轨道交通控制与安全国家重点实验室(北京交通大学)STATE KEY LAB OF RAIL TRAFFIC CONTROL & SAFETY
Extending the Human-controller
methodology in Railway System
Accident Analysis based on STAMP
Chenling Li ,Ph.D. candidate
Tao Tang, Prof.
Ru Niu, Dr.
Maria Mikela Chatzimichailidou, Dr.
Patrick Waterson, Dr.
State Key Laboratory of Rail Traffic Control and Safety, Beijing Jiaotong University
LRF Transport Risk Management Centre, Imperial College London
Human Factors and Complex Systems Group, Loughborough University
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轨道交通控制与安全国家重点实验室(北京交通大学)STATE KEY LAB OF RAIL TRAFFIC CONTROL & SAFETY
Outline
Background and Motivation– Accident investigation and analysis
– Human factor analysis based on STAMP
Some ideas in using STAMP analysis on human
factors– Extension: human controller state
– Human controller model’s elements
– Analysis procedure: the Analysis Matrix for Human Error (AMHE)
Case study :7.23 Yongwen railway accident– The accident: human factors
– Analysis and results
Conclusion
轨道交通控制与安全国家重点实验室(北京交通大学)STATE KEY LAB OF RAIL TRAFFIC CONTROL & SAFETY
Background and Motivation
Railway system
The complex control system and serious operation circumstance of
the railway system, especially high-speed railway, make it become a
typical socio-technical system (Wilson et al., 2007) .
S
S SAT
CS S
S
SVC
S
S SAT
CS S
S
SRC
Safety braking distance
V
80km/h Permitted
speedReal speed
Line limit speed
TrainInfrastructure
Train Control
Railway System is complex socio-technical S
轨道交通控制与安全国家重点实验室(北京交通大学)STATE KEY LAB OF RAIL TRAFFIC CONTROL & SAFETY
Background and Motivation
Accident investigation and analysis
Jul. 2011. China YongWen Railway Accident. 40 people dead, 200 injured.
Apr. 2008. China JiaoJi Railway Accident.. 72 people dead, 416 injured.
Train accidents involving collisions, derailments and fires related to
human factors make up a significant proportion of all train accidents
(MLTM, 2009; Reinach, Viale, 2006).
Railway signaling and
interlocking (Anders, 2009)
Human error
轨道交通控制与安全国家重点实验室(北京交通大学)STATE KEY LAB OF RAIL TRAFFIC CONTROL & SAFETY
Background and Motivation
Accident investigation and analysis
Accident causation model
(Leveson, 2012)
STAMP
Human error: system symptom
Mental model
轨道交通控制与安全国家重点实验室(北京交通大学)STATE KEY LAB OF RAIL TRAFFIC CONTROL & SAFETY
Background and Motivation
Human controller model in STAMP
Mental model and work process
(Leveson, 2012)
(Thornberry, 2014).)
(France, 2017))
轨道交通控制与安全国家重点实验室(北京交通大学)STATE KEY LAB OF RAIL TRAFFIC CONTROL & SAFETY
Background and Motivation
Human controller model in STAMP
(France, 2017))
Human controller state?
轨道交通控制与安全国家重点实验室(北京交通大学)STATE KEY LAB OF RAIL TRAFFIC CONTROL & SAFETY
Background and Motivation
Human controller model in STAMP
(Thornberry, 2014).)
轨道交通控制与安全国家重点实验室(北京交通大学)STATE KEY LAB OF RAIL TRAFFIC CONTROL & SAFETY
Background and Motivation
Human controller status influence?
Information processing: four steps
Human controller state is a
essential part of human
controller model
轨道交通控制与安全国家重点实验室(北京交通大学)STATE KEY LAB OF RAIL TRAFFIC CONTROL & SAFETY
Background and Motivation
Human controller status influence?
Information processing: four steps
轨道交通控制与安全国家重点实验室(北京交通大学)STATE KEY LAB OF RAIL TRAFFIC CONTROL & SAFETY
Background and Motivation
Human controller status influence?
The human cognitive experiments should that the perception
of mental fatigue impacted individual’s persistence, attention
and elabortative thought (Carkson et al., 2016).
Fatigue is the largest identifiable and preventable cause of
accident in transport operations (Akerstedt, 2000) , and now
is still a fatal factors contributed to Chinese railway accidents
(Taso et al., 2017).
轨道交通控制与安全国家重点实验室(北京交通大学)STATE KEY LAB OF RAIL TRAFFIC CONTROL & SAFETY
Background and Motivation
Human controller status influence?
轨道交通控制与安全国家重点实验室(北京交通大学)STATE KEY LAB OF RAIL TRAFFIC CONTROL & SAFETY
Outline
Background and Motivation– Accident investigation and analysis
– Human factor analysis based on STAMP
Some ideas in using STAMP analysis on human
factors– Extension: human controller state
– Human controller model’s elements
– Analysis procedure: the Analysis Matrix for Human Error (AMHE)
Case study :7.23 Yongwen railway accident– The accident: human factors
– Analysis and results
Conclusion
轨道交通控制与安全国家重点实验室(北京交通大学)STATE KEY LAB OF RAIL TRAFFIC CONTROL & SAFETY
Human controller model
Extension about human controller model
Human Controller
Mental Models
Process Behavior
(PB)
Environment
(E)
Process State
(PS)Mental
Model
Updates
(U)
Control
Action
Selection
(S) Sensory
Feedback
& Input
Control
Actions
Human State
(HS)
Mental Model of the Human
State:(What does the
operator perceive about
his/her own state?)
Physical state
Mental stae
Physical/mental limitations
The attitude about safety
…
轨道交通控制与安全国家重点实验室(北京交通大学)STATE KEY LAB OF RAIL TRAFFIC CONTROL & SAFETY
Analysis procedure: the procedure
Control
Actions
Detection and
InterpretationDecision
makeing
Sensory
Feedback
& Input
Mental Models
Process Behavior
(PB)
Environment
(E)
Process State
(PS)
Human State
(HS)
Up
dat
e
System operation
condition and goal
Reco
gn
itio
n
1
2
3
3.Information detection and
interpretation
2.Condition recognition
1.Decision
Extension about human controller model
轨道交通控制与安全国家重点实验室(北京交通大学)STATE KEY LAB OF RAIL TRAFFIC CONTROL & SAFETY
Analysis procedure: the procedure
Control
Actions
Detection and
InterpretationDecision
makeing
Sensory
Feedback
& Input
Mental Models
Process Behavior
(PB)
Environment
(E)
Process State
(PS)
Human State
(HS)
Up
dat
e
System operation
condition and goal
Reco
gn
itio
n
1
2
3
Last step factor(s)
(LF)
Human own
character(s) (HC)
Factors from other
parts in the system
(OF)
HCUC
A
LF
1
OM
LF
2
轨道交通控制与安全国家重点实验室(北京交通大学)STATE KEY LAB OF RAIL TRAFFIC CONTROL & SAFETY
Analysis procedure: the Analysis Matrix for Human
Error (AMHE)
Last step factor(s)
(LF)
Human own
character(s) (HC)
Factors from other
parts in the system
(OF)
轨道交通控制与安全国家重点实验室(北京交通大学)STATE KEY LAB OF RAIL TRAFFIC CONTROL & SAFETY
Analysis procedure: the content of each item
Extension about human controller model
轨道交通控制与安全国家重点实验室(北京交通大学)STATE KEY LAB OF RAIL TRAFFIC CONTROL & SAFETY
Analysis procedure: the content of each item
Identify system(s) and system hazard(s)
Document the system safety control structure
Analysis individual human errors
For organisational and regulation
level analysis
Recommendations (in human error level)
Identify human errors
Extension about human controller model
轨道交通控制与安全国家重点实验室(北京交通大学)STATE KEY LAB OF RAIL TRAFFIC CONTROL & SAFETY
Outline
Background and Motivation– Accident investigation and analysis
– Human factor analysis based on STAMP
Some ideas in using STAMP analysis on human
factors– Extension: human controller state
– Human controller model’s elements
– Analysis procedure: the Analysis Matrix for Human Error (AMHE)
Case study :7.23 Yongwen railway accident– The accident: human factors
– Analysis and results
Conclusion
轨道交通控制与安全国家重点实验室(北京交通大学)STATE KEY LAB OF RAIL TRAFFIC CONTROL & SAFETY
7.23 Yongwen railway accident
On the 23 July 2011 at 20:30:05
Two EMU train in same direction collided together
Cause 40 deaths, 172 injuries, interruption of traffic for 32 hours and
35 minutes
轨道交通控制与安全国家重点实验室(北京交通大学)STATE KEY LAB OF RAIL TRAFFIC CONTROL & SAFETY
Ministry of Railway
MOR Science & Technology Department
MOR Transport Bureau
MOR Foundation Department
CRSC Mangement
Project Management
TCC Project Management and Dev.
Process(CRSCD)
System Development System Operation
Verification and Validation
Directives Progress Reports
Accidents
Requirements
(including
CTCS,CTCS-2 Specs)
& Standard
Progress Reports
Accidents
Progress Reports
Design and Development
Requirements & Specs
& StandardsProgress Reports
Test Requirements Test Reports
Ministry of Railway
MOR Transport Bureau
Shanghai Railway Bureau
Mangement
Directives Performance Reports
Accidents
Operation
Regulation
Performance Reports
Accidents
CTC Dispatching Center
The Operation Process
Operation
RegulationPerformance Reports
Accidents
Station Operator
Train Operator
The Physical Process:CTCS-2 System
Maintenance
StatusProblem
Operation Assumption
Operation Procedure
Problem Reports
Maintenance procedure
Maint.Req
Status Report
Missing controls,feedbacks
Performance Reports
Accidents
TCC Requirements
Manufacture SRSS Management
Maunfacturing
Product
Quality Stds
Quality
Reports
Specifications Reports
7.23 Yongwen railway accident
轨道交通控制与安全国家重点实验室(北京交通大学)STATE KEY LAB OF RAIL TRAFFIC CONTROL & SAFETY
Dispatcher
CTC centre
Station operator
Station monitor
CTC station exetention
TCC
Onboard system
Driver
Train
Maintenance
worker
TSR
Interlocking
route
command Block section
information
Route
information
TSR
information
Track
circuit
information
Display
Operation plan
TSR Operation
status
TSR status
Track occupation status
Station status
TSR status
Track occupation
information
CI status
Train status
Alarm for overspeed
Input
data
Select
mode
Accelerate
DecelerateTrain
status
Accelerate
Decelerate
Train
status
Display
Status
information
MA
Monitor system
operation Display
MA
Operation
osrder
Maintenance
command
Report
Line
data
Require
station
status
Report
Report train status
Track train status
Inform em
ergency
Report train status
Inform station status
Inform em
ergency
Track circuit in
interval
LEU
Active
balise
Monitoring
information
Track
circuit
code
Track
occupation
information TSR
Positive
balis
Signaling
monitoring
TSRTSR
status
CI
Signal machine
in stationSwitch
Track circuit
in station
Status
Switch
command
Switch
status
Signal
command
Signal
machine
status
Communication
between human
operators
Communication
between technical
equipment
Human
operatorsTechnical
equipment
Maintenance
command
Report
Dispatcher
Station operator
D3115 Train driver
D301 Train driver
Maintenance worker
7.23 Yongwen railway accident
Identify human
errors(UCA)
轨道交通控制与安全国家重点实验室(北京交通大学)STATE KEY LAB OF RAIL TRAFFIC CONTROL & SAFETY
7.23 Yongwen railway accident
轨道交通控制与安全国家重点实验室(北京交通大学)STATE KEY LAB OF RAIL TRAFFIC CONTROL & SAFETY
Dispatcher: A1:Dispatcher did not check
and confirm the track condition in time
7.23 Yongwen railway accident
轨道交通控制与安全国家重点实验室(北京交通大学)STATE KEY LAB OF RAIL TRAFFIC CONTROL & SAFETY
Outline
Background and Motivation– Accident investigation and analysis
– Human factor analysis based on STAMP
Some ideas in using STAMP analysis on human
factors– Extension: human controller state
– Human controller model’s elements
– Analysis procedure: the Analysis Matrix for Human Error (AMHE)
Case study :7.23 Yongwen railway accident– The accident: human factors
– Analysis and results
Conclusion
轨道交通控制与安全国家重点实验室(北京交通大学)STATE KEY LAB OF RAIL TRAFFIC CONTROL & SAFETY
Conclusion(1)
Find out the causal factors contributing the
unsafe control actions of human operators.
轨道交通控制与安全国家重点实验室(北京交通大学)STATE KEY LAB OF RAIL TRAFFIC CONTROL & SAFETY
Conclusion(2)
More clearly about analysis process
Easy to track back to organistional and higher
levels
轨道交通控制与安全国家重点实验室(北京交通大学)STATE KEY LAB OF RAIL TRAFFIC CONTROL & SAFETY
Reference(1)Wilson, J.R., Farrington-Darby, T., Cox, G., Bye, R., Hockey, G.R. (2007). The railway as a socio-technical
system: human factors at the heart of successful rail engineering. Proceedings of the Institution of
Mechanical Engineers, Part F: Journal of Rail and Rapid Transit, 221(1), 101-115.
Reinach S, Viale A. (2006). Application of a human error framework to conduct train accident/incident
investigations. Accid Anal Prev, 38, 396–406.
Zhan, Qingjian., Zheng, Wei., Zhao, Bobo. (2017). A hybrid human and organizational analysis method for
railway accidents based on HFACS-Railway Accidents (HFACS-RAs). Safety Science, 91, 232-250.
Clarkson, J.J., Otto, A.S., Hassey, R., Hirt, E.R. (2016). Perceived Mental Fatigue and Self-Control. In book:
Hirt, E., Clarkson, J.J., Jia, L. (Eds). Self-Regulation and Ego Control. Academic Press, 185-202.
Shappell, S.A., Wiegmann, D.A. (2000). The human factors analysis and classification system – HFACS.
Federal Aviation Administration Technical Report No. DOT/FAA/AM-00/7. National Technical Information
Service, N Springfield.
Thomas, J., France, M., Green, C.A., Vernacchia, M.A., Sundaram, P., D’Ambrosio, J. (2016). Engineering
for humans:STPA Analysis of an Automated Parking System. The 5th MIT STAMP/STPA Workshop, MIT,
March 21th-24th, 2017.Available at: http://psas.scripts.mit.edu/home/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/Thomas,France-Engineering_for_Humans.pdf (Last accessed August 24th, 2017)
轨道交通控制与安全国家重点实验室(北京交通大学)STATE KEY LAB OF RAIL TRAFFIC CONTROL & SAFETY
Thornberry, C. (2014). Extending the human controller methodology in Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis
(STPA). Master thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Tsao, L., Chang, J., Ma, L. (2017). Fatigue of Chinese railway employee and its influential factors: Structural
equation modelling. Applied Ergonomics, 62, 131-141.
Reference(2)
轨道交通控制与安全国家重点实验室(北京交通大学)STATE KEY LAB OF RAIL TRAFFIC CONTROL & SAFETY
State Key Laboratory of Rail Traffic Control and Safety
Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing, China
Q&A
Thank you!
Chenling Li
轨道交通控制与安全国家重点实验室(北京交通大学)STATE KEY LAB OF RAIL TRAFFIC CONTROL & SAFETY
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