government to debate the expected and actual results of proposed budgetary plans and resource levels, rather than simply different resource levels.
IMPLEMENTATION OF PREPAREDNESS OBJECTIVES 2.34
2.34 All Defence Groups are required to provide input into the preparedness management cycle; the relevant part is shown in figure 2–4. Executive managers retain responsibility for preparedness planning within their respective groups.
Figure 2–4: Implementation of preparedness. This figure shows the flow of tasks for the implementation of preparedness.
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2.35 Responsibilities. Service Chiefs are responsible for the implementation of preparedness. This includes all aspects leading up to the assignment and subsequent application of forces to specific operations, sustainment of capabilities on and for operations, including reinforcement, as well as during reconstitution. DCJOPS is responsible for defining the requirement for operations and the implementation of preparedness for forces once they have been assigned. CDF exercises command of operations through DCJOPS, who, in conjunction with the Service Chiefs, is responsible for the implementation of the collective aspects of preparedness. Whilst the OE are ultimately responsible for preparedness, they achieve this with the assistance of the enabling executives of DCG, the DMO and CSIG which are responsible for the implementation of the materiel and logistic aspects of both single-Service and joint preparedness. This is achieved through the CSA.
2.36 The implementation process is aimed at ensuring that the FIC are available, maintained and/or ready through such activities as:
• ensuring that an adequate and appropriately-skilled work force is available;
• ensuring that adequate and serviceable equipment is available;
• ensuring that adequate and serviceable facilities are available;
• ensuring that adequate resources and supplies are available to maintain DLOC;
• undertaking training activities to ensure that DLOC is maintained;
• ensuring that resources are available for forces to move from DLOC to OLOC when required; and
• ensuring that sustainability resources are planned for and will be available when required.
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REPORTING AND REVIEW OF PREPAREDNESS 2.37
Reporting 2.37
2.37 The concept relating to deficiency reporting includes operational deficiencies, capability deficiencies and agreed deficiencies. This information will allow DCJOPS to make a monthly assessment of the options available to achieve the OLOC requirements of the JOCOPR appropriate to the individual OPO. The ability to take into account all deficiencies that impact on performance should enable DCJOPS to develop a more comprehensive
HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—HMS INDOMITABLE AT CAPTAIN COOK GRAVING DOCK, SYDNEY 1945
An original Royal Navy dock was gifted to Australia by the UK in a generous but astute move, which also gave the Royal Navy its use, with the upkeep paid for by Australia. At the beginning of World War II, it was decided to build a dock capable of docking the largest warships, taking four years of intense work. Although not completed until the tail end of the war, the dock remained as a significant naval support asset for not only the Royal Australian Navy but also allied navies.
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assessment of options available to achieve the requirements of the JOCOPR and minimise the risk of ‘surprises’ in terms of what is not available. This process is indicated in figure 2–5.
2.38 The CPD and OECD specify preparedness reporting requirements. HQJOC provides performance reports through C & P Branch (within CD Group) on preparedness issues to meet all MRO bands incorporated within the OPO. These reports use the FIC as the basis of assessment and are included in the DPS. OE also incorporate preparedness reporting into their DPS. These reports are made against the benchmarks set out in Schedule 2A of each/the relevant Service Chief’s OPA. Preparedness reporting by OE are compiled on the basis of ‘high-level by exception’ reporting for the purpose of strategic level performance reporting and the resolution of resource management issues by the DC. The reports are forwarded in the first instance, for staffing and analysis, to C & P Branch for subsequent inclusion in the monthly DPS. The formal Defence reporting cycle is complemented by OE reports compiled by CFO for the benefit of the Minister. Australian National Audit Office conducts independent audits at the direction of Parliament.
2.39 DCJOPS and the OE report, on-occurrence, any operational deficiencies that impact on their ability to meet their preparedness responsibilities. DDD entries (in effect operational deficiency reports) are to be raised by HQJOC, outputs or Service and component headquarters if they are unable to meet the preparedness requirements detailed in the JOCOPR, or the benchmarks set in Schedule 2A of the relevant OPA. All raised deficiencies are to be reported through component headquarters level to DCJOPS for entry on the DDD for consideration at the operational or strategic level.
2.40 The database provides a mechanism by which deficiencies, both agreed and on-occurrence can be reported and monitored. This database, managed by C & P Branch and DCJOPS, is used to record deficiencies against the requirements of the JOCOPR and their current status, and is used by the Component Commanders to guide DCJOPS assessment of the ability of the ADF to provide Government with various courses of action of the JOCOPR. In doing this, the priority of the agreed deficiencies can be regularly reviewed.
2.41 Consideration of operational deficiencies at these levels may involve the allocation of appropriate resources (financial or non-financial) for remediation. Remediation may be simply a matter of adjusting allocations or may involve detailed submissions for supplementation against a defined plan extending over a period of time. Other deficiencies, for example, personnel, may take several years to replace or increase. As a consequence, early trend analysis is extremely important in identifying deficiencies as early as possible.
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Figure 2–5: Reporting rectification of preparedness deficiencies
2.42 As a general rule, preparedness deficiencies will be rectified at the lowest possible level of management. Those deficiencies which cannot be rectified at the HQJOC or Service headquarters level will be referred to the DC for resolution. Remediation will be based upon risk determination and subsequent management within the prevailing resource climate.
Review 2.43
2.43 Preparedness is reviewed to determine whether forces are able to achieve the preparedness requirements specified in the relevant preparedness directives. Review may lead to a refinement of preparedness objectives and/or an adjustment of associated resources. Review is based on the measurement of a force’s preparedness level. Measurement focuses on the readiness and sustainability aspects of a force’s personnel, equipment, facilities, training and consumable resources. The measurement of a force’s
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preparedness is determined by comparing available resources and present levels of proficiency with those required for the force’s DLOC. Commanders will make judgments when assessing their forces’ levels of proficiency. Preparedness objectives serve as performance indicators for the reporting and review of preparedness.
2.44 Review of preparedness levels against the strategic situation is undertaken through the Defence update and QSR processes. These review processes focus on the implications of strategic changes upon readiness, and sustainability guidance for the employment of Defence capabilities. An important element is the examination of concurrency and operational sustainment issues. The review processes are also used within Defence to inform and to guide short-term planning in view of changes in the strategic environment.
Figure 2–6: Review process
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2.45 CFO and groups review the OPA and assess OPA performance. The results of this review are presented to the Defence Capability and Investment Committee to form judgements about the need to re-balance performance or resourcing levels, or develop performance improvement strategies. They are also used to support the additional estimates and annual report processes. The timing and structure of these reviews is agreed between the CFO and the Reporting Group several weeks prior to the review.
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CHAPTER 3
MOBILISATION 3
Introduction 3.1
3.1 Mobilisation is the process that generates military capabilities and marshals national resources to defend the nation and its interests. The ability to do so is a measure of strategic level preparedness. The effective implementation of military strategies derived from Australia’s security posture will depend on the nation’s mobilisation capacity. The decision to mobilise is a political one, albeit with professional Defence advice. Mobilisation planning supports preparedness management and contingency planning by informing preparedness and operations planning staff of the Defence and national mobilisation requirements. Critical to the mobilisation process is Australia’s ability to rapidly increase the capability of part or all of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and to surge the capacity of industry to support higher levels of Defence capability and preparedness.
3.2 Purpose. The purpose of this chapter is to describe mobilisation concepts, principles and processes within Defence.
MOBILISATION CONCEPTS 3.3
Mobilisation and preparedness 3.3
3.3 Mobilisation is the process of generating Defence capabilities outside the scope and capacity of existing preparedness guidance, budgetary allocations and in certain circumstances may necessitate the marshalling of national resources to defend the nation and its interests. It will involve areas such as work force planning, industry alignment, re-prioritising Service support and infrastructure development. Increasing the preparedness of, and deploying the force-in-being (FIB) from within existing Defence resources, should not be confused with the four levels of mobilisation discussed in paragraph 3.6. Individuals, units, the ADF and wider Defence, will move through the four phases depicted in figure 1–3. Longer-term force expansion (to a new steady-state) may occur as a result of a general change in the strategic environment, while mobilisation will occur in response to a specific scenario or threat. Deployment or the movement and distribution of the FIB, does not necessarily mean mobilisation. However, for a force to be deployed it will almost certainly necessitate an increase in the current level of capability of a force, and in some instances may involve the re-alignment of personnel and some short-term opportunities for industry. This may necessitate bids for supplementation.
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3.4 High levels of mobilisation may encompass force expansion. Force expansion is the process whereby the FIB is increased in size (more of the same), capability (with respect to new platforms as opposed to the complete FIB) or both, by the recruitment of significant additional personnel and the acquisition of additional equipment, facilities or other resources. It may also involve a change in the structure of the force. Mobilisation does not automatically involve the expansion of the current force structure ie more of the same, but may mean the introduction of new capabilities.
3.5 At the strategic level, mobilisation is the combination of the military mobilisation process, as a first response to mobilisation requirements, and the national mobilisation process, which includes the military mobilisation process, as follows:
• The national mobilisation process, which is the development of the national economy, support base and infrastructure to focus on the achievement of national objectives and to increase the capability and sustainment of the ADF. It involves Government intervention in the economic, business and societal fabric and processes of the wider nation, in order to direct resources through public decision-making rather than market and private sector decision-making. This process will be inter-departmental, inter-agency, involving all sectors, and in many respects, international.
• The military mobilisation process, whereby Defence in general and the ADF (comprising both permanent and Reserve force personnel) in particular are brought to an increased level of capability or preparedness. It may involve the processes of activating, movement, and distribution, increasing supplies and Service elements that currently exist and can be obtained through acquisition. This involves budget supplementation.
3.6 The Government, in response to a crisis, may call on the military. In doing so it will request certain effects-based responses; it will not necessarily ask for specific units. In determining the most appropriate force to be deployed or mobilised, the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) has available four levels of manpower-based responses:
• Employ the FIB within current guidance and funding.
• Call for volunteers from the Reserves.
• Request call out of the Reserves (selective, partial or Defence).
• Request for conscription (national).
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Levels of mobilisation 3.7
3.7 There are four levels of mobilisation which, in order, embody an increasing commitment by the Government for Defence to respond to a contingency with greater military capability and more comprehensive national support. They are largely based upon the legislative requirements relating to the provision of personnel ie ‘call out’. It must be noted that there will be a complimentary impact on support mechanisms to cater for the expansion and increase of capability:
• Selective Defence mobilisation. Selective Defence mobilisation involves raising the level of preparedness of selected individuals or force elements (FE). These individuals or FE will be raised to their operational level of capability (OLOC) in order to achieve objectives endorsed by the Government. Certain national resources may be required to support selective mobilisation. Increased individual readiness and subsequent sustainability, which is outside of the previously authorised, published and funded levels of capability, is an integral part of this stage of mobilisation. The call out of selected individuals or minor elements of the Reserves may be necessary.
• Partial Defence mobilisation. Partial Defence mobilisation involves raising the level of preparedness of significant numbers of individuals and/or FE. These individuals and/or FE will be raised to OLOC in order to achieve longer-term, increased preparedness endorsed by the Government. Some mobilisation of national resources is likely to be required to support partial Defence mobilisation. Partial Defence mobilisation will involve the call out of some Reserve personnel.
• Defence mobilisation. Defence mobilisation is the process of increasing the military capability of the FIB, from within Defence resources, to OLOC. All FE will be prepared to conduct operations to defend Australia and its interests. All elements of Defence will be involved and significant national resources will be required to support Defence mobilisation. Defence mobilisation will involve the call out of most, if not all Reserves: some force expansion may also be required.
• National mobilisation. National mobilisation involves total Defence mobilisation and Government coordination of the national effort to defend Australia and its interests. Defence and the nation will be totally committed to maximising the operational effectiveness of all FE. Significant force expansion will be required to achieve more substantial objectives. National mobilisation will see profound increases in capability, preparedness and sustainability of Defence and ADF. This level of mobilisation will normally require the application of special legislation, and there will be significant impact on the general public. Where necessary, the international community may be
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called upon to assist across a range of activities both directly at the military level and at the Government, commercial and industry level. This level of mobilisation could involve the introduction of conscription.
Surge and mobilisation 3.8
3.8 Mobilisation is likely to involve a significant increase in effort over a wider range of activities for an extended period of time with comprehensive linkages and synergies between many organisations. In addition, mobilisation involves special legislation being invoked and may have significant impact on the lives of the general public. Mobilisation may involve Government intervention to influence supporting infrastructure, and may involve the re-alignment or focus of specific industries. This process may occur across all levels and phases of mobilisation (particularly the two higher-levels) dependent upon the specific threat and associated Defence response.
3.9 Surge provides an immediate effect and will generally arise at short notice, have a limited duration, only effect a limited range of activities or few organisations, and will generally proceed under current legislation and with some modifications to extant contractual provisions. Based on strategic guidance, the requirement to surge by some elements of the ADF, and hence some elements of its supporting contractor base, on an irregular basis, is much more likely to occur than large-scale mobilisation. Furthermore, depending on its scale, surge requirements may occur with minimal public awareness or involvement. Surge is dependent upon three factors—the notice of surge (when it is required), activity level (rate of effort of the surge) and the duration of the operation or activity.
HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—MOBILISATION IN AUSTRALIA WORLD WAR II
At the outbreak of World War II (WWII), Australia had in place:
Royal Australian Navy: three cruisers, a destroyer, plus Reserves;
Royal Australian Air Force: ten squadrons awaiting re-equipment, plus Reserves; and
Army: Citizen Force, which mirrored the seven divisions of the 1st
Australian Imperial Force (AIF)—five infantry and two cavalry, the previous war’s worn-out equipment, still not mechanised.
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HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—(cont)
This force was to grow to 750 000 by 1943, over a million passing through it by war’s end. Raising them to those levels required resources—manpower, materiel and financial—so strained by 1943 that downsizing commenced as the homeland threat receded. The war ended with the forces fighting with a nominal structure of major fighting units similar to what they started with.
Expansion for the forces in the first three years of the war was tenfold, at a time when Defence production, infrastructure demands, and support of United States forces under Reciprocal Lease-Lend were claiming their own heavy share of manpower, output and gross domestic product. This required progressively more intrusive and pervasive central Government control—manpower control, conscription, directed civil employment; materials control including rationing of fuel, food and clothing; and financial controls and raisings, with the Federal Government assuming broad taxation powers from the states.
Learning from the WW I failed overseas-service conscription referendums, the Army initially raised a volunteer AIF, and was thereafter, supplied for the South-West Pacific by regulations extending conscript service to the Equator. While the initial growth of all three Services was frenetic, the economic base was kept stable by the continued availability of the manpower of the seven Citizen's Military Force divisions by retaining them on part-time service only, until the entry of Japan into the war, when all were called up for full-time duty for the duration.
Thereafter the effects of a war economy began to bite—accentuated by the inevitable over-manning and over-consumption by the forces at home and overseas. The resource crisis peak in 1943 provoked an uneven reduction of some excesses by the Services, stabilisation of the operational capability of each Service, and from 1944 on, a more serious Government-forced planned progressive reduction.
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MOBILISATION PRINCIPLES 3.10
3.10 The four principles of successful mobilisation are:
• clear objectives,
• unity of effort, and
• flexibility and timeliness.
Clear objectives 3.11
3.11 Operational and mobilisation planners at their respective levels must coordinate their efforts to ensure that the time necessary for mobilisation is clearly defined and understood. Supported operational commanders must be advised about the extent of mobilisation activity needed to be undertaken by supporting commanders and establishments, and the possible impacts on their plans. Strategic level planning staff will undertake this responsibility.
3.12 Mobilisation planning and implementation must be directed towards clearly defined, attainable and decisive objectives. Operational planners must comprehend the mobilisation implications of their plans to ensure that their plans are not compromised and that appropriate resources are acquired in the most expeditious manner. Force expansion requirements must also be clearly identified as early as possible in the planning process.
HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—(cont)Democracies tend to enter crises ill prepared as neither the time, location nor scope of war, peacekeeping or humanitarian emergency is of their choosing, It is, therefore, all the more important that sound general force structures, with realistic plans for associated expansion and resources, are in place to provide the flexibility to respond to the contingencies that actually arise.
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Unity of effort 3.13
3.13 Fundamental to achieving effective mobilisation will be an integrated effort between Australia’s military and civilian organisations to achieve common objectives established by the Government, such as the Australian Industry Development Corporation, the Australian Chamber of Commerce, the Australia Industry Group and Industry and the Australian Logistics Council. Integration will be achieved by the effective application of processes that provide for timely and thorough coordination between Defence, other government departments, State and regional authorities, and the industrial and commercial sectors.
Flexibility 3.14
3.14 Flexibility will be an essential ingredient in developing the appropriate response to a crisis in order to overcome unforeseen problems and adapt to uncertainties.
3.15 Flexibility in mobilisation is achieved by delegating authority to those areas best suited to influence or direct actions, without jeopardising control, to promote freedom of action by subordinate authorities and to ensure that mobilisation activities will continue during uncertainty. Inherent in a flexible mobilisation framework will be a system for monitoring the status and progress of mobilisation and the level of capability that it generates, and the ability to redirect activities and priorities to alleviate delays, choke-points, overcome resource inadequacies and protect the forces, equipment and infrastructure being mobilised.
Timeliness 3.16
3.16 Timely mobilisation of resources will be critical to seizing and maintaining the initiative, and ensuring that the required capability is at the right place at the right time to achieve the intended objective. This is dependent upon an effective assessment of the strategic environment, identification of the associated requirements, and the will of the Government to act with a view to the future.
3.17 Timely mobilisation will be dependent on the maintenance of appropriate levels of preparedness throughout Defence during the preparation phase, the efficient implementation of effective, embedded mobilisation plans, and a civilian sector fully prepared and aligned to support mobilisation activities. Timely mobilisation may also depend on Defence obtaining exemption from environmental or other constraints. The development and introduction of appropriate legislation, procedures and processes, establishment and convening of committees etc during the preparation and work-up phases (described later in this chapter) is imperative to enhancing timeliness.
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NATIONAL MOBILISATION 3.18
3.18 The following categories are considered critical enablers for the successful implementation of mobilisation. They are related to the fundamental inputs to capability (FIC) in that these considerations are sub-sets of the FIC. Mobilisation planners and decision-makers should note that these categories should not be considered in isolation, as they are interdependent. Coordination and effective communication will ensure that mobilisation activities in one category can be successfully supported by others. These categories are expanded in the mobilisation planner in annex C:
• work force availability,
• transportation,
• equipment and materiel,
• health service support,
• facilities,
• industrial base,
• training base expansion,
• communications,
• host nation support,
• environment,
• legislative issues, and
• funding.
3.19 Mobilisation implementation is managed through the national mobilisation management hierarchy and the Defence mobilisation management hierarchy, both of which are informed by the strategic planning process.
Strategic planning 3.20
3.20 Australia’s Military Strategy for the defence of Australia and its interests is based on the total active force, Reservists, Defence civilians, Defence contractors and private enterprise. The successful implementation of the strategy will depend on Defence’s ability to coordinate the total force and the resources necessary to defend the nation and its interests.
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3.21 Strategic warning. Strategic warning commences when the Government first accepts the existence of a possible threat and concludes when the Government commits military forces to operations in response to the threat. Strategic warning is central to the strategic planning process and is a key factor in determining mobilisation requirements. Strategic warning differs from the warning period associated with the preparation phase. The time available to increase designated force preparedness levels to OLOC is also a critical planning factor. It will be derived from an assessment of the ADF’s mobilisation requirements relative to its current preparedness levels. The decision to commence work-up may be taken by the CDF within current Budget allocation, before the period of Government nominated strategic warning is declared. The range of military response options (MRO) will depend, in part, on the political implications of decisions to adjust preparedness levels of forces and the associated deterrent or escalatory effect. It is possible that circumstances may preclude or limit any strategic warning.
3.22 Depending on the nature of the contingency and the level of mobilisation, coordination between all agencies within Defence will be essential. Coordination between Defence, other government departments, and Federal, State and regional authorities and industry, will also be required. These relationships must be developed in the steady-state period (prior to operations) to ensure that the ADF can respond efficiently during a contingency. It is important that the structures and processes employed during peace are those that will be employed during a contingency. The most significant of these are the Defence State and Territory Consultative Arrangements. These meet annually and are co-chaired by the Director General Strategic Logistic Branch in Joint Logistic Command (JLC) and a senior member of the Premier’s/Chief Minister’s Department. They provide a forum for exposure of national defence planning issues and State and Territory infrastructure planning activities, and for the development of joint initiatives of common concern or interest.
National mobilisation management hierarchy 3.23
3.23 National level mobilisation management involves those national and Defence management structures and processes that enable the Government to respond militarily to protect Australia and its interests. The following paragraphs outline the nation’s and Defence’s mobilisation management hierarchies, and the linkages between them.
3.24 National responsibility for the provision of strategic direction to Defence and the coordination of all aspects of the protection of Australia’s national interests rests with the National Security Committee of Cabinet
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(NSC). Subordinate organisations include the Secretaries’ Committee on National Security (SCNS) and the Strategic Policy Coordination Group (SPCG).
3.25 The national management hierarchy is responsible for the strategic coordination of the nation’s response to crises, including national and Defence mobilisation. Coordination of the national effort is undertaken by the SPCG on a day-to-day basis. The key areas of national effort which require coordination are listed in annex A, and the issues which require coordination are detailed in the appended tables. Linkages between the national and Defence mobilisation management processes are achieved by Defence membership of the National Crisis Management Machinery process at SCNS and SPCG levels. National mobilisation structures, membership and outline responsibilities are summarised in table 3–1.
MILITARY MOBILISATION PROCESS 3.26
Mobilisation phases 3.26
3.26 While the Services are fundamentally effected by requirements to change preparedness levels, all groups within Defence contribute to the mobilisation process through the support they provide to the Services in the context of the raise, train and maintain functions of the Service Chiefs. The military mobilisation process (regardless of level), as part of the national mobilisation process, is a continuum of interrelated activities which occur across the following four phases:
• preparation;
• work-up;
• operations; and
• reconstitution.
3.27 The preparedness of individuals or FE is an integral and fundamental consideration for each phase of the mobilisation continuum. At any given time, depending on the level of mobilisation (and level of capability required), different individuals or FE will be at different levels of preparedness and different phases of the continuum. The relationship between the levels of capability and the phases is shown in figure 1–3.
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The preparation phase 3.28
3.28 The successful conduct of activities throughout the mobilisation continuum is founded on effective planning and preparation within current guidance leading to work-up for specific operations. The objectives of the preparation phase are:
• The FIB has the capabilities directed in strategic guidance.
• The ADF is reviewing, and is capable of implementing appropriate mobilisation plans.
• Mobilisation considerations are developed and resource requirements are identified, including those related to force expansion of current capabilities and the development and introduction of new capabilities.
3.29 The preparation phase consists of two periods:
• The warning period. The warning period is initiated by the identification of a contingency, which may require the commitment of military forces. Plans are reviewed and developed as required. Military options are prepared for endorsement by Government. Individuals and/or FE to be assigned to operations are identified and formally warned. The level of capability of the individuals and/or FE involved will be confirmed and liaison between them and supporting agencies will be established. Reservists may be warned for operational duty. Not all circumstances will allow an adequate warning period.
• The planning and preparation period. This period equates to a ‘steady-state period’, normally peacetime, but not necessarily so. During this period the force structure and preparedness of the ADF is developed and maintained to ensure military capability is consistent with strategic guidance. Work-up and force expansion requirements are identified and the mechanisms to effect them are established. The outcome is to ensure the effective transition to OLOC.
The work-up phase 3.30
3.30 While work-up is triggered by a real and specific threat and is, therefore, intimately linked to pending operations, the application of resources and activities related to work-up are so significant as to be addressed as a separate phase. The objective of the work-up phase is to raise identified individuals or FE to OLOC efficiently and effectively. The work-up phase commences with the activation of mobilisation plans refined or developed during the preparation phase. Depending on the nature of the contingency and the level of mobilisation required, Reservists may be called-out and force expansion may be required. The work-up phase may involve activities
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associated with force assembly, training and pre-deployment. Work-up will probably involve the use of more resources than for operations, because work-up is likely to be based on the full spectrum of likely military tasks, to a high standard of competency. There may be an initial large facilities investment.
3.31 Where assembly is required, the objective will be to concentrate assigned individuals or FE as quickly as possible and prepare them to conduct work-up training. Assembly activities should involve the identification of any FIC deficiencies and the action required to rectify them (materiel and logistic resource mobilisation is discussed in chapter 4—‘Sustainment’). Deployment administration will commence and those determined unfit or unable to deploy will be redirected to support the mobilisation effort elsewhere.
3.32 At the conclusion of work-up training, assigned individuals or FE will have their training standards validated to ensure that they have achieved the required level of capability. Additional training may be necessary to overcome competency deficiencies.
PREPAREDNESS FOR OPERATIONS
[6th Division] must have training with the full scale before it can be considered ready to take the field. I am very loath to allow this Force out of my control until I am assured of its fitness for the task involved, and I am very certain that the Commonwealth Government will demand this of me.
AIF Commander LTGEN Sir Thomas Blameyto Commander-in-Chief Middle East Wavell, 1940
3–12
ADDP 00.2 Chapter 3
HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—READINESS ASSESSMENT FOR DEPLOYMENT TO SOUTH VIETNAM, SHOALWATER BAY 1967
Readiness for operations requires a formal measurement of individual and unit preparation and capability. Commitment of inadequately prepared forces has long been recognised as a precursor for failure by trying to substitute numbers for quality. Since inception of the Australian forces, it has been the policy to carry out formal pre-embarkation inspections, and given the super-charged atmosphere surrounding the commitment of Australian servicemen, including national servicemen, to South Vietnam, particular care was taken to ensure that rotating individuals and units were properly trained and readied.
3–13
ADDP 00.2 Chapter 3
3.33 Pre-deployment activities, which generally commence after the successful achievement of OLOC, will be based on the nature of the contingency as it develops. FE and FE group commanders will focus on their missions and conduct specific mission-oriented training. Training will also be conducted to ensure that OLOC is maintained. FE will be administratively prepared for deployment and advance parties will be deployed if required.
3.34 It is during this phase that the national support base (NSB) (including the Corporate Services and Infrastructure Group (CSIG) and other areas of Defence) may be called upon to assist the national and Defence effort. This will depend on the threat and the consequent level of mobilisation and will involve some or all of the critical considerations discussed in paragraph 3.17. It will be largely driven by the demand and time frames created by Defence and the nature of the crisis. Furthermore, it will be characterised by the development of significant Defence and industry relationships such as strategic partnering and the re-alignment of industry output from routine commercial operations to nationally focussed output. It is imperative that the processes to facilitate this transition be embedded in peacetime through the preparedness system.
The operations phase 3.35
3.35 The operations phase generally commences with the initial arrival of individuals or FE in the area of operations (AO) and concludes with their departure from the AO, although some FE may commence operations outside of the defined AO. The ongoing assistance, and sometimes re-alignment, of the NSB will be essential in sustaining operations. This phase may involve the deployment and re-deployment and sustainment of a tailored force within an AO.
The reconstitution phase 3.36
3.36 Reconstitution is the process by which, at the conclusion of the operations phase, individuals or FE adopt the force structure and preparedness levels indicated by strategic guidance and policy (Government White Paper). This change will then be reflected in the directed level of capability. This may not necessarily be the same as that prior to mobilisation. The reconstitution phase commences with the redeployment of forces to the support area and concludes when the forces are returned to the preparation phase. Administrative action will involve transition to peacetime or revised steady-state activities and procedures. This phase is particularly important for the redirection of the NSB away from a contingency or mobilisation footing and back to that of supporting the wider community. Personnel will be
3–14
ADDP 00.2 Chapter 3
re-posted or transferred as required, and unit equipment will be re-assigned to home locations. Support agencies and support units are expected to be the last to complete reconstitution.
Structure Membership Role Responsibility
NSC
• Prime Minister
• Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade
• Minister for Defence
• Attorney-General
• Treasurer CDF (may be invited)
Management of national security crises as they affect Australia’s national interests.
• Decisions on major issues affecting Australia’s national security interests.
• Policy issues relating to intelligence and domestic security matters.
• Law enforcement matters that have implications for Australia’s security.
• Provision of strategic guidance for Defence.
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ADDP 00.2 Chapter 3
Table 3–1: National mobilisation management hierarchy
Defence mobilisation management hierarchy 3.37
3.37 Defence’s response to crises is managed by the Strategic Command Group (SCG), which takes advice from the Defence Committee (DC), the Strategic Watch Group (SWG) and the Defence Mobilisation Committee (DMC): there are a number of other related committees, including the Strategic Planning Group. CDF is responsible for the mobilisation of the
SCNS
• Secretaries of Departments from Prime Minister and Cabinet, Defence, Foreign Affairs and Trade, Attorney-General’s and Treasury;
• CDF;
• Director-General of the Office of National Assessment
Provision of coordinated advice to the NSC on the broad range of factors affecting Australia’s security (strategic, defence, economic, trade, intelligence and national security matters).
Provision of advice, options and strategies to the NSC.
SPCG
• Deputy Secretaries from Prime Minister and Cabinet, Defence, Foreign Affairs and Trade;
• Senior officers from other appropriate departments;
• Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF)/ Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS);
• Deputy Secretary Strategy
To enhance interaction on strategic and security issues and to come together in a crisis to ensure the necessary arrangements for supporting ministers are in place.
Inter-departmental coordination of mobilisation requirements.
Structure Membership Role Responsibility
3–16
ADDP 00.2 Chapter 3
ADF for operations, and the Secretary is responsible for providing Defence Department support to mobilisation activities. The Service Chiefs are responsible to CDF for the mobilisation of their Services to support operations. The DMC coordinates Defence’s mobilisation planning in accordance with the mobilisation functions and responsibilities outlined in annex B. The Defence mobilisation management hierarchy may be involved in all Defence mobilisation activities, regardless of the level of mobilisation. Defence mobilisation structures, their membership and responsibilities are summarised in table 3–2.
3.38 Strategic Command Group. The function of the SCG is to provide timely military strategic advice to CDF for specific contingencies. The SCG comprises CDF as chairman, Secretary, VCDF/CJOPS, the Service Chiefs, Chief Capability Development Group, Deputy Secretary Strategy, Intelligence and Security and Director Defence Intelligence Organisation. At the invitation of CDF, the SCG may be augmented by Deputy CJOPS (DCJOPS), Logistics Component Commander (LOGCC) Joint Operations Command and Director General Public Affairs as the situation dictates. In relation to military strategic planning, the SCG advises CDF on:
• guidance to Government;
• military aspects and implications of Defence strategy;
• approval of military options and concepts of operations and campaign plans, including allocation of forces and supporting assets to designated commanders; and
• longer-term mobilisation including aspects relating to the size of the ADF and the balance within it, preparedness, forces disposition, major investments and supporting infrastructure.
3.39 Strategic Watch Group. This group is chaired by Head Strategic Operations Division. The SWG monitors indicators and warnings to identify potential crises that may require an ADF response, and oversees the military strategic situation and ADF response, to ensure it remains consistent with the developing situation or crisis. If the CDF directs military planning for an immediate ADF response, the SWG provides a seamless transition from monitoring to crisis management. During a crisis, the SWG also provides an avenue for coordination between the operational and strategic levels of command.
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ADDP 00.2 Chapter 3
Structure Membership Role Mobilisation responsibility
DC
• Secretary (Chair)
• CDF
• Chief Executive Officer Defence Materiel Organisation (CEO DMO)
• VCDF/CJOPS
• Chief of Navy (CN)
• Chief of Army (CA)
• Chief of Air Force (CAF)
• Chief Capability Development Group (CCDG)
• Deputy Secretary (DEPSEC) Strategy
• DEPSEC Intelligence and Security (I&S)
• DEPSEC Corporate Services (CS)
• Chief Finance Officer (CFO)
• Chief Defence Scientist
• Chief Information Officer (CIO)
• Head Defence Personnel Executive (HDPE)
To make the decisions that assist in achieving the results specified in the Ministerial Directive to Secretary and CDF. The DC gives direction and assesses performance in delivering those results with a longer-term focus.
Advice to Minister and Government on the management of ADF mobilisation.
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ADDP 00.2 Chapter 3
SCG
• CDF (Chair)
• SEC
• VCDF/CJOPS
• CCDG
• DEPSEC Strategy
• DEPSEC I&S
• CN
• CA
• CAF
• Augmented as required—normally DCJOPS, Commander Joint Logistics and Director General Public Affairs
Provide advice to CDF to assist in commanding the ADF and advising the Government on MRO.
Advice to CDF on the management of ADF mobilisation. Establishment of mobilisation coordination framework. Approval of mobilisation plans. Determine longer-term military capability (force structure and preparedness) requirements. Approve military strategies and military strategic planning guidance in general.
Structure Membership Role Mobilisation responsibility
3–19
ADDP 00.2 Chapter 3
SWG
• Head Strategic Operations Division (Chair)
• Director-General Intelligence Operations
• DG Public Affairs
• Head International Policy Division
• Deputy Chief of Navy (DCN)
• Deputy Chief of Army (DCA)
• Deputy Chief of Air Force (DCAF)
• Head Capability Systems
• Head Strategic Policy and Plans
• DGMS
• HDPE
• DCJOPS
The SWG monitors indicators and warnings to identify potential crises that may require an ADF response, and oversees the military strategic situation and ADF response, to ensure it remains consistent with the developing situation or crisis. If CDF directs military planning for an immediate ADF response, the SWG provides a seamless transition from monitoring to crisis management.During a crisis, the SWG also provides an avenue for coordination between the operational and strategic levels of command.
The provision of advice to the ADF Command Group and other senior committees as required.
Structure Membership Role Mobilisation responsibility
3–20
ADDP 00.2 Chapter 3
DMC
• CCDG (Chair) Permanent members
• Head Strategic Operations Division
• LOGCC
• DCN
• DCA
• DCAF
• CIO
• FAS Business Strategy (CFO)
• Head Strategic Policy
• HDPE
• Head Infrastructure Division (CSIG)
• Head Industry Division (DMO)
• Head Reserve Policy
• DG Strategic Logistics Branch (JLC)
• DG Capability and Plans (CDG)
• Director Mobilisation (providing secretarial support)
Coordinate strategic level mobilisation planning within Defence and, where appropriate, liaise with external organisations to facilitate national and international support for Defence’s mobilisation effort.
Coordinate mobilisation planning/ implementation activities on behalf of the SCG. Coordinate Service and non-Service mobilisation activities, including those summarised in annex B. Coordinate the Defence aspects of the national defence effort.
Structure Membership Role Mobilisation responsibility
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ADDP 00.2 Chapter 3
Table 3–2: Defence mobilisation management hierarchy
Planning processes 3.40
3.40 The national intelligence system identifies potential threats to Australia’s security. Imminent threats will trigger the preparation of a range of MRO by Defence’s SWG, under CDF direction, for Government consideration.
3.41 Based on judgments regarding the lead times required to effect the Government’s preferred response options, CDF will initiate mobilisation activities by issuing directives to the Service Chiefs, VCDF/CJOPS and DCJOPS to increase the levels of preparedness of their forces. Deputy Secretary Corporate Services, CEO DMO and LOGCC will be directed to ensure that the enabling elements can support the increases. Activities in the non-Service Executives of Defence in support of mobilisation will be directed by the CDF through the DMC. The Secretary’s primary role will be to authorise and fund the DMC’s plans to mobilise Defence. Whether changes to preparedness levels are undertaken will be a decision taken by the
Standing invitees
• Head Capability Investment and Resources
• DG Public Affairs
• DG The Defence Legal Service (DGTDLS)
• FAS Science Policy (DSTO)
• Head Defence Security Authority (DSA)
• Head Capability Systems (HCS)
• Emergency Management Australia Rep (Attorney General’s Department)
Structure Membership Role Mobilisation responsibility
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ADDP 00.2 Chapter 3
Government based on advice from CDF, the prevailing strategic circumstances, an understanding of the lead times required to optimise mobilisation efficiency, and naturally, funding availability.
3.42 It is probable that changes to the preparedness levels of particular FE will be directed by CDF in anticipation of the strategic warning period to enable particular tasks, such as strategic and operational surveillance, to be undertaken. Mobilisation of those forces may require the implementation of deception plans depending on the Government’s intentions.
Mobilisation planner 3.43
3.43 The mobilisation planner is a tool for mobilisation planners to make a systematic appraisal of potential mobilisation requirements and options in support of operational plans. The purpose of conducting a mobilisation ‘appreciation’ is to review key planning factors to determine whether an operational plan can be supported and which course of action is best from the supporters’ perspective. Mobilisation plans must be developed concurrently with operational plans. Defence’s SWG will analyse and initiate the further development of mobilisation planning. Once a strategic military response plan has been endorsed by Government, and operational plans are developed and refined, mobilisation planning must be conducted by operational support planners. Mobilisation plans will normally be conducted by logistic and personnel staff. Mobilisation planning conducted pre-emptively or in concert with the operational plan will inform the development of the operational commander’s military appreciation process. An outline format for mobilisation planning is in annex C. The accuracy of information gathered and the quality of analysis made are essential for the development and implementation of effective mobilisation plans.
Annexes:A. Coordination of the national effort for the defence of AustraliaB. Defence Mobilisation Committee—mobilisation functions and
responsibilitiesC. Mobilisation planner format
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Annex A to ADDP 00.2 Chapter 3
COORDINATION OF THE NATIONAL EFFORT FOR THE DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA A
Issues of coordination 1
1. A key feature of mobilisation is the need for the Australian Defence Force to be supported as much as practicable by Australia’s national industry, infrastructure and community. The management of Australia’s national effort during conflict could involve a range of Commonwealth and State agencies and demand high levels of coordination between responsible authorities at all levels of Government and the private sector.
2. The key areas for national effort are:
a. Australia’s security (appendix 1);
b. activities during a Defence emergency (appendix 2);
c. wider Australian community (appendix 3);
d. intelligence and surveillance (appendix 4);
e. industry (appendix 5);
f. science and technology (appendix 6);
g. logistics (appendix 7); and
h. management of national coordination (appendix 8).
Appendixes: 1. National Defence effort: Australia’s security2. National Defence effort: activities during a Defence emergency3. National Defence effort: wider Australian community4. National Defence effort: intelligence and surveillance5. National Defence effort: industry6. National Defence effort: science and technology7. National Defence effort: logistics8. National Defence effort: management of national coordination
3A–1
Appendix 1 to Annex A to
ADDP 00.2 Chapter 3
NATIONAL DEFENCE EFFORT: AUSTRALIA’S SECURITY 1
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
Mec
hani
sms
to
coor
dina
te d
omes
tic
appr
oach
to
Aust
ralia
’s s
ecur
ity.
Dep
artm
ent o
f Pr
ime
Min
iste
r and
C
abin
et (P
M&C
)
Stra
tegy
Pol
icy
(SP
) D
ivis
ion
, In
tern
atio
nal P
olic
y (IP
) Div
isio
n, a
nd
Stra
tegi
c O
pera
tions
D
ivis
ion
(SO
D)
Mec
hani
sms
shou
ld
faci
litat
e a
com
mon
un
ders
tand
ing
of
natio
nal i
nter
ests
, ob
ject
ives
and
pr
iorit
ies
amon
g ag
enci
es a
t all
leve
ls.
Nat
iona
l int
eres
ts
incl
ude
the
pres
erva
tion
of
Aust
ralia
’s te
rrito
rial
inte
grity
and
eco
nom
ic
inte
rest
s, p
rote
ctio
n of
A
ustra
lian
lives
and
pr
oper
ty, m
aint
aini
ng
Aust
ralia
’s
inte
rnat
iona
l sta
ndin
g,
and
avoi
ding
un
nece
ssar
y ris
k to
th
e Au
stra
lian
Def
ence
Fo
rce
(AD
F).
3A1–1
Mec
hani
sms
to
coor
dina
te
inte
rnat
iona
l ap
proa
ch to
Au
stra
lia’s
sec
urity
.
PM
&C
,
Dep
artm
ent o
f Fo
reig
n Af
fairs
and
Tr
ade
(DFA
T)
IP D
ivis
ion
Def
ence
par
ticip
atio
n in
the
deve
lopm
ent o
f Au
stra
lia’s
bila
tera
l an
d m
ultil
ater
al
rela
tions
hips
:
•hi
gh-le
vel c
onta
cts
betw
een
seni
or
offic
ials
;
•m
ilita
ry e
xerc
ises
an
d ac
tiviti
es;
•in
tellig
ence
, in
form
atio
n an
d tra
inin
g ex
chan
ges;
DFA
T
IP D
ivis
ion,
SP
,
SOD
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
3A1–2
•in
dust
ry
deve
lopm
ent;
and
•sc
ienc
e,
tech
nolo
gy,
logi
stic
s an
d re
sour
ce a
nd
finan
cial
m
anag
emen
t co
oper
atio
n.
Mai
ntai
n re
latio
ns
with
regi
onal
co
untri
es.
DFA
TIP
Div
isio
n
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
3A1–3
Glo
bal s
ecur
ity
Supp
ort f
or U
nite
d N
atio
n (U
N) a
nd
othe
r mul
tilat
eral
ac
tiviti
es.
DFA
TIP
Div
isio
n,SO
D
Aust
ralia
’s n
atio
nal
inte
rest
s ar
e se
rved
by
conf
lict p
rese
rvat
ion,
m
anag
emen
t and
re
solu
tion
achi
eved
th
roug
h U
N
mec
hani
sms.
The
UN
pl
ays
an a
ctiv
e ro
le in
al
levi
atin
g in
tern
atio
nal
hum
anita
rian
suffe
ring
caus
ed b
y na
tura
l di
sast
ers,
pol
itica
l tu
rmoi
l and
war
. Su
ppor
t fro
m A
ustra
lia
invo
lves
coo
rdin
atio
n of
man
y go
vern
men
t ag
enci
es a
nd
non-
gove
rnm
ent
orga
nisa
tions
.
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
3A1–4
Man
agem
ent o
f the
al
lianc
e re
latio
nshi
p w
ith th
e U
nite
d S
tate
s to
ens
ure
it co
ntin
ues
to m
eet t
he
need
s of
bot
h pa
rties
.
DFA
TIP
Div
isio
nTh
e pr
actic
al b
enef
its
to A
ustra
lia o
f thi
s re
latio
nshi
p in
clud
e in
telli
genc
e, a
cces
s to
hi
gh te
chno
logy
m
ilitar
y sy
stem
s,
indu
stria
l and
scie
ntifi
c co
oper
atio
n, m
ilitar
y tra
inin
g, a
nd s
uppl
y an
d su
ppor
t ar
rang
emen
ts.
Man
agem
ent o
f the
m
ilita
ry a
spec
ts o
f th
e re
latio
nshi
p.
SOD
Shar
ed in
tere
sts
with
U
nite
d K
ingd
om,
New
Zea
land
and
C
anad
a.
DFA
TIP
Div
isio
n
ADF
assi
stan
ce w
ith
maj
or d
isas
ter r
elie
f an
d se
arch
and
re
scue
.
Atto
rney
-Gen
eral
’s
(Em
erge
ncy
Man
agem
ent
Aus
tralia
)A
ustra
lian
Mar
itim
e S
afet
y A
utho
rity
SOD
Maj
or d
isas
ters
in
clud
e bu
sh fi
res,
flo
ods,
dro
ught
and
ea
rthqu
ake.
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
3A1–5
Appendix 2 to Annex A to
ADDP 00.2 Chapter 3
NATIONAL DEFENCE EFFORT: ACTIVITIES DURING A DEFENCE EMERGENCY 2
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
Prov
ide
natio
nal
polic
y (N
ATP
OL)
an
d ob
ject
ives
for
hand
ling
conf
lict
Prov
ide
Gov
ernm
ent
requ
ired
natio
nal
stra
tegi
c ‘e
nd-s
tate
’ to
guid
e Au
stra
lian
Def
ence
For
ce (A
DF)
op
erat
ions
.
Dep
artm
ent o
f Pr
ime
Min
iste
r an
d C
abin
et
(PM
&C
)
Inte
rnat
iona
l P
olic
y (IP
) D
ivis
ion,
Stra
tegi
c O
pera
tions
D
ivis
ion
(SO
D)
Res
pons
e to
na
tiona
l dis
rupt
ion
Coo
rdin
atio
n of
Fe
dera
l/Sta
te s
ecur
ity
polic
ies.
PM
&C
,At
torn
ey-
Gen
eral
’s (A
G’s
) D
epar
tmen
t (E
mer
genc
y M
anag
emen
t A
ustra
lia (E
MA
))
SO
D
Stat
e an
d Te
rrito
ry p
olic
ies
incl
ude
stat
utor
y an
d ad
min
istra
tive
resp
onsi
bilit
ies,
reso
urce
allo
catio
ns a
nd u
se
of S
tate
and
Ter
ritor
y re
sour
ces.
EM
A c
oord
inat
es
NAT
POL
aspe
cts,
and
pr
ovis
ion
of te
chni
cal a
dvic
e on
civ
ilian
she
lters
and
pa
ssiv
e pr
otec
tion
of s
peci
fic
civi
lian
faci
litie
s.
3A2–1
Mai
nten
ance
of
cont
inui
ty o
f G
over
nmen
t. As
soci
ated
pla
nnin
g ne
eds
to ta
ke a
ccou
nt
of li
kely
effe
cts
caus
ed
PM
&C
, A
G’s
Dep
artm
ent
(EM
A)
IP D
ivis
ion
by h
ostil
ities
in te
rms
of:
•na
ture
of h
azar
ds,
•le
vel a
nd in
tens
ity o
f ac
tivity
, and
•po
tent
ial f
or in
cide
nts
to e
ndur
e.
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
3A2–2
Addi
tiona
l fun
ding
Dep
artm
ent o
f Fi
nanc
e an
d Ad
min
istra
tion.
Chi
ef F
inan
ce
Offi
cer
Det
erm
inat
ion
mad
e fo
r ad
ditio
nal f
undi
ng to
be
mad
e av
aila
ble
from
exi
stin
g ap
prop
riatio
ns o
r thr
ough
su
bmis
sion
to G
over
nmen
t for
su
pple
men
tary
fund
ing.
Inte
rnat
iona
l re
latio
nshi
ps
Man
agem
ent o
f ch
angi
ng re
latio
nshi
ps
invo
lvin
g tim
ely
and
cont
inui
ng
cons
ulta
tions
with
alli
es
and
regi
onal
ne
ighb
ours
.
PM
&C
Dep
artm
ent o
f Fo
reig
n A
ffairs
an
d Tr
ade
(DFA
T)
IP D
ivis
ion
Spe
cific
reas
ons
by n
atio
ns
wou
ld b
e in
fluen
ce b
y th
eir
natio
nal i
nter
ests
and
am
bitio
ns a
nd p
ossi
bly
also
by
Aus
tralia
’s a
ctio
ns.
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
3A2–3
Prot
ectio
n du
ring
a D
efen
ce e
mer
genc
y
Det
erm
inat
ion
of
prio
ritie
s fo
r the
pr
otec
tion
of
com
mer
cial
act
iviti
es
and
civi
lian
popu
latio
ns.
PM
&C
,
DFA
T
IP D
ivis
ion,
SO
D
Act
iviti
es in
the
sea
and
air
appr
oach
es th
at a
re li
kely
to
have
a fo
cus
for p
rote
ctio
n in
tim
es o
f a D
efen
ce e
mer
genc
y in
clud
e in
tern
atio
nal s
hipp
ing
carry
ing
Aust
ralia
n tra
de,
coas
tal s
hipp
ing
and
reso
urce
ex
tract
ion
and
prod
uctio
n in
clud
ing
oil,
gas
and
mar
ine
harv
estin
g (fi
sh, p
raw
ns,
pear
ls, k
elp
and
salt)
, and
of
fsho
re te
rrito
ries.
Pro
tect
ion
of p
eopl
e an
d te
rrito
ry m
ight
in
volv
e a
focu
s on
pop
ulat
ion
conc
entra
tions
, tra
nspo
rt or
te
leco
mm
unic
atio
ns
infra
stru
ctur
e, e
cono
mic
or
indu
stria
l ass
ets,
or m
ilita
ry
base
s. A
doc
umen
t of v
ital
natio
nal a
sset
s is
nee
ded
to
iden
tify
the
com
mer
cial
ac
tiviti
es o
f val
ue to
pro
tect
.
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
3A2–4
Wid
e ra
ngin
g in
tera
ctio
n be
twee
n th
e AD
F an
d th
e co
mm
unity
in
clud
ing:
•re
pres
enta
tion
in
coop
erat
ive
mec
hani
sms,
•pl
anni
ng a
nd c
ondu
ct
of c
oord
inat
ed
activ
ities
, and
•A
DF
cont
rol o
f sp
ecifi
c ac
tiviti
es.
PM
&C
, D
FAT
SO
D
Pass
ive
defe
nce
mea
sure
sA
G’s
Dep
artm
ent
(EM
A)
SO
DIn
clud
es p
rovi
sion
of a
dvic
e on
mea
sure
s fo
r civ
ilian
asse
ts.
Coo
rdin
atio
n of
milit
ary
and
non-
mili
tary
as
pect
s of
nat
iona
l se
curit
y in
volv
ing
com
mun
ity p
rote
ctio
n an
d pr
otec
tive
secu
rity.
AG
’s D
epar
tmen
t (E
MA
)S
OD
ADF
activ
ities
nee
d to
be
coor
dina
ted
with
the
Pro
tect
ive
Ser
vice
s C
oord
inat
ion
Cen
tre.
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
3A2–5
Appendix 3 to Annex A to
ADDP 00.2 Chapter 3
NATIONAL DEFENCE EFFORT: WIDER AUSTRALIAN COMMUNITY 3
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
Legi
slat
ion
and
adm
inis
trat
ion
Dev
elop
men
t of d
omes
tic
legi
slat
ion
rele
vant
to th
e na
tiona
l Def
ence
effo
rt,
incl
udin
g:
•fre
edom
of m
ovem
ent;
•pr
otec
tive
secu
rity;
•A
ustra
lian
Def
ence
Fo
rce
(AD
F) u
se o
f civ
il in
frast
ruct
ure;
•ha
rnes
sing
spe
cific
el
emen
ts o
f ind
ustry
for
defe
nce
purp
oses
;
•co
mpe
nsat
ion
for t
he
use
of p
rivat
e re
sour
ces;
an
d
•in
dust
rial a
war
ds a
nd
wor
kpla
ce c
ondi
tions
for
civi
l per
sonn
el.
Atto
rney
-Gen
eral
’s
(AG
’s) D
epar
tmen
t
The
Def
ence
Le
gal S
ervi
ce
(TD
LS)
3A3–1
Arra
ngem
ents
that
co
ordi
nate
adm
inis
tratio
n ac
ross
adj
acen
t and
as
soci
ated
juris
dict
ions
.
Prim
e M
inis
ter a
nd
Cab
inet
(PM
&C)
AG’s
Dep
artm
ent
TDLS
, Hea
d S
trate
gic
Pol
icy
Div
isio
n
Dom
estic
legi
slat
ion
to
supp
ort t
he D
efen
ce
pow
ers
whe
n in
voke
d.
AG’s
Dep
artm
ent
TDLS
, C
omm
ande
r Jo
int L
ogis
tics
(CJL
OG
)
Anc
illar
y m
ariti
me
serv
ices
Con
tinui
ty o
f Aus
tralia
’s
mar
itim
e tra
de b
oth
in
peac
e an
d in
mor
e de
man
ding
circ
umst
ance
s
Dep
artm
ent o
f Fo
reig
n A
ffairs
and
Tr
ade
(DFA
T)
CJL
OG
, H
ead
Stra
tegi
c Po
licy
Div
isio
n
Coo
rdin
atio
n m
echa
nism
s lik
e th
e M
ariti
me
Res
cue
Coo
rdin
atio
n C
entre
and
th
e Au
stra
lian
Ship
ping
D
efen
ce C
ounc
il ne
ed
clos
e w
orki
ng
rela
tions
hips
to p
rovi
de
cont
inuo
us a
ncilla
ry
mar
itim
e se
rvic
es to
sh
ippi
ng in
pea
ce a
nd in
co
nflic
t.
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
3A3–2
Airs
pace
m
anag
emen
t
Est
ablis
hmen
t and
de
velo
pmen
t of
arra
ngem
ents
to c
onsi
der
the
coor
dina
tion
of
airs
pace
man
agem
ent
durin
g a
Def
ence
em
erge
ncy.
Dep
artm
ent o
f Tr
ansp
ort a
nd
Reg
iona
l Ser
vice
s (D
oTR
S)
Air
Ser
vice
s A
ustra
lia (A
SA
)
CJL
OG
, H
ead
Stra
tegi
c Po
licy
Div
isio
n
Furth
er d
evel
opm
ent o
f A
SA
/Def
ence
Air
Coo
rdin
atin
g C
omm
ittee
an
d N
atio
nal A
irspa
ce
Use
rs A
dvis
ory
Cou
ncil
need
s to
brin
g to
geth
er
AD
F, A
SA
and
indu
stry
co
nsul
tatio
n.
Civ
ilian
sup
port
to
AD
F op
erat
ions
Impl
icat
ions
of p
rovi
ding
co
ntin
uous
sup
port
in
times
of D
efen
ce
emer
genc
y in
clud
ing
prov
isio
n of
:
•co
mm
erci
al s
ervi
ces,
an
d
•lo
gist
ics.
AG’s
Dep
artm
ent
CJL
OG
, H
ead
Stra
tegi
c Po
licy
Div
isio
n
Civ
il de
fenc
e
Inte
rpre
tatio
n of
Aus
tralia
n po
sitio
n on
pro
toco
ls
rele
vant
to c
ivil
defe
nce.
AG’s
Dep
artm
ent
Def
ence
Pe
rson
nel
Exe
cutiv
eD
G C
apab
ility
and
Plan
s
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
3A3–3
Nat
iona
l coo
rdin
atio
n of
C
omm
onw
ealth
Sta
te/
Terri
tory
resp
onsi
bilit
ies:
•pl
anni
ng,
•tra
inin
g de
velo
pmen
t,
•br
oade
ning
aw
aren
ess,
•le
gisl
atio
n fo
r im
plem
enta
tion
whe
n re
quire
d,
•fu
ndin
g,
•ex
erci
sing
arra
ngem
ents
in
pea
cetim
e, a
nd
•st
anda
rdis
atio
n.
AG’s
Dep
artm
ent
Civ
il de
fenc
e is
prim
arily
th
e re
spon
sibi
lity
of th
e St
ates
and
Ter
ritor
ies.
Ef
fect
ive
coor
dina
tion
mus
t ens
ure
natio
nal
stan
dard
isat
ion
of c
ivil
defe
nce
mea
sure
s.
Org
anis
atio
ns a
nd
pers
onne
l tha
t mig
ht
unde
rtake
civ
il de
fenc
e fu
nctio
ns c
ould
be
draw
n fro
m p
ublic
util
ities
, m
edic
al a
nd w
elfa
re
orga
nisa
tions
, em
erge
ncy
resp
onse
age
ncie
s in
clud
ing
fire,
pol
ice,
am
bula
nce
and
Stat
e an
d Te
rrito
ry s
ervi
ces
and
the
AD
F.
Com
bine
d em
ploy
men
t of
ADF
and
civi
l ele
men
ts in
ci
vil d
efen
ce.
AG’s
Dep
artm
ent
Stra
tegi
c O
pera
tions
D
ivis
ion
(SO
D)
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
3A3–4
Nat
iona
l Int
egra
ted
War
ning
Sys
tem
and
S
helte
r Sys
tem
.AG
’s D
epar
tmen
tSO
D
Inte
grat
ion
with
the
Nat
iona
l Air
Def
ence
W
arni
ng S
yste
m a
nd
inco
rpor
atio
n of
radi
o an
d te
levi
sion
bro
adca
stin
g fa
cilit
ies
are
likel
y to
be
nece
ssar
y. D
esig
n an
d co
nstru
ctio
n of
pro
tect
ive
shel
ters
(ind
ivid
ual a
nd
colle
ctiv
e) m
ay in
volv
e a
num
ber o
f C
omm
onw
ealth
and
Sta
te
agen
cies
, inc
ludi
ng th
e D
epar
tmen
t of F
inan
ce
and
Adm
inis
tratio
n (D
oFA
).
AD
F as
sist
ance
to
civi
l aut
horit
ies
and
orga
nisa
tions
AD
F as
sist
ance
to c
ivil
com
mun
ity.
AG’s
Dep
artm
ent
SOD
AD
F ai
d to
the
civi
l pow
er
(incl
udin
g co
unte
r-ter
roris
t ca
pabi
lity.
AG’s
Dep
artm
ent
SOD
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
3A3–5
Law
enf
orce
men
t an
d co
unte
r-te
rror
ism
ADF
supp
ort t
o th
e in
terc
eptio
n of
sus
pect
ed
illeg
al im
mig
rant
s, fi
shin
g ve
ssel
s an
d flo
ra, f
auna
, dr
ug, a
rms
smug
gler
s, a
nd
coun
ter-
terro
rist a
nd b
omb
disp
osal
ope
ratio
ns.
AG’s
Dep
artm
ent
SOD
Law
enf
orce
men
t ag
enci
es in
clud
e cu
stom
s, fi
sher
ies,
im
mig
ratio
n, q
uara
ntin
e an
d St
ate
and
Aust
ralia
n Fe
dera
l Pol
ice.
The
N
atio
nal A
nti-t
erro
rist
Plan
of t
he S
tand
ing
Adv
isor
y C
omm
ittee
for
Com
mon
wea
lth/S
tate
C
oope
ratio
n fo
r P
rote
ctio
n A
gain
st
Viol
ence
pro
vide
s ar
rang
emen
ts fo
r co
unte
r-ter
roris
m.
Coo
pera
tion
betw
een
the
AD
F an
d lo
cal
com
mun
ities
on:
•av
aila
bilit
y an
d ef
ficie
nt
use
of re
sour
ces,
AG’s
Dep
artm
ent
SOD
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
3A3–6
•ex
chan
ges
of
info
rmat
ion
and
loca
l in
telli
genc
e, a
nd
•ad
vice
on
spec
ific
loca
l iss
ues
or
prob
lem
s.
Infr
astr
uctu
re
Ava
ilabi
lity
of in
frast
ruct
ure
in n
orth
ern
Aust
ralia
.
DoT
RS,
D
epar
tmen
t of
Indu
stry
, Tou
rism
an
d R
esou
rces
(D
ITR
)
Def
ence
M
ater
iel
Div
isio
n (D
MO
), C
JLO
G a
nd
Stra
tegi
c Lo
gist
ic B
ranc
h
Ava
ilabi
lity
of in
form
atio
n on
civ
il in
frast
ruct
ure:
•tra
nspo
rt an
d di
strib
utio
n sy
stem
s, a
nd
•fu
el.
DoT
RS,
D
ITR
DM
O, C
JLO
G
and
Stra
tegi
c Lo
gist
ic B
ranc
h
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
3A3–7
Geo
spat
ial In
form
atio
n an
d S
ervi
ces
(GI&
S)
DIT
R (N
atio
nal
Map
ping
Div
isio
n)
DoT
RS
Dep
artm
ent o
f En
viro
nmen
t and
H
erita
geA
ustra
lian
Bur
eau
of S
tatis
tics
Indi
vidu
al S
tate
de
partm
ents
and
ag
enci
esA
ustra
lian
Spa
ce
Offi
ce
Col
lect
ion
and
diss
emin
atio
n of
A
ustra
lian
GI&
S is
pr
oble
mat
ic. I
n th
e w
ider
co
mm
unity
, no
sing
le
depa
rtmen
t has
car
riage
. Th
e N
atio
nal M
appi
ng
Div
isio
n in
DIT
R is
the
maj
or c
ivilia
n to
pogr
aphi
c or
gani
satio
n.
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
3A3–8
Com
mun
icat
ions
Allo
catio
n of
car
rier
capa
bilit
y an
d pr
ovis
ion
of
spec
ific
serv
ices
to m
eet
the
need
s of
the
natio
nal
defe
nce
effo
rt:
•ad
apte
d to
the
Aust
ralia
n en
viro
nmen
t,
•fu
lly in
tegr
ated
,
•se
cure
,
•tim
ely,
•ac
cura
te,
•re
liabl
e, a
nd
•ro
bust
.
DoF
AD
epar
tmen
t of
Com
mun
icat
ions
In
form
atio
n Te
chno
logy
and
th
e Ar
ts (D
oCIT
A)
SOD
Inte
llige
nce
and
Sec
urity
Cor
pora
te
Ser
vice
s an
d In
frast
ruct
ure
Gro
up (C
SIG
)
This
sup
port
invo
lves
co
ordi
natio
n in
the
activ
ities
and
ope
ratio
n of
w
ide
rang
ing
civi
lian
and
mili
tary
ass
ets
and
capa
bilit
ies,
incl
udin
g AD
F el
emen
ts o
pera
ting
over
wid
ely-
disp
erse
d ar
eas.
It a
lso
enab
les
the
sust
ainm
ent a
nd
adm
inis
tratio
n of
thes
e ac
tiviti
es a
nd o
pera
tions
, in
clud
ing
logi
stic
s an
d re
sour
ce a
nd fi
nanc
ial
man
agem
ent.
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
3A3–9
Publ
ic c
onfid
ence
Publ
ic a
war
enes
s an
d ac
cept
ance
of
arra
ngem
ents
for t
he
natio
nal d
efen
ce e
ffort
incl
udin
g th
e im
plem
enta
tion
of s
peci
fic
resp
onse
in ti
mes
of
Def
ence
em
erge
ncy.
PM
&C
DFA
TD
oCIT
A
DG
Pub
lic
Affa
irs
Incl
udes
con
tribu
ting
to
loca
l com
mun
ities
’ pe
rcep
tions
of t
heir
secu
rity
and
enge
nder
ing
publ
ic c
onfid
ence
in th
e na
tiona
l def
ence
effo
rt.
Dev
elop
men
t of a
gree
d ar
rang
emen
ts w
ith th
e m
edia
.
DG
Pub
lic
Affa
irs
Aus
tral
ia’s
en
viro
nmen
t
Con
side
ratio
n of
the
effe
cts
of a
ny n
atio
nal
defe
nce
activ
ity, b
oth
in
peac
e an
d in
tim
es o
f co
nflic
t, on
Aus
tralia
’s
natu
ral,
artif
icia
l and
soc
ial
envi
ronm
ent:
•ph
ysic
al;
•bi
olog
ical
;
•po
llutio
n;
Dep
artm
ent o
f En
viro
nmen
t and
H
erita
geP
M&
C
Def
ence
C
omm
ittee
Are
as th
at n
eed
parti
cula
r co
nsid
erat
ion
are
herit
age
site
s, b
uild
ings
and
st
ruct
ures
and
an
thro
polo
gica
l and
ar
chae
olog
ical
site
s,
relic
s, a
nd a
rtefa
cts.
In
clud
es c
onsi
dera
tion
of
inte
rnat
iona
l agr
eem
ents
, an
d ar
rang
emen
ts fo
r ac
cess
to n
ativ
e tit
le la
nd
and
rese
rves
.
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
3A3–10
•no
ise;
•vi
brat
ion;
•so
cio-
econ
omic
;
•vi
sual
;
•el
ectro
mag
netic
; an
d
•he
alth
and
saf
ety.
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
3A3–11
Appendix 4 to Annex A to
ADDP 00.2 Chapter 3
NATIONAL DEFENCE EFFORT: INTELLIGENCE AND SURVEILLANCE 4
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
Dire
ctio
n on
in
telli
genc
e an
d su
rvei
llanc
e re
quire
men
ts
Cle
ar s
trate
gic
dire
ctio
n on
the
dem
and
for
inte
lligen
ce a
nd
surv
eilla
nce
in a
ch
angi
ng s
trate
gic
envi
ronm
ent.
Prim
e M
inis
ter
and
Cab
inet
(P
M&
C),
Offi
ce o
f Nat
iona
l A
sses
smen
ts
(ON
A)
Stra
tegi
c O
pera
tions
Div
isio
n (S
OD
) Int
erna
tiona
l P
olic
y (IP
) Div
isio
n,
Def
ence
Sig
nals
D
irect
orat
e (D
SD),
Def
ence
In
tellig
ence
O
rgan
isat
ion
(DIO
)D
efen
ce Im
ager
y an
d G
eosp
atia
l O
rgan
isat
ion
(DIG
O)
The
esse
ntia
l ele
men
ts fo
r di
rect
ion
incl
ude
spec
ifica
tion
of th
e su
bjec
ts
for i
nfor
mat
ion
colle
ctio
n pr
iorit
y, le
vels
of a
ccur
acy
and
deta
il, w
hat in
telli
genc
e pr
oduc
ts a
re n
eede
d an
d ho
w th
ey a
re to
be
form
atte
d an
d di
strib
uted
.
3A4–1
Coo
rdin
atio
n of
in
telli
genc
e an
d su
rvei
llanc
e ac
tiviti
es
Esta
blis
hmen
t of a
na
tiona
l sur
veill
ance
sy
stem
that
focu
ses
on
surv
eilla
nce
of th
e se
a-ai
r app
roac
hes.
PM
&C
,Au
stra
lian
Cus
tom
s S
ervi
ce
SO
DIP
Div
isio
nD
SD
DIO
DIG
O
Incl
ude
inte
grat
ion
of c
ivil
and
mili
tary
info
rmat
ion
from
the
sea
and
air
appr
oach
es a
nd
diss
emin
atio
n to
mili
tary
co
mm
ande
rs a
nd o
ther
au
thor
ities
. Civ
il ag
enci
es
incl
ude
Coa
stw
atch
, Air
Serv
ices
Aus
tralia
, Au
stra
lian
Cus
tom
s S
ervi
ces,
Fi
sher
ies,
Imm
igra
tion,
Qua
rant
ine,
St
ate,
Ter
ritor
y an
d Fe
dera
l Po
lice,
Atto
rney
-Gen
eral
’s
Dep
artm
ent (
AG
’s) a
nd
othe
r gov
ernm
ent
depa
rtmen
ts.
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
3A4–2
Coo
rdin
atio
n of
nat
iona
l in
tellig
ence
and
su
rvei
llanc
e in
term
s of
:
•di
visi
on o
f re
spon
sibi
litie
s,
•co
nsul
tativ
e m
echa
nism
s,
•in
tegr
atio
n of
pr
oced
ures
,
•in
tellig
ence
ex
chan
ges,
and
PM
&C
SO
DIP
Div
isio
nD
SD
DIO
DIG
O
Inte
lligen
ce a
ctiv
ities
un
derta
ken
by d
omes
tic
agen
cies
incl
udin
g D
epar
tmen
t of F
orei
gn
Affa
irs a
nd T
rade
(DFA
T),
ON
A, D
IO, D
SD, A
ustra
lian
Secu
rity
Inte
lligen
ce
Org
anis
atio
n, C
oast
wat
ch,
Def
ence
Atta
ches
, St
ate/
Terri
tory
and
Au
stra
lian
Fede
ral P
olic
e,
Aust
ralia
n C
usto
ms
Serv
ice,
and
Inte
lligen
ce
orga
nisa
tions
of a
llied
D
efen
ce fo
rces
.
•cl
ear
unde
rsta
ndin
g of
in
divi
dual
age
ncy
cont
ribut
ions
to th
e na
tiona
l def
ence
ef
fort.
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
3A4–3
Coo
rdin
atio
n of
pr
otec
tion
of in
form
atio
n an
d in
telli
genc
e.A
G’s
Dep
artm
ent
Def
ence
Sec
urity
A
utho
rity
(DS
A),
SO
D,
IP D
ivis
ion,
DS
D,
DIO
,D
IGO
Cou
nter
mea
sure
s in
clud
e th
e pr
otec
tion
of k
now
ledg
e of
the
deci
sion
s su
ppor
ted
by in
telli
genc
e an
d co
nseq
uent
act
ions
and
ac
tiviti
es.
Pro
visi
on o
f inf
orm
atio
n on
inte
rnal
thre
ats
and
coor
dina
tion
of n
atio
nal
resp
onse
.
AG
’s D
epar
tmen
t
SO
D,
DS
A,D
SD
,D
IO
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
3A4–4
Col
lect
ion
of
info
rmat
ion
Col
lect
ion
of in
form
atio
n on
cou
ntrie
s of
inte
rest
fo
r Aus
tralia
n m
ilita
ry
plan
ning
:
•na
tiona
l aim
s/
obje
ctiv
es;
•po
litic
al
deve
lopm
ents
;
•ec
onom
ic a
nd s
ocia
l;
•m
ilita
ry c
apab
ilitie
s;
•ci
vil s
uppo
rt to
mili
tary
ca
pabi
litie
s an
d S
trate
gic
Com
man
d;
and
•m
ilita
ry g
eogr
aphi
c in
form
atio
n.
PM
&C
(ON
A),
DFA
T,A
G’s
Dep
artm
ent,
Dep
artm
ent o
f E
nviro
nmen
t and
H
erita
ge
SO
D,
IP D
ivis
ion,
DS
D,
DIO
,D
IGO
Envi
ronm
enta
l inf
orm
atio
n ra
nges
from
act
ual a
nd
fore
cast
ed w
eath
er a
nd
ocea
nogr
aphi
c in
form
atio
n w
hich
cha
nges
co
ntin
uous
ly, t
o ot
her
fact
ors
that
cha
nge
less
fre
quen
tly in
clud
ing
geog
raph
y, h
ydro
grap
hy
and
heal
th.
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
3A4–5
Appendix 5 to Annex A to
ADDP 00.2 Chapter 3
NATIONAL DEFENCE EFFORT: INDUSTRY 5
ELEMEN
TS O
F N
ATI
ON
AL
DEF
ENC
E EF
FOR
T
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
Supp
ort f
or th
e A
ustr
alia
n D
efen
ce F
orce
Esta
blis
h an
d re
fine
mec
hani
sms
for
ensu
ring
the
avai
labi
lity
of e
ssen
tial
form
s of
indu
stria
l sup
port
durin
g co
nflic
t.
Dep
artm
ent o
f Ind
ustry
, To
uris
m a
nd R
esou
rces
(DIT
R)
Com
man
der
Join
t Lo
gist
ics
(CJL
OG
)
Focu
sing
D
efen
ce p
olic
y fo
r ind
ustr
y
Con
tinue
to re
fine
and
exte
nd
stat
emen
ts o
f Def
ence
prio
ritie
s fo
r A
ustra
lian
indu
stry
bas
ed o
n ea
rly
and
effe
ctiv
e co
nsid
erat
ion
of
indu
stry
cap
abili
ties
and
thro
ugh
life
supp
ort i
ssue
s in
the
capa
bilit
y de
velo
pmen
t pro
cess
.
DIT
R,
Dep
artm
ent o
f Com
mun
icat
ions
In
form
atio
n Te
chno
logy
and
the
Arts
(DoC
ITA)
Hea
d In
dust
ry
Div
isio
n (D
efen
ce
Mat
erie
l O
rgan
isat
ion)
Coo
rdin
ate
Def
ence
pol
icy
for i
ndus
try
Con
tinue
to p
rovi
de e
ffect
ive
dial
ogue
bet
wee
n D
efen
ce a
nd
indu
stry
to e
ncou
rage
a b
ette
r un
ders
tand
ing
of m
utua
l dem
ands
an
d ca
pabi
litie
s.
DIT
R,
DoC
ITA
CJL
OG
3A5–1
Con
sult
with
indu
stry
to c
oord
inat
e th
e ap
plic
atio
n of
pro
gram
s an
d m
echa
nism
s fo
r enc
oura
ging
the
cost
-effe
ctiv
e de
velo
pmen
t and
su
stai
nmen
t of h
igh
prio
rity
indu
stry
ca
pabi
litie
s.
DIT
RC
JLO
G
Neg
otia
te a
ppro
pria
te a
gree
men
ts
cove
ring
the
prov
isio
n of
ess
entia
l in
dust
rial s
uppo
rt du
ring
conf
lict.
Atto
rney
- G
ener
al’s
Dep
artm
ent,
Dep
artm
ent o
f Tra
nspo
rt an
d R
egio
nal S
ervi
ces,
DoC
ITA
CJL
OG
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
3A5–2
Appendix 6 to Annex A to
ADDP 00.2 Chapter 3
NATIONAL DEFENCE EFFORT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 6
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
Tech
nolo
gica
l de
velo
pmen
t
Tech
nolo
gy
deve
lopm
ents
that
:
•en
hanc
e im
porta
nt
milit
ary
capa
bilit
ies
such
as
inte
llige
nce
colle
ctio
n an
d el
ectro
nic
war
fare
,
•re
duce
d re
quire
men
t fo
r lar
ge n
umbe
rs o
f pe
rson
nel,
and
•gi
ves
Aus
tralia
a
deci
sive
adv
anta
ge in
co
mba
t situ
atio
ns.
Dep
artm
ent o
f Ed
ucat
ion,
Sci
ence
an
d Tr
aini
ng
(DE
ST)
Def
ence
Sci
ence
an
d Te
chno
logy
O
rgan
isat
ion
(DS
TO) (
Sci
ence
P
olic
y D
ivis
ion)
Key
are
as fo
r de
velo
pmen
t of
Aust
ralia
n D
efen
ce
Forc
e ca
pabi
litie
s in
clud
e:in
telli
genc
e co
llect
ion;
eva
luat
ion
and
dist
ribut
ion;
surv
eilla
nce
and
reco
nnai
ssan
ce;
com
man
d an
d co
ntro
l;ke
y w
eapo
ns
sens
ors;
and
elec
troni
c w
arfa
re.
3A6–1
Res
earc
h an
d de
velo
pmen
t (R
&D
)
A c
oord
inat
ed
partn
ersh
ip a
ppro
ach
to
scie
nce
and
tech
nolo
gy
that
:
•en
hanc
es th
e se
lect
ion
and
dire
ctio
n of
R&
D
effo
rts to
mee
t spe
cific
ne
eds;
•en
hanc
es a
ssim
ilatio
n in
to D
efen
ce c
apab
ility
;
•fa
cilit
ates
the
man
agem
ent o
f te
chno
logy
tran
sfer
s;
and
•en
hanc
es A
ustra
lian
indu
stry
’s in
tern
atio
nal
com
petit
iven
ess.
DE
ST
DS
TO (S
cien
ce
Pol
icy
Div
isio
n)
Prin
cipa
lly a
s th
e D
STO
but
als
o th
e C
omm
onw
ealth
Sc
ienc
e an
d In
dust
rial R
esea
rch
Org
anis
atio
n,
Coo
pera
tive
Res
earc
h C
entre
s,
Aus
tralia
n N
ucle
ar
Scie
nce
and
Tech
nolo
gy
Org
anis
atio
n,
Aus
tralia
n In
stitu
te o
f M
arin
e Sc
ienc
e,
Aus
tralia
n in
dust
ry.
Inte
rnat
iona
l co
llabo
ratio
n is
an
impo
rtant
inpu
t m
ultip
lier.
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
3A6–2
Def
ence
sci
ence
and
in
dust
ry
Tech
nolo
gy tr
ansf
er to
an
d fro
m c
omm
erci
al
mar
kets
that
driv
e te
chno
logi
cal
adva
ncem
ents
, suc
h as
co
mm
unic
atio
ns a
nd
info
rmat
ion
tech
nolo
gy.
DE
ST
DS
TO (S
cien
ce
Pol
icy
Div
isio
n),
Def
ence
Mat
erie
l O
rgan
isat
ion
Agen
cies
incl
ude
Aus
tralia
n In
dust
ry,
Tele
com
mun
icat
ion.
In
dust
ry
Dev
elop
men
t A
utho
rity.
The
invo
lvem
ent o
f in
dust
ry in
the
early
ph
ase
of d
efen
ce R
&D
unde
rpin
ned
by
agre
emen
t on
issu
es
conc
erni
ng:
•te
chno
logy
tran
sfer
;
•ex
ploi
tatio
n of
R&D
; an
d
•in
dust
ry d
evel
opm
ent.
DE
ST
DS
TO (S
cien
ce
Pol
icy
Div
isio
n)
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
3A6–3
Appendix 7 to Annex A to
ADDP 00.2 Chapter 3
NATIONAL DEFENCE EFFORT: LOGISTICS 7
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
Man
agem
ent o
f lo
gist
ics
Dev
elop
men
t of l
ogis
tic
man
agem
ent
mec
hani
sms
and
syst
ems
in p
eace
time
with
a v
iew
to
faci
litat
ing
man
agem
ent i
n tim
es o
f D
efen
ce e
mer
genc
y.
Dep
artm
ent o
f In
dust
ry, T
ouris
m
and
Res
ourc
es
(DIT
R)
Chi
ef J
oint
Lo
gist
ics
(CJL
OG
)
Hea
lth s
ervi
ces
Prov
isio
n of
civ
ilian
hea
lth
serv
ices
:
•tra
ined
per
sonn
el;
•tre
atm
ent f
acili
ties;
•ev
acua
tion;
and
•ph
arm
aceu
tical
s,
vacc
ines
and
blo
od
prod
ucts
.
Dep
artm
ent o
f Fa
mily
and
C
omm
unity
S
ervi
ces
or
Dep
artm
ent o
f H
ealth
and
A
gein
g,
Dep
artm
ent o
f V
eter
ans’
Affa
irs.
Def
ence
H
ealth
S
ervi
ces,
Def
ence
Pe
rson
nel
Exe
cutiv
e (D
PE
)Se
rvic
e H
Q,
Cor
pora
te
Ser
vice
s In
frast
ruct
ure
Gro
up
DPE
invo
lved
in th
e im
plem
enta
tion.
Incl
udes
ca
pabi
lity
for t
reat
ing
battl
e ca
sual
ties
and
mai
nten
ance
of
hea
lth s
ervi
ces
to th
e co
mm
unity
.
3A7–1
Pres
erva
tion
of m
edic
al
team
s fo
r war
inju
ries
and
illnes
s.
Tim
ely
dist
ribut
ion
of
med
ical
sto
res.
Effe
ctiv
e sy
stem
s to
re
gula
te th
e m
ovem
ent o
f ca
sual
ties.
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
3A7–2
Rep
air a
nd
mai
nten
ance
se
rvic
es
Pres
erva
tion
of
equi
pmen
t and
ac
hiev
emen
t of f
ull
serv
icea
ble
life.
Effe
ctiv
e co
ordi
natio
n of
m
ilitar
y an
d ci
vilia
n re
pair
and
mai
nten
ance
ca
pabi
litie
s.
Flex
ibili
ty o
f rep
air a
nd
mai
nten
ance
ar
rang
emen
ts in
term
s of
de
man
ds o
f spe
cific
ci
rcum
stan
ces.
DIT
RC
JLO
GR
epai
r and
mai
nten
ance
ca
pabi
lity
incl
udes
ski
lls,
faci
litie
s an
d st
anda
rds.
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
3A7–3
Tran
spor
t and
di
strib
utio
n
Rev
iew
of e
xtan
t ar
rang
emen
ts in
clud
ing
mem
oran
da o
f un
ders
tand
ing.
Max
imis
ing
use
of
com
mer
cial
ser
vice
s.
Use
of f
orei
gn-o
wne
d ca
rrier
s.
Pay
men
t on
occu
rrenc
e.
Pre
dete
rmin
ed ra
tes
for
com
pens
atio
n.
Con
sulta
tive
arra
ngem
ents
bet
wee
n th
e A
ustra
lian
Def
ence
Fo
rce
(AD
F) a
nd c
arrie
rs.
Dep
t of T
rans
port
and
Reg
iona
l S
ervi
ces
(DoT
RS
)
CJL
OG
Incl
udes
the
mov
emen
t of
mili
tary
per
sonn
el o
n op
erat
iona
l ser
vice
:
•de
ploy
men
ts fr
om b
ase
area
s;
•fo
rce
rota
tion;
•re
info
rcem
ent;
•m
edic
al e
vacu
atio
n; a
nd
•re
depl
oym
ent t
o ba
ses.
The
trans
port
of m
ater
iel
incl
udes
dep
loym
ent a
nd
rede
ploy
men
t of w
eapo
ns
syst
ems,
equ
ipm
ent a
nd
stor
es, a
nd d
istri
butio
n of
co
nsum
able
item
s su
ch a
s w
ater
, foo
d, fu
el, a
mm
uniti
on
and
repa
ir pa
rts.
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
3A7–4
Dev
elop
men
t of
arra
ngem
ents
that
ac
com
mod
ate
cont
inue
d an
d ex
pand
ed a
vaila
bilit
y of
civ
ilian
tran
spor
t and
as
soci
ated
infra
stru
ctur
e in
tim
es o
f a D
efen
ce
emer
genc
y w
hen
the
ADF’
s de
man
d fo
r vol
ume
and
frequ
ency
of
mov
emen
ts b
etw
een
base
are
as a
nd li
kely
ar
eas
of m
ilita
ry
oper
atio
ns in
the
sea
and
air a
ppro
ache
s an
d no
rther
n Au
stra
lia w
ould
gr
eatly
incr
ease
.
DoT
RS
,A
ir S
ervi
ces
Aus
tralia
(AS
A)
CJL
OG
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
3A7–5
Res
olut
ion
of d
istri
butio
n ch
oke
poin
ts s
uch
as:
•w
areh
ouse
cap
abili
ty;
•tra
nspo
rt m
ode
rest
rictio
ns;
•re
gula
tions
(saf
ety,
w
eigh
t lim
itatio
ns, n
oise
cu
rfew
); an
d
•m
ater
iel h
andl
ing
limita
tions
.
DoT
RS
,A
SA
CJL
OG
Syst
ems
incl
ude:
faci
litie
s,
equi
pmen
t, se
rvic
es, a
nd
peop
le w
hich
with
to p
erfo
rm
the
func
tions
of p
roce
ssin
g or
ders
, pac
kagi
ng,
war
ehou
sing
, inv
ento
ry
man
agem
ent a
nd
trans
porta
tion
usin
g ve
ssel
s,
vehi
cles
, rai
l, ai
rcra
ft an
d pi
pelin
es. C
onsu
ltatio
n w
ith
Aus
tralia
n C
usto
ms
Ser
vice
an
d th
e Au
stra
lian
Qua
rant
ine
and
Insp
ectio
n Se
rvic
e (D
epar
tmen
t of
Agric
ultu
re, F
ishe
ries
and
Fore
stry
).
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
3A7–6
Appendix 8 to Annex A to
ADDP 00.2 Chapter 3
NATIONAL DEFENCE EFFORT: MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL COORDINATION 8
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
Man
agem
ent o
f lo
gist
ics
Dev
elop
men
t of l
ogis
tic
man
agem
ent m
echa
nism
s an
d sy
stem
s in
pea
cetim
e w
ith a
vie
w to
faci
litat
ing
man
agem
ent i
n tim
es o
f D
efen
ce e
mer
genc
y.
Dep
artm
ent o
f In
dust
ry, T
ouris
m
and
Res
ourc
es
(DIT
R)
Chi
ef J
oint
Lo
gist
ics
(CJL
OG
)
Hea
lth s
ervi
ces
Prov
isio
n of
civ
ilian
heal
th
serv
ices
:
•tra
ined
per
sonn
el;
•tre
atm
ent f
acili
ties;
•ev
acua
tion;
and
•ph
arm
aceu
tical
s,
vacc
ines
and
blo
od
prod
ucts
. P
repa
ratio
n of
med
ical
te
ams
for w
ar in
jurie
s an
d illn
esse
s.
Dep
artm
ent o
f H
ealth
and
Ag
eing
or
Dep
artm
ent o
f Fa
mily
and
C
omm
unity
S
ervi
ces
Dep
artm
ent o
f V
eter
ans’
Affa
irs.
Def
ence
H
ealth
S
ervi
ces
Def
ence
Per
sonn
el
Exec
utiv
e in
volv
ed in
the
impl
emen
tatio
n. In
clud
es
capa
bilit
y fo
r tre
atin
g ba
ttle
casu
altie
s, a
nd
mai
nten
ance
of h
ealth
se
rvic
es to
the
com
mun
ity.
3A8–1
Tim
ely
dist
ribut
ion
of
med
ical
sto
res.
E
ffect
ive
syst
ems
to
regu
late
the
mov
emen
t of
casu
altie
s.
Rep
air a
nd
mai
nten
ance
se
rvic
es
Pres
erva
tion
of e
quip
men
t an
d ac
hiev
emen
t of f
ull
serv
icea
ble
life.
Effe
ctiv
e co
ordi
natio
n of
m
ilita
ry a
nd c
ivili
an re
pair
and
mai
nten
ance
ca
pabi
litie
s.
Flex
ibilit
y of
repa
ir an
d m
aint
enan
ce a
rrang
emen
ts
in te
rms
of d
eman
ds o
f sp
ecifi
c ci
rcum
stan
ces.
DIT
RC
JLO
GR
epai
r and
mai
nten
ance
ca
pabi
lity
incl
udes
ski
lls,
faci
litie
s an
d st
anda
rds.
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
3A8–2
Tran
spor
t and
di
strib
utio
n
Rev
iew
of e
xtan
t ar
rang
emen
ts in
clud
ing
mem
oran
da o
f un
ders
tand
ing.
Max
imis
ing
use
of
com
mer
cial
ser
vice
s.
Use
of f
orei
gn-o
wne
d ca
rrier
s.
Pay
men
t on
occu
rren
ce.
Pred
eter
min
ed ra
tes
for
com
pens
atio
n.
Con
sulta
tive
arra
ngem
ents
be
twee
n th
e Au
stra
lian
Def
ence
For
ce (A
DF)
and
ca
rrier
s.
Dep
artm
ent o
f Tr
ansp
ort a
nd
Reg
iona
l S
ervi
ces
(DoT
RS
)
CJL
OG
Incl
udes
the
mov
emen
t of
mili
tary
per
sonn
el o
n op
erat
iona
l ser
vice
:
•de
ploy
men
ts fr
om b
ase
area
s;
•fo
rce
rota
tion;
•re
info
rcem
ent;
•m
edic
al e
vacu
atio
n;
and
•re
depl
oym
ent t
o ba
ses.
The
trans
port
of m
ater
iel
incl
udes
dep
loym
ent a
nd
rede
ploy
men
t of w
eapo
ns
syst
ems,
equ
ipm
ent a
nd
stor
es, a
nd d
istri
butio
n of
co
nsum
able
item
s su
ch
as w
ater
, foo
d, fu
el,
amm
uniti
on a
nd re
pair
parts
.
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
3A8–3
Dev
elop
men
t of
arra
ngem
ents
that
ac
com
mod
ate
cont
inue
d an
d ex
pand
ed a
vaila
bilit
y of
ci
vilia
n tra
nspo
rt an
d as
soci
ated
infra
stru
ctur
e in
tim
es o
f a D
efen
ce
emer
genc
y w
hen
the
AD
F’s
dem
and
for v
olum
e an
d fre
quen
cy o
f mov
emen
ts
betw
een
base
are
as a
nd
likel
y ar
eas
of m
ilitar
y op
erat
ions
in th
e se
a an
d ai
r ap
proa
ches
and
nor
ther
n Au
stra
lia w
ould
gre
atly
in
crea
se.
DoT
RS
Air
Serv
ices
A
ustra
lia (A
SA
)C
JLO
G
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
3A8–4
Res
olut
ion
of d
istri
butio
n ch
oke
poin
ts s
uch
as:
•w
areh
ouse
cap
abilit
y;
•tra
nspo
rt m
ode
rest
rictio
ns;
•re
gula
tions
(saf
ety,
wei
ght
limita
tions
, noi
se c
urfe
w);
and
•m
ater
iel h
andl
ing
limita
tions
.
DoT
RS
AS
AC
JLO
G
Syst
ems
incl
ude:
fa
cilit
ies,
equ
ipm
ent,
serv
ices
, and
peo
ple
whi
ch w
ith to
per
form
the
func
tions
of p
roce
ssin
g or
ders
, pac
kagi
ng,
war
ehou
sing
, inv
ento
ry
man
agem
ent a
nd
trans
porta
tion
usin
g ve
ssel
s, v
ehic
les,
rail,
ai
rcra
ft an
d pi
pelin
es.
Con
sulta
tion
with
Au
stra
lian
Cus
tom
s Se
rvic
e an
d th
e Au
stra
lian
Qua
rant
ine
and
Insp
ectio
n Se
rvic
e (D
epar
tmen
t of
Agric
ultu
re, F
ishe
ries
and
Fore
stry
).
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
3A8–5
Faci
litie
s
Coo
rdin
atio
n of
pub
lic a
nd
priv
ate
sect
or d
eman
d fo
r fa
cilit
ies
in a
Def
ence
em
erge
ncy.
Cor
pora
te
Ser
vice
s In
frast
ruct
ure
Gro
up (C
SIG
), C
JLO
G
CS
IG in
volv
ed in
im
plem
enta
tion.
D
evel
opm
ent o
f an
appr
opria
te c
oord
inat
ion
mec
hani
sm n
eeds
to
acco
mm
odat
e th
is
prin
cipa
l iss
ue. I
ts
repr
esen
tatio
n sh
ould
in
clud
e D
epar
tmen
t of
Fina
nce
and
Adm
inis
tratio
n, D
efen
ce,
Sta
te a
nd T
errit
ory
Dep
artm
ent o
f Wor
ks, a
nd
indu
stry
.
ELEM
ENTS
OF
NA
TIO
NA
L D
EFEN
CE
EFFO
RT
PRIN
CIP
LE IS
SUES
CO
OR
DIN
ATI
NG
D
EPA
RTM
ENT
DEF
ENC
E LE
AD
CO
MM
ENTS
3A8–6
Annex B to ADDP 00.2 Chapter 3
DEFENCE MOBILISATION COMMITTEE—MOBILISATION FUNCTIONS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES B
SUBJECT FUNCTION DESCRIPTION PRIME PLANNING RESPONSIBILITY
Fundamental inputs to capability
Reserves Provide advice to the Chief of the Defence Force on matters affecting the Australian Defence Force (ADF) Reserves; includes call out, conditions of employment and employer support, and employee protection.
Head Reserve Policy
Conditions of employment and conditions of service
Develop Defence policy on pay and conditions and employment. This includes such things as work force planning/safety, risk management, training and honours and awards.
Head of Defence Personnel Executive (HDPE)
Recruiting Plan and functionally control the recruiting operations of the three Services. Develop recruiting policy.
HDPE
Member and family support and services
Provide social work, family liaison, and support services/ programs for ADF and Defence personnel and their families.
HDPE
3B–1
ADDP 00.2
Health services
Provision of ADF health services and policy. Coordinate health issues with other agencies.
HDPE
Acquisition Manage the acquisition and introduction of major and minor capital equipment
Chief Executive Officer Defence Materiel Organisation (CEO DMO)
Fundamental inputs to capability
Requisition Advise on requisition requirements and policy.
CEO DMODirector-General The Defence Legal Service (DG TDLS)
Industry Develop policy and programs for industry support to Defence requirements.
CEO DMO
Agreements Manage international logistics policy and agreements.
Commander Joint Logistics (CJLOG)
Fuel management
Plan and undertake strategic fuel management.
CJLOG
Ammunition management
Plan and undertake strategic ammunition management.
CJLOG
Contracting Formulate and implement contracting policies and services to support Defence purchasing.
CEO DMOand CJLOG
SUBJECT FUNCTION DESCRIPTION PRIME PLANNING RESPONSIBILITY
3B–2
ADDP 00.2
Facilities/infrastructure
Develop, recommend, implement, and review facilities and property policies, plans and programs.
CEO DMO/Deputy Secretary Corporate Services (DEPSEC CS)
Strategic transport and distribution
Develop policy, procedures and doctrine for operational and non-operational movements, and national civil infrastructure support. Maintain Defence movement and transport information and planning systems.
CJLOG and Deputy Chief of Joint Operations
Regional support
Provide regional administrative and operational support.
DEPSEC CS
Finance Budget/FiveYear Defence Program Ministerial Submissions
Prepare/coordinate the preparation of Budget and Ministerial Submissions.
Chief Finance Officer
Legal Provide legal advice on international and operational law, the law of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions and Protocols, command and administration of the ADF.
DEPSEC CS (DG TDLS)
SUBJECT FUNCTION DESCRIPTION PRIME PLANNING RESPONSIBILITY
3B–3
ADDP 00.2
Science and technology
Provide scientific and technical advice and support for critical short warning conflict requirements.
Chief Defence Scientist
Other Public relations/public information
Reflect in public information activities the maintenance of Defence policy and issues.
DG Public Affairs
Emergency management
Undertake national coordination for dealing with emergency management across the boundaries of all Emergency Services and States and Territories.
Emergency Management Australia (EMA)–Attorney- General’s Department.
Civil defence Undertake national coordination for civil defence.
EMA
Environmental Review and apply environmental considerations
DEPSEC CS
Liaison Undertake strategic level liaison.
Deputy Secretary Strategy (FAS International Policy)CEO DMO and CJLOG
Coordination of national mobilisation issues
Provide advice on the national issues supporting Defence level mobilisation.
Chief of Capability Development Group (DG Capability Plans)
SUBJECT FUNCTION DESCRIPTION PRIME PLANNING RESPONSIBILITY
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MOBILISATION PLANNER FORMAT C
Security classification
Originating organisation Place of issue Date-time group
Mobilisation Plan Number
References: A. Maps and chartsB. Other pertinent documents
1. Mission. State the strategic or operational commander’s mission.
2. Situation and considerations:
a. Assumptions:
(1) The fundamental inputs to capability should be used as a guide.
b. Mobilisation considerations:
(1) Work force availability.
(2) Transportation.
(3) Equipment and materiel.
(4) Health service support.
(5) Facilities.
(6) Industrial base.
(7) Training base expansion.
(8) Communications.
(9) Host nation support.
(10) Environment.
(11) Legislative issues.
(12) Funding.
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c. National support base. For example, liaison—clearly identified tasks and priorities, acquisition policy, standards determined, multinational support implications, work force implications.
d. Legal considerations. For example, compensation, Reserve force legislation, secondment implications, call out legislation reviewed, rules of engagement, review of Occupational Health and Safety legislation, implication of international treaties etc.
e. Funding. For example, level of funding determined, funding priorities established, costing capture mechanisms developed and in place.
f. Environment. For example, impact of training areas, training focus, requirement for compliance and exemptions, host country environment issues, legal issues, use of the environment as a weapon or bargaining influence, conservation, compliance, clean-up and impact analysis.
3. Mobilisation analysis of courses of action:
a. Make an orderly examination of factors, including their impact on each other, to assess the affect on the proposed courses of action (COA). The objectives are to determine whether the mobilisation requirements can be met and to isolate the implications that should be considered by the operational commander in the military appreciation process:
(1) For example, if a COA requires training base expansion, the analysis process should establish that there are sufficient qualified instructors, facilities, equipment and medical support for an expanded training establishment. A shortage in one or more areas may render a COA unfeasible.
b. Analyse the factors in subparagraph 2b. for each COA under consideration. Examine these factors realistically for time-phased requirements versus actual or programmed capabilities that may affect the mobilisation COA.
c. Throughout the analysis, keep mobilisation considerations foremost in mind. The analysis is not intended to produce a decision. It is intended to ensure that all applicable mobilisation factors have been properly considered and to serve as the basis for comparisons in paragraph 4.
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4. Comparison of courses of action:
a. List the effect that work force mobilisation has on the other resource areas from an operational support point of view.
b. Develop a work sheet that identifies decisions that must be made in all resource areas based on the mobilisation decision.
5. Conclusions:
a. State whether the mission can be achieved from a mobilisation perspective.
b. State which mobilisation COA can best be achieved from an overall perspective.
c. Identify the major resource area deficiencies that must be brought to the attention of the operational commander or the Defence Mobilisation Committee.
d. Provide recommendations to eliminate or reduce the effects of those deficiencies.
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CHAPTER 4
SUSTAINMENT 4
Introduction 4.1
4.1 Chapter one defines capability as the combination of force structure and preparedness with the components of preparedness being readiness and sustainability. This chapter draws upon complimentary concepts from Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 4.0—Defence Logistics and ADDP 4.2—Support to Operations.
4.2 Purpose. The purpose of this chapter is to provide sustainment concepts and doctrine.
SUSTAINMENT CONCEPTS 4.3
Sustainment 4.3
4.3 Sustainment is the outcome achieved by ensuring the ability of a force to continue to conduct effective operations for the duration required to achieve its objectives. It includes not only the in-theatre support of forces deployed, but also encompasses the generation of additional forces and support outside the area of operations (AO) during all phases of the continuum. At the strategic level, sustainment of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) includes the capacity to generate forces at operational level of capability (OLOC) from the force-in-being at directed level of capability (DLOC) and to grow capability for the future force. The sustainment process is concerned with every stage of the preparedness (and mobilisation) cycle that is, from force preparation, generation, the conduct of the operation and its subsequent recovery and re-constitution. It influences the decision on the level of commitment, duration, tempo and the level of intensity of an operation or campaign. It in turn is influenced by several factors including:
• demand;
• duration;
• distance;
• destination;
• attrition—both of personnel and equipment;
• equipment availability;
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• capability evolution;
• resource availability;
• command support;
• training;
• current stockholdings;
• risk; and
• priority.
4.4 Sustainment is the function of providing personnel, logistic and other support required to maintain and prolong operations until the successful accomplishment of the mission or the national objective. Such a national objective may be the sustainment of capabilities to a prescribed level of preparedness.
Sustainment period 4.5
4.5 The sustainment period (SP) is the time a force is to be supported on operations including the operational viability period (OVP). The OVP is that period whereby the force must be self-sufficient until the logistic and other support chains can be established. The SP ceases when the force is withdrawn from operations and commences the reconstitution phase. The SP is likely to require the rotation of the whole, or part, of the initial deployment force.
4.6 Force element groups (FEG), units and formations will normally maintain sufficient supplies, replacements and reinforcements for an initial deployment at OLOC for several days; for Army, usually three or four. However, Navy major fleet units operate with sufficient supplies for independent operations for several weeks (normally OLOC). Support organisations at the operational level will often maintain a further 26 or 27 days of these commodities in-theatre to take the total to 30 days. The strategic level of support, as part of the contingency operational planning process, will provide the stocks required to sustain operations beyond this point. Whilst 30 days is often the prescribed planning level, in-theatre
Sustainability—the ability of a force to maintain the necessary level of combat power for the duration required to achieve its objectives.
Sustainment—the provision of personnel, logistic and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment of the mission or the national objective.
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stockholdings will to a large extent be driven by the distribution system and its capacity, the sourcing of commodities, and the nature and security of the lines of communications (LofC).
Levels of sustainability 4.7
4.7 The national strategic level of warfare is concerned with the employment of national power to achieve military outcomes that conform to national objectives.1 It links the national economic base (people, resources and industry) to military operations. Strategic capabilities include the Department of Defence, the ADF, other government agencies as necessary or appropriate, and the support of the private sector, particularly defence industry. Effective sustainability relates to optimising limited resources, making decisions based on new and changing circumstances, improvising where necessary and overcoming impediments.
4.8 Sustainability relates to the three levels of ADF warfare as follows:
• Strategic. Strategic sustainment is the capability to generate and reconstitute maritime, land or air forces to OLOC for assignment to operational commanders and to sustain those forces once deployed beyond the OVP. It also includes the capability to generate rotation forces as required. Strategic sustainment requires support from the national support base (NSB) and international sources to develop and sustain Australian military capability. It is the role of the three Services to ‘raise, train and sustain’ their respective forces to be employed by Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC).
• Operational. Operational sustainment is that provided to a number of deployed forces in one or more AO within a theatre during SP that might or might not be concurrent. Planning at this level should occur at HQJOC.
• Tactical. Tactical sustainment is provided to a particular deployed force during the SP of a specific operation within an AO. It is planned and conducted by specific units within given time frames and focuses directly upon war fighting.
1 ADDP–D—Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine
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4.9 The relationship between force structure, preparedness, readiness and sustainability represents something of a balance. If force elements are maintained at relatively high states of readiness and are able to achieve decisive results early in a campaign, there is less likelihood of requiring significant strategic sustainment resources. Managing levels of ADF sustainability is essentially a strategic risk management activity in which sustainability must be balanced against force structure, readiness and operational outcome. It is important to keep any consideration of sustainability within its proper context as an integral element of capability, rather than in relative isolation.
Elements of sustainment 4.10
4.10 The elements of sustainment are essentially the elements of capability. Accordingly, the fundamental inputs to capability (FIC) in chapter 1—‘Capability and preparedness concepts’ figure 1–2 describe the elements of sustainment. The FIC provide the basis for sustainability planning and for expressing the sustainment requirement, and, therefore, for reporting deficiencies against the requirement.
FORCE STRUCTURE, READINESS AND SUSTAINABILITY
Over time we lost strategic agility. Our units became hollow. Our ability to operate away from the Australian support base degraded dangerously. Our capacity to generate, sustain and rotate forces eroded.
The tremendous efforts of all of the Australian Defence Force in East Timor concealed these deficiencies in the Army’s capabilities. But we learnt some important lessons during that deployment.
We needed increased readiness, enhanced mobilisation capabilities, more and better strategic lift, improved logistics, improved engineering capability, better mobility, improved long-range communications and an ability to win water, distribute fuel over the shore as well as improved stevedoring and medical services.
Chief of Army LTGEN Peter Leahy
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HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—PERSONNEL SUSTAINABILITY, SOUTH VIETNAM AND EAST TIMOR
Maintaining a task force of three battalions plus combat support and service support was testing enough for the ADF, with a tour of duty of one year in South Vietnam (SVN) and two years respite before a repeat tour. This was so even with Army able to replenish junior ranks with national servicemen, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) able to call on its reservists to man logistics shipping, and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) without other significant commitment. This force expansion made ongoing heavy demands on the Permanent Forces as the commitment extended year-by-year. Units and individuals, particularly scarce senior non-commissioned officers, repeated and some re-repeated tours of duty, while the repetitive training cycle, added to the administrative demands of a short-term national service commitment, soaked up additional resources at home.
An alternative national service obligation directed eligible conscriptees into service in the Citizen Military Forces, which was maintained at three divisions that were thereby unusually well-manned. However, these reserve units were not intended to be part of the replacement process, and few individuals from them volunteered and were accepted for service in SVN. Also, with a two-year national service full-time obligation, after subtracting time required for basic, advanced and pre-operational training, and for discharge procedures at the end of the full-time period, this left an average of about nine months for operational service, resulting in substantial turnover within units during their 12 months deployment. The commitment was maintained, with increasing difficulty, by the expanded Regular Army of nine battalions and its national service augmentation from 1966 to 1972.
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The relationship between sustainability and logistics 4.11
4.11 Sustainability comprises all the ‘sinews of war’, including logistic, materiel, personnel, and the technical, administration and infrastructure support required to maintain the capabilities of a modern Defence force. Sustainment is drawn from the three areas that constitute the NSB; organic resources of Defence, Australian national resources and civil support arrangements, and international resources and support.
4.12 Sustainment is a concept and outcome that normally deals with the strategic and operational levels of command (particularly regarding preparedness issues) and encompasses the provision of resources for operations. Logistics may be considered as the application of sustainment (less manpower) at the operational and tactical levels of command and deals with the practical application of those resources within the AO. Sustainment encompasses logistics, as logistics does not include such aspects as manpower, legal issues, and communications. Logistics provides the
HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—(cont)Deployment to East Timor in 1999 was based on the existing RAN and RAAF resources and an Army of six under-strength battalions with a depleted logistic support system. This base was further compromised by a tour of duty of six months with the added overload on training, movement and manpower which early rotations dictate. Additional commitments to other peacekeeping and peacemaking tasks were set to exacerbate the problems, however early dramatic success of the stabilising operation, further aided by a subsequent takeover of the succeeding phase by a United Nations force, reduced the liability to a sustainable battalion group plus logistics support.
What was shaping to crisis proportions receded. However, the lessons learnt and re-learnt so regularly in the ADF’s previous century—of the crippling effects of ongoing degrading of core capabilities for expedient and partisan reasons, and depletion of materiel and personnel resources which enable successful force sustainment—were once more brought home. A wiser and chastened ADF has undertaken rectification of this—for the present.
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resources that underpin combat power, positions those resources in the battlespace, sustains them throughout the execution of operations and redeploys and regenerates them.
Accountability for sustainment 4.13
4.13 Ensuring sustainment means being accountable for developing the sustainability requirement and then ensuring that other agencies or organisations deliver the necessary support to agreed levels of quantity, quality, cost and time. In the wider Defence it is probable that actual physical sustainment will be delivered by non-organic organisations other than those which have the requirement to be sustained (organic). These enabling organisations are accountable for their respective contributions to sustainability.
Sustainment must be considered as an integral element of capability and encompassing logistics.
Accountability may be described in terms of ensuring, contributing, advising and monitoring.
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4.14 Using the levels of sustainability, the following accountabilities are prescribed:
Table 4–1: Levels of sustainability and associated accountability
Sustainability level
Accountability Responsibility
Strategic
Chief of the Defence Force (CDF)Secretary Department of Defence
Defence Service ChiefsChief Executive Officer Defence Materiel Organisation (CEO DMO)Deputy Secretary Corporate Services (DEPSEC CS)Head Defence Personnel Executive (HDPE)
NationalWhole-of-GovernmentAustralian IndustryAustralian national resources
International Alliance and coalition partnersInternational sources
Operational
Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS)/Vice Chief of the Defence Force
Service ChiefsDeputy Secretary Strategy (DEPSEC S)Deputy Secretary Intelligence and Security (DEPSEC I&S)Deputy CJOPS (DCJOPS)CEO DMODEPSEC CS Commander Joint Logistics (CJLOG)HDPE
TacticalJoint Task Force Commander
Service ChiefsDCJOPSDEPSEC SDEPSEC I&S CEO DMODEPSEC Corporate Services and Infrastructure GroupCJLOG HDPE
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Sustainability planning 4.15
4.15 The process and accountabilities for joint planning are set out in Australian Defence Force Publication 9—Joint Planning (to be re-written as ADDP 5.0—Joint Planning). The officer(s) accountable for ensuring sustainability at the strategic, operational and tactical levels are also responsible for ensuring that the necessary sustainability planning is undertaken. The outcome sought from sustainability planning is a statement of the requirement that can be implemented by the organisations contributing to sustainment. Government guidance will be critical to informing such things as rotation policies, the operational and strategic end-states, duration and supplementary resourcing.
4.16 The FIC should be used as the broad categories in which the sustainment requirement is expressed. The requirement will normally be derived through the application of assumption-based planning techniques. Endorsed assumptions should be employed when deriving sustainability data. When endorsed assumptions are not available the assumptions which form the basis of the requirement must be clearly expressed. Without a clearly expressed sustainment requirement, the organisations responsible for contributing to sustainment will be unable to effectively perform their role and make optimal use of limited resources.
Sustainability planning guidance 4.17
4.17 Sustainment planning is conducted at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Guidance for this planning is contained in the following documents:
• ADDP, notably ADDP 4.2 and ADDP 4.0—Defence Logistics.
• The CDF Preparedness Directive (CPD).
• HQJOC Operational Preparedness Requirement.
• Group Organisational Performance Agreements (including Customer Supplier Agreements incorporating DLOC).
• ADF Key Priorities Statement. The Key Priorities Statement is attached to the CPD as annex C.
• Defence Instruction (General) (DI (G)) LOG 06–4—ADF Reserve Stockholding Policy.
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Scenarios and sustainability planning 4.18
4.18 Sustainability planning is assumption-based planning. Scenarios from Australia’s Illustrative Planning Scenarios (AIPS) set should be used to derive sustainability planning data. Scenarios not derived from the AIPS should still meet the following criteria:
• a clear and credible linkage to strategic guidance;
• are sufficiently detailed to form the basis for sustainability calculations; and
• are endorsed by senior Defence (Defence Committee or Chiefs of Service Committee) committees as a basis for planning.
STOCKHOLDING POLICY 4.19
4.19 The translation of sustainability guidance into administrative, logistic and other resources, requires the identification of both the operating stock levels required by FEG to maintain their DLOC, and the reserve stocks required by FEG to contribute to work-up to OLOC. This will allow for the support of their deployment and sustainment on operations for the duration of the specified period.
Reserve stocks 4.20
4.20 Reserve stockholdings are fundamentally linked to sustainability. They are over and above peacetime operating stocks, and encompass work-up, OVP and sustainment stocks. To ensure there are sufficient reserve stockholdings to support short notice operations and longer-term operational preparedness objective requirements, they need to be calculated (or otherwise assessed), considered and procured against a conscious risk management decision largely based on threat (scenario-based), discretion, consequence, cost and availability. Policy for the determination of selected reserve stock categories is included in the CPD. For stock categories not included in the CPD the policy contained in DI(G) 06–4, is to be used to determine reserve stockholdings.
4.21 CPD reserve stockholding policy is set and controlled by the CDF. The reserve stockholding levels contained in the CPD cannot be breached or adjusted without the explicit approval of CDF.
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SUSTAINABILITY FACTORS 4.22
4.22 Experience and historical analysis have a part to play in the quantification of sustainment; for example, attrition rates from previous campaigns are readily available. Equally, operational analysis and computer modelling can give an indication of the likely requirement. However, these alone are not the complete answer and ultimately it will become a professional judgement of the requirement that balances the need to avoid over-insurance against the minimum essential need. Risk assessment and subsequent risk management strategies are essential practices. As noted in paragraph 4.2, there are many factors that influence sustainment, however, there are four critical factors to be considered when estimating the requirement for sustainment, these being: destination, demand, distance and duration.
4.23 Destination (ie the operational theatre) dictates the environment in which the operation is to take place, including the physical threat. The environment determines the pattern of wear and tear and storage on equipment, and the physiological demands on personnel. The destination will define the LofC to the operation and determine the resources required to maintain it. Destination will critically influence the resources required for deployment, the timing, speed of deployment and reaction, and the execution of subsequent operational plans. The length and difficulty in maintaining the LofC, and the ability of the enemy to interdict it, will determine the need, or otherwise, for forward mounting bases and the extent to which non-organic resources may be required.
4.24 Demand will determine the volume of support required. Demand is not simply a function of calculating the consumption or usage of supplies, but also its pattern, rate of change and variability. Demand is related to the Commander’s intent and may vary with time, be cyclical, steady or surge at particular times. Demand will determine the size of the organisation required to sustain the operation. Demand will depend on the nature and scale of the operation, the characteristics and size of the force and also the facilities and services available within theatre. Essential to meeting the demand will be some method of prioritising demands. There will seldom be sufficient resources to meet all demands, therefore, controlled allocation of resources is essential.
4.25 Distance both to and within the theatre of operations will determine the length and capacity of supply routes. This in turn will affect the size, shape, structure and balance of resources required to sustain the operation. It will also determine the volume of equipment required to stock any equipment regeneration process as well as transit times and the need for intermediate staging bases. Distance may vary as air operations develop; therefore there must be sufficient resources available to re-adjust and extend the LofC to maintain operational flexibility.
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4.26 The duration of the operation, along with the other factors, will determine the overall volume of materiel required and the size of the sustainment task. Duration will determine the need for endurance and the need to rotate or replace personnel and supporting infrastructure. An assessment of risk will have to be made. Is a short, sharp operation to be planned and lightly sustained (with associated risk), or is it to be a fully resourced, more deliberate and possibly better prepared operation that takes longer to mount? Duration should also take into account the need for preparation and recovery.
SOURCES OF SUPPORT 4.27
4.27 Once the requirement for sustainment has been quantified, the question of resourcing the requirement is raised. Previously, and notably during World War II, forces were sustained by a home war economy where all the resources of the state were focused on the war effort. Every conceivable requirement was met by uniformed personnel and the system of sustainment was comprehensive and complete. Recent military operations have been characterised by the reduction of available military resources and services and also the increasing importance of allied and civilian resources. There are several types of support available for ADF operations. They are ADF organic support, international military support and commercial and civil support. These categories are fully explored in ADDP 4.2, with only a summary given in the following paragraphs. The three categories are not prescriptive, are not hierarchical in employment and there is no graduated decision as to which to utilise. The most appropriate means or combination, must be employed to suit the prevailing circumstances.
4.28 Australian Defence Force organic support. This category of support is the most responsive available. The level of deployment will be based on an estimate of the requirement balanced against the availability of resources from other sources. Inevitably there will be pressure to minimise the level of military assets deployed to both minimise costs and also to reduce the requirement to sustain the supporting infrastructure. Balanced against this is the certainty of support given by dedicated military assets. In addition to initial deployment, reinforcement from military assets could be enhanced if the level of deployed organic resources is insufficient to support the operation. Military assets offer the greatest flexibility and reliability, but by their very nature they may be the most expensive resource and may need to be balanced by the use of other non-organic assets. However, such assets may act in a combatant role when required, whereas there are significant limitations regarding the employment of civilians in an AO.
The four key factors of sustainability are: destination, demand, distance and duration.
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4.29 International military support. Australia must have the capability to be self-reliant in terms of combat capability, but it is unlikely to be self-sufficient in the goods and services it needs to support that combat capability due to our small population and limited infrastructure base. We are likely to require assistance from overseas sources of support for the foreseeable future. There may also be a need to transit through other countries when deploying to an AO via an Intermediate Staging Base with an inherent requirement for support from the host nation. Ongoing support from coalition and non-coalition military forces in the form of the military equipment sales, associated technical support, and ongoing mutual logistics support may also be required. Strategic sea lift and airlift in particular, is likely to continue to be a critical weakness in the Australian order of battle and supplementation will often be sought from international military sources. Availability of military and commercial strategic lift and other support will, however, be dependent on worldwide operations and contingencies current at that time and should not be taken for granted. Such support will be enhanced through the development of personal relationships and the establishment of various arrangements and agreements.
4.30 Commercial support. This is the third primary source of support to operations and involves the civilian work force in the commercial and civil sectors, both nationally and internationally. The commercial work force includes civilian employees of Australian and overseas contractors working either from their home locations or deployed to a theatre or AO. Commercial support provided under the capability support dimension via In-Service Support contracts is equally applicable in support of operations if circumstances allow. This area of support, excluding international support, is often referred to as the NSB. The NSB encompasses the full range of organisations, systems and arrangements (both formal and informal) that own, control or influence ADF access to and use of capability. In geographic (physical) terms, the NSB refers to Australian territory. Details regarding the employment of civilians in an AO, is contained in ADFP 4.2.1—Civilians in Support of Australian Defence Force Operations and supported by DI(G) OPS 5–3—Civilians in Support of ADF Operations.
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Figure 4–1: F–111 maintenance by civil contractor and Royal Australian Air Force technicians, Amberley
4.31 The civil sector includes Australian Public Service (APS) personnel employed in the Department of Defence, public servants of other Federal and State or Territory Government Departments (including police and emergency services), and philanthropic and special category civilians who may be treated in a manner similar to the APS. It also encompasses support from public servants from other nations and employees of non-government agencies or organisations.
The size and depth of the Australian civil aviation industry gives a significant capacity for quality-assured base aircraft maintenance. This obviates the necessity to maintain extensive and expensive duplication within the ADF for RAAF, Army and RAN air assets, leaving the lesser-level field servicing and repair levels for ADF maintenance units.
Use of available and effective contract systems can provide valuable and economic force extenders both in base and operational areas, while using Service technicians in tandem with the contractor maintains the Service skill levels for field operations.
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4.32 Host nation support comprises military and civil assistance given by a host nation to coalition forces which are either located in, or are in transit through the host nation’s territory. The basis of such assistance would come from agreements and arrangements concluded between the host nation and Australia or other coalition members. The assistance may be free of charge or provided on a repayment basis. Local commercial contractors should also be considered as a possible resource having first gained the political assent of the host nation authorities. It should be noted that in the case of some regional countries, support from host nations might be very limited.
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CHAPTER 5
LOGISTIC RESOURCE MOBILISATION 5
Introduction 5.1
5.1 Mobilisation planning should ensure that a capacity exists to exploit all the fundamental inputs to capability and national mobilisation resource categories.
5.2 Economic considerations largely dictate that the Australian Defence Force (ADF) will not own or control all of the logistics capability required for mobilising forces to achieve their operational level of capability (OLOC). Because of long lead times and cost constraints, mobilisation of materiel and facilities will often need to occur before the mobilisation of personnel. Accordingly, strategic arrangements, agreements, partnerships, alliances and processes with sources beyond the control of the ADF should be in place to guarantee logistics availability when and where required. The prime responsibility for this rests with the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO).
5.3 The relationship between mobilisation phases, levels of capability and consequent resource implications are shown diagrammatically in chapter 1—‘Capability and preparedness concepts’. In summary, the phases and their respective generic resource requirements are:
• Preparation, during which minimum resources are needed to ensure force elements (FE) attain and remain at their agreed and funded directed level of operational capability (DLOC).
• Work-up, whereby resources and arrangements are required to bring FE to OLOC within warning time and to sustain forces at OLOC for the operational viability period (OVP).
• Operations, during which sustainability resources are required and consumed.
• Reconstitution, during which resources are required to reconstitute FE or move them from OLOC to DLOC, which may not be the same as that prior to mobilisation.
Mobilisation is a rare, momentous and unique event. The magnitude of such an administrative operation is imperfectly understood, and yet it is an operation of such magnitude as to impose burdens across the whole infrastructure of a nation.
J. Wood 1986
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5.4 Materiel resources are considered prime equipment and systems acquired through major or minor equipment programs. Logistic resources concern the equipment, infrastructure, consumables and services required to support the operational FE. Included in logistics is the capability to access resources, services and infrastructure not held on the inventory of the force-in-being (FIB) and, therefore, under the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) control. Unless otherwise specified, for the ease of subsequent use during this chapter, materiel and logistic resources will be referred to generically as ‘resources’. Those resources associated with preparation, work-up and an initial OVP are termed ‘readiness resources’. Readiness resources and sustainability resources together are termed ‘preparedness resources’.
5.5 A decision to work-up all or part of the ADF will cause an increase in activities and necessarily place greater demand on current stockholdings of the ADF supply system and non-organic supply sources. It will also impact on our ability to maintain a supply of trained and ready forces and on the performance of other resource elements integral to preparedness and mobilisation. To ensure that an adequate flow of resources is available to meet preparedness demands, supply sources need to be identified and mechanisms need to be in place to optimise responsiveness in time of contingency. An estimate of demand will not be available until the nature of the threat and subsequent level of commitment and mobilisation is determined.
5.6 Purpose. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the resource elements of mobilisation and describe the framework required during peace to ensure essential resources can be acquired in time to support contingency operations.
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 5.7
General 5.7
5.7 Effective and efficient resource management during operations will always be a considered and informed judgment of the balance between the time frame, activity levels, usage rates, priority for allocation of resources and the ability of resource systems to surge to meet the needs of a particular contingency. These aspects combine to form a resource management framework for testing and determining the resource needs of an FE’s operational requirements.
Period of contingency 5.8
5.8 Effective preparedness and mobilisation planning is contingent upon effective and consistent assessment of operational resource requirements in addition to those required for work-up. The period of contingency (POC) is the
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term given to the planning time frame, which should be used to assess and determine the period for which operational resource requirements will be required.
5.9 The POC encompasses three time periods: the work-up period, the OVP and the sustainment period (SP):
• Work-up period. The work-up period is the period in which FE are required to raise their levels of capability from DLOC to OLOC. The resources used in this period are termed work-up resources. The period commences when the Government identifies a significant change in the prevailing strategic environment, and, through CDF, commits the ADF to a specific task. The task and the time period involved will determine the nature of the work-up training and resources required.
• Operational viability period. This is the period whereby the force must be self-sufficient until the logistic and other support chains can be established. The requirement for OVP resources will be set in accordance with the length of the OVP, replenishment lead times and the anticipated resource usage rates for the level of conflict envisaged.
• Sustainment period. The SP is the time a force is to be sustained on operations; it includes the OVP. The SP ceases when the force is withdrawn from operations and commences the reconstitution phase. The SP is likely to require the rotation of the whole, or part, of the initial deployment force (see chapter 3—‘Mobilisation’). The Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC) Operational Preparedness Requirement (JOCOPR) is less prescriptive (through necessity) and stipulates a rotation requirement for each operational preparedness objective.
Activity levels and usage rates 5.10
5.10 Activity levels refer to the tempo and intensity (rate of effort) of likely contingency operations. There are planning assumptions used to calculate resource usage rates. Usage rates are the levels of resource consumption for defined activity levels over time. The ADF Preparedness Planning Guide is an evolutionary document that provides the relevant and endorsed guidance and planning assumptions to assist with the calculation and application of usage rates. It is a repository or compendium, not a tool in itself.
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5.11 Preparedness planning provides guidance on the nature of the forces to be committed in a given operation. Forecasting the likely tempo and intensity of operations and the rates of consumption of resources is made on the basis of strategic guidance, preparedness planning scenarios, historical data, objective assessment and professional judgment. The levels of activity to maintain DLOC of the FIB, for work-up, maintenance of OLOC and for sustainability, are all used to determine the associated usage rates.
5.12 The CDF Preparedness Directive (CPD) and the JOCOPR establish the order of priority for activity levels and their associated usage rates. The first priority are those activity levels relevant to peacetime tasks and operations associated with contingencies considered credible in the shorter-term. Lower priority is given to activity levels and usage rates for higher levels of conflict. Regardless of priority, planning of total activity levels and usage rates is necessary to enable logistic policies for total preparedness to be developed.
Resource allocation priority 5.13
5.13 The priority for allocation of available resources is determined by the requirements of readiness and sustainability. All FE require a base level of resources to maintain DLOC from which their OLOC can be achieved within readiness notice (RN). The base level of allocated resources will vary due to the effect of differing RN and OLOC. FE on longer RNs will normally require a lower level of resource commitment, and conversely, a greater demand for work-up resources.
5.14 Work-up resource requirements are based on RN, the plan for achievement of the specified OLOC and contingency supply arrangements. Contingency supply arrangements, stockholding plans, operational viability and sustainability requirements are based on assessed contingency activity levels and usage rates.
Stockholding 5.15
5.15 Preparedness and mobilisation plans may require that stocks are physically held, or that plans are developed for their timely provision. Stockholding policy guides this process. The general stockholding principles are:
• Stocks forming part of minimum resources should be held at optimum levels which reflect a cost/risk trade-off between inventory procurement and holding costs, and the cost and operational impact of stock shortages. This is a function of strategic risk assessment and management.
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• Reserve stocks are required to support both work-up training and operations. Reserve stocks for operations need to be held only if they cannot be obtained in a timely manner by procurement initiated within RN. However, reserve stocks for use during work-up training will also need to be held to the extent that they are not available for timely delivery prior to planned usage. In applying these principles, consideration should be given to:
– international logistics support Agreements and Arrangements, including foreign military sales (FMS);
– industry capacity and expansion capability; and
– pre-packing and pre-positioning needs.
• The continuing availability of operating stocks from the peacetime supply system also needs to be considered. Reserve stocks are required to cater for the increased demand over and above normal peacetime levels, not the total usage during contingencies.
5.16 In applying these principles, particular attention needs to be given to critical and long lead time items, and items with a potential for supply interruption. The ability of transport resources to provide the required logistics mobility and distribution is also important.
5.17 Reserve stock requirements need to be based on endorsed activity levels and usage rates expected in the work-up from DLOC to OLOC, and during the period of operations. Additionally, assessment of the duration and geographical spread over which operations may extend is necessary for the determination of total stockholding requirements and to ascertain where, when and which elements of the ADF logistics system must be in place to support operations.
5.18 The policy detail regarding Reserve stockholding is contained in Defence Instruction (General) (DI(G)) LOG 06–4—ADF Reserve Stockholding Policy.
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RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ELEMENTS 5.19
Equipment and facilities 5.19
5.19 Defence mobilisation planning documents are regularly updated and provide guidance for the capability development process. The system of higher Defence committees is the mechanism by which these plans are approved. As changes to strategic or financial guidance occur, priorities are reassessed and approval is sought to re-engineer budgets against revised objectives for acquisition of new capability and adjustment of financial expenditure within the normal budgetary cycle.
Impressment powers 5.20
5.20 Occasionally the ADF will need to have access to assets and resources that exist in the wider community such as vehicles, equipment, fuel and facilities. In scenarios short of a declared Defence emergency the Commonwealth will contract, lease, buy or charter the services or items it requires. During a Defence emergency the Defence Act 1903 confers the power to requisition materiel for Defence purposes provided that provision has been made to appropriately recompense the owner of the materiel requisitioned. These regulations are necessary, as the Constitution requires that acquisition of property be on ‘just terms’.
Infrastructure 5.21
5.21 Infrastructure is the framework of interdependent tangible and intangible networks and systems comprising industries, institutions and distribution capabilities that provide a continuous flow of goods and services essential to the defence of Australia. The ADF has always been reliant on national and international infrastructure for a wide range of goods, service and facilities. The trend to outsource support instigated by the Commercial Support Program and accelerated under the Defence Reform Program has increased the ADF’s reliance on the national support base (NSB) during peacetime and during conflict. The success of ADF operations across the full spectrum of conflict will depend upon the capability of NSB to respond and adjust to increased Defence demands.
5.22 Mobilisation planning and management must ensure the needs of all FE of the ADF and, if necessary, the foreign elements of a combined force, are met through a holistic approach. An overarching framework of agreements and arrangements is required to harness national and international resources in a concentrated, efficient and effective fashion. These agreements and arrangements must provide for the need to surge to higher levels of support, and to sustain these levels, or to adapt to changed
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tasks and priorities during Defence mobilisation. Where possible, major exercises and wargames should incorporate and test preparedness and sustainability levels, not just combat issues.
5.23 The Defence Logistics Board is responsible for the development of policies, strategies, and arrangements that facilitate ADF access to national and international support infrastructure to support Defence mobilisation and sustainment. This includes:
• the development of strategic level plans for the mobilisation of national resources to support and sustain the Defence effort;
• the development of a strategic level understanding of Defence’s support needs and the national and international support base’s potential to meet those needs;
• the development and maintenance of relationships with those who control, shape and influence the national and international support bases including governments, industry, infrastructure owners and the general community;
• the development of strategies for better engaging industry in support of operations thereby broadening the options for Defence planners at all levels;
• the development of agreements, arrangements and understandings with those elements of the civil infrastructure relevant to support ADF operations; and
• the development of international government-to-government and military-to-military arrangements, agreements and understandings enabling support to ADF operations in Australia and overseas.
5.24 A range of international logistics agreements and arrangements with foreign governments and national arrangements with civil airlines and shipping companies currently exist. These are reviewed periodically and new arrangements negotiated to facilitate ADF access to requisite goods and services during Defence mobilisation. Further detail is contained in DI(G) LOG 5–1—International Co-operative Logistics Agreements and Arrangements.
Production/adaptation 5.25
5.25 Defence industry is that part of industry which provides, or is capable of providing, goods and services which are strategically important to Defence. This definition enables the focus for industry to be altered in accordance with changing strategic guidance. The focus for industry, however, is likely to remain in the areas of key technologies that act as force multipliers, and
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where retaining a technological edge is significant. All of these activities will reflect changing national priorities, including the appropriate use of skilled personnel and resources.
5.26 There are three levels of priority for industry in relation to preparedness and mobilisation planning. They are:
• First order priorities are those essential to the development of Australia’s self-reliant defence posture. In particular, they are concerned with information technology, communications and electronics, which are crucial to the development of intelligence, surveillance, command and control, combat performance and consumables.
• Second order priorities are those considered being generally strategically important but cannot be justified on economic grounds. That is, there is no strategic justification for paying a significant premium to maintain them. They include the ability to build end items, such as naval platforms. It should be noted that important capabilities are developed for through-life support of this equipment which fall into the first order category.
• Third order priorities are those capabilities that are of lower strategic importance or are less urgent in the context of our foreseeable strategic circumstances. That is, they relate mainly to industry support of those elements of the force maintained at lesser degrees of readiness. Consequently, international competition (normal commercial practice) is used to determine the level of Australian industry involvement.
5.27 Defence preparedness and mobilisation planning provides a statement of strategic priorities for local industry support to the ADF. It also identifies longer-term development needs for key Defence-related technologies, which assist Australian industry to meet Defence needs competitively.
Movements and distribution 5.28
5.28 Movement involves the transportation of personnel and materiel from their source of origin to a destination within a stated period of time and in a designated order. It requires coordination of movements through dedicated movement agencies utilising all necessary transport resources in accordance with the doctrine and procedures outlined in Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 4.0—Defence Logistics. Transport resources are those organic to the ADF and those accessed through national and international agreements and arrangements, from commercial and foreign military sources. Mobilisation planning should ensure that agreements and
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arrangements with these sources are in place to provide the framework for accessing extra air, land and sea transport capability for contingencies as required. Responsibility for such arrangements rests with DMO.
5.29 Distribution involves access to, and management of facilities, equipment, services and people to achieve an efficient and cost-effective flow of raw materials or finished products from point of origin to point of utilisation.
5.30 Distribution management involves both planning and operations, each with different infrastructure implications. In essence it is the operational process of synchronising all elements of the logistic system to deliver the right things to the right place in the right order to support the operational commander. Distribution planning is facilitated by trained personnel and effective information systems support. Distribution operations include functions such as order processing, packaging, warehousing, inventory management and transportation. Distribution operations will be facilitated by structures such as warehouses, roads, railways, ports and airfields. Materiel resources are managed and delivered in accordance with the Australian Standard Materiel Issue and Movement System outlined in ADDP 4.0. This involves the application of force activity designators (FAD). FAD are allocated by CDF or delegate, and their use ensures that the allocation of logistic resources is aligned with operational objectives.
HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—CIVIL SEA AND AIR FREIGHTER SUPPORT, WORLD WAR II
While it is usual to think of transportation into forward operational areas being effected by military shipping and aircraft, the lack of such resources until the build-up of United States (US) naval and air resources meant that freighters and commercial aircraft played a significant role in the defence and recapture of Papua New Guinea (PNG). Then, when US air and sea transport effort moved down Macarthur’s ‘Tokyo Road’, commercial shipping became essential, to support the final campaigns in PNG and the Islands.
Local civil aircraft operated forward into Myola lakebed on the Kokoda Track, and the Wau-Bulolo area. QANTAS flew cargo support for PNG as far as a forward airfield at Dobodura. The airline also provided a trans-Pacific aircraft ferrying service, took the Singapore leg of the ‘Horseshoe arc’ from United Kingdom (UK) via Durban when the Cairo route was cut, and maintained the Singapore-Karachi route. During the Malayan campaign it undertook freight duties and also the evacuation from Singapore and Java.
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5.31 The essence of distribution management is to provide an unhindered flow of products (and personnel) to the customer. The speed of that flow is governed by operational and economic factors. Operational factors include such elements as priority, availability targets and critical items that are influenced by Defence preparedness plans. Economic factors are governed by the endeavour to achieve the most cost-effective means of potential distribution. To meet operational needs in the most cost-effective manner it is necessary to identify and resolve distribution choke points such as warehousing capacity, transport mode restrictions, Government regulations (safety, environmental considerations, weight limitations, noise curfews) and material handling limitations. Defence mobilisation planning provides the mechanism to identify choke points and develop solutions through changes in distribution patterns, Defence investment or changes to logistic concepts of operations.
HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—(cont)At the beginning of the war, the Admiralty took over well-known passenger liners as troop transports and freighters for cargo which, provided with naval escorts, deployed Australian forces and materiel to the UK and Middle East and back. After the entry of Japan into the war, Australia used commercial shipping from the beginning, with expected and accepted losses.
A Shipping Control Board was established, for chartering Australian, foreign and ‘refugee’ shipping (Singapore and the Philippines) in the Australian area. This Board effected operations through the owner-companies, which were paid on a cost-plus basis. About 150 vessels were so controlled, and as well as handling coastal and international trade, they deployed, supported and recovered the forces, through the main ports in PNG, New Britain and Bougainville, in the process running the gauntlet of air and submarine attack. In the closing phases of the war, with the little available military shipping used in close support of operations, the merchant marine became the lifeline sustaining the deployed forces, overall delivering 1.3 million tons.
Civil transport has always been an invaluable extender of military movement capabilities—rail, road, sea, inland water and latterly air. Too often it has been taken over or replaced unnecessarily by military organisations, rather than leaving in place experienced organisations. While military organisation and management can sometimes bring life to inefficient, unruly or rundown transport agencies, such intervention may be best by exception rather than by rule.
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Maintenance 5.32
5.32 The maintenance of military equipment is necessary to ensure that equipment is available for operational use. It also ensures that planned life-of-type (LOT) is achieved in peacetime. Equipment availability is influenced by the availability of spare parts and consumables and by its maintenance schedule. The maintenance schedule is in turn dictated by the inherent reliability and maintainability aspects of the equipment’s design.
5.33 Maintenance consists of three elements: application of skills, specialist facilities and adherence to standards. The determination of the type and frequency of maintenance processes and the prediction of usage rates of parts and consumables, is a part of maintenance planning.
• Application of skills. Preparedness and mobilisation planning needs to ensure that the permanent and Reserve force skill base to support the ADF is relevant, appropriately trained and capable of surging for mobilisation. As technologies develop, new skills, training and levels of proficiency may be needed. The development of new skills may necessitate changes in training, which may lead to a reassessment of the ‘core’ functions, work force and lead times appropriate to preparedness. Formal arrangements and contingency contracts are effective planning tools for the provision and transfer of skills and capacity from the civil sector.
• Specialist maintenance facilities. Specialist maintenance facilities are generally provided as part of the capital investment in Defence capabilities (eg ammunition and petroleum, oil and lubricant holdings). Preparedness and mobilisation planning should quantify the need for maintenance facilities, whether part of industry or Defence, and ensure they are of the right size and in the appropriate place to provide efficient maintenance support during mobilisation.
• Maintenance standards. Maintenance standards are specified for general and specific classes of equipment. They are determined by the individual Services in accordance with civil standards for similar equipment, international military standards, and past experience with the equipment. In a non-operational environment, emphasis is placed on conservation of the equipment and maximising LOT. In times of contingency operations, serviceability criteria may be relaxed and the focus altered from long-term asset preservation and cost minimisation to maximising operational availability and mission success. Unusual unserviceability will arise because of the changed environmental conditions, increased rates of usage and battle damage. Maintenance standards and practices must take account of the need to improvise, use innovative repair techniques to offset shortages of consumables and repair parts, and cannibalisation of unserviceable equipment to make other equipment serviceable.
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Information management (strategic communications) 5.34
5.34 Defence routinely uses the civil communications infrastructure. In the more populated areas of the continent, where the communications infrastructure is sophisticated and robust, that use could be expanded rapidly to meet mobilisation needs. In sparsely populated areas where the communications infrastructure is more austere, Defence mobilisation planning needs to identify any potential increases in the use of the civil communication infrastructure by Defence, its impact on community routine users and the lead times involved for upgrading communication infrastructure to meet such increases. Civil communication carriers need to be constantly appraised of Defence communication planning intentions. It should be noted that should the need arise for mobilisation and subsequent deployment offshore, there is potential to use host nation or coalition networks as the primary provider of information infrastructure.
5.35 Defence mobilisation planning for strategic communications involves the development of infrastructure under the following headings:
• Defence communications network. This consists of the Defence network and a range of civilian-controlled or operated communications capabilities. They are limited to what is considered necessary to sustain communication support to existing force capabilities during operations. This network should provide Defence with the ability to assess ADF surge capability by utilising the national and international civil infrastructure, within imposed constraints.
• Civil communication carriers. The national carriers provide a range of services to Defence. These services range from the provision of point-to-point bandwidth that Defence manages and uses, through to the provision of specific services to end-users. Formal structures, including a range of management and working-level committees, are in place between national communications carriers and Defence to ensure cooperative communications infrastructure planning. A major outcome of this cooperative planning is the enhancement of the civil communications infrastructure for Defence use that is now capable of expansion during mobilisation.
Health 5.36
5.36 Health support to Defence is heavily reliant on the national infrastructure. The need to provide health support to deployed forces competes with the maintenance of effective services in the civil community. The national health infrastructure is designed to support existing civilian dependencies with a small surge capacity for short periods to meet civil emergencies. The capacity of the national health infrastructure to provide higher levels of medical care from existing medical resources to Defence is limited, particularly in remote areas.
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5.37 The elements of national health infrastructure upon which Defence may be reliant upon are:
• trained health services personnel;
• civilian treatment facilities;
• various casualty-carrying transport; and
• health materiel; including national contingency stocks of drugs, vaccines, blood and blood products.
5.38 Australia has a limited health materiel base and is reliant on overseas sourcing of a range of specialist pharmaceuticals, advanced medical equipment and technology, and items required for treatment of nuclear, biological and chemical casualties. Health care is a critical and limited resource that must be thoroughly planned in advance. Preparedness and mobilisation planning involves the determination of the size of this requirement and the development of options and courses of action.
5.39 Defence health mobilisation planning is coordinated by the Defence Health Services and chaired by the Director-General Defence Health Services and includes State and Commonwealth representatives. Arrangements provide the basis for accessing the civil infrastructure to meet the health support needs of the ADF during a Defence emergency. The development of these arrangements, in the first instance, will likely occur through Emergency Management Australia. International Agreements and Arrangements provide the basis for securing access to civilian and military health support capabilities of other nations in combined operations. These Agreements and Arrangements are supported by measures designed to develop health support interoperability. However, it should not be assumed that host nations have the same standards of health support available to supporting nations and coalition partners.
Liaison 5.40
5.40 Information is required from a variety of sources to inform judgments and decisions relating to Defence mobilisation. For preparedness and mobilisation planning to be effective, liaison at all levels within Defence is necessary. Liaison is undertaken through formal and informal arrangements. Constant liaison is essential to ensure matters are reviewed as they unfold and the best possible advice is provided to Government. The process may necessitate the establishment of liaison staffs at other government departments to supplement existing standing committees and working groups. Other elements of Defence liaise with civil industry and other national authorities to secure support for Defence. International alliances and Defence
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Agreements and Arrangements require continuous formal liaison procedures and gain prominence during a Defence emergency, particularly those with countries likely to provide materiel support.
5.41 The Defence media liaison process is controlled by Australian Defence Headquarters through the Coordination and Public Affairs Division (CPAD). The function of CPAD is to provide centralised liaison with the international/national media, furnishing informed commentary on all issues and arranging access for the media to appropriate operational environments, within Government guidance. Media liaison is integral to the Government’s foreign and domestic policy and is necessary for gaining both international and domestic support for Australia’s role in a Defence emergency. The media play an important role during Defence mobilisation in keeping the nation informed of events and broadcasting mobilisation announcements such as the call out of Reserve forces. Guidance for briefing the media in a Defence emergency will be the subject of Government policy and will be different for each circumstance. Defence media liaison is a continuous process in which activity increases substantially during a Defence emergency.
5.42 Domestic security is an important consideration during a Defence emergency. Defence preparedness and mobilisation planning should draw on existing liaison structures, where appropriate and established, to save time or to enhance cooperation. The National Anti-Terrorist Plan (NATP) is an example of an existing national structure which coordinates responses from State and Federal agencies representing legislative, executive, judicial, law enforcement and Defence agencies. The NATP is a widely understood liaison structure which provides a model for the preparation of threat assessments and coordinating domestic protective security action.
Science and technology 5.43
5.43 Identification of the science and technology areas that provide the greatest strategic advantage and leverage for Defence is a key aspect of preparedness and mobilisation planning. Responsibility for maintaining the science and technology base on behalf of Defence is vested in the Chief Defence Scientist who heads Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO). The Service Scientific Advisers provide the conduit between specific-to-client research requirements and DSTO.
5.44 Research and development (R&D) is an ongoing process and Government’s policy of self-reliance in Defence acknowledges that Australia should not rely completely on imported technology and offshore support, and recommends, where appropriate, enhancement of indigenous capabilities for technological support, modification and development. Further, Australia’s strategic circumstances pose challenges that often call for unique and therefore local solutions. The purpose of indigenous R&D, which covers a wide field of activities and technologies, is enhancement of military capability
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and Defence’s ability to meet preparedness objectives. The technologies which are favoured are those that provide an operational advantage, reduce personnel or life-cycle costs, avoid early obsolescence or the need for additional equipment, simplify operations and support, or are particularly suited to Australia’s strategic circumstances.
5.45 Demand on R&D resources is likely to increase significantly as a contingency develops. Defence-related R&D infrastructure needs the flexibility to cater for this, including a capacity to incorporate increased use of national R&D and academic organisations. The demand for R&D resources to support the ADF during a contingency dictates the need for a national base of competency in contemporary military technology that enables FE to achieve a ‘first response capability’ for specific contingencies. DSTO is the major element of this base, but the role of private industry and specialist sectors also needs to be recognised, incorporated and tasked where appropriate. DSTO and the Service Scientific Advisers will have an increased role during mobilisation in providing the interface with the wider scientific community and focussing some areas of research on Defence needs.
International support 5.46
5.46 Defence self-reliance depends upon the ability of the national infrastructure to support military operations. Additional support from other nations including host nation support, can be made available under specific International Logistic Agreements and Arrangements (including FMS) and arrangements/contracts with Defence industry, civil infrastructure elements and overseas suppliers.
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HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—RECIPROCAL LEASE–LEND, IN AND OUT, UNITED STATES–AUSTRALIA 1943
Under Reciprocal Lease-Lend, Australia provided supplies, foodstuffs and facilities to US forces in the South-West Pacific, as exchange for US-supplied equipment for the Australian forces and industry. While a successful and mutually beneficial enabler of the war aims of both, it was also manipulated by both sides seeking to maximise their benefit. As Commander-in-Chief Blamey iterated:
The impression is growing that stocks are being built up under Reciprocal Lease-Lend, far in excess of legitimate operational requirements, with the object of making them available in the Philippines, China or America itself, for civilian or relief purposes, thus buying favourable publicity for American interests, both Government and private, at the expense of our sadly strained and depleted resources … [Australia] should immediately revise and very considerably limit reciprocal Lease-Lend administration and commitments.
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CHAPTER 6
MOBILISATION—LEGAL ISSUES 6
Introduction 6.1
6.1 The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia provides the legislative basis for the establishment, administration and control of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and provides for its employment in protecting Australia’s national security. Legislation covering control and administration of the ADF is contained in a number of Acts of Parliament including the Defence Act 1903 (Defence Act). Australian Defence Doctrine Publication–D—Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine describes the broader applications and implications of the legal and public policy aspects of applying military power.
6.2 In the context of this chapter, the following terms are described:
• ‘War’ is synonymous with the term ‘armed conflict’ and defined to mean any invasion or apprehended invasion of, or attack or apprehended attack on Australia, by an enemy or armed force. This definition is the same as that of the Defence Act. There does not have to be an attack upon Australian territory; the term ‘apprehended attack’ relates to an understanding that there will be an attack on Australia. As a consequence, some conflicts in which Australia could be involved offshore, may be ‘war’ as defined in the Defence Act. This will permit the deployment of Reservists.
• ‘Defence emergency’ is defined in the Defence Act as the period between the publication of a proclamation by the Governor-General that a state of Defence emergency exists and the publication of a proclamation that such a state no longer exists. Declaration of a ‘Defence emergency’ would be a matter for ministerial judgment based on the prevailing situation and the legislative necessity to declare such a state.
6.3 Purpose. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the legal/legislative basis under which Defence will mobilise or expand to prosecute military operations in defence of Australia and its interests. It does not prescribe all of the situations that must be considered as a part of mobilisation planning, and legal advice should be sought to ensure appropriate consideration is given to the subject areas described herein, given that circumstances will differ.
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LEGAL CONSTRAINTS 6.4
The Constitution and Defence power 6.4
6.4 The Constitution provides the legal basis for the Commonwealth Parliament to legislate for a range of matters including the defence of Australia. The relevant Defence power is contained in sub-section 51(vi) of the Constitution, which reads:
‘The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to:
The naval and military defence of the Commonwealth and of the several States, and the control of the forces to execute and maintain the laws of the Commonwealth.’
6.5 The powers and duties of the Commonwealth in relation to Defence are derived not only from sub-section 51(vi) but also from a number of other sections of the Constitution, including sections 68, 52(iii), 69, 70, 114 and 119. There is also an internal security aspect of Defence which is derived in part from sub-section 51(vi) but is usually held to reside primarily in section 61 (the Executive power) and section 51(xxxix) (the incidental power).
6.6 The Defence power is flexible and varies according to the state of hostilities, or more accurately speaking, according to the degree and nature of the danger of external aggression at a given particular time. A High Court decision on the Defence power explains:
6.7 The exercise of Defence power is either by legislative or Executive action. The Constitution, by virtue of section 1, vests legislative power in the Federal Parliament. Section 61 of the Constitution provides that the Executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Queen and is exercisable by the Governor-General as the Queen’s representative. The Executive power extends to the execution and maintenance of the Constitution, and of the laws of the Commonwealth. The structure of the Executive Government, or Executive as it may sometimes be colloquially referred to, encompasses not only the Queen, Governor-General and Government ministers but also the
‘... unlike some other powers its application depends upon facts, and as those facts change so may its actual operation as a power enabling the legislature to make an actual law. The existence and character of hostilities, or a threat of hostilities, against the Commonwealth are facts which will determine the extent of operation of the power.’
per Dixon J., in Andrews v. Howell (1941) 65 C.L.R. 255, p 278
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members of the Public Service and various boards associated with the day-to-day administration of the affairs of the Commonwealth. In a time of expanded Defence power, much of the legislation created to facilitate the defence of Australia and its interests may be subordinate legislation, by way of regulations made by the Executive, in this case being Cabinet or the relevant members of Cabinet. In the circumstances of a ‘credible contingency’ developing, Parliament could grant the Executive a regulation-making power with respect to Defence matters. If the contingency developed slowly, this might consist of successive grants that supplement and widen the scope of the earlier grants. Within each of the levels of conflict there will be varying degrees of Defence emergencies, and it is not possible to predict the extent to which the Defence power will need to be expanded.
HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—NATIONAL SECURITY REGULATIONS, WORLD WAR II
A War Book was prepared before the war, outlining the procedures following declaration of war, cooperation with the State Governments, action required by existing civil departments, and the creation of new instrumentalities. A series of draft proclamations, gazette notices, draft bills, regulations, and plans was drawn up by the relevant Commonwealth departments, and from 1936 a series of Commonwealth-State meetings was held to help coordinate resource allocation and utilisation in support of military and civil defence.
The scope and urgency of reaction to developing problems under a state of direct external and internal threat, and the progressive transition to a war economy, required extraordinary measures which telescoped and truncated normal established democratic procedures, checks and balances. Interstate and inter-department arrangements were worked-up to plans for coordinating or advisory committees to control and coordinate, using existing government agencies. They covered commerce, industry, production, manpower, health, facilities, works, transportation and communications, plus a broad range of associated areas including economic controls, rationing, price control, internal security, propaganda, censorship and civil defence.
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Commonwealth powers in time of war 6.8
6.8 Although the general test of validity remains the same in war as in peace, the courts are more ready to uphold Defence legislation in time of war. In wartime, it is easier to see a real connection between Defence and the laws that regulate ordinary civil activity. During the Second World War, however, by striking down legislation, the High Court made it clear that the existence of war did not mean that the Commonwealth had unlimited powers.
HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—(cont)Little change was envisaged to the Federal and State legislative structure. Rather, such changes were effected by a pre-prepared blanket National Security Bill, enacted at the outbreak of war, and progressively expanded by regulations under its aegis. By this means, extensive measures, unthinkable in peacetime, and overriding existing legislation when in conflict, were imposed to avoid the logjam of endless parliamentary drafting, legislation and negotiation. And to enable easy supplementation of these regulations, there was provision for orders, rules and by-laws.
Original doubts and activism against the Act and its Regulations concerned civil liberties, and there were indeed abuses of this, as is inevitable when both military and civil bureaucracies gain virtually unfettered power. The effects were, however, pervasive in all the other areas as infrastructure and production, the human and material resources of the country, and the lives and activities of the people, were harnessed to support the war.
Imperfect in so many ways, the draconian rule by regulation was unavoidable in ensuring that the war aims and effort were adequately supported, and the country was able to support this effort in fiscal and economic terms. While lesser orders of emergency, Defence commitment or defensive measures demand lesser controls and commitment, each will incur sacrifices according to its nature, in personal freedoms, choices, living and welfare standards.
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Commonwealth powers in times of tension 6.9
6.9 In time of international tension short of war, the situation is not as clear as in times of war or peace. The range of matters, which can be brought within the scope of the Defence power, expands and contracts according to the degree of apprehension of danger of external aggression. It follows that legislation may be justified, under the power, at a time of imminent danger of war, or disturbed international conditions that would not be justified under ordinary conditions of peace.
EMPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL 6.10
Employment of Reservists 6.10
6.10 Reservists, unlike members of the Permanent Forces, are generally not required to render continuous full-time service (CFTS). They can volunteer to render full-time service (FTS), and, if the offer to serve is accepted, they become bound to render that service. The only circumstance in which the service of the Reserves may be secured by other than voluntary means is when ‘called out’. Under the provisions of the Defence Act, the Reserves may be called out by the Governor-General, acting on advice from the Executive Council or the Minister, in time of war or Defence emergency, where the Governor-General considers it desirable to do so for the defence of Australia and its interests. Members of the ADF may also be called out by the Governor-General other than in time of war or Defence emergency, where the Governor-General, acting on advice from the Executive or the Minister, considers it desirable to do so for the defence of Australia and its interests for one or more of the circumstances given insub-section 50D(2) of the Defence Act as follows:
NATIONAL SECURITY REGULATIONS
The greatest tragedy that could overcome a country would be for it to fight a successful war in defence of liberty and lose its own liberty in the process. There is no intention on the part of the Government to use these powers … in any way other than to promote the security of Australia. I hope that when the time comes for me to cease exercise of these powers, I shall be able to say that they were exercised firmly, definitely, and promptly, but without intolerance and with a due respect for the interests of minorities.
Prime Minister R.G. Menzies 06 September 1939
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‘However, the Governor-General may only make an order in circumstances (whether within or outside Australia) involving any one or more of the following:
a. war or warlike operations;
b. Defence emergency;
c. Defence preparation;
d. peacekeeping or peace enforcement;
e. assistance to Commonwealth, state, Territory or foreign government authorities and agencies in matters involving Australia’s national security or affecting Australian defence interests;
f. support to community activities of national or international significance; and
g. civil aid, humanitarian assistance, medical or civil emergency or disaster relief.’
6.11 The Governor-General exercises these powers under Part III, section 50D of the Defence Act, by publishing a written order in the Commonwealth Gazette for the call out for CFTS of the Reserves, or specified parts, classes or members of the Reserves. The period of FTS will be that as directed by the Chief of the Defence Force or Service chiefs. The period of continuous service must start on the day on which the relevant call out order takes effect and may be indefinite or limited.
6.12 In April 2001 Federal Parliament enacted the Defence Reserve Service (Protection) Act 2001, which places legally binding obligations on employers of Defence Reservists and specifies protection measures for employees undertaking ordinary Defence Reserve Service, CFTS, or Defence Reserve Service following call out. The intent of the Protection Act is to provide anti-discrimination, employment, partnership, education and financial liability and bankruptcy protection for Reservists, prospective Reservists and former Reservists. The nature of the protection varies with the type of Reserve Service being undertaken.
6.13 Where Australian military forces are employed in armed conflict they operate under the laws of armed conflict (LOAC). The LOAC is broadly concerned with the protection of the victims of armed conflict, and how nations may conduct armed conflict. ADF legal advisers will be available to provide advice on all operations law issues.
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Employment of women 6.14
6.14 The Sex Discrimination Act 1984 allows the ADF to preclude women from employment in positions involving combat duties. While women can be employed on combat duties, the ADF is not legally obliged to employ them in this manner. The Sex Discrimination Regulations 1984 defines combat duties as those duties which require a person to commit, or participate directly in the commission of, an act of violence against an adversary in time of war. ‘Time of war’ has the same meaning as in the Defence Act.
6.15 Policy. All ADF employment categories are open to women except employment in the following combat positions: Navy—Clearance Divers; Army—Armour, Artillery, Infantry and Combat Engineers; Air Force—Ground Defence.
Recruitment and employment of members under 18 years in the Australian Defence Force 6.16
6.16 In accordance with Australia’s obligations under the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in Armed Conflict (the Protocol), the ADF has a minimum age permitting voluntary recruitment into the ADF. There are inherent safeguards applying to members under the age of 18 years.
6.17 While the Protocol requires all signatories to observe a minimum armed forces voluntary recruitment age of 16 years, the ADF observes a minimum recruitment age of 17 years. The exception to this rule is entrants to military schools, apprentices and members of Service cadet schemes.
6.18 The ADF will take all feasible measures to ensure that minors do not participate in hostilities. That is, to the maximum extent possible, and where it will not adversely impact on the conduct of operations, minors should not be deployed into areas of operations (AO) where there is a likelihood of hostile action. The primary Defence publication is Defence Instruction (General) (DI(G)) PERS 33–4—Recruitment and Employment of Members under 18 Years in the Australian Defence Force.
Use of civilians 6.19
6.19 Legal factors, including Australia’s international obligations, will often determine the extent to which civilians may be employed to support ADF operations. It may well be that, in some cases, such employment may be unlawful. Mobilisation planning which intends the use of civilians in support of operations, needs to consider the effect of a considerable body of law, including the LOAC which incorporates the Geneva Conventions 1949 and their two Additional Protocols of 1977. Australian references include the Defence Act, the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982, the Safety,
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Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988, and other domestic law. The primary Defence publication is Australian Defence Force Publication 4.2.1—Civilians in Support of Australian Defence Force Operations and is supported by DI(G) OPS 5–3—Civilians in Support of Australian Defence Force Operations.
6.20 Legal guidelines applying to the employment of civilians are:
• Status. LOAC specifically states what persons may accompany the armed forces without actually being members of those armed forces. A civilian employed by the military in an AO retains the status of a civilian.
• Protection. The LOAC maintain a clear distinction between combatants and non-combatants. Under the LOAC, civilians are non-combatants and enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from military operations unless they take a direct part in hostilities. Parties to the conflict have an obligation, to the maximum extent feasible, to endeavour to remove civilians from the vicinity of military objectives and to take necessary precautions to protect them from the dangers resulting from military operations. Civilians used in support of operations, while indirectly involved in hostilities, will not lose their protection, but may be exposed to injury or death where they are collocated with a military objective, as permitted by LOAC.
• Loss of protection. To use civilians as combatants is to deprive them of the protection accorded to the civilian population. If civilians take any part in direct combat functions, such as defending installations from attack, they will be classed as combatants, not as civilians for the purposes of protection, for that period of time during which they have taken a direct part in hostilities. If they act in such a manner, civilians stand to forfeit their protective status whilst doing so.
• Employment. Civilians may be used in direct support of ADF operations where it can be shown that the presence and employment of civilians is required for the effective conduct of operations, and where such use does not contravene the LOAC.
• Use of civilians through military necessity. While it is lawful to employ civilians for reasons of military necessity, for example, because of the need to have certain technical skills available to military forces which are not available through the use of military personnel, there is a general principle that reliance on civilians should not be deliberately engineered solely on economic grounds. The circumstances of each case need to be determined on its merits.
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• Prisoner of war status. Civilians accompanying armed forces are entitled to prisoner of war status. Civilians employed by the military, upon capture, are entitled to be accorded prisoner of war status.
• Bearing arms. Though not a combatant, a civilian may be authorised to carry small arms for the purpose of self-defence. A civilian is not to engage in direct hostilities with the enemy. Where a civilian engages in direct hostilities with the enemy other than when acting in self-defence, and is subsequently captured by the enemy, they risk losing prisoner of war status.
• Obligation. Generally speaking, and depending on the nature of the AO, a civilian cannot be legally compelled to remain in, or move to, an AO as part of that person’s terms of employment.
• Discipline. Civilians are not ordinarily subject to military discipline. However, there are occasions when it may be considered necessary for civilians, accompanying the ADF overseas on operations, to be subject to the provisions of the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982. In such cases, civilians must consent in writing if they are to be bound by the provisions of the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 and only certain provisions of that Act will apply to civilians.
Compulsory military service 6.21
6.21 The only statutory provision enabling compulsory military service resides in the Defence Act. In time of war, the Governor-General may issue a proclamation requiring, with few exceptions, all persons between the ages of 18 and 60, and who have resided in Australia for not less than six months to serve in the ADF for the duration of the war.
6.22 Certain classes of persons are exempt from conscription. These classes include persons suffering from a physical or mental disability, parliamentarians, judges, those involved with religions or religious orders and those whose conscientious beliefs do not allow them to participate in war, warlike operations, particular wars or particular warlike operations. Provision is made for tribunals to be established to determine questions relating to conscientious beliefs.
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REQUISITION POWERS 6.23
6.23 During Defence emergencies, the ADF will need to have recourse to the assets and resources existing in the community such as vehicles, equipment, fuel and facilities. In most cases the Commonwealth will contract, lease, buy or charter the services and items it requires. In cases where material and facilities have to be requisitioned for defence purposes, the Defence Act confers the power to do so, provided that regulations have been made to prescribe the method of recompense. These regulations are necessary, as the Constitution requires that acquisition of property must be on ‘just terms’.
Siting of Defence facilities 6.24
6.24 LOAC requires that to the maximum extent feasible, military objectives including Defence facilities should not be located near densely populated areas and that other necessary precautions to protect the civilian population are taken. This is applicable to new and existing facilities.
CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS 6.25
Defence and civil cooperation (State emergency powers) 6.25
6.25 The responsibility for the conduct of operations in the defence of Australia lies with the Commonwealth, not with the civil law enforcement powers of the States. The Commonwealth has full executive and legislative authority for the conduct of such operations. In an armed conflict, the powers of a State or Territory Government do not expand to encompass the conduct of hostilities, although those Governments may legislate to carry out their own functions in a way appropriate to changed circumstances, subject to the Commonwealth’s overriding authority. For example, in areas such as public safety, transport and essential services, the States would play an important role through their own emergency legislation, in assisting the ADF to meet any threats. Essentially, the State or Territory is responsible for the conduct of normal domestic activities within its boundaries, including police actions against breaches of civil authority.
6.26 Close coordination of all these civil enforcement activities at the national level could be expected to occur as soon as the prospect of significant foreign activity was identified. Response activities would be directed by the Federal Government, with the State and Territory Governments being appraised and their cooperation sought in appropriate areas. Cooperation would include such areas as the availability and efficient use of limited resources and personnel, exchange of information and intelligence, and advice on specific local issues or problems.
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6.27 State or Territory coordination bodies would bring together their own responsibilities, ensuring they were properly taken into account by the Commonwealth. They should also ensure that State and Commonwealth directed activities did not clash and were mutually reinforcing and that State or Territory support for national, and particularly Defence, operations was maximised. In any contingency where ADF personnel would be deployed into areas in Australia where they would come into contact with all elements of the civilian population there would need to be a regime for coordinating Defence and civil activities. Importantly, ADF members must comply with State laws unless acting pursuant to a valid Commonwealth law which is inconsistent with the State law.
Civil defence 6.28
6.28 ADF personnel assigned to civil defence organisations must be clearly distinguishable from other members of the ADF and are not permitted to perform military duties during the conflict. Such personnel must be permanently assigned to the civil defence task. Legal advice should be sought if such action is contemplated.
HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—MOUNTED INFANTRY PROTECTING FREE WORKERS FROM THE OBSTRUCTING UNIONISTS IN
THE SHEARERS STRIKE, BARCALDINE 1891A prolonged strike by shearers in Western Queensland in 1891 turned to violence and danger to life and property. The Colony’s Governor, on advice from the Executive Council, called out the militia-mounted infantry regiments to re-establish control. Such action is unusual, and was contemplated only because of the potential unsustainable loss to the economy, the strikers were practising military manoeuvres, and consequently, the violent, dispersed and extended nature of the action exceeded police response capability.
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Aid to the civil authority 6.29
6.29 Aid to the civil authority is Defence Force aid to the Commonwealth or State Governments and their civil authorities in the performance of law enforcement tasks. The possible application of armed force distinguishes aid to the civil authority from aid to the civil community. Aid to the civil authority is derived from section 119 of the Constitution, which specifies that ‘The Commonwealth shall protect every State against invasion and, on the application of the Executive Government of the State, against domestic violence’.
HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—(cont)The Federal Defence Act 1903 forbade permanent cavalry and infantry, so that there should specifically not be a standing military force available for civil intervention. This remained in effect until 1947, when the ongoing overseas commitments required regular armed forces. Any aid to the civil power, as well as national defence, was intended to be the province of citizen soldiers not beholden for their livelihood to a government.
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6.30 Part IIIAAA of the Defence Act 1903 makes detailed provision for the use of the Defence Force to protect Commonwealth interests or a State against domestic violence. Those provisions only operate, however, if, among other things, the authorising Ministers are satisfied that Division 2 or Division 3 of the Part should apply. Those Divisions deal respectively with powers to recapture buildings and free hostages and with powers to search premises in a declared general security area. Part IIIAAA is only available where domestic violence is ‘occurring or likely to occur’. This is not a scenario in which the ADF would be authorised in advance to take certain defensive actions to protect persons and property.
6.31 In the initial stages of conflict, when hostilities might be limited and ambiguous, it could be appropriate for incidents to be treated as breaches of Commonwealth or State law and Defence Force assistance for that purpose to be provided under aid to the civil authority arrangements. Once hostilities with another nation are identified, or ADF security operations are being conducted on that basis, those operations would no longer be aid to the civil authority; they become the direct responsibility of the Commonwealth and conducted under the Defence power laid out in the Constitution.
6.32 There may be circumstances whereby the Commonwealth takes the initiative prior to a formal request from the State(s) and seeks to protect Commonwealth assets and interests with the employment of the ADF.
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CHAPTER 7
WORK FORCE MOBILISATION AND ITS SUSTAINABILITY 7
Introduction 7.1
7.1 The mobilisation of Defence personnel for a contingency or wider Defence or national emergency involves the consideration of the four phases of mobilisation described in chapter 3—‘Mobilisation’. They are:
• preparation;
• work-up;
• operations; and
• reconstitution.
7.2 Sustainability requires consideration of action to be taken to ensure the viability of continued operations during the period between work-up and reconstitution. The ability of Defence to sustain operations is critical to mission success.
7.3 Purpose. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the Defence work force mobilisation and sustainability process.
ESSENTIALS OF WORK FORCE MOBILISATION AND SUSTAINABILITY 7.4
7.4 The essentials of mobilisation for, and sustainability of, operations are:
• Determination of required force structure for the contingency—assigned units as amended.
• Identification of the available work force—personnel presently posted to units and planned to rotate, reinforce, or replace.
• Identification of the gap—the difference between the force-in-being (FIB) and the required force structure for the contingency.
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• Staffing—the activity of filling established positions with appropriately qualified and experienced personnel. This might entail additional recruitment and training or mobilisation/call out of Reserves and consideration of the need for conscription.
• Training—conducting initial employment training, trained force training, Reservist training and Defence civilian training.
7.5 The Defence work force is an integral component of capability comprising full and part-time members of the Permanent Forces, Reservists, and full, part-time and temporary Defence civilians (Australian Public Service (APS)). The Defence work force also includes civilian personnel employed by companies contracted by Defence. The work force structure required during contingencies must make best use of the skills and competencies of the total Defence work force.
OVERALL PROCESS 7.6
7.6 In the event of a contingency requiring some degree of mobilisation the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) will direct Chief of Joint Operations to undertake the operation, with the Outcome Executives and Chief Joint Logistics providing direct support and other groups providing support as required. The operational level appreciation of this operation will reveal the work force requirements to be detailed in the ensuing Australian Defence Force (ADF) Mobilisation Plan.
7.7 Head Defence Personnel Executive (HDPE) will prepare a staffing plan in accordance with the ADF Mobilisation Plan. It will encapsulate the necessary deployment of personnel in support of operations. The staffing plan will address the four phases of mobilisation as well as the requirement to rotate, reinforce, or replace elements of the Defence work force.
7.8 Any work force deficiency existing in the FIB will be addressed by HDPE for resolution in consultation with the Service Chiefs. The respective Service Chiefs will advise approval of any cross-levelling of personnel between Services or within Services to HDPE. The Defence Mobilisation Committee is the appropriate forum to address work force deficiencies and priorities for subsequent staffing.
Management of personnel resources 7.9
7.9 The key to the success of the work force mobilisation and sustainability process is the appropriate allocation of the right people to the right job at the right time. That is, the staffing of positions needs to be closely managed by DPE to ensure that adequate numbers of personnel of the appropriate rank and trade/profession and experience are available when
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necessary. Similarly, variations to establishment must be carefully considered in terms of achievability and sustainability. There will be occasions where critical areas of shortage will be filled by personnel from areas of lesser operational need or by the use of Reserve personnel and Defence civilians or contractors.
7.10 Combat and combat-related units, headquarters and collective training units (required to bring force elements (FE) to operational level of capability (OLOC)) receive the highest work force priority. The enabling agencies, such as logistics support and training may also require personnel supplementation to enable them to meet their expanded commitments. Such supplementation may be in the form of Reservists, Defence civilians or contractors.
Management of additional work force resources 7.11
7.11 An increase in the number of personnel that the ADF needs to recruit, train and qualify will be required to fill current vacant established positions as well as cater for any force expansion in time of mobilisation. HDPE will initiate such action to meet the requirement of the relevant Mobilisation Plan.
7.12 While 65 per cent of the Permanent Force ADF personnel are currently planned to be in combat or combat-related activities, this may change depending on the nature of the mobilisation. Should mobilisation require a greater percentage of the ADF to deploy, Reservists will be required to supplement the deployed forces.
7.13 The use of Reserves during mobilisation is a major contributor to sustainability and will be critical to the success of the relevant ADF Mobilisation Plan. As well as backfilling high priority support roles, key Reserve elements may be integrated into current combat or combat-related units. The extent of Reserve supplementation will be based on the extent of critical shortages in permanent manning and the particular skills of individual Reserve personnel. The provision of such support will place heavy demands on Reserve work force numbers.
7.14 During periods of mobilisation the use of Defence contractors in supporting roles is likely to be increased to enable military personnel to be released for combat tasks and to sustain the increased operational tempo. The traditional role of contractors only operating outside of the area of operations (AO) is no longer appropriate. Given the complexity of many platforms and equipments, there is an increasing need for contractors and other civilian specialists to be deployed into the AO in direct support of such items. The doctrine covering such employment is contained in Australian Defence Force Publication 4.2.1—Civilians in Support of Australian Defence Force Operations and supported by Defence Instruction (General) OPS 05–3—Civilians in Support of Australian Defence Force Operations.
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Work force mobilisation and sustainability responsibilities 7.15
7.15 HDPE has prime planning responsibility for personnel mobilisation functions. Those functions are listed in chapter 3, annex A.
RESERVE FORCES 7.16
Nature of Reserve Service 7.16
7.16 Reservists, by their very nature, are ADF members who voluntarily commit to rendering varying levels of Defence Reserve Service on a part-time basis. As part of this commitment, each Reservist also accepts an obligation to undertake continuous full-time service (CFTS) when called out under the provisions of the Defence Act 1903.
7.17 When undertaking training, Reservists seek to meet the same competency levels as their Permanent Force counterparts. However, the inherent part-time nature of most ADF Service rendered by Reservists together with their limited availability for attendance at training courses and gaining on-the-job experience in units, means that Reservists will generally not achieve and hold the same skill, preparedness and readiness levels as their Permanent Force counterparts. The skill and readiness levels of Reservists will also vary depending on the category of Reserve Service to which the Reservist belongs.
Categories of Reserve Service 7.18
7.18 The ADF, within its three Reserve components, requires different numbers of Reservists at various levels of skill and readiness. Recognising this, and that individuals will be willing and able to commit to varying levels of service, there are different categories of Reserve Service.
CONTINGENCY RESPONSE
We should not take counsel of our long-term fears and take action to meet a possible long-term requirement which would weaken our capacity to deal with the situation which faces us now in the short term. By so doing we would, of course, make a certainty of the long-term adverse situation we seek to prevent.
Chief of the General Staff (CGS) LTGEN Sir Ian Wilton 1964
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7.19 The Defence (Personnel) Regulations 2002 specify the following categories of Reserves:
• High Readiness Active Reserve,
• High Readiness Specialist Reserve,
• Active Reserve,
• Specialist Reserve, and
• Stand-by Reserve.
7.20 These categories are defined, with indicative attributes, in annex A. The Defence (Personnel) Regulations 2002 require that a Stand-by Reserve must be raised in each Service. Raising of the other categories is optional. The Regulations also allow a Service Chief to establish other Reserve categories within their parent Service.
Preparedness 7.21
7.21 Preparedness planning focuses on the preparation of the FIB, which comprises both the Permanent Forces and the Reserves. While Permanent Force members are generally trained and individually ready to meet specified readiness requirements, members of the Reserves have a much broader variation in their levels of training, skills and readiness, which is dependent on their category of Reserve Service.
Differing obligations for Reserve Service 7.22
7.22 A Reservist’s training commitment, readiness level and service will depend on the category of Reserve Service to which that Reservist belongs. High readiness Reservists are required to undertake more days of annual military training, and maintain a higher-level of individual readiness, than other Reservists are. Reservists in the Active and Specialist Reserve, while generally less ready for employment on Defence Service than high readiness Reservists, will normally be more ready for employment than Stand-by Reservists. Stand-by Reservists, while able to volunteer to render Defence Service, are only obligated to render Defence Service when called out.
7.23 In recognition of the different demands of the various categories of Reserve Service and the unique personal circumstances of individuals, Reservists volunteer to serve in a nominated Reserve category (other than service in the Stand-by Reserve which is compulsory in some circumstances). When a Reservist voluntarily commits to service in a specified category, the Reservist is then obligated to undertake the minimum service and readiness requirements stipulated for that category.
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Mandatory training requirements 7.24
7.24 Within each Service, each category of Reserve Service has an associated level of readiness, which determines training and competency requirements. For each category, the Chief of Service may specify a minimum training requirement (in terms of Reserve training days per year) that each Reservist in that category is obligated to meet.
Preparedness planning: Reserve characteristics 7.25
7.25 While the Reserves should be considered in all preparedness planning, planners should be aware of the composition and characteristics of the Reserves. The implications of the varying levels of military skills held in the Reserve, and the associated training times required to bring individual Reservists up to specified readiness levels, must be understood and applied by planners during any planning process that involves the Reserves.
Defence Reserve Service (Protection) Act 2001 7.26
7.26 The Defence Reserve Service (Protection) Act 2001 (Protection Act) places legally binding obligations on employers of Defence Reservists and specifies protection measures for employees undertaking ordinary Defence Reserve service, CFTS or service following call out. The Protection Act:
• protects Reservists against being discriminated against in employment or education;
• protects the status and entitlements of Reservists in relation to their employment;
• protects the right of a Reservist to re-enrol in or resume a course; and
• provides for financial assistance to Reservists, and in some cases, their dependants, following call out.
7.27 The nature of the protection varies with the type of Reserve service being undertaken. The Office of Reserve Service Protection under the Protection Act carries out investigation of complaints made under the Protection Act.
PREPARATION 7.28
7.28 The Preparation Phase in the mobilisation continuum occurs when the planning and preparation for work force mobilisation is undertaken. Strategic guidance, which may come from a range of areas, including strategic reviews and the Quarterly Strategic Review, provides the framework and timing for this activity.
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Permanent Forces 7.29
7.29 To minimise the need for force expansion in times of contingency, Defence policy aims to develop a high degree of flexibility and efficiency within the FIB. This is achieved by ensuring that:
• a high proportion (65 per cent) of all Permanent Force ADF personnel are employed in combat or combat-related duties;
• the FIB maintains levels of preparedness appropriate to credible contingencies and appropriate warning times/readiness levels; and
• resources are allocated and used effectively and efficiently.
Reserves 7.30
7.30 Where force expansion is required, Defence policy aims to develop a flexible Reserve structure. This is achieved by ensuring that:
• There is sufficient Reserve personnel possessing core skills that are commensurate with strategic guidance.
• A comprehensive database of Reserve personnel readiness information is available.
• The appropriate levels of training are undertaken relative to preparedness objectives and warning notices. The Reserve categories and the associated levels of preparedness are in annex A.
• Appropriate measures are in place to encourage civil employers to release Reserve personnel for preparation training.
• Appropriate measures are in place, through the ADF Reserves Employer Support Payment Scheme, to financially compensate civil employers of Reservists, and self-employed Reservists, during absences of employees undertaking Reserve service.
Defence civilians and contractors 7.31
7.31 Defence civilians and Defence contractors are integral to Defence and contribute significantly to overall capability. When required, force expansion is achieved by ensuring that appropriate measures are in place to allow the employment of additional Defence civilians and, where appropriate, Defence contractors, in a timely manner. This may also mean consideration of an extension to baseline working hours for members of the APS and associated funding. Preparedness, mobilisation and surge provisions must be included
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in the contracts of service providers contracted to Defence, including specific statements addressing sustainability of operations. However, the complexity and sensitivity of this process should not be underestimated.
Training 7.32
7.32 During the preparation phase, any change in force structure required to respond to the contingency will generate increases in training rates and, therefore, training resources—both consumables and for facilities such as ranges and accommodation. Accordingly, training plans for mobilisation need to be developed early in the preparation phase. The training plan should include the following:
• proficiency levels of essential combat-related skills required for the contingency;
• development of initial fast track training courses for expansion force personnel;
• development of fast track courses for full-time ADF, Reserve and contractor personnel requiring specific skills;
• development of training required at unit level to meet OLOC requirements;
• policy regarding the recognition of prior service and civilian qualifications; and
• identification of civilian training institutions that could assist the ADF to meet its training surge.
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Resources 7.33
7.33 Any submission to Government regarding Defence work force mobilisation will require an indicative estimate of additional resource requirements. HDPE, in conjunction with the Service Chiefs, Capability Development Group and Chief Finance Officer, is responsible for identifying personnel resource implications. Those resource implications will include additional funding requirements stemming from:
• expansion force salaries and allowances, including deployment allowances and tax concessions;
HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—EMPIRE AIR TRAINING SCHEME TRAINING, WINNIPEG 1941
This scheme trained 37 500 Australian aircrew in 1939–1945 to help man the aircraft being churned out by the Empire’s wartime factories. While 27 300 were trained in Australia, 10 000 completed their qualifications in Southern Rhodesia and Canada. This augmented the overstretched training facilities in Australia, and made possible the very significant Australian contribution to the air war in Europe, the Atlantic and the Far East, while maintaining a commitment to the war in the Pacific.
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• additional outfitting;
• extra training facilities;
• expanded operational unit facilities;
• indirect work force costs including housing, community and family support, compensation, reunion/compassionate/rotation travel, removals/storage, and funeral/burial;
• employers’ compensation;
• increased recruiting activity; and
• additional funding for Defence contractors.
WORK–UP 7.34
7.34 The work-up phase of the Defence work force mobilisation continuum consists of the assembly, preparation and predeployment of the expansion force. The succeeding paragraphs outline key elements of the work-up phase.
HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—FITNESS FOR DEPLOYMENT, WORLD WAR I, WORLD WAR II, SOUTH VIETNAM AND
EAST TIMOREarly events in World War (WW) I cemented the lesson that even large numbers of poorly trained and prepared troops do not win battles, but simply collapse against competent opponents. While semi-trained Australian soldiers were sent overseas in that war, they were given a thorough preparation in the Middle East before the British commanders certified their readiness for battle at Gallipoli, the Western Desert, France and Palestine. The 3rd Division, sent directly to England, was also held there for six months training before its dispatch to France. Reinforcements and rehabilitees not only trained and prepared in the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) depots in the United Kingdom, but also passed through a theatre-training depot in France before joining their designated units.
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7.35 The military response options are prepared in conjunction with Australia’s Military Strategy and the CDF Preparedness Directive. When combined with specific information provided by, largely through the Joint Operations Command Operational Preparedness Requirement, HDPE develops an operational level appreciation for most contingencies. Specific FE supporting plans will provide the detail of the work force required determining the extent of the Defence work force mobilisation required and the period to be sustained. Once approval to mobilise has been obtained,
HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—(cont)A similar system was followed in WW II for the AIF in the Middle East. AIF commander General Blamey refused the use of his units until he was satisfied that they were adequately equipped, trained, and concentrated as Australian divisions. In the South-West Pacific, after early failures of poorly prepared units in Papua, a rotation system was established, with divisions resting from action reformed, refitted and retrained on the Atherton Tableland before their next operation. Divisions ran their own battle schools to ensure incoming reinforcements were finished and given local indoctrination.
For service in Vietnam, all ranks except senior staff officers were required to undergo battle efficiency training at the Jungle Training Centre, either as part of sub-units or as individuals on special courses. Units on rotation additionally carried out field exercises, with a final one which was attended by the CGS or his representative. Battalions not at the required standard repeated it.
Before the East Timor operation, the training unit in existence was designed for the small numbers involved in minor United Nation deployment contingents. It could not cope with the immediate and specific demands for theatre preparation, not only for the non-Operational Deployment Force units and individuals, but also for a large number of transiting coalition forces, and then the ongoing preparation of rotation units and individuals. Ad hoc-prepared units, thrown together, coped as best they could with begged and borrowed resources.
This consistent preparation policy, where it was consistently applied, paid dividends in both casualty reduction and operational success. While a major unused training system cannot be maintained in peacetime, the Timor experience has underlined the need of a pre-planned unit with shadow-posted instructors and administrative staff, able and practiced to come together in pre-allocated facilities at short notice.
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DPE will be responsible for coordinating work force expansion aspects. The following tasks will be undertaken by DPE on behalf of the total Defence work force:
• Measure current capacity. Refine the numbers and skill categories of the total FIB.
• Cease voluntary separations. Cease voluntary separations to maintain a stable core of trained personnel that can be used as required. The Defence Act provides the authority to reject a commissioned rank’s resignation or a non-commissioned rank’s claim for discharge in time of war or Defence emergency.
• Amend recruiting targets. Maximise the effective work force base by amending recruiting targets towards those areas of greatest need and then refining them to ensure a sustainable force in the longer-term.
• Reserve call out. Volunteers from the Reserves will be sought in the first instance. Should it be required, a Reserve call out might be used to supplement manning in key areas. The Defence Act allows members of the Reserves to be called out for CFTS by the Governor-General for situations listed in Section 50D(2).
• Amend training priorities. Training priorities will be amended to focus training on support to key areas and meeting deficiencies in critical categories. Promotion and personal development training might be substantially reduced or cancelled during that period.
• Support units to full establishment. Support units should be manned to their full establishment during work-up. It is intended that, once fully manned, units will remain virtually unchanged during all phases of mobilisation and sustainability. Should additional combat personnel be required in combat units, Reservists or Defence contractors/civilian staff may be used to backfill military personnel moved from support units.
• Placement of personnel. The placement and integration of Service personnel into operational units will be coordinated. Similarly, the placement of Defence contractors or civilian staff into support positions vacated by uniformed personnel will be managed.
• Conscription or national service. Should the situation be so dire and voluntary enlistment and Reserve call out does not achieve recruitment targets, conscription or national service may be an option for Government.
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OPERATIONS 7.36
7.36 The operations phase of mobilisation involves the sustainment of the entire Defence work force throughout the contingency. The key elements of the operations phase are:
• identification of additional personnel to account for attrition, including adjustment of recruiting and training targets;
• the development of a rotation plan for respite between rotations;
• identification and activation of cross-levelling between Services and across units to fully staff units to be deployed and units in direct support of operations;
• the management of the personnel needs of the entire Defence; and
• an assessment of the potential degradation of wider core skills not being utilised within the AO and its relationship to training on rotation outside of the AO for subsequent potential operations/contingencies.
RECONSTITUTION 7.37
7.37 The reconstitution phase of the mobilisation continuum consists of reducing the size of the Defence work force to the latent levels of the preparation phase or other levels as determined by the prevailing strategic circumstances. The key elements of the reconstitution phase are:
• resettlement of expansion force personnel into the civilian community; and
• reestablishment of the Defence work force. This may not mean returning to pre-operation levels, as the strategic environment may have changed.
MOBILISATION CONTINUUM 7.38
7.38 The phases of the mobilisation continuum will normally be repeated throughout the duration of a contingency. Units and personnel will be going through the initial and preparation phases concurrently, while others are being subjected to the operations phase. Simultaneously, other units will be reconstituted as they are rotated out of the AO.
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BROADER MANPOWER OPTIONS 7.39
7.39 The following table lists the manpower resources that may be available for use by the Defence. They are not in any order of priority.
Table 7–1: Manpower resources
Annex:A. Reserve categories: terminology and definition
Manpower resource options Approving authorityEmployment of Reserve volunteers DefenceCall out of the Reserves By the Governor-GeneralRedistribute APS DefenceIncreasing employment of host nation support Government Extend working hours GovernmentConscription/national service Referendum requiredIncreasing the employment of contractors DefenceDeployment of contractors into the AO Defence/GovernmentRedistribute State-based public servants GovernmentRecall of military retirees (particularly those with an expertise in a technical area with a long lead time for training).
Government/Defence
Restrict retirements and resignations from the ADF
Government
Have Defence APS classified as essential services
Government
Use of Commonwealth, State and local employees on a loan basis
Government/Defence
Integration of foreign military personnel and functions
Government/Defence
Integration of foreign personnel and functions Government/DefenceRedirection of those on the unallotted lists Defence
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RESERVE CATEGORIES: TERMINOLOGY AND DEFINITION A
Category Definition Attributes
High Readiness Active Reserve (also covers High Readiness Reserve)
The High Readiness Active Reserve consists of Reservists who are required to undertake an annual military training commitment, maintain a minimum level of fitness and health and maintain a specified level of individual readiness (at levels of 28, or less, days to move to full-time service (FTS)). High Readiness Active Reservists may volunteer to render continuous full-time Defence service and are required to render continuous full-time Defence service after call out.
• Trained members.
• Required to agree to render designated service, in accordance with Service requirements, at specified levels of individual readiness, when called for.
• Required to undertake an annual military training obligation.
• Required to maintain a minimum level of fitness or health.
• Required to maintain a specified level of individual readiness (at levels of 28, or less, days to move to FTS).
• Liable for continuous full-time service (CFTS) after call out under the Defence Act 1903 (Defence Act).
• Able to volunteer to render CFTS (any Service prerequisites for such service will have to be met).
• Held against an establishment position.
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High Readiness Specialist Reserve
The High Readiness Specialist Reserve consists of Reservists, belonging to a specialist employment group, who are required to undertake an annual military training commitment, maintain a minimum level of fitness and health and maintain a specified level of individual readiness (at levels of 28, or less, days to move to FTS). High Readiness Specialist Reservists may volunteer to render continuous full-time Defence service and are required to render CFTS after call out.
• Trained members.
• Belonging to a specialist employment group.
• Required to agree to render designated service, in accordance with Service requirements, at specified levels of individual readiness, when called for.
• Required to undertake an annual military training obligation.
• Required to maintain a minimum level of fitness or health.
• Required to maintain a specified level of individual readiness (at levels of 28, or less, days to move to FTS).
• Liable for CFTS after call out under the Defence Act.
• Able to volunteer to render CFTS (any Service prerequisites for such service will have to be met).
• Held against an establishment position.
Category Definition Attributes
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Active Reserve
The Active Reserve consists of Reservists who are required to undertake an annual military training commitment, maintain a minimum level of fitness and health and maintain a specified level of individual readiness (at levels of greater than 28 days to move to FTS). Active Reservists may volunteer to render continuous full-time Defence service and are required to render continuous full-time Defence service after call out.
• Trained members or members in training.
• Required to undertake an annual military training obligation or commit to undertake service.
• Required to maintain a minimum level of fitness or health.
• Required to maintain a specified level of individual readiness (at levels of greater than 28 days to move to FTS) in accordance with Service requirements.
• Liable for CFTS after call out under the Defence Act.
• Able to volunteer to render CFTS (any Service prerequisites for such service will have to be met).
• Held against an establishment position.
Category Definition Attributes
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Specialist Reserve
The Specialist Reserve consists of Reservists, belonging to a specialist employment group, who are required to undertake an annual military training commitment, maintain a minimum level of fitness and health and maintain a specified level of individual readiness (at levels of greater than 28 days to move to FTS). Specialist Reservists may volunteer to render continuous full-time Defence service and are required to render CFTS after call out.
• Trained members or members in training.
• Belonging to a specialist employment group.
• Required to undertake an annual military training obligation or commit to undertake service.
• Required to maintain a minimum level of fitness or health.
• Required to maintain a specified level of individual readiness (at levels of greater than 28 days to move to FTS) in accordance with Service requirements.
• Liable for CFTS after call out under the Defence Act.
• Able to volunteer to render CFTS (any Service prerequisites for such service will have to be met).
• Held against an establishment position.
Category Definition Attributes
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Standby Reserve
The Stand-by Reserve is a pool of trained Reservists, with prior ADF military service, who have no training or readiness liability but who may volunteer to render Defence service and are required to render CFTS after call out.
• Trained members with prior Permanent Force and/or Active Reserve service.
• Not required to undertake any annual military training obligation.
• Not required to maintain any minimum level of fitness or health.
• Not required to maintain any level of individual readiness.
• Liable for CFTS after call out under the Defence Act.
• Able to volunteer to render either CFTS or part-time Reserve service (any Service prerequisites for such service will have to be met).
• Not held against an establishment position.
Category Definition Attributes
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CHAPTER 8
FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF MOBILISATION 8
Introduction 8.1
8.1 Mobilisation requires a financial policy response to support the wider Defence response. It can be expected that if Government decides to commit the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to a contingency or expand the force-in-being through mobilisation of national resources, it would, at the same time, decide to provide the appropriate level of funding nationally. It is necessary for Defence to prepare realistic estimates of the net additional costs of mobilisation, operations and reconstitution for consideration by Government. In determining these estimates, Defence would be required to assess both its current year budgetary position for short-term flexibility and the Defence Management and Finance Plan (DMFP) for longer-term flexibility. Normal budgetary processes would be followed, although they will probably be accelerated and possibly abbreviated.
8.2 Purpose. The purpose of this chapter is to outline the processes for the funding of mobilisation, and specific funding issues that should be considered in the event that Defence and the national support base is mobilised. The chapter also describes, in practical terms, how Defence would obtain the funds to meet both shorter and longer contingencies, from within the Defence Budget or by supplementation. The existing Budget process is also outlined briefly (see annex A).
The costs to be captured 8.3
8.3 To satisfy Chief Finance Officer (CFO) data requirements in justifying bids for additional funding and reallocating resources, the Contingency Costing System must be able to estimate the net additional costs of undertaking a particular operation. To develop net additional cost estimates, the system must be able to identify the direct and indirect cost estimates associated with the operation, and also the direct and indirect cost estimates of not undertaking activities that were otherwise planned.
8.4 Estimates for cash expenditure and cash and non-cash expenses must be developed to ensure that Defence Outcomes and Groups can be funded appropriately. Estimates must be able to be split by Outcome, Output and Group to enable appropriate allocation of funds within Defence.
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PROCESSES FOR OBTAINING FUNDING 8.5
Costing and funding requirements 8.5
8.5 Where mobilisation is for a specific time and constant level of commitment, funding the response to a contingency requires a comprehensive estimate of the total additional costs of such factors as work-up, deployments, reconstitution, force augmentation, force structure adjustments, security and other associated activities. For a more general and open-ended mobilisation, estimates may prove less accurate however, cost-capturing mechanisms must be in place.
8.6 Depending on the magnitude of possible costs and the impact of those costs on other areas, Group resource coordinators will become involved in the costing and preparation of bids for additional resources. CFO staff will play a key coordination role in this process. CFO liaison staff may be posted to key Defence areas such as Joint Operations Command and Strategic Operations Division, and across other Departments given the level of mobilisation.
Shift of emphasis and pace 8.7
8.7 During mobilisation, the financial emphasis becomes one of providing maximum capability from increased funding as the world or regional situation becomes clearer. The planning focus moves from an unknown to specific planning parameters, with specific time frames, which constrain the range of responses, both financial and military, that are relevant and available. Assessment and justification of the response chosen will remain an essential element of the budgetary process, even though it too will be constrained by the available time.
8.8 During mobilisation the internal purchasing and budgetary processes for assessing, agreeing and obtaining capability would not be altered, except that they would be accelerated to function at the pace appropriate to support the given response. In addition, processes would be implemented to review any continued expenditure for the response and its continued effect on the Defence Budget. Processes put in place to support the mobilisation must be flexible enough to match deployment needs, and also feature a review facility to better manage the possible continued deployment or expanded mobilisation.
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FUNDING PROCESSES 8.9
Types of contingencies 8.9
8.9 For the purposes of funding, a distinction can be made between two types of contingencies: shorter notice contingencies—the likely level of which would usually be reasonably accurately known—and longer notice contingencies—which would usually have an extended warning time. While the funding response to both types of conflict is essentially the same, the nature of the conflict will impose some differences.
Shorter notice contingencies 8.10
8.10 The cost of maintaining all force elements (FE) at high readiness levels to meet shorter notice contingencies is expensive. It requires higher rates of training activity, including collective training and live-weapons firing, near complete staffing and fully provisioned and maintained equipment holdings. Readiness is therefore maintained at the level appropriate to Australia’s strategic circumstances. Even with shorter notice contingencies, it is unlikely that full financial resources will be available from within the Defence Budget at the time the Government commits all or part of the ADF to the conflict.
8.11 In responding to such a conflict, Defence will be required to assess the total net additional cost of the response, and also the extent to which it can fund this response from within the Defence Budget. Defence would be expected to identify flexibility in the expenditure program and offsets such as the cancellation of exercises and non-essential tasks. If the response could not be funded from within the Defence Budget, Defence would have to seek supplementation from Government.
HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—ADDITIONAL FUNDS ALLOCATIONS FOR OPERATIONS
Compared to total wars, additional costings and allocation of funds is quite different and more identifiable for limited operations, where specific forces are applied to prosecute and support a finite operation. In major war, it is necessary to harness the economy to sustain it for what may be an indefinite period. While crude figures of application of funds for maintenance of the forces is possible, there is a failure to recognise the total costs of such war on the overall economy, and the economic and human benefits foregone and gained.
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1
1 Source—Official Histories; CYB, DFAT Parliamentary Current Issues Brief 24, 2002–03.
HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—(cont)For the World Wars, costs are best expressed as a per cent of gross national product (GNP)/gross domestic product (GDP). This avoids futile attempts to compare real monetary values and their associated economic effects across the span of a century. These were 19 per cent of GNP for World War (WW) I, 28 per cent for WW II, and were national rather than Defence losses, the Defence forces being mobilised to the necessary size and structure, and demobilised thereafter. Funds were, in general, allocated without restriction to prosecute the war, and were over-resourced rather than under-resourced. Heavy cancellations of orders were made later in WW II.
The following exemplifies additional costs in present dollars against a single final-year-of-war GDP:
Cost $AU m
Per Capita $
Per cent GDP
Vietnam 1962–72 Gulf War 1990–92 Timor 1999–03 Iraq 2003
14901153369 154*
16.805.64
177.327.82
0.470.024.70.02
*About the same as running Parliament House for a year.
The real function of additional costs from an ADF, as opposed to a macro-economic, viewpoint is to replace the reduction in the Defence Budget arising from diversion of resources from their intended purpose for a Government-directed contingency, not envisioned in the Budget approved by Parliament. As well as not providing for political free rides, this prevents the erosion by stealth of both long-term Defence capabilities and pre-planned activities, which would otherwise occur and re-occur. It is in the interests of the ADF to capture all legitimate additional costs of contingencies in order to seek their replacement, so that the approved structure, functioning, training, equipment and future development of national defence capability can proceed as planned1.
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Longer notice contingencies 8.12
8.12 In the event that the ADF becomes involved in a longer notice and more extensive contingency, it will be necessary to reassess the total net additional cost of the response, and also the extent to which Defence can fund this response from within its existing Budget. For example, an escalation of a conflict might require a commensurate escalation in the ADF response. In this event, the balance of funding that has not been included in the current-year Budget would be dealt with as for a shorter notice contingency. Any force structure changes, for example, reordering of priorities in the unapproved investment program, would be considered in the normal way, although the processes might be accelerated.
Internal sources of funding 8.13
8.13 The assessment of funding flexibility within Defence will commence when Government, on Defence advice, decides upon the appropriate response to the contingency. Some of the considerations are shown in figure 8–2.
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HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—ADDITIONAL ACCOUNTS FOR THE EUREKA UPRISING, 1855
In the aftermath of the suppression of the revolt at the Ballarat Goldfields, the Victorian Legislative Council very properly called for an account of the funds expended at the Goldfields and in the defence of Pentridge Gaol against an expected attempt to break out the 13 arrested leaders. The Commissary and Colonial Storekeeper equally properly confined the cost to additional ones incurred by the operation, above the normal maintenance of the military and police establishments.
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8.14 All Defence Groups, through their resource coordination areas, will prepare cost estimates on a net additional cost basis for their involvement in the response. CFO staff would coordinate this process. Groups will also have to prepare bids and identify offsets for consideration by the Defence Committee. It must be noted that reporting to Government will be by Outcome rather than Group. CFO will be responsible for this process.
8.15 All Groups within Defence will need to determine the level of resources required given the level of mobilisation directed by the Chief of the Defence Force or Government. This will include the resources required for the work-up activity, operational viability period and the sustainment period and for all support requirements across the portfolio, over and above normal operating costs.
Figure 8–1: Net additional cost of Defence activities
8.16 If the operation is of limited duration and limited expansion, FE, under extant directed level of capability arrangements and funding, would be largely for the purchase of minor capital items and sustaining and maintaining those FE involved. Funding for such items might be at least partially met internally by adjusting priorities within the Budget. If the operation continues and becomes extended, a major re-ordering of priorities in the DMFP (especially in the unapproved investment program) would be necessary to fund the additional requirements. In the case of any major adjustment to the unapproved investment program, the normal capability development process would be followed, although the steps in the process may be accelerated.
External sources of funding 8.17
8.17 If funding could not be met from within Defence, supplementation would be sought from Government. Appropriate Cabinet submissions should identify the extent to which Defence can provide funding from within the Defence Budget/DMFP, and also request Cabinet approval for any increases in funding that may be required. Any requests for additional supplementation must be cleared by the Department of Finance and Administration (DoFA)
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prior to Cabinet consideration. It is imperative that cost estimates are as robust and accurate as possible. Once Cabinet approval has been given for increased funding, CFO staff would approach the DoFA seeking the appropriate level of supplementation. If a sufficiently large level of funding was required, additional Appropriation Bills may be prepared. CFO staff could also seek an Advance from the Minister for Finance to meet short-term requirements late in the financial year.
8.18 Defence should be aware that additional funds directed by Government for mobilisation may have a cost in terms of a reduction of funds allocated to other Departments. In the event of national mobilisation funding will be based upon Cabinet prioritisation, largely determined by risk assessment and subsequent management. A range of fiscal options may become available to Government, such as borrowing from the public through bonds, increasing taxation or borrowing from overseas under such arrangements as lend lease.
8.19 Though it could be argued that these national level budgetary aspects are not of direct concern to Defence, it is important in terms of the coordination of Australia’s national defence effort that Defence appreciates these external financial forces and their broader implications. It would be unwise for Defence to base planning on false assumptions or unrealisable expectations.
8.20 In times of mobilisation detailed policy, guidance and information regarding the procurement and budgetary systems within Defence can be obtained from the CFO.
Annex:A. The Defence Budget process
REBUILDING A NEGLECTED DEFENCE BASE: TOO LITTLE TOO LATE
With reference to Defence I can assure you that there has been no stinting of money here in Australia. Defence is the only Department of the Commonwealth Government that, from the financial point of view, has been able to ‘write its own ticket’. Any money Defence wants it can get …
Treasurer R.G Casey 1938 on a pre-World War Defence build-up to two per cent of GNP
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THE DEFENCE BUDGET PROCESS A
Elements of the Budget process 1
1. There are two key elements to the Budget process:
a. The Budget and the forward estimates for the current year are presented to Parliament in May each year. Defence appropriations are included in Appropriation Bills No 1 and 2, which are passed as part of the Budget by the end of June each year.
b. Additional estimates (AE) for the current year provide for additional supplementation required to meet new or unforeseen expenditure, since the Budget. It allows the Portfolio and Executives to reallocate resources provided in the Budget to meet emerging pressures or Government-directed activities. Defence AE are incorporated in Appropriation Bills No 3 and 4, and are presented to Parliament in November each year.
Defence Management and Finance Plan 8.2
2. On 22 August 2000, Cabinet decided on a range of measures aimed at improving Defence’s performance management. One initiative to increase transparency and accountability to the Government required Defence to develop an annual management plan for consideration in the annual Budget process—the Defence Management and Finance Plan (DMFP).
3. As part of Defence’s 2001–02 Budget submission, the first Defence annual management plan was submitted to Government DMFP. The 2001–02 DMFP sought Government’s approval of funding levels for the progressive implementation of the Defence White Paper, Defence 2000—Our Future Defence Force.
4. The ten-year DMFP reflects the strategic objectives and priorities outlined in the White Paper and seeks the Government’s approval of planned performance objectives, Major Capital Investment levels for new equipment and infrastructure, and a resourcing strategy for Defence for the 10 years.
5. The DMFP includes details of Australia’s strategic security outlook, operational commitments, capability levels, budgeted financial performance for Defence, and major new equipment acquisitions (the DMFP incorporates the Defence Capability Plan (DCP)).
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6. The annual Budget/DMFP process is directed towards the development and continuation of detailed long-term resource planning across the Defence portfolio and the development and lodgment of the annual Defence Budget and forward estimates proposals.
7. As part of the annual Budget process, the Government provides Defence with an indication of its likely level of funding for each year of the next ten years, although only the Budget and three forward estimate’s years are shown in the Appropriation Bills. In light of this funding advice, the Defence Committee (DC) agrees on a planning basis for the development of the next DMFP.
8. Defence Executives provide advice each year of their proposed funding allocations and any additional resource requirements for the DMFP period. These bids from Executives are considered by the DC and further refined and reviewed by the Chief Finance Officer (CFO) Group over the period leading up to the Budget. The DMFP development process culminates in the Defence Budget Cabinet Submission lodged in February each year.
Defence Capability Plan 8.9
9. The DCP is the program of future Major Capital Investment supporting the delivery of the Government’s White Paper. Cabinet agreed with the first version in 2000 during the White Paper development. The DCP is reviewed on an annual basis as part of the Defence Budget process.
Defence Capital Budget: Major Capital Investment 8.10
10. Major capital investment is contained in three separate programs within the DCP.
Defence Capital Investment Budget: Major Capital Investment 8.11
11. Major Capital Investment projects are defined as those projects that have a total capital outlay of over $20m, have a unit cost of more than $1m where numbers of items are being procured, or which have particular joint or strategic significance.
12. Defence plans for Major Capital Investment are contained within three separate programs: the Unapproved Major Capital Investment Program, the Approved Major Capital Investment Program, and the Capital Facilities Program.
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Defence Capability Plan and Unapproved Major Capital Equipment Program 8.13
13. The DCP is the Government-agreed document outlining the program of future Major Capital Equipment Investment supporting the delivery of the Government’s White Paper. Cabinet agreed to the first version in 2000 during the White Paper development and it is revised annually as part of the Annual Strategic Review/Update and Defence Budget processes. It is comprised of capital equipment projects that were either approved but not yet to contract, or unapproved at the time of the White Paper. It contains project listings with brief descriptions, timing details and total funding allocations for both capital and ongoing operating expenditure. It does not contain Major Capital Facilities (MCF) proposals. A public version of the DCP is compiled by the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) and published annually, usually mid-year.
14. The Unapproved Major Capital Equipment (UMCE) Program is likened to the DCP in that it contains UMCE proposals and not facilities proposals. However, this Program is a rolling program of investment, dropping projects as they are approved and picking up new projects in the later years as they are added through the Defence Capability Development Guidance process. The UMCE Program is a classified internal document prepared by the CFO Group. It not only provides information on the status, description, proposed scope, timing and total cost of UMCE investment proposals, but also details of proposed expenditure spreads. This Program is a Major Capital Investment management instrument rather than a Government-agreed statement of intent.
Approved Major Capital Equipment Program 8.15
15. Once projects in the UMCE Program are approved by Cabinet, they are transferred to the Approved Major Capital Equipment (AMCE) Program. This Program sets out all Government-approved projects on which funds will be expended during the DMFP. It is subject to review with emphasis on risk management and ensuring that projects are on schedule, within cost estimates and endorsed capability requirements. The AMCE Program is managed by DMO.
Major Capital Facilities Program 8.16
16. Defence’s program of capital facilities investment is contained within the MCF Program. It covers both approved and unapproved projects and contains all facilities proposals in excess of $250 000. The program is divided into Major Works (greater than $6M), Medium Works (between $6M and $250 000) and Acquisitions. All individual projects costing more than $20M,
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as well as projects of less cost that have strategic importance, are submitted to Cabinet for approval. Infrastructure Division within the Corporate Services and Infrastructure Group manages the MCF.
Time ActivityApril DC consideration of the draft 10-year Defence Work Force
Plan
May Budget announced
Current-year Budget allocations and forthcoming 10-year allocations advised to Groups
Defence Capability and Investment Committee (DCIC) updated on draft organisational performance agreements (OPA)
June Budget estimates and Senate Legislative Committee (SLC) hearings
Current OPA updated and finalised to reflect the Budget decisions
DCIC considers the OPA
DCIC and DC consideration of planning guidance for the development of the next DMFP
July Budget phasings due in BORIS
Group Heads DMFP submissions, incorporating a full estimates update, to be forwarded to the CFO for consolidation and analysis
August DCIC and DC consideration of the current-year outcome and Group allocation adjustments and initial consideration of the development of the next DMFP
September Group AE for current financial year (FY) submitted to CFO
DCIC consideration of the draft DMFP and Senior Ministers’ Review (SMR) letter to the Prime Minister (PM) on the next Budget (including the Compendium of Performance and Resources and New Policy Proposals)
DC consideration of the AE submissions
AE submission sent to Department of Finance and Administration
October Initial DMFP output costing run
Groups submit a full DMFP estimates update, including a Mid Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook Foreign Exchange (MYEFO FOREX) estimates update to CFO
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MYEFO estimates updates in Audit Information Management System (AIMS)
Draft DMFP sent to the Minister for consideration
SMR letter to the PM on the next Budget and the next DMFP
Current Defence Annual Report tabled in Parliament
Publication of MYEFO by the Treasurer
Portfolio additional estimates statements output costing run
Budget estimates supplementary hearing
Current FY Portfolio AE Statements and AE Bills tabled in Parliament
December Senior Ministers’ Review meeting on the next FY Budget
January Group DMFP estimates update due with CFO
February Draft Portfolio Budget Statement (PBS) provided to Finance for costing of policy proposals
Draft nest FY PBS and revised DMFP go to the Minister for consideration
AE SLC Hearing
Defence circulates exposure draft of PBS to central agencies
Defence finalises DMFP and associated Compendium of Output Performance and Resources
Defence circulates draft PBS for coordination comments
March Lodgement of Defence PBS
Expenditure Review Committee meets to consider PBS, cross Portfolio issues and other Budget-related matters of concern
April Group Budget FOREX estimates update due to CFO
AIMS open for pre-Budget estimates update
DMFP Output costing run
Preparation of Budget documentation
Budget Cabinet
May Budget delivery/announcement
Time Activity
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Table 8A–1: Indicative timetable of key events for the Defence Management and Finance Plan
May Budget allocations and indicative allocations for next 10-year period advised to Groups
June OPA updated and finalised to reflect Budget decisions
Time Activity
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GLOSSARY
Australian Defence Force preparedness planning guide (ADFPPG)The ADFPPG is a central repository of preparedness planning guidance, policy and relevant contacts. It is maintained on the Defence Secret Network by Capability and Plans Branch staff.
aggregated military response option (AMRO)AMRO link military response options (MRO) by similarity of tasks based on similar outcomes, force elements (FE) and operational objectives. They represent the worst case MRO within the related AMRO and subsequent operational preparedness objective (OPO).
Australia’s Illustrative Planning Scenario (AIPS)The AIPS assist planning staffs in Defence by providing a specific interpretation of strategic guidance, largely for capability and logistic planning. The scenarios are intended to supplement other sources of strategic direction. They are endorsed by Chiefs of Service Committee (COSC).
Australia’s military strategy (AMS)The AMS is the Defence strategy document that interprets, refines and classifies Government Defence policy for use by Defence. The AMS describes military objectives, effects and options that link the means available to the ADF to the ways Defence will achieve the strategic ends designated by Government.
coalition operationAn operation conducted by forces of two or more nations, which may not be allies, acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.
combinedBetween two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies. (When all allies or Services are not involved, the participating nations and Services shall be identified, eg combined Navies.) See also joint.
Unless stated otherwise, approved Australian Defence Force (ADF) terms and definitions are used within this publication. Externally sourced terms and definitions, herewith approved for ADF use, have the source designated in brackets following the definition, using the following legend:
NATO Allied Administrative Publication–6, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, 2003 (AAP–6).
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combined operationAn operation conducted by forces of two or more allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.
Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) Preparedness Directive (CPD)This principal strategic level directive contains strategic planning guidance, lists MRO and determines preparedness requirements. It informs all subordinate preparedness and capability directives at the operational level, which set specified levels of preparedness, resourcing and contains the capability standards against which force units measure and report.
civil defenceCivil defence comprises those measures taken to protect the civil population against the dangers of hostilities and disasters during time of armed conflict. It forms part of Australia's overall emergency management arrangements and is an integral part of Australia's defence strategy. In ratifying the 1997 Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions 1949, Australia committed itself to conducting civil defence in accordance with the provisions of those Protocols. Emergency Management Australia is the agency charged with coordinating the Commonwealth's civil defence responsibilities.The functions of civil defence are:a. to protect the civil population against the dangers of hostilities
or disasters;b. to help the civil population to recover from the immediate
effects of hostilities or disasters; andc. to provide the conditions necessary for the survival of the civil
population.
concurrencyThere are two dimensions to concurrency. The first concerns competing demands for resources. The second concerns competing demands on FE to meet simultaneous operational requirements. One or both of these dimensions will usually require the establishment of priorities of effort.
customer supplier agreement (CSA)The CSA is an agreement between internal customers and suppliers (between Groups) for the supply of a service at an agreed quantity, standard and price.
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deliberate planningThe start of a process for the development of considered military strategic guidance for the employment of the ADF, to achieve an end-state, in support of government national strategy. The process is generally free of time constraints. It relies on a mix of assumption-based planning against current strategic guidance and future analysis to account for possible future strategic environments.
Defence mobilisation committee (DMC)The committee, chaired by the Vice Chief of the Defence Force, is comprised of senior military officers and Defence officials, and provides advice and develops policy on a broad range of mobilisation-related issues, such as reserves and other personnel matters, logistics, law and finance.
directed level of capability (DLOC)DLOC is the funded level of capability maintained during a specific Budget period. DLOC is formally agreed in organisational performance agreements between the Secretary/CDF and each of the Defence’s six Outcome Executives (OE). DLOC captures the levels of capability to be maintained to meet preparedness, ongoing operations, and known national task requirements. It is expressed in terms of assigned FE, tasks, authorised readiness and sustainability requirements against each OPO. Joint Operations Command (JOC) may risk manage the FE options available for each OPO. The difference between the JOC Operational Preparedness Requirement(JOCOPR) derived level of preparedness and the DLOC-resourced level is the risk level accepted by Secretary/CDF.
distribution1. The operational process of synchronising all elements of the logistics system to deliver the ‘right things’ to the ‘right place’ at the ‘right time’ to support the geographic operational commander.2. An official delivery of anything, such as orders or supplies.
force element (FE)An FE is a component of a unit, a unit, or an association of units having common prime objectives and activities.
force element group (FEG)A grouping of FE with an appropriate command and control structure for a specified role(s).
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force expansionForce expansion is the process by which the force-in-being is increased in size, capability or both, by the acquisition of significant additional equipment, personnel, facilities or other resources.
force-in-being (FIB)The current state of the planned force structure which is represented by the ADF as it currently exists.
force structureForce structure relates to the type of force required personnel, equipment, facilities and military doctrine to achieve the level of capability necessary to conduct operations effectively. In the medium-term to the long-term, military capability will vary due to changes in force generated by the capability development progress. In the short-term, force structure is the more constant component of military capability and the level of capability available for operations is determined by the Defence’s management preparedness of the current force. Changes to force structure usually affect on the preparedness of the associated forces. For example, the introduction of a new platform, retirement of an old platform or capability enhancement will have a direct impact on the resource, training and facility requirements of the forces involved.
fundamental inputs to capability (FIC)The effective generation of a capability consists of a range of inputs. To ensure consistency, these have been consolidated as the FIC. The FIC are a guide that may be used to quantify capability. The eight FIC are organisation, personnel, collective training, supplies, facilities, major systems, support and command and management.
immediate planningTime sensitive planning for the employment of assigned forces and resources that occurs in response to a developing situation that may result in military operations. It is informed by the products of deliberate planning, with assumptions and projections replaced with facts as the situation unfolds.
jointConnotes activities, operations, organisations, etc in which elements of more than one Service of the same nation participate. (When all Services are not involved, the participating Services shall be identified, eg Joint Army-Navy). See also combined.
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logisticsThe science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with:a. design and development, acquisition, storage and movement;b. distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of
materiel;c. transport of personnel;d. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and
disposition of facilities;e. acquisition or furnishing of services; andf. medical and health service support.
logistics-over-the-shore (LOTS) operationsThe loading and unloading of ships without the benefit of deep draft-capable, fixed-port facilities in friendly or non-defended territory and, in time of war, during phases of theatre development in which there is no opposition by the enemy; or as a means of moving forces closer to tactical assembly areas dependant on threat force capabilities.
maintenance1. All actions taken to retain equipment in or to restore it to a spec-ified condition, including inspection, testing, servicing, classification as to serviceability, repair, rebuilding and reclamation.2. All supply and repair action taken to keep a force in condition to carry out its mission.3. The routine recurring work required to keep a facility (plant, building, structure, ground facility, utility system or other real property) in such condition that it may be continuously utilised, at its original or designed capacity and efficiency, for its intended purpose.
military response option (MRO)MRO are generic joint tasks that the ADF may conceivably perform to achieve associated military strategic objectives (MSO), which are the desired military outcomes. MRO, together with MSO provide the basis for operational planning. They are also a critical element of the deliberate planning process, at both the strategic and operational levels, and are used to inform the immediate planning process. MRO assist in informing Government of the range of possible military responses to a specific circumstance. They also provide the basis for determining the preparedness and capability development requirements of the ADF. MROs are derived from AMS and are contained within the Strategic Response Options Table and promulgated in the AMS, CPD and JOCOPR.
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military strategic effects (MSE)MSE describe the effect we seek to have on an adversary such as a change of will or the neutralisation of offensive operations.
military strategic objective (MSO)MSO is a desired outcome of ADF military operations in a given set of strategic circumstances. MSOs are derived from an analysis of strategic policy and the military strategies associated with particular national security objectives.
minimum level of capability (MLOC)MLOC is the lowest level of capability from which an FE can achieve its operational level of capability (OLOC) within readiness notice (RN), and it encompasses the maintenance of core skills, safety and professional standards. It is a term employed only within the six OE.
mobilisationMobilisation is the process of generating military capabilities and marshalling national resources for the conduct of military operations to defend the nation and its interests. It encompasses activities associated with preparedness and the conduct of operations—it may involve force expansion. Mobilisation is a continuum of interrelated activities that occur during the four phases: preparation, work-up, the conduct of operations and reconstitution.
movementThe activity involved in the change in location of equipment, personnel or stocks as part of a military operation. Movement requires the supporting capabilities of mobility, transportation, infrastructure, and movement control and support functions.
national support base (NSB)The NSB encompasses the full range of organisations, systems and arrangements (both formal and informal) that own, control or influence ADF access to, and the use of capability. In geographical terms, the NSB refers to the Australian nation.
notice to move (NTM)NTM is a tactical term not to be confused with RN. NTM is normally expressed in hours or minutes, and is the time from when a force receives direction (notice) to move to conduct a specified operation/mission to the time it either actually moves or is required to be able to move to conduct that operation/mission. For example, in an exercise or operational setting where forces are operating at OLOC (having achieved OLOC within RN/readiness lead-time), the forces’ administrative movement, commitment to periods of combat and other
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tactical movement is controlled by the issue of NTM. Battle procedure (including activities such as orders, flight planning and mission briefing) is normally conducted/completed during the NTM period.
operational level of capability (OLOC)OLOC is the task-specific level of capability required by a force to execute its role in an operation at an acceptable level of risk.
operational preparedness objective (OPO)OPO are the specific tasks, RN and sustainability requirements assigned to specific FE via the JOCOPR. JOC may have several FE options to implement a particular OPO. They equate to each of the AMRO (in essence they are populated AMRO).
organisational performance agreement (OPA)OPA are formally agreed between CDF/Secretary and each of the six OE annually, and are expressed in terms of input resource budget and output performance capabilities. Schedule 2 of the OPA encompasses the DLOC agreements.
operational viability period (OVP)OVP is the period immediately following deployment on operations, during which deployed forces must be self-sufficient until the logistic resupply system is in place. It is considered part of the sustainment period.
preparedness management system (PMS)The PMS is designed to provide a mechanism for the translation of Government strategic guidance into detailed directions used by the OE in producing outputs for Government. It includes the guidance on the roles and tasks required in producing these outputs and the levels of activity (preparedness) that are to be maintained within the specified Budget. As such the system provides a basis for detailed guidance in the allocation of resources to the OE and Enabling Groups to achieve required levels of preparedness and works in parallel with Defence Capability Planning Guidance to inform the management and development of current and future capability. The system evolves through an incremental process that has four phases; development, implementation, reporting and review.
readinessReadiness denotes a force’s ability to be committed to operations within a specified time. Readiness refers to the availability and efficiency/serviceability of personnel, equipment, facilities and consumables allocated to a force.
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readiness notice (RN)RN is the specified amount of time in which a force is to complete its work-up from DLOC/MLOC to OLOC.
reconstitution phaseOne of the four phases of the Mobilisation Continuum, the reconstitution phase is that period during which a force’s level of capability is returned from OLOC to DLOC at the cessation of operations. This may be at a different prevailing steady state or DLOC from that prior to operations.
redeploymentThe transfer of a unit, an individual or supplies deployed in one area to another area, or to another location within the area, or to the support area for the purpose of further employment.
regenerationThe rebuilding of a unit or formation outside the operational environment.
rehabilitation1. The processing, usually in a relatively quiet area, of units or individuals recently withdrawn from combat or arduous duty, during which units recondition equipment and are rested, furnished special facilities, filled up with replacements, issued replacement supplies and equipment, given training, and generally made ready for employment in future operations. (NATO)2. The action performed in restoring an installation to authorised design standards. (NATO)3. The action taken to prepare demobilised individuals, such as military prisoners and hospital patients, for their return to military duty or useful civilian employment.
reserve stocksThe quantities of stocks required to be held to ensure against an emergency, unforseen fluctuations and expenditure, delays in production and transit, misfortune, etc. Reserve stocks cover requirements for work-up, operational viability and sustainability. In an area of operations (AO), reserve stocks are divided as follows:a. Unit reserve stock. Stocks that comprise an emergency
ration, a limited quantity of petroleum, oils and lubricants, and one or more first lines of ammunition being constantly replenished.
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b. Combat reserve stocks. Stocks that are held under the control of the senior combat formation headquarters and are usually located in the rear of the combat zone. A portion may be allotted to subordinate formations.
c. Force reserve stocks. The remaining reserve stocks in an AO are termed force reserve stocks. They are held under the control of the force commander stocks. They are held under the control of the force commander.
rules of engagement (ROE)ROE are directives that set out the circumstances and limitations within which commanders may apply military force to achieve military objectives in support of Government policy. ROE guide the application of force, but in doing so they neither inhibit nor replace the command function. ROE may be used to prohibit or limit certain actions permitted by law. Alternatively, they may be used to authorise actions, to the full extent permissible under international and domestic law. The essential point about ROE is that they are a means of ensuring there is appropriate strategic level control over ADF operations, to ensure consistency with policy objectives and political constraints. Subordinate commanders may impose more restrictive limits on the actions of assigned forces than those authorised by their ROE, but they may not issue more relaxed ROE. ROE do not limit the inherent rights of unit and individual self-defence.
strategic warning time (SWT)That period when indication of the possible application of military capability is identified. It considers the time needed to analyse the threat, conduct feasibility studies of the options available, receive approval, provide estimates and directives, plan in detail for a specific response and prepare forces. This time may vary considerably within the strategic environment and result in capabilities being maintained, practised and ready at very short notice, through to maintaining some skills and organisations to meet less likely, but nevertheless possible, contingencies with a very long lead-time. Accurate and thorough intelligence is essential for the review of SWT and to analyse changes within the strategic environment that may affect it. Accurate reporting on the effectiveness of capabilities is critical in order to ensure that resources and effort can be adjusted to compensate, and that the appropriate capabilities are available in the required time frame.
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supplyThe procurement, distribution, maintenance while in storage and salvage of supplies, including the determination of kind and quantity of supplies:a. Producer phase. That phase of military supply which extends
from determination of procurement schedules to acceptance of finished supplies by the Services.
b. Consumer phase. That phase of military supply which extends from receipt of finished supplies by the Services through issue for use or consumption.
supportThe action of a force, or portion thereof, which aids, protects, complements or sustains any other force.
surgeSurge is the process by which military and civilian elements operate at higher than normal rates of effort for a limited and usually short period in order to undertake operations and/or achieve specific objectives.
sustainmentThe provision of personnel, logistic and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment of the mission or the national objective.
sustainabilityThe ability of a force to maintain the necessary level of combat power for the duration required to achieve its objectives.
sustainment period (SP)The SP covers all of the operations phase including the OVP, whereby FE are sustained either from organic or imbedded sources, or through the mainstream logistic system when it is established into an AO.
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONSADDP Australian Defence Doctrine PublicationADF Australian Defence ForceAE additional estimateAG Attorney-GeneralAIF Australian Imperial ForceAIMS Audit Information Management SystemAIPS Australia’s Illustrative Planning ScenariosAMCE Approved Major Capital Equipment AMRO aggregated military response optionAMS Australia’s military strategyANZUK Australian, New Zealand and United KingdomAO area of operationsAPS Australian Public ServiceASA Air Services Australia
CA Chief of ArmyCAF Chief of Air ForceCCDG Chief Capability Development GroupCD capability developmentCDF Chief of the Defence ForceCEO Chief Executive OfficerCFO Chief Finance OfficerCFTS continuous full-time serviceCGS Chief of the General StaffCIO Chief Information OfficerCJLOG Commander Joint LogisticsCJOPS Commander Joint OperationsCN Chief of NavyCOA course of actionCOSC Chiefs of Service CommitteeCPAD Coordination and Public Affairs DivisionC & P Branch Capability and Plans BranchCPD CDF Preparedness DirectiveCSA customer supplier agreementCSIG Corporate Services and Infrastructure Group
DA Defending AustraliaDC Defence CommitteeDCA Deputy Chief of ArmyDCAF Deputy Chief of Air ForceDCIC Defence Capability and Investment CommitteeDCJOPS Deputy Chief of Joint OperationsDCN Deputy Chief of NavyDCP Defence Capability PlanDCPG Defence Capability Planning Guide
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DDD Defence Deficiency DatabaseDEPSEC CS Deputy Secretary Corporate ServicesDEPSEC I&S Deputy Secretary Intelligence and SecurityDEPSEC S Deputy Secretary StrategyDEST Department of Education, Science and TrainingDFAT Department of Foreign Affairs and TradeDGTDLS Director-General The Defence Legal ServiceDIEP Defence International Engagement PlanDIESP Defence International Engagement Strategic
PlanDI(G) Defence Instruction (General)DIGO Defence Imagery and Geospatial OrganisationDIO Defence Intelligence OrganisationDITR Department of Industry, Tourism and ResourcesDLOC directed level of capabilityDMC Defence Mobilisation CommitteeDMFP Defence Management and Financial PlanDMO Defence Materiel OrganisationDOCITA Department of Communications Information
Technology and the ArtsDoFA Department of Finance and AdministrationDoTRS Department of Transport and Regional ServicesDPE Defence Personnel ExecutiveDPS Defence Performance SummaryDR deficency reportDSA Defence Security AuthorityDSD Defence Signals DirectorateDSTO Defence Science and Technology Organisation
EMA Emergency Management Australia
FAD force activity designatorFE force elementsFEG Force Element GroupFIB force-in-beingFIC fundamental inputs to capabilityFMS foreign military salesFOREX foreign exchangeFTS full-time serviceFY financial year
GDP gross domestic productGI&S geospatial information and servicesGNP gross national product
HCS Head Capability SystemsHDPE Head Defence Personnel ExecutiveHQ headquarters
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IP International Policy Division
JMAP Joint Military Appreciation ProcessJOC Joint Operations CommandJOCOPR Joint Operations Command Operational
Preparedness Requirement
LofC lines of communicationLOAC law of armed conflictLOGCC Logistics Component CommanderLOT life-of-typeLOTS logistics over the shore
MCF Major Capital FacilitiesMLOC minimum level of capabilityMRO military response optionMSE military strategic effectsMSO military strategic objectivesMYEFO Mid Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook
NATP national anti-terrorist planNATPOL national policyNSB National Support BaseNSCC (NSC) National Security Committee of CabinetNSO national strategic objectivesNTM notice to moveNZ New Zealand
OE Outcome ExecutivesOECD Outcome Executive capability directiveOLOC operational level of capabilityONA Office of National AssessmentOOPR on occurrence preparedness reportOPA organisational performance agreementOPO operational preparedness objectiveOPR operational preparedness requirementOVP operational viability period
PAES Portfolio Additional Estimates StatementsPBS Portfolio Budget StatementPM Prime MinisterPM&C Prime Minister and CabinetPMIS peparedness management information systemPMS preparedness management systemPNG Papua New GuineaPOC period of contingency
QSR quarterly strategic review
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RAAF Royal Australian Air ForceRAN Royal Australian NavyR&D research and developmentRN readiness noticeROE rules of engagement
SCG Strategic Command GroupSCNS Secretary’s Committee of National SecuritySEATO South East Asia Treaty OrganisationSLC Senate Legislative CommitteeSMR Senior Ministers' ReviewSOD Strategic Operations DivisionSP Strategic Policy DivisionSP sustainment periodSPCG Strategic Policy Coordination GroupSROT Strategic Response Options TableSVN South VietnamSWG Strategic Watch GroupSWT Strategic Warning Time
TDLS The Defence Legal Service
UK United KingdomUMCE Unapproved Major Capital EquipmentUN United NationsUS United States
VCDF Vice Chief of the Defence Force
WW World War
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