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Family Feuds: Digital Battles Over thePlace of Women in Contemporary IranNiki Akhavana

a The Catholic University of America, Washington DC, USAPublished online: 08 Aug 2014.

To cite this article: Niki Akhavan (2014): Family Feuds: Digital Battles Over the Place of Women inContemporary Iran, Middle East Critique, DOI: 10.1080/19436149.2014.938515

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2014.938515

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Family Feuds: Digital Battles Over the Placeof Women in Contemporary Iran

NIKI AKHAVANThe Catholic University of America, Washington DC, USA

ABSTRACT Late marriages, rising divorce rates, and women outnumbering their male counterpartson university campuses are among the most striking indicators of major shifts in the position ofwomen and the family in contemporary Iran. In the post-revolutionary state, where officiallysanctioned discourses largely have addressed women’s roles and rights in terms relating to family,marriage and motherhood, these changes constitute a crisis. To address this crisis and to reframediscourses on women, the Iranian state has provided substantial support for the production ofmaterial that emphasizes the essential links between women and family. Recognizing the influenceof New Media in general and the online successes of dissenting voices in particular, state actorsand supporters have supplemented the explosion in offline material about women and the familywith digital sites for promoting similar content. With a focus on New Media, this article interrogatessuch attempts to define and circumscribe discourses on women within frameworks pertaining to thefamily. Drawing from online venues dedicated to women’s issues (such asMehrkhaneh, a ‘news andanalysis site on women and the family,’ and Charghad, which describes itself as a site for the‘Muslim Iranian Girl’), the article also highlights the internal inconsistencies of conservativediscourses on women and examines the reasons why these sites have been unable to garner popularparticipation. In addition, the article argues that the push to redirect the conversations about womenmust be understood not only in relation to the changing status of women and marriage but also mustbe placed in a broader context where the state’s views and policies on women constantly are beingchallenged by foreign media, reformist and independent activists, and even dissenters within thefactionalized power establishment.

KEY WORDS: Digital divide; divorce; conservatives; family; Islamic feminists; marriage;motherhood; state funded media; new media; opposition; reform movement; women

In post-revolutionary Iran, state sanctioned discourses largely have addressed the roles

and rights of women in terms relating to family, marriage, and motherhood. The rise of

the reform movement in the late 1990s and the appearance of independent feminist

campaigners in the new millennium posed a challenge to such frameworks, and official

responses to competing narratives and activities relating to women in Iran have been

multifold: Alongside various steps toward suppressing opposing voices such as harassing

and arresting activists, undermining or shutting down women’s studies departments,

and supporting legislation aimed at undermining women’s social and legal progress, the

production of material emphasizing the essential links between women and family has

q 2014 Editors of Middle East Critique

Correspondence Address: Department of Media Studies, The Catholic University of America, 620 Michigan

Ave., NE, Washington, DC, 20064, USA. Email: Akhavan@cua.edu

Middle East Critique, 2014

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2014.938515

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been highly encouraged. The rising number of books, television show forums, and public

declarations (including by Supreme Leader Khamenehi) about women and the family are

evidence of this. Given that most offline publications and public spaces are regulated

to varying degrees by state institutions, many oppositional activists use the Internet as

a primary site for writing or organizing around women’s rights issues. Recognizing

the influence of New Media in general and the online successes of dissenting voices

in particular, the explosion in offline material about women and the family has been

accompanied by an intensification of digital sites for promoting similar content. Focusing

on two digital magazines, Mehrkhaneh1 and Charghad,2 this article examines the digital

manifestation of the push to define and circumscribe discourses on women within

frameworks pertaining to the family. An examination of these digital attempts reveals that

they are not without complication or surprising elements. Some of these complexities arise

from the internal inconsistencies in the conservative approaches to the issue, but also they

can be attributed to the specificities of the digital spaces where these discussions are taking

place, where feedback, even when moderated, is visible to larger audiences.

Crisis of Women and the Family

State sanctioned discourses on women and the family and their expansion across various

platforms have been shaped in relation to several factors: The rise of reformist and

independent women’s rights activism in the late 1990s; developments in media

technologies and official strategies for increasing participation in digital spaces; and

perhaps most importantly, the socio-economic realities for women in Iran in the face of

high unemployment, the increasing age of marriage, and steep divorce rates, among

other issues. Various analysts and writers often have credited the advent of the reform

movement and its electoral successes in the late 1990s with catalyzing the creation of

official and independent arenas for political and social action. Although these spaces

eventually would be sacrificed in the power struggles between reformist and conservative

factions, the explosion in news and literary publications as well as the formation of various

civil society organizations created a lively forum for cultural production and political

participation.3 This era also stimulated developments in the work of secular and

Islamic feminists alike.4 Because such a large number of feminists—whether or not

1 http://mehrkhane.com/; accessed February 17, 2014.2 http://charghad.ir/about; accessed February 17, 2014.3 Much has been written about the factional infighting following the reformist victories in the late 1990s

and early 2000s and the consequences of these power struggles for political and cultural work in Iran.

While a majority of these discussions targeted popular audiences, scholars in diverse disciplines also have

taken on the issue. For background and analysis, see G. Khiabany and A. Sreberny (2001) The Iranian press

and the continuing struggle over civil society 1998–2000, International Communication Gazette, 63(2–3),

pp. 203–223; and V. A. Zoeram and L. Y. Fee (2010) Criticism in Public Sphere: The Press Development in

Iran’s Civil Society, 1997–2000, Journal of Politics and Law, 3(2), pp. 222–238.4 The history and definitions of what constitutes ‘Islamic feminism’ is much contested and beyond the scope of

this paper. For background on the topic and the debates it has engendered, see Ziba Mir-Hosseini (2006)

Muslim women’s quest for equality: Between Islamic law and feminism, Critical Inquiry, 32(4), pp. 629–645;

Z. Mir-Hosseini (1999) Islam and gender: The religious debate in contemporary Iran (Princeton, NJ:

Princeton University Press); and V. Moghadam (2002) Islamic feminism and its discontents: Toward a

resolution of the debate, Signs, 27(4), pp. 1135–1171.

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they considered themselves Islamic feminists—either explicitly identified with or were

sympathetic to the reformist cause, women’s rights became yet another site of factional

conflict and muscle-flexing.5

For conservatives aligned with the most powerful elements in the political structure,

factional disputes in relation to women often has manifested itself in the following forms:

Suppression of women’s rights activists and organizations;6 legislation and policy battles;

and both engaging and restricting media as it pertains to women. In 1998, for example,

when conservatives held a majority in the Majles [parliament], two bills on women

became law: One extended gender segregation codes to medicine while the second

objected to what it deemed un-Islamic formulations of women’s rights and depictions of

women in Iranian media. As Ziba Mir-Hosseini has pointed out, both laws were unrealistic

and proved impossible to implement. Nonetheless, they were clear legislative attempts

at challenging reformist promises to improve the position of women.7 Although the

subsequent Majles (2000–2004) held a reformist majority that tried to address legal

inequalities facing women, the conservative Council of Guardians vetoed most of their

efforts. Relevant bills that were allowed to become law were weakened significantly by

amendments demanded by the Council of Guardians.8

By the end of Khatami’s second term, conservatives enjoyed a revival, with gains that

would become apparent in local councils, the Majles, and ultimately in 2005, with the

election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president. Although the reformists were greatly

weakened, their policy and legislative differences with the conservatives over issues

pertaining to women continued. In fact, increased infighting during Ahmadinejad’s two

terms as president further complicated factional power struggles, which in turn had

consequences for how questions pertaining to women and the family were handled.

Specifically, several proposed policies and bills not only catalyzed opposition by reformist

and secular activists, but also caused tensions among conservatives.

In 2012, for example, the Minister of Education, Kamran Daneshjoo, and other officials

sought to enact new segregation regulations restricting enrollment in certain degree

programs by gender. Outnumbered by their female classmates on many college campuses

throughout the country, male students would be the primary beneficiaries of these new

policies. Not surprisingly, the proposed policies received considerable negative attention in

diaspora and opposition circles. Yet conservatives were also divided on the issue, including

5 For further details on the conservative-reformist battles over women’s rights from 1997–2002, please see

Z. Mir-Hosseini (2002) The Conservative–Reformist Conflict Over Women’s Rights in Iran, International

Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 16(1), pp. 37–53.6 This aspect of official reactions to women’s activism has received the most attention, particularly outside Iran,

and is well documented in the reports of human rights organizations and foreign state-funded media. The arrest

and harassment of the members of the OneMillion Signature Campaign for Equality—a campaign launched in

2006 to demand changes to discriminatory laws against women—is an often-cited example of how the state

has attempted to suppress women’s rights work. The official website of the Campaign is available at http://

www.we-change.org/; accessed February 17, 2014.7 Mir-Hosseini, The Conservative–Reformist Conflict, p. 40.8 Z. Mir-Hosseini and V. Hamzic (2010) Control and Sexuality: The Revival of Zina Laws in Muslim Contexts

(London: Women Living Under Muslim Laws), p. 106. More specifically, Mir-Hosseini and Hamzic point out

that a bill aiming to raise the minimum age of marriage to 18 was changed to allow girls to marry at 13 and

boys at 15. Another bill aimed at making divorce equally accessible to men and women was weakened to allow

only expansion of grounds for divorce and increased custody rights for women.

Digital Battles Over Women’s Place in Contemporary Iran 3

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Ahmadinejad, who disagreed with his own minister. In so doing, Ahmadinejad earned the

wrath of one of his most ardent conservative critics, the Majles representative Ali

Motahhari. The latter politician defended these policies in terms of their implications for

sexuality, and therefore morality, on Iranian campuses and in Iranian society generally.9

In short, the potential of women’s upward mobility in education implicitly was linked to the

breakdown of the society’s moral fabric.

Similar concerns, this time literally involving women’s mobility, were apparent in the

introduction of and debates around a passport law that aimed to place restrictions on

women’s travel. In its original iteration proposed in April 2012, the Passport and Exit Law

would require that single women under the age of 40 obtain the permission of a male

guardian to leave the country. For married women, the bill required not only the

permission of a woman’s husband to leave the country, but also required the husband’s

permission to obtain a passport.10 Like the proposed changes to universities, the reactions

to this bill similarly defied ideological and factional categorization. Indeed, the internal

opposition from conservatives was so strong that a member of the national security

committee in the Majles, Mohammad-Hassan Asefari, directly credited ‘basiji sisters

and (female) seminary students’ for the repeal of the passport bill.11 The justification

provided by the bill’s supporters is as important as their acknowledgment that

conservative women had played a role in killing it. Namely, supporters claimed that the

aim of the law was to protect women ‘who had been taken advantage of . . . primarily in

the countries around the Persian Gulf.’12 Whether the proposed bill had been motivated

mainly by the case of such women, the paternalism underlying the bill and its justification

is unmistakable. This urge to underline the authority of the male guardian must be read

in relation to the broader context where ruling forces in the power structure implicitly

or directly blame women’s upward mobility in the public sphere for the rising age of

marriage and divorce rates.

Ironically, the state itself has played a central role in promoting women’s education.

According to Bahramitash and Kazemipour, the post-revolutionary Iranian government’s

investments in schools and literacy programs for both children and adult populations

resulted in notable improvements in female literacy and education, which they identify as

a major factor explaining the increase in the mean minimum age of marriage. They also

note a decline in the number of married women, whether they are women who never marry

or who remain single after a divorce.13 Similarly, divorce rates have risen significantly in

9 N. Shahrokhi and P. Dokouhaki (2012) A Separation at Iranian Universities, Middle East Research and

Information Project, October 18, available online at www.merip.org/mero/mero101812; accessed February

17, 2014. According to Shahrokhi and Dokouhaki, Motahhari claimed that Ahmadinejad’s opposition to the

policies were in line with his too liberal leanings in the cultural sphere in general and that these tendencies

would lead to moral and sexual problems.10 International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran (2013) Lawyer and Women’s Rights Activist Hopes

Discriminatory Passport Law Does Not Pass, January Available online at: http://www.iranhumanrights.org/

2013/01/passport_women/; accessed February 17, 2014.11 Bultan News (27 Feb. 2013) Vakonesh-e Khaharan-e Talabe va Basiji bar Laghv-e Ghanoon-e Gozarname

Taseer Gozar Bood [The reactions of Basiji sisters and seminary students was influential in the repeal of the

passport law]. Available online at: http://www.bultannews.com/fa/news/128003; accessed February 17, 2014.12 Ibid (author’s translation).13 R. Bahramitash and S. Kazemipour (2006) Myths and Realities of the Impact of Islam on Women: Changing

Marital Status in Iran, Critique, 15(2), pp. 111–128.

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post-revolutionary Iran. Tracking the number of divorces for every 1,000 marriages,

Aghajanian and Thompson have illustrated a steady increase in the rate of divorce starting

in 1997, such that by the new millenium Iran qualifies as a “high divorce country.”

Specifically, they point out that:

By 1997, the rate of divorce started to increase slowly from a rate of 78 per 1,000

marriages to a higher level of 82 per 1,000 and then, by 2001, it jumped to 94 per

1,000. Since then the rate has accelerated, reaching a level as high as 153 divorces

per 1,000 marriages in 2011. This high rate demonstrates an increase of almost 45%

over the rate in 2006.14

They also note that the rates for divorce have been consistently higher in urban areas, and

posit two important factors that must be taken into consideration to explain the steep

increases: Economic hardships in Iran (inflation, unemployment, high competition for few

positions, etc.) and access to media that is outside the purview of the Iranian state. Namely,

content available on the Internet and via satellite channels raise expectations for material

goods and lifestyles that are not easily attainable.15

Thus, the context for the rise of material online that variously is sanctioned or approved

by state institutions is one where the sanctity of marriage appears to be unraveling, women

show striking improvements in their education levels but continue to face challenges in

meeting their employment potential,16 and both independent and foreign state-sponsored

media are seen as a dual threat to the Iranian state and society. The entry of the Iranian

state and its supporters into the digital media sphere, of course, is not new and dates to the

earliest days of the Internet in Iran. While state participation as an active promoter of

online content has increased steadily, its involvement in both repressing and producing

material on the Internet intensifies during times of crisis.17 In the case of the sites

considered below, the crisis is the situation of women and the family in Iran. These digital

manifestations of attempts to shape the discourses and circumstances of Iranian women

reveal the paradoxes and complexities of conservative positions on new media and

women’s issues alike.

Designing Virtual Homes for Women and Family

Both Charghad and Mehrkhaneh cover women’s issues from angles compatible with

officially-sanctioned frameworks, but their tone, and to some extent, their target

audiences, are distinct. This is evident in their aesthetics and self-description.Mehrkhaneh

is well designed and easy to navigate, with a familiar news site layout that includes photos

but is dominated by written text. The site carries original material as well as republished

news, analysis, and photography. It also includes a number of high quality infographics on

14 A. Aghajanian and V. Thompson (2013) Recent Divorce Trends in Iran, Journal of Divorce & Remarriage, 54

(2), p. 116.15 Ibid, p. 120.16 N. Mehdizadeh (2012) ‘Beyond Cultural Stereotypes: EducatedMothers’ Experiences of Work andWelfare in

Iran, Critical Social Policy, 33(2), pp. 243–265.17 For a periodization and description of the state’s relationship to new media, see N. Akhavan (2013) Electronic

Iran: the Cultural Politics of an Online Evolution (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press).

Digital Battles Over Women’s Place in Contemporary Iran 5

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a range of issues including women and family law during various Majles sessions,18

women’s organizations from the Constitutional era to the present,19 and fertility rates over

the last 120 years,20 among others. In an apparent effort to experiment with multimedia,

the site includes an underdeveloped audio section with several short ‘workshop’ programs

on themes of sexual and family health.21 This material leaves little doubt about the site’s

major focus on interlinked issues of women and the family.

Mehrkhaneh’s archives show that it seems to have had a slow start, with much early

content focusing on international news about women as individuals or groups such as the

parliamentary campaign ofAung San SuuKyi ormarriage in India as a tactic to avoid sexual

harassment. Much of the early material is not original, as most pieces previously appeared

in other publications. However, the main concerns of the site have remained largely

unchanged. Mehrkhaneh situates itself as an advocate for women in Iran, often including

material about the challenges for women in the face of cultural and technological changes.

The site also shows a marked interest in developments in the Majles that impact women.

Articles about Majles debates and policies on women and family have been a core

component from the outset. The site also inserts itself in controversial issues, such as the

earlier noted passport bill.

Although there are parallels in positions between Mehrkhaneh and other women’s

organizations and activists from across the political spectrum, Merhkhaneh’s stances are

distinguishable by their emphasis on family and marriage as the dominant lens for locating

and assessing women’s issues in contemporary Iran. This emphasis is clear in its content,

its self-description, and its affiliation with the Tarranom-e Andisheh Organization,

which was founded in February 2013. On its website, Tarranom-e Andisheh claims to

be a non-partisan, non-governmental organization, founded to ‘advertise and promote

the discourses of the Islamic Revolution in relation to women and the family.’22

The organization notes that it will focus on media and educational workshops as a means

for spreading the message of the Islamic Revolution and women as articulated by

Ayatollahs Khomeini and Khamenehi.23 Describing itself as a base for developing and

spreading the discourses of the Islamic revolution, Mehrkhaneh also acknowledges the

18 Mehrkhaneh (2012) Ghavaneen-e masoob-e hozey-e zanan, az doreh-e aval ta hashtom-e Majles, Infography

[Laws on women passed by the First through Eighth Parliaments, an Infographic], October 13, available online

at: http://tinyurl.com/lpyhgl5; accessed February 17, 2014; and ibid, ‘Ghavaneen-e khanvedeh dar Iran az

ebteda’i-e enghelab ta konoon, infography [Family law in Iran from the beginning of the Revolution to the

present, an infographic, November 7], available online at: http://tinyurl.com/jw9vbt7; accessed February 17,

2014.19 Ibid, ‘Tashakol-e zanan az mashrooteh ta enqelab-e Islami’ (August 5) [Women’s organizations from the

Constitutional era to the Islamic Revolution], available online at: http://tinyurl.com/qy3aws6; accessed

February 17, 2014.20 Ibid, ‘Tahavol-e mizan-e barvari az 1270 ta konoon (September 3) [Fertility rates from 1890 to the present],

available online at: http://tinyurl.com/lk35rka; accessed February 17, 2014.21 Ibid, passim, see website, http://mehrkhane.com/fa/ava; accessed February 17, 2014.22 Tarranom-e andisheh website, which is available in English and Persian at: http://tarannomandisheh.ir/About/.

Ayatollah Khomeini’s photo is atop both the English and Persian pages with an accompanying quote:

‘The nation whose women have been always at the front to promote the Islamic aspirations and objectives

won’t be damaged.’ The Persian and English sites are available at http://tarannomandisheh.ir/ and http://

tarannomandisheh.ir/en/default.aspx, respectively, accessed February 17, 2014.23 Ibid.

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existence of other groups working on women in Iran but considers itself unique in having a

holistic approach to the issue:

Currently there are various groups with different approaches that are concerned with

reforming the situation of women and families in Iran and work toward this end.

But none have been able to address all aspects of the issue with one comprehensive

look and to design a plan and execute a plan based on it . . . The Mehrkhaneh

news-analysis site has been established with the hope that, alongside analyzing and

investigating problems from various angles, it can provide a space for dialogue and

the exchange of opinions that is free from pre-judgment or labeling so that it can

provide a way for people with ideas to solve problems.24

In contrast to Mehrkhaneh’s serious tone and conventional design, Charghad’s image-

heavy pages, bright colors, and unique layout indicate a youthful and fresh outlook.

Taking on a more personal tone than the former, Charghad, which described itself as a site

specifically for the ‘Muslim girl,’25 also considers that it is fulfilling a unique role

despite the multiplicity of existing organizations and institutions that cover the issue.

Addressing its audience in a familiar manner, it answers the question of ‘Why Charghad?’

as follows:

Yes, you are right, there are many sites and digital and non-digital magazines that

work on women’s issues. There are also news services and sites that may not

specialize in women’s issues but often have a service or section that is devoted to

them. And this means that if there is to be a new digital magazine that announces its

arrival or if there is an existing magazine that wants to refresh itself and grow, it

must have something new to say. What does Charghad have to say that is new? . . .

Charghad is a home for the Iranian Muslim girl, with all of her characteristics.

[She is] a girl who has remained a stranger, even though her name always is

repeated, and she always is a topic of discussion. And no one officially wants to

recognize who she really is. Television series have not been successful in showing

her in all her dimensions, nor has the cinema depicted her as she really is. Women’s

rights activists do not know her (or want to know her!), nor do the religious and

traditional segments take her updated identity into consideration.26

Both Mehrkhaneh and Charghad not only recognize but also emphasize the polyphony of

voices that speak on the issue of women. They present themselves more as antidotes to the

overabundance of existing representations and activism on women rather than as sites that

fulfill gaps. Their proposed correctives to current discourses expose what is at the heart of

contemporary debates about Iranian women. Charghad’s emphasis on ‘girl’ rather than

woman and its hip design indicate a target audience of young, unmarried women. The site

24 Mehrkhaneh (ND) Darbarey-e Ma [about us], available online at: http://mehrkhane.com/fa/about; accessed

February 17, 2014.25 Charghad, online at: http://charghad.ir/about, accessed February 17, 2014.26 Charghad ‘Charghad chera?’ [Why Charghad? ], available online at: charghad.ir/why-charghad; accessed

February 17, 2014 (author’s translation).

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is user-friendly, full of photos and illustrations, and provides options that allow readers to

remove pictures easily before printing. It also is integrated visibly into various social

media platforms. All of these features are appropriate for attracting the younger audience it

seeks. Despite the emphasis on Muslim ‘girls’ and younger audiences, however, Charghad

promotes content that is in line with the shift to family in conservative discourses on

women. Notably, despite the emphasis on content by and about girls, the managing

director of the publication is a cleric, Ahmad Najmi. The presence of a male overseer for a

site promoting the voices of women and girls is not the only paradoxical feature of

Charghad. Indeed, a closer look at both publications reflects a range of contradictions and

the challenges they face in their attempts to impact discourses on women in Iran by

framing women’s issues in terms of the family.

Conventional Content: The Push Toward Home and Family

For all its focus on girls (i.e., single women), Charghad carries many pieces about

marriage and family, often stressing the unhappiness or yearning of those who have yet to

get married or to have children. In an article reflecting on marriage, for example, the

author, Sara Erfani, a frequent contributor to the site and a well-known novelist, regrets

not having had children sooner, and she attributes the decision of postponing having

children to a kind of selfishness. Speaking on behalf of herself and her husband, she

notes: ‘If we had experienced the good taste of having children earlier, we may have

put aside our intellectual posturing and we would not have deprived ourselves from

having a celestial angel for the sake of a few trips for two and a few months of love and

pleasure.’27

In another article, ‘I am sad for you Women,’ the author Sarah Minayee laments that

childbearing has become a choice. Identifying modernity as the root cause of why women

have turned against their nature, she asserts that the question of whether to have children is

predicated on a worldview that should be incongruent for Muslim women:

This question is a humanist question, it is a question that only comes up in societies

where humans determine their own fate, a society where God does not give children

to humans, humans decide whether to have children or not, a society where humans

are not created, they are creators. Where they are not servants but masters, a society

where humans have risen up against their nature and in which they act against their

nature, based on their desire and their selves . . . Becoming a mother is not a choice.

It is a capacity. It is an opportunity. It is you passing the matriculation exams.

Becoming a mother is becoming beautiful. Becoming a mother is really difficult, but

it is really good. And I am sad, for all the children who could have been born but

were not, for all the mothers who could have grown wings but did not. I am sad for

myself, because I don’t have wings yet, I haven’t flown yet, and I still am sitting in a

27 S. Erfani (2012) Oboor az roozha-ye do nafareh [Moving beyond the days of couples], Charghad, 15 August.

Online at: http://charghad.ir/4203/%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B1%

D9%88%D8%B2%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D9%88-%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%

87; accessed February 17, 2014 (author’s translation).

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world where women who can fly construct the question of whether or not to become

a mother.28

Unlike Erfani’s piece, which makes an attempt to prompt women to choose motherhood,

Minayee dismisses the choice all together. Other pieces offer a more complicated picture of

competing desires for contemporary conservative women. For example, Fatemeh Alamadar,

a sociology doctoral student at Tehran University, addresses her child in expressing the guilt

she feels for pursuing a higher degree. The article’s title, ‘A homemaking mother is always

more holy, but . . . is a mother who is a student, a sinner?,’29 takes for granted the moral

superiority of being a stay-at-home mother, but the article presents a justification for a

mother’s pursuit of a higher degree:

To tell you the truth, I think that my studying and being social and working are

necessary for me to be a good mother, so that I can understand you better and

your concerns in today’s world, so that tomorrow you will feel that you can talk

to me, consult with me, and feel that I understand, and so that I myself have the

self-confidence to speak with you when you are an adolescent and young person, and

so that I can feel satisfied with myself . . . I know these things and believe them, but

creating a balance between a mother’s sense and feeling responsible to social duties

is not easy.30

While Alamadar’s justifications for pursuing activities beyond motherhood still are linked

largely to her identity as a mother, she does allow herself to admit that she needs these

pursuits for her own self-confidence. She also highlights the difficulties of negotiating the

competing demands of motherhood and life outside the home. Overall, however, the

emphasis remains on the centrality of motherhood to the author’s identity and decision-

making process.31

Articles posted under the category ‘Dokhtaran-e’ [which roughly translates as Girlish or

For Girls] address an audience of unmarried women and, as such, are not dominated by

material pertaining to the experiences of motherhood. Nonetheless, the connections

between women, home, and family are emphasized. The short piece, ‘I am a Woman,’

written in the format of a stream of consciousness conversation between the author and

herself, is a good example of this. Describing the household chores in which she is

28 S. Minayee (2012) Baraye shoma zanha ghamgeenam [I am sad for you, women], Charghad, 1 July; available

online at: http://charghad.ir/4202/%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7-%

D8%B2%D9%86%E2%80%8C%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%BA%D9%85%DA%AF%DB%8C%D9%86%

D9%85, accessed February 17, 2014.29 F. Alamdar (2012) Hamishe madar-e khane-dar moghadasstar ast, vali aya madar-e daneshjoo gonahkar ast

[A homemaking mother is always more holy, but is a student mother a sinner?], April 22, Charghad, available

online at: http://charghad.ir/3969/%D8%A2%DB%8C%D8%A7-%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%

D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%AC%D9%88-%DA%AF%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%87%E2%

80%8C%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%9F; accessed February 17, 2014

(author’s translation).30 Ibid (author’s translation).31 Alamdar’s piece also was published inMadar Banoo, a website dedicated entirely to issues about motherhood

in Iran; online at: http://madarbanoo.com. Sarah Erfani, author of the article cited above, is the Editor-in-Chief

of Madar Banoo as well as an active writer for Charghad.

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engaged, the author, Mahdieh Amanzadi, interjects with assertions of what she envisions

for herself and what she will demand of a future husband: ‘Where was I? Yes, that I had a

firm belief in being a man and not a woman. Of course, I don’t mean that I am a man, but

I am not a traditional woman. I will wear sporty clothes and enjoy the activities of boys.

And if I get married, I will make the person first understand that this is how I prefer things.

If you like it, take it, if not go get yourself a housewife.’32

Yet these musings do not last long, as the author appears to come to an epiphany in

the course of her house work that she is a ‘a woman with authentic feminine beauty’ despite

all that is said about women in her family, the media, and other tribunes, and concludes her

piece with a quote from Imam Ali that ‘woman is a spring flower, not a hero.’33

While advocating for marriage, motherhood, and ties to the household, Charghad also

reflects concerns about the rising age of marriage and the barriers to getting and staying

married.34 In other words, although the site contains much content that seems to cajole,

convey guilt, and/or persuade its readers to choose marriage and family, there is also

recognition of the various obstacles that have led Iranian women to delay or avoid

marriage and childbearing altogether. Whereas Charghad largely focuses on individual

stories with only occasional forays into exploring the broader social and economic reasons

behind changing childbearing and marriage statistics in Iran, the reverse is the case for

Merhkhaneh, which often reports the findings of studies attempting to explain these

questions.35 In addition to considering the socioeconomic factors dictating marriage

decisions, Mehrkhaneh is also distinct from Charghad in looking into the policy side

of the issue, with many articles evaluating failed ventures by various ministries or other

government initiatives.36

In addition to considering the broader social factors as well as the institutional and

policy issues of marriage, Merkhaneh discusses intimacy issues between couples and

introduces the concept of ‘emotional divorces,’ where couples remain legally married but

lead lives that are alienated from one another.37 Other articles explain factors leading to

32 M. Amanzadi (2012) Man yek zanam [I am a woman], Charghad, 27 May, available online at: http://

charghad.ir/4052/%D9%85%D9%86-%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D8%B2%D9%86%D9%85, accessed February

17, 2014.33 Ibid.34 See, for example, S. Daneshvar (2012) Mojarad-e ejbari, mojarad-e ekhtiyari: Chera amare dokhtaran-e

mojarad roo be afzayesh ast? [Single by force, single by choice: Why are the rates of single women on the

rise?], Charghad, available online at: http://charghad.ir/4031/%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%

87%D8%A7%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%8C-%D9%85%

D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%

A7%D8%B1%D9%8A, accessed June 13, 2014.35 See for example, Mehrkhaneh (2012) Ezdevaj-e javanan bozorgtareen daghdaghy-e khanevadeha-ye Tehrani

ast [Marriage of youth is the biggest concern for Tehran families], November 7, available online at: http://

mehrkhane.com/fa/print/4602, accessed February 17, 2014.36 See, for example, Mehrkhaneh (2013) Vaghti tamame tarhaye-e vezaratkhane baraye ezdevaj-e javanan

shekast mikhorad [When all the ministry’s plans for marriage of the young fail], October 7, available online at:

http://tinyurl.com/oq9hnfo, accessed February 17, 2014. See also Mehrkhaneh (2013) Dard-e bi zeghbati

javan be ezdevaj ba eghdamat-e namadeen darman nemishavad [Disinclination of youth toward marriage will

not be solved with symbolic acts), October 7, available at http://tinyurl.com/px7hsaj, accessed June 13, 2014.37 M. Moslemifar (2012) Interview: Emrooz shahed-e amr-e jensi dar jame hasteem [Today we are witnessing an

inflation in sexual affairs] Mehrkhaneh, December 25, available at: http://mehrkhane.com/fa/news/4938/

میتسه-هعماج-رد-یسنج-رما-مروت-دهاش-هزورما

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troubled married life, and one such piece quotes research that attributes blame to in-laws.38

Individual stories of failed marriages also personalize the issue:

Fatemeh is a 40 year-old woman who married a man ten years her junior seven years

ago. She said that she met her ex-husband immediately after what she calls a heart-

break, and that she married him out of revenge. She says: “I was a teacher and many

men had asked for my hand in marriage, but I never could make the right decision

when it came to getting married. My father had passed away a while back and then

my mom passed away, and [thus] I was alone. That is when I met Behrooz. We were

supposed to get married but we didn’t, so, to get revenge, I married one of his

friends, Navid, who was ten years younger than I. Navid’s family was against the

marriage, so they ostracized him, and my brothers and sisters did the same to me.

I got pregnant during the first year of our marriage and that is the same time I found

out that Navid was an addict. He stopped going to work and everything was running

on my salary. My son was born but my husband’s bad behavior kept getting worse.

That is when my brother couldn’t stand it anymore and interfered. With my family’s

help and waiving my right to my dowry, I was able to finish that tumultuous life and

get a divorce and custody of my child.39

Whether through the personal or societal lens, both Charghad andMehrkhaneh’smaterials

on marriage and family indicate underlying problems. Although these sites ostensibly are

geared toward promoting marriage and family, they cannot avoid addressing the

widespread problems with them.

Tough Sell: Challenges for Promoting the Family Online

Clearly, it is no easy task to elevate family and married life in the midst of a crisis so severe

that even the staunchest proponents of the institutions must acknowledge their problems.

In a crowded media field online and off, where a range of foreign state-funded outlets offer

diverse content, officially sponsored or approved media cannot compete for the attention

of oppositional or apolitical audiences.40 Perhaps surprisingly, state efforts to expand

media production beyond over the air televised and radio broadcasts have not had great

success, not even with ideologically like-minded audiences. Like other state-sanctioned

online venues that lean toward the hardline elements of the Iranian power structure,

38 Mehrkhaneh (2013) Zendegi ashofte madar-e shohar va ashefotegiy-e zanashooyee pesar/ashoftegiy-e madar-e

zan dar rabetey-e jensi az avamel-e ashoftogeiy-e zanashooyee dokhtar ast [Troubledmarriages due tomothers-in-

law and troubled sexual life ofmothers as a factor in the troubledmarriages of daughters], December 22, available

online at: http://tinyurl.com/o8rne28; accessed February 17, 2014.39 Mehrkhaneh (2012) Esghha-ye godakhtey-e ke zood khamoosh mishavand [Fiery loves that extinguish quickly],

October 20, available at: http://tinyurl.com/p98o6gz; accessed February 17, 2014.40 In terms of domestic penetration, television remains a top media form. With the hardline factions in control of

the state Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, the state long has had an upper hand in reaching audiences

inside the country. The rise of satellite broadcasts in the 1990s, followed by spread of the Internet, has posed a

challenge to this dominance over content, prompting the state both to restrict satellite and Internet content and

to produce favorable content via these media.

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these sites do not appear to have widespread popularity among their target readers inside

the country.41

At the same time, the engagement of those who are drawn to the sites and actively

participate in the comments section shows that there is no consensus on the core issues.

For example, the comments section of the earlier discussed Charghad article, ‘I am sad for

you Women,’ included passionate objections to the article’s assertions about motherhood.

In a blunt, unsentimental riposte to the author’s musing that ‘And I am sad for all the

children who could have been born but were not, for all the mothers who could have grown

wings but did not,’ one commenter simply noted: ‘And I am happy, for the children who

could have been born but were not.’ Others who also disagreed with the author were less

terse and tried to engage her claims more constructively. One commenter pointed out that

perhaps in some cases having children may be a selfish rather than selfless act, such as

when someone bears a child simply to gain some kind of social status. This commenter

also noted that in some circumstances having children can do more harm than good to a

woman, and therefore one should not insist that all women strive for motherhood.42 Like

the range of views on motherhood evident among the authors who post material on the site

(examined above), the comments indicate that the readership also holds no consensus on

central issues.

Similar complexities are evident in the pages of Mehrkhaneh. As noted above, a core

group of conservative women in the Majles staunchly opposed the passport law introduced

by fellow conservatives. In publicizing a petition against the proposed passport law and

reporting on opposition to it, the site echoed some of the sentiments of the conservative

opposition.43 But the pushback Mekrkhaneh received also showed parallels to what

oppositional and/or secular feminists have faced. In the comments section of an article

against the passport law, for example, the site was harangued for being anti-men and for

failing to understand the requirements of religious law.44 In this and other instances, broad

ideological alignment with religious or state powers did not protect Mehrkhaneh from

accusations that are routinely directed at independent or oppositional women who object

to the situation of women in Iran.

41 I would like to thank Roksana Bahramitash for sharing some of her research findings with me via email

correspondence. In her extensive research on conservative-leaning women from working class neighborhoods

in Iran, Bahramitash questioned many of her research subjects about their Internet habits and found that they

had little knowledge or interest in such sites and instead were more engaged with satellite content, specifically

serials.42 S. Minayee (2012) Baraye shoma zanha ghamgeenam [I am sad for you women], Charghad, July 1, available

at: http://charghad.ir/4202/%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%

B2%D9%86%E2%80%8C%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%BA%D9%85%DA%AF%DB%8C%D9%86%D9%

85; accessed February 17, 2014 (author’s translation).43 Merkhaneh (2013) Tabsarey-e mamnooiat-e dokhtaran-e mojarad ra hafz koneed [Remove the section on

forbidding single girls], February 19, available at: http://tinyurl.com/o9w9gfy; accessed February 17, 2014.44 Mehrkhaneh (2012) Entezar Miraft bad az 40 Sal, Mahdoodiathaye Atay-e Gozarname be Zanan Bardashte

Shavad (One would expect that after 40 years, the limits on granting women passports would be lifted),”

December 25, at: http://tinyurl.com/olqzxgy; accessed February 17, 2014.

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Conclusion

Whatever their popularity, or lack thereof, sites like Charghad and Mehrkhaneh are

important to any consideration of discourses on women in contemporary Iran. Continuous

with offline efforts, these sites are digital manifestations of widespread efforts to redirect

conversations about women toward marriage and the family. Yet these efforts to promote

married life and childbearing are occurring at a time when both institutions are facing

severe problems. Indeed, the expansion in the discussions on marriage and the family and

the increase in the venues where these conversations are promoted must be read as

a response to the crisis of these institutions. The rise in the age at first marriage, steep

divorce rates, and more divorcees who are not re-marrying also mean an overall increase in

single women. In addition, while women outnumber men on university campuses, they

fare worse than men in the weak economy and continue to be socially and legally

disadvantaged compared with their male counterparts. All of this occurs in a context where

activist and entertainment content on foreign-funded media provide Iranian audiences a

window into lifestyles that are free from the restrictions faced by Iranian women. Whether

these depictions of life outside Iran are accurate or not, authorities see them as posing

a threat to the already fragile status of marriage and family in Iran. Finally, the state’s

responses must be understood in a broader context where their overall policies, and

in fact, their basic legitimacy as a ruling structure, constantly are being challenged by

foreign media, reformist and independent activists, as well as by dissenters within

the factionalized power establishment. Given the external and internal challenges, the

complexities and contradictions of both Charghad and Mehrkhaneh are not surprising.

While these websites may not be as popular as oppositional media, they are unique in

showing that tackling the crisis of the family is a difficult and contested task, even within

conservative circles sympathetic to the state. This is due to the specificity of online arenas,

where audience members can either respond on the site (if commenting is allowed) or they

can easily copy-and-paste and comment on content elsewhere. These sites of interaction

make visible contestations that may remain hidden in other media formats.

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