Exploring National Perspectives in Transnational Communica-
tion. The Case of a European Public Sphere.
Annett Heft
Freie Universität Berlin, Germany
Paper prepared for presentation at the IPSA-ECPR Joint Conference
"Whatever Happened to North-South?“
at the University of Sao Paulo, Brazil from February 16 to 19, 2011.
Draft – please do not quote.
Annett Heft, M.A.
Freie Universität Berlin Tel.: +49 30 838-57529
Institut für Publizistik- u. Kommunikationswissenschaft e-mail: [email protected]
Garystr. 55
14195 Berlin
Paper prepared for presentation at IPSA 2011. Draft – please do not quote. 2
Exploring National Perspectives in Transnational Communication. The Case of a
European Public Sphere.
1 Introduction
Transnational communication in Europe is regarded as enhancing the democratic legiti-
macy of the EU and advancing the construction of a European identity. But how and with
what quality is such transnational communication possible? According to the literature,
national perspectives are expected to hinder the emergence of a European public sphere.
One reason for the emergence of national perspectives within the media might be that the
national news media follow the voices and viewpoints of their own national governments,
as the indexing thesis suggests, instead of providing an inclusive arena for transnational
exchange and problem solving.
The paper explores whether transnational communication is biased towards national per-
spectives, how these perspectives might evolve and how their emergence can be explained
by a media logic and the relationship between states and their media.
Starting from the network-character of Europeanized public spheres, the paper discusses
the theoretical dimensions and the empirical measurement of national and European per-
spectives. The concept of indexing and related theoretical concepts are introduced in order
to explain the emergence of national perspectives in news and commentary on European
topics and to propose an advanced approach to measure national perspectives. This concept
is then applied to a comparative case study on the political discourse and media coverage
of the European Monetary Union crisis during the “third wave” of the financial crisis in
2009-2010. The empirical design and operationalization to measure whether this transna-
tional conflict is leading to transnational discourse or to national domestic closure within
the mass media are then discussed and first results on the structure of the political dis-
course presented.
Paper prepared for presentation at IPSA 2011. Draft – please do not quote. 3
2 The significance of national perspectives for the emergence of a European public
sphere
2.1 Relevance and theoretical dimensioning of national perspectives in the models of a
European public sphere
A public sphere can be described as an open forum of communication for everybody who
wants to say something or listen to what other speakers say. Following this basic definition
by Neidhardt (1994), a transnational communicative space in Europe is modelled in two
ways: First, as a pan-European or supranational public sphere and second, as the Europe-
anization of national public spheres (Gerhards 1993, Neidhardt et al. 2000, Eilders/Voltmer
2003). The realization of the first model, understood as a transnational communicative
space organized by European-wide media which address transnational publics, is not held
to be realistic on a broader basis (Gerhards 1993, 2002; Kielmansegg 1996).1 As a result,
the research focuses on the second model, the Europeanization of national public spheres.
Within this line of thought, a European public sphere is conceptualized as a network of the
various national public spheres which are increasingly “Europeanizing”. Transnationaliza-
tion and Europeanization are both relational concepts which describe the density of interac-
tions within social systems, in this case, nations, in comparison to interactions and com-
munications which transcend national borders (Gerhards/Rössel 1999, Wessler et al.
2008).2 If transnational communication increases within the scope of Europe or the mem-
ber states of the EU, then we call this Europeanization (Wessler et al. 2008: 24).3
Accordingly, the Europeanization of public spheres is theorized and measured along vari-
ous dimensions. The more these dimensions feature a European character, the more one
can speak of a European public sphere. One of these dimensions is the evaluation of Euro-
pean themes and actors with a “European, not-national perspective” (Gerhards 1993: 102,
1 Language barriers, different cultural identities, media economics as well as the institutional structure of the
EU are regarded as obstacles for the emergence of a broad pan-European media infrastructure.
2 Kohler-Koch defines the Europeanization of politics within the realm of the European Union as “enlarging
the scope of the relevant unit of policy-making” (Kohler-Koch 2000: 22).
3 Since most studies on Europeanization deal with processes within the framework of the member states of
the European Union, some authors suggest to use the more specific term of EU-fication or EU-
Europeanization (Sturm/Pehle 2005:12).
Paper prepared for presentation at IPSA 2011. Draft – please do not quote. 4
own translation), which means that evaluations extend beyond the particular country and
its interests.
Following the argumentation of Jürgen Gerhards, who introduced this theoretical criterion
for a European public sphere, it is not sufficient that national public spheres qualify as Eu-
ropeanized, that European topics and actors gain more salience and coverage. This first
criterion needs to be complemented by a second one, which is the evaluation of these
themes and actors from a European perspective (Gerhards 1993: 102, 2002). A national
perspective is understood as the interest- and problem definition of a certain country and
the framework under which these definitions and the proposals of others (for example,
other member states or the European commission) are evaluated. National perspectives are
regarded as obstacles for the emergence of a European public sphere, because this would
lead to discourses in the national public spheres defined by national lines. These lines cre-
ate boundaries between a national in-group and other out-groups, such as the French or the
Greek, instead of providing a space for a European community of communication and the
construction of a European identity (Gerhards 1993, 2002, similar Risse 2010). Following
theorizing on the dimensions of a European public sphere research is divided about the
necessity of a European and the hindering of a national perspective in transnational politi-
cal communication. Some argue that this criterion “seems unnecessarily restrictive in that it
demands an orientation on a European common good in order for an act of public commu-
nication to qualify as ‘Europeanized’” (Koopmans/Statham 2010: 36), and vote for the
investigation of “patterns of communicative flows” (2010: 38, original emphasis) and their
relative density within and between different political spaces without looking at the content
of these communicative flows. Others advocate for inclusion of the content by looking at
the framing of political issues and the divergence or convergence of this framing in various
public spheres (Wessler et al. 2008) or ask if issues are “addressed as concerning ‘us as a
community of Europeans’ so that the relevant community is Europe rather than individual
member states or other particular groups” (Risse 2010: 123). Taking all these indicators
together, the concept of a national perspective (as well as a European) in transnational
communication is more than an equivalent for the national interest,4 although the national
4 Following Nye (1999), “[I]n a democracy, the national interest is simply the set of shared priorities regard-
ing relations with the rest of the world. It is broader than strategic interests, though they are part of it. It can
include values such as human rights and democracy, if the public feels that those values are so important to
its identity that it is willing to pay a price to promote them.” (Nye 1999: 23)
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interest definitions or the arguments regarding a certain issue and the positions on these
arguments are probably the central dimension. Altogether, the concept of a national per-
spective in mass media content is understood as a multidimensional analytical construct. It
includes a) the salience of an issue in a certain public sphere, b) the speakers who get rep-
resented in a public sphere as well as the actors about whom they talk or at whom they
address their claims including their evaluation, c) the frames and arguments regarding a
certain issue (the interest-definition in narrower sense) with the respective positions on
these arguments and d) the community affected.
2.2 Empirical measurement and findings on national and European perspectives in the
present research on a European public sphere
The simplest approaches to measure a European or national perspective are to count a)
which actors get represented in a mass media public sphere and b) which relevance is as-
signed to a certain topic at a defined point in time or during a specific time period within
various nationally defined public spheres. Almost all studies count which speakers get a
say in a certain public sphere. Some studies also include the actors about whom speakers
talk or at whom they address their claims. The more this ensemble is composed of national
actors from the same national provenance as the respective national medium, the more re-
search takes this as signs of national perspectives. Several findings on this indicator are
shown in table 1:
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Table 1: Origin of speakers in national media arenas
(Several studies on EPS, frequency in percent)
Study Issue National self (domestic)*
Nat. European horizontal**
European ver-tical***
seven issue fields 34 – 90 6 – 32 0,3 – 30 Koopmans/ Erbe/ Meyer 2010 thereof monetary politics 42 21 21
Wessler et al. 2008
sample of discursive articles, not issue specific 45 – 55 17 < 5
50,3 27,6 21,6 discourse on constitution for Europe in Germany and France 45,2 26,7 27,2
42,0 30,6 18,7
Adam 2007
discourse on EU-enlargement in Germany and France
23,0 42,7 27,0
Tobler 2010 discourse on taxes on interests within EU 48 34 16
* Speakers with same origin as media arena. ** National speakers from other EU member states. *** Speakers from the EU institutions.
Although the studies mentioned apply different methods at varying time spans on diverse
issues, what makes it methodologically problematic to compare them, the findings point in
the same direction: Domestic speakers mostly determine public discourses. But on Euro-
pean issues or within issue fields with stronger integration the share of actors from other
European countries or the European institutions is particularly high. However, with the
mere counting of actors we can not assess a) how these actors get represented in the mass
media, that is if they or their arguments are evaluated positively or negatively, and b) what
arguments they actually introduce with what positions.
A more ambitious approach on national perspectives therefore is the analysis of frames and
positions on certain issues that get represented in various public spheres. Frames in general
are understood as “patterns of interpretation through which people classify information in
order to handle it efficiently” (Scheufele 2004: 402). Here, researchers count how often
certain, mostly pre-defined frames get attention in media contents of various EU member
states. If in the various public spheres the same frames are displayed with similar attention,
then research considers this as sign that the same “criteria of relevance” (Eder/Kantner
2000, van de Steeg 2003, Risse 2010) are employed and interprets this as sign of a Euro-
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pean perspective. In the same vein, if the similarity of frames in various public spheres
increases over time this is called by Wessler and others “discourse convergence” (Wessler
et al. 2008, Tobler 2010). That can also be interpreted as sign of emerging European per-
spectives. Conversely, the research literature talks about national perspectives if the frames
that gain most attention in one national public sphere differ from those displayed in other
public spheres. The same logic is applied to the analysis of positions on certain frames that
get visible in various public spheres.
So far, there are a number of issue-specific case studies analysing the similarity or differ-
ence of reported frames in the media coverage of various countries. They include the dis-
course on a constitution for Europe (Adam 2007, Vetters 2008), the EU-enlargement
(Adam 2007, van de Steeg 2010), the conflict on the EU-accession of Turkey (Wimmel
2006) or the Haider-debate (van de Steeg 2006) as well as discourses on military interven-
tions and genetically modified food (Wessler et al. 2008) or taxes (Tobler 2010). All of
these studies look at the salience of several frames in the media coverage of different coun-
tries. But only some of them consider what positions or views on these frames are adopted
by which actors and what actors bring in what positions in the media. All in all, the find-
ings of these studies are mixed. The majority of them highlights country differences in the
problem- and interest definitions of various countries (Adam 2007), the frames applied
(Wimmel 2006) and the conflict lines emphasized (Pfetsch et al. 2008) just as differences
in the frames and positions displayed in the mass media of different countries (Tobler
2010). They implicitly or explicitly point at national perspectives in the media coverage
and/or commentaries. The talk about a „domestic adaptation with national colors“ (Risse et
al. 2001: 1) despite the shared European political input is nearly common knowledge to-
day. But van de Steeg, for example, presents contradictory findings within a study on the
Haider-debate and considers the nationality “not a dominant explanatory variable” (2006:
622).
To some extent the mixed findings might result from methodological problems. The
broader and the more abstract a frame category is constructed by the researcher, the more
likely he or she will find the similar use of this frame in various European public spheres.
In addition, the mere visibility of frames in a public sphere does not reveal which actors
hold what positions and views on certain problems and frames. The overall picture – how
common European challenges are defined by political actors and what solutions they sup-
port – can not be approached by pure frame analysis without considering evaluations.
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Going a step further, even if a study includes frames and views on a given topic and reveals
in a comparative analysis country differences, studies so far can not explain in detail
through which mechanisms these country differences get constructed within the mass me-
dia and under what conditions they are more or less likely to appear. This question directly
addresses the role of national mass media in the construction of coverage on transnational
political issues. Do the national mass media provide an inclusive arena for transnational
exchange, opinion formation and problem solving or do they rather act as agents of their
own national governments, propagating the viewpoints of their own national political el-
ites?
3 Explaining and measuring the emergence of national perspectives within the mass
media
3.1 The role of the media in the construction of national perspectives
Research on European public spheres shows that the public discussion of European politi-
cal topics mainly takes place in the national mass media, which Europeanize insofar that
they report more on European issues and actors (for an overview see Latzer/Saurwein
2006, Wessler et al. 2008). These national public spheres form, at best, a network of trans-
national communication through various communicative linkages (Koopmans/Erbe 2003).
The emergence of a mass media public sphere is here conceived as a construction process
which lies in the hands of specialized organisations and professions, the media organisa-
tions and the journalists within them (see Gerhards/Neidhardt 1993). They shall be respon-
sible for the pictures on European issues emerging in the national media; and within their
work they can take up various roles (Peters 1994, Page 1996, Pfetsch/Adam 2008). As
gatekeepers (White 1950), journalists select actors and issues for publication. In this role,
they decide what actors and actor types get access to the media arena und therewith the
possibility to promote their views and ideas (Neidhardt 1994: 14). In the role as agenda
setters journalists themselves introduce issues and frames in public discourses (Dear-
ing/Rogers 1996, Norris 2009). As commentators media actors have the possibility to pro-
mote their own views, to comment on various positions and to evaluate the policy and poli-
tics of involved political actors (Eilders 2008). In their watchdog role journalists can reveal
the abuse of state authority and channel diverse and also conflictive views on politics
(Voltmer 1998/99: 30, Norris 2009). To what extent journalists complete these roles when
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it comes to transnational political issues and how their own national background impacts
their selection process and their own evaluation is still not explored satisfactorily.
3.2 Explaining national perspectives in European public communication as result of a
“media logic” – the indexing hypotheses
Within deeply integrated policies European politics is the result of interaction processes on
different political levels where the national governments of the EU member states can’t act
as exclusive power holders. They have to reach their decisions through arguing- and bar-
gaining processes between the national governments of the member states and the political
institutions on the supranational level of the EU, such as the European commission or the
European parliament. The hypothesis presented here postulates that, although there are
possibly very differing views on the adequate problem definition and solution on a given
European issue held by the national governments and the EU institutions within the trans-
national political discourse, the national news media would promote only the views of their
own national political actors. This does not necessarily mean that, for example, political
actors from other EU member states or the EU commission are excluded in the coverage
but that the evaluation of these actors and their arguments within the mass media follows
the evaluation given by the national political elite.
Thus, the central hypothesis that shall be analysed within the study states that the national
news media coverage and comments regarding a European political issue reproduce only
that views that are taken up by the respective national political actors within the transna-
tional political discourse at a given point in time (Hypothesis 1).
Figure 1: The adapted indexing hypothesis
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This reasoning is informed by research on the indexing thesis that was formulated by
Lance Bennett in the 1990s. Based on the normative ideal that mass media should achieve
a reasonable balance of voices and viewpoints in the news, Bennett stated regarding the
press-government relations in the United States at that time that
"[m]ass media news professionals, from the boardroom to the beat, tend to 'index' the
range of voices and viewpoints in both news and editorials according to the range of views
expressed in mainstream government debate about a given topic." (Bennett 1990: 106)
Evidence supporting the indexing hypothesis would mean that other views would only
make it into the news and editorials when they are already stated inside the “official cir-
cles” (1990: 106). This hints at a rather passive and non-autonomous role of the media.
Bennett grounded his hypothesis on theoretical assumptions regarding structural, behav-
ioural and attitudinal factors. Journalists’ newsgathering routines, transactional or even
symbiotic relationships between governing elites and the media as well as economic crite-
ria and the objectivity norm would lead to an implicit “indexing norm” (1990: 110) as ex-
planation of indexing processes. From indexing as an “ongoing, implicit calibration proc-
ess conducted by the press corps” follows, according to Bennett, that “the mainstream
news generally stays within the sphere of official consensus and conflict displayed in the
public statements of the key government officials who manage the policy areas and deci-
sion-making processes that make the news.” (Bennett et al. 2007: 49)
While the original indexing hypothesis was developed in the political context of the United
States with regard to the press-state-relations there, this study applies its leading idea in the
context of transnational communication regarding European topics in Europeanized public
spheres. To do this, the hypothesis got specified according to the transnational political
context within the European Union and the characteristics of national media systems in
distinct European countries. Within this transnational context, I do not expect that the na-
tional mass media would follow the views of all the key officials – what would include the
views of the European institutions and the other member states. Instead, the study expects
indexed views according to the range of views expressed in the mainstream national de-
bate. This assumption not only follows from newsgathering routines and the relationship
between national political actors and their respective national media. It also infers from the
multilevel structure of European policy making and the institutional structure of the EU,
where at the end national governments have to take the responsibility for European deci-
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sions.5 Furthermore, it derives from national political cultures, where national interests get
defined and national identities constructed. It is an open empirical question how autono-
mous journalists socialized in a national context and with their national audiences in mind
behave in cases of transnational political dissent on European issues. On the one hand, re-
search states that “[…] the media reflect national political cultures towards the EU.”
(Pfetsch et al. 2008: 483) One the other side, due to the finding that European politics not
necessarily falls within the usually left-right cleavage (Hooghe et al. 2002, Wes-
sels/Maurer/Mittag 2003) research expects that there could be more room for autonomous
media opinion about European issues and that the media would come up with their own
positions (Eilders/Voltmer 2003, Pfetsch 2008: 25) or advocate the positions of conflicting
parties such as the views of other EU member states. Journalists in this situation have to
cope with different demands. A professional understanding of their role expects them to
make European policy making transparent and visible and to channel diverse and also con-
flicting views on politics in an objective manner (Koopmans/Erbe 2003, Trenz 2008). But
journalists own belonging to a national culture and national identity could narrow their
views and lead to the “rally around the flag”-phenomenon well-known in the context of
foreign affairs.
3.3 Conditions influencing indexing processes
The study focuses on the media coverage on European topics where a wide range of politi-
cal actors from the national and the supranational level of policy making is involved. Re-
search on the making of a European public sphere shows that European discourses mainly
emerge in those policy areas where decision-making authority got transferred strongly
from the national to the supranational or intergovernmental level (Koopmans 2004). Yet,
the assumed indexing mechanism stated in hypothesis 1 is supposed to work under certain
conditions.
Issue characteristics
The first condition is constituted by the topic itself. To expect national perspectives within
the transnational political discourse as well as within the media coverage appears to be
5 This does not mean that national governments would not take advantages out of the multilevel structure.
Gerhards et al. (2009), for example, show that national governments tend to blame the EU commission and
the other member states for failures of EU politics whereas they attribute positive outcomes on their own.
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reasonable only if there actually is a transnational conflict between EU member states or
between member states and the EU institutions. In a situation where the political elites of
the EU advocate the same problem definitions and solutions regarding a given topic (that is
a situation of transnational consensus) to ask for national perspectives is less striking. In
fact, meaningful regarding national perspectives are situations of transnational conflict
when European authorities argue about the wise solution of a common European problem
and when the parties involved pursue differing self-interests. Therefore, national perspec-
tives are to expect in cases of transnational dissent.
In such a situation two conflicting assumptions are possible. First, the broad spectrum of
various national positions and the views of the EU institutions generally provides a promis-
ing condition for a truly transnational public space where the divergent national perspec-
tives get reported in the news and the position of the own national political elites possibly
get challenged. The voices of divergent conflict parties would give journalists the possibil-
ity to strengthen the diversity of the national media contents by integrating other European
views (see Wessler et al. 2008) and, at best, advocating divergent views on their own. In
this case we would talk of media taking an active and critical role. But, second, following
the adapted indexing hypothesis, in such situations of transnational dissent I expect media
to act as agents of their own national governments defending the own national position.
National discursive context
Whereas the transnational conflict constellation is a required condition for expecting na-
tional perspectives, this study assumes the national discursive context to be an intervening
variable that moderates indexing processes in transnational contexts.
As the literature on indexing as well as studies on the Europeanization of public spheres
each point out, the given constellation of consensus or dissent regarding a certain issue is
an important explanatory variable (Bennett 1990, Adam 2007, especially on the conflict
hypothesis Tobler 2010). As Bennett puts it, the “range of official debate” (1990: 107) is
paramount for the width of the journalistic gate.
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Figure 2: Intervening national discursive contexts
Applied to transnational discourses on EU-issues, this study hypothesises that a consensus
within the particular national political discourse (the national political elites and the na-
tional public) on the national position regarding a certain issue strengthens national per-
spectives whereas a dissent within the national discourse weakens national perspectives
within the media (Hypothesis 2). When the national political elites internally are already
divided about the appropriate solution of a given topic then this study expects it to be eas-
ier for journalists to advocate positions from outside the own national realm or positions
that in the national political discourse gain only minor acceptance. To summarize the sec-
ond condition, the politicization of a European issue within the national political discourse
is expected to moderate national perspectives as an intervening variable.
Political parallelism / closeness and distance between media and politics
As constant and structural condition the study, third, assumes the degree of „press-party
parallelism“ (Seymour-Ure 1974) or (in a somewhat broader understanding) the degree of
„political parallelism“ (Hallin/Mancini 2004) to moderate the indexing of news and com-
mentary according to national perspectives. The concept of political parallelism is used by
Hallin and Mancini as a broad framework to describe the closeness between media and
politics within a national context (2004: 26-30). The stronger the parallelism between me-
dia and politics, the more this study expects national perspectives within the news media
coverage and commentary (Hypothesis 3).
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Broken down on the organizational level: If the national elite press represents a broad spec-
trum of political viewpoints, the media are expected to index the views according to the
viewpoints of the actors with whom they share their political or ideological views. For ex-
ample, studies on national topics in the German newspapers show that the national elite
press represents a broad spectrum of political viewpoints (Hagen 1992, Voltmer 1998/99,
Eilders 2004). Therefore, regularly, if the national government defines the national main-
stream position on a European issue, one could expect more critical voices in those Ger-
man papers which are not that close to the respective government in their ideological posi-
tion. Interestingly enough, studies on Europeanization processes so far state that coverage
on European topics does not show the commonly known differences between more right-
leaning and more left-leaning papers. The study attempts to analyse this in more detail.
Figure 3: Intervening political parallelism
4 Comparative case study on national perspectives within the discourse on the Greek
and European Monetary Union crisis
4.1 Design of the case study
This study analyses national perspectives within the political discourse as well as the me-
dia coverage of the Greek and European Monetary Union (EMU) crisis during the “third
wave” of the financial crisis in 2009-2010 (Dyson 2010). Following the subprime crisis in
2007 and the crash of Lehman Brothers and other banking houses in 2008 several Euro-
pean countries, first of all Greece, faced serious budget deficits. The Greek debt crisis led
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to a controversial discussion on the adequate reaction of the EMU member states on this
crisis and on the future of the EMU. Two main questions can be seen as the core of this
transnational dissent: First, should the other members of the eurozone assist Greece solving
its debt crisis and if so, according to which mechanisms? Second, what changes on the
structure and rules of EMU are required in order to stabilise the eurozone and to secure
their future? On both questions the euro states advocate different solutions. These solutions
reflect different views on the balance of power among the EU institutions and the member
states. To put it simply, the vision of a federal/supranational European Union with the
Commission as primary holder of authority competes against the vision of an intergovern-
mental/state-centric Union where the authority is held by the member states (Fischer 2000,
Jörges et al. 2000). Within European economic and monetary policy, the first view advo-
cates clearly the establishment of a European economic government what the second view
rejects. Proponents of the second view instead favour stronger rules and procedures and a
model of increasing coordination without assigning vital competences to the supranational
level (Kauffmann/Uterwedde 2010: 5-8).
Country selection
The study comparatively analyses the political and media discourses of Germany and
Spain. These two countries got chosen because, following the literature, they feature dif-
ferent long-term traditions regarding EMU and different visions of the European Union in
general. Thus, different views on the current problem definitions and solutions in the Greek
and EMU crisis could be expected.
Both countries are strongly affected by the EMU crisis and should pay high attention on
this issue. Germany because the country’s economy is strongly export-oriented and there-
fore interested in a strong currency and a strong euro area. Beyond that, Germany is the
biggest credit grantor within EMU. Spain also displays heavy concernment with this issue
as the country ranks fourth among the loan creditors.6 On the other side, Spain has to deal
with its own budget deficit amounting to 11 percent in 2009 and faces an excessive deficit
procedure by the EU commission and strict decreases in its public spending. The country
should be especially interested in stabilising Greece and securing confidence and stability
6 The euro area member states pledged a three-year programme total of €80 billion in bilateral loans for
Greece. Germany assumes an amount around 28 percent of this programme, France about 21 percent, Italy
about 18 percent and Spain about 12 percent.
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within the euro area. The two cases, furthermore, are expected to display different national
discourse constellations.
Additionally, following the work of Hallin and Mancini, the media systems of both coun-
tries represent different levels of political parallelism. The Spanish one is classified as be-
longing to the “Polarized Pluralist Model” of media systems (2005: 217). This model is,
among others factors, characterised by high political parallelism. The parallelism mani-
fests, for example, in the career patterns of journalists, the patterns of readership and also
in “the character of news content, including the degree to which media discourses and dis-
courses of partisan politics coincide” (Hallin/Mancini 2005: 219). The German media sys-
tem is classified as belonging to the “Democratic Corporatist Model” (ibid: 217). It is
characterised by lesser political parallelism than the Polarized Pluralist Model. Regarding
the Democratic Corporatist Model the authors state “[…] that in the Democratic Corpora-
tist system a high level of political parallelism has coexisted with a high level of journalis-
tic professionalization. Journalistic autonomy is relatively high in the Democratic Corpora-
tist system.” (Hallin/Mancini 2005: 226).
Media sample
To capture the influence of press-party-parallelism at the organisational level of media in-
stitutions the study includes in each case two elite newspapers with a more liberal orienta-
tion and two papers with a more conservative orientation. In Germany, Die Welt, Frankfur-
ter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ) and Frankfurter Rundschau were
chosen. In Spain, El Mundo, ABC, El País and La Vanguardia build the newspaper sample.
These papers rank highest on circulation figures within the daily quality press of the two
countries.
Time span
The study covers the time span from October 2009 to June 2010. It starts with the Greek
announcement that the budget deficit is much higher than expected before and covers the
whole discussion leading to the euro area and IMF agreement on a three-year financial
support programme of €80 billion in bilateral loans for Greece in April 2010 and the Euro-
pean financial stabilisation mechanism with a total of up to €500 billion7 to provide finan-
7 The IMF participates in this financing arrangement with an additional amount of at least €250 billion, bring-
ing the total amount to €750 billion (see European Commission 2010c).
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cial assistance in the form of loans or credits to Member States in difficulties in Mai 2010.
It further includes the first period of discussion on plans to reinforce European economic
policy coordination up to the Communication from the Commission for stronger economic
governance in Europe at the end of June 2010 (European Commission 2010a, 2010b).
4.2 Empirical method and operationalization – measuring national perspectives
To analyse the correlation between the transnational political discourse or, more specific,
the respective national mainstream position and the views expressed in the media contents
the study proceeds in two steps. First, the transnational problem definitions and solutions
of the relevant political actors, especially the German and Spanish political actors, get ana-
lysed.8 Basis for this part of the study are government policy statements, parliamentary
debates and press releases by German and Spanish governmental and other political actors
as well as speeches and communications by the European Commission, the Eurogroup and
the Council plus scientific papers on the Greek and Euro crisis. The contents of these extra
media data are approached by a qualitative content analysis (Mayring 2008). Within this
content analysis, the relevant political actors and their definitions of the basic causes of the
Greek and Euro crisis, their proposals for solution and the predicted outcomes of the given
problems or the justifications of individual solutions are recorded. In doing so, the study
follows existing framing research by analysing single frame elements. It draws on the re-
search of Robert Entman who describes the framing process as follows: "Framing essen-
tially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived
reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a
particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment rec-
ommendation for the item described." (Entman 1993: 52) Similarly, the study focuses on
the causal interpretations, the treatment recommendations or solutions to the Greek and
Euro crisis and the outcomes predicted or justifications given to approach the argumenta-
tion or framing given by the political actors. The findings of this first part of the study then
provide the basis for the codebook of the quantitative content analysis of the mass media
coverage. Furthermore, the study seeks to order the evaluative statements and to assign
8 Altogether, the study considers the Spanish, German, French and Greek governmental positions as well as
the attitude of the EU commission and the EZB. However, Germany and Spain are at the centre of this analy-
sis. Their frames and positions get analysed in more detail and a broader range of political actors is included.
Paper prepared for presentation at IPSA 2011. Draft – please do not quote. 18
them to a conflict scale representing the two conflict dimensions the study deals with: the
supranational versus the state-centric pole respectively the pro help versus the contra help
pole. Here the study follows the methodological concept of argumentation analysis by
Hans-Jürgen Weiss (1992). The overall goal of argumentation analysis “is to ascertain how
public discussion of a particular issue is transmitted in news coverage and how it is dis-
cussed in media commentaries.” (Weiss 1992: 381)
In the second part of the study, the news, editorials and commentaries of the selected pa-
pers get content analysed on the basis of the standardised codebook. The study includes
every article featuring a reference to the Greek or Euro crisis within the headline, lead or
the first paragraph. The coding proceeds in two steps on the level of the whole article and
the level of individual statements or speech acts. Within the individual statements the pre-
defined framing elements respectively arguments get coded together with the respective
actor and his or her evaluation of the framing element. Following the concept of argumen-
tation analysis by Weiss, the study does not stop at coding individual actors with their
speech acts. Instead, for every framing element coded the “semantic context” (Weiss 1992:
381) is identified. That means to assess whether the argument is quoted or mentioned as
the author’s opinion and if the argument is evaluated additionally so that “[…] the original
meaning of an argument – taken to the extreme – can be reversed.” (ibid: 387) By doing so,
the analysis combines the framing approach of existing indexing studies, the indicators
used so far to measure the emergence of European public spheres and the in- depth study
of argumentation analysis.
4.3 The political discourse on the Greek and Euro crisis
Within this study, the causal interpretations, treatment recommendations or solutions to the
Greek and Euro crisis and the outcomes predicted or justifications given by German, Span-
ish, Greek and French political actors as well as those of the EU institutions (EU commis-
sion, council, EZB) got analysed. For the purpose of this paper, the positions within the
German and Spanish political debate are illustrated in more detail. These first data mainly
derive from the analysis of government policy statements and parliamentary debates in
both countries.
Paper prepared for presentation at IPSA 2011. Draft – please do not quote. 19
German governmental position
The position and argumentation of the German government can be described as follows:
During the first phases of the discourse from October 2009 to May, 8, 2010,9 the German
government concentrates in its main causal interpretation on the Greek crisis. A lack of
accountability of individual euro states is seen as main cause for the problems given. Ac-
cording to this argumentation, this applies first of all to Greece, but also rests in the policy
and politics of other countries with fiscal deficits leading to a weakening of the European
Stability and Growth Pact. The treatment recommendations at the national level therefore
concentrate on national budgets and reform programms to reach budget consolidation.
Controls and sanctions against the countries affected should provide for stability and
growth. Quick help on EU level is equally rejected as measures within Germany to reduce
the export surplus of the country. For a long time the German government refuses a com-
mon accountability of the members of the euro area and therewith a supranational view on
European economic and monetary policy. Regarding the financial support mechanism for
Greece, Germany gets its preferred solution of bilateral loans given by euro area member
states and the IMF through the discussion. The notion of a “transfer union”, of joint Euro-
bonds or a European monetary fund is strongly rejected by the German government. Alto-
gether, measures at the European level got articulated very seldom. Although the German
chancellor in principle agrees that more coordination on the supranational EU level is re-
quired. Only in the time span following May 8, 2010,10 the German government not only
calls for a new stability culture, stronger efforts of the member states and sanctions against
deficit countries but also for more coordination within the euro area and better regulation
of the global financial markets. Following the analysis of Kauffmann and Uterwedde, the
argumentation of the German government represents German historic traditions and posi-
tions on European economic and monetary policy. In this view EMU is to provide regula-
tory policy assuring sound fiscal policies and stability and growth. Common preferences of
the EU community or a European economic government are not included in this vision. On
the proposed simplifying continuum of EU debate between the poles of supranationalism
and state-centrism or, with other words, solidarity and stability, Germany is to be placed at
the stability pole (Kauffmann/Uterwedde 2010a, b).
9 See German government policy statements from 17.12.2009, 25.03.2010 and 05.05.2010.
10 See German government policy statement from 19.05.2010.
Paper prepared for presentation at IPSA 2011. Draft – please do not quote. 20
Spanish governmental position
The Spanish argumentation does not display as much change during the course of time as
the German one.11 Altogether, the particular crisis of Greece receives minor attention of the
Spanish prime minister.12 Instead, the global financial crisis, speculations and panic at in-
ternational financial markets are considered as reasons for the euro area crisis that rank
first within the Spanish argumentation. In this view, it is mainly the financial crisis that
leads to deficient stability within the euro area followed by decreasing confidence in the
euro area at a whole and also decreasing trust in the solvency of Spain. The solutions advo-
cated by the Spanish government mainly focus on the shared EU level. Spanish political
elites encourage stronger coordination of European economic policy and a “European eco-
nomic government”. At the same time, the Spanish government emphasises individual re-
sponsibility and promotes national reform programms to reach budget consolidation within
the own country. Although Spain supports the idea of euro bonds and a European monetary
fund, the country accepts the financial support mechanism for Greece on the basis of bilat-
eral loans. After May 9, 2010, the Spanish argumentation does not change much. Spain
advocates joint efforts on European level to control financial markets, coordinate the eco-
nomic policies of the euro area member states and, on the national level, efforts to greatly
minimise budget deficits. From the very beginning, Spanish government emphasises the
common European responsibility and need for cooperation, coordination and regulation at
the European and international level in addition to national individual responsibility.13 In
terms of the mentioned continuum, Spain can be placed close to the supranationalism and
solidarity pole.
In addition to the described different German and Spanish views and foci within the Euro-
pean transnational political discourse on the Greek and euro crisis the constellation of con-
sensus and dissent within the particular national political debates appears to be different.
11 See Spanish government policy statements from 16.12.2009, 17.02.2010, 21.04.2010 and 12.05.2010.
12 According to the literature, this is due to Spains own budget deficit that led to strong criticism on Spanish
fiscal and budgetary policy by other euro area contries. Therefore, Spain could not capture a leadership role
throughout this debate despite its presidency of the EU council in 2010. This role, instead, went to countries
such as Germany and France (Devrim 2010: 23).
13 The Spanish view is not only based on the country’s historical vision of EMU but also on the specific
Spanish situation. In the years before the financial crisis Spain greatly met the deficit criteria of the stability
and growth pact (see Münchau 2010, Enderlein 2010).
Paper prepared for presentation at IPSA 2011. Draft – please do not quote. 21
Political discourse and public opinion within Germany and Spain
Germany and Spain show different internal discourse constellations. The German internal
debate on the Greek and euro crisis is characterised by a dissent between the national po-
litical parties and between political elites and public. According to a public opinion pool by
Infratest Dimap,14 in April 2010 the German public adopts a critical position on financial
assistance for Greece. 57 percent of respondents oppose EU financial assistance for Gree-
ce. 33 percent support the decision of the German government to assist Greece with funds.
A representative survey among the German population in May 2010 shows that 45 percent
agree upon the claim to exclude Greece from the euro area.15
German parties quarrel over the financial assistance for Greece and even more over the
European financial stabilisation mechanism. The law on the three-year financial support
programme for Greece got enacted in the German Federal Parliament with the voices of the
CDU/CSU and FDP coalition plus the vote of the Greens (Fraktion Bündnis 90/Die
Grünen). The left (Linksfraktion) voted against the law. The social democrats (SPD) ab-
stained from voting.16 Regarding the law on the European financial stabilisation mecha-
nism stronger dissent is displayed. This law got enacted only through the votes of the
members of the governing coalition. The left again voted against the law. Besides the so-
cial democrats in this case also the Greens abstained from voting.17 Justifications by the
opposition are given with regard to contents and procedures. The opposition, for example,
blamed the government it had refused to inform the parliament in a comprehensive manner
at the earliest. Strong criticism even states that the government had mislead the parliament
by purpose (Deutscher Bundestag 2010). In addition, the opposition criticises the lack of
crucial regulatory mechanisms for the financial markets on European and international
14 Infratest dimap, representative survey conducted for France 24 among the German eligible population from
the age of 18, 1009 respondents, http://www.infratest-dimap.de/de/umfragen-analysen/bundesweit/um-
fragen/aktuell/mehrheit-lehnt-zustimmung-zu-finanzhilfen-an-griechenland-ab/ (09.08.2010).
15 Infratest dimap, May 2010, ARD-DeutschlandTREND Mai 2010, representative survey among the German
eligible population from the age of 18, 1.000 respondents, http://www.infratest-
dimap.de/uploads/media/dt1005_bericht.pdf (09.08.2010). 16 http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2010/29673660_kw18_de_griechenland_2/index.html
(30.08.2010).
17 http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2010/29826227_kw20_de_stabilisierungsmechanismus/
namabst.html (30.08.2010).
Paper prepared for presentation at IPSA 2011. Draft – please do not quote. 22
level and claims a much stronger coordination of monetary and economic policy within
EU.18
Within the Spanish national debate the Spanish government experiences more support by
its public concerning the financial support programme for Greece. About 45 percent of the
Spanish population agree with the financial help announced by their government. 35 per-
cent of them oppose this decision. According to a survey in March 2010, only 22 percent of
the Spanish respondents agree upon the suggestion to exclude Greece from the euro area.19
Spanish parties support the Greek support programme by the majority. They discuss the
issue against the background that the Greek problems reveal the necessity to reduce the
own budgetary deficit. Spanish internal debate instead centres on questions regarding the
measures suggested by the Spanish government to consolidate the own national finances.20
4.4 Further steps of the analysis
To confront the findings from political discourse with the media content, in the second part
of the case study the media coverage gets analysed. Answers on the hypotheses are then
approached by making multiple comparisons of the actors, frame elements and positions
across and within the two countries, the political and the media discourse, the various news
organisations and the various journalistic styles (news reporting versus commentaries and
editorials). Hypothesis 1 involves a comparison of the views detected within the political
discourse, the news coverage and the editorials within each country. Hypothesis 2 means
comparing the results of the two countries Germany and Spain. Hypothesis 3 requires com-
paring the news reporting and commentaries among all newspapers of the same country.
Therewith the study aims at verifying to what extent the national political discourse (espe-
cially the governmental statements), the news coverage and the editorials feature similar or
different tendencies or views.
18 See www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2010/29882585_kw20_de_bankenrichtlinie/index.html
(30.08.2010). 19 Harris Interactiv, survey conducted for Financial Times/Harris Poll among the Spanish population in the
age of 16 to 64. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/ee055e82-3529-11df-9cfb-00144feabdc0 (09.08.2010)
20 See Congreso de los Disputados, 21.04.2010,
http://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L9/CONG/DS/PL/PL_156.PDF#page=5 (08.09.2010).
Paper prepared for presentation at IPSA 2011. Draft – please do not quote. 23
5 Conclusion
Transnational communication within Europe is hoped to enhance the democratic legiti-
macy of European politics and to foster growing identification with Europe. But is transna-
tional communication in the framework of Europeanized mass media public spheres able to
narrow perceptual gaps, to mediate conflicting interests between politicians and citizens of
various EU member states and to provide an arena for transnational information and prob-
lem solving? As national perspectives are expected to hinder the emergence of a European
public sphere, the paper discussed the present theoretical dimensioning and empirical
measurement of national perspectives. To promote research the paper argued for applying
an adapted indexing hypothesis in order to explain the emergence of national perspectives
within Europeanized mass media coverage. It further proposed a comparative design to
study the assumed indexing processes under varying national discursive contexts and vary-
ing degrees of press-party parallelism. Using the example of the discourse on the Greek
and European Monetary Union crisis, one of the most contested European issues at present,
the study suggested an advanced approach on measuring the correlation between political
mainstream positions and views expressed in national media contents. At large, the study
strives towards contributing to a better understanding of the fragmentation of a European
public sphere and the professional autonomy of national mass media.
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