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Falling Rubber Prices in Northern Laos: Local Responses and Policy Op:ons
Thoumthone Vongvisouk, PhD Na:onal University of Laos, Faculty of Forestry Sciences
Michael Dwyer, PhD University of Bern, Centre for Development and Environment
MRLG Regional Stakeholder Workshop
24 February, 2016
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Singapore Commodity Exchange, No. 3 Smoked Rubber Sheets (Index Mundi)
CNY/kg
Rubber (plan:ng) boom 7 years later
CONTEXT
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. How are rubber producers and government officials responding to the recent fall in rubber prices?
2. Are producer responses related to produc:on arrangements, and if so, how and why?
3. How are rubber prices in northern Laos actually determined?
STUDY DESIGN
Broad not deep • 2 provinces, 5 districts, 7 villages • Qualita:ve > Quan:ta:ve • 20 days of fieldwork Interviews with: • PAFO, PICO et al. (n=8) • DAFO, DICO et al. (n=15) • Village representa:ves (n=7) • Private sector actors (n=3) • TOTAL: 33 interviews with 68 parWcipants Literature review • Connect plan:ng with harves:ng • Build on VT (2015) and Shi (2015)
RESULTS
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Average annual purchase price for rubber, northern Laos (Luang Namtha Provincial Investment and Commerce Office sta:s:cs)
Singapore Commodity Exchange, No. 3 Smoked Rubber Sheets (Index Mundi)
CNY/kg
1. Provincial Rubber Management CommiZee (LNT) • Promo:ng farmer marke:ng groups • Calcula:ng recommended prices • Brokering (nego:a:ng) rubber purchases • Banning land conversion
Provincial Rubber Management Commiaee created
VERY LIMITED LEVERAGE
RQ 1
Banning land conversion (LNT only)
UNDER-‐REPORTING?
RQ 1
2. Not enforcing contracted floor prices
Contracted floor prices were the excep:on, not the rule: • 4 of 7 companies discussed did not have them. (Total: 3 LNT, 4 OUD) But in the 3 cases we found, these seem to not be enforced. • Viengphoukha District: there is contracted floor price, but the company
“could not afford to pay based on the contract.” (Gov’t interview) • Xai District: “this set price [of LAK 5,000/kg] have not been enforced … .
Rubber prices in our province and district are based on what buyer offers. (Gov’t interview)
• Houn District: “The floor prices set in the contract is 5.000 k/kg, but the company s:ll pay lesser than floor prices. The company is not payment based on the contract. We proposed this the provincial level many :me, but we did not receive any responses from the provincial level. At the district, we also proposed the district mee:ng, but again no responses from the district authori:es.” (Gov’t interview)
RQ 1
3. Encouraging farmers to sWck with rubber
“It is not maaer rich or poor; whoever have rubber planta:on and pa:ent in working in their rubber planta:on will get income.”
(LNT-‐NT DAFO) “Although rubber prices are falling at LAK 5,000–6,000/kg is OK for local people to tap rubber – they gain from rubber planta:on [more] than other agricultural ac:vi:es.”
(OUD PAFO)
THE BAN HAT NYAO STORY
RQ 1
1. Wai:ng for prices to rise (not tapping) 2. Tapping with household labor 3. Land sales to wealthier buyers in or out of village 4. Land leases to outside investors for conversion to other crops
(e.g. bananas) 5. Aggrega:on (including collec:ve ac:on) to aaract higher prices
Responses by rubber producers RQ 2
1. WaiWng for prices to rise (not tapping) 2. Tapping with household labor 3. Land sales to wealthier buyers in or out of village 4. Land leases to outside investors for conversion to other crops
(e.g. bananas) 5. Aggrega:on (including collec:ve ac:on) to aaract higher prices
Responses by rubber producers RQ 2
“With [prices at] 4 Yuan/kg, we have to tap our rubber by ourselves. In the case of households that have large area of rubber planta:on, they tap only liale part of their rubber planta:on based on their household labor forces.”
(Village interview, Ban Hat Nyao)
1. WaiWng for prices to rise (not tapping) 2. Tapping with household labor 3. Land sales to wealthier buyers in or out of village 4. Land leases to outside investors for conversion to other crops
(e.g. bananas) 5. Aggrega:on (including collec:ve ac:on) to aaract higher prices
“Selling rubber planta:ons is normal [here] – it depends on having buyers. The growers [who sell] are mainly poor households in villages. Buyers are mainly businessmen from the province [capital] as well as Chinese investors. … However, during the falling rubber prices, no one wants to buy rubber planta:on.”
(Government interview, Oudomxai)
Responses by rubber producers RQ 2
Rubber prices
Posted rubber price, Yunnan Rubber Co. factory, Luang Namtha
1. Floor prices not enforced: 3 examples 2. Recommended prices > actual prices 3. “Prices are mainly based on what buyers
propose.” (Gov’t interview)
RQ 3
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Prices paid to ru
bber fa
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XSB (KIs, Tang et al. 2009)
XSB (Online data)
Provincial sta:s:cs LNT
Village interviews LNT-‐Sing
Village interviews LNT-‐NT
Village interviews LNT-‐VPK
Village interviews OUD-‐Xai
Village interviews OUD-‐Houn
Where rubber prices come from
• Prices drop by ~ half from China to Laos • Some of this is probably quality-‐related, but some is
market power.
RQ 3
CONCLUSIONS 1. Boom crop vs. strategic commodity? Lao producers losing
twice: to a global boom crop and a Chinese strategic crop 2. This is selecWng for wealthier rubber producers. If a
smallholder model is going to prevail, a more regulated model is needed. Enforcing floor prices is just the :p of the iceberg.
3. Ban Hat Nyao: we need to learn the right lessons: • Shiv from public to private credit launched the land market • Hat Nyao got lucky in the price environment; smallholders today
need price supports. 4. More research needed on (a) households impacts of
tapping at low prices; (b) distribu:on of rubber holdings; (c) role of debt in land conversions and transac:ons; and (d) Chinese agribusiness strategy & market power.
Full Report (53 pages): hap://www.laofab.org/document/view/2827 Execu:ve Summary (3 pages): hap://www.laofab.org/document/view/2828 Presenta:on (37 slides): hap://www.laofab.org/document/view/2829
Acknowledgments MAF DAEC, Somxay Sisanonh, LURAS Project, Helvetas, Andrew Bartlea Representa:ves of: • Hat Nyao, Sop Sim, Oudomsin, Phiyer, Nam Ngeun, Kor Noi and Mokpalai
villages • Luang Namtha PAFO, PICO, PDPI • Namtha DAFO, DICO • Sing DAFO, DICO, DDPI, DFO • Vieng Phou Kha DAFO, DICO, DFO • Oudomxai PAFO, PICO, PDPI, PFO • Xai DAFO, DICO, DDPI • Houn DAFO, DICO, DDPI • Sino-‐Lao Rubber Company • Yunnan Rubber Company
NUoL Faculty of Forestry, Mr. Chimmy Bounlom
Melanie Canet, Weiyi Shi, Dietrich Schmidt-‐Vogt, Zhuang-‐Fang Yi