HS2 Ltd accept no responsibility for any circumstances, whicharise from the reproduction of this map after alteration,amendment or abbreviation or if it is issued in part or issuedincomplete in any way.
High Speed TwoPetitioner Location Plan
Reference Drawing
!
!
LONDON
BIRMINGHAM
Petition number
Petitioner
Registered in England. Registration number 06791686. Registered office: 2 Snowhill Queensway Birmingham B4 6GA
The purpose of this study is to carry out a Risk Assessment in connection with the construction of the proposed HS2 railway alignment (the ‘Proposed Scheme’) adjacent to Denham Airport. The Risk Assessment, to the operation of aircraft (both fixed‐wing and helicopters) to and from Denham Airport, considers the existing situation, the risks associated during the construction phase, and the situation once construction of the railway is completed.
The study first sets out some background information to set in context the discussions relating to the risk assessment.
The term ‘aircraft’ encompasses fixed‐wing aeroplanes and helicopters; where necessary the text refers specifically to aeroplanes or helicopters.
2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
2.1 DenhamAirport
Denham Airport (EGLD) is a licensed aerodrome located to the north east of the M25/M40 junction and near Gerrards Cross, approximately 7.5 nautical miles (nm) north of London Heathrow Airport. The UK Air Information Publication entry for Denham is attached as Appendix 1. Commercially produced aerodrome guides, such as the Pooley’s Guide and AFE Guide also give similar textual and graphical information for the aerodrome.
The Aerodrome is licensed (by the Civil Aviation Authority, CAA) as a Private Aerodrome, which requires that Prior Permission (‘PPR’) is obtained from the aerodrome operator for flights to and from the airfield.
The airfield lies just inside the northern boundary of the Heathrow Control Zone, and has special access routes; it has a Flight Information Service, as opposed to Air Traffic Control: thus the aerodrome controls the movement of aircraft on the airfield, but can only give advisory information to aircraft taking off, landing, or in the vicinity. The aerodrome is for use in visual conditions only; there are no Instrument Approach procedures.
There is an asphalt runway orientated approximately 060/240 degrees and designated 06/24. Although notionally 775m long, it has inset take‐off/landing points (‘Displaced Thresholds’) so a take‐off run available of 686m on 06, with a landing distance available of 706m, and, on Runway 24, 728m and 670m respectively. The purpose of the displaced threshold on Runway 24 is specifically to ensure that aeroplanes are at a greater height when overflying the public road near the runway at the airfield’s north‐eastern boundary. There is also a grass runway 12/30, some 546m long, but due to inset thresholds the take‐off
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and landing distances available are much reduced; consequently there are restrictions on the use of this runway, particularly by student pilots flying on their own (Solo).
2.2 UsersandClassesofUsers. The aerodrome is (according to the current Airport website) home to two fixed‐wing flying schools, and three helicopter businesses offering training and charter flights. There are also two specialist helicopter film companies based at Denham. Additionally, there are many private aircraft (more than 60) based at Denham, used for recreational and business purposes and two charter/sales broking companies. The London Air Ambulance service is stated to be based at Denham.
2.3 MovementsData In undertaking the risk assessment, there was no movements’ data for Denham. A ‘movement’ is a take‐off or a landing. Other data can be put into context if movements data is subsequently made available.
The Proposed Scheme in the vicinity of Denham Airport will be running from southeast to northwest. In this area the railway is constructed on embankments, cuttings, viaduct and tunnel. Running from West Ruislip to Maple Cross, the Proposed Scheme consists of a 90m long embankment on the approach to Colne Valley Viaduct. The viaduct is approximately 3.4km long, passing over the Grand Union Canal, River Colne, Savay Lake and A412 North Orbital Road. To the west of the North Orbital Road, a 350m long embankment forms the northern approach to Colne Valley viaduct. HS2 then runs through a cutting before entering the Chiltern Tunnel via the tunnel portal just south of the M25. The Colne Valley Viaduct would be located approximately 0.5km away from the north eastern end of Denham Airport’s runway.
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2.5 Denhamairportoperatorsconcerns The Denham Airport owners presented a number of concerns in their letter of 31 March 2011, arising from the HS2 Proposed Scheme:
Possibility of restricting ‘touch and goes’ at the airport due to construction of the viaduct (The’ touch and go’ is a manoeuvre where the aircraft lands on the runway and then takes off again).
The proposed viaduct and temporary construction cranes infringing the obstacle limitation surface
Risk of collision with HS2 infrastructure
Loss of open field space used for emergency landing These concerns have been carefully considered throughout the hazard identification process and a number of mitigation measures have been proposed in this report.
3. Physical Characteristics of Aerodromes and Obstacle Limitation Requirements
3.1 RegulatoryRequirement Civil Aviation Publication (CAP) 168 ‘Licensing of Aerodromes’ sets out the requirements for the licensing of aerodromes and the requirements for the assessment and treatment of obstacles are set out in Chapter 4. In simple terms, an Obstacle Limitation Surface (OLS) has to be established to prove that obstacles will not impinge on the safe passage of aircraft taking off, landing or in the aerodrome vicinity. Detailed instructions for the measurement of obstacles are given in CAP 232 ‘Aerodrome Survey Requirements’.
Colne Valley Colne Valley Viaduct Approach Embankment
Colne Valley Viaduct Approach Embankment
HS2 Cutting Chiltern Tunnel
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3.2 ApplicabilitytoDenham. Clearance between the top of catenary posts along the proposed HS2 Colne Valley Viaduct and the OLS would be approximately 21.5m and therefore the current proposal for the viaduct would not impinge within the current OLS. The current method of construction assumed for the viaduct does not require construction equipment to project into the OLS.
3.3 AircraftPerformance Aircraft performance of both aeroplanes and helicopters is mainly determined by aircraft design, particularly aerodynamic shape and the power output of the installed engine(s). Performance is affected by Weight, Altitude and Temperature (known as WAT factors). Although an aircraft will have a maximum weight specified, performance will generally be better at lower all‐up weights. Increases in altitude and temperature decrease the air density, which adversely affects the performance of lifting surfaces; i.e. wings and rotor blades. Aircraft Flight Manuals provide the certificated data for take‐off and landing distances required for differing weights, altitudes and temperatures, generally in tabular or graphical form. Other environmental factors affect performance too. So, as examples, for aeroplanes an asphalt surface is preferable for performance reasons to grass, a flat runway surface better than a slope, and dry conditions preferable to wet. And of course it is preferable to take off and land into wind, or at least with a head‐wind component, as lift depends greatly on airspeed, and into a 20 knot wind an aircraft will reach 40 knots airspeed whilst only travelling at 20 knots groundspeed: so take‐off distance will be reduced. The CAA provides advisory information on how to factor Flight Manual data for such environmental factors to ensure that a safe take‐off and landing distance is available in all circumstances, and it is the pilot’s responsibility to check that the aircraft’s loading will comply with the calculated distances.
4. Aircraft Operation
4.1 Aeroplanes At the risk of being simplistic, aeroplanes take off and land on runways; normally for the classes of aircraft using an airfield such as Denham, the final approach will be commenced at or before 500 ft above runway level, with the aeroplane aligned with the centre‐line of the runway. For a ‘normal’ or ‘standard’ approach with engine power the approach angle will be approximately 3 degrees, or greater. For 3 degree approach angle the aircraft will be at 300 ft relative to the runway threshold at 1 nm from touchdown. Steeper approach angles are associated with idle power or ‘glide’ approaches, which are typically used to simulate the latter stages of a forced landing in the event of engine failure as this manoeuvre cannot usually be practiced below 500 ft off an airfield. As such, the glide approach is essentially a
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training manoeuvre. Aeroplanes normally use wing flaps for landing, which enable them to fly safely at a lower airspeed for their approach and landing. Flap failures are rare, but nevertheless ‘flapless’ approaches and landings are practiced; in these cases the approach angle will be slightly flatter than normal, in order for the pilot to maintain a view over the nose and maintain the correct perspective relative to the runway. With flaps down the pilot’s forward view is better than with flaps up, because effectively the wing is now a different shape. The Airport operators refer to the possibility of restricting ‘touch and goes’ at the aerodrome due to construction of the viaduct. However, there are trees on the north‐eastern end of the aerodrome that are in closer proximity to the OLS than would be the viaduct. By reviewing light aeroplane and helicopter accidents in trees, experience shows that anything other than small saplings is less frangible than the aircraft structure, and an aircraft usually suffers severe structural damage from impact with trees, as a result of which injury to those on board is probable. Whilst ideally the aeroplane should be aligned with the centre‐line of the runway on final approach and take‐off, there are aerodromes where for reasons of obstructions or for noise‐abatement in the locality, an offset approach or departure track may be mandated. An example is Turweston Aerodrome, (EGBT), where the final approach and departure tracks are offset 20 degrees from the runway centreline. In our opinion, this is the maximum acceptable offset angle which may be considered. In passing, Turweston’s based usage is mainly for aeroplane flying training and private aircraft owners.
4.2 Helicopters Although helicopters do not need runways for take‐off and landing, it is usual at airfields where there is also aeroplane activity for helicopters to depart or approach from or to the runways or to adjacent grass areas. Some aerodromes have dedicated landing spots or areas for helicopters. Part of the essence of the helicopter is its ability to operate into and out of relatively small areas. So, for example, the ‘worst case’ scenario amongst currently certificated helicopters on the UK civil register requires for two different helicopter types, at Maximum All‐Up Weight and in still air in the Standard Atmosphere for Sea Level, a take‐off run of 500m from the hover until attaining 100 ft above the surface at the departure point. This distance is calculated using the manufacturer’s ‘Recommended’ take off profile, although alternate procedures, requiring less distance, may be an option to the pilot. Landing distances required from 100 ft above the surface level of the touch‐down point are always shorter, using the recommended profiles, than for the take‐off distance. Additionally, the normal approach angle for a helicopter is approximately 7 degrees, so in comparison to an aeroplane’s height of 300 ft at one mile from touchdown a helicopter would be at approximately 700 feet at that range. Unless there is an Air Traffic Control requirement, it is unusual for a helicopter to make its approach directly to, or abeam, the runway threshold. It is also common for helicopters to make offset approaches or departures, either to increase
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separation from aeroplane traffic, or to take advantage of being able to land in a wider variety of wind conditions than an aeroplane.
5. Certification Standards and Accident Causal Factors.
The certification standard for civil aircraft and components is that the probability of failure is between 1 x 10‐7 and 1 x 10‐9, which in descriptive terms is classed as ‘Improbable’. Only where the possibility of a catastrophic failure, most significantly an event causing structural failure, need the standard meet or exceed 1 x 10‐9, which is defined as ‘Extremely Improbable’. So aircraft design means that that as a system an aeroplane or helicopter is very unlikely to ‘fail’. Analysis of most aviation accident databases bears out that technical failures are statistically rare, although human inter‐action with otherwise benign technical failures, is, along with human factors per se, a common cause of accidents. One example of this is take‐off and landing accidents caused by engine failure. In the general aviation spectrum, there has historically been a tendency to regard turbine engines as more reliable than piston engines, the latter class being more common in light aeroplanes than turbine engines. Training helicopters remain predominantly piston‐engined, whereas in the UK‐registered helicopter fleet as a whole (gross weight < 3175 Kg, which includes most light twin‐engine helicopters), there is a greater balance between piston and turbine engined helicopters. However, in recent years it has been generally accepted that piston engine reliability is greater than had been assumed. Some statistical data of ‘engine failure’ skews the results. For example, where engine failure has been the result of lack of fuel due to either running out of fuel or incorrect fuel tank selection; or due to other human factors such as where an engine has failed to deliver the anticipated power which might have been determined during pre‐take‐off and /or initial runway acceleration checks, which were omitted by the pilot. One concept in operational helicopter usage is to permit a twin‐engined helicopter operating for public transport, where there must be a ‘reasonable probability at all times of continuing flight or landing at all stages of flight following failure of a power unit’ to take advantage of an ‘Exposure Time’ during take‐off and landing, when, should one of the two engines fail, the helicopter would have insufficient power on the remaining engine to land safely or continue flight. Statistical analysis of specific engines and their historical failure rates when operating at high power settings is used to modify the Probability equation. For example, the probability of failure can be moved to beyond 1 x 10‐9 for a period of 10‐20 seconds exposure to deem this period ‘safe’. For single‐engined aircraft, the concept of single engine reliability is accepted readily by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the USA and by many other countries where single engined operations over congested areas (and often at low altitude) are permitted, whereas in the UK and Europe this is not legal.
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6. Take off and landing data
6.1 General There are a number of authoritative accident databases, for example those of the American National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) the Canadian Transport Safety Board, the Australian Civil Aviation Safety Agency (CASA) and the UK DoT Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB) and the CAA, whose reports and statistics have been reviewed in preparation of this report as has the UK CAA’s analyses (in CAA publications CAP 667 and 673) of fatal General aviation accidents 1985‐1994 and Accident Safety Review 1987‐1996. (These are the most recent CAA analyses.) Take‐Off and Landing accidents account for between 25% and 50% of General Aviation accidents or Serious Occurrences. This is in many ways unsurprising, since these are the phases of flight requiring the highest degree of pilot skill, attention and judgement. They are also regimes of flight where the aircraft is both closest to the ground and, in the case of aeroplanes, closest to stalling speed (i.e. the speed at which the wings no longer produce lift) and for helicopters where the function of the pilot’s flying controls changes subtly between the regimes of hover and forward flight, or vice‐versa.
6.2 DenhamDataThe Airport owners stated at the meeting on 10th May 2012 with HS2 that 20 Take‐Off and Landing occurrences had occurred at Denham over the previous 26 years. According to the owners in their letter of 31 March 2011, between 1995 and 2010 there were 4 incidents of engine failures occasioning successful and safe forced landings at Denham, and 3 accidents during take‐off or landing, two of which resulted in serious injuries or fatality, however it is difficult to contextualise these particular occurrences statistically without specific movements data for the airport which has not been made available to us.
7. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND MITIGATION
7.1 PotentialeffectofHS2onoperationalsafety HS2 is constructed on Colne Valley Viaduct approximately 500m away from the north eastern end of the airport. On the runway axis, an area of woodland (Northmoor Hill Nature Reserve) runs on a steep slope towards the North Orbital Road and the lakes, resulting in the railway viaduct lying below the level of the runway and the existing woodland. There is an existing line of trees alongside the viaduct at this location. With reference to the drawings provided in Appendix 3, the line of trees across from Tilehouse Lane towards HS2 viaduct are in closer proximity to the Obstacle Limitation Surface than the viaduct. The OLS is equally defined by the trees adjacent to the viaduct. In the event of a collision these trees are likely to be impacted prior to HS2 infrastructure.
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7.2 HazardAssessmentBased upon the preceding information and accident reports and statistics, we have considered the following Hazards, which are classified in terms of the formal Risk Assessment in Appendix 2. The classification refers to the existing status, that when construction of the viaduct is complete, and an attempt to assess additional risk (if any) during the construction phase. Mitigation strategies are exampled where appropriate. The specific hazards considered are:
Collision with an object off the airfield during take‐off (Aeroplanes)
Collision with an object off the airfield during final approach (Aeroplanes)
Collision with an object off the airfield during final approach (Helicopters)
Mislanding due to false visual perceptions during final approach (Aeroplanes)
Collision with an object off the airfield following engine failure in the airfield circuit (Aeroplanes)
Collision with an object off the airfield following engine failure in the airfield circuit (Helicopters)
Each hazard is considered for one or more causal factors, and where necessary these are considered separately. Hazards are considered for the existing situation, post‐construction, and during construction. The Hazard analysis is restricted to hazards to aircraft and occupants. In a number of potential cases, where take‐off or landing accidents might occur, the presence of obstructions closer to the airfield than the proposed railway line means that essentially the risk factor remains almost constant. For example, an aeroplane taking off with incorrect configuration or loading and thus not achieving the rate of climb expected and necessary to remain clear of obstacles would impact the nearer obstacles. For the reasons already stated when discussing helicopter operations, and specifically because the helicopter is not constrained to take off from or land at the runway thresholds, the general impact of the proposed development on helicopters is, in our opinion, negligible: which is why only two specific hazards are discussed.
7.3 Mitigation For each of the hazards identified in section 7.2, using the Standard Risk Assessment Criteria provided in Appendix 2, we have assessed the probability and severity of the hazards and ensured mitigation measures are in place in order to reduce the risks to an Acceptable level. This process has been undertaken for the three phases of existing, HS2 construction, and post construction phase. Alongside more standard mitigation measures such as supervision of pilot trainees and adherence to checks and standards, more specific mitigation strategies should include:
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Use of Visual Approach Slope Indicators to reduce the risk of collision with objects during final approach and take‐off.
Ensuring adequate briefing of the construction activities are in place for the pilot’s awareness of the construction activities in the vicinity of the airport (Construction phase only).
Ensuring the construction activities and plans adhere to the height restrictions introduced by the obstacle limitation surface (Construction phase only).
Review of the approach and departure paths during the construction phase of HS2.
Identification of suitable forced landing areas in flight circuit and a provision of suitable training and briefing for pilot’s awareness of such measures.
These measures have been described in detail under Appendix 2.
8. Conclusion and recommendations
8.1 ConclusionsWith careful consideration of the points put forward by the Airport owners in their letter of 31 March 2011, and an analysis of the hazards and Risk Assessment, we conclude that with the proposed mitigation strategies in place, the overall risks can be contained to an Acceptable level. There is one particular case where the owner raises concerns that a reduced area for forced landing may be available as a result of HS2 development. Whilst this does elevate the existing risks, using a standard risk assessment model with the right mitigation strategies in place, the residual risk is also reduced to an Acceptable level. With the existing ground level falling steeply away from the runway axis towards the HS2 viaduct, the proposed viaduct alignment ends up below the level of the existing woodland. As a result of this, the obstacle limitation surface would not be affected by any of the proposed HS2 infrastructure and construction activities.
8.2 Recommendations If the Proposed Scheme does go ahead, clearly HS2 Ltd. and the airport authority will need to work closely together to minimise any adverse health and safety effect on the airport and aircrafts during construction. The Designers Risk Assessment will need to clearly identify the restrictive measures required during the temporary construction activities, ensuring that construction methodology and plant used adhere to the height limitations and restrictions arising from the obstacle limitation surface in the vicinity of the airport.
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Appendix 1‐ UK AIR INFORMATION PUBLICATION ENTRY: EGLD DENHAM
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Appendix 2‐ RISK ASSESSM
ENT FO
R OPER
ATIONS AT DEN
HAM AIRPORT
10.1
Stan
dardised Risk Assessment Criteria:
Risk Assessment Matrix
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10.2
Id
enti
fied
Haz
ard
: C
olli
sio
n w
ith
an
ob
ject
off
th
e ai
rfie
ld d
uri
ng
tak
e-o
ff (
Aer
op
lan
es)
Cau
sal Factor(s): A
ircraft perform
ance insufficient for runway length; incorrect aircraft configuration for take
‐off; aircraft incorrectly
load
ed/over‐weight; engine(s) fail or do not deliver rated power.
Case 2.1: Existing
Severity
Probab
ility
Classification
Mitigation
Residual Risk
Notes
Hazardous
Rem
ote
Unacceptable
1. Supervision of trainee
and self‐fly
hire pilots by schools and clubs.
2. Adheren
ce to checks and
standard operating procedures.
3. Adheren
ce to Flight Manual
limitations.
Accep
table
Aeroplane fails to clim
b and
remain within OLS.
Trees near north‐eastern
boundary likely to be im
pacted
Case 2.2: P
ost‐Construction
Severity
Probab
ility
Classification
Mitigation
Residual Risk
Notes
Hazardous
Rem
ote
Unacceptable
1. Supervision of trainee
and self‐fly
hire pilots by schools and clubs.
2. Adheren
ce to checks and
standard operating procedures.
3. Adheren
ce to Flight Manual
limitations.
4. Promulgation of obstruction data
in UK AIP, Pooley’s, AFE, etc.
Accep
table
Aeroplane fails to clim
b and
remain within OLS.
Trees near north‐eastern
boundary likely to be im
pacted
prior to reaching viaduct.
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Case 2.3: Construction Phase: The construction m
ethod assumed at this stage
of the design
will not im
pinge
upon the OLS. Should the
construction m
ethodology chan
ge at later design
stages, the Risk Assessment below will need to be revisited.
Severity
Probab
ility
Classification
Mitigation
Residual Risk
Notes
Hazardous
Rem
ote
Unacceptable
1. Adhere to height restriction and
limitations (OLS) for construction
plant and m
ethodology
2. Briefing for pilot aw
aren
ess and
iden
tification of the construction
areas and works carried out in the
vicinity of the airport.
3. Review of approach and
dep
arture paths.
4. Adheren
ce to checks and
standard operating procedures.
5. Adheren
ce to Flight Manual
limitations.
6. Promulgation of obstruction data
by NOTA
M
Review by
Operator
(Accep
table)
Based
on the curren
t construction m
ethodology, the
OLS will not be obstructed
by
construction plant or the
viaduct.
The trees near north eastern
boundary will be m
ore of an
im
pact; this is due to the raise
in ground level towards the
airport runway. The ground
slopes steep
ly towards to the
viaduct and the lakes.
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10.3
Iden
tifi
ed H
azar
d:
Co
llisi
on
wit
h a
n o
bje
ct o
ff t
he
airf
ield
du
rin
g f
inal
ap
pro
ach
(A
ero
pla
nes
) Cau
sal Factor(s): incorrect aircraft configuration for landing; engine(s) fail or do not deliver rated power; aircraft descends due to wind‐
sheer/turbulence; incorrect selection of ap
proach angle.
Case 3.1: Existing
Severity
Probab
ility
Classification
Mitigation
Residual Risk
Notes
Hazardous
Rem
ote
Unacceptable
1. Supervision of trainee
and self‐fly
hire pilots by schools and clubs
2. Adheren
ce to checks and
standard operating procedures.
3. Adheren
ce to Flight Manual
limitations.
4. Use of Visual Approach Slope
Indicators
Accep
table
Aeroplane descends outside
OLS.
Trees near north‐eastern
boundary likely to be im
pacted
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Case 3.2: P
ost‐Construction
Severity
Probab
ility
Classification
Mitigation
Residual Risk
Notes
Hazardous
Rem
ote
Unacceptable
1. Supervision of trainee
and self‐fly
hire pilots by schools and clubs
2. Adheren
ce to checks and
standard operating procedures.
3. Adheren
ce to Flight Manual
limitations.
4. Use of Visual Approach Slope
Indicators.
5. Promulgation of inform
ation in
UK AIP, Pooley’s, AFE, etc.
Accep
table
Aeroplane descends and fails
to rem
ain within OLS.
The trees near north eastern
boundary will be m
ore of an
im
pact; this is due to the raise
in ground level towards the
airport runway. The ground
slopes steep
ly towards to the
viaduct and the lakes.
P50
11 (2
5)H
OL/
0082
6/00
33
APPEN
DIX 2 to SAFETY
AND RISK ASSESSM
ENT:
CONSTRUCTION OF HS2
RAILWAY VIADUCT IN PROXIM
ITY TO DEN
HAM AIRPORT
C222‐ATK
‐HW‐REP
‐020‐000001
Revision P03
23
Uncontrolled when printed
Case 3.3: C
onstruction Phase: The construction m
ethod assumed at this stage
of the design
will not im
pinge
upon the OLS. Should the
construction m
ethodology chan
ge at later design
stages, the Risk Assessment below will need to be revisited.
Severity
Probab
ility
Classification
Mitigation
Residual Risk
Notes
Hazardous
Rem
ote
Unacceptable
1. Adhere to height restriction and
limitations (OLS) for construction
plant and m
ethodology
2. Briefing for pilot aw
aren
ess and
iden
tification of the construction
areas and works carried out in the
vicinity of the airport.
3. Review of approach and
dep
arture paths.
4. Adheren
ce to checks and
standard operating procedures.
5. Adheren
ce to Flight Manual
limitations.
6. Promulgation of obstruction data
by NOTA
M
Review by
Operator
(Accep
table)
Based
on the curren
t construction m
ethodology, the
OLS will not be obstructed
by
construction plant or the
viaduct.
The trees near north eastern
boundary will be m
ore of an
im
pact; this is due to the raise
in ground level towards the
airport runway. The ground
slopes steep
ly towards to the
viaduct and the lakes.
P50
11 (2
6)H
OL/
0082
6/00
34
APPEN
DIX 2 to SAFETY
AND RISK ASSESSM
ENT:
CONSTRUCTION OF HS2
RAILWAY VIADUCT IN PROXIM
ITY TO DEN
HAM AIRPORT
C222‐ATK
‐HW‐REP
‐020‐000001
Revision P03
24
Uncontrolled when printed
10.4
Id
enti
fied
Haz
ard
: C
olli
sio
n w
ith
an
ob
ject
off
th
e ai
rfie
ld d
uri
ng
fin
al a
pp
roac
h (
Hel
ico
pte
rs)
Cau
sal Factor(s): Shallow approach angle required for (practice) downwind approach or lim
ited power exercise
Case 4.1: Existing
Severity
Probab
ility
Classification
Mitigation
Residual Risk
Notes
Hazardous
Rem
ote
Unacceptable
1. Supervision of trainee
and self‐fly
hire pilots by schools and clubs
2. Adheren
ce to checks and
standard operating procedures.
3. Use of helicopter landing
point/area
towards centre of
airfield, rather than
Runway
Threshold.
Accep
table
Assumes that helicopter
descends outside OLS.
P50
11 (2
7)H
OL/
0082
6/00
35
APPEN
DIX 2 to SAFETY
AND RISK ASSESSM
ENT:
CONSTRUCTION OF HS2
RAILWAY VIADUCT IN PROXIM
ITY TO DEN
HAM AIRPORT
C222‐ATK
‐HW‐REP
‐020‐000001
Revision P03
25
Uncontrolled when printed
Case 4.2: Post‐Construction
Severity
Probab
ility
Classification
Mitigation
Residual Risk
Notes
Hazardous
Rem
ote
Unacceptable
1. Supervision of trainee
and self‐fly
hire pilots by schools and clubs
2. Adheren
ce to checks and
standard operating procedures.
3. Use of helicopter landing
point/area
towards centre of
airfield, rather than
Runway
threshold.
4. Promulgation of inform
ation in
UK AIP, Pooley’s, AFE, etc.
Accep
table
Helicopter descends and fails
to rem
ain within OLS.
P50
11 (2
8)H
OL/
0082
6/00
36
APPEN
DIX 2 to SAFETY
AND RISK ASSESSM
ENT:
CONSTRUCTION OF HS2
RAILWAY VIADUCT IN PROXIM
ITY TO DEN
HAM AIRPORT
C222‐ATK
‐HW‐REP
‐020‐000001
Revision P03
26
Uncontrolled when printed
Case 4.3: C
onstruction Phase: The construction m
ethod assumed at this stage
of the design
will not im
pinge
upon the OLS. Should the
construction m
ethodology chan
ge at later design
stages, the Risk Assessment below will need to be revisited.
Severity
Probab
ility
Classification
Mitigation
Residual Risk
Notes
Hazardous
Rem
ote
Unacceptable
1. Adhere to height restriction and
limitations (OLS) for construction
plant and m
ethodology
1. Briefing for pilot aw
aren
ess and
iden
tification of the construction
areas and works carried out in the
vicinity of the airport.
2. Review of approach and
dep
arture paths.
3. Adheren
ce to checks and
standard operating procedures.
4. Adheren
ce to Flight Manual
limitations.
5. Promulgation of obstruction data
by NOTA
M
Review by
Operator
(Accep
table)
Based
on the curren
t construction m
ethodology, the
OLS will not be obstructed
by
construction plant or the
viaduct.
The trees near north eastern
boundary will be m
ore of an
im
pact; this is due to the raise
in ground level towards the
airport runway. The ground
slopes steep
ly towards to the
viaduct and the lakes.
P50
11 (2
9)H
OL/
0082
6/00
37
APPEN
DIX 2 to SAFETY
AND RISK ASSESSM
ENT:
CONSTRUCTION OF HS2
RAILWAY VIADUCT IN PROXIM
ITY TO DEN
HAM AIRPORT
C222‐ATK
‐HW‐REP
‐020‐000001
Revision P03
27
Uncontrolled when printed
10.5
Iden
tifi
ed H
azar
d:
Mis
lan
din
g d
ue
to f
alse
vis
ual
per
cep
tio
ns
du
rin
g f
inal
ap
pro
ach
(A
ero
pla
nes
) Cau
sal Factor(s): P
erceived concern at presence of an
obstruction, lead
ing to steeper ap
proach angle /faster ap
proach and possibility of
landing long/runway excursion.
Case 5.1: Existing
Severity
Probab
ility
Classification
Mitigation
Residual Risk
Notes
Negligible
Improbable
Accep
table
N/A
Accep
table
Case 5.2: P
ost‐Construction
Severity
Probab
ility
Classification
Mitigation
Residual Risk
Notes
Major
Rem
ote
Unacceptable
1. Supervision of trainee
and self‐fly
hire pilots by schools and clubs
2. Adheren
ce to checks and standard
operating procedures.
3. Use of Visual Approach Slope
Indicators.
4. Promulgation of inform
ation in
UK
AIP, Pooley’s, AFE, etc.
Accep
table
OLS is defined
equally by trees
near airport boundary.
Continued
need to avoid low
overflight of public road
adjacent to runway end.
The perception of the viaduct
as ‘obstruction’ w
ill be less in
comparison with the trees that
surround the viaduct, and the
trees near the north eastern
boundary of the airport. The
ground slopes up towards the
airport runway.
P50
11 (3
0)H
OL/
0082
6/00
38
APPEN
DIX 2 to SAFETY
AND RISK ASSESSM
ENT:
CONSTRUCTION OF HS2
RAILWAY VIADUCT IN PROXIM
ITY TO DEN
HAM AIRPORT
C222‐ATK
‐HW‐REP
‐020‐000001
Revision P03
28
Uncontrolled when printed
Case 5.3: C
onstruction Phase: The construction m
ethod assumed at this stage
of the design
will not im
pinge
upon the OLS. Should the
construction m
ethodology chan
ge at later design
stages, the Risk Assessment below will need to be revisited.
Severity
Probab
ility
Classification
Mitigation
Residual Risk
Notes
Hazardous
Rem
ote
Unacceptable
1. Adhere to height restrictions and
limitations (OLS) for construction
plant and m
ethodology
2. Briefing for pilot aw
aren
ess and
iden
tification of the construction
areas and works carried out in the
vicinity of the airport.
3. Review of approach and
dep
arture paths.
4. Adheren
ce to checks and
standard operating procedures.
5. Adheren
ce to Flight Manual
limitations.
6. Promulgation of obstruction data
by NOTA
M
Review by
Operator
(Accep
table)
Based
on the curren
t construction m
ethodology, the
OLS will not be obstructed
by
construction plant or the
viaduct.
The trees near north eastern
boundary will be m
ore of an
im
pact; this is due to the raise
in ground level towards the
airport runway. The ground
slopes steep
ly towards to the
viaduct and the lakes.
P50
11 (3
1)H
OL/
0082
6/00
39
APPEN
DIX 2 to SAFETY
AND RISK ASSESSM
ENT:
CONSTRUCTION OF HS2
RAILWAY VIADUCT IN PROXIM
ITY TO DEN
HAM AIRPORT
C222‐ATK
‐HW‐REP
‐020‐000001
Revision P03
29
Uncontrolled when printed
10.6
Iden
tifi
ed H
azar
d:
Co
llisi
on
wit
h a
n o
bje
ct o
ff t
he
airf
ield
fo
llow
ing
en
gin
e fa
ilure
in t
he
airf
ield
cir
cuit
(A
ero
pla
nes
) Cau
sal Factor(s): engine failure or major loss of power; restricted m
anoeuvre cap
ability due to proximity to stalling speed.
Case 6.1: Existing
Severity
Probab
ility
Classification
Mitigation
Residual Risk
Notes
Hazardous
Rem
ote
Review
1. (Pre‐briefed
) aw
aren
ess of
suitable forced
landing areas in
circuit.
2. Consideration of cross‐w
ind
rather than
into‐w
ind landings.
Accep
table
P50
11 (3
2)H
OL/
0082
6/00
40
APPEN
DIX 2 to SAFETY
AND RISK ASSESSM
ENT:
CONSTRUCTION OF HS2
RAILWAY VIADUCT IN PROXIM
ITY TO DEN
HAM AIRPORT
C222‐ATK
‐HW‐REP
‐020‐000001
Revision P03
30
Uncontrolled when printed
Case 6.2: P
ost‐Construction
Severity
Probab
ility
Classification
Mitigation
Residual Risk
Notes
Hazardous
Rem
ote
Review
1. (Pre‐briefed
) aw
aren
ess of suitable
forced
landing areas in circuit.
2. Consideration of cross‐w
ind rather
than
into‐w
ind landings
3. Promulgation of inform
ation in
UK
AIP, Pooley’s, AFE, etc.
Accep
table
Accep
ted that there is a
slight elevation of risk as a
result of reduction in
available landing areas than
the existing phase. The open
field near M25 will be
dissected
with HS2 railway in
a cutting. Adeq
uate briefing
will ensure that pilots are
aware of the constraints as a
large proportion of the open
field will still be available for
landing.
The provision of the viaduct
does not change the overall
risk classification. O
n runway
axis, the path of the railway
and viaduct are below
existing wooded
and sloping
surfaces not conducive to
forced
landing.
P50
11 (3
3)H
OL/
0082
6/00
41
APPEN
DIX 2 to SAFETY
AND RISK ASSESSM
ENT:
CONSTRUCTION OF HS2
RAILWAY VIADUCT IN PROXIM
ITY TO DEN
HAM AIRPORT
C222‐ATK
‐HW‐REP
‐020‐000001
Revision P03
31
Uncontrolled when printed
Case 6.3: C
onstruction Phase: The construction m
ethod assumed at this stage
of the design
will not im
pinge
upon the OLS. Should the
construction m
ethodology chan
ge at later design
stages, the Risk Assessment below will need to be revisited.
Severity
Probab
ility
Classification
Mitigation
Residual Risk
Notes
Hazardous
Rem
ote
Review
1. (Pre‐briefed
) aw
aren
ess of
suitable forced
landing areas in
circuit.
2. Briefing for pilot aw
aren
ess and
iden
tification of the construction
areas and works carried out in the
vicinity of the airport.
3. Consideration of cross‐w
ind
rather than
into‐w
ind landings
4. Promulgation of obstruction data
by NOTA
M
Accep
table
Accep
ted that there is a
slight elevation of risk as a
result of reduction in
available landing areas.
The open
field area near
M25 will be further red
uced
during the construction
phase of HS2. A
deq
uate
briefing will ensure the pilot
is aware of the open
field
areas available.
The construction of the
viaduct does not change the
overall risk classification. O
n
runway axis, the ground
slopes steep
ly towards the
viaduct; the sloping surface
in the existing woodland
are not suitable locations
for forced
landing.
P50
11 (3
4)H
OL/
0082
6/00
42
APPEN
DIX 2 to SAFETY
AND RISK ASSESSM
ENT:
CONSTRUCTION OF HS2
RAILWAY VIADUCT IN PROXIM
ITY TO DEN
HAM AIRPORT
C222‐ATK
‐HW‐REP
‐020‐000001
Revision P03
32
Uncontrolled when printed
10.7
Id
enti
fied
Haz
ard
: C
olli
sio
n w
ith
an
ob
ject
off
th
e ai
rfie
ld f
ollo
win
g e
ng
ine
failu
re in
th
e ai
rfie
ld c
ircu
it (
Hel
ico
pte
rs)
Cau
sal Factor(s): autorotational landing due to engine failure or major loss of power; autorotational forced landing follo
wing loss of tail
rotor thrust.
Case 7.1: Existing
Severity
Probab
ility
Classification
Mitigation
Residual Risk
Notes
Hazardous
Rem
ote
Review
1. (Pre‐briefed
) aw
aren
ess of
suitable forced
landing areas in
circuit.
2. Consideration of cross‐w
ind
rather than
into‐w
ind landings.
Accep
table
Helicopter very
manouevrable during
autorotational descent and
requires m
uch lesser
landing space than
aeroplane: touchdown
speed typically 10‐20 knots
only.
P50
11 (3
5)H
OL/
0082
6/00
43
APPEN
DIX 2 to SAFETY
AND RISK ASSESSM
ENT:
CONSTRUCTION OF HS2
RAILWAY VIADUCT IN PROXIM
ITY TO DEN
HAM AIRPORT
C222‐ATK
‐HW‐REP
‐020‐000001
Revision P03
33
Uncontrolled when printed
Case 7.2: P
ost‐Construction
Severity
Probab
ility
Classification
Mitigation
Residual Risk
Notes
Hazardous
Rem
ote
Review
1. (Pre‐briefed
) aw
aren
ess of
suitable forced
landing areas in
circuit.
2. Consideration of cross‐w
ind
rather than
into‐w
ind landings
3. Promulgation of inform
ation in
UK AIP, Pooley’s, AFE, etc.
Accep
table
Accep
ted that there is a
slight elevation of risk as a
result of reduction in
available landing areas than
the existing phase. The
open
field near M25 will be
dissected
with HS2 railway
in a cutting. Adeq
uate
briefing will ensure that
pilots are aware of the
constraints as a large
proportion of the open
field
will still be available for
landing.
The provision of the viaduct
does not change the overall
risk classification. O
n
runway axis, the ground
slopes steep
ly towards the
viaduct; the sloping surface
in the existing woodland
are not suitable locations
for forced
landing.
P50
11 (3
6)H
OL/
0082
6/00
44
APPEN
DIX 2 to SAFETY
AND RISK ASSESSM
ENT:
CONSTRUCTION OF HS2
RAILWAY VIADUCT IN PROXIM
ITY TO DEN
HAM AIRPORT
C222‐ATK
‐HW‐REP
‐020‐000001
Revision P03
34
Uncontrolled when printed
Case 7.3: C
onstruction Phase: The construction m
ethod assumed at this stage
of the design
will not im
pinge
upon the OLS. Should the
construction m
ethodology chan
ge at later design
stages, the Risk Assessment below will need to be revisited.
Severity
Probab
ility
Classification
Mitigation
Residual Risk
Notes
Hazardous
Rem
ote
Review
1. (Pre‐briefed
) aw
aren
ess of
suitable forced
landing areas in
circuit.
2. Briefing for pilot aw
aren
ess and
iden
tification of the construction
areas and works carried out in the
vicinity of the airport.
3. Consideration of cross‐w
ind
rather than
into‐w
ind landings
4. Promulgation of obstruction data
by NOTA
M
Accep
table
Accep
ted that there is a
slight elevation of risk as a
result of further red
uction
in available landing areas.
The open
field area near
M25 will be further red
uced
during the construction
phase of HS2. A
deq
uate
briefing will ensure the pilot
is aware of the open
field
areas available.
The construction of the
viaduct does not change the
overall risk classification. O
n
runway axis, the path of the
railw
ay and viaduct are
below existing wooded
and
sloping surfaces not
conducive to forced
landing.
P50
11 (3
7)H
OL/
0082
6/00
45
APPEN
DIX 2 to SAFETY
AND RISK ASSESSM
ENT:
CONSTRUCTION OF HS2
RAILWAY VIADUCT IN PROXIM
ITY TO DEN
HAM AIRPORT
C222‐ATK
‐HW‐REP
‐020‐000001
Revision P03
35
Uncontrolled when printed
Appendix 3‐ DRAWINGS
Denham
Airport Runway Plan‐C222‐ATK
‐CV‐DSK
‐020‐000037
Denham
Airport Runway Section‐C222‐ATK
‐CV‐DSK
‐020‐000036
P50
11 (3
8)H
OL/
0082
6/00
46
Drawn Checked Approved
Drawing No.
Date Scale Size
Rev.
DrawnRev Description
Project/Contract
Discipline/Function
ZoneLegends/Notes:
Drawing Title
Design Stage
Ordnance Survey Licence number 100049190
' Crown Copyright and database right 2012. All rights reserved.
Registry under delegated authority from the Controller of HMSO.
' Crown Copyright material is reproduced with the permission of Land
may be used for legal or other official purposes.
Only an official copy of a title plan or register obtained from the Land Registry
sold or published without the formal permission of Land Registry.
This material was last updated on 2012 and may not be copied, distributed,
Scale with caution as distortion can occur.
London. SW1E 5DU
Bressenden Place,
Eland House,
Registered office:
Registration number 06791686
Registered in England
Creator/Originator
HS2 Security Classification
Checked Con App HS2 App
or if it is issued in part or issued incompletely in any way.
the reproduction of this document after alteration, amendment or abbreviation
HS2 accepts no responsibility for any circumstances which arise from
CAR P
AR
K (4
00 S
PACES)
A311/01/2013
TJB
Country South
PROTECT
SS---
P00.1C222-ATK-CV-DSK-020-000037
Preliminary - Draft Initial Civil
Atkins
Country South Design
Work-in-progress
11/01/13
P00.1
100.000
0.000
200.000
300.000
400.000
500.000
600.000
700.000
Denham Airport Runway
Plan
1:2500
C222-ATK-DSK-020-000036To View Section Refer to
Tile House Lane
Denham Airport RunwayA412/North Orbital Road
HS2 Viaduct
HS2 Ch. 28590
P5011 (39) HOL/00826/0047
Drawn Checked Approved
Drawing No.
Date Scale Size
Rev.
DrawnRev Description
Project/Contract
Discipline/Function
ZoneLegends/Notes:
Drawing Title
Design Stage
Ordnance Survey Licence number 100049190
' Crown Copyright and database right 2012. All rights reserved.
Registry under delegated authority from the Controller of HMSO.
' Crown Copyright material is reproduced with the permission of Land
may be used for legal or other official purposes.
Only an official copy of a title plan or register obtained from the Land Registry
sold or published without the formal permission of Land Registry.
This material was last updated on 2012 and may not be copied, distributed,
Scale with caution as distortion can occur.
London. SW1E 5DU
Bressenden Place,
Eland House,
Registered office:
Registration number 06791686
Registered in England
Creator/Originator
HS2 Security Classification
Checked Con App HS2 App
or if it is issued in part or issued incompletely in any way.
the reproduction of this document after alteration, amendment or abbreviation
HS2 accepts no responsibility for any circumstances which arise from
