Fairness to Goodness John Rawls

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Philosophical Review

Fairness to GoodnessAuthor(s): John RawlsSource: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 84, No. 4 (Oct., 1975), pp. 536-554Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review

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DISCUSSION

FAIRNESS TO GOODNESS

T

HE following

remarks

take up

an

apparent

difficulty

with

the

idea

of

the

original

position

as stated

in A

Theory

f

justice.1

This

difficulty

an

be formulated

s

follows.

The

original

position

must

be

specified

so

as

to

meet

two

conditions-namely:

(a) the initial agreementmust be unanimous,

and

(b)

the parties,

with

their

conceptions

of

the

good,

must

be

treated

fairly.

But

there

seem

to be

obstacles

to satisfying

hese

conditions: first,

o

guarantee

unanimity,

the parties

are

deprived

of

ostensibly

relevant

moral

information-in

particular,

information

bout

their

conceptions

of

the

good;

and second,

in

order

that

the

parties

can

choose

at

all,

they

are

assumed

to

have

a desire

forprimary

goods-that

is,

for

ertain

basic

liberties,rightsand opportunities,for ncome and wealth, and,

finally,

for

the

social

bases

of self-respect.

These

goods,

however,

except

possibly

for

the bases

of

self-respect,

re

not,

it

seems,

equally

useful

in

advancing

all

conceptions

of

the

good,

and

in

fact

their

pursuit

inclines

us toward

some

conceptions

of

the

good

rather

than

others.

Therefore,

the original

position,

even

if

it

leads

to

unanimity,

arbitrarily

favors

some conceptions

of

the

good

over

others,

and

fails

to

treat

fairly

hose

who

turn

out

to

have

certain

conceptions.

Thus, it would appear thatwe are faced with a dilemma: to secure

unanimity,

we

must

not

only

exclude

morally

relevant

information

but

introduce

a

general

desire

for

primary

goods

that

improperly

biases

the original

position

toward

some

conceptions

of

the

good.

1

I

shall

start

my

discussion

of

this

difficulty

y

considering

Thomas

Nagel's

formulation

of it

in

his

review

in

the

Philosophical

Review,

LXXXII

(I973),

esp.

226-229.

Nagel expresses

special

indebtedness

to

Mary

Gibson

for

his

account of this problem. Very soon, however, we are led into an

examination

of

certain objections

to the

theory

of

primary

goods

as

expressed

by

a

number

of people,

but

in

particular

by

Adina

Schwartz,

Moral

Neutrality

and

Primary

Goods,

Ethics

I973),

and

Michael

Teitelman,

The

Limits

of

ndividualism,

Journal

of

Philosophy,

XIX

(1972).

I

am

grateful

to

these

writers

for

their

discussion

of these questions.

My

discussion

assumes

an

acquaintance

with

A

Theory

f

Justice.

should

like

to thank

Burton

Dreben

for

valuable

criticisms

and comments.

536








FAIRNESS

TO GOODNESS

Hence

our

problem:

is

the

original position

improperly

biased by the

account

of

primary goods?

I

Let

us consider

first whether by

excluding

information

about

people's

conceptions

of

the

good

the

original position

rules

out morally

relevant

nformation.

We

might

say

that

by

definition

uch

information

is moral information;

after all,

it

relates to conceptions

of the

good.

There

is,

offhand,

no

objection

to excluding information

bout people's

natural talents and abilities, their social role or class situation, their

sex

and

race,

and so on.

Such

knowledge

is

ruled out to

prevent

the

biases

of

self- and

group-interest;

and this seems

appropriate.

But

conceptions

of the

good

are not

in

general

self-interested,

lthough

some

of

them

are;

nor are

they

mere

preferences

nd

personal

tastes;

so

how

can

information bout

them be excluded?

By

way

of reply:

the

original

position

s framed to

eliminate

prejudice

and

self-interest,

nd this is one

reason for not

letting

people

know

certain facts about themselves-for example, their sex and race. But

there is

also

another reason: we want

to abstract from certain social

and natural

contingencies.

Our social

position

and

class,

our sex

and

race should

not influence deliberations

made

from

a

moral point

of

view;

and

on this

ground,

these

facts hould

be bracketed. This second

reason is

connected

with

the

Kantian interpretation.

The ideas

behind

these

two

reasons

are distinct:

in

the firstwe exclude

just

enough

information

to secure

impartiality;

in the

second,

we bring

in

just

enough information o make rational agreement possible. The second

reason

eliminates

more

information than the first

and results

in

a

thicker veil

of

ignorance.2

Both

reasons,

but the second

in

particular,

apply

to conceptions

of

the

good.

It

is not for

reasons of mpartiality

nd

simplicity

lone

that

these are not

known. Our

final ends

(as

limited by notions of

the

right)

depend

on our

abilities

and

opportunities,

on

the

numerous

contin-

gencies

that have

shaped

our

attachments

and affections.

That we

have one conception of the good rather than another is not relevant

from

moral standpoint.

In

acquiring

it

we

are

influenced

by

the same

sort

of

contingencies

that lead us to rule out

a

knowledge

of our

sex

and class.

2

I am

indebted

o

Joshua

Rabinowitzfordiscussion

n

these

points.

They

cannot

be

pursued

further

ere.

537








JfOHN

RAWLS

But

it

may

be

objected:

this

argument

assumes

that

a

conception

of

the

good

is simply

an

ordering

of

our

more

final

aims,

and

therefore

not essentiallydifferent for the purposes of the present discussion)

from

a scheme

of

preferences,

which

may

indeed

be

arbitrary.

A

con-

ception

of

the good,

however,

is

something

one

advances

as

good

for

others

as

well as

oneself.

t comprises

a

basic

part

of our

over-all

moral

scheme.

So

how

can

these

notions

be

bracketed?

This

reply

misconceives

the

aim

of

the original position.

It

suffices

to

recall

that

people's

conceptions

of the right

are

also bracketed.

To

the extent

that our

conceptions

of

the

good

are connected

with

notions

of right,theyshould also not be known. So far as possible one

assumes

only

a knowledge

of

the

thin

theory

of

the

good,

a

theory

founded

on

the

facts of psychology

and setting

out

the

general

structure

f

human

desires

and

ends.

On

the

basis

of

this

theory

we can

define

the

primary

goods.

Of

course,

the

thin

theory

must

be

sound;

but

at the

moment

this

s not

at

issue.

For

the point

of

the

original position

s to understand

our

conception

of

ustice

(and

our

notion

of

the good, too,

in so

far

as

it extends

beyond

the thin

theory)

by seeing

how

this conception

is

limited by and can be constructed

from

other

notions

that

it

is

natural

to

think

of

as

more basic

and

abstract.3

This

is the reason

for

bracketing

conceptions

of

the right

and

it

applies

equally

to

conceptions

of

the

good

(other

than

the

thin

theory).

There are,

then,

at

least three

different

easons

forexcluding

informa-

tion

from

the original

position:

it would

permit

self-

nd

group-interest

to

distort the

parties'

deliberations;

it refers

to

contingencies

and

accidents

that should

not

influence

the

choice

of moral principles;

or

it

represents

the

very

moral

conceptions

(or

aspects

thereof)

that we

seek

to understand

in the

light

of

other

and more basic

notions.

Of

course,

t

is

tempting

o reject

the original

position

construction

ntirely

by

saying:

why

should

I

give

up

(or

amend)

my

conception

of the

good

merely

because

in

an imaginary

hypothetical

situation

where

I am

forbidden

to

know what

this

conception

is,

I

would

acknowledge

principles

that require

this of

me?

But

clearly

this

question

applies

equally

to

one's

conception

of right.

The

objection

misinterprets

he

original

position.

This

idea,

as such,

is

not

intended

to make

us

give

up

anything.

The argument

expressed

by

it will

give

us

pause

only

to the

extent

that: (a)

the

various

conditions

imbedded

in

it

(and

which

embody

the

features

of

a

well-ordered

society)

have

a hold

upon

us or

3

These formal

lements

re

drawn

mportantly

rom

he

dea

of

fairness

nd

the

notion

f

well-ordered

ociety.

On the

atter,

ee

below

ec.

VI.)

538










JOHN RAWLS

religious ase,thatno

principles f

ccommodation

etween

moralities

exist;

or else that

there s no fair

nitial

ituation

n

which

uch

prin-

ciples,granting heywereavailable, could be agreed to, evenhypo-

thetically. erhaps

so. Still

we

would like to know

why

theoriginal

position

s not

fair,

nd

how

far t

falls

hort.

III

So

far

have been

considering

he

objection hat,

n

order

o achieve

unanimity,

morallyrelevant

nformationin

particular, heparties'

conceptions

f the

good)

is

improperly xcluded

from he

original

position. turn t

thispointto the

much more

difficult

bjection hat

theoriginal

osition

ails o treat

persons

airly.

More specifically,

he

assumptions

bout

primary

oods

are

said to

bias the

choice of prin-

ciples

n

an

individualistic

irection nd

against

ommunitarianalues.

Thus

it

is held that

ome

people's

conceptions f thegood

are

unfairly

favored ver

others.

In

this section note some

possible

misinterpretationsf

primary

goods thatmaylead one to

overemphasizeheir

ndividualistic

ias.

First:

comment

bout wealth.

This

is not an

easyconcept o

define,

but

I

mean to

use

it

roughly

n

the sense

understood y

economists.

Thus wealth

onsists f

legal) command ver

exchangeablemeansfor

satisfying

uman

needs and

interests.

tems

that

we

own,

such as food

and

land,buildings

nd

machines,

re

wealth;

so too are

rights

o use

or to

receiveor

in

any way

to

derive benefit

rom

uch items-for

example,

hares

n

private

r

public

companies,

r

rights

f access

to

libraries,museums, nd otherpublicfacilities,ights o variouskinds

of

personal

ervices,

nd

so on.

Mill

provisionally efineswealth as

signifying

ot

only

he

orts f

hings

have

isted,

ut the

whole um

of

things ossessed

y

individuals r

communitieshat re

means

for he

attainment

f their

ends. But he

thinks hat

this

definition,

hile

philosophicallyorrect, eparts rom

ommon

sageand is notsuitable

for

conomics;

nd

so

Mill

limitswealthto

those

hings

hat

normally

have an

exchange alue.5This

gives hedefinition

bove.

Understoodnthis ense, t s hard tosee howwealth an failto be a

primary ood;

for

f

we haveno command

ver uch

tems,we

cannot

carryout our

plans. To be

sure, the

particular orms f

wealth,

the

5

See

Principles

f Political

Economy, d. by W. J.

Ashley London,

1909),

pp. 6-9.

540








FAIRNESS TO

GOODNESS

sorts f

things

hat

comprise he

accumulated

tock

of

means,

differ

from

ne

society r

epoch

to

another.

Butthis

doesnot

affect

he

dea

of

primary

oods.For

whatever

orm

hey

ake,

natural

resources

nd

themeansofproduction,nd therights o

control

hem,

s well

as

rightso

services,

re

wealth.

When

Marx

says

hat

historys

the

history

of

class

struggles,

e

means

n

part that t

is a

history

f

how

social

classes

have

fought

ver

the

control f

these

orms

f

wealth,

specially

over

he

control

fthe

meansof

production,ince

he

believed

his orm

of

control

to

be

crucial.

Not

altogether

ifferently,

ill

regarded

property,

ntelligence,

nd

the

power

of

combination

o

be

the

con-

stituent

lements of

political

importance.6

Both

Marx

and Mill

recognizea basic kind of motivation hat persists hroughout he

course f

historical

hange.

The

desire

or

ncome

nd

wealth

income

being

flow,wealth

stock7),

nderstood

s

the

legal)

command

ver

exchangeable

means for

satisfying

uman

needs and

interests,

s

characteristic

f

societies

generally.

t

is not

peculiarto

societies n

which

people

have

individualistic ather

han

communitarian

alues.

A

closelyrelated

considerations

this:

people

have

controlover

wealth

not

only as

individuals

but also

as

members f

associations

and groups.The stockholdersf a corporation ave ointcontrol ver

its

capital

and

means

of

production;

ne's

share

of

controls

propor-

tional

(in

theory)

o the

fractional

ize

of

one's

stock.

Similarly,

n

an

associational

ocialist

economy, he

workers

n

the firm

ontrol

its

capital

and

means

of

production.

aculties

have

some

control

ver

their

niversity'sealth

viewed

s

the

meansfor

arrying

ut

their

ims

of

scholarship

nd

research;

nd so

on, for

many

other

possible

ases,

including

itizens'

ontrol

ver

ocial

resources

sed

as

public

goods

n

a democratictate.The accountofprimary oodsdoesnotrequire hat

the

ndex

of

well-beingf

ocial

groups

be

computed

olely n

terms f

what

we think

f

as

personal

ncomeand

private

wealth.

This

index

also

depends on

the

control

ver the

stock

and

flow of

means

that

peopleshare n

as

members

f

associationsnd

groups,

ncluding

heir

role

as

citizens.

There

s, of

course,

relational

ense,

notof

the

term

wealth, but

of

the

adjective

wealthy.

Someone

who is

wealthy,

r

who

aspires

to be so, ssomeonewhohas,orstrives opossess, armorewealth han

the

verage

person.

Relative

to

others,

ne's

command ver

the

means

6

See

Mill's

review of

Tocqueville's

Democracyn

America

n

The

Philosophy

f

J. S.

Mill,

ed.

by M.

Cohen

(New

York, I

96

I), p. I

33.

I

Because

of

this

relationship,

what

is

said

about

the

interpretation

f

wealth

applies

also

to

income.

54I








JOHN

RAWLS

necessary to

attain

human

ends

is,

or

is

sought

to

be,

very

great.

But

assuming that

the

people

in

the

original

position

desire

wealth

does

not

imply

that

they

desire

to

be

wealthy (as just defined). In fact, by

postulating

the

absence

of

envy

and

supposing

that

the

parties

care

only about

their

absolute

share of

primary

goods

and

have

no

concern

for

their

relative

place

in

the

distribution

of

wealth, the

desire

to

be

wealthy

is

excluded.

Therefore,

f

ndividualistic

values are

thought

to

include

the

value

of

being

wealthy,

the

account

of

primary

goods

is

not

individualistic.

To

summarize:

three

observations

weaken

the

tendency to think

that

the

account

of

primary

goods

is

biased

toward

individualistic

conceptions:

(a)

that

income

and

wealth

is

the

legal

command

over

the

material

means in

general

necessary to

realize

people's

needs

and

interests,

whether

as

individuals

or

as

members

of

associations,

and

the

desire

for

such

goods

is

not

peculiar

to

a

particular

type

of

society

at

any

rate, not

so

long

as

the

relevant

class of

societies

s

those

that

have a

sizable

population,

a

fairly

advanced

technology,

and

a

developed

civilization

and

culture);

(b)

that

income

and

wealth

can

be

held

in

many

forms

public

and

associational

as

well

as

private and

individual

(it is true that the

theoryof

the

good

uses

the

notion

of an

individual's

plan

of

life;

but

this

does

not

imply

that

such

plans

must be

individualistic);

and

(c)

that

the

desire

for

ncome

and

wealth

is distinct

from

the

desire

to

be

wealthy,

and

being

wealthy s

not a

primary

good.

IV

A

further

ause of

misunderstanding s a

tendency

to

misinterpret

the

nature

and

scope

of

the

motivation

assumption.

That

the

parties

are

mutually

disinterested

s

sometimes

taken

to

mean

that

they

are

self-interested

ndividuals

with

individualistic

aims.

The

relation

between

self-centered

conomic

competitors or

seekers after

power is

then

regarded

as a

suggestive

paradigm.8

But a

far

more

helpful

case

8 This

may

be

because

power is

regarded

as

a

primary

good.

However,

I

never

held

this;

the

term

use is

powers

and

it

usually

occurs

in

such

phrases

as

powers

and

opportunities,

liberties

and

powers,

powers

and

prerog-

atives

(see,

e.g.,

pp.

62,

92,

93,

94). I

understand

the

term

much

in

the

way

that

H.

L.

A.

Hart

does

in

The

Concept

f

Law

(Oxford,

i96i),

pp.

27-33,

238 f.

Hart

says

of

powers

conferred

on

private

persons that

they

provide

individuals

with

facilities

for

achieving

their

aims;

they

bestow

upon

them

542








FAIRNESS

TO

GOODNESS

is

the

relation

between

members

f

different

eligions;

or

while

they

are

mutually

disinterested

nder

circumstances f

ustice,

theyare

neither elf-interestedornecessarilyngaged n thepursuit f indi-

vidualistic

lans of ife. n

fact, n

view

of the

priority

f

iberty,

he

situationwith

opposing eligious nd

moral

beliefs

s the

one that

we

shouldwork

rom.

As for the

scope

of the

motivation

ssumption, ne

must

keep in

mind

that t

holds

only

for he

parties

n

the

original

osition:

hey

re

to

deliberate

s

if

hey

refer

more

rather han

ess

primary

oods.This

stipulation

eems

reasonable

n

a

theory f

ustice

for

two

reasons.

First, t setsup a determinatehoiceproblemby supposing hatthe

partiesmaximize

omethingin

particular

rimary

oods); and

second,

it

reflects he

fact

that

n

circumstances

f

ustice

moderate

carcity

obtains,

o that

by

hypothesis

ot

all

that

s

claimed can

be

granted.

The

assumption

may not

characterize

he

general

motivation f

people

in

society,

owever, nd

in

particular

t

may fail

for

he

citizens

f a

well-ordered

ociety

a

society

effectivelyegulated

by

the

public

principles

dopted n

the

original

position).

But

then

some

questions

rise. First,how does one ascertainthe

motivation f

people

n

a

well-ordered

ociety?

Answer:

rom he

aws

of

psychology;

ssuming

that

people

grow

up

and

live

under

ust

institutions,s the

principles

dopteddefine

hem,

ne

tries o

work

ut

what

conceptions

f the

good

and

what

moral

nterests

eople

would

acquire.

When

these

deliberations

ccur from

he

standpoint

f the

original

position,

hey

re

part

of the

reasoning

hat

confirmsr

dis-

confirms

he

provisional choice

of a

conception

of

ustice.9

Obviously,

the

truth

bout

such

matterss hard

to ascertain

nd

any

conclusionsmustbe

highly

entative;

ut the

point

here

s

that

the

motivation f

persons

n

a

well-ordered

ociety

s

not

determined

irectly y

the

motives f the

parties

n

the

originalposition.

These

motives ffect

thoseof

persons

n

a

well-ordered

ociety

nly

ndirectly:

hat

s,

via

their

ffectsn

the choice

of

principles.

t

is these

principles,

ogether

with

the

laws of

psychologyas

thesework

under the

conditions f

just

institutions),

hat

determine

he

resulting

motivation.

o

suppose

powers

to

create

by certain

procedures

a

structureof

rights

nd duties

that

the

courts will

enforce. The

power to

make a will is an

example.

Powers so

defined

seem

naturally

to

belong with

liberties

and

opportunities

as

primary goods.

That

political

and

economic

power is a

primarygood

I

never

meant to

say;

if at

certain

points

the

textwill

bear

this

nterpretation, t

needs to

be

corrected.

9

See A

Theory f

Justice,

hs. VIII

and IX.

543








70HN

RAWLS

that he ccountof primary

oodsentails hatpeople n a well-ordered

society

re moved

mainly

y

a desire

or hese oods s

a mistake.

Effectiverguments or he conclusion hat the accountof primary

goods is individualistic ould have to show at least

the following:

first, hat

n

a well-orderedociety ffectivelyegulated

by the prin-

ciplesof ustice people

would acquire

and

pursue

ndividualistic ays

of

ife.For

example,

t

might

urnout that most

everyonewould

be

moved by

a

strong esire

to be wealthy in the relative ensedefined

earlier).

Or

it

might

e that norder o follow he

ust

savings rinciple,

the economic ystemwould have to be arranged

n

ways

that tressed

individualisticonceptions.econd,one must howthatthe reasonfor

these esultss

the

account

of primary oods. The argument as to be

that f his ccountwere hanged nd differentrinciples

ere dopted,

the corresponding

ell-ordered ocietywould not be individualistic.

These questions re difficult

o settle. tried o argue hatthesorts f

motivations

ust

notedwouldnotbe

prevalent

n

a well-ordered

ociety.

Of course, hese rgumentsre at best conjectural.

ut whywouldn't

it

turnout that a society

hat follows he principles f ustice allows,

and even encourages, ssociations n which individuals bjure the

desire

forwealth

beyond

ome amount ppropriate or

heir ommon

purposes?

am

thinking,

or

example,

of

religious

groups

and

uni-

versities,

s

they

hould be.

A

well-orderedociety ertainly

oes not

require its membersto

striveforgain, for ever greaterpower as

necessary

ortheir

elf-protection

r

safety,

ince

it

insures n equal

liberty

nd

freedom

f association.

And,

in

fact,

a

society nsisting

upon

an

equal liberty

orall,

and

allowing nequalities

n its basic

structurenlyas the differencerinciple ermits,mightbe a society

more favorably isposed

o

these

ssociations han

a

society dhering

to the other

onceptions

f ustice

I

discuss.

The

principles

f

ustice

certainly

llow

religious,

cholarly,

nd communal forms f

life

for

which

ordinary ersonal

nd more ndividualistic

mbitions

may

be

a distraction.

urthermore,

hese

forms f

life

should be

secure

n

a

society ollowing

hese

principles.

here seems o be no reason

offhand

why

the

ends of

people

in

a

well-ordered

ociety

hould be

pre-

dominantly

ndividualistic.

It

may

be

said,

however,

hat

whatever he ends

of

ndividuals

nd

private associations,

well-ordered ociety

must be

devoted,

as

a

society,

o the

perpetual

ncrease

of

wealth.10

herefore he social

10

Schwartz assumes

throughout

that

people

in

(a well-ordered)

society

are

said to want more

rather than less

primary

goods, and in particular

more

wealth. See esp. pp. 302-304.

544









milieu required by

the

theory of ustice will foster he public pursuit

of

material

things.

I

do not believe this is correct:

again

a

misinter-

pretationofthescope of the motivationassumption seemsto be at work.

In

Section 44, where

the

question ofjust savings is discussed, the target

of the

savings process

is said to

be

a sufficientmaterial

base formaking

the

equal liberties

effective.

Beyond

this

point justice requires no

further ccumulation

of

wealth and

net

savings may drop

to zero.

Of

course,

it

is

still

necessary

that social

capital

be

preserved

and the

difference

rinciple

satisfied. But this

principle

can

be met

statically;

that

is,

it

does not enjoin

a continual

increase

in

the

general level of

wealth,but onlythat theexisting and possibly constant) social product

be

distributed

n

a certain

way. Of course,

whether

continued saving

takes place depends

on

what

the

members of society want to do.

So it

may

be

objected

that

once a

society embarks

on the

accumulation

process regulated by the principles of ustice, it will acquire tendencies

that

cause

it

to persist

in

the quest for material advance far beyond

what

justice

dictates. But we need some

argument

to

show

why

this

will

happen,

and also to establish that other

savings principles

are

not

open to the same difficulty. ere it suffices o note that the ust savings

principle

does not

enjoin

an

unending

accumulation

process;

and

the

well-ordered

society finally

reached

might

well

be one

in

which

the

desire

for greater wealth, and

the

desire

to

be wealthy (as

earlier

defined), is not very strong,

at least

compared

to other alternative

conceptions.

V

It

is plain, then, that what ways

of ife

are predominant, or favored,

in a

well-ordered society depends upon

the

principles of psychology

and

sociology.

We

cannot decide this

question by looking

at the motiva-

tion assumption

of

the

original position

and the

conception of ustice

that

would

be

adopted. One may reasonably ask, though, what kind

of

psychological

and

sociological hypotheses

would

prevent

the

account

of

primary goods

from

leading

to

an

individualistically

motivated

society.

I

think that the

following two conjectures

are

plausible

in

this

connection.

The

first s

sociological:

it

is

that the

primary goods

are

socially strategic)'

This means that

if

these

goods

are

justly

distributed

as the

principles

of

justice require (that is,

the

two principles of

A

11

This seems to be denied by Teitelman,

op

cit.,pp. 552 f.

545








JOHN

RAWLS

Theory

f

Justice,

nd

perhaps

or

ome

other

onceptions

s

well),

then

other

njustices

re

unlikely

o

occur.

The

supposition

s

that,

given

just

distribution

f

primary

oods,

individuals

nd associations

an

protect

themselves

gainst

the

remaining

nstitutionalorms f in-

justice.

Both

Marx

and

Mill could,

believe,

ccept

this

ssumption.

Marx

stressed

he control

f

the

means

of

production,

he sources

f

ncome

and

wealth,

whereas

Mill

emphasized

the

importance

f

liberties

and

opportunities.

f course,

Marx

would

question

he

stability

f

a

well-ordered

ociety

n the

absence

of

some

form

f

socialism,

ut

this

is not to denythat,givena well-orderedociety, rimary oodsare

strategic

in

the sense

defined);

and,

in any

case,

the

principles

f

justice

do

not

exclude

certain

forms

f

socialism

nd

would

in

fact

require

hem

f

he

tability

f

well-ordered

ociety

ould

be

achieved

in no

other

way.

(We

are to

view

the

principles

fjustice

s

constraints

that,

so

far

as

the

description

f

institutions

s

concerned,

may

be

realized

either

by

associational

ocialism

or

property-owning

emoc-

racy.12)

ut

more

mportant

or

our

purposes

here

s the

observation

that,f heprimary oods reindeed trategic,hecasefor aking hem

as

what

is

wanted

in the original

position

s greatly

trengthened.

Primary

goods

will

then

turn

out to

be

not only

things

we

want,

whatever

lse we want,

but

things

he

possession

f

which

in

just

measure

ecures

s against

ther

kinds

f njustice.

The second

assumption

s psychological:

just

distribution

f

primary

oods

so

affects

uman

motives

hatunder

a

just

distribution

people

are

less

concerned

with

acquiring

a

greater

ndex

of

these

goods and concentrate or the most part on pursuingotheraims

within

the

framework

hat

ust

institutions

stablish.

Here

one

is

assuming,

s

a

general

psychological

act,

that

strong

r

inordinate

desires

or

more

primary

oods

on the part

of

ndividuals

nd

groups,

particularly

desire

or

reater

ncome

nd wealth

nd

prerogatives

f

position,

pring

rom

nsecurity

nd anxiety.

And

the

same

is true

of

the

desire

to be

wealthy

to

have

more

wealth

than

others).

To

the

extent

that

ust

institutions

lleviate

these

psychological

onditions,

they educe he trengthfthequestforwealth ndposition. fcourse,

therewill

be

various

ndividual

exceptions;

the assumption

pplies

rather

o

the

tendencies

f sizable

numbers

nd

influential

roups.

A finalcomment:

hepreceding

emarks

how,

believe,

that

the

original

position

does

not

presuppose

he doctrine

of

abstract

ndi-

12

See

A Theory

f

Justice,p.

270-274,

280

fif.

546

This content downloaded from 147.156.148.8 on Wed, 23 Oct 2013 04:39:39 AM





FAIRNESS TO

GOODNESS

vidualism. This

is

defined as the

doctrine that the fundamental

aims

and

interests

of

individuals are determined

independently

from

particular social

forms; society

and the

state are regarded as insti-

tutional

arrangements that answer to these

antecedent individual

ends

and purposes, as specified

by

a

fixed nd invariant

human psychology.13

In

contrast to this view, the

theory of a

well-ordered society

stresses

that the interests nd ends of

individuals depend

upon existing

insti-

tutions and the principles of

justice they satisfy

(see Section 79).

Moreover, the parties

in

the

original position are

presumed to

know

whatever

general

truths characterize

the

dependence of

individuals

on their social background. The account of primary goods does not

deny these facts,

ong recognized by

social

theory and

common

sense.

The thin

theory

of

the

good holds

that

human wants

have a certain

structure

which,

in

conjunction

with

the

strategic feature of

primary

goods, supports

the

reasonableness of the

motivation

assumption, given

the

constraints

f the

original position. The

required

structure f wants

and

the

strategic

role of

primary goods

is not

the doctrine of

abstract

individualism.

VI

So far

I

have

tried to

blunt

the force of

two

objections

to

the idea

of

the

original position:

(a)

that

it

incorrectly

xcludes

morally

relevant

information;

and

(b)

that it is

arbitrarily

biased

(given

the

motivation

assumption

and the nature of

primarygoods)

in

favor of

ndividualistic

conceptions

of the

good.

In

my

further emarks should like

to sketch

a more constructiveview.

It

may help

to

begin by recalling

some of the

characteristic eatures

of

a

well-ordered

society.14

uch

a

society

is defined as

one that is effec-

tivelyregulated by

a

public conception ofjustice.

That

is,

it

is a

society

in

which:

(i) Everyone accepts,

and

knows that

others

accept,

the

same

principles (the

same

conception)

of

ustice.

(2)

Basic social institutions and their arrangement into one

scheme

(the

basic structure

of

society)

satisfy

nd are

with

reason

believed

by everyone

to

satisfy

hese

principles.

13

See Steven Lukes, Individualism

New York, I973),

ch.

i i. Lukes suggests

(pp. 75, I

39)

that

A Theory fJustice elies on

this

doctrine.

14

Unfortunately,

n A

Theory fJustice

hese featureswere not stated together

at any one place.

547






JOHN

RAWLS

(3)

The

public

conception

of

justice

is founded

on

reasonable

beliefs

that

have been established

by generally

accepted

methods

of inquiry.

It is assumed

also

that

themembers

of a

well-ordered

society

are, and

view themselves

as, free

and equal

moral

persons. More

specifically,

they

may be described

as follows:

(4)

They

each

have,

and view

themselves

as having,

a sense

of

justice (the

content of

which

is defined by

the

principles

of

the

public

conception)

that is normally

effective the

desire

to

act on thisconception determinestheirconduct forthe most

part).

(5)

They

each

have, and

view themselves

s having,

fundamental

aims

and

interests

a

conception

of

their

good)

in the

name

of which

it is

legitimate

to

make claims on one

another

in the

design oftheir

nstitutions.

(6)

They

each

have,

and

view

themselves

as

having,

a

right

to

equal respectand considerationin determiningthe principles

by

which

the basic structure

f their society

is to be

regulated.

In addition,

a well-ordered

society

is stable

with

respect

to

its

public

conception

of

ustice.

This means

that,

viewing

the society

as a going

concern,

its

members acquire,

as

they

become

adults,

a

sufficiently

strong

and effective

ense

of

ustice,

one

that

usually

overcomes

the

stresses nd temptations

of social

life.

Thus:

(7) Basic social institutionsgenerate an effective nd supporting

sense

of

ustice.

There

are other

aspects of

a

well-ordered

society, such

that

its

institutions re

a more

or

less self-sufficient

nd

productive

scheme

of

social

cooperation

for

mutual

good,

but

these

we

need

not consider

here.'-5

The essential thing

to note

is that

the

description

of

the

original

position is designed to incorporate the relevant formal featuresof a

well-ordered

ociety

enumerated

above.

A striking

spect

of

the account

of these

features

s that

we

have not

said

anything

very specific

about

the

content

of

the

public

conception

ofjustice.

The aim of

the

descrip-

15

Scc

Rcply

to

Alexander

and Musgravc,

Quarterly

ournal of

Economics

(November,

974), scc.

I.

548







tion

of the original

position

s to put togethern one conception

he

idea

of fairnesswith the

formal

alues expressed

y the

notionof a

well-ordered

ociety,

nd thento use this onception

ohelpus

select

between lternative

rinciples

f ustice. The principles hosenare,

we assume,

those most suitable

to

the

conditions

f

a well-ordered

societynd fair

o ts

members,incethese

rinciples

re

acknowledged

under

conditions hat

are fair.

Thus,

the idea

is

to

put

limits

on

admissible onceptions

f usticeby summing

p

the

force

f certain

formal

onstraints.

o much

is already

understood;

but the question

here

s: what

s

implied

bout admissible

onceptions f

the

good

(as

we might ephrase

urinitialquestion);

and are

the

resulting

imita-

tionsfairto the conceptions hat ose out or, rather, o thosepersons

whoseconceptions

hey re,

ormight e?

Now

it seems thatsomeconceptions

will

indeed be

excluded, nd

this anhappen

n

two

ways: a)

theymay be in

direct onflict

ith he

principles

f ustice;

or (b) theymay

be admissible

but fail to

gain

adherents

nder

the social conditions

f

a

well-ordered

ociety.

The

first ase

is illustrated y conceptions

f the good

that require

the

repression

or degradation

of certain

groups on,

say, racial

or ethnic or

perfectionist rounds. Examples of the second may be certain kinds of

religion.

Thus,

in

the

latter case,

suppose

that a particular

religion

and

the conception

f the

good

it

defines

an

survive nly f

t

controls

he

machinery

f stateand practices

ffective

ntolerance.

his

religion

will

cease to exist

n

a

well-orderedociety.

No doubt

there re such

cases;

otherconceptions

f the good

may persist

but always

among

relatively

mall segments

f society.

If

some conceptions

ill die out

and others urvive

nly barely

n a

well-orderedociety,does that mean that the originalposition s

arbitrarilyiased against

hese

iews?

do not

see

that

his

onclusion

follows.

n

anytheory

t all

some conceptions

re bound

to be

elim-

inated

and others

ssumea

minorrole.

In itself his s

no objection.

But

further,

t

seems that

a well-ordered

ociety

defines

a

fair

background

within

whichways

of ifehave

a reasonableopportunity

to establish

hemselves.

f

a conception

fthegoodis unable

to

endure

and gain adherents

nder nstitutions

f equal freedom

nd

mutual

toleration,nemustquestionwhethert is a viable conception f the

good,

and whether

ts

passing

is to

be

regretted.

We

might

say

that a

well-ordered

ociety etsup

a

situation

n which

Mill's choice

criterion f

the

good

can be fairly

pplied: those

ways

of ife re good

(or good

for

hosewho

affirm

hem)

that re consistent

ith

he

prin-

ciples

of

ustice

nd continue o

win advocatesover

generations

ithin

549








JfOHN

RAWLS

a

well-ordered

ociety.16

xperience

hows

hat

many

ways

of

life

will

pass

this est,

nd

ifnumbers

re

not

the

measure

f

success,

many

will

pass it equallysuccessfully:ifferentroups

of

peoplesharing

istinc-

tive

traditions

nd ways

of life

find

different

onceptions

qually

satisfying;

r

better,

we

can

attach

no

significance

o

denying

his

equality,

nor

do

we wish

to.

It is notnecessary

hat

a well-ordered

society

be

a situation

of perfect

airness

and

similarly

for

the

original

position).

t

is

enough

that

the

basic

structure

f a

well-

ordered

ociety

e

as

fair

background

f nstitutions

s

one

can

devise

against

which

to apply

Mill's criterion,

iven

he

conditions

f

human

life the

circumstances

f ustice).

Thuswe arrive t this entativenswer:whetherheoriginal osition

is arbitrarily

iased

in

favor

f

some conceptions

f

the

good

depends

on

whether

well-ordered

ociety

stablishes

air

background

ondi-

tions

for

ways

of

ife o

maintain

hemselves.

We

have

to

look

at

how

the

theory

works

tself

ut;

this

r

that

spect

of

theoriginal

osition

s

not

sufficient

o settle

he

matter.

efore

we

can

say

that

the

original

position

eads

to

individualistic

onceptions

nd arbitrarily

xcludes

communitarian

alues,

we

must

how

that

only

the

former

an

endure

in a well-orderedociety, rso predominatehatpeopleaffirminghe

latter

re

unable

to

flourish,

nd that

the conditions

hat ead

to

this

situation

are

unjust.

I have questioned

both

of

these

conclusions.

There

is

no

reason

why

a well-ordered

ociety

should

encourage

primarily

ndividualistic

alues

if thismeans

ways

of life

that

lead

individuals

o

pursue

their

wn

way

and

to have

no

concern

for

he

interests

f

others

although

respecting

heir

rights

nd

liberties).

Normally

one

would

expect

most people

to belong

to

one

or

more

associationsnd tohaveat least omecollectivends n this ense.The

basic

liberties

re not

intended

o

keep

persons

n isolation

from

ne

another,

r to persuade

hem

o

ive

private

ives,

ven though

ome

no

doubt

will,

but

to secure

theright

f

free

movement

etween

ssocia-

tions

and

smaller

communities.

here is,

to

be

sure,

one

collective

aim supported

by state

power

for

the

whole

well-ordered

ociety:

namely,

that

t

be

a

well-ordered

ociety,

just

society

wherein

he

common onception

f ustice

s

publicly

recognized;

but within

his

frameworkommunitarianimsmaybe pursued, nd quite possibly

by

thevast

majority

fpersons.

Other

ocially

ollective

nds

may

well

exist

besides

hat

ofbeing

well-ordered

ociety;

ut

these

nds

cannot

16

This

is

how

(following

G.

A. Paul)

I would

interpret

Utilitarianism,

h.

II,

pars.

2-i0,

and

On

Liberty,

h. III.

See A Theory

f Justice,

p. 209

f.

550








FAIRNESS

TO

GOODNESS

be

upheld

by the

coercive pparatus

of

the

state.

f

socially

ollective

communitarian

ims

could

survive

n no other

way,

why

should

we

regret

heir

demise,

and

consider

the

original

position

unfair

and

arbitrarily

iased

against

hem?

VII

Against

the

view

of the

preceding

section,

omeone might

say:

there

s

a

way

of

treating

ll conceptions

f

the good perfectly

airly-

namely,

o adopt

the

principle

fequal proportionate

atisfaction.

t

reads

s

follows:

nstitutions

re

to

be arranged

nd

income

nd

wealth

distributedo as to maximizethe fraction ,whereo < k

<

i,

that

measures

he

extent

o

which

everyone's

onception

f

the

good

is

to

be satisfied.

he

fraction

is

the

same

for

veryone,

o in

this

ense

ll

conceptions

f

thegood

are

equally

atisfied

nd

each

istreated

airly.17

A

few

comments

n this

criterion.

t

seems

that

t

is

best

applied

only

to

conceptions

f

the good

that

satisfy

he

principle

of

equal

liberty,

r

something

ike t,

and,

inorder

o allowpeople

a fair

hance

to

develop

and

form

heir

ims

and

interests,

e

should

lso

constrain

theseconceptions y theprincipleoffair opportunity.hus we are

really

onsidering

he

principle

fequal proportionate

atisfaction

s

a

substitute

or

hedifference

rinciple.

We should

note

next

that

the

size

ofk clearly

depends

on

what

people's

conceptions

f

the good

are.

With

given resources,

will

clearly

be larger

f

they

generally

have

conceptions

hat

are

more

easily

satisfied.

o although

k

must

be

the

same

for

veryone,

t

will

vary

from

ne

time

to

another

s

citizens'

ims

and

interests

hange.

In orderto determine ,we mayassume,forpurposes f llustration,

that

each person

has

a Neumann-Morgenstern

ardinal

utility

hat

s

bounded

both

above

and below.

Then

we can

use

the

zero-one

rule:

set

all

the

(greatest)

ower

bounds

equal

to zero,

and

all

the

(least)

upper

bounds

equal

to

one.

This

establishes

he

interpersonal

om-

parisons

equired

o

apply

the

principle

to

determine

hen

everyone

has

k utility

n the sense

defined).18

17

This

idea

is suggested

by

W.

F.

Frankena,

Some

Beliefs

about

Justice

(The Lindley Lecture, The University of Kansas,

i966),

pp.

i6

f; and

J.

N.

Findlay,

Values

and Intentions

London,

I

96 I),

pp.

30

I

f.

18

For

a brief

account

of

Neumann-Morgenstern

utility,

see

Guillermo

Owen,

Game Theory Philadelphia,

i968),

Ch.

VI,

pp.

I24-I35.

The

zero-sum

rule

and

some arguments

for

boundedness

are

noted

on

pp.

I33

f.

A

few

difficulties

with

this

rule

are

mentioned

in A.

K.

Sen,

Collective

hoice

nd

Social

Welfare

San

Francisco,

I970),

p.

98.

55I








JOHN

RAWLS

Now, as we noted

earlier,

the

conceptions

of the

good

that

ndividuals

form depend

in part

on their

natural

abilities

and

the

way

in which

these

are shaped

and realized by

social and

other

contingencies.

And if we

adopt

the principle

of equal proportionate

satisfaction,this

fact can

have striking

ffects

n the

allocation

of social

resources.

For

example,

someone may

have

a

strong

desire

to

study

quasars

with

powerful

radio

telescopes;

the aims of

other

people

may

be much

more

modest.

This principle

would

then require

society

to skew the

allocation

of resources

in an extreme

way

in favor of

the

person

interested

in

quasars.

Moreover,

it would

require

this

simply

on the

basis of the

conceptions

of

the good

that people

happen

to

have,

and

irrespective

of the co-operative relations between individuals and the mutual

effects hat

the

satisfaction

of

one

individual's

aims has on the

satis-

faction

of

the plans

of others,

except,

of course,

as this

is taken into

account

in maximizing

k. The

result

s

that the allocation

of

resources

is

highly

dependent

upon

the distribution

fabilities

and what different

people

happen

to

want badly,

and other arbitrary

contingencies.

Indeed,

it

seems

that this

principle,

which

at first

ight

may

strikeus as

fair,

has some very

peculiar

consequences.

For

example,

it

may

encourage people to develop, or claim to have developed, costly

conceptions

of the good

in

order

to shift

he

distribution

of the means

of satisfaction

n

their direction,

if

only

to

protect

themselves

against

the exorbitant

claims

of others.

A proponent

of

the

principle

of equal proportionate

satisfaction

might

try

to meet

these difficulties

s follows.19

There is no need

to

identify ndividuals

with their

existing

conceptions

of the good,

with

theiractual

plans

of

life.

A

more

adequate

interpretation

would

take

into account not only actual but possible plans as well. The lattercan

be

ascertained

by noting

people's

present

situations,

their abilities,

desires, and

social circumstances

generally,

and the developments

and

changes

that these

allow.

Thus society

can

induce or even require

individuals

to

alter their

plans

of life when

these

are relatively

more

costly to satisfy,

nd

in this

way

skewed and extreme

distributions

of

social resources

can

be

avoided.

To

be

sure,

if

such conceptions

of

the

good

exist,

they

must

affect

his distribution

t least for

the

time

being

and perhaps to some extent the eventual outcome; but the larger

distorting

ffects hould

be

reasonably

transitory.

If, however,

the principle

is defended

in

this way,

it no

longer

achieves its

original

purpose-namely,

to define

an

independent

cri-

19

am

indebted

o RobertCooter

for

discussion

n

this

point.

552








FAIRNESS

TO

GOODNESS

terion

for

treating

conceptions

of

the

good

fairly.

For

now

the

principle

is

followed

only

on

the

condition

that

the

distribution

to

which

it

leads

is

not

too

unequal;

but

the

limit

on

inequalities

and

the

reasons

for

this

imit

are

still

to

be

specified.

Should

one

appeal

to

some

notion

of

maximizing

satisfactions, he

principle

would

become

a

variant

of

that of

utility

(although

one

constrained

by

the

other

principles

of

justice).

I

shall

not

pursue

this

question

further

ere.

Instead,

we

may

observe

that in

justice

as

fairness

ndividuals

are

not

identified

with

their

actual

or

possible

plans

but are

viewed

rather

as

beings

that

have

a

capacity

for

forming,

adopting,

and

changing

these

plans,

should

they

be so

moved;

and

who

give

priority

to

preserving

their

liberty

in these matters.People are assumed to have a

highest-order

nterest

in

how

all

their

other

nterests,

ven

their

fundamental

ones,

are

shaped

and

regulated

by

social

institutions.

They

do

not think

of

themselves

as

inevitably

bound

to the

pursuit

of

any

particular

complex of

ends

that

they

may

have.

The

two

principles of

ustice

are

seen

as

securing

the

social

institutions

hat

are

required

if

individuals'

original

allegiance

and

continued

devotion

to

their

ends

and

aspirations

are

to

be

formed

and

affirmed

nder

conditions

that

are

free.

Another point is the following: the principle ofequal proportionate

satisfaction

hares

with

the

principle

of

utility

the

idea

that

wants

and

desires,

as

such,

establish a

claim

to

social

resources.

Other

things,

uch

as

the

strength of

claims

based

on

relations of

co-operation

and

the

extent

of

one's

contribution,

are

derivative

from

this.

By

contrast,

n

justice

as

fairness

he

notion

of

primary goods

is

defined

and a

measure

based on an

index

of

these

goods

is

established.

The

difference

rinciple

then

works

as a

principle

of

contribution:

ocial

and

economic

inequali-

tiesare governedby the rule that thegreaterbenefits ttached to insti-

tutional

positions

(as

indicated

by

the

index) are

justified

only

if

they

serve

to

improve the

situation

of

those in

less

favored

positions.

Implicit

in

the

use

of

primary goods is

the

following

conception:

since

we

view

persons

as

capable of

mastering and

adjusting

their

wants

and

desires,

they

are

held

responsible for

doing

so

(assuming

that

the

principles of

ustice

are

fulfilled).

ociety

on

its

part

accepts the

responsibility

or

maintaining certain

basic

liberties

and

opportunities

and forprovidinga fairshare ofprimarygoods withinthisframework,

leaving

it

to

individuals

and

associations

to

form

nd to

revise

their

ims

and

preferences

accordingly.

Thus

there is

an

understanding

among

members

of

a

well-ordered

society

that

as

citizens

they

will

press

claims

only

for

ertain

kinds of

things

nd

in

ways

allowed for

by

the

principles

of

ustice.

Strong

feelings

and

zealous

aspirations

for certain

goals

do

553








JOHN

RAWLS

not,

as such,

give people

a claim

upon

social resources

or

the design

of

public

institutions.

t is

not

implied

that

those

with the same

index

have

equal

well-being,

all

things onsidered;

for

their

nds

are

generally

different

nd

many otherfactors re relevant.But forpurposesofsocial

justice,

this is

the

appropriate

basis

of

comparison.

The

theory

of

primary

goods

is

a generalization

of

the notion

of needs,

which

are

distinct

from aspirations

and

desires.

So

we

could

say:

as

citizens

the

members

of

a well-ordered

society

take

responsibility

or dealing

justly

with

one

another

on

the

basis of

a public

measure

of

(generalized)

needs,

while

as individuals

they

and members

of

associations

take

responsibility

for

their preferences

nd

devotions.

Thus followingout the idea ofthe original position,we do not take

plans

of

ife conceptions

of

the

good)

as

given;

nor

do

we maximize

the

satisfaction

of any specified

set of plans.

Instead

the

institutions

nd

distributions

f a

well-ordered

society

set

up

a

just background

scheme

and

a fair principle

of contribution

for shifting

he

primary

goods

of

income

and wealth

so

that

individuals

may

form

nd

pursue

whatever

(admissible)

plans

they

wish

in

ways

that serve

their

mutual

benefit

(as

measured

by

primary

goods).

We should

not

speak

of

fairness

to

conceptionsof the good, but offairness o moral personswitha capacity

for adopting

these conceptions

and caring

about

the

conditions

under

which they

are formed.

Fairness

to

persons

may

be achieved

by

a

well-

ordered

society

even

though

all

(admissible)

conceptions

of the

good

do

not flourishequally

and

some

hardly

at all.

This

is because

it

is

fairness

o

persons

that

is

primary

and

not

fairness

o conceptions

of

the

good

as such.

Only

those

conceptions

that

can endure

and

flourish

under

conditions

establishing

fairness

o

persons

have claims,

and

then

only in the name of those persons and associations whose claims they

represent.

JOHN

RAWLS

Harvard University

554

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