F B I Law Enforcement Bulletin - March 2003 Issue

ISSN 0014-5688 USPS 383-310

Features

Departments

9 Bulletin ReportsWeb-Based Resources

Law Enforcement

The Seven-Stage Hate Model By John R. Schafer, M.A.

and Joe Navarro, M.A.

A Study on Cyberstalking By Robert D’Ovidio, M.S.

and James Doyle

Best Practices of a Hate/BiasCrime Investigation

By Walter Bouman

Obtaining WrittenConsent to Search

By Jayme WalkerHolcomb, J.D.

1

March 2003Volume 72Number 3

United StatesDepartment of Justice

Federal Bureau of InvestigationWashington, DC 20535-0001

Robert S. Mueller IIIDirector

Contributors' opinions and statementsshould not be considered an

endorsement by the FBI for any policy,program, or service.

The attorney general has determinedthat the publication of this periodical is

necessary in the transaction of thepublic business required by law. Use

of funds for printing this periodical hasbeen approved by the director of theOffice of Management and Budget.

The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin(ISSN-0014-5688) is published

monthly by the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation, 935 PennsylvaniaAvenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.

20535-0001. Periodicals postage paidat Washington, D.C., and additionalmailing offices. Postmaster: Send

address changes to Editor, FBI LawEnforcement Bulletin, FBI Academy,

Madison Building, Room 209,Quantico, VA 22135.

EditorJohn E. Ott

Associate EditorsCynthia L. Lewis

David W. MacWhaBunny S. Morris

Art DirectorDenise Bennett Smith

Assistant Art DirectorStephanie L. Lowe

Staff AssistantLinda W. Szumilo

This publication is produced bymembers of the Law Enforcement

Communication Unit,Training Division.

Internet Address [email protected]

Send article submissions to Editor,FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, FBIAcademy, Madison Building, Room

209, Quantico, VA 22135.

To successfully investigate cyberstalkingcases, law enforcement mustunderstand how offenders use theInternet to stalk victims.

Investigators must understand the hateprocess to deal successfully with hategroups.

21Rendering hate/bias crimes the specialattention they deserve will help lawenforcement agencies treat victims,relate to communities, and prosecuteoffenders.

10

26Courts analyze a number of significantissues regarding written consentsearches.

18 Police PracticeRecruitment Strategies

March 2003 / 1

he manifestations of hateare legion, but the hate pro-cess itself remains elusive.T

Limited research in this field pre-cluded the development of a com-prehensive hate model. Under-standing hate groups is essential forthe development and implementa-tion of successful intervention strat-egies, which depend on an under-standing of the hate process. Theproposed hate model consists ofseven stages, including how hategroups define themselves, how hategroups target their victims and tauntthem with verbal insults and offen-sive gestures, and how hate groupsattack their victims with or withoutweapons.1

DEFINITION OF HATE

Hate, a complex subject, di-vides into two general categories:rational and irrational. Unjust actsinspire rational hate. Hatred of aperson based on race, religion,sexual orientation, ethnicity, or na-tional origin constitutes irrationalhate.

Both rational and irrational hatemask personal insecurities. Every-one experiences personal insecuri-ties in varying degrees throughouttheir lives. The more insecure a per-son feels, the larger the hate mask.Most people concentrate on the im-portant issues in life, such as earn-ing a living, rearing a family, andachieving personal goals. These

pursuits give meaning and value tolife.2 Nonetheless, irrational hatebleeds through day-to-day activitiesin the form of racial barbs and eth-nic humor. Not all insecure peopleare haters, but all haters are insecurepeople.

With respect to rational hate,haters do not focus as much on thewrong done to them or others, but,rather, on their own helplessness,guilt, or inability to effect change.The object of rational hate often isdespised or pitied.3 In the same way,irrational hate elevates the haterabove the hated.4 Many insecurepeople feel a sense of self-worth byrelegating a person or group ofpeople to a lower status.5

The Seven-Stage Hate ModelThe Psychopathology of Hate GroupsBy JOHN R. SCHAFER, M.A., and JOE NAVARRO, M.A.

2 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

Special Agent Navarro serves inthe FBI’s Tampa, Florida, officeand also is a member of the FBI’sNational Security Division’sBehavioral Analysis Program.

Special Agent Schafer isassigned to the FBI’s Lancaster,California, resident office andalso serves as a member of theFBI’s National Security Division’sBehavioral Analysis Program.

SKINHEAD GROUPS

During a 7-year FBI investiga-tion of skinhead groups in South-ern California between 1992 and1999, specific patterns emerged.Skinhead groups typically consistof uneducated, young, white malesbetween the ages of 13 and 24 whohave no long-term prospects forsuccess. Although many come fromsingle-parent, dysfunctional fami-lies, some exceptions exist. For ex-ample, members of the WesternHammerskins in Hemet, California,had high school educations andcame from two-parent, middle-classfamilies. Further examination re-vealed that both parents made long,daily commutes to work in Los An-geles and left their teenage childrenunsupervised. The lack of parentalsupervision and guidance spawnedpersonal insecurities similar tothose found in skinheads who comefrom dysfunctional, single-parentenvironments.

Fortunately, most skinheadgroups are not well organized and

lack the leadership structure foundin the majority of street gangs en-gaged in “for-profit” criminal ac-tivities. However, the WesternHammerskins group has a strongerleadership hierarchy than mostskinhead groups, and it boasts avery active recruitment program.Potential members receive a re-cruitment package, which includesa swastika armband, a T-shirt withwhite supremacist slogans, whitesupremacist literature and bandstickers, and other supremacistmaterials. Recruiters also pass outbusiness cards embossed with theWestern Hammerskins’ logo andthe recruiter’s name and telephonenumber. The group’s highereducational level may explain thesophistication of its recruitmenttechniques.

Skinhead groups subdivide intotwo categories: criminally moti-vated and hate motivated. Crimi-nally motivated skinhead groupsspend most of their time engaged infor-profit criminal activities, such

as drug sales and burglaries. Inci-dental to their criminal activity,they commit hate crimes. The SanFernando Valley Peckerwoods(SVP) in California was a crimi-nally motivated skinhead group.SVP members primarily sold meth-amphetamines and committed resi-dential burglaries. Periodically,SVP members attacked minoritieswith weapons and, on one occasion,placed packages resembling bombsnear an apartment complex whereAfrican-Americans lived. Membersintended for the fake bombsto frighten current residents torelocate and to discourage otherAfrican-American families frommoving into the complex.

Conversely, hate-motivatedskinhead groups dedicate the ma-jority of their time to hate crimes.6

Incidental to hate crimes, thesehard-core skinheads commit pettythefts or sell small amounts of nar-cotics to support daily needs, suchas food, cigarettes, and alcohol andother drugs. The Nazi Low Riders(NLR) skinhead group located inLancaster, California, exemplifies ahate-motivated skinhead group. Atone time, NLR members spent theirtime prowling the streets ofLancaster looking for minorities toattack. The NLR matured to thepoint where their members rou-tinely beat and stabbed minorities,and, in one instance, murdered anAfrican-American.

Haters cannot stop hating with-out exposing their personal insecu-rities. For example, at the onset ofthe FBI investigation, FBI authori-ties told hard-core members of theNLR that they would arrest them iftheir hate violence continued; yet,the hate violence persisted. The FBI

March 2003 / 3

similarly warned the members ofthe SVP who, however, stopped orwere more surreptitious concerningcriminal activities, and their hateviolence ceased. The reaction of theSVP members comported with gen-eral criminal deterrence literature.7

The reaction of the NLR membersdid not, however, because hate, notcriminal acts, was their primarymotive.

Interviews of both criminallymotivated and hate-motivatedskinheads may explain this phe-nomenon. Criminally motivatedskinheads identified themselves ascriminals first and haters second.They also expressed a degree ofpersonal security in their status ascriminals. The criminally motivatedskinheads possess a certain sense ofself-worth; hence, they have fewerinsecurities. However, this was notthe case with hate-motivatedskinheads. The explanation by one15-year-old NLR member typifiedthe thought process of hate-moti-vated skinheads. He said, in effect,“I dropped out of school in theeighth grade, but I stopped learningmidway through the sixth grade. Icovered my body with hate tattoos. Icouldn’t get a good job if I wantedto. No one would hire me. Once, Itried to get a job at a fast food res-taurant, but the manager refused tohire me because the restaurantserved multiracial customers. If Iquit being a skinhead, I have noth-ing. I am nothing. I have no choicebut to be a skinhead. I expect to diea young, violent death.”

Skinheads converge, get drunk,take drugs, and, at some point,spontaneously seek out hate targetsto attack. They conduct little, ifany, planning before committing

hate crimes. One hate-motivatedskinhead put it best when he stated,“We don’t look for trouble butsomehow trouble always finds us,and we’re ready to deal with it whenit comes.”

THE HATE MODEL

Several academic authorities onhate crimes in America identifiedthree types of bias crime offenders:the thrill seeker, the reactive of-fender, and the hard-core offender.8

They described the reactive of-fender as one “who grounds his at-tack on a perceived transgression,

fact that they acted as the instiga-tors. Secondary justification is dif-ficult to detect because skinheadscan interpret a simple glance as ag-gressive behavior.

Secondary justification also ex-ists on a larger scale. When a com-munity reacts to a hate crime,skinheads perceive that reaction asaggressive, which reinforces the no-tion that skinheads must defendthemselves against a common en-emy. Secondary justification placesthe skinheads in a victim status andrationalizes continued violence. Tofurther illustrate this principle, askinhead, with a swastika tattooedon his cheek, walked into a jewelrystore to buy a ring for his girlfriend.The skinhead became incensedwhen the Jewish clerk treated himpoorly. The skinhead later com-mented that if Jews treated him withmore respect he would not hatethem so much. The skinhead clearlysaw himself as a victim, although heopenly displayed a provocativesymbol of hate on his face.

Empirical observations showthat hate groups go through sevenstages in the hate process. Haters, ifunimpeded, pass through theseseven successive stages withoutskipping a stage. In the first fourstages, haters vocalize their beliefs.In the last three stages, haters act ontheir beliefs. A transition period ex-ists between vocalization and actingout. In this transition period, vio-lence separates hard-core hatersfrom rhetorical haters.

Stage 1: The Haters Gather

Irrational haters seldom hatealone.10 They feel compelled, al-most driven, to entreat others tohate as they do. Peer validation

”“

such as an insult, interracial dating,or a neighborhood integration.”9

The authors’ model incorporatesthe thrill seeker and the hard-coreoffender, but redefines the conceptof the reactive offender. This phe-nomenon can be described as sec-ondary justification; skinheads rou-tinely use this technique to instigateattacks. For example, a group ofskinheads encounter a mixed-racecouple and shout racial slurs. If thecouple reacts in a manner other thana submissive one, the skinheadsperceive that behavior as an act ofaggression. The skinheads later tellthe police they merely defendedthemselves against aggressors. Theskinheads, of course, leave out the

Skinhead groupssubdivide into

two categories....


”

Empiricalobservations showthat hate groups go

through sevenstages in the hate

process.

“

bolsters a sense of self-worth and,at the same time, prevents intro-spection, which reveals personal in-securities.11 Further, individualsotherwise ineffective become em-powered when they join groups,which also provide anonymity anddiminished accountability.

Stage 2: The HateGroup Defines Itself

Hate groups form identitiesthrough symbols, rituals, and my-thologies, which enhance the mem-bers’ status and, at the same time,degrade the object of their hate. Forexample, skinhead groups mayadopt the swastika, the iron cross,the Confederate flag, and other su-premacist symbols. Group-specificsymbols or clothing often differen-tiate hate groups. Group rituals,such as hand signals and secretgreetings, further fortify members.Hate groups, especially skinheadgroups, usually incorporate someform of self-sacrifice, which allowshaters to willingly jeopardize theirwell-being for the greater good ofthe cause. Giving one’s life to acause provides the ultimate sense ofvalue and worth to life.12 Skinheadsoften see themselves as soldiers in arace war.

Stage 3: The Hate GroupDisparages the Target

Hate is the glue that binds hat-ers to one another and to a commoncause.13 By verbally debasing theobject of their hate, haters enhancetheir self-image, as well as theirgroup status. In skinhead groups,racist song lyrics and hate literatureprovide an environment whereinhate flourishes. In fact, researchershave found that the life span of

aggressive impulses increases withideation.14 In other words, the moreoften a person thinks about aggres-sion, the greater the chance for ag-gressive behavior to occur. Thus,after constant verbal denigration,haters progress to the next more ac-rimonious stage.

Stage 4: The Hate Group Tauntsthe Target

Hate, by its nature, changes in-crementally. Time cools the fire ofhate, thus forcing the hater to lookinward. To avoid introspection, hat-ers use ever-increasing degrees ofrhetoric and violence to maintainhigh levels of agitation. Taunts and

Stage 5: The Hate GroupAttacks the Target WithoutWeapons

This stage is critical because itdifferentiates vocally abusive hat-ers from physically abusive ones. Inthis stage, hate groups become moreaggressive, prowling their turf seek-ing vulnerable targets. Violencecoalesces hate groups and furtherisolates them from mainstream so-ciety. Skinheads, almost withoutexception, attack in groups and tar-get single victims. Research hasshown that bias crimes are twice aslikely to cause injury and four timesas likely to result in hospitalizationas compared to nonbias crimes.16

In addition to physical vio-lence, the element of thrill seekingis introduced in Stage 5. Two ex-perts found that 60 percent of hateoffenders were “thrill seekers.”17

The adrenaline “high” intoxicatesthe attackers. The initial adrenalinesurge lasts for several minutes;however, the effects of adrenalinekeep the body in a state of height-ened alert for up to several days.18

Each successive anger-provokingthought or action builds on residualadrenaline and triggers a more vio-lent response than the one that origi-nally initiated the sequence.19 An-ger builds on anger. The adrenalinehigh combined with hate becomes adeadly combination. Hard-coreskinheads keep themselves at alevel where the slightest provoca-tion triggers aggression.

Stage 6: The Hate GroupAttacks the Target withWeapons

Several studies confirm thata large number of bias attacks in-volve weapons.20 Some attackers

offensive gestures serve this pur-pose. In this stage, skinheads typi-cally shout racial slurs from movingcars or from afar. Nazi salutes andother hand signals often accompanyracial epithets. Racist graffiti alsobegins to appear in areas whereskinheads loiter. Most skinheadgroups claim turf proximate to theneighborhoods in which they live.One study indicated that a majorityof hate crimes occur when the hatetarget migrates through the hategroup’s turf.15

March 2003 / 5

use firearms to commit hate crimes,but skinheads prefer weapons, suchas broken bottles, baseball bats,blunt objects, screwdrivers, andbelt buckles. These types of weap-ons require the attacker to be closeto the victim, which further demon-strates the depth of personal anger.Attackers can discharge firearms ata distance, thus precluding personalcontact. Close-in onslaughts requirethe assailants to see their victimseye-to-eye and to become bloodiedduring the assault. Hands-on vio-lence allows skinheads to expresstheir hate in a way a gun cannot.Personal contact empowers andfulfills a deep-seated need to havedominance over others.

Stage 7: The Hate GroupDestroys the Target

The ultimate goal of haters is todestroy the object of their hate.Mastery over life and death imbuesthe hater with godlike power andomnipotence, which, in turn, facili-tate further acts of violence. Withthis power comes a great sense ofself-worth and value, the very quali-ties haters lack. However, in reality,hate physically and psychologicallydestroys both the hater and thehated.

Model Application

Anecdotal evidence suggeststhat this hate model has a widerapplication. For example, when acoworker becomes a hate target forreasons other than race, sex, or na-tional origin, the hater immediatelyseeks out others in the office whodislike, or can be persuaded to dis-like, the hated coworker (Stage 1).The group establishes an identityusing symbols and behaviors. They

use a lifted eyebrow, a code word toexclude the hated coworker from alunch invitation, or any number ofother actions to demean and isolate.The haters even may adopt a namefor their group (Stage 2). At thispoint, the haters only disparage thehated coworker within their group(Stage 3). As time passes, the hatersopenly insult the hated coworker ei-ther directly or indirectly by allow-ing disparaging remarks to be over-heard from afar (Stage 4). Onemorning, the hated coworker dis-covers his desk rearranged and

ASSESSMENT

Assessing and analyzingskinhead groups can help investiga-tors tailor intervention strategies toeach hate group, thus increasing theprobability of successful interven-tion and rehabilitation. Law en-forcement can assess a skinheadgroup by first determining if thegroup is hate motivated or crimi-nally motivated. The best method toestablish motivation is through one-on-one interviews, although re-viewing police reports and criminalhistories prove adequate determin-ing factors as well.

Second, investigators shouldmeasure the maturity of the group,which is not determined by thechronological age of the group’smembers but by the collective ac-tions of the group. Violence consti-tutes an important maturation indi-cator. Comparing the group’sactivities to the stages in the hatemodel can determine the maturityof a skinhead group. Mature groupscommit more violent acts than im-mature groups.

An additional step in the assess-ment process involves gauging thestrength of the group’s mythology.Immature groups have simple my-thologies, whereas mature groupshave more complex and stubbornmythologies. Studying group my-thologies proves difficult becausethey represent the aggregate of agroup’s common beliefs, experi-ences, symbols, and rituals.

SYMBOLS, RITUALS, ANDMYTHOLOGY

Fully understanding hategroups involves identifying anddefining their unique symbols, ritu-als, and mythologies. Symbols give

offensive images pasted over a pic-ture depicting his wife and children(Stage 5). From the sophomoric tothe terroristic, acts of hate have thesame effect. Eventually, the haterssabotage the hated coworker’sprojects and attempt to ruin theindividual’s reputation throughrumors and innuendoes (Stage 6). Inso doing, the haters make the workenvironment intolerable for the hatetarget (Stage 7). Scenarios like thisoccur every day across Americaand, indeed, around the world. Thetargets of hate may change, but thehate process remains constant.

© Corbis


”

An accurateassessment of

skinhead groups iscritical to developing

interventionstrategies.

“

greater meaning to irrational hate.Haters use symbols for self-identifi-cation and to form common bondswith other group members. Addi-tionally, they often swear alle-giance to these symbols. For ex-ample, the swastika, a simplesymbol, served as a powerful rally-ing point for the Nazi movementand helped mobilize an entirecountry.21

Each hate group adopts its ownsymbols or borrows them from oth-ers. Symbolic words and nonverbalbehaviors reflect individual disdainand serve as advertisements to at-tract fellow sympathizers. Offen-sive language is the most commonexpression of dislike for others.Hate groups also display contemptby using nonverbal gestures, suchas a Nazi salute. Clothes, short hair-cuts, military boots, tattoos, andbumper stickers also represent sym-bols that can effectively communi-cate hate.

Symbols, however, are notenough to unify a group; therefore,more organized hate groups incor-porate rituals, which serve twofunctions. First, they relieve indi-vidual group members from deepthought and self-examination. Sec-ond, rituals reinforce beliefs andfortify group unity.

The hate group’s experiences,beliefs, and use of symbols andrituals combine to create group my-thologies. Mythologies unify dis-parate thoughts and act as filtersthrough which group members in-terpret reality.22 Group mythologiescan have profound effects on itsmembers.23 A group with a power-ful mythology results in one resis-tant to ideological challenges, and,therefore, it is more dangerous.

Mythologies nurtured, reinforced,and protected from outside ideasprovide a forum where groupmembers can escape individualresponsibility. “When we lose ourindividual independence in thecorporateness of a mass movementwe find a new freedom–freedom tohate.”24

questions, such as “Why do youhate?” “Can’t you see what you’redoing is wrong?” “How would youlike it if someone picked on youbecause of your race?” Skinheadsanswer smugly; they feel secure asskinheads. Because hate masks per-sonal insecurities, interviewersshould temporarily forego ques-tions about why skinheads hate andstrive to identify the skinheads’ per-sonal insecurities. Interviewersshould begin this probe by askingskinheads about their family rela-tionships, which probably representthe source of the skinhead’s insecu-rities because a sense of who peopleare and where they fit in societytypically develops within the familystructure. Interviewers also shouldexplore skinheads’ future plans,educational goals, and desired em-ployment. This forces skinheads tosee themselves as they really are. Ifforced to look at themselves,skinheads become vulnerable, lessresistant to rehabilitation, and, inlaw enforcement settings, morelikely to confess. This processcould take several hours or manymonths depending on the resistancelevel of the skinhead.

This strategy proves less effec-tive when interviewing criminallymotivated skinheads because theyview themselves as criminals whohate, rather than haters who commitcriminal acts. More traditional in-terviewing strategies have provensuccessful with criminally moti-vated skinheads.

INTERVENTIONSTRATEGIES

An accurate assessment ofskinhead groups is critical todeveloping intervention strategies.

INTERVIEWINGTECHNIQUES

Ironically, skinheads, espe-cially hate-motivated skinheads,talk to anyone who will listen, in-cluding law enforcement officers.One investigator who knew littleabout white-supremacist ideologysimply asked skinheads why theyhated, what their tattoos meant, andhow skinhead groups were orga-nized. Numerous interviews andobservations substantiated the ini-tial information obtained by the in-vestigator. On the other hand,criminally motivated skinheads areless likely to talk because they actmore like criminals. Investigatorsshould determine the motivation ofskinheads when planning interviewstrategies.

Hate-motivated skinheadshave well-rehearsed answers for

March 2003 / 7

Dismantling immature skinheadgroups proves easier than breakingdown sophisticated skinheadgroups. Skinheads not solidly com-mitted to supremacist ideologymore likely will respond to rehabili-tation attempts than hard-coreskinheads.25 Skinheads who havenot passed from Stage 4 (rhetoric)to Stage 5 (violence) will provemore receptive to rehabilitationstrategies than those skinheads whocommit violence.

Investigators should approachcriminally motivated skinheadgroups by using tactics similar tothose used against criminal streetgangs. Disrupting the activities ofmature, hate-motivated skinheadgroups requires time and moreelaborate interdiction strategies be-cause such groups are more unifiedand committed to their beliefs. Con-versely, aggressive prosecutionconstitutes an efficient means todisrupt immature, hate-motivatedskinhead groups.

Law enforcement used thistechnique to dismantle Peer Pride,an immature, hate-motivatedskinhead group in Palmdale, Cali-fornia. The FBI learned about PeerPride when the group hung a noosefrom a tree in front of the home ofan African-American family. FivePeer Pride members taunted thefamily with racial slurs and de-manded that they move out of theneighborhood. Local law enforce-ment initially treated this incidentas a prank because hanging thenoose was the only reported hateactivity by the group. However, aneighborhood canvass determinedthat Peer Pride members periodi-cally sat in front of a local fast foodrestaurant and shouted racial slurs

at the African-American patrons.Instead of leniency for the first-timeoffenders, the Los Angeles CountyDistrict Attorney’s Hate CrimesUnit recommended harsh sanctions,including jail sentences. The effectwas immediate. The group dis-banded and no other similar prob-lems occurred in the neighborhood.The incident, in and of itself, couldhave been interpreted as a prank,but, in reality, the group was pass-ing from Stage 3 to Stage 4 in thehate model.

operating provides valuable infor-mation to determine how dangerousthe group is and what type of inter-vention strategies to employ. Earlyintervention increases the probabil-ity of success, especially before thetransition period from rhetoric(Stage 4) to violence (Stage 5).These strategies can range from in-formal sensitivity instruction tomore formal programs, such as theJuvenile Offenders Learning Toler-ance (JOLT) program adminis-trated by the Los Angeles CountyDistrict Attorney’s Office HateCrimes Unit. JOLT is a model inter-vention program intended for first-time, low-level offenders who facepotential criminal prosecution andschool disciplinary action.

CONCLUSION

To develop and implement suc-cessful intervention strategies todeal with hate groups, law enforce-ment personnel first must under-stand the hate process. The hatemodel identifies the multiple stagesof the hate process. Investigatorscan use this model to identify haterswho have not yet transitioned fromhate rhetoric to hate violence andtarget them with intervention pro-grams, which have a higher prob-ability of success. Likewise, lawenforcement personnel can identifyand target hard-core haters with ap-propriate interdiction strategies.Knowing how the hate processworks helps interviewers penetratethe hate mask and address thehater’s underlying personal insecu-rities. If investigators can attenuatethese personal insecurities, haterswill become more receptive to reha-bilitation. Identifying and under-standing the stages of the hate

In contrast, the Lancaster NLRgroup was a mature, hate-motivatedskinhead group. Four NLR mem-bers beat an African-American tran-sient to death to earn the right towear lightning-bolt tattoos. Accord-ing to the group’s ritual, membersonly can earn lightning-bolt tattoosby killing minorities. A review ofpolice reports related to NLR crimi-nal activities clearly showed theNLR group progressing through theseven stages of the hate model.

School administrators andteachers can use the hate model toinformally assess hate groupactivities on campus. Identifyingthe stage in which a hate group is

© Digital Stock

process constitute the first steps incontrolling hate violence.

Endnotes

1 The authors based this article on theirobservations and interviews of several hundredself-described skinheads, defined as “usuallywhite males belonging to any of various,sometimes violent, youth gangs whose membershave close-shaven hair and often espouse white-supremacist beliefs,” Merriam Webster’s

Collegiate Dictionary, 10th ed. (1996), s.v.“skinhead.”

2 See Eric Hoffer, The True Believer:

Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements

(New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1989).3 Ibid.4 Ibid.5 Ibid.6 Statistics, however, reveal that most

hate crimes are not committed by hate groups.See U.S. Department of Justice, FederalBureau of Investigation, Uniform CrimeReporting Program, Hate Crime Statistics

2000 (Washington, DC, 2001). For moreinformation on collecting hate crime, seeU.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureauof Investigation, Uniform Crime ReportingProgram, Training Guide for Hate Crime Data

Collection (Washington, DC, 1997).7 Raymond Paternoster and Alex Piquero,

“Reconceptualizing Deterrence: An EmpiricalTest of Personal and Vicarious Experiences,”Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency

32 (August 1995): 251-286.8 See Brian Levin, “A Dream Deferred: The

Social and Legal Implications of Hate Crimes inthe 1990s,” The Journal of Intergroup

Relations 20, no. 3 (Fall 1993): 10, citing JackLevin and Jack McDevitt, Hate Crimes: The

Rising Tide of Bigotry and Bloodshed (NewYork, NY: Plenum Press, 1993).

9 Ibid.10 Supra note 2, 93-94.11 Supra note 2, 93-94.12 Supra note 2, 99.13 Supra note 2, 92.14 Charles W. Turner and John F. Layton,

“Verbal Imagery and Connotation as Memory

Induced Mediators of Aggressive Behavior,”Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

33 (1976): 755-763.15 Supra note 8, 10.16 Supra note 8, 9.17 Supra note 8, 10.18 Dolf Zillerman’s research is described in

Daniel Goleman, Emotional Intelligence (NewYork, NY: Bantam Press, 1997), 60-62.

19 Ibid.20 Supra note 8, 8.21 William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall

of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi

Germany (New York, NY: Fawcett Crest,1960), 71.

22 Daniel C. Maguire and A. NicholasFarnoli, On Moral Grounds: The Art, Science

of Ethics (New York, NY: The CrossroadsPublishing Co., 1991), 164-167.

23 Joseph Campbell and Bill Moyers, The

Power of Myth (New York, NY: Doubleday,1988), 31.

24 Supra note 2, 100.25 Supra note 8, 10.

8/ FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

T he FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin staff invitesyou to communicate with us via e-mail. Our

Internet address is [email protected] would like to know your thoughts on

contemporary law enforcement issues. Wewelcome your comments, questions, and

suggestions about the magazine. Pleaseinclude your name, title, and agency

on all e-mail messages.Also, the Bulletin is available

for viewing or downloading on anumber of computer services,as well as the FBI’s home page.The home page address ishttp://www.fbi.gov.

The Bulletin’sE-mail Address

March 2003 / 9

Bulletin Reports

Biometrics Catalog On-line

The Biometrics Catalog, a federally funded database, is a service of the National Institute ofJustice for the biometrics community and potential users of biometric technology. The catalog isdesigned to provide multiple search options so that browsers can find information quickly and easily.This catalog can be accessed at http://www.biometricscatalog.org.

Crime Mapping Research Center (CMRC)

The CMRC Web site is the primary source of information from the National Institute of Justice’s(NIJ) Crime Mapping Research Center. It serves as an international clearinghouse for informationabout the development of crime mapping and spatial analysis. It includes a list of CMRC staff, NIJ-funded grants that pertain to crime mapping, descriptions of upcoming conferences, a list of mapping-related software, a bibliography of crime-mapping resources, and descriptions of CMRC’s currentinitiatives. CRIMEMAP, CMRC’s listserv, is one of the center’s main information dissemination tools.CRIMEMAP facilitates communication among crime analysts, researchers, geographers, and otherinterested parties about justice-related computerized mapping technologies. CMRC can be accessed athttp://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/maps.

Web-Based Resources

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) and the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services(COPS) sponsored a study on the combined effects of pepper spray exposure and positional restrainton respiratory functions. Pepper Spray’s Effects on a Suspect’s Ability to Breathe presents the resultsof this study. This NIJ Research in Brief (NCJ 188069) summarizes the issues that gave rise to thestudy, the study’s major findings, and their implications for law enforcement. Findings suggest thatinhalation of pepper spray does not pose a significant riskto subjects in terms of respiratory and pulmonary functions,even when it occurs with positional restraint. However,pepper spray exposure did result in a small but statisticallysignificant increase in blood pressure, the origins andimplications of which remain unclear. This report isavailable electronically at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/188069.htm or by contacting the NationalCriminal Justice Reference Service at 800-851-3420.

Law Enforcement

Bulletin Reports is an edited collectionof criminal justice studies, reports, andproject findings. Send your material forconsideration to: FBI Law EnforcementBulletin, Room 209, Madison Building,FBI Academy, Quantico, VA 22135.(NOTE: The material in this section isintended to be strictly an informationsource and should not be considered anendorsement by the FBI for any productor service.)


y enabling human interac-tion without the constraintsof physical barriers and with

enforcement officers with solutionswhen they encounter impedimentsinvestigating these types of cases.

DEFINITION OFCYBERSTALKING

As the Internet becomes thecommunication device of choice formillions of people worldwide, newsheadlines, such as “Killer KeepsWeb Pages on Victim, Stalks HerThrough Internet”1 and “PennOpens Hate E-mail Inquiry,”2 havebegun to appear more frequently.These headlines depict stories of

criminal intimidation, harassment,fear, and suggestive violence whereindividuals use the Internet as a toolto stalk another person. The termcyberstalking has emerged to de-scribe the use of such technology toharass or stalk.3 Cyberstalking isdefined as the repeated use ofthe Internet, e-mail, or relateddigital electronic communicationdevices to annoy, alarm, or threatena specific individual or group ofindividuals.

All 50 states and the federalgovernment have enacted statutesaimed at protecting the victims ofstalking. Many of these statuteshave existed for a long time, whileothers have originated recently.Some of the older statutes werebroad enough to cover any typeof stalking behavior, includingcyberstalking; others had to beamended to do so. In some jurisdic-tions, new laws specifically ad-dressing the problem of cyber-stalking have been enacted. Inadapting general stalking and ha-rassment statutes to cover instancesof cyberstalking, legislators haveexpanded the means by whichoffenders commit this crime toinclude electronic communicationdevices.

Several states currently includespecific protections against threat-ening electronically transmittedcommunications in their stalkingor harassment statutes.4 Addition-ally, Title 18, Section 875, U.S.Code, criminalizes threateningmessages transmitted electronicallyin interstate or foreign commerce.The use of federal legislation toprosecute cases of cyberstalking,however, is limited, by law, to

Bthe perception of anonymity, theInternet has become the ideal in-strument for individuals who wishto intimidate, threaten, and harassothers. A stalker can use theInternet to send alarming messagesanywhere, within a matter ofmoments, under the guise of a ficti-tious screen name or pseudonym.Understanding how offendersuse the Internet to stalk victimsin cyberspace can provide law

© John Foxx Images

A Study onCyberstalkingUnderstandingInvestigative HurdlesBy ROBERT D’OVIDIO, M.S., and JAMES DOYLE

March 2003 / 11

instances where the harassing mes-sages are transmitted across statelines or outside the United States.Despite the existence of Title 18,Section 875, the federal govern-ment historically has limited its in-volvement in prosecuting cases re-lated to electronically transmittedthreatening messages to cases in-volving special circumstances, suchas threats made against the presi-dent of the United States. As withstalking that does not involve theInternet, local authorities investi-gate and prosecute most cyber-stalking cases in either the jurisdic-tion where the victim resides or inthe jurisdiction where the messagesoriginated.

With the rapid pace of techno-logical advancement that existsin today’s society, legislationshould take an evolutionary ap-proach toward defining electroniccommunication devices and sys-tems of transmission. Legislationthat limits electronic devices andtransmission systems to specifictechnologies, such as telephonesand land-based wires, risk becom-ing antiquated with the emergenceof new technologies, such as com-puters and wireless transmissionsystems.

THE STUDY

Background

Anticipating the significantrole computers would play in thecommission of crimes in the future,the New York City Police Depart-ment (NYPD) developed the Com-puter Investigation & TechnologyUnit (CITU) in 1995. CITU investi-gates cases where offenders use a

Mr. Doyle serves as presidentof a private company thattrains law enforcement andconsults in the area of high-tech crime.

Mr. D’Ovidio is a Ph.D. studentand instructor at TempleUniversity in Philadelphia,Pennsylvania.

computer or the Internet as an in-strument to commit a crime orwhere a computer represents thetarget of a crime or constitutes asource of evidence relating to acrime. The unit also performs out-reach services to business and com-munity groups to educate people oncomputer ethics, safe Internet prac-tices, and data security issues re-lated to the most current practicesof computer hackers. Additionally,CITU provides training and techni-cal assistance to local, state, andfederal law enforcement andprosecutorial agencies.

Methodology

The authors used official policerecords from NYPD’s CITU tocapture data on the extent andnature of cyberstalking for thisstudy. Specifically, the data for thisstudy were drawn from information

contained within standardizedforms filed by the complainant atthe time of the initial complaint andstandardized investigative formsthat detail the progress of the inves-tigation from beginning to end.Data were gathered using all closedcases of aggravated harassment5 in-vestigated by NYPD from January1996 through August 2000 in whichcriminals used a computer or theInternet as the instrument of the of-fense. In addition to the date of theoffense, descriptive informationwas gathered on the victim, the of-fender, the outcome of the case, themethod used to harass, and whetherthe victim and suspect resided in thesame jurisdiction.

Extent of the Problem

When compared to othercybercrimes, cyberstalking hasbeen the most prevalent crime


reported to and investigated byCITU since the unit’s inception.During the 56-month period fromJanuary 1996 through August 2000,42.8 percent of the cases investi-gated by CITU involved aggravatedharassment by means of a computeror the Internet. Additional CITU in-vestigations during this period in-volved grand larceny, computer andnetwork trespassing, forgery, pettylarceny, criminal impersonation,child pornography, crimes againstchildren, and schemes to defraud.Understanding the distributionof cybercrimes is essential to allo-cating a computer crime unit’sresources in a cost-efficient man-ner. Training that provides investi-gators with the technical know-ledge and procedural experienceneeded to successfully investigatecyberstalking should be a priorityfor a computer crime unit. Agenciesshould note that the technical train-ing needed to successfully investi-gate cases of cyberstalking is notentirely crime specific and willprove useful when investigatingother types of computer-relatedcrime.

An examination of case out-comes revealed that 192 of the 201cyberstalking cases investigatedby CITU were closed during the56-month period of this study.Approximately 40 percent of thecases were closed with an arrest,and almost 11 percent of the casesfailed to produce evidence that acrime was committed. CITU closedthe remaining cases after findingevidence to support the victim’scomplaint due to a jurisdictionalissue, an uncooperative complain-ant, a case transfer, or exhausting

all investigative leads withoutpositively identifying a specificoffender.

The Offender

Offender characteristics wereexamined using the 134 closedcases where a suspect was arrestedor where evidence to support an ar-rest existed but a suspect was notarrested because of an uncoopera-tive complainant or a jurisdictionalissue. The results revealed that

where investigators determined thata threatening or alarming message6

was transmitted using a computer orthe Internet (excluding cases withunfounded outcomes). Females, themost likely recipients, were victim-ized in about 52 percent of thecases, whereas males were the vic-tims of aggravated harassment inapproximately 35 percent. Educa-tional institutions represented thenext most likely target with 8 per-cent. Offenders chose private cor-porations in almost 5 percent of thecases. Public-sector agencies weretargeted in about 1 percent of thecases.

Approximately 85 percent ofvictims were white, 6 percentAsian, 5 percent black, and 4 per-cent Hispanic. The average age ofthe victims was 32, with the young-est victim being 10 years old and theoldest being 62 years of age.

Technological Methods

In 92 percent of the cases,offenders used only one methodto stalk their victims. E-mail wasused most often. Offenders used e-mail to harass their victims in ap-proximately 79 percent of the cases.The second method most oftenused by offenders was the instantmessenger. Offenders used instantmessengers to harass their victimsin about 13 percent of the cases.Chat rooms were used in approxi-mately 8 percent of the cases,while message boards and Websites were used respectively in4 percent and 2 percent of thecases. Last, offenders employednewsgroups and false user profilesin approximately 1 percent of thecases.

”

...computer crimeinvestigation units

should developworking relationshipswith their counterpartsin other jurisdictions.

“males (approximately 80 percent ofthe cases) were more likely than fe-males to commit aggravated harass-ment using a computer or theInternet. Approximately 74 percentof the offenders were white, 13 per-cent Asian, 8 percent Hispanic, and5 percent black. The average age ofthe offender was 24, with the oldestoffender being 53 years old and theyoungest being 10 years old. Ap-proximately 26 percent of offenderswere juveniles, according to NewYork State law, or under the age of16.

The Victim

Victim characteristics were ex-amined using the 171 closed cases

March 2003 / 13

Cyberstalkers have employed various methods of

Internet communication to harass their victims. Although

not exhaustive, the following list describes some of the

methods that cyberstalkers may use:

• E-mail: A method of communication that allowsan individual to transfer text, picture, video, andaudio files to another person’s electronic mailbox. Inusing e-mail to harass, the cyberstalker creates a text-based, graphic-based, or audio-based message of athreatening, alarming, or otherwise harassing natureand sends it to the e-mail account of the intendedvictim.

• Newsgroups: A method of communication that amountsto an ongoing discussion about a particular topic.Internet users contribute to the ongoing discussion byposting their opinions, comments, or related experi-ences about a particular subject. These postings arelinked together and can be retrieved by querying adatabase of newsgroup topics. Cyberstalkers can usethese forums to post threatening or defamatorystatements directed at a specific individual or group ofindividuals. In New York v. Munn (688 N.Y. S.2d 384;1999), the court found the defendant guilty of aggra-vated harassment for posting a message to an Internetnewsgroup that instructed people to kill police officersfrom the NYPD.

• Message boards/guest books: A method of communica-tion similar to a newsgroup in that its contents amountto comments about a particular topic. Internet sitesoften have guest books where visitors can entertheir names and make comments about the site. Thevisitor’s name and comments are subsequently avail-able to be viewed by others visiting the Web site. Aperson who wants to threaten or harass the owner of aWeb page easily can leave alarming messages in aguest book.

• Internet sites: A method of communication thatinvolves posting information to a unique uniformresource locator (URL). Internet users later can retrievethis information by directing their Web browser to thecorresponding URL. An Internet site becomes themethod of harassment when a cyberstalker postsinformation on a Web page about an individual thatcauses them to become alarmed or frightened. Forexample, a cyberstalker could create an Internet sitethat advertises sexual services for hire and includes thevictim’s picture, phone number, and address. Subse-quently, the victim is bombarded with telephone callsor personal visits from individuals inquiring about theadvertised sexual services.

Cyberstalking Methods• Chat rooms: A method of communication that enables

real-time text, audio, and video-based group interaction.Chat rooms, or chat channels, usually are organizedaround specific topics of conversation. Topics include,but are not limited to, such issues as politics, religion,relationships, and sex. When communicating in a chatroom, a participant’s messages are broadcast toeveryone signed into the particular chat room. Severaltypes of chat services have emerged since the develop-ment of the Internet. Chat services can be public orprivate. Public chat services are open to everyone withaccess to the Internet. For example, Internet relay chat(IRC) and I seek you (ICQ) chat are open to all Internetusers. Both IRC and ICQ chat rooms have hundreds ofchat channels that cover a diverse range of subjects andenable the transfer of files between active participants.Unlike public chat services, private services limit accessto their chat channels and are hosted by specific on-lineservice providers. Chat rooms provide cyberstalkerswith different options to harass their victims. A stalkercan send alarming messages directly to the victim whileconversing in a chat room. The message is delivered tothe intended victim, as well as to all those users whocurrently are logged into the chat room. In addition, thecyberstalker can pose as the victim in a chat room andprovide personal information to participants, therebyresulting in the intended victim being directly contactedin person, by e-mail, or by phone.

• Third-party instant messengers: A method of communi-cation that enables real-time text, audio, and video-based interaction between two individuals over theInternet or a computer network. Users program theirinstant messenger software to notify them whendesignated individuals log on to the network. Withinstant messaging software, users have the ability toengage in real-time dialogue with a designated person aslong as both parties are connected to the network.Stalkers with prior knowledge of a victim’s screen namecan use an instant messenger to send harassingmessages in real time when both parties are logged ontothe Internet.

• Commercial service user profiles: A method ofcommunication that involves posting descriptiveinformation about oneself to the membership directoryof a commercial Internet service. Service subscriberscan query this directory so that they may find othermembers who share similar hobbies, interests, orbackgrounds. People who want to harass others mayestablish a false user profile that will direct unwantedcommunication toward their victim in the form ofrepeated telephone calls, e-mails, or in-person contact.

Knowing the type of Internettechnology used most often bycyberstalkers can prove beneficialto law enforcement administratorswho must decide how to allocatethe training budget for computercrime investigators. Because e-mailconstitutes the method most oftenused by cyberstalkers, unit adminis-trators should prioritize technicaltraining that provides investigatorswith the knowledge needed toperform e-mail-related forensics.

ISSUES FACING LAWENFORCEMENT ANDPOTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

Technical features of theInternet and procedural issueswith the law present problems forcriminal justice agencies wheninvestigating and prosecutingcyberstalking cases. These prob-lems, however, are not crime spe-cific and generally occur whenagencies investigate and prosecutecases involving any type of com-puter crime.

Jurisdiction

The global reach of the Internetand the instantaneous nature of

computer-mediated communicationpresent law enforcement withjurisdictional issues that couldnegatively impact the investigationand the subsequent prosecution ofcomputer crimes.7 With theInternet, stalkers no longer needphysical proximity to have contactwith their victims. They just aseasily can harass a person inanother state or country as theycan a person who lives in closeproximity.

The majority of CITU’s aggra-vated harassment cases involved in-vestigations where both the of-fender and victim resided within thejurisdiction of the NYPD. In ap-proximately 72 percent of the cases,the offender and the victim residedwithin the five boroughs of NewYork City. In comparison, 26 per-cent of the cases involved either anoffender or a victim who residedoutside the jurisdiction of theNYPD but within the United States,while 2 percent of the cases in-volved an offender from a foreigncountry.

An offender residing outsidethe jurisdiction of the investigatingagency can negatively impact the

outcome of a case. In New YorkCity, the District Attorney’s Officeis less inclined to prosecute aggra-vated harassment cases if the arrestof the suspect requires extraditionfrom another jurisdiction. Suchpolicies have prevented the appre-hension of offenders by the NYPDin cases where investigations byCITU have produced evidence sup-porting their arrests. In 20 aggra-vated harassment cases investigatedby CITU, the NYPD did not arrestthe suspects, despite supporting evi-dence, because their arrests wouldrequire extradition from another ju-risdiction. In these cases, the NYPDmade referrals to the police depart-ments that had jurisdiction over theoffenders.

Differences in statutory defini-tions of stalking across statesmay complicate the investigationand prosecution processes whenoffenders reside outside thejurisdiction of the investigatingagency. Jurisdictions that do notrecognize Internet communicationas a viable method to stalk orharass may deny or ignore theextradition request, search warrant,or subpoena of a jurisdiction where

U.S. Department of Justice Cybercrime Web Site: http://www.cybercrime.gov

High Technology Crime Investigation Association: http://www.htcia.org/

SEARCH—The National Consortium for Justice Information & Statistics: http://www.search.org/

National Center for Missing & Exploited Children: http://www.ncmec.org/

International Association of Computer Investigative Specialists: http://www.cops.org/

Compuforensics: http://www.compuforensics.com/

National Law Enforcement & Corrections Technology Center: http://www.nlectc.org/

National White-Collar Crime Center: http://www.iir.com/nwccc/nwccc.htm

Resources


March 2003 / 15

such methods do constitute a crimi-nal offense.

To minimize the negative im-pact jurisdictional issues have onthe successful investigation andprosecution of cyberstalking cases,computer crime investigation unitsshould develop working relation-ships with their counterparts inother jurisdictions. Such relation-ships can prove essential to secur-ing the arrest of out-of-state or for-eign offenders in their homejurisdictions when the victim’s ju-risdiction will not arrest if extradi-tion is required. In addition, cross-jurisdictional relationships betweencomputer crime investigation unitscan help secure the execution ofout-of-state subpoenas and searchwarrants and facilitate relationshipswith out-of-state Internet serviceproviders, computer manufacturers,and software developers. Over thepast decade, various professionalorganizations have formed for thoseinvolved with the investigation ofcomputer-related crimes. Participa-tion in these organizations canprovide law enforcement with in-valuable links to out-of-stateresources.

Because of the ease with whichcyberstalkers may attack across ju-risdictional lines, legislaturesshould carefully define the venue ofthe offense. In cases where threat-ening communication originatesfrom another state or country andthe statute of the investigating juris-diction defines the venue of the of-fense in terms of where the commu-nication originated, the criminaljustice community will not be ableto properly serve the victim. Whencreating legislation to combat

cyberstalking or when revising ex-isting stalking legislation to includeInternet communication, statesshould define the venue of the of-fense in a manner that includes boththe place where the communicationwas received and the place wherethe communication originated.

and time an investigator spends on acase.

Out-of-date and missing ac-count, subscriber, or user informa-tion also presents problems to lawenforcement agencies when investi-gating cases of cyberstalking. With-out toll records or transactionaldata, investigators can have a diffi-cult time establishing an electroniclink between the suspect and thevictim. The financial and humancosts associated with gathering andmaintaining account informationdecreases the possibility thatInternet service providers will vol-untarily collect and maintain suchdata for a useful period of time.Missing toll records, transactionaldata, user information, or accountcontent resulted in a negative caseclearance in approximately 18 per-cent of the cyberstalking cases in-vestigated by CITU. In these cases,the content of the communicationcontained a threatening message,but no arrest occurred because de-tectives could not gain access to theelectronic evidence to legally sup-port apprehending a specific indi-vidual. To ensure that account, sub-scriber, and user information arecollected and saved long enough tohelp law enforcement, legislationthat regulates Internet service pro-viders should include data collec-tion requirements.

Anonymizing Tools

The continued developmentand increased availability ofanonymizing Internet tools (i.e., de-vices that ensure a person’s ano-nymity when using the Internet) cancomplicate the investigation ofcyberstalking cases. Anonymous

Account and UserInformation

The unwillingness of someInternet service providers to readilygrant law enforcement access tosubscriber records further compli-cates the investigation of acyberstalking case. Not all Internetservice providers agree on whatconstitutes subscriber records,which are obtainable by subpoena,as opposed to transactional records,which require a search warrant.8

When compared to obtaining tele-phone records from a telephonecompany, obtaining a suspect’sInternet account information from aservice provider can prove far morecomplicated and involve an in-crease in the amount of paperwork

”

...administratorsshould prioritizetechnical training

that providesinvestigators with theknowledge needed to

perform e-mail-related forensics.

“


remailers allow individuals to sendelectronic mail without transmittingany information that would enableothers to determine the identity ofthe author. Remailers strip identify-ing information from the e-mailheader and erase any transactionaldata from servers that would enablelaw enforcement to trace the mes-sage back to the author. Conse-quently, cyberstalkers who use ananonymous remailer as the solemeans to send threatening or ha-rassing e-mail messages will remainvirtually undetectable to the victimand law enforcement. The dangerraised by the use of anonymousremailers, as depicted by CITU’scaseload, does not stem from thefrequency in which these toolsare used, but from the effectthese tools have on the investigativeprocess. Anonymous remailerswere used in only 4, or 2.1 percent,of the 192 cyberstalking cases

investigated by CITU. Investiga-tors, however, could not trace theharassing e-mail messages sentthrough the anonymous remailersback to their authors in all fourcases where these tools were used.

Anonymous Web-browsingservices also offer cyberstalkers theopportunity to harass or threatenvictims while remaining virtuallyuntraceable to law enforcement.Some companies provide userswith the ability to surf the Inter-net, participate in public chat chan-nels, send instant messages, andpost messages to newsgroupswithout transmitting any identify-ing information. The exclusiveuse of such services to send harass-ing messages would prevent inves-tigators from establishing anelectronic link between thevictim and the offender. An exami-nation of CITU’s cyberstalkingcaseload found no instances where

offenders used anonymous Web-browsing services to stalk theirvictims.

The widespread availability ofanonymizing tools can increase theamount of cyberstalking andInternet deviance in general. Theo-retically, deviance will result fromthe use of anonymizing toolsbecause people will feel lessrestrained when not faced with thefear of detection by their victim orthe police. The absence of a legallybinding international body to regu-late the Internet leaves little hopethat the deployment of anonymizingtools will be stopped. Even if acountry did succeed in banning thedistribution of anonymizing tools,the global reach of the Internetwould enable people to seek outsuch tools in countries that allowtheir use. Consequently, citizensmust learn to survive on an Internetwhere people can act without ac-countability. In the absence of aregulatory solution to safeguardInternet users against those whoemploy anonymizing tools to ha-rass, Internet service providers andrelated software companies shouldseek a technological solution aimedat blocking unwanted anonymouscommunication.

CONCLUSION

Because the Internet allows hu-man interaction without physicalbarriers and with the perception ofanonymity, it has become the idealinstrument for individuals whowish to intimidate, threaten, or ha-rass. Federal and state legislationhave emerged to criminalize suchbehavior. Legislatures aiming tocriminalize cyberstalking should

Distribution of Cybercrimes Investigated bythe New York City Police DepartmentJanuary 1996 through August 2000

Number of PercentCrime Cases of CasesAggravated harassment 201 42.8Grand larceny 102 21.7Hacking (e.g., computer trespass) 46 9.8Forgery 23 4.9Petit larceny 22 4.7Criminal impersonation 20 4.3Child pornography 19 4.0Crimes against children 14 3.0Scheme to defraud 10 2.1Other crimes 13 2.8Total 470 100

March 2003 / 17

take an evolutionary approach to-ward defining the means of commu-nication covered by the law toensure protection against harassingcommunications sent using newlydeveloped technologies.

An examination of all computercrimes investigated by the NewYork City Police Department fromJanuary 1996 through August 2000found cyberstalking to be the mostprevalent computer crime investi-gated by the department. Thus, po-lice personnel administrating com-puter crime units should prioritizestaffing and training initiatives thatproperly equip their units to dealwith the cyberstalking problem.Additionally, because cyberstalkersuse e-mail as the communicationmethod of choice, computer crimeunit administrators should prioritizetechnical training that provides in-vestigators with the knowledgeneeded to perform e-mail-relatedforensics.

Out-of-date and missing ac-count, subscriber, and user informa-tion, as well as anonymizing tools,presented problems for law en-forcement during cyberstalking in-vestigations. Working relationshipsbetween computer crime units in allagencies can minimize the negativeeffects that jurisdictional issueshave on the investigation andprosecutorial processes. These re-lationships can help facilitate theexecution of out-of-state subpoenasand search warrants and providelaw enforcement with an open doorto out-of-state Internet serviceproviders.

Out-of-date and missing ac-count, subscriber, and user informa-tion also have prevented law en-forcement from establishing an

electronic link between the suspectand the victim. To offset thisnegative effect, legislative actionshould establish data collectionstandards for Internet service pro-viders that meet the needs of com-puter crime investigators.

(November 7, 1999), retrieved June 21, 2001,from http://www.phillynews.com/inquirer/99/

Nov/7/front_page.3 U. S. Department of Justice, “1999 Report

on Cyberstalking: A New Challenge for LawEnforcement and Industry,” August 1999;retrieved November 6, 2001, from http://

www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/

cyberstalking.htm.4 American Prosecutors Research Institute,

The Status of Cyberstalking in the Context of

Violence Against Women (Arlington, VA:American Prosecutors Research Institute,1999). For instance, section 240.30 of the NewYork State Penal Law finds a person guilty ofaggravated harassment if the individualpurposely intends to harass, annoy, threaten, oralarm another person by means of mechanical,electronic, or written communication.Additionally, New York revised its antistalkingstatutes in December 1999 to cover electroniccommunication, such as e-mail, that is likely tocause fear or harm. In defining the actions thatconstitute stalking, section 646.9 of theCalifornia State Penal Code includes verbal,written, or electronic communications that areintended to place individuals in reasonable fearfor their safety. In defining electroniccommunications, California has relied upon thedefinition used in the U.S. Code for regulatingbehavior related to communication devices.Specifically, the term electronic communicationmeans “any transfer of signs, signals, writing,images, sounds, data, or intelligence of anynature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire,radio, electromagnetic, photo-electronic orphoto-optical system.” According to theCalifornia State Penal Code, the devices used totransmit electronic communications include,but are not limited to, telephones, cellularphones, computers, video recorders, faxmachines, and pagers.

5 New York Penal Law § 240.306 As defined by New York Penal Law §

240.30.7 Neil Barrett, Digital Crime: Policing the

Cybernation (London, England: Kogan Page,1997).

8 The legal requirements for obtaining suchrecords are contained in the ElectronicCommunications Privacy Act (ECPA), codifiedin 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711.

”All 50 states and thefederal government

have enacted statutesaimed at protecting the

victims of stalking.

“Finally, the infrequent use of

anonymous remailers by cyber-stalkers should not pull attentionfrom the negative effect that thesetools can have on the law enforce-ment process. The increased avail-ability and continued developmentof anonymizing Internet tools thatare easier to use than previousversions likely will increase the useof these options by criminals. Whenused, anonymous remailers suc-cessfully prevented law enforce-ment from tracing e-mail messagesback to the offender. A technologi-cal solution aimed at blockinganonymous communication willoffset the threat to users posed byanonymous remailers.

Endnotes

1 “Killer Keeps Web Pages on Victim,Stalks Her Through Internet,” (November 29,1999), retrieved June 21, 2001 from http://

www.canoe.ca/technews9911/30_killer.html.2 Sudarsan Raghavan, “Penn Opens Hate

E-mail Inquiry,” Philadelphia Inquirer on-line

Mr. D’Ovidio can be reached viae-mail at [email protected]. Doyle can be reached via e-mail [email protected].


or years, an official advertisement in a localnewspaper constituted the only police recruit-

Recruitment StrategiesA Case Study in PoliceRecruitmentBy Mark A. Spawn

Police Practice

examination for the police officer position, and, ofthose, 100 individuals passed. When the departmentoffered the police test again in 1999, 47 applicantstook the test and 36 (76 percent) passed.

The next stage in the testing process consists ofthe physical agility test. The department tests candi-dates for flexibility, the amount of push-ups and sit-ups performed in a certain time frame, and thecompletion of a 1.5-mile run. In 1999, more than 58percent of the applicants could not pass the agilitytest, which left a short list of candidates. After theremaining group completed background investigationsand psychological and polygraph testing, seven moreapplicants were excluded from the list leaving only 12percent of those who had taken the written testeligible for appointment. The shortage of eligiblecandidates seriously concerned the department. Inparticular, candidates did not seem prepared for theagility test. The written examination had not changedsignificantly in recent years, but neither had theagility standards. To rectify the problem of a seriouslyshort candidate list, the Fulton Police Departmentannounced another written test in 2000 to garner morecandidates.

Recruitment

For the written test in 2000, the departmentembarked on a serious recruitment campaign. Thedepartment sent posters to area colleges and pressreleases to local newspapers and radio and televisionstations. The department highlighted the recruitmentdrive, as well as the physical standards, on a specialpage on its Web site. The department’s officers andtheir families, as well as the department staff, assistedwith the production of a television commercial thataired in the region and drew the most attention. Itshowcased Fulton and its police department bystarting with a community theme, then leading to apolice officer talking with a citizen, investigating anaccident, and examining crime scene evidence. At theend of the commercial, viewers saw a telephonenumber and heard a voice that asked them, “Are youup to the challenge?” For 2 months, the agencycontinued a barrage of media releases and aired thetelevision commercial. This proved an unusualrecruitment approach in the area, and it drew theattention of all three local network affiliates, whichincreased publicity even more. During this time, the

Fment efforts of the Fulton, New York, Police Depart-ment. The simple announcement usually provided asufficient number of applicants for screening andhiring purposes. However, the department recentlyencountered a problem—even though applicantspassed the written civil service test, many of themfailed the physical agility test.

Background

Fulton, New York, a small city in the central partof the state, employs 35 sworn officers to serve thecommunity. The Fulton Police Department maintainsan active police candidate list for at least 2 years and,often, up to 4 years. But, because of an insufficientnumber of candidates several years ago, the agencyoffered the civil service test, the first phase of thetesting process, for police officers for the second timein 2 years. In 1996, 144 applicants took the written

March 2003 / 19

department made applications available not onlythrough the civil service office during business hoursbut also from the police department. All of theseefforts proved so successful that the department hadto use a high school gymnasium as a testing center.

To help candidates meet the required physicalfitness standards, each applicant received a summaryof the requirements. Even though the standardsconstitute a part of the basic application package, thedepartment added emphasis by attaching a simplifiedchart, which showed applicants what the departmentwould require if they passed the written examination.Candidates received the fitness standards once againprior to agility testing, several weeks before the test.By providing this information to the candidates wellin advance, the department hoped that the eliminationrate would decrease significantly.

Results

The results of candidate testing showed that thedepartment’s efforts paid off. A record 160 candidatestook the written examination and 111 (69 percent)passed. A segment of those applicants with a passingscore underwent the physical agility testing. Of thatgroup, 71 percent passed, a 29 percent increase fromthe previous year. Even though a 7 percent greaterfailure rate existed with the written examinationcompared to the previous year’s exam, the significantincrease of those who successfully completed theagility test gave the department a much larger candi-date pool. It also validated the recruitment campaign

and, particularly, the emphasis on the physical agilitycomponent.

During the written examination in 2000, thedepartment surveyed candidates to elicit responsesconcerning recruitment efforts. It designed the surveyto measure best practices for recruitment, availabilityof application packages, number of police tests taken,and applicants’ knowledge of physical agility stan-dards. A summary of the survey results indicated thatnewspaper advertising proved the most prominentmedium from which candidates learned about thepolice test, followed closely by the television adver-tising. Candidates suggested that newspaper andtelevision were the best mediums to notify them offuture tests. The availability of police test packageswas important—45 percent of candidates obtainedthem from the police station and 33 percent from thepersonnel office.

The most critical survey question evaluatedwhether the department delivered the message onagility standards. Surveys asked if candidates knewabout the physical agility requirements. An over-whelming 94 percent said that they knew, and 5percent answered that they “somewhat” knew aboutthem. Only 1 percent answered “no.” The bestanalysis occurred when top-scoring candidatesunderwent physical agility testing. At that time, thepass rate for the agility test reached 71 percent, a 13percent increase from the previous year.

In New York, the entrance exam is standardizedand given on the same day statewide. This allows

Candidates taking written test

Candidates passingwritten test

Top-scoring candidatespassing all screenings*

1999 No Strategy

2000 Aggressive Strategy

47

36

42%

160

111

71%

*includes written exam, physical agility test, and background investigation

Recruitment Strategy


applicants to sit for one test and have their scoresfiled with other jurisdictions in the state. In 2000, 82percent of the applicants sitting for the Fulton examtested only for the Fulton Police Department.

Conclusion

The officer candidate selection process—from thewritten test to the agility test, to background investi-gations, psychological evaluations, and polygraphexaminations—is intensive and expensive. Aftermany applicants failed the physical agility test in1999, the Fulton Police Department implemented anaggressive recruitment campaign to attract largernumbers of candidates. The department used a varietyof resources to recruit local residents and to advisethem of required physical fitness levels. As a result, a

record number of candidates took the written exami-nation, and the number of applicants who passed thephysical agility test increased dramatically from theprevious year.

A recurrent emphasis on fitness throughout thetesting process is a message to candidates of theimportance of the standards. While some law enforce-ment administrators might view a high failure rate forphysical testing as a problem beyond their control, anintense recruitment program highlighting the mini-mum requirements is one method to increase resultsand yield more candidates.

Chief Spawn heads the Fulton, New York, PoliceDepartment.

Subscribe Now

March 2003 / 21

n April 23, 1990, the U. S.Congress signed the HateCrime Statistics Act intoO

law.1 Previous to this act, hate/biascrimes existed, but were nottracked or focused on as a specifictype of crime. For example, AdolfHitler’s attempted genocide in the1930s and 1940s registers as oneof the most heinous acts in historyand the abomination that all hate/bias crimes are measured against,but, at the time of its discovery andinvestigation, no act or specificguideline for investigating andclassifying hate/bias crimesexisted.

The FBI defines a hate/biascrime as “a criminal offense com-mitted against a person, property, orsociety which is motivated, inwhole or in part, by the offender’sbias against a race, religion, disabil-ity, sexual orientation, or ethnicity/national origin.”2 Hate/bias crimesdestroy communities, as well ashoard resources from law enforce-ment agencies. Hate/bias crimestear at the very fabric of Americansociety—a society based on clearand certain truths intended for allcitizens and communities and dis-tinctly stated in the Declaration ofIndependence. “We hold these

truths to be self-evident, that allmen are created equal, that they areendowed by their Creator with cer-tain unalienable Rights, that amongthese are Life, Liberty, and the pur-suit of Happiness.”

Law enforcement agencies andofficers need to know the issues,guidelines, and action steps thatcomprise an effective hate/biascrime response and investigation.3

Law enforcement agencies alsoshould ensure that investigators re-ceive training in such critical ele-ments as understanding the role ofthe investigator, identifying a hate/bias crime, classifying an offender,

Best Practices of a Hate/BiasCrime InvestigationBy WALTER BOUMAN

© Mark C. Ide


interviewing a victim, relating to acommunity, and prosecuting an of-fender. When hate/bias crimes oc-cur, they deserve investigators’timely response, understanding,and vigilance to ensure an accurateand successful investigation. Whileveteran investigators of hate/biascrimes recognize these basic tenets,they also know the importance ofrevisiting them periodically to re-mind law enforcement officers howto handle fragile victims, families,and communities that have beentraumatized by the hateful act of acriminal. Furthermore, the events ofSeptember 11, 2001, require the lawenforcement community to renderspecial attention to these crimes be-cause the hated community was theentire United States and its way oflife.

Understandingthe Investigator’s Role

All investigators responding toor helping in the investigation of a

hate/bias crime must be caring andcompassionate persons. They musttolerate all races, religions, nationalorigins, sexes, sexual orientations,and disabilities to maintain anonjudgmental attitude throughoutan investigation. Investigators musthave comprehensive knowledge ofthe general elements and motiva-tions behind hate/bias crimes. In-vestigators also need to recognizethe potential of such crimes toaffect the primary victim, thevictim’s family, other members ofthe victim’s group, or the largercommunity.

When working with the victimsof a hate/bias crime, the role of thefirst responder is critical.4 In manyinstances, the investigator is thefirst contact with law enforcement,the government, or the justice sys-tem that the victim may have expe-rienced. Investigators become rep-resentatives of their entire agency,and, without a good first impres-sion, the victim may feel driven

away. Driving a victim away, evenunintentionally, will slow an inves-tigation and cause the victim to feeleven more alienated. Responding toa potential hate/bias crime in thecorrect fashion can open the lines ofcommunication between the victimand the investigator, but it also canensure that the search for offendersbegins in the right direction.

Identifying Hate/Bias Crimes

A common, but critical, mis-take in a hate/bias crime investiga-tion is the misidentification of thecrime. Attempting to correct amisidentification with a victim,community, or within a law en-forcement agency is time consum-ing and difficult at best. Officersunsure about identifying a potentialhate/bias crime should consult witha supervisor or an expert on thetopic. They should use the depart-ment chain of command to informthe department of the incident andto update key members throughoutthe investigation. Questions similarto the following will help investiga-tors identify hate/bias crimes andbegin an investigation.

• Was the victim a member of atargeted class?

• Was the victim outnumberedby the perpetrators?

• Did the victim and offenderbelong to different groups?

• Would the incident have takenplace if the victim and of-fender were of the samegroup?

• Have other incidents occurredin the same locality or in asimilar place?

Investigatorsbecome

representatives oftheir entire agency,and, without a goodfirst impression, the

victim may feeldriven away.

”Mr. Bouman currently trains federal officers in California and NewMexico in cooperation with the Federal Law Enforcement TrainingCenter (FLETC) based in Glynco, Georgia.

“

March 2003 / 23

• Have other incidents happenedat similar times?

• Is the time significant to hate-motivated groups?

• Were the victims of theseincidents members of atargeted group?

• Was the victim a member of aprotected class that is outnum-bered by members of anothergroup in the neighborhood?

• Did the offender use biasedoral comments, written state-ments, or gestures?

• Were bias-related objects,items, or symbols used or leftat the crime scene?

Classifying Offenders

Equipped with the answers tothese questions, investigatorsshould be able to determine if thecrime was committed based uponhate or bias and, if so, begin to in-vestigate the motivations of the of-fender. Hate/bias crimes, offenders,and their motivations all typicallyfit within five basic classifications.

1) Thrill seeking: Generallygroups of young people, theseoffenders are motivated by theexperiences of psychologicalor social excitement, merepleasure, or the gain of brag-ging rights. Their targets oftenare unknown outside thegroups they represent. Hate/bias-based graffiti or verbal orphysical assault representoffenses of this classification.

2) Organized: Motivated bythe need to express theirprofound resentment against,

for the most part, minoritygroups, these offenders lookfor a role model or leader whowill organize and encouragethem to act. Skinheads andtheir activities exemplify thisclassification.

3) Missionary: Usually identi-fying with a specific leader orhigher power, these offendersseek to rid the world of evil bydisposing of the members ofan identified and despisedgroup. Those led by Hitlertypify this classification.

assault targets with whom theyshare common traits or charac-teristics. A homosexual persontargeting or assaulting otherhomosexuals epitomizes thisclassification.

Once a crime has been re-sponded to, recognized as a hate/bias crime, and classified as such,investigators should conduct atimely and comprehensive follow-up investigation. Knowing and un-derstanding the five typical classifi-cations, as well as remaining awareof meaningful calendar and anni-versary dates (e.g., Hitler’s birth-day), key symbols (e.g., tattoos,mantras), or previous patterns of ac-tivity significant for these groupsand their agendas, can assist in aneffective investigation. Investiga-tors must proceed promptly to keepthe incident from escalating, appre-hend the perpetrator, and diligentlyprocess all physical evidence, allwhile remaining sensitive to thefeelings and needs of the victim orsurrounding community.

Interviewing Victims

Hate/bias crimes are uniquelyviolent and traumatic. Victims ofthese crimes feel degraded, iso-lated, frightened, suspicious of oth-ers, powerless, and depressed.Some victims experience severetrauma and denial about the inci-dent, and some victims and familiesmay feel emotionally disturbed forextended periods of time. Thislong-term stress can take a substan-tial toll on a family and the sur-rounding community. Effective in-vestigators know and understandthese elements of hate/bias crimes.

4) Reactive: Typically show-ing a lack of tolerance forindividuals of other groups,these offenders protect anddefend what belongs to them(a country, community,neighborhood, school, orchurch) from outsiders.Average citizens defendingtheir race against another racecharacterize this classification.

5) Identity conflicted: Moti-vated by self-hatred or self-protection, these offenders

”

Hate/bias crimesdestroy communities,

as well as hoardresources from law

enforcementagencies.

“


Responsive and sensitiveinvestigators also understandhow important their communi-cation skills are in these casesand that, in many cases,listening is more importantthan talking.

When interviewing the victimof a hate/bias crime, investigatorsmust pay attention to the victim’sstate of mind and do everything intheir power to gain useful informa-tion while creating a nonstressfulenvironment for the victim. Investi-gators should interview victims inprivate. This will help calm victimsand remove them from any distrac-tions. Investigators who allow aclose friend or family member tojoin the interview will experiencecalmer victims. These people willprovide support, keep the victimsfocused, and help them relax.However, official statements can-not be made for victims by friendsand family, and investigatorsshould make this clear. Some vic-tims also may require, or be more

the response to other such crimes,and the prevention of hate/biascrimes in the future.

Relating to Communities

Many citizens do not under-stand hate/bias crime laws, investi-gation procedures, or the time re-quired to complete a successfulinvestigation. Thus, investigatorsneed to work as liaisons betweentheir agency and the community.Educating victims and others abouthate/bias crimes should become apriority and coincide with an inves-tigation. Victims and communitieswill then better understand probingand inquisition regarding the inci-dent. Moreover, education couldbecome a valuable investment infuture prevention or response tosuch crimes.

Investigators can use many tac-tics to educate, train, and empowercommunities to fight hate/biascrimes. Establishing and trainingNeighborhood Watch groups, en-couraging community meetings andcommunity problem-solving activi-ties, and supporting community ef-forts by involving local law en-forcement agencies are just a few ofthe ways investigators can make agood first impression with the com-munity. Investigators also can traintargets and victims of hate/biascrimes as responsive and preventiveadvocates; engage members of localcommunity organizations to helpwith the response, investigation,and prevention of hate/bias crimes;and help coordinate critical supportservices for primary and secondaryvictims. Vigorously responding toand investigating hate/bias crimesin the local community and using

comfortable with, an interpreter.Investigators should ask ques-

tions slowly and allow the victimplenty of time to think or recall im-portant details. Some questions willbe difficult to ask and answer;therefore, investigators nevershould become impatient or argu-mentative with the victim. Investi-gators need to collect critical infor-mation about specific acts or wordsused by the perpetrator, as well asrecord and compile anything elsethat can help establish a motivationof hate or bias. Victims also willneed time to vent frustration anddisplay emotions. To help facilitatethis, investigators should express agenuine sense of care and concernthroughout the investigation. Last,investigators must help victims con-nect to sources of support in thecommunity. The critical informa-tion gathered during these inter-views will be advantageous to athorough and expeditious investiga-tion, the apprehension of perpetra-tors, the prosecution of the crime,

© Peter Hendrie

March 2003 / 25

the media proactively to inform andeducate the community also willgenerate trust for investigatorswithin a community. On a largerscale, using national resources, pro-grams, and models for prevention,response, and healing will help re-vive communities.

Working with the families,friends, neighbors, and communi-ties that surround a hate/bias inci-dent becomes as important as work-ing with the victim. Secondaryvictimization induces blame, out-rage, or fear in a family, group offriends, or community. Thesegroups may be motivated to act inresponse to a hate/bias crime andretaliate in their own ways unlessthey are educated and providedother options for response or heal-ing. Moreover, no better advocatesexist in a community than victimsof a hate/bias crime. Training vic-tims and communities to cooperatewith law enforcement and othercommunity programs takes the con-trol out of the hands of the perpetra-tor, instills confidence in the victimand community, and prevents futurecrimes.

Prosecuting Offenders

To instill even more confidencein an affected community, investi-gators must help with the prosecu-tion of offenders. Keeping the statedistrict attorney’s office informedand involved is absolutely neces-sary for effective prosecution of in-dividuals involved in hate/biascrimes. Federal violations will re-quire the involvement of federalagencies. In these cases, establish-ing rapport with the federal agencyassisting in the investigation and

with the U.S. Attorney’s Office willconstitute the correct avenue for in-vestigators. Also pertinent to inves-tigations is the fact that some statesdo not have hate/bias crime laws.Departments and investigators inthese states must be willing to assistthe federal agencies and unite withthe U.S. Attorney’s Office to ensurethe prosecution of suspects. Aworking relationship with any stateor federal attorney’s office and itsinvestigators can help develop ajoint road map to a successful inves-tigation and prosecution, secureneeded search warrants, establish

rapport between the victim and theprosecutor, and introduce the victimand community to the inner-work-ings of the justice system.

The goal of an investigation isto bring the criminal to justice.Prosecution of the perpetrator willhelp the victim and communitybring closure to the horrid eventsand will bring law enforcement andthe community more into harmony,thus creating a safer place forpeople to live and work.

Conclusion

Law enforcement officers who

respond to or investigate hate/biascrimes must understand the com-plexities that define such acts. Inturn, they will benefit from in-formed choices and actions that canhelp keep or return a community toa safe, secure, and peaceful state.Before the goal of returning a com-munity to normalcy can beachieved, however, investigatorshave the task of dealing with fami-lies, the community, and the localmedia, in addition to the victim andoffender. Furthermore, multiplelaw enforcement agencies must beincluded in the investigation to en-sure that every logical question isasked and every practical scenariois investigated. Law enforcementagencies and departments that un-derstand the connections betweenthese actions and results willpromote the sensitive, timely,and effective response and investi-gation of hate/bias crimes in theircommunities.

Endnotes

1 U.S. Department of Justice, FederalBureau of Investigation, Uniform CrimeReporting Program, Hate Crime Statistics 2000

(Washington, DC, 2001). For more informationon collecting hate crime, see U.S. Departmentof Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation,Uniform Crime Reporting Program, Training

Guide for Hate Crime Data Collection

(Washington, DC, 1997), 60.2 Ibid., Training Guide for Hate Crime Data

Collection, 59.3 The author reached the conclusions in

this article by drawing on his 15 years ofteaching experience on hate/bias crimes, aswell as his 33 years of experience with theLos Angeles County, California, Sheriff’sDepartment.

4 In some agencies, the first responder isalso the lead investigator, while in otheragencies the lead investigator is a differentofficer. For the purpose of this article, theroles of the first responder and the leadinvestigator are combined and referred to asthe investigator.

”...no better

advocates exist in acommunity thanvictims of a hate/

bias crime.

“


he Fourth Amendmentpreserves the “right ofthe people to be secure

established and well-delineated ex-ceptions.”2 The U.S. SupremeCourt has stated that a search con-ducted pursuant to lawfully givenconsent is an exception to the war-rant and probable cause require-ments of the Fourth Amendment.3

In Schenkloth v. Bustamonte,4

the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that acourt reviewing whether an indi-vidual voluntarily consented to asearch must consider the totality of

the circumstances surrounding theconsent. An individual need notprovide written consent for a searchof his or her person or property to alaw enforcement officer for a con-sent search to be valid. Even thougha writing is not legally required, lawenforcement officers often will askan individual for written consent tosearch to provide evidence ofvoluntariness.

This article considers the par-ticular issues that courts analyze re-garding written consent to search.These issues include the evidentiarysignificance of a written consent tosearch form, the presentation of aconsent to search form to an indi-vidual, the impact of a person’s re-fusal to sign a written consent tosearch, and the content of consent tosearch forms.

Evidentiary Significance

The government has the burdenof proving that an individual volun-tarily consented to a search.5 Thepresence of a writing reflecting thatan individual consented is, there-fore, quite significant,6 and evi-dence that an individual signed astatement of consent to a search hasbeen found to be a clear indicationof voluntariness.7 The lack of awriting memorializing a consent tosearch also may be noted by acourt,8 as may the failure of an of-ficer to use an available written con-sent form.9 One court has stated,“[o]f course, a written consent to asearch is not a legal requirement,but law enforcement officers fail toobtain a written consent when onereadily could be obtained at the riskthat the government’s ability toprove the voluntariness of a consentwill be seriously compromised.”10

Tin their persons, houses, papers,and effects, against unreasonablesearches and seizures.”1 It is wellsettled that “searches conductedoutside the judicial process, withoutprior approval by judge or magis-trate, are per se unreasonableunder the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically

Legal Digest

© Mark C. Ide

Obtaining WrittenConsent toSearchBy JAYME WALKER HOLCOMB, J.D.

March 2003 / 27

The decision by the U.S. Courtof Appeals for the Seventh Circuitin United States v. Duran11 is anexcellent example of the role asigned written consent can play in acourt’s analysis. In Duran, CesarDuran’s wife, Karen, took a pair ofnew tennis shoes back to a shoestore to obtain help lacing them.Karen left the shoes with a storeemployee and went shoppingelsewhere in the mall. The storeemployee discovered three pack-ages of what appeared to bemarijuana in the shoes and calledthe police. The police arrivedat the store and determined thatthe packages did contain marijuana.The police arrested Karen whenshe returned to the store. The offic-ers also found $3,000, a smallamount of cocaine, and drug para-phernalia in her purse. The officersread Karen her Miranda warningsand took her to the police station.

At the police station, Karen toldthe officers where she lived and ad-mitted that her husband sold largequantities of marijuana in the localarea. Karen also signed a form con-senting to a search of the Duranresidence, an old farmhouse on theproperty, and several outbuildings.The police arrested Cesar after find-ing 28 pounds of marijuana and anumber of weapons during thesearch.

In considering Cesar’s chal-lenge to Karen’s consent to search,the Duran court specificallypointed to the consent form signedby Karen. The court rejectedCesar’s argument that the fact thatthis was Karen’s first arrest shouldbe given weight, noting that theform’s language stating that shecould refuse to consent and that any

“

”

Officers who obtainwritten consent to

search from anindividual should

document in detail thefacts and circumstancesunder which the consent

was given.

Ms. Holcomb serves as the chief of the LegalInstruction Section, DEA Training Academy.

evidence discovered could be usedagainst her put her on par with anexperienced arrestee in terms ofwhat she needed to know. The courtstated, “[t]hat the form containedthese warnings, in fact, weighsheavily toward finding that her con-sent was voluntary.”12

Signing the Form

Circumstances surrounding thesigning of a written consent will beanalyzed carefully by a court. Eventhough an individual signed a con-sent to search form, the consent tosearch still may be found invalid.Factors that courts will consider indetermining if the consent was vol-untary include the characteristicsof the subject giving the consent,the environment in which the con-sent is given, the actions taken orstatements made by the subject giv-ing the consent,13 and the actionstaken or statements made by lawenforcement officers during thecourse of asking for consent tosearch.14

The extent to which law en-forcement officers maintain a non-coercive environment in which awritten consent to search is ob-tained also is significant.15 For ex-ample, what is said if the individualasks questions or makes statementsabout the form or while signing it16

and how many law enforcement of-ficers are present when the form issigned will be factors considered bya court.17 Moreover, courts alsohave examined the following fac-tors when deciding if a person hasgiven voluntary written consent:whether the officer ascertained theability of the individual to read,18

whether the officer saw the indi-vidual read the form,19 whether theofficer read the form out loud to theindividual,20 whether the officer ex-plained the content of the form tothe individual,21 whether there wasadequate light in which to read theform,22 whether there was enoughtime to read the form,23 whether theofficer accurately translated theform while reading it out loud,24


whether the form adequately indi-cated that the individual is consent-ing to the search if it is in anotherlanguage,25 whether the individualwas allowed to change the languageof the form,26 whether the indi-vidual made a phone call prior tosigning the form,27 and whether theform was signed before or after thesearch occurred.28

The 1995 decision of the U.S.Court of Appeals for the EleventhCircuit in United States v. Tovar-Rico29 is an example of a case inwhich an individual signed a con-sent to search form where the searchwas found invalid. In Tovar-Rico,officers followed two persons whohad just obtained a substantialamount of cocaine from two under-cover officers. The individuals en-tered an apartment building withoutcarrying anything and were seenleaving apartment 901 a short timelater. Neither person carried any-thing. The individuals returned tothe apartment and left 10 to 15 min-utes later with a third person.

One individual then removed alarge amount of cocaine from thetrunk of a car parked at the buildingand took it inside. An officer ob-served that individual exit unit 901.Officers arrested all of the individu-als involved in the transaction whowere around the apartment buildingand then proceeded to unit 901.

Five officers knocked on thedoor to unit 901, announced theiridentity, and requested permissionto enter. When Tovar answered thedoor, the officers quickly enteredwith weapons drawn and conducteda protective sweep. The officers en-tered each room of the apartmentwhile Tovar sat at the dining room

table. One of the officers askedTovar for permission to search theentire apartment. The officer toldTovar that she did not have to allowthe search, but that if she did not,they would come back with a searchwarrant. Tovar agreed to the searchand signed a written consent form.

The court rejected the argumentthat there were exigent circum-stances that would permit a war-rantless entry. The court also citedanother case stating that the govern-ment does not carry its burden of

In the 1999 case of UnitedStates v. Rodriguez,31 the court heldthat the defendant did not voluntar-ily consent to a search of his car.Agents in Rodriguez obtained asearch warrant to search thedefendant’s residence. Between 10and 15 agents participated in theexecution of the warrant, but no evi-dence was found during the 3-hoursearch. At the end of the search, anagent asked the defendant about acar parked in front of the house,which the defendant denied own-ing. He remained silent even whenshown a bill of sale for the vehiclewith his name on it.

The agent presented a writtenconsent form printed in English forthe defendant to sign. The defen-dant did not speak English, and,therefore, the form had to be trans-lated into Spanish. The agent thenproceeded to literally translate theform as he read it to the defendant.Notably, the agent never had ob-tained a person’s consent to searchin Spanish before, and there wereSpanish-speaking officers presentat the home who may have done abetter job in translating. The defen-dant agreed to sign the consentform. As the agent filled out theform and the defendant was about tosign it, the “defendant asked [theagent] ‘whether they [agents] weregoing to search the vehicle any-way,’ to which the latter respondedaffirmatively.”32 The defendantsigned the form. The agents foundweapons in the car, which the de-fendant sought to suppress.

In determining whether the de-fendant voluntarily consented tothe search, the court consideredthe defendant’s age and criminal

proving that a consent is voluntaryby showing that someone merelysubmitted to a claim of lawful au-thority. The court found Tovar’sconsent was involuntary and statedthat, “Tovar had already observedofficers explore every room in theapartment and could not reasonablyhave known that she could stillrefuse a search....We entertain nodoubt that Tovar opened the door inresponse to a ‘show of official au-thority’ and cannot be deemed tohave consented to the agents’ entryor to have voluntarily consented tothe search.”30

© Mark C. Ide

March 2003 / 29

history and noted that there was noinformation in the record regardingthe defendant’s education, experi-ence, intelligence, or whether hewas mentally deficient. The defen-dant argued that he was not told thathe could refuse consent, while thegovernment stated that the consentto search form signed by the defen-dant advised him of his right torefuse. The court stated thatwhether the defendant is informedof the right to refuse consent tosearch is one factor to be taken intoaccount in determining voluntar-iness, but indicated that the criticalissue to be addressed in this casewas the agent’s ability to accuratelytranslate the consent form.

The court concluded that thedefendant had not voluntarily con-sented to the search of the vehicle.The court stated that the environ-ment created by the agents in thehome at the time the defendant’sconsent was obtained was implic-itly coercive. More particularly, thecourt found it significant that whenthe agents obtained consent, the de-fendant was handcuffed, unlawfullyseized, separated from the rest ofhis family while his crying 3-year-old daughter was left alone with oneof the 10 to 15 agents in the house,and it was strongly implied that thecar would be searched even if he didnot consent. At the suppressionhearing, the agent was asked totranslate the consent form intoSpanish as he had on the day inquestion. The court stated the fol-lowing with regard to the agent’stranslation:

Assuming that the formertranslation replicated the latter,we find that defendant was

ill-advised of his constitutionalrights.... The translation wasliteral and clumsy, almostawkward sounding. Whileunder more relaxed circum-stances it would not be implau-sible to find that [the agent’s]translation sufficiently in-formed defendant about somebasic concepts (e.g., his rightto refuse consent, his right toconsult an attorney), theimplicitly coercive environ-ment created by...agents atdefendant’s home precludessuch a finding.33

court held that the prior verbal con-sent of a suspect was sufficient eventhough the individual failed to read,but signed, a consent form that hadbeen incorrectly translated intoSpanish.36

Officers who encounter indi-viduals who refuse to consent to asearch in writing but who consentverbally should document their re-fusal to provide written consent.Additionally, as with any verbalconsent to search, officers shouldcarefully document exactly whatthe person said to the officers toindicate his or her consent. Forexample, in United States v.Boukater,37 the U.S. Court of Ap-peals for the Fifth Circuit found thatBoukater voluntarily consented to asearch of his briefcase. After beingadvised of his constitutional rightsand being told that he was free toleave, Boukater stated that hewanted to know what was going on.The agents advised Boukater thathe was suspected of carrying coun-terfeit bills and was asked if hewould consent to a search. Boukaterthen stated, “It looks like yougot me. You can search my bags.”After refusing to give writtenconsent, he was asked if he waswithdrawing his consent. At thatpoint, one agent stated thatBoukater said, “No, go ahead,” andthe other agent stated that he said,“Well, go ahead. You got me. It’s inthere.”38

Form Content

There is no prescribed languagethat federal courts have held thatmust be placed into a consent tosearch form. A written consent tosearch may be handwritten39 or be

Refusal to Sign Form

In many cases, an individualwill be willing to verbally consentto a search but will refuse to sign aconsent to search form. In suchcases, as long as the consent tosearch is voluntary, the verbal con-sent will be sufficient to allow thesearch.34 Significantly, it has beenheld that “the refusal to execute awritten consent form subsequent toa voluntary oral consent does notact as an effective withdrawal of theprior oral consent.”35 In one case, a

”

...officers should beextremely careful inmaking sure that thelanguage in the formaccurately describes

what will be searched.

“


on a preprinted form. While there isno specific language that must beincluded in a written consent, thelanguage that is used is extremelyimportant. For example, there is avast difference between a writingstating, “I have been asked to permitspecial agents...to search...”40 and“it has been required of me that Igive my consent to a search....”41

The first of these statements indi-cates that the individual had achoice in whether to agree to asearch, while the latter implies thatthere was none.

In most situations, officers usea preprinted form when obtaining awritten consent. The officer willfill in the particular details on theform relating to the item or locationto be searched and the individualconsenting to the search. The use ofa preprinted form may prevent anofficer from inadvertently using po-tentially coercive language, but us-ing such forms may lead to con-tested issues related to descriptionsof items or property due to a failureto change boilerplate language.42

There are a number of standarditems included in valid written con-sent to search forms. First, the formwill indicate to whom the individualis giving consent to search, for ex-ample, Officer Smith of the High-way Patrol or agents of the DrugEnforcement Administration.43

Second, the form will identify theitem or location that the individualis consenting to be searched, forexample, a 1986 blue Ford pickuptruck, VA license 123 ABC.44

Third, the form will state that theindividual is voluntarily consentingto the search, for example, “I freelyconsent to this search”45 or “I have

given this authorization...vol-untarily and without threats, prom-ises, pressures, or coercion of anykind.”46 Even though it is wellsettled that an individual does nothave to be informed by an officer ofthe right to refuse to consent to asearch,47 because courts willconsider this as a factor in deter-mining the voluntariness of the con-sent, many forms include such astatement.48

Appellant Kapperman arguedthat the consent form signed byCervantes did not authorize open-ing the suitcase in the trunk. Theconsent form authorized officers tosearch the car and remove “what-ever documents or items of propertywhatsoever, which they deem perti-nent to the investigation.”52 TheKapperman court found that thislanguage permitted searchingwithin containers in the car, as itwould be unlikely that papers andother items would be loosely strewnabout the inside of a vehicle. Thecourt also noted that the U.S. Courtof Appeals for the Seventh Circuitrejected an identical challenge inUnited States v. Covello53 andstated that in Covello

[t]he Seventh Circuit rejecteda challenge identical to theone presented here. Reviewinga district court opinion thatheld that an individual’sconsent to search his car didnot include authorization tosearch luggage found insideof the car, the court reversed,noting that the interpretationof the signed consent formwas crucial to the case. Theform authorized the agents“to conduct a complete search”of the car, and permitted thesearching agents to removefrom the vehicle any propertycontained therein. Thus, thecourt concluded, the signedconsent form authorized thequestioned conduct. To bolsterits decision, the court evalu-ated the circumstances sur-rounding the property owner’sdecision to consent, conclud-ing that they were consistent

Most of the challenges made tothe language found in written con-sent forms concern the scope of thesearch49 permitted by the languagein the form.50 For example, in theU.S. Court of Appeals for the Elev-enth Circuit decision United Statesv. Kapperman,51 officers stoppedCervantes’ car based upon a reason-able suspicion that the passenger inhis car was fugitive Kapperman.After determining that the passen-ger was Kapperman, the officersasked Cervantes for consent tosearch his car. Cervantes providedboth oral and written consent tosearch. The police arrestedCervantes after finding cocaine in asuitcase in the trunk.

”

...the critical issueto be addressed inthis case was theagent’s ability to

accurately translatethe consent form.

“

March 2003 / 31

with a complete search ofthe vehicle.54

Challenges by defendants to thelanguage in standardized consentforms are usually unsuccessful.Nonetheless, officers should be ex-tremely careful in making sure thatthe language in the form accuratelydescribes what will be searched.

Conclusion

Obtaining an individual’s con-sent to search in writing providessubstantial evidence that an indi-vidual voluntarily consented. How-ever, even though an individualconsents to a search in writing,courts still will scrutinize all of thefacts surrounding the signing of theconsent form when decidingwhether, under the totality of thecircumstances, the consent wasvoluntary.

Officers who obtain writtenconsent to search from an indi-vidual should document in detailthe facts and circumstances underwhich the consent was given. Offi-cers should pay particular attentionto actions and statements made byboth the officer and the individualwhen the form is signed. Similarly,in situations where an individual re-fuses to sign a written consent tosearch but verbally consents to asearch, officers should documentmeticulously both what the officersaid when asking for consent andwhat the individual said when giv-ing consent.

Officers also should be familiarwith the content of any preprintedconsent forms used by theirdepartment and any departmentalpolicies related to obtaining consentto search and the use of written

17 See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 68F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Puerto Rico 1999).

18 See, e.g., United States v. Fryer, 974 F.2d813, 820 (7th Cir. 1992).

19 See, e.g., United States v. Santurio, 29F.2d 550, 558 (10th Cir. 1994); United States

v. Fryer, 974 F.2d 813, 820 (7th Cir. 1992).20 See, e.g., United States v. Botello, 991

F.2d 189, 194 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v.

Fryer, 974 F.2d 813, 820 (7th Cir. 1992);United States v. Ramirez, 963 F.2d 693, 704(5th Cir. 1992).

21 See, e.g., United States v. Murillo, 255F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2001); United States

v. Garza, 118 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 1997); United

States v. Ramirez, 963 F.2d 693, 704 (5th Cir.1992); United States v. Tibbs, 49 F. Supp. 2d47, 54 (D. Mass. 1999).

22 See, e.g., United States v. Fryer, 974 F.2d813, 820 (7th Cir. 1992).

23 See, e.g., United States v. Chaidez, 906F.2d 377, 379 (8th Cir. 1990).

24 See, e.g., United States v. Iribe, 11 F.3d1553, 1555 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v.

Rodriguez, 68 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Puerto Rico1999).

25 See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 37 F.3d510, 515 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v.

Jamarillo, 841 F. Supp. 490 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).26 See, e.g., United States v. Twomey, 884

F.2d 46 (1st Cir. 1989).27 See, e.g., United States v. Fryer, 974 F.2d

813, 820 (7th Cir. 1992).28 See, e.g., United States v. Tibbs, 49 F.

Supp. 2d 47, 54 (D. Mass. 1999).29 61 F.3d 1529 (11th Cir. 1995).30 Id. at 1536.31 68 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Puerto Rico

1999).32 Id. at 108.33 Id. at 112.34 See, e.g., United States v. Pereira-Munoz,

59 F.3d 788 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v.

Thompson, 876 F.2d 1381 (8th Cir. 1989).35 See United States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d

647, 650 (4th Cir. 1996)(citing United

States v. Thompson, 876 F.2d 1381, 1384(8th Cir. 1989)); United States v. Castillo, 866F.2d 1071, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 1988); United

States v. Boukater, 409 F.2d 537, 539 (5th Cir.1969).

36 United States v. Garza, 118 F.3d 278 (5thCir. 1997).

37 409 F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1969).38 Id. at 538.39 See, e.g., United States v. Twomey, 884

F.2d 46 (1st Cir. 1989).

consent to search forms. Consentto search forms should be re-viewed by department counsel forlegal sufficiency, and foreign lan-guage consent forms should bereviewed by certified or otherwisequalified interpreters prior touse.55 Careful attention to the detailsassociated with the use of writtenconsent to search forms will helpensure that the use of the formprovides valuable proof of vol-untariness, instead of providinga source for defense counselchallenge.

Endnotes1 U.S. CONST. Amend. IV.2 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357

(1967).3 Id.4 412 U.S. 218 (1973).5 Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543

(1968).6 United States v. Moreno, 280 F.3d 898,

901 (8th Cir. 2002).7 United States v. Navarro, 90 F.3d 1245,

1257 (7th Cir. 1996).8 See United States v. Marc, 1997 W.L.

129324 (D. Del. 1997).9 United States v. Forbes, 181 F.3d 1, 8 (1st

Cir. 1999).10 United States v. Rodriguez-Diaz, 161 F.

Supp. 2d 627, 631 n.7 (D. Md. 2001).11 957 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1992).12 Id. at 502.13 For example, actions, such as signing a

consent to search form, volunteering thepossession of an apartment key, and showingofficers how the key worked, are important.United States v. Genao, 281 F.3d 305, 310(1st Cir. 2002).

14 See J.W. Holcomb, “Consent Searches:Factors Courts Consider in DeterminingVoluntariness,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin,May 2002, 25-32.

15 United States v. Ramirez, 963 F.2d 693,704 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Twomey,884 F.2d 46, 51 (1st Cir. 1989).

16 See, e.g., United States v. Moreno,

280 F.3d 898, 900 (8th Cir. 2002); United

States v. Saadeh, 61 F.3d 510, 517 (7th Cir.1995).


40 United States v. Saadeh, 61 F.3d 510,517 (7th Cir. 1995).

41 United States v. Jamarillo, 841 F. Supp.490, 491 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).

42 See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 963F.2d 693, 704 (5th Cir. 1992).

43 See, e.g., United States v. Saadeh, 61F.3d 510, 517 (7th Cir. 1995).

44 See, e.g., United States v. Torres, 32 F.3d225, 228 (7th Cir. 1994).

45 United States v. Saadeh, 61 F.3d 510,517 (7th Cir. 1995).

46 United States v. Reeves, 6 F.3d 660, 661(9th Cir. 1993).

47 See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S.194 (2002).

48 See, e.g., United States v. Torres, 32 F.3d225 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Reeves, 6F.3d 660 (9th Cir. 1993).

49 For additional information regarding thescope of a suspect’s consent to search, see

Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991), inwhich the Court stated that “The standard formeasuring the scope of a suspect’s consentunder the Fourth Amendment is that of‘objective’ reasonableness–what would thetypical reasonable person have understood bythe exchange between the officer and thesuspect?”

50 See, e.g., United States v. Stribling, 94F.3d 321 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v.

Torres, 32 F.3d 225 (7th Cir. 1994); United

States v. Reeves, 6 F.3d 660 (9th Cir. 1993);United States v. Covello, 657 F.2d 151 (7th Cir.1981).

51 764 F.2d 786 (11th Cir. 1985).52 Id. at 794.53 657 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1981).54 United States v. Kapperman, 764 F.2d

786, 794 (11th Cir. 1985).55 See generally United States v Jamarillo,

841 F. Supp. 490 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); 28 U.S.C. §1827 (2002).

Law enforcement officers of other thanfederal jurisdiction who are interestedin this article should consult their legaladvisors. Some police proceduresruled permissible under federalconstitutional law are of questionablelegality under state law or are notpermitted at all.

Not

heBT

of presinal jusits Notment. Adeliverand woinformaudienccript ofBulletin

Assions, tedit theclarity,informorally, the origPresenttranscrspacedwhite pnumbeelectroscript sshould ment. S

EditoEnforFBI AMadisRoomQuantelephe-mai

Wanted:
able Speeches
FBI Law Enforcementulletin seeks transcriptsentations made by crim-tice professionals forable Speech depart-

nyone who hased a speech recentlyuld like to share theation with a widere may submit a trans- the presentation to the for consideration.

with article submis-he Bulletin staff will speech for length and but, realizing that theation was presentedmaintain as much ofinal flavor as possible.ers should submit theiripts typed and double- on 81/2- by 11-inchaper with all pages

red. When possible, annic version of the tran-aved on computer diskaccompany the docu-end the material to:

r, FBI Lawcement Bulletincademyon Building, 209

tico, VA 22135one: 703-632-1952,l: [email protected]

Law enforcement officers are challenged daily in the performance of their duties; they face eachchallenge freely and unselfishly while answering the call to duty. In certain instances, their actionswarrant special attention from their respective departments. The Bulletin also wants to recognizethose situations that transcend the normal rigors of the law enforcement profession.

The Bulletin Notes

Deputy Ramage Deputy Warner

Deputies Devant Ramage and DavidWarner of the Graves County, Kentucky,Sheriff’s Department received a call of anunconscious man in a rural part of GravesCounty whose breathing had ceased. Dueto the large size of the county, the depu-ties were dispatched because they couldrespond more quickly than an emergencymedical services (EMS) team. Uponarrival, the deputies found an elderly manon the floor of his home. The man wasunconscious, not breathing, and lacked apulse. Deputies Ramage and Warnerimmediately began CPR. They were ableto resuscitate the man prior to the arrivalof EMS personnel, who stated that theman probably would not have survivedhad it not been for the quick response andjudgment of the deputies.

Sergeant Tatum Officer Carter

Responding to a call about a drownedindividual, Sergeant Chris Tatum andOfficer Debbie Carter of the Waycross,Georgia, Police Department found a smallchild at the bottom of a pool. OfficerCarter entered the pool and retrieved thechild. Sergeant Tatum also noticed a maleadult at the bottom of the pool andimmediately dove in to retrieve theindividual who happened to be the child’sfather. With the assistance of an emer-gency medical technician, the father wasremoved from the pool and CPR wasstarted on both individuals. The child wasrevived and recovered completely.Unfortunately, the child’s father could notbe revived. The skill and prompt action ofSergeant Tatum and Officer Carter savedthe life of the young child and brought ablessing out of a terrible tragedy.

Nominations for the Bulletin Notes should be based on either the rescue of one or morecitizens or arrest(s) made at unusual risk to an officer’s safety. Submissions should include ashort write-up (maximum of 250 words), a separate photograph of each nominee, and a letterfrom the department’s ranking officer endorsing the nomination. Submissions should be sentto the Editor, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, FBI Academy, Madison Building, Room 209,Quantico, VA 22135.

PeriodicalsPostage and Fees PaidFederal Bureau of InvestigationISSN 0014-5688

U.S. Department of JusticeFederal Bureau of InvestigationFBI Law Enforcement Bulletin935 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20535-0001

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use $300

Patch Call

The patch of the North Salt Lake, Utah, PoliceDepartment depicts the year that Utah became a state.The center of the patch features a beehive, which is thestate symbol for industry. The city of North Salt Lakewas incorporated in 1946. It has a population of 8,500and currently is served by 11 sworn police officers.

The mission of the University of Vermont PoliceServices, established as a full-time police agency withstatewide authority in 1991, is represented by its patch.The green mountains, overlooking Lake Champlain,speak to the natural beauty and rugged individualism ofVermont and are the namesake for the university. TheLatin words represent three keys to the agency’ssuccess: excellence, integrity, and service.

FB I

B U L L E T I N

March 2003

Date post:	03-Jan-2017
Category:	Documents
Upload:	vuliem
View:	214 times
Download:	0 times

F B I Law Enforcement Bulletin - March 2003 Issue

Documents