‘‘Failed’’ States and Global Security:Empirical Questions and Policy Dilemmas1

Stewart Patrick

Center for Global Development

Weak and impoverished states and ungoverned areas are not only a threat totheir people and a burden on regional economies, but are also susceptible toexploitation by terrorists, tyrants, and international criminals. We will workto bolster threatened states, provide relief in times of crisis, and build capacity indeveloping states to increase their progress

(2006 National Security Strategy of the United States of America).

One of the dominant influences shaping contemporary North–South relations isthe perception that the main threats to international security emanate dispropor-tionately from poorly governed states in the developing world. Beyond represent-ing the hard core of today’s development challenge, such countries are said toenable a host of transnational dangers from terrorism to weapons proliferation,organized crime, pandemic disease, environmental degradation, regional con-flict, humanitarian catastrophes, and energy insecurity (Crocker 2003; Fearonand Laitin 2004:13; Fukuyama 2004:92; Rice 2006). This perception is particu-larly prominent within advanced market democracies, and notably the UnitedStates, where it has gained the status of conventional wisdom. In response, Orga-nization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) governmentshave begun to adapt their defense, diplomatic, and development policies andinstruments to help prevent state failure and respond to its aftermath as well asto try to quarantine themselves from the presumed ‘‘spillover’’ effects of stateweakness. Such moves have been mirrored by those of international institutions,including the United Nations and the World Bank.

What is striking is how little empirical analysis has been undertaken to docu-ment and explore the connection between state failure and transnational secu-rity threats (Patrick 2006a). Scholars and policymakers have advanced blanketassociations between these two sets of phenomena, often on the basis of anec-dotes or single examples (e.g., al-Qaeda operations in Afghanistan) rather thanthrough sober analysis of global patterns or in-depth case studies that reveal cau-sal linkages. These sweeping generalizations provide little analytical insight orguidance for policymakers, since they fail to distinguish among categories ofweak and failing states or to ask whether (and how) particular developing coun-tries are associated with particular threats.

Three things have been missing from the discussion. One is appreciation thatstates in the developing world vary along a continuum in terms of institutionalstrength, both overall and in particular spheres; equally important, their level ofdysfunction can represent a variable mixture of inadequate capacity and insuffi-cient will (Patrick 2006b). A second is a nuanced appreciation of the complexlinkages between state weakness, on the one hand, and a country’s propensity to

1The author thanks the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Australian National Aid Agency for support-ing ongoing research in this field. He is grateful to Susan Rice for ongoing collaboration and to Kaysie Brown andKevin Ummel for research support and comments on this manuscript.

� 2007 International Studies Review.Published by Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ , UK .

International Studies Review (2007) 9, 644–662

fall victim to or enable particular threats, on the other. A third is recognitionthat developing countries are embedded in a larger global system that exertsboth positive and pernicious impacts on their resilience and vulnerability. Thescholarly community has an important role to play in elucidating the diversesources and expressions of state fragility; clarifying and mapping the connectionbetween particular forms of weakness and specific transnational ‘‘spillovers’’; andplacing any linkages in the context of an integrated global system in which cau-sality may flow in multiple directions.

For the governments and peoples of the global South, the new-found strategicsignificance of weak and failed states is both a blessing and a curse. It carriesopportunities in the form of increased Northern policy attention and resources.But it also entails risks, threatening a distorted pattern of North–South policyengagement that seeks to address the symptoms rather than the causes of statefragility in the developing world. Solid research can help ensure that today’sthreat perceptions are grounded in reality; that they help to overcome ratherthan exacerbate North–South cleavages; and that policy interventions of thewealthy governments and international institutions are aligned with the desiresand priorities of the world’s poor.

This essay seeks to promote such a constructive research and policy agenda. Itbegins by documenting growing official attention to the spillover effects of weakand failing states. Noting shortcomings in the reigning concept of the ‘‘failedstate,’’ it proposes a new approach to measuring state performance in the devel-oping world. Attention then turns to five major transnational security threats,suggesting that state weakness is only imperfectly correlated with them. The essaycloses by proposing new donor policies to advance reform in the world’s weakestcountries.

Common Claims and Policy Innovations

The high strategic salience of weak and failing states is a novel development. Itis a direct result of the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11,2001. Previously, senior officials in Washington and other capitals tended toregard peripheral states with sovereignty deficits primarily as a humanitarian mat-ter. They tugged at Northern heart strings—and occasionally purse strings—butthey were at best third tier security concerns. This strategic calculus changed dra-matically after al-Qaeda’s attacks on the United States from Afghanistan, one ofthe poorest and most wretched countries in the world. President GeorgeW. Bush captured this new view in his National Security Strategy of 2002 declaringthat ‘‘America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failingones’’ (White House 2002).

This new preoccupation with spillovers from weak or failed states has driven aslew of recent US policy pronouncements and institutional innovations spanningthe realms of diplomacy, development, defense, intelligence, and even trade. Inearly 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced a new ‘‘transforma-tional diplomacy’’ initiative intended to help build and sustain democratic, well-governed states so that they will respond to the needs of their people and con-duct themselves responsibly in the international system. To advance this goal,she announced a sweeping plan to ensure that US foreign assistance is more clo-sely aligned with US foreign policy priorities (Patrick 2006b). Such initiativeshave been mirrored across the Potomac. The Defense Department’s most recentNational Defense Strategy emphasizes military cooperation to strengthen thesovereign capacities of friendly governments in the developing world against theinternal threats posed by insurgents, terrorists, and criminals. To respond to thismission, the Defense Department is deploying new assets to the world’s so-called‘‘ungoverned spaces,’’ including rugged remote regions, uncontrolled borders,

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and un-policed coast lines through such programs as the Combined Joint TaskForce-Horn of Africa. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has identified somefifty lawless zones around the world that are conducive to illicit activity (Tenet2003; National Intelligence Council (NIC) 2003). The Bush administration haseven cast its campaign for regional trade liberalization as a means to preventstate failure and its negative externalities (Zoellick 2004).

This is not simply a US phenomenon. Both collectively and individually,other rich world governments have adopted similar policy statements andadapted institutions accordingly. The European Security Strategy of 2003 identifiesthe ‘‘alarming phenomenon’’ of state failure as one of the main threats to theEuropean Union (European Council 2003:11). In Great Britain, the Prime Min-ister’s Strategy Unit (PMSU) has advocated a new, government-wide effort tohelp prevent failed states from generating pathologies like crime, terrorism, dis-ease, uncontrolled migration, and energy insecurity (PMSU 2005). Similarly,Canada’s International Policy Statement of 2005 (Government of Canada 2005)and Australia’s recent white paper on overseas programs (Australian NationalAid Agency 2006) advocate cross-departmental collaboration to forestall statecollapse and its associated negative consequences.

Likewise at the international level, state failure has been depicted as the Achil-les’ heel of collective security. A unifying theme of recent UN reform proposalshas been the need for effective, sovereign states to contend with today’s globalthreats. As UN Secretary General Kofi Annan declared in a December 2004speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, ‘‘whether the threat is terror orAIDS, a threat to one is a threat to all…Our defenses are only as strong as theirweakest link.’’ He expanded on this theme in his 2005 report, In Larger Freedom,declaring, ‘‘if states are fragile, the peoples of the world will not enjoy the secu-rity, development, and justice that are their right’’ (UN General Assembly2005:6). In early 2006, UN member states endorsed the creation of a Peacebuild-ing Commission to ensure that war-torn states do not collapse once again intofailure. In parallel with these steps, the major donors of the OECD (2005) havepursued a so-called ‘‘Fragile States’’ initiative, in partnership with the WorldBank (2006) Low Income Countries under Stress (LICUS) program.

Given this flurry of activity, it is fair to ask whether the underlying assumptionanimating much of Northern policy is correct. That is, what is the connectionbetween state failure, on the one hand, and transnational threats, on the other?Answering this question requires us first to probe more deeply into the conceptof the ‘‘failed state.’’

The ‘‘Failed State’’ Reconsidered

Contemporary approaches to the concept of the ‘‘failed state’’ have sufferedfrom several analytical shortcomings. These include the absence of clear criteriato define ‘‘failure’’; a cavalier tendency to apply this single label to a heteroge-neous group of countries; and inattention to the specific histories, trajectories,and regimes of the countries so designated. The concept of ‘‘failed state’’ alsoraises troubling normative questions by ignoring the historical antecedents tostate failure, placing the blame for any difficulties entirely on developing coun-tries, and (arguably) privileging the preservation of domestic order over the pur-suit of justice. The following paragraphs outline these concerns and propose amore variegated approach to conceptualizing state weakness.

No Agreed-Upon Definition

Perhaps the main limitation of the ‘‘failed state’’ concept is the lack of agree-ment among both policymakers and scholars about the particular characteristics

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that warrant such a designation. As Charles Call (2006) pointedly observes, theindicators scholars have proposed for state failure tend to be idiosyncratic. Rob-ert Rotberg (2003:5–9), for example, notes a dozen-odd characteristics of failingstates, among them endemic civil wars; inability to control peripheral regions;increased criminal violence and lawlessness; rampant corruption; dramaticallydeclining economic growth; and loss of political legitimacy. Meanwhile, theannual Failed States Index produced by the Fund for Peace (2006) and pub-lished in Foreign Policy magazine offers a competing set of indicators that overlaponly imperfectly with Rotberg’s, including such factors as large-scale refugeemovements; mounting demographic pressures; inequitable economic develop-ment; sharp or severe economic decline; and the rise of factionalized elites.

Apples, Oranges, and Other Fruit

Lacking a consensus definition, scholars tend to lump all troubled developingcountries into a single, catch-all ‘‘failed state’’ category. The results are notencouraging. Besides obscuring their unique cultural legacies, historical experi-ences, and current challenges, this hodgepodge approach risks encouraging gen-eric, one-size-fits-all policies instead of thoughtful interventions tailored to theunique causes and expressions of instability in a given case. Among the bottom20 countries in the 2006 Failed States Index, for instance, one finds Sudan, Iraq,Zimbabwe, Haiti, Afghanistan, Liberia, Pakistan, North Korea, Nepal, Yemen,and Burma. What strikes one immediately is the heterogeneity among thesecountries in terms of their relative population, political stability, governmentcapacity, regime legitimacy, and current trajectory.

Ignoring the Nature of the Regime

A particularly problematic aspect of the grab-bag approach to ‘‘failed states’’ isits failure to distinguish among troubled countries according to the legitimacy oftheir governing regimes as well as their commitment (rather than merely capac-ity) to deliver to their people the basic goods associated with statehood and toengage with the international community. It makes little sense, for example, togroup North Korea—whose authoritarian leader Kim Jong II is capable of field-ing one of the largest armies in the world while permitting his citizens to star-ve—or Zimbabwe—a once-promising country that President Robert Mugabe hasdriven into the ground—with post-conflict East Timor or contemporary Liberia,whose recent governments have demonstrated the will but have lacked the capac-ity to meet the immense needs of their societies.

Normative Objections

The ‘‘failed state’’ label also raises normative hackles. First, it ignores that manyof the countries so designated have never been effective states. Particularly inAfrica, many are the artificial creations of the European scramble for empireand the subsequent abrupt decolonization following World War II. Such ‘‘quasi-states’’ (Jackson 1990) possess the juridical trappings but little of the empiricalsubstance of sovereignty; indeed, their arbitrary borders encompass diverse andoften fractious political communities (Mazrui 1984). Many suffered from beingthe objects of Cold War competition and patronage, which further distortedtheir institutional development.

Second, the ‘‘failed state’’ epithet lays the culpability for state weakness and itsattendant spillovers squarely at the feet of dysfunctional governments and socie-ties in the developing world. Although this framing provides cognitive consola-tion to the comfortable, it ignores that the sources of state weakness are often in

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part a function of sins of omission or commission in the global North. Theseinclude casting aside concerns for good governance in resource-rich countries;tolerating bribery of Southern governments by multinational companies domi-ciled in OECD countries; providing financial havens for the ill-gotten gains ofdeveloping world kleptocrats; sustaining demand for narcotics and other illicitcommodities; and engaging in a lucrative trade in armaments that subsequentlycirculate freely in the world’s conflict zones (Moore 2004 ⁄ 2005).

Finally, the ‘‘failed states’’ lens arguably encourages rich world policies thatpromote strong but not necessarily just or equitable rule in the global South.Just as Cold War security concerns led the United States and allied Northerngovernments to promote strongman rule in the periphery, today’s ‘‘global waron terrorism’’ may encourage a shallow approach to state-building by sustainingregimes that promise order and stability rather than supporting the slow andpainstaking work of creating legitimate, participatory institutions of governancecapable of delivering a broader panoply of socioeconomic goods as well ashuman security for their populations (Rubin 2005 ⁄ 2006).

Measuring State Weakness

Notwithstanding flaws in the concept of the ‘‘failed state,’’ there is merit inattempting to measure institutional strength in developing countries in the formof an index that ranks state performance in delivering essential political goods(Rotberg 2004 ⁄ 2005). This would recognize that state weakness is relative, witheach country falling along a spectrum relative to its cohort rather than reflectinga binary, either ⁄ or condition. It would help overcome unproductive debates overwhether particular countries should be categorized as ‘‘weak,’’ ‘‘failing,’’‘‘failed,’’ ‘‘collapsed,’’ or some other adjective. It would also have practical utilityif it included measurements on specific subcategories of state function, thus per-mitting national authorities and outside actors to pinpoint sources of institu-tional weakness and target their policy interventions accordingly.

There is no consensus about how to define and measure state weakness (Bes-ancon 2003). The following paragraphs review the advantages and drawbacks ofsome leading approaches. The best-known effort is the CIA-supported State Fail-ure (now Political Instability) Task Force, which uses an extensive data set to iso-late variables associated with the onset of a ‘‘severe internal political crisis.’’Although considered the most accurate predictor of severe ‘‘state failure,’’ it isnot geared to measuring and analyzing cases of more moderate or endemicweakness. More recently, the 2004 report of the Commission on Weak States andUS National Security (2004) classifies 50–60 countries as ‘‘weak states’’ based oftheir failure to provide physical security, social welfare, and legitimate institu-tions. However, the report relies on only three indicators to define its cohort,omits any quantitative indicators for economic performance, and does not seekto rank states on relative performance.

Two other indices actually rank state capacity. The aforementioned ‘‘FailedStates Index’’ grades states according to their susceptibility to political instabilityand violence, using software that scans news articles, US State Departmentreports, independent studies, and corporate financial filings, noting the numberof positive and negative ‘‘hits’’ for each country (Fund for Peace 2006). Theeffort focuses primarily on the risk of violence, however, rather than otheraspects of institutional strength. A more comprehensive model is the CountryIndicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project of Carleton University, funded bythe Canadian International Development Agency, which measures a state’s abilityto provide basic governance functions on the basis of 74 indicators across 10dimensions of statehood (Carleton University 2006). More recently, Ashraf Ghani,Clare Lockhart, and Michael Carnahan (2005) have proposed a ‘‘sovereignty

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index’’ to ‘‘measure…how far short a state falls in performing its basic func-tions.’’ They identify 10 areas that could be combined to assess such a country’ssovereignty gap. Their index, which will be released during 2008, places heavyemphasis on the financial and economic components of state function.

These independent efforts have been mirrored at the official level. Britain’sDepartment for International Development has produced a list of 46 ‘‘fragile’’states with some 870 million inhabitants, though without attempting to rankthem (Department for International Development (DFID) 2005). The WorldBank (2006), meanwhile, classifies 25 very poor, troubled developing countriesas Low Income Countries under Stress (LICUS) as determined by low scores onthe Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (CPIA). There are twomain drawbacks to the Bank’s approach. First, the LICUS designation is limitedto those countries eligible for grants from the Bank’s International DevelopmentAssociation (IDA), thus omitting a number of other fragile countries. Second,the CPIA rests heavily on economic components of governance, giving lessweight to security, political, and social considerations.

Within the donor community, the closest thing to a true index for state fragil-ity was created in 2006 by USAID (2006) in a document titled Measuring Fragility:Indicators and Measures for Rating State Performance. The model proposes 33 indica-tors to measure the capacity and legitimacy of state institutions in four criticalspheres of governance: security, political, economic, and social. Unfortunately,the country results generated by this promising exercise have never beenreleased publicly; the initiative itself was shelved with the recent reform of USforeign assistance.

Collectively, these attempts to define and measure state weakness provide valu-able insights by (among other things) suggesting connections between institu-tional weakness, poverty, and political violence. At the same time, they tend tosuffer from one or more shortcomings, whether by focusing on extreme cases offailure or collapse rather than a broader spectrum of weakness; by lack of trans-parency in data sources or incomplete coverage of the relevant countries; or byemphasizing one or two dimensions of state weakness (such as propensity forconflict or strength of economic institutions) while overlooking other manifesta-tions of institutional capacity.

A New Measure of State Weakness

Seeking to devise a more balanced and transparent index that builds on insightsof previous efforts, the author has collaborated with Susan Rice of the BrookingsInstitution to create an index of state weakness in the developing world (Riceand Patrick 2007). The measure seeks to assess the relative performance of all141 developing and transitional countries2 in fulfilling four sets of critical gov-ernment functions, relying on 20 widely accepted indicators—see Appendix Afor a list of the indicators.

The security basket indicators evaluate whether a state is able to maintain secu-rity for its citizens and sovereignty over its territory. It measures the degree towhich citizens are insecure due to lawlessness or violent conflict, repressive gov-ernment tactics, and the illegal seizure of power. The political basket of indicatorsassesses the extent to which a government rules legitimately and capably. Itmeasures the state’s political accountability to citizens and the ability of stateinstitutions to function effectively and transparently. The economic basket of indi-cators measures a state’s ability to provide its citizens with a stable economicenvironment conducive to growth, taking account of recent macroeconomic

2We include all low, lower middle, and upper middle-income countries as calculated by the World Bank Atlasmethod.

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performance, quality of existing policy and regulatory environments, the strengthof the private sector, and the degree to which income is equitably distributed.The social welfare basket of indicators assesses how well a state meets the basichuman needs of its citizens including nutrition, health, education, access todrinking water, and improved sanitation. In each of the four baskets, the indexaggregates the underlying indicators to determine a score that reflects a coun-try’s performance in that area. Scores are then normalized on a scale from 0(weak) to 10 (strong) within each of the four core functions. These four normal-ized scores are averaged to obtain an overall score of state weakness.

Viewed individually, the four underlying scores provide separate barometersfor state performance in each of the core functions—security, social welfare, eco-nomics, and governance.3 Although some of the weakest states fail in all fourfunctions, other countries exhibit relative weakness in providing just one or twofunctions. The ability to compare countries across the four principal dimensionsof weakness is a distinctive contribution of this approach.

Overview of the Rankings

Based on this measure of state weakness, the bottom 20 or so states stand apartin the magnitude of their problems (for the scores for all 141 countries on thismeasure, see Rice and Patrick 2007). The vast majority face challenges in virtu-ally all categories of state function.

Nearly all have experienced violence or profound political turmoil in the pastfive years. With the exception of oil-rich Iraq, Sudan, and Angola, all are low-income countries (below $905 per capita). The bottom 20 include the eightpoorest nations in the world (Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo,Eritrea, Liberia, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Afghani-stan). The index suggests that Somalia is by far the weakest country. The Demo-cratic Republic of the Congo and Afghanistan are the most insecure.

Looking beyond the bottom 20 states, we find that state weakness varies alonga continuum, with no single component of the index driving results across coun-tries in any consistent sense. There are no major regional differences in perfor-mance other than the low sub-Saharan African scores in providing basic socialwelfare. Among the weakest 60 states, we find that three quarters are low-incomestates and that more than half are located in sub-Saharan Africa. In general, stateweakness is strongly associated with poverty (which explains some 50% of varia-tion in country scores) as well as government effectiveness, child mortality, andrecent conflict.

Individual country scores suggest that weakness may manifest itself in variousways, whether through broad-based decline or marked deterioration in one area.Some countries fare reasonably well on several dimensions but are stung on asingle issue such as security (e.g., Colombia, Pakistan, and Algeria) or poor polit-ical governance (e.g., oil rich Equatorial Guinea, the only upper middle-incomecountry in the bottom 60). Others, such as Mauritania and Yemen, have medio-cre scores across the board.

A Typology of Pathology: Additional Parameters of State Weakness

The index described above should permit cross-country comparison of institu-tional performance in the developing world. Beyond arraying states along a con-tinuum, however, it is useful analytically to distinguish among several categoriesof weak states, based on their current situation and trajectory as well as the com-

3This aggregation methodology implicitly assumes that each of the four core areas of state function contributeto state weakness equally.

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mitment of their governing regime (not merely capacity) to provide essentialpolitical goods. The following seven categories of countries (which occasionallyoverlap) present distinctive challenges to and require differentiated approachesfrom would-be interveners:

(1) Endemically Weak States: This label applies to stagnant, often aid-dependent, countries, such as Zambia, that are not at major risk ofviolent conflict but are characterized by low growth, anemic institu-tions, and patrimonial systems of political leadership (van de Walle2005).

(2) Resource-Rich Poor Performers: Such countries generate large naturalresource rents that distort the national economy and sustain corrupt,clientelist governance (Rosser 2006). Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, andAngola provide examples of this phenomenon.

(3) Deteriorating Situations: This category encompasses states suffering amarked decline in institutional performance, particularly as a result ofpolitical or economic crisis, with increasing risk of violence and evenstate collapse. Policy dialogue between national authorities anddonors is poor. Contemporary Zimbabwe provides a case in point.

(4) Prolonged Political Crisis: In such situations, the state is paralyzed orhindered by a political impasse or conflict (e.g., Nepal before 2006).External donors and the host government frequently fail to achieveconsensus on a strategy for development.

(5) Post-conflict Situations: One can distinguish two subcategories here.The first is a negotiated settlement (e.g., Mozambique) with progressdependent on ongoing political deals, often under the auspices of amultilateral peace operation. The second is a clear-cut victory of oneside (e.g., Uganda), which is typically followed by a smaller interna-tional presence. As Marina Ottoway (2003) notes, the two scenariospresent distinct state-building challenges.

(6) Brittle Dictatorships: Many of the world’s ‘‘weakest’’ states are para-doxically ruled by strongmen (Freedom House 2004). They includeNorth Korea and Myanmar, authoritarian ‘‘outposts of tyranny’’ (inthe parlance of the Bush administration) that appear superficiallystrong but rest on a brittle foundation.

(7) Reform-Minded Governments: In a number of states around the world(e.g., Georgia under Mikheil Saakasvili), reform-minded leaders haveattempted to overcome legacies of authoritarian government andfailed development policies, often in the context of a democratic tran-sition.

As the sixth and seventh categories above suggest, state weakness is not justa question of inherent capacity or current trajectory but also of will. Assess-ments of state weakness must, thus, consider the level of government commit-ment to actually deliver the goods associated with effective statehood as wellas the legitimacy (or venality) of the ruling regime. By distinguishing betweencapacity and commitment, we can differentiate four broad categories of states:(1) good performers with both the will and the way; (2) states that are weakbut willing; (3) states that have the means but not the commitment; and (4)those with neither the will nor the way. (Table 1 presents these four idealtypes in diagrammatic form.) Such analytical distinctions have practical utility,informing the mix of incentives that external actors can deploy in engagingpoor performers. The goal is to move weak states toward the upper left quad-rant by filling capacity gaps, persuading unreconstructed elites to mend theirways, or both.

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Weak States and Transnational Threats: Rhetoric and Reality4

How does state weakness correlate with the main transnational threats to globalsecurity? Based on official rhetoric, one would assume a close overlap. As USAIDdeclared in its 2003 White Paper (USAID 2003):

When development and governance fail in a country, the consequences engulfentire regions and leap across the world. Terrorism, political violence, civil wars,organized crime, drug trafficking, infectious diseases, environmental crises, refu-gee flows, and mass migration cascade across the borders of weak states moredestructively than ever before.

To date, such sweeping claims have been overdrawn and based largely onanecdotal evidence. (Logan and Preble 2006; Patrick 2006a). Seeking to take amore rigorous approach, the author is collaborating with Susan Rice on a WeakStates Threat Matrix to map the intersection between state weakness in the devel-oping world and specific transnational security threats. Pending the results ofthat ongoing research, the following paragraphs offer preliminary observationsabout the oft-stated connection between weak and failing states and current pat-terns of transnational terrorism; weapons proliferation; international crime,infectious disease, and energy insecurity.

Terrorism

A central motivation for Northern policy attention to weak and failing states isthe conviction that such countries enable transnational terrorist networks. As theNew York Times (2005) argues, ‘‘failed states that cannot provide jobs and foodfor their people, that have lost chunks of territory to warlords, and that can nolonger track or control their borders send an invitation to terrorists.’’

Such claims are plausible. Data from 1991 to 2001 suggest that individual ter-rorists prior to 9 ⁄ 11 came disproportionately from low-income authoritariancountries in conflict and that most US-designated Foreign Terrorist Organiza-tions used weak and failing states as their primary base of operations (Marshalland Gurr 2005). Weak states have at times provided transnational terrorist orga-nizations with multiple benefits, by offering safe havens and ungoverned spaces;sources of ideological support; bases for training and indoctrination; access toweapons, conflict experience, financial resources, pools of recruits; staginggrounds, transit zones, and targets of attack. Al-Qaeda, for example, enjoyed thehospitality of Sudan and Afghanistan, where it built training camps and enlistedmembers; exploited Kenya and Yemen to launch attacks on US embassies in Nai-robi and Dar e Salaam and the USS Cole; and financed operations through gem-stones, including diamonds and tanzanite, from African conflict zones (Takeyhand Gvosdev 2002). To underline this role, jihadi web sites have identified weakand failing states as attractive targets of opportunity.

TABLE 1. Capacity and Will as Dimensions of State Weakness in Developing Countries

Strong Will Weak Will

High Capacity Relatively Good Performers (e.g.,Senegal and Honduras)

Unresponsive ⁄ Corrupt ⁄ Repressive(e.g., Burma and Zimbabwe)

Low Capacity Weak but Willing (e.g., Mozambiqueand Timor Leste)

Weak–Weak (e.g., Sudan; Haitibefore 2006)

4This section borrows from Stewart Patrick (2006b).

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With these presumed connections in mind, the US National Strategy for Com-bating Terrorism commits the United States to ‘‘diminishing the underlying con-ditions that terrorists seek to exploit,’’ by bolstering state capacities, alleviatingpoverty, and promoting good governance. As President Bush explained in aSeptember 2005 address to the UN General Assembly: ‘‘We must help raiseup the failing states and stagnant societies that provide fertile ground for ter-rorists’’ (White House, 2005). A major strategic aim in the US-led ‘‘global waron terrorism’’ is to deny terrorists access to poorly governed lands, includingin Africa, where porous borders, political instability, and lawless regions areperceived as vulnerabilities (Lyman and Morrison 2004; Miko 2004). Underthe US Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership, the US Department ofDefense is training the security services in a dozen African countries to con-trol their territories. Likewise, related Combined Joint Task Force-Horn ofAfrica has involved US soldiers in activities ranging from border security tobuilding schools in coastal Kenya.

A closer look suggests that the connection between state weakness andtransnational terrorism is more complicated and tenuous than often assumed.First, it is obvious that not all weak and failed states are afflicted by terrorism.As historian Walter Laqueur (2003:11) has pointed out, ‘‘in the 49 countriescurrently designated by the United Nations as the least developed hardly anyterrorist activity occurs.’’ By itself, weak capacity cannot explain why terroristactivity is concentrated in the Middle East and broader Muslim world ratherthan other regions like Central Africa. Clearly, other variables and dynam-ics—including political, religious, cultural, and geographical factors—shape itsglobal distribution.

Similarly, and second, much of the terrorism that occurs in weak and failingstates is not transnational but self-contained, motivated by local political griev-ances (e.g., the FARC in Colombia) or national liberation struggles (e.g., theLTTE in Sri Lanka). It is thus only tangentially related to the ‘‘global war on ter-rorism,’’ which as defined by the Bush administration focuses on terrorists with aglobal reach, particularly those motivated by an extreme Salafist strand ofWahabi Islam.

Third, not all weak and failing states are equally attractive to terrorists. Con-ventional wisdom holds that collapsed, lawless polities like Somalia or Liberia areparticularly vulnerable. In fact, terrorists are likely to find weak but functioningstates like Pakistan or Kenya more congenial bases of operations. Such poorlygoverned states are fragile and susceptible to corruption, but they also provideeasy access to the financial and logistical infrastructure of the global economy,including communications technology, transportation, and banking services(Menkhaus 2004; Mills 2004).

Fourth, weak and failing states may be of declining importance to transna-tional terrorists. For one thing, the al-Qaeda threat has evolved from a cen-trally directed network, dependent on a ‘‘base,’’ into a more diffuse globalmovement with autonomous cells in dozens of countries, poor and wealthyalike. For another, the source of radical Islamic terrorism may reside less instate weakness in the Middle East than in the alienation of de-territorializedMuslims in Europe. The ‘‘safe havens’’ in the global war on terrorism are aslikely to be the banlieues of Paris as the wastes of the Sahara or the slums ofKarachi (Roy 2004).

In sum, weak and failing states can provide useful assets to transnational ter-rorists, but they may be less indispensable to their operations than widelybelieved. If there is a failed state that is important to transnational terrorismtoday, that state is Iraq. As CIA Director Porter Goss testified in early 2005, theUS-led invasion and occupation transformed a brutal but secular authoritarianstate into a symbol and magnet for the global jihadi movement (Priest 2005).

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Proliferation

Fears that weak and failing states may incubate transnational terrorism mergewith a related concern: that poorly governed countries may be unable or disin-clined to control stocks of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons (WMD) orprevent the onward spread or leakage of WMD-related technology. This is not anidle worry. According to the British government, of the 17 states that have cur-rent or suspended WMD programs, beyond the permanent five members of theUN Security Council, 13 are ‘‘countries at risk of instability’’ (Carnegie Endow-ment for International Peace 2005; PMSU 2005).

Still, it is appropriate to note that the link between state weakness andWMD proliferation is restricted to a relatively small number of developingcountries. According to experts, the main pathways to WMD proliferationinclude the collapse of a state armed with nuclear, biological, or chemicalweapons; theft of fissile material or a functioning nuclear, biological, or chem-ical weapon; unauthorized diversion of such weapons, material, or technology;or direct weapons transfer by the ruling regime (Albright 2006). Particularlyin the nuclear field, the number of countries that could plausibly serve assources of weapons or fissile material remains (fortunately) very small. Themost frightening prospect is that a nuclear armed state like Pakistan or NorthKorea might lose control of its weapons through collapse or theft, placingthem directly in the hands of a successor regime or nonstate actors with littlecompunction about their use. A more likely scenario may involve the transferof biological weapons, which are easier to make and transport but difficult totrack.

Direct transfer of functioning WMD should not be the only concern. Revela-tions about the international nuclear arms bazaar of Abdul Qader Khan suggestthat poor governance may be the Achilles’ heel of global nonproliferationefforts. For more than two decades, Pakistan’s leading nuclear scientist orches-trated a clandestine operation to sell sensitive expertise and technology, includ-ing the means to produce fissile material and design and fabricate nuclearweapons, to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. As David Albright and Corey Hinder-son (2005) write, ‘‘the Khan network could not have evolved into such a danger-ous supplier without the utter corruption and dishonesty of successive Pakistanigovernments, which, for almost two decades, were quick to deny any involvementof its scientists in illicit procurement.’’ Nor could it have gone global withoutinstitutional weaknesses in more advanced middle-income countries (includingMalaysia, South Africa, and Turkey) that possessed manufacturing capabilitiesbut lacked the knowledge, capacity, or will to implement relevant export controland nonproliferation laws.

Although US officials and many of their counterparts in Northern states areunderstandably preoccupied with the dangers of WMD proliferation, for most ofthe world it is the spread of more mundane but also deadly conventional weap-ons that poses the greatest threat to human security and civil peace. There isclear evidence that weak, failing, and post-conflict states play a critical role in theglobal proliferation of small arms and light weapons. More than 640 millionsuch weapons circulate globally, many in private hands for illicit purposes (SmallArms Survey 2006). Weak states are often the source, transit, and destinationcountries for the illegal arms trade. On the borderlands of the former SovietUnion, vast stockpiles of weapons lie in ill-secured depots, providing temptingtargets for rebel groups, terrorists, and criminal networks. Such materiel fre-quently surfaces on the global black or grey markets, as corrupt officials manipu-late legitimate export licenses to obscure the military purpose or ultimaterecipient of the shipment. In 1999, the Ukraine export agency transferred 68tons of munitions to Burkina Faso; they were then shipped to Liberia and

654 ‘‘Failed’’ States and Global Security

ultimately Sierra Leone, landing in the hands of Foday Sankoh’s RevolutionaryUnited Front (Chivers 2005).

The easy availability of conventional weapons further weakens state capacity byfueling civil wars and insurgencies and fostering a culture of criminality andimpunity. As the experiences of Afghanistan, Haiti, and the Democratic Republicof Congo (among others) show, easy access to instruments of violence compli-cates efforts by governments and international partners to establish public orderand the rule of law, provide relief, and pursue more ambitious developmentgoals.

International Crime

Beyond posing terrorist or proliferation risks, weak and failing states are said toprovide ideal bases for transnational criminal enterprises involved in the produc-tion, transit, or trafficking of drugs, weapons, people, and other illicit commodi-ties as well as in the laundering of the profits from such activities. The surgingscope and scale of international crime underpins these concerns. The global nar-cotics trade alone is estimated to be a $300–500 billion business. Former IMFmanaging director Michel Camdessus estimates that money laundering accountsfor 2–5% of world GDP or between $800 billion and $2 trillion (US Government2000:18). This rise in crime is being driven by the dynamics of globalization.Advances in communications and transportation, the removal of commercial bar-riers, and the deregulation of financial services have created unprecedentedopportunities for illicit activity (Naim 2005). National authorities, particularly inweak states, strain to encourage legitimate commerce while curbing illicit trade(van Schendel and Abraham 2005).

The relationship between transnational organized crime and weak states isparasitic. Criminal networks seek to exploit ‘‘functional holes’’ in state capacity(Williams 2001), operating in environments where the rule of law is absent orimperfectly applied, law enforcement and border controls are lax, regulatory andtaxation systems are weak, contracts go un-enforced, public services are unreli-able, corruption is rife, and the state itself may be subject to capture. Thanks topoor governance, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2006a) notes,Africa has in recent years become ‘‘an ideal conduit through which to extractand ⁄ or transship a range of illicit commodities, such as drugs, firearms, mineralsand oil, timber, wildlife, and human beings.’’ More generally, criminal groupshave become adept at exploiting weak state capacity in conflict zones (fromColombia to the Democratic Republic of Congo) where political authority is con-tested or formal institutions have collapsed as well as in fluid, post-conflict set-tings (like Bosnia or Kosovo) where they have not yet been firmly reestablished.Transnational crime typically reduces state capacity still further, as criminalsdeploy corruption to gain protection for themselves and their activities and toopen new avenues for profit.

If state weakness is necessary for the influx of organized crime, it is not suffi-cient. Even more than a low risk operating environment, criminals seek profits.In a global economy, realizing high returns requires tapping a worldwide marketto sell illicit commodities and launder the proceeds, which, in turn, depends onaccess to financial services and modern telecommunications and transportationinfrastructure. Such considerations help explain why South Africa and Nigeriahave become magnets for transnational organized crime and why Niger has not.Criminals will accept the higher risks of operating in states with greater capacityin return for greater rewards.

In addition, the link between global crime and state weakness varies by illicitsector. The category ‘‘transnational crime’’ encompasses a vast array of activities,not limited to: drug trafficking, alien smuggling, piracy, environmental crime,

655Stewart Patrick

sanctions violations, contraband smuggling, counterfeiting, financial fraud, high-tech crime, and money laundering. Some of these activities are closely linked tostate weakness, narcotics being a case in point: Poorly governed states dominateboth US and UN lists of major drug producing and transiting nations (UNODC2006b; US Department of State 2006a). More than 90% of global heroin, forexample, comes from Afghanistan and is trafficked to Europe via poorly gov-erned states in Central Asia or along the ‘‘Balkan route.’’ Burma, likewise, is thesecond largest producer of opium and a key source of methamphetamine. Weakstates are similarly over-represented among the worst offenders in trafficking inpersons—a $7–8 billion business that sends an estimated 800,000 women andchildren across borders annually for purposes of forced labor or sexual slavery(UNODC 2006b; US Department of State 2006b).

Other criminal sectors like money laundering, financial fraud, cyber crime,intellectual property theft, and environmental crime are less obviously corre-lated with state weakness. With few exceptions, for example, money launderingoccurs primarily in small offshore financial centers, wealthy nations, or middle-income countries. The reason is straightforward: most weak and failing stateslack the requisite banking systems. On the other hand, many of the profitsbeing laundered come from activities that emanate from—or transit through—-weak states.

Infectious Disease

The rapid spread of avian influenza, which could conceivably kill tens of millionsof people, has made infectious disease a first tier national security issue. There isgrowing concern that weak and failing states may serve as important breedinggrounds for new pandemics and—lacking adequate capacity to respond to thesediseases—endanger global health. As Clive Bell and Maureen Lewis (2005:32)write, ‘‘failed or faltering states cannot or will not perform basic public healthfunctions…placing the rest of the world at risk.’’

Since 1973 more than 30 previously unknown disease agents, includingHIV ⁄ AIDS, Ebola, and West Nile virus, have emerged for which no known curesare available. Most have originated in developing countries. Over the same span,more than 20 well-known pathogens, including TB, malaria, and cholera, havereemerged or spread often in more virulent and drug-resistant forms (NIC2000). In an age of mass travel and global commerce, when more than 2 millionpeople cross international borders a day and air freight exceeds 100 billion tonkilometers a year, inadequate capacity or insufficient will to respond with vigor-ous public health measures can quickly threaten lives across the globe. Nationalsecurity and public health experts alike worry that weak and failed states—whichinvest little in epidemiological surveillance, health information and reportingsystems, primary health care delivery, preventive measures, or response capa-city—will lack the means to detect and contain outbreaks of deadly disease.

Although there is little solid data on the link between state capacity and epi-demic patterns, the global infectious disease burden falls overwhelmingly (90%)on low- and middle-income countries that account for only 11% of global healthspending (Pirages 2005:46). The Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center hasdevised a typology of countries by health care status, ranking nations into fivecategories on the basis of resources and priority devoted to public health, qualityof health care, access to drugs, and capacity for surveillance and response. Statesin the bottom two quintiles are the main victims of the world’s seven deadliestinfectious diseases: respiratory infections, HIV ⁄ AIDS, diarrheal diseases, TB,malaria, hepatitis B, and measles. Sub-Saharan Africa is most afflicted, with just10% of the world’s population but 90% of its malaria and 75% of its HIV ⁄ AIDScases (NIC 2000).

656 ‘‘Failed’’ States and Global Security

The spread of infectious disease is partly a function of breakdowns in publichealth, especially during periods of political turmoil and war. Nearly all strainsof HIV ⁄ AIDS in South and Southeast Asia can be traced to northern Burma, anungoverned warren of drug gangs, irregular militias, and human traffickers (Gar-rett 2005). The collapse of the Democratic Republic of Congo likewise made thatcountry a petri dish for the evolution of numerous strains of the virus. In Ethio-pia and several other African countries, rising HIV ⁄ AIDS prevalence has paral-leled the return and demobilization of ex-combatants and their reintegrationinto society (Collier et al. 2003).

Beyond countries in conflict, many developing and transitional states possessdecrepit and decaying public health systems that can easily be overwhelmed. Fol-lowing the end of the Cold War, the states of the former Soviet Union all experi-enced spikes in the incidence of measles, TB, and HIV. In spring 2005, weakhealth infrastructure in Angola amplified an outbreak of the hemorrhagic feverMarburg. The same year, the government of Nigeria failed to enforce a nationalimmunization program, allowing polio, a disease on the brink of eradication, tospread across a broad swath of Africa and beyond to Yemen, Saudi Arabia, andIndonesia.

Diseases incubated in weak and failing states pose both direct and indirectthreats to Northern countries. The direct threat involves the fact that signifi-cant numbers of rich world citizens may become infected and die. The indirectthreat is that such epidemics may impose high economic costs and underminekey countries or regions. The World Bank estimates that SARS cost the EastAsian regional economy some $15–30 billion, despite killing only 912 people(World Bank 2003). The political costs of disease are more nuanced but noless real. In the most heavily affected African countries, HIV ⁄ AIDS has deci-mated human capital and fiscal systems, undermining the already limitedcapacity of states to deliver basic services, control territory, and manage theeconomy. It has strained health and education systems, eroded social cohesion,undermined agriculture and growth, and weakened armies. Given the rapidspread of the pandemic into populous countries of Eurasia, total victims couldsurge to one hundred million cases in the coming years, with dramaticincreases in countries of strategic significance like India, China, and Russia(NIC 2002).

Energy Insecurity?

The doubling of world oil prices during 2005 exposed strains and volatility inthe global energy market at a time of surging global demand, intensifying com-petition over dwindling reserves and instability in key producer countries fromIraq to Nigeria to Venezuela. To some these trends suggest that reliance on oiland gas from weak and failing states may endanger global energy security byincreasing the volatility, costs, and risk of interruption of supplies. Beyondrequiring oil-importing countries in the global North to pay an ‘‘insecurity pre-mium,’’ such dependence threatens to complicate their pursuit of broadernational security and foreign policy objectives.

Anxiety about energy security is nothing new, particularly in the UnitedStates. Much hand wringing accompanied the oil crisis of the 1970s, whendomestic US production peaked and the country confronted an Arab oilembargo. Despite temporary shortages and a price shock, the Nixon-era UnitedStates found alternate sources of supply. Most economists are confident thattoday’s markets are similarly capable of absorbing temporary interruptions,albeit at a price.

Nevertheless, some new dynamics deserve consideration. First, the quest forenergy security is unfolding at a time of increased global competition for limited

657Stewart Patrick

supplies. Since 2000, the world’s consumption of fossil fuels has risen much fas-ter than most analysts had predicted, driven not only by sustained US demandbut also by China’s apparently unquenchable thirst. During 2003–2004 alone,Chinese oil imports surged 40%, making it the second largest importing country.The removal of excess production and refining capacity dramatically tightenedthe global energy market, leaving prices vulnerable to sudden spikes in the eventof disturbances in producer countries.

Second, such price shocks seem increasingly likely, given growing reliance onenergy supplies from weak states, as proven reserves in stable countries peak orbecome depleted. As Michael Klare (2001:44) writes, the geographic concentra-tion of exploitable fossil fuels means that the availability of energy is ‘‘closelytied to political and socioeconomic conditions within a relatively small groupof countries.’’ Many of the world’s main oil exporters—including Iraq, Nigeria,Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela—are less stable today than in 2000. TheUK government calculates that 43% of oil reserves are located in potentiallyunstable countries like Azerbaijan, where untapped reserves could generate$124 billion in revenue by 2024. Further complicating matters, a large percent-age of the world’s oil and gas transits unstable regions (e.g., the Transcaucasia)and vulnerable choke points (e.g., the Straits of Hormuz) via pipeline or tan-ker (US Department of Energy 1999; PMSU 2005).

Significantly, the US exposure to volatility and interruption of energy supplieshas grown markedly since 1973, when it imported only 34% of its crude oil. By2005, the figure was 58%, with fully one-third coming from Venezuela, Nigeria,Iraq, and Angola. Increasingly, US energy security is hostage to foreign politicaldevelopments. Over the past several years, oil markets have tightened inresponse to strikes in Venezuela, violence in Nigeria, and insurgency in Iraq.This dependence on weak states will only increase. By 2015, the United Stateswill be importing 68% of its oil, a full quarter of it from the Gulf of Guinea (upfrom today’s 15%). All the countries in that region—Angola, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Nigeria—face tremendous gover-nance challenges (Goldwyn and Morrison 2005). Nigeria, a fragile democracythat Washington hopes will become an anchor of stability in the region, is besetby rampant corruption and crime, simmering ethnic tensions, and grinding pov-erty. In recent years, rebels in the Niger Delta have repeatedly disrupted some ofNigeria’s oil flow.

Rising dependence on energy from weak and failing states promises to haveunpleasant ramifications for wider US foreign policy objectives. It will surely com-plicate US democracy promotion, by encouraging Washington to cozy up toauthoritarian dictators or to intervene to shore up unstable regimes in regionslike the Caucuses or Central Asia.

Conclusions and Policy Implications

As the author (Patrick 2006b) has argued elsewhere, the overlap between stateweakness and today’s most pressing transnational threats is hardly clear-cut,much less universal. It depends on the threat in question, the specific sourcesof state weakness, and the will of ruling regimes to deliver effective gover-nance and control transnational ‘‘spillovers.’’ Each poorly performing countrysuffers from distinctive pathologies and generates unique domestic and inter-national challenges of varying gravity. Accordingly, there can be no one-sizefits all response to addressing the sources or consequences of these shortcom-ings.

Scholars can assist policymakers in Northern countries by helping to mapthe global intersection between state weakness and specific threats; by revealinglinkages between spillovers and specific gaps in state capacity or will (such as

658 ‘‘Failed’’ States and Global Security

inability or unwillingness to protect citizens or provide social services); by clarify-ing pathways of causality in specific cases; and by suggesting points of leveragefor external actors seeking to bolster effective and legitimate states and to reducethe negative externalities of poor governance.

Clear-headed analysis may also help restrain the worst impulses of Northerngovernments. In their preoccupation with security, wealthy donor countries oftenfocus more attention on strengthening the operational capabilities of troubleddeveloping countries in controlling their borders and territory than on long-termstructural reforms that address the underlying causes of weak state capacity anddysfunctional governance. This is especially true of the United States, which isdevoting significant resources to programs in the Sahel and Horn of Africa,targeted particularly at training effective security services. The risk is that thisapproach may empower authoritarian regimes whose dedication to legitimategovernance and bettering the life of their citizens is minimal at best. To avoidrepeating Cold War mistakes, the United States and partner countries mustdevote sustained diplomatic efforts and adequate resources in support of broad-based political, economic, social, and security sector reforms in the global Southwith an emphasis on helping local actors build effective, legitimate, and account-able states. (Where a key source of fragility is a noxious ruling regime, donorengagement will necessarily be primarily with nongovernmental and oppositionactors working for constructive change.)

The United States and other Northern governments must also adapt theirstrategies and policy instruments to deal with the interdependent security,development, and governance challenges posed by the world’s weakestcountries. OECD governments increasingly recognize that preventing conflict,promoting recovery, and advancing reform in weak, failing, and war-tornstates cannot be done through traditional bureaucratic stove pipes (Picciotto,Alao, Ikpe, Kimani, and Slade 2004). Accordingly, some are exploring ‘‘wholeof government’’ approaches that bring together multiple departments andagencies—not only diplomatic, defense, and development ministries (theso-called ‘‘3Ds’’), but also their intelligence, treasury, trade, and interior ministrycounterparts. They are formulating ‘‘joined-up’’ strategies toward fragile states,embarking on integrated planning processes and joint implementation in thefield, and experimenting with pooled funding arrangements (like the UK’sConflict Pools) to forge interagency collaboration. At the same time, individualdonor governments are only beginning to navigate the trade-offs and tensionsinherent in attempting to reconcile and harmonize the distinctive mandates,objectives, and time lines of these various departments (Patrick and Brown2007).

A final obstacle to more effective Northern policies remains a general lack ofdonor understanding of how precisely to foster effective institutions, particularlyin the most difficult environments (Fukuyama 2004). Even though donors haveembraced a set of ‘‘principles for good international engagement in fragilestates’’ (OECD 2005), their development policies in practice often respond lessto the requirements of state-building than to the incentives of Northern aidagencies and their NGO and private sector implementing partners. The frequentresult is the creation of a ‘‘parallel international public sector’’ that reinforcesweak state aid dependence rather than promoting sustained economic growthand institutional reform (Ghani et al. 2005). Although donors often bemoan alack of ‘‘absorptive capacity’’ in weak states, donor ‘‘capacity’’ to engage stateswith weak institutions has also been severely lacking. Making progress on thisfront is essential to cut the connection between state weakness and transnationalthreats.

659Stewart Patrick

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Appendix

APPENDIX A. Indicators of State Weakness in Developing Countries

Security Social Welfare Economic Political

1. Conflict Intensity(Center for SystemicPeace, 2006)

6. Child MortalityRate (UNICEF, 2007)

11. GNI per capita(World Bank, 2007)

16. GovernmentEffectiveness (GovernanceMatters VI, 2007)

2. Political Stability andAbsence of Violence(Governance MattersVI, 2007)

7. Primary SchoolCompletion Rate(World Bank, 2007)

12. GDP growth,(World Bank, 2007)

17. Rule of Law(Governance MattersVI, 2007)

3. Incidence of Coups(Archigos, 2006,EIU, 2007)

8. Undernourishment(FAO, 2006)

13. Income Inequality(World Bank, 2007)

18. Control of Corruption(Governance MattersVI, 2007)

4. Gross Human RightsAbuses (Political TerrorScale, 2007)

9. Access to ImprovedWater and Sanitation(World Bank, 2007)

14. Inflation Rate(IMF, 2007)

19. Voice and Accountability(Governance MattersVI, 2007)

5. Territory Affected byConflict (PoliticalInstability Task Force,2006)

10. Life Expectancy(World Bank, 2007)

15. Regulatory Quality(Governance MattersVI, 2007)

20. Freedom House(Freedom in theWorld, 2007)

Source: Rice and Patrick (2007)

662 ‘‘Failed’’ States and Global Security