Volume 54, Numbers 3 & 4 May/June/July/August 2001

continued on p. 4

The Central Deception of NationalMissile DefenseBy Robert Sherman

F.A.S. PUBLIC INTEREST REPORTJOURNAL OF THE FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS (F.A.S.) SPECIAL DOUBLE ISSUE!

FAS Status ReportBy Henry Kelly

continued on p. 5

When casual acquaintanceslearn my line of work, they

frequently ask “Do you think weshould build a shield againstnuclear weapons?”

As readers of this journal are nodoubt aware, no such shield hasbeen proposed. But by encourag-ing the American people to equatedefense against missiles withdefense against weapons of massdestruction, National MissileDefense (NMD) supporters playtheir strongest card.

So long as the American peoplethink “nuclear defense” when theyhear “missile defense,” popularsupport for NMD is likely toremain substantial. One of themost effective lines of attackagainst NMD is to educate theAmerican people to the fact thateven a successful defense againstballistic missiles will not protect usagainst weapons of mass destruc-tion.

It is useful to illustrate thedistinction by examining thehistorical analogues to a defensiveshield against ballistic missiles.

One precedent that springsimmediately to mind is that ofnationwide anti-aircraft defense.With remarkable consistency, theBritish defense against Germanbombers in the Battle of Britain,the German defense against Allied

bombers, and the North Vietnam-ese defense against Americanbombers all averaged about 2%effectiveness. In slow grindingwars of attrition, such defenseswere profitable. But against anuclear attack this level of effec-tiveness, or even an order-of-magnitude improvement over it,would be useless.

While defense against ballisticmissiles is probably even moredifficult than defense againstaircraft, for the sake of discussionlet us grant NMD the benefit of thedoubt. Let us assume it would be100% effective, and that NorthKorea, Iraq, Iran et al are fullyconvinced that any ballistic missileattack they make against the UnitedStates will fail. In that case, thebest historical analogue is found bygoing back seven decades.

As France’s Minister of War in1929, Andre Maginot was deter-mined that never again wouldGermany invade his country. Sohe began construction of the mostmassive, powerful and technologi-cally advanced homeland defensein history.

Stretching the entire length ofthe Franco-German border, theMaginot Line was to consist of aseries of interconnected forts using

Election Results

The FAS membershipelected Richard Garwin, JaneOwen, and Gregory Simon tothe FAS Council, replacingArthur Rosenfeld, MarvinMiller, and Priscilla McMillan,whose terms ended this year.The membership also over-whelmingly approved themerger of the FAS Fund andthe FAS into a single organiza-tion. This change will stream-line management of the organi-zation and means that allcontributions to FAS will betax deductible. The mergerwill take effect upon receiptand approval of merger docu-ments by the DC government.

Board Meeting

The FAS Council with itsnewly elected members and theFAS Fund Board met for thelast time as separate entities onJuly 13 and 14. The FASCouncil re-affirmed its previ-ous vote to appoint HazelO’Leary, Shankar Sastry, andJonathan Silver to the FASFund Board. Once the mergertakes effect, members of boththe Fund Board and the FAS

If Not NMD, Then What?By Robert Sherman

The FAS Public Interest Report (USPS 188-100) is published bi-monthly at 1717 K St. NW Suite 209,Washington, DC 20036. Annual subscription is $25/year. Copyright©2001 by the Federation ofAmerican Scientists. ! Archived FAS Public Interest Reports are available online at www.fas.org orphone (202) 546-3300, fax (202) 675-1010, or email fas@fas.org.

Editor: Henry Kelly, PresidentAssisant Editor: Karen Kelley, Organization Manager

FAS

Chairman: FRANK VON HIPPEL

President: HENRY C. KELLY

Members:

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The Federation of American Scientists (FAS), founded October 31, 1945 as theFederation of Atomic Scientists by Manhattan Project scientists, engages in re-search and advocacy on science-and-society public policy issues with an emphasis onglobal security policy. Current weapons nonproliferation issues range from nucleardisarmament to biological and chemical weapons control to monitoring small armssales; related issues include drug policy, space policy, and disease surveillance. FASalso works on learning technology and on reductions in government secrecy.

BOARD OF SPONSORS

2 """"" FAS Public Interest Report May/June/July/August 2001

*Sidney Altman BiologyBruce Ames Biochemistry*Philip W. Anderson Physics*Kenneth J. Arrow Economics*Julius Axelrod Biochemistry*David Baltimore BiochemistryPaul Beeson Medicine*Baruj Benacerraf Immunology*Hans A. Bethe Physics*J. Michael Bishop Biology*Nicolaas Bloembergen Physics*Norman Borlaug Agriculture*Paul Boyer ChemistryAnne Pitts Carter Economics*Owen Chamberlain PhysicsMorris Cohen Engineering*Stanley Cohen BiochemistryMildred Cohn Biochemistry*Leon N. Cooper Physics*E. .J. Corey ChemistryPaul B. Cornely Medicine*James Cronin Physics*Johann Deisenhofer BiologyCarl Djerassi ChemistryAnn Druyan Writer/Producer*Renato Dulbecco MicrobiologyJohn T. Edsall BiologyPaul R. Ehrlich BiologyGeorge Field Astrophysics*Val L. Fitch PhysicsJerome D. Frank Psychology*Jerome I. Friedman Physics*John Kenneth Galbraith Economics*Walter Gilbert Biochemistry*Donald Glaser Physics-Biology*Sheldon L. Glashow PhysicsMarvin L. Goldberger Physics*Joseph L. Goldstein Medicine*Roger C. L. Guillemin Physiology*Herbert A. Hauptman Chemistry*Dudley R. Herschbach Physics*Roald Hoffmann ChemistryJohn P. Holdren Political Science*David H. Hubel Medicine*Jerome Karle Physical ChemistryNathan Keyfitz Demography*H. Gobind Khorana Biochemistry*Arthur Kornberg Biochemistry*Edwin G. Krebs Pharmacology

*Willis E. Lamb Physics*Leon Lederman Physics*Edward Lewis Medicine*William N. Lipscomb ChemistryJessica T. Mathews Public PolicyRoy Menninger PsychiatryRobert Merton SociologyMatthew S. Meselson BiochemistryNeal E. Miller Psychology*Franco Modigliani Economics*Mario Molina ChemistryPhilip Morrison PhysicsStephen S. Morse Virology*Joseph E. Murray MedicineFranklin A. Neva Medicine*Marshall Nirenberg Biochemistry*Douglas D. Osheroff Physics*Arno A. Penzias Astronomy*Martin L. Perl PhysicsGerard Piel PublisherPaul Portney EconomicsMark Ptashne Molecular BiologyGeorge Rathjens Political Science*Burton Richter PhysicsDavid Riesman, Jr. Sociology*Richard J. Roberts BiologyVernon Ruttan AgricultureJeffrey Sachs Economics*J. Robert Schrieffer PhysicsAndrew M. Sessler Physics*Phillip A. Sharp BiologyStanley K. Sheinbaum EconomicsGeorge A. Silver Medicine*Herbert A. Simon Psychology*Richard E. Smalley ChemistryNeil Smelser Sociology*Robert M. Solow Economics*Jack Steinberger Physics*Henry Taube Chemistry*James Tobin Economics*Charles H. Townes PhysicsFrank von Hippel PhysicsMyron E. Wegman MedicineRobert A. Weinberg Biology*Steven Weinberg Physics*Torsten N. Wiesel MedicineAlfred Yankauer Medicine*Herbert F. York Physics

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FAS PublicInterestReport

In This

Issue ...The Central Deception of Na-tional Missile Defense ..................

FAS Status Report ........................

If Not NMD, Then What? ............

Sharing Missile Defense ...............

US Fails to Lead on Small Arms ..

US Policy and the BWC Protocol

Hail and Farewell to FAS Staff ....

Intelligence Oversight Faces NewObstacles .......................................

Controversy of Wen Ho LeePersists ..........................................

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The threat of weapons of massdestruction (WMD) attack by

rogue states or subnational entitiescannot be dismissed. While thepresent Administration undoubt-edly errs in treating compoundedworst-case analyses as if theydescribe the probable case, thisdanger is real.

Prudently, we have to presumethat an aggressor would rendermissile defense irrelevant bydriving around it, using clandestinedelivery methods. If we accept thatunpleasant fact and focus on theproblem of clandestine delivery,we are not helpless against it. Onthe contrary, we have at least threecountermeasures available:

Arms control and nonprolif-eration agreements and policiescan help keep weapons and fissilematerials out of the wrong hands.The smaller the number of weap-ons of mass destruction and thescarcer the materials to make them,the lower the probability that thewrong people will acquire them.

It is sometimes argued thatnonproliferation and arms controlhave failed because they have notbeen completely successful. De-spite the Nuclear NonproliferationTreaty, India and Pakistan haveconducted nuclear tests, and Israeland South Africa have deployednuclear weapons. Shortly after

continued on p. 11

May/June/July/August 2001 FAS Public Interest Report """"" 3

continued on next page

Sharing Missile DefenseBy Les AuCoin and Robert Sherman

Some commentators have re-cently suggested that President

Bush offer to negotiate a missile-defense sharing arrangement withRussia and China.

Sharing missile defense is not anew idea. During the Star Warsdebate of the 1980s, Reagan Ad-ministration spokesmen talked ofsharing missile defense with theSoviet Union – at a time when anycomputer with more than 32Kmemory was subject to national

security export controls. In HouseDefense Appropriations Subcom-mittee hearings, we repeatedlyinvited Administration witnesses tostate which missile-defense tech-nologies they were prepared toshare. The response was, invari-ably, a prompt shift into mumblemode.

Eventually the Reagan Admin-istration allowed that it wouldn’tactually share the technology, butmight permit the Soviet Union to“share the protection” of missiledefense. Presumably that meantthat if American missiles werelaunched against the Soviet Union,we would use the American missiledefense to shoot them down. Evenin the surreal world of the missiledefense debate, the giggle factor onthat one was prohibitive, and talkof sharing went away.

There are several reasons whysharing fails to pass the straight-face test.

Begin with the technology anyNational Missile Defense (NMD)must contain. Even if it is totally

ineffective, NMD will certainlyincorporate our most advancedmilitary technology, much ofwhich will be applicable to othermilitary systems.

Will we – should we – bewilling to give the Russian andChinese militaries such a majorboost? It is incumbent uponadvocates of NMD-sharing to spellout specifically which leading-edgetechnologies they are willing toshare and why. Don’t hold your

breath waiting for them to do it.The absurdity of NMD-sharing

hasn’t declined with time or withthe end of the Cold War. On thecontrary, it may be acquiring agrim new overtone.

According to some respecteddefense analysts, China will be-come a major military threat to theUnited States in about 20 years.This may be nothing but hype, butfor the moment let’s assume theseanalysts are right.

Today, Chinese military tech-nology trails ours by decades. Arethere any circumstances in whichwe should intentionally assist theChinese military to close thetechnology gap? None are appar-ent.

To their credit, NMD advocatesusually don’t propose NMD-

sharing as strategically merited.They merely offer it as an overtlypolitical gimmick for politicalpurposes. As such, it is fullyconsistent with the fundamentalnature of NMD itself.

The problem with politicalgimmicks is that at some point theyturn into real hardware that costsreal money and has a real nationalsecurity impact.

President Bush came to officecarrying ideological baggage thatthreatens to undermine the militarysecurity of the United States. Inthe case of NMD, the strategicpenalty will probably be seen asRussia and China respond by

augmenting their nuclear offensiveforces above the levels they wouldotherwise have, and as our relationswith our allies become increasinglystrained. All of that notwithstand-ing, it is unlikely that externalreality will cause this Administra-tion to question its NMD stance.Domestic political ramifications ofnational security decisions are onthe White House radar screen withan intensity that national securityitself cannot match.

But internal contradictions willbe more difficult to avoid. Secre-tary of Defense Donald Rumsfeldis committed to revolutionizingconventional capabilities of the USmilitary, but now he finds that thefunds to do it are not going to be

NMD will certainly incorporate our mostadvanced military technology . . .

Will we – should we – be willing to givethe Russian and Chinese militaries such amajor boost?

4 """"" FAS Public Interest Report May/June/July/August 2001

the strongest concrete armor andmost powerful artillery in exist-ence. It was even to provide airconditioning for the crews – aston-ishingly advanced technology forthat time.

Maginot died in 1932 but hisdream project continued. By thetime Germany again turned hostileeyes toward France in 1940, theMaginot Line was complete, fullyoperational, ready for combat – anduseless. It might well have been100% effective, and it would havemade no difference.

The Germans simply drovearound it. They easily crossed theGerman-Belgian border, and thenhooked across the Franco-Belgianborder; their successful invasion ofFrance was delayed by only a fewdays.

France’s mistake was to definethe threat as a German invasionthrough a particular border. Thereal threat was a German invasion,

regardless of route.Similarly, the Bush

Administration’s mistake is todefine the threat as nuclear orbiological weapons delivered byballistic missiles. It isn’t. Thethreat is nuclear or biologicalweapons, regardless of delivery

method.A hostile missile without a

weapon threatens no American.But a hostile nuclear weaponwithout a missile threatens allAmericans.

Imagine that you are a foreignaggressor, you have a workablenuclear weapon, and you wish tokill a large number of innocentAmerican civilians. In broad-brushterms, you have two options:

You can use an ICBM. Or youcan use clandestine delivery: Putthe bomb in the hold of a merchantship and explode it in an Americanharbor. Put it in an airliner and flyit to the city of your choice. Or justput it in a Ryder truck and drive itthere.

The ICBM would be moreexpensive, less accurate, and muchless reliable than clandestinedelivery. Even more important, theICBM would leave an unmistak-able return address, while clandes-tine delivery offers at least apossibility of anonymity.

Ballistic missiles make sensefor the five declared nuclearweapon states, which can test andperfect their missiles and need todeliver multiple weapons to rap-idly-chosen targets. But for aThird World despot with one ortwo weapons, ICBMs are theweakest delivery method imagin-able.

Imagine, then, that the Secre-tary of Defense were to make apublic statement that the purpose ofNMD is to force hostile states toabandon ineffective ICBMs anddeliver their nuclear or biologicalattack by more effective clandes-tine means.

He’ll never say that, of course,because if he did the NMD debatewould be over.#$

NMD Deception continued from p. 1

Sharing continued from p. 3

available, and the shortfall islargely created by NMD. Missiledefense is already the largest itemin the defense budget. If pastpatterns hold, missile defense costswill escalate rapidly and dramati-cally. It must be dawning on Mr.Rumsfeld that he can have real-world defense capability upgrades

to his conventional forces, or hecan have National Missile Defense;he cannot have both. $

Les AuCoin (D-Or.) served on theHouse Defense AppropriationsSubcommittee (1983-1992) wherehe chaired an investigation ofNational Missile Defense.

A hostile missile without a weapon threatens noAmerican. But a hostile nuclear weapon without amissile threatens all Americans.

Robert Sherman is Director of theNuclear Security Program at theFederation of American Scientists,and was AuCoin’s national secu-rity staffer.

May/June/July/August 2001 FAS Public Interest Report """"" 5

Summary of recommendations in A Nuclear Posture for the Next Decade**

Our analysis shows that US security would be substantially improved by adopting a nuclear posture for thenext five to ten years in which the United States would:

· Declare that the sole purpose of US nuclear weapons is to deter and, if necessary, respond to theuse of nuclear weapons by another country.· Reject rapid-launch options, and change its deployment practices to provide for the launch ofUS nuclear forces in hours or days rather than minutes.· Replace its reliance on pre-set targeting plans with the capability to promptly develop a re-sponse tailored to the situation if nuclear weapons are used against the United States, its armedforces, or its allies.· Unilaterally reduce its nuclear arsenal to a total of 1,000 warheads, including deployed, spare,and reserve warheads. The United States would declare all warheads above this level to be inexcess of its military needs, move them into storage, and begin dismantling them in a mannertransparent to the international community. To encourage Russia to reciprocate, the United Statescould make the endpoint of its dismantlement process dependent on Russia’s response. The de-ployed US warheads should consist largely of a survivable force of submarine-based warheads.· Promptly and unilaterally retire all US tactical nuclear weapons, dismantling them in a transpar-ent manner. In addition, the United States would take steps to induce Russia to do the same.· Announce its commitment to further reductions in the number of nuclear weapons, on a negoti-ated and verified multilateral basis.· Commit to not resume nuclear testing and to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.· Reaffirm its commitment to pursue nuclear disarmament and present a specific plan for movingtoward this goal, in recognition that the universal and verifiable prohibition of nuclear weaponswould be in the US national security interest.· Recognize that deployment of a US missile defense system that Russia or China believed couldintercept a significant portion of its survivable long-range missile forces would trigger reactions bythese countries that could result in a net decrease in US security. The United States should there-fore commit to not deploy any missile defense system that would decrease its overall security inthis way.

** The full text of this report can be found at www.fas.org/ssp/docs/010600-posture.htm.

Status continued from p. 1

Council will become the inital slateof directors for the new FAS. Ournext elections and Board appoint-ments will be made using the newFAS bylaws.

The Board meeting was livelyand, at least from my perspective,highly productive. It’s clear that

the new FAS Board will play anactive role in shaping theorganization’s future. We arelikely to form several advisorygroups for FAS projects that willreport regularly to the Board.These groups would include FASBoard members and other individu-als interested in the specific topicscovered. We already have an

active Biological Weapons Work-ing Group, but we may start todevelop Groups advising us onGlobal Security and InformationTechnology (with emphasis oninformation technology in educa-tion). We’re likely to be contactingFAS members to ask them for help.

continued on p. 12

By the Center for Defense Information, the Federation of American Scientists, the National ResourcesDefense Council, and the Union of Concerned Scientists.

6 """"" FAS Public Interest Report May/June/July/August 2001

US Government Fails to Lead on Small ArmsBy Tamar Gabelnick

Arms Sales MonitoringArms Sales MonitoringArms Sales MonitoringArms Sales MonitoringArms Sales Monitoring

At the UN Conference on theIllicit Trade in Small Arms

and Light Weapons in All ItsAspects, held from 9-20 July inNew York, the US governmentblew a great opportunity to mendits international image on armscontrol. The UN Conference wasorganized to develop an action planto combat the black market trade insmall arms and light weapons.Governments have become increas-ingly interested in this subset of theconventional arms branch – whichranges from pistols to grenadelaunchers – because they are thepreferred tools of insurgents,organized criminals and otherthreats to state security and peace-keepers in the field.

The US government has beenquite active in addressing theproblems surrounding the spread ofsmall arms since the issue reachedthe international radar screen in themid-1990s. In addition to prepara-tions for the UN Small ArmsConference, it signed the OASConvention on Small Arms in1997; pushed hard for a strongFirearms Protocol to the UNConvention against TransnationalOrganized Crime, finally signed inFebruary 2001; promoted passageof one the world’s only lawsregulating the operations oftroublesome arms brokers; began a$2 million a year program of smallarms destruction in post-conflictcountries; and partnered withseveral African nations to improveregional capacity to prevent armssmuggling.

Then Secretary of StateMadeleine Albright made no fewerthan four major speeches signalingher commitment to reducing smallarms proliferation. Secretary ofState Powell has not yet made thisa priority issue, but his interest in

gun-ravaged Africa should makehim a natural candidate. He alsoresponded to a House of Represen-tatives letter requesting his atten-dance at the UN Conference bysaying he was committed to a“successful outcome,” and that theUS Delegation “has forcefullyadvocated, and will continue toadvocate, that the ConferenceProgram of Action include stronglanguage” on export controls.

But US government actions inNew York turned it from leader torenegade on the small arms issue.Egged on by gun rights lobbyistsinside and out of the official del-egation (three “public” members ofthe official delegation had ties tothe NRA), the US delegation beganand ended the Conference with ahard-nosed, anti-UN, pro-gunstance. During his opening state-ment, Under Secretary of StateJohn Bolton quoted JohnAshcroft’s interpretation of theSecond Amendment, throwing in ajab at international and non-gov-ernmental organizations for goodmeasure. He introduced several“red line” issues that the US couldnot accept in the Program ofAction, including problems nevermentioned during the three Prepa-ratory Committee meetings. Ontwo of these issues – restrictions oncivilian ownership of guns and aprohibition on transfers of arms tonon-state actors – the US wasprepared to walk out of the Confer-ence rather than accept anodynecompromise language suggested bythe Conference Chair. Eventually,

the vast majority of nations wereforced to cede to US demands inorder to save the Conference.

In his opening speech, Boltondid make note of strong US exportcontrols and called on other statesto “adopt similar practices.” Butwhile the US delegation apparentlyproposed stronger language onsome export control provisions, itdid not insist on these changes.Rather, it used most of its politicalcapital to insert qualifying lan-guage on many measures and toremove calls for internationalfinancing of new initiatives.

Given that the end result of theConference was only a politically –not legally – binding document, thenegative quality of US leadershipwas surprising. With the black eyethe United States has received fromblocking progress on other issuesof importance at the global level –from the biological weaponsprotocol to the Kyoto greenhousetreaty – the inability of the US toplay a productive role on an issue itnormally takes a strong stand onshows either a lack of politicalsavvy or the indomitable influenceof the gun lobby on US foreignpolicy-makers.

Despite an unhelpful USposition, the final ConferenceProgram of Action did move thedebate on small arms proliferationforward in several other significantareas. It contains repeated refer-ences to the humanitarian impact ofsmall arms violence, a relativelynew way to frame the issue thatwill help enlarge the group of

The inability of the US to play a productive role on an issue itnormally takes a strong stand on shows either a lack of politi-cal savvy or the indomitable influence of the gun lobby on USforeign policy-makers.

May/June/July/August 2001 FAS Public Interest Report """"" 7

I am speaking today for myorganization, the Federation ofAmerican Scientists, and on behalfof the US Small Arms WorkingGroup, an alliance of non-governmental organizations andindividuals working to reduce theproliferation and misuse of smallarms. We stand firmly behind theidea that the Program of Actionshould include a call for norms andstandards on the export of smallarms and light weapons. And webelieve that such norms should bedeveloped at the internationallevel.

Some delegates havechallenged the pertinence of exportcriteria to a document focused onthe illicit trade in small arms. Butthe connection is often shortbetween government-authorizedsales and the illicit trade. Smallarms exported to states with weakborder controls, poor stockpilesecurity, or even corruptgovernment agents can quickly endup in the black market. Breakingthe legal to illicit link thereforedepends on prudent exportingdecisions that take intoconsideration the recipient states’records on diversion, among otherfactors.

But I will go one step furtherand argue that some government-authorized sales must beconsidered illicit in the firstinstance. Just because a

government agencies and NGOsinvolved. It calls on states to assesssmall arms exports based on their"responsibilities under internationallaw," a critical phrase for NGOstrying to get states to integratehuman rights and humanitarian lawinto their export decisions. It alsorecognizes the importance ofdemobilization, disarmament, and

government grants permission for anexport does not mean that it is legalunder international law. The mostobvious example is when a stateapproves weapon transfers to a state orarmed group in violation of a UN armsembargo. While government-authorized, it is still illegal. Likewise,small arms exports that violate states’obligations under other internationaltreaties - such as the Convention onCertain Conventional Weapons or theLandmines Treaty - are also obviouslyillegal.

Beyond these express limitationson states’ freedom to transfer smallarms and light weapons, there are alsoindirect limits on exports based on theuse of the weapons. According to theInternational Law Commission’s DraftArticles on State Responsibility, astate that aids another state to commitan international crime isinternationally responsible for thataction. If I were to hand a gun tosomeone about to commit murder, Icould be considered an accomplice tothat crime. And so it is withinternational weapons transfers.

Under current principles ofinternational law, states have aresponsibility not to authorize armsexports when there is a clear risk thatthe weapons would be used to commitserious violations of internationalhumanitarian or human rights law, toengage in acts of genocide or othercrimes against humanity, or to violatenorms of the UN Charter. Article 1 of

the Geneva Conventions on thelaws of war – which requires statesto “respect and ensure respect” forits provisions – reinforces thenotion that states must not sell armsthat would be used to violate theConventions.

The norm of stateresponsibility for the use of itsexported weapons has also beenenshrined in many states’ nationallaws and has been included inregional agreements such as the EUCode of Conduct and the OSCEDocument on Small Arms. Theinternational community must nowbuild on the norms accepted bymany of the major arms expertsand agree to them at theinternational level.

Mr. President and distinguisheddelegates, my recommendation toyou today is therefore to include inthe Program of Action, in thesection entitled “at the globallevel,” a call to “create commonnorms and standards for the exportof small arms and light weaponsbased on internationalhumanitarian and human rights lawand respect for the UN Charter.”This is essential and fully relevantlanguage that only serves toreinforce principles that states havealready committed to, and shouldalready be implementing.#$

reintegration of ex-combatants; theneed for international rules on theactivities of arms brokers; and theresponsibility of governments tokeep close watch over their weap-ons stockpiles and internationalborders.

Finally, conferees agreed tohold a review conference in 2006,plus biennial meetings along the

Address to the UN Conference on Illicit Trade in Small ArmsBy Tamar Gabelnick

way. These meetings will allowNGOs and governments to keep themomentum moving on the smallarms issue and to revisit the Pro-gram of Action formally in a shorttime frame.

For more information, visitwww.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/smallarms/illicit.html.#$

8 """"" FAS Public Interest Report May/June/July/August 2001

Biological/Chemical Arms ControlBiological/Chemical Arms ControlBiological/Chemical Arms ControlBiological/Chemical Arms ControlBiological/Chemical Arms Control US Policy and the BWC Protocol

Ever since President Nixonunilaterally renounced biologi-

cal weapons, there has been biparti-san support for the BWC and,under Ronald Reagan, GeorgeBush (Sr.) and Bill Clinton, vocalUS support for strengthening it.Throughout the six years of Proto-col negotiations, however, virtualdeadlock in the inter-agencyprocess prevented US leadershipand greatly limited US contribu-tions. With each agency mostinterested in protecting its own turf,there has been no participant whohas had both the vision and thepower to insist on the publicinterest. Only high-level determina-tion will override these narrowinterests.

Consequently, at the Protocolnegotiations the ball has beencarried by our allies, particularlythe United Kingdom, which servedas Friend of the Chair for Compli-

In what has become a depressingly consistent pattern of resis-tance to international agreements, the U.S. has effectively scuttled asix-year effort to draft a verification protocol to the BiologicalWeapons Convention. The US chief negotiator Donald A. Mahley,said that the US had concluded that “… the draft protocol wouldput national security and confidential business information at risk.”This administration apparently sees no risk in failing to use interna-tionally agreed mechanisms for verifying the treaty or the encour-agement that potential violators will take from this failure. Theirony, of course, is that the weakness of the protocol is there largelyat US insistence. Instead of using its position as the world’s singlesuperpower with humility, the US is once again parting ways withits closest allies and taking a position that can only be read as aninsistence that other nations should lay themselves open to intrusiveinspection, while the US accepts no obligations.

The following material is excerpted from testimony by BarbaraHatch Rosenberg, Director of the FAS Chemical and BiologicalWeapons Arms Control Project, made before the House Committeeon Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security, Veter-ans Affairs and International Relations on June 5 urging the US notto abandon the verification protocol. Its logic remains compelling.

ance Measures. The UK has de-voted great effort to research anddevelop an effective complianceregime. If the Western Group hadstood solidly behind the originalBritish contributions to the rollingtext we would have a much stron-ger Protocol text now. But USobjections forced continual weak-ening of the text, and the obvioussplit in the Western Group pre-vented the West from negotiatingfrom a position of strength withother Blocks. Countries like Chinahave been able to use the US as ashield for their views. Rejection ofthe Chairman’s Text for the Proto-col puts the US in a position moreextreme than that of the radicalfringe — China, Libya, Cuba, Iranand Pakistan — which have ex-pressed significant objections butnot outright rejection of the text.

US objections to the strongProtocol measures originally

advocated by our allies centeredaround the declaration of Biologi-cal Defense facilities. This year,new objections were added, includ-ing opposition to declaration ofnon-governmental productionfacilities. Once US objections werevoiced, it became essentiallyimpossible to reach consensus onanything stronger. Incorporation ofUS demands in his compromisetext left the Chairman in a weak-ened position to deal with thedemands of other countries. Ourallies consider the Chairman’s textto be the best that can now beachieved. At the same time, theyconsider it the bottom line andwant no further compromises.Moreover, the negotiators are closeto the end of their patience and ourallies see no point in continuing tospar unproductively with the US.We are within reach of the goal. Ifconsensus cannot be reached soonwith minor adjustment of theChairman’s text, it means that thereis no political will to strengthen theBWC.

Unless it can be seen by the endof the negotiation that agreement isnear, there is sure to be a conten-tious row at the fifth BWC ReviewConference in November, withquite likely a lack of agreement onwhat to do next. The US is certainto receive most of the blame. Byturning down an international steptoward prevention that is almostwithin our grasp, the US is tellingpotential proliferators that theinternational community is notprepared to enforce the ban onbiological weapons. As citizens ofthe lone superpower, Americanswould be a prime target if theseweapons were used either strategi-cally or as an instrument of terror.Even without use, the proliferation

of biological weapons entails aserious risk of escape and thepossible establishment of new anduncontrollable diseases in thebiosphere. There are no militaryweapons that can “take out” anemerging disease.

US military experts, and studiesby many non-governmental ex-

perts, agree that, at present and forsome time to come, terrorist groupsare highly unlikely to have suffi-cient expertise and resources tosucceed in a mass attack withbiological weapons. AumShinrikyo, the Japanese terroristgroup, had plenty of both but failedin nine attempts to mount a bio-logical attack. Although the US hasso far concentrated on preparationsfor mopping up after a bioterroristdisaster, it would be foolhardy toignore the more important goal ofcutting off the source by preventingthe proliferation of biologicalweapons. That is not something theUS can do unilaterally. The firststep must be international, andstrengthening the BWC is theavailable tool. That is why ourEuropean and other allies are soangered and dismayed by the USstance.

A verification regime that canbe relied upon to detect violationsof the BWC is impossible. That isnot what the Protocol is about, andnot what the negotiators have evertried to do. Too much of what isneeded to develop biologicalweapons also has peaceful uses. Insuch “dual-use” situations, the

objective is transparency withregard to relevant capabilities. Thiswas an intrinsic premise in theVEREX feasibility study and itspositive outcome.

Sufficient transparency can beachieved by requiring declarationof relevant installations and provid-ing means for clarifying any ques-

tions that may arise regarding thedeclarations, including whether ornot relevant sites have NOT beendeclared. The Chairman’s text doesthis. It requires declaration of thesites of greatest potential threat,and it provides several differentmeans for getting on site (which, ifblocked by the party in question,would also yield information).

The intrinsic tension betweentransparency and confidentialitymeans that, in any biologicalweapons regime, no smoking gunsare likely to be found. Althoughinspectors’ on-site activities haveto be subject to limits in order toprotect confidential information,that doesn’t mean that nothing willbe learned. Raising suspicions, orresolving them, is what the Proto-col is about. National means canthen be focused on the sites orquestions of concern. TheProtocol’s compliance regimewould effectively complementnational intelligence, militarypower and diplomacy. In serioussituations the Protocol wouldprovide a basis, broader than wenow have, for international action.

The Chairman’s text provides avariety of on-site measures:

• mandatory randomly-selectedvisits to declared facilities;

• visits to clarify remainingquestions when consultationsfail (these may be voluntary orcan be pursued through theExecutive Council to becomemandatory);

• mandatory challenge investigations anywhere, including bothfacility and field investigations.

Douglas MacEachin, formerDeputy Director of the CIA, hasmade a persuasive case for thedeterrent effect of non-challengevisits. In a recent article he pointsout that, ideally, a proliferatorwould use a commercial plant as acover for a biological weaponsprogram, thereby facilitatingoperations and the procurement ofdual-use equipment and materials.But if the plant had to be declared,he would not take the chance thatinspectors might obtain enoughinformation during a visit to raisenew suspicions. Instead, the illicitactivity would be forced intoundeclared, clandestine operation,with all the attendant risks. Anyevidence of suspicious activity atan undeclared site could lead tointense surveillance, a clarificationprocess under the Protocol or achallenge investigation. TheChairman’s Protocol text calls for a50% vote of Executive Councilmembers present and voting toauthorize a challenge investigationat a suspected facility. An FASstudy recommended this formula asthe best means for preventing ill-founded investigations withoutunduly inhibiting the use of thisimportant measure or impeding itsdeterrent effect.

By turning down an international step toward pre-vention that is almost within our grasp, the US istelling potential proliferators that the internationalcommunity is not prepared to enforce the ban onbiological weapons.

May/June/July/August 2001 FAS Public Interest Report """"" 9

continued on next page

10 """"" FAS Public Interest Report May/June/July/August 2001

It is ironic that, while suspectingIraq of continuing its biologicalweapons program and decrying itsrefusal to allow UN inspections,the US is turning down a treatythat would provide a variety ofmeans for probing suspiciousinstallations by going on site.

The US policy review has rejectedthe Chairman’s text on the groundsthat

a) it is too weak,b) it would threaten nationalsecurity and commercial propri-etary information, andc) it threatens the AustraliaGroup and its “dual use” exportcontrol regime.

a) Weakness:With regard to weakness of the

text, the old argument of not beingable to detect violations (meaningalways, and with certainty) isfrequently invoked. As discussedalready, this is not and could notpossibly be the purpose of theProtocol. If this were the onlycriterion of interest to the US, weshould never have participated inthe negotiations in the first place.

Furthermore, the US delegationhas made it known in Geneva thatthey will not support any Protocolbased on the present negotiationmandate, but would prefer a muchmore limited mandate — whichwould inevitably lead to a morelimited Protocol. A more limitedProtocol — say, containing onlychallenge investigations—would beweaker, not stronger.

Finally, the weaknesses in thetext are largely there in compliancewith past US demands, includingthe following:

—The text does not requiredeclaration of all biodefensefacilities; only those conductingcertain activities, and only

those above a certain size.There are ample loopholes tosatisfy DoD specifications.—The text requires no signifi-cant information about produc-tion facilities for pharmaceuti-cals (other than licensed vac-cines), and exempts them fromvisits! No problem there forAmerican pharmaceuticalcompanies.

—All on-site activities ofinspectors during visits are atthe discretion of the hostgovernment, and all proceduresduring challenge investigationsare subject to managed access.—All visits require at least twoweeks notice.

b) Confidentiality:The Chairman’s text possesses

more safeguards for confidentialinformation than the ChemicalWeapons Convention of 1993(CWC), to which we are already aparty and which covers most of thesame facilities: those handlingtoxins (including the USbiodefense program), for example,fall under both treaties; mostpharmaceuticals are manufacturedchemically, and therefore are“discrete organic chemicals”covered by the CWC. Challengeinspections under the CWC cantake place “anytime, anywhere,” asPresident George Bush (Sr.) in-sisted.

Unlike the CWC, for example,the Protocol text allows no sam-pling and analysis in non-challengevisits, and gives control of accessto the host country. These aspectsof the Protocol text comply withthe wishes of US bioindustry,

which is particularly concernedabout protecting its proprietarymicrobial strains. There are, inaddition, all the protections forconfidentiality that were developedfor the CWC with the help of thechemical industry. The exemptionof certain defense facilities and ofmost pharmaceutical facilities fromdeclaration under the Protocol,discussed above, provides addi-

tional protections for confidentialinformation. The Chairman’s textmore than meets all the essentialconfidentiality concerns of thepharmaceutical and biotech indus-tries. Further safeguards forindustry could be incorporated intoUS Protocol implementing legisla-tion.

c) Export ControlsOne only need read Article 7 of

the Chairman’s text to realize thatits rhetoric is meant to please thecritics of the Australia Group butits substance tilts heavily towardthe West. The text contains onlyguidelines, with no hard obliga-tions regarding exports; each StateParty has full discretion overimplementation of the suggestionsin the text.

One thing is certain: any weak-nesses in the Protocol do not stemfrom inadequate technical informa-tion. Although the US has submit-ted no reports on trial visits orinvestigations to the Protocolnegotiations, twelve trial visitshave been reported by other coun-tries, most of them US allies. Halfof these trials involved more thanone country, or included foreign

A verification regime that can be relied upon todetect violations of the BWC is impossible. That isnot what the Protocol is about.

continued on p. 15

BWC Protocol continued from p. 9

signing the Biological WeaponsConvention, the Soviet Unionembarked on a massive BW pro-gram. And today a handful ofrogue states are actively workingon biological and chemical weap-ons, as at least two extremistsubstate actors have done in therecent past.

But the question is not of howthe performance of arms controland nonproliferation compares withperfection. If perfection were thestandard, we would never build aweapon, certainly not an NMD thathas failed as many tests as it haspassed.

The question is of how armscontrol and nonproliferation com-pare with the only real-worldalternative, which is their absence.

Forty years ago it was generallypredicted that the turn of themillennium would see at leastthirty nuclear weapon states.Today there are six to eight. SouthAfrica has destroyed all its nuclearweapons. Brazil and Argentinaturned back from the nuclear-weapons brink at the eleventh hour.Russia is, albeit erratically, de-stroying its chemical and biologicalweapons complexes. If it were notfor arms control and nonprolifera-tion initiatives, none of these thingswould be happening. Weapons ofmass destruction would be ac-cepted as normal methods ofwarfare, as chemical weapons wereaccepted in the first World War.There is no getting around the factthat arms control and nonprolifera-tion have made the world safer.

Deterrence. Against ballisticmissiles or other traceable threats,the primary answer isn’t compli-cated. Deterrence by threat ofintolerable retaliation is to interna-tional relations what the queen plustwo rooks are to chess. Deterrenceis old hat and it’s not pretty, but it

works against foes great and small.The end of the Cold War has notchanged that fact.

Deterrence need not and shouldnot mean a threat of massivenuclear destruction of civilians. Onthe contrary, it is most crediblewhen it does not require nuclearweapons at all, and does notthreaten great loss of innocent life.Consider that Saddam Hussein hadthe ability to use chemical weaponsnot only against our forces, butagainst any American city hechose. He was stopped not byPatriot defensive missiles, but bythen-Secretary of State JamesBaker’s pointed non-nuclearwarning to his Iraqi counterpart:

If the conflict starts, God forbid,and chemical or biologicalweapons are used against ourforces, the American peoplewould demand revenge, and wehave the means to implement this.This is not a threat, but a pledgethat if there is any use of suchweapons, our objective would notbe only the liberation of Kuwait,but also the toppling of thepresent regime. Any person whois responsible for the use of theseweapons would be held account-able in the future.

Rogue governments are, in almostall cases, dictatorships in a state ofphysical conflict with the people ofthe country they rule. Thesegovernments exist of themselves,by themselves, and for themselves.Baker correctly recognized that tothreaten nuclear retaliation againstlarge numbers of Iraqi citizenswould not only be morally andpolitically unacceptable; it wouldalso be of no great concern toSaddam Hussein who himself killssubstantial numbers of Iraqis tomaintain his hold on power. Bakerexercised effective deterrence byfocusing it on the only thingsSaddam and his colleagues caredabout: their own existences and

their access to wealth and power.The same is true of the North

Korean and Chinese leadership.For all their aggressive posturing,they lead lives of comfort andpower and will place neither theirpositions nor their persons at risk.

It is sometimes asserted thatthere are “undeterrables” – those soconsumed by religiosity and fanatichatred that they fear nothing. If aperson is willing to strap a bomb tohis body, what threat could possi-bly be meaningful to him?

Perhaps none. But it is not thesuicide bombers who need deter-ring. It is his leaders, those whoorganize, finance, train, and moti-vate the suicide bombers — butwho never volunteer to carry thebombs themselves and who arefully deterrable.

The most difficult threat willnot be leaders who are identifiedbut cannot be deterred – it isdoubtful that such exist or willexist. It will be leaders who orderanonymous attacks and cannot beidentified or traced.

Intelligence and interceptionare the best tools – possibly theonly tools – for dealing withanonymous attacks.

The history of interception is amixed bag. Timothy McVeigh andthe World Trade Center bomberswere not intercepted until theirdamage had been done. But morerecently, the terrorists who plannedto bomb Los Angeles Airport onNew Years Day 1999 were caughtas they crossed from Canada intoWashington State with their bombmaterial.

Identifying and interceptingterrorists will never be easy, norwill it ever be a sure thing. But itcan certainly be done better if it hasgreater resources available –resources the present Administra-tion now plans to dissipate onNMD.#$

If Not NMD continued from p. 2

May/June/July/August 2001 FAS Public Interest Report """"" 11

12 """"" FAS Public Interest Report May/June/July/August 2001

Strategic Security Project Co-Authors Report, Expands Staff

Bob Sherman is building astrong team in Strategic Security.We have been working actively tobuild a rational basis for a new USnuclear and space posture, workingwith the Center for Defense Infor-mation, the Union of ConcernedScientists, and the Natural Re-sources Defense Council. FASCouncil Chair Frank von Hippeland Fund Board Chair Steve Fetterwere active participants in theprocess. The recommendations inthis report (see summary on page5) represent an effective way totake advantage of the end of theCold War. We have been encourag-ing a broad national debate onthese issues and helping the Con-gress to prepare to review the BushAdministration’s nuclear posturereview due December 1.

Robert Nelson continues hisanalysis of small nuclear weaponsand is working actively with FASBoard members Lynn Sykes andGregory van der Vink to review thestate-of-the-art in detection ofnuclear testing. Our new staffmember Michael Levi will befocusing initially on reviewing newproposals for Ballistic MissileDefense technology. This workwill soon be available in a majorre-design of the FAS global secu-rity website.

Charles Vick continues toanalyze missile development inNorth Korea, Iran, and Iraq. Hiswork can be seen in the relevantsections of the FAS website.

ASMP Attends UN Conference

Tamar Gabelnick, together withPamina Firchow and MattSchroeder, have been working

actively to use the opportunity ofthe UN Conference on the IllicitTrade in Small Arms and LightWeapons in All Its Aspects tostrengthen international controls onthe conventional arms trade.Gabelnick’s presentation to theConference can be found on page9. Her work was made muchharder by an administration that attimes seemed more interested inhighlighting its bona fides with theNRA than developing multi-national approaches to the controlof the small arms trade.

BWC Project Widens FocusWhile Continuing Protocol Fight

Barbara Rosenberg and herBiological Weapons WorkingGroup fought hard to preserve theverification protocol to the Biologi-cal Weapons Convention, makingan eloquent case for a strongverification protocol in testimonybefore the House Committee onGovernment Reform Subcommitteeon National Security, VeteransAffairs and International Relations(see page 11).

Now that near term hopes for averification protocol have beendashed, it is even more critical thatwe identify other approaches.Rosenberg and her FAS group isactively promoting several. Theyare examining options for a globalinfections disease surveillancesystem, and development of adatabase on pathogen strain identi-fication. Van Blackwood will beleading an effort designed to ensurethat the largest possible number ofpeople in a position to identifyinappropriate use of biologicaltechnology is trained to identifymisuse, and know how to respondappropriately. A key element ofthis work is a collaborative effort todevelop high-quality educational

materials on this topic, availableover the internet, that could be usedaround the world in courses forstudents in the biological sciences.

Ed Tech Pinpoints Resources

Marianne Bakia has beenworking actively to encourageincreased federal investment ineducation technology research. AnNSF-sponsored workshop that FAShelped lead last fall concluded thata key barrier to increased invest-ment was the absence of a clearlyarticulated program of research.We have been working hard toremedy this situation by assistingin the creation of a LearningFederation, a public-private part-nership that will conduct researchon use of education technology forpost-secondary instruction inscience, mathematics, and engi-neering. An initial step will bedeveloping a detailed roadmap ofrequired research.

Marianne has also been anactive part of the Digital Legacyproject — a proposal for a majornational investment in the develop-ment and dissemination of educa-tional and cultural materials usingnew digital communication tech-nologies. Like the Morrill Act ofthe 19th century, this would sparkwidespread use of technologies thatcan enrich the lives of peoplethroughout the US.

FAS Sponsors Survey of Science/Tech Institutes

Peter Balint, on loan to FASfrom the University of Maryland,has been exploring options forstrengthening the ability of univer-sity centers to support accurate,timely analysis of science andtechnology policy issues mostrelevant to the Congress and the

Status continued from p. 5

May/June/July/August 2001 FAS Public Interest Report """"" 13

FAS is undergoing several staffchanges this summer.We are pleased to welcome

Michael Levi and Van Blackwoodto the staff. Michael Levi will beassisting Robert Sherman on theStrategic Security Project as theAssociate Director. He comes toFAS from Princeton Universitywhere he has been pursuing a Ph.D.in string theory and theoreticalcosmology while working withFrank von Hippel on science andpolicy issues.

Van Blackwood joined the staffin August. He will be assistingBarbara Rosenberg of the BW/CWNonproliferation Project primarilyon a new initiative in bioethics.With a Ph.D. in chemistry, Van hasspent the last three years as theAAAS Defense Science PolicyFellow at the USAF Office of theDeputy Assistant Secretary.

We are saddened by the depar-ture of Pamina Firchow and Amy

Hail and Farewell to FAS StaffBy Karen Kelley

Rossi, both of whom will bepursuing their Master’s degrees atthe London School of Economicsthis fall.

Amy Rossi has been an invalu-able asset to FAS, serving initiallyas the Assistant to the President,and subsequently providing vitalresearch and logistics support asthe Project Coordinator of both theBW/CW Nonproliferation Projectand the Learning Technology

public. His work involves (i)identifying existing capacity in USuniversities and developing a planfor strengthening their capacity andtying them more directly to prioritywork, and (ii) surveying potentialCongressional clients to proposemechanisms for identifying thehighest priority projects, the timingrequired, and the best format fordelivering the information.

FAS Sponsors Digital HumanConference

Gerry Higgins of FAS, joinedby Tim Poston on leave from JohnsHopkins University, are working to

create an open-source communityworking with a shared set ofstandards that can build a DigitalHuman – a simulation of thehuman body that would range inscale from molecules to organs.These simulations would be used toteach and learn biology at alllevels, to integrate information andconduct research, to predict stresson the human body in a variety ofcircumstances. We started buildingthis community at a major confer-ence on this topic held at NIH onJuly 23 and 24. The proceedingsare posted on the FAS homepage,www.fas.org/dh.

Project.Pamina Firchow has con-

tributed a great deal in hercapacity as the Research Assis-tant to the Arms Sales Monitor-ing Project. She has authored apaper on the implementation ofthe OAS Convention on SmallArms, in addition to providingfundamental research support.

We wish them great successin their new endeavors.#$

Van Blackwood, BW/CWArms Control Project

Michael Levi, StrategicSecurity Project

A Final Note

We’ve been working actively toboth strengthen FAS’ work in areaswhere it has been active for manyyears and explore new areas. Ournew facilities on K Street in down-town Washington, DC are helpingus work together much moreeffectively, and we look forward toworking with our new Board.

I apologize for the erraticmailing schedule of the PIR.We’ve successfully navigated somemajor transitions and hope to beback on a regular schedule this fall.We’ve plainly got our work cut outfor us. Thank you for your contin-ued support.#$

14 """"" FAS Public Interest Report May/June/July/August 2001

Government SecrecyGovernment SecrecyGovernment SecrecyGovernment SecrecyGovernment Secrecy Intelligence Oversight Faces New ObstaclesBy Steven Aftergood

A change in the rules of theHouse of Representatives

poses a new obstacle to congres-sional oversight of intelligence.That is what the House Govern-ment Reform Committee discov-ered when the CIA blocked one ofits investigations.

Committee members wereastonished — and infuriated —when the CIA refused to participatein a hearing they called to examinecomputer security at the Agency.

“Neither I nor any CIA repre-sentative will testify,” wrote Direc-tor of Central Intelligence GeorgeJ. Tenet bluntly on July 17. Henoted that House IntelligenceCommittee chairman Porter Goss“urged me not to testify.” (A copyof Tenet’s letter, obtained by FAS,is posted at www.fas.org/irp/news/2001/07/tenet.html.

The focus of the Committee’sinterest immediately shifted fromcomputer security to a new topic:“Is the CIA’s refusal to cooperatewith Congressional inquiries athreat to effective oversight of theoperations of the Federal Govern-ment?”That rather leading questionwas the title of an unusual hearingheld before two subcommittees ofthe House Government ReformCommittee.

The hearing was unusualbecause the established structuresof intelligence oversight are rarelycriticized within Congress itself,and Republican leaders rarelyspeak of the CIA with anger andindignation. But this time they did.

“The CIA is assaultingCongress’s constitutional responsi-bility to oversee executive branchactivities,” said subcommitteechairman Rep. Stephen Horn (R-Calif.) “The CIA believes it isabove that basic principle in ourConstitution. We do not agree.”

“Tell me why I shouldn’t beoutraged,” said Rep. ChristopherShays (R-Conn.), his voice trem-bling. “When faced with persistentinstitutionalized [CIA] resistance tolegitimate inquiries, we’re com-pelled to reassert our authority.”

FAS helped to publicize theconflict and reported on the under-

lying issues in our email newsletterSecrecy News.

To justify his refusal to testify,Mr. Tenet of the CIA cited a little-noticed amendment to the HouseRules that was adopted last January3. As a result of that amendment,“The Permanent Select Committeeon Intelligence is to have exclusiveoversight responsibility over thesources and methods of the coreintelligence agencies.”

The upshot of this change isthat congressional oversight ofintelligence, which is alreadysubject to far-reaching limitations,is being further diminished byrestricting the oversight jurisdictionof most committees other than theIntelligence Committee.

The new House rule is “whollyinconsistent with the compromisewhich led to the creation of theIntelligence Committees,” notedMorton H. Halperin, now seniorfellow at the Council on ForeignRelations. Mr. Halperin, whoserved in numerous national secu-rity functions in and out of govern-ment, played an influential role inthe formulation of intelligence

oversight policies in his formercapacity as director of the Centerfor National Security Studies.

That original compromisepermitted the establishment of theIntelligence Committee on condi-tion that the existing jurisdiction ofother committees would be fullypreserved.

Specifically, the 1977 HouseRule that established the HouseIntelligence Committee stated:“Nothing in this rule shall beconstrued as prohibiting or other-wise restricting the authority of anyother committee to study andreview any intelligence or intelli-gence-related activity to the extentthat such activity directly affects amatter otherwise within the juris-diction of such committee.”

This rule remains in effect,even though it appears to be contra-dicted by the new amendmentgranting “exclusive” oversight ofintelligence sources and methods tothe Intelligence Committee.

As a practical matter, the newrule has already curtailed intelli-gence oversight in the HouseGovernment Reform Committee.

Members of the GovernmentReform Committee met with theSpeaker of the House in late July todiscuss the new challenge to theirjurisdiction, a Committee spokes-man said. He added that thoughthere was no immediate resolutionof the issue, the Committee intendsto defend its interests vigorously.

“The CIA is assaulting Congress’s constitu-tional responsibility to oversee executive branchactivities ... [It] believes it is above that basicprinciple in our Constitution.”

-Rep. Stephen Horn (R-California)

Controversy over Wen Ho Lee PersistsBy Steven Aftergood

It has been nearly a yearsince former Los Alamos

scientist Wen Ho Lee, oncesuspected of espionage, wasfreed from jail with an apologyfrom the judge after he pledguilty to illegally downloadingclassified information. But thehandling of his case continuesto be a source of controversyand confusion.

Most recently, the GAOreported that testimony pre-sented to Congress by FBIAssistant Director NeilGallagher about the Lee casewas “inaccurate and mislead-

ing.”Mr. Gallagher assured Con-

gress in 1999 that the FBI had fullconfidence in the initial Inquirywhich asserted that design secretsof the W-88 nuclear warhead hadbeen compromised at Los Alamosand which identified Wen Ho Leeas an espionage suspect.

But such confidence wasunwarranted. The GAO found thatMr. Gallagher “should have knownthat the FBI’s Albuquerque FieldOffice had concerns about the ...Inquiry.”

Specifically, a January 1999communication from the FBI

Albuquerque Field Officespelled out the defects in theInquiry that launched the Leeprosecution and was provided toMr. Gallagher. That documentremains classified.

The text of the new GAOreview may be found atwww.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/whl_gao.html.

In response to the assess-ment, Mr. Gallagher lashed outat the GAO for suggesting thathe may have “intentionally”misled Congress, writing “At no

The intrinsic limits on Con-gressional oversight of intelli-gence — involving shortages ofstaff personnel, time, resources,and Members’ attention as well asa lack of independent sources ofinformation — were describedwith unusual frankness by MaryK. Sturtevant in the Summer 1992issue of the American IntelligenceJournal, published by the Na-tional Military IntelligenceAssociation.

Though dated in some re-spects, Ms. Sturtevant’s articleidentifies the basic structuralbarriers to oversight that will onlybe exacerbated by the new Houserule. See “Congressional Over-sight of Intelligence: One Per-spective” at www.fas.org/irp/eprint/sturtevant.html.#$

observers. All of them concludedthat non-challenge visits wouldbe effective in strengthening theBWC and increasing confidencein compliance. They also con-cluded that confidential informa-tion could be protected at thesame time. Americans should beaware that protection of theirdefense establishments and bio-industry is of great importance toour allies, as it is to us. In formu-lating their policies our allieshave worked productively withthe same multinational corpora-tions that are the major players inthe US.

In addition, copious amountsof information were availablefrom trial inspections conductedby the US and many other coun-tries not so long ago duringnegotiation of the CWC, from theUNSCOM experience in Iraq,and from the experience of

multiple types of national andinternational inspections carriedout routinely at sites relevant to theProtocol by many countries. Itwould be desirable for the US tocarry out on-site trials of its own inorder to allay the fears of thosepotentially affected, but to becredible, such trials would have tobe multilateral and would have tomake a special effort to demon-strate the absence of bias.#$

May/June/July/August 2001 FAS Public Interest Report """"" 15

continued on next page

For more informationabout the BWC, testimonyfrom other parties (includ-ing the Chairman, Ambas-sador Tibor Toth), and thecurrent draft of the Proto-col, visit

www.fas.org/bwc/index.html

BWC Protocol continued from p. 10

PeriodicalsPaid at

Washington, D.C.

FAS PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT (202) 546-33001717 K Street NW Suite 209 Washington, D.C. 20036; fas@fas.orgMAY/JUNE/JULY/AUGUST 2001, VOLUME 54, NO. 3/4

ADDRESS CORRECTION REQUESTEDReturn Postage Guaranteed

time during my 28-year career inthe FBI have I ever misled orintentionally misinformed a mem-ber of Congress.”

In a June 27 letter released bythe FBI, Mr. Gallagher acknowl-edged that when he testified beforeCongress in June 1999 he was notaware of the defects in the Admin-istrative Inquiry that initiallynamed Lee as a possible espionagesuspect. But in his defense, henotes that he wrote to Congress inNovember 1999 to correct therecord after he learned that thebasis for the Lee investigation wasdisputed. See Mr. Gallegher’srebuttal to the GAO review atwww.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/whl_gall.html.

But that’s not the end of it.Former DOE counterintelligenceofficial Notra Trulock, who playeda key role in shaping congressionaland media perceptions of the case,criticized Mr. Gallagher’s letter.He spoke of a “web of deceit theFBI has spun to cover up its ownmistakes and blunders in the WenHo Lee debacle.... Gallagher isdistorting the record and attemptingto mislead both the GAO and theCongress. “ See Mr. Trulock’s

letter to the GAO at www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/whl_gao_trulock.html.

Several other official assess-ments of the Wen Ho Lee caseremain outstanding. The massiveJustice Department report con-ducted by federal prosecutor RandyBellows on the investigation upthrough March 1999 has beendeclassified and is awaiting finalprocessing for public release. It issaid to provide a withering accountof the FBI’s conduct of the case.

An FBI Office of ProfessionalResponsibility report is beingwithheld in its entirety as “lawenforcement information,” eventhough it was initiated, in part, torespond to public concerns aboutthe conduct of the case.

A separate JusticeDepartment’s Office of Profes-sional Responsibility review,which commenced nearly a yearago, is still “in its preliminarystages,” and “it would be prematureto estimate when it will be com-pleted,” according to Justice offi-cial Robert B. Lyon, Jr.

And not least, Wen Ho Leehimself has completed a memoir ofhis experience.

His 256 page manuscript,entitled “My Country Versus Me,”is to be published by Hyperion

Books later this year. It is nowunder review by Department ofEnergy officials to ensure that itcontains no classified information.

In a recent floor statement,Senator Arlen Specter criticized theexecutive branch for failing tocooperate with congressionaloversight of the Lee case. He saidthat the treatment of Dr. Lee as“public enemy No. 1, when he wasput in manacles and solitaryconfinement...had all the earmarksof an effort at the top of the JusticeDepartment and FBI to coerce aguilty plea.”#$

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Wen Ho Lee continued from p. 15