FBI Instructions on CIA Cover-ups

8/12/2019 FBI Instructions on CIA Cover-ups

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/fbi-instructions-on-cia-cover-ups 1/19

. ..

30,.

r crimes committed by CIA employees or persons acting on behalf of

1c CIA.8. The staJ.llte establishing the office of the special prosecutor

m"ufd'P ro\·id€1 spec:ifica lly that the special prosecutor, n.nd not the11A, h a l l p n ~ o ; upon the sensitivity of the in formation which t.he CIAJy withho ld in the course of an investigation or prosecution

r cnmn.P. The burden of proof should be placed upon the government

1tlter th r,n tl1c defendant to show that the information 1t wishes to

eep from di,c losu rc during prosecution is irrelevant or too sensitiven disclosed.

10 The Ju stice Department should give reasons for failure tou t e in cases of nationv.l concern, at lcnst where public nd

ts3ions of gu ilt have been made.

..i

•t

[COMMITTEE PRINT]

Calendar Xo.l Hh C'ong r .'ss, 2d S£>ssion • ll• lll"C p o r t :'\u. ) . . ~ )

JUSTICE DEPARTMENT T R E A T ~ E N T OFCRIMINAL CASES INVO: ::;VING CIA

PERSONNEL AND CLAIMS OF

NATIONAL SECURITY

- REPORT

BY THE

COMM:ITTEE O GOVERN1ffiNT

OPERATIONS

~ b t ~~ ~~ i j

SEl l 'EliBER - , 1976.- Committed to the C o m m t e e of the Whole House

on the State of tbe Union and ordered to be printed

7 7 ~ $ 1

,

U.S. GOVERNME:\'T PRI \'TING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 197G



CO:\D ITTEE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

JACK BROOKS, Texa.s, Chairmanl l . FOUNTAIN , North Carolina FRAN K H ORTO N, New York

OHN E. MOSS, California J OH N N. ERLENBORN, Illlnol

HSTE B. FASCELL, Florida JOHN W. WYDL E R , New Y ork

I I LLIAM S. IOORUEAD, Pennsylvania CLARENCE J . B ROWN, Oblo

r ~ I . J RANDALL, = u r i GILBERT GUDE, Mn.ryland

lE NJAMTN S. RO SENTHAL, New York PAUL N. McCLOSKE Y , JR., CalUorniaf ~ f WRI GII T, Tex:u S A.\ ST E IG ER, Ariwna

' ERNA.:-ID J ST GE RMA IN, Rhode Island GARRY BRO WN, Michigan

'LOYD V. lU CKS , Wa.shi ngt<>a CHARLES 'r B ONE , Nebraska

)ON t : Q U . F lorida ALA N 8 T E E L ~ 1 A Texas

O HN CO:-IYERS, J a ., Michigan J OEL ~ R D Washingt on

IE LLA S. ABZ UG, New York EDWI N B FORS Y'I'H E, New Jersey

A ~ I E S \ . STANTON, Ohio ROBERT W. KASTEN, Ja . , Wisconsin

.LO 1. RYAN , Cnlilornla WILLIS D. G R - ~ D I S O N J a . Ohio

:ARDISS CO LLI:-IS, 1Wnoi3

OITI'\ L. BURTON , Cnlilorn ln

llCHARDSON PHEYER, North Caroll.na[ CH AEL HARRINOT0:-1, \lassa.chusetts

O B E R T F. DRI:-1.-I.N, M=buset t s

DI L\RD E Z V I : - I S Iowa

J OR DA:-1, T exas

•I.E:-IN ENGLIS IT , Oklahoma

L t .IOTT II LEYlTAS, Georgia1A ' ID W. EV ANS, lndln.na

NT HO:-IY MOFFETT, Connecticut

:- DREW MAGUIRE , New JerseyES . ~ S P I : - 1 Wisconsin

WILL All M. J ON : , Gt Ural Coumel

JOH N E. MOORE, Staf Admlni. lrator

W tLLlAX H COrE:>'HAVER, Auociot' Coum'lLYN :s E HtGGtNBOT IAX, Ckrk

1 P. CARLSON, Mi ruv ounul

GOVl':B....,YENT INFORMATION AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS SUl COMMlTTEE

BELLA S. ABZUO, New Yo rk, Chairman

EO J. RYAN, Calllomln

lHN CONYERS, R., '.llcbigaa

>HN E. MOSS, Crui ornla

ICl iAEL llARRINOT0:--1, Mossachusett•

NDREW MAG U IRE, New Jersey

NT HONy MOFFETT, Connecticut

BAM STEfOER, Arltoaa

CLARENCE J. BROWN, Ohio

PA UL N. McCLOSKEY, Jn., Cal ornla

Tn<OTHT H lNGRAll, Staf DiruJor

ERICL IltRSCI liORN, ounul

ROBERT FINK, PTofmional Staff Mtmbtr

A.'IITA W<E511AN, Clrrk

(II)

LETTER OF TR NSMITT L

Hon . CARL ALBERT,

HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

Washington, D .C. September-, 1976:

S p e a k ~ r of the House of Representatives ,Washtngton, D.C.

DEAR Mn. SPEAKE R: By direc tion of the Committee on Government Operations, I submit herewith the committee's reportto the 94th Congress. The committee's report is ba sed on a studymade by its Government Activities and Individual Rights Subcommittee.

J AC K BROOKS, r m a n ~Jn)



.

CONTENTS

I ntrodnction_________________________________________________ _

11 The 1954 agreement: Findings_____________ : ___________________ _A. 1\-rarch 1, 1954 to December 19, 1974 _____________________ _

B. The agreement was brought to the attention of the JusticeDepn.rtment n.gain on December 19, 1974 _______________ _

C. The ngrecment was not clcnrly terminated nt the meeting__ _D. At the December 19, 19741 meeting, Justice Department

officials did nothing to insure that the agreement usurpingtheir prosecurtorial powers would be inoperative in thefuture. They terminated the agreement offichdly only afterits public disclosure in the Rockefeller report_ __________ _

E. Cases referred and nt t referred to the Justice Departmentduring the 105,1 agreement____________________________ _

F. Sc?.t:e of the n g r ~ m n t wns onil• on reporting of illegal activ- L esnoL nuthonzed by theCA _______________________ _

G. Disposition of the 20 referred cases ______________________ _

li The Ju:;tice Depnrtmcnt failed to inquire whether the 1954agreement wns legal, and vhether the CIA had violated any

Federal laws by exercising prosecutorial powers __________(1) The legality of the 1954 agreement_______________ _

(2) The Attorney General may delegate prosecutorialpower to members of the executive brnnch______ _

(3) It. is unclear, however, whether the Attorney Genernl

actuaUy delegated prosecutorinl power to the CIAby the 1954 agreement, and wl:cther that delegationwas intended to last for 20 y·ear-s_______________ _

(4) Exercise of prosccutorinl discretion by the CIA underthe agreement may have amounted to conspirncyto deprive the Government of proper functioniugof n Government agency ______________________ _

. ~ ) The mere failure of the CIA to report the crimes wnsnot a violation o the law_____________________ _

G) Other Justice DepartmcnL ae,rrccment.s were notabusive _____________________________________ _

1. The 1954 ngreement; Summar y of findings nnd conclusions__ -

III. Barriers to prosecution of intelligence agency members after 1954agreement is tenninated; Findings____________________________ _

A. The internal controls nnd investigatory procedures tJ( the CIAhave been insufficient to facilitate report Gf CIA crimes to

. the Justice Department_ ______________________________ _B. The national security claim _____________________________ _

(1) Discussion _______ _____ ______ _

(n) Disclosure of Government information exer-cise of the sixth nmendment_ __________ _

(b) The CIA justification for refusing to dis-close the infor mation __________________ _

(2) Findings_______________ _

'

P n ~ : ~

144

77

8

8

99

1010

10

10

10

11

1212

13

13Hl414

1617



\" [

Jl; ('2) (a) CL\ r d ~ · : \ l . to di:.;clO:)C' informntion mnydrLrr mttmt prp:;ccutlon or ull.d to d i : > ~mi: ::ml of a p r o : - ; c • c u t i o n ~ - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - -

(b) Tne0 nntionnl :;ccurity 11 clnim hn..'l hccn

nhu: <rd and sti l lm:w lw n o u r c e of i J U : > < ~(c) Fnilure of Lhr .JusticC Dt•parLnwnt to p r n : ; ~ - : _

cute any (;IA persomwl for crinH·s publiclyn d m i l t t ~ d to nnd c r i n H ~ . disclu:·H'd inGon•ntrnt•nt t{'poris, nnd f a i l u n ~ of tho

Ju:ilke D t ~ p n r i H H • n L to gi\·c r c : \ . . { o n ~ for:-;uch nonprn:-<ccutiun, uncferminc thn pubHr.':-; belief in cqu:d enforcement of the law.The J u : > l i c t ~ DcpartnH:Jit t>hould giYCreason: , for dccbioll 5 not to prosecute, utlc:1st in ccrtn n limited circumstanccg___ _

(3} Remcdic:\ nnd recommendation;-; _________________ _

(n) In order to facilitate initiation of p r o ~ c c u ·t i o n ~ , the prosecutor should mnkc nnind('pt ndcnt and finn dccil:iion of thescnsitidty of GoYcrnmcnt mntcrinl ex·pC'CL(•d to Je d i ~ c l o s c d during p r o ~ c c u t i o n _

· b) A speci:d pro:-:ecut{Jr to prosecute crimescnntmittNi l1y intP\ligt•nt:C n -(ency JH'r:;onill'l t" muld bu n p p n i n t l ~ d in onh•r tufnrilit.nt.u p r o ~ t ' c u t i o n , nnd d\:t(:r futureintelligence ngcncy abuses nnd rcBtorc

pu1Jlic confidence in equal enforcement ofthe lnw ____________ ___ _(c) A 1-il:tlulc should be enacted 'vhich gives n.

p,rcci:Jc and narrow definition to the term•zw.tional security information'' nnd which

pro\'idcs for the employment of a sufficientnumber of pe:oplc "who will decbssify f\11

the information which nccording to thedl'finition of the statute, overcln.ssificd __

e d i . ~ r n i ; . s a l of the indictment in a cu::;c whcr0 n CIA operative ncknowledged participation in opium s m u ~ g l i n g i : ~ nn cxnmple of

of D.bu.se of the 0nationnl ::wcurity claimu nnd J u ~ t i c e Department

n c q u l c c s ~ n c e to the CIA: Findings____________________________ _

A. The f u e l ~ surrounding the 1974 Ju,ticc Department dismissal

of an indictme11t ng:tin;;t n. CIA operative on un:ttionalsecurity" ground:-i provides u s t e p · b y ~ n t r p cxnmplc·of hownational ~ c c u r i t y c1:tim;:; muy be u::;cd by intelligence agcncic::;

nnd d c f e n ~ c coun:-;rl to U\'oid prosecution of ii1tclligcncengency p e r ~ O l l H : I . The facts indicntc thut the Just.ice Dcp:utntcnt improperly allowed the CIA to cxcrci:;c pro.sccutorial dbcn:tion by :\llo\\'ing the CIA to force di:mlissn o

the i n d i c t m e n t - ~ . FurthC'r, the dismissal is an cxarnplc ofth( Ju:.ticc Depnrtnwnt complicity in setting the intelligence

n g { • n c i e ~ : - ~ b o \ · c t hc l a w s . ·B. The CIA f:tilrd to fndlitate pro;;ccution of the e r i m c ~ - - - - - - -C. Tbe CIA rf'flls:t to cnnpr·rat( \\'ll' h 1..'>Cd in part on politicnl

r c a : > n n ~ tht\t had nothing to do wilh protection of natiouu\:iC·curity ______ _ -- -- __ -- __________ __

D. D.cfu:-:al of t.hc CIA to turn oYer the documents wa::; inconsist-ent with Federal court. of nppC'nb; d c c i ~ i o n ______________•

E. The Ju:::.tict: Dcp:trtrnC'nt nhrog:ttcd its responsibility to vigor

oush p r u ~ e C 1 J t c Ll Jt' c : t ~ C - · - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - ' - F. The dl•ri:-:it1;1 that tlH' information was too : - ; c n ~ i t i v c to tum

O\'er was that of the CIA nnd not the Justice Dc·purtmcnL_

G. Cnnclushm __ •. __ -- -- H. CIA ______ . . ________________________ -- ______ _

I. Nutional :iCl Hrit\' c l a i m ~ and the rules of C\'idt·nee _________ _~ c o m r o e n d u t i o n : 5 ~ . ___ __________ -- - - - - - -

PUKO

17

17 -

1920

20

20

22

24

2424

25

25

26

27

27282828

Union Calendar Nv. _ _94-rn CoNGRESS } HOuSE OF REPRESEK'L\'l'l\'ES {3d ession

R;:ronTNo. 94-00==

JUSTICE DEPARTMENT

OASES INVOLVING CIA

NATIONAL SECURITY

TREATiviENT OF C R f ~ 1 I i \ A LP R S O ~ P i L AND CLAI:\1S OF

SI<;PTEMBER - 1976.-Comrn.itted to the Committee o the Vl'bole House on the

State of the Union and ordered to be printed

REPORT

BASED ON A STUDY Y THE GOVER 1MENT INJ.<,ORMATION A:-.'"D INDIYtDUAL

RIGHTS SUBCOMMITTEE

On September-, 1976, the Committee on Government Operationsapproved and adopwd a report entitled "Justice Department Treatment of Criminal Oases Involving CIA Personnel and Claims ofNational Security." The chairman was directed to transmit a copy tothe Speaker of the House.

I. INTRODUCTION

This investigation was instituted by the Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights of the Committee on Govern

ment Operu.tions pursuant to the subcommittce1s oversight jurisdictionof the Dcpa.rtment of Justice. The purpose of this invest.iaation was toconsider how best to mukc intelligence ngency personnel nccountu.blcto the criminal laws of the United S t a ~ e s without compromising thenational security.

'rho question was raised initially by the almost totnl immnnityintelligence agcnC)' personnel seeq1 to 'have from the criminnl laws.Evicknco of thnt 1mmunity was and s the glaring nbsencc. of .JnsliccD e p t ~ r t m e n o prosecution of any CIA personnel despite the public admission und disclosure of mnssive illegalitics. 1

The commit.tee believes that one of the most effective methods ofpreventing future intelliO'encc ncrcncy nbuscs i:l to bring int<'lligcncecommunity 1ncmbcrs witltin the

0

covernge of the criminni ln\'l in pntcticc as well as in theory. In furtherance of that goal, the committee

1 t t l ' r {rom CIA Dire('\ or Co by to P r ~ ~ d r n t Ford, D((•.:?.'>, 1 9 ~ ( ' '\ 'f ill R•·port") "Rr lorl to t h ~ P : - . · ~ 1 ·dent hy 1hr C o m r n l f ~ l ( • t t ott rL \ Arth•\t l'S within th1• t'n ttd Stfllrs," J u n ~ G, 1 ~ ; . ~ tthr Rr;:kdo•\h•r rom·mlss rm Ttnrwrll; "Flnul H ~ p o r t of thr Srkr.t Cnmmit\Nl to StuLl>' {iowrnmrnt:"il O J . . ' N \ I I o n ~ wilh H<'>:>PI :"I

to lntc Ut:cttce Agenck;" i C . h ~ r c h .Commit ter.), Unit ed Slnlt•s S e n ~ ; ~ t e , A prll :.G, l ~ l j t i Boob I, I , l l l . '

I

•



\"

I. Jl; (2) (a) CL\ refu;ml to disclo:;c information mnydctC'r initial pro ')ccution or lend to dispmi:>:ml of a pro:;Ccution ________________ _

(b) Tne "nntionnl security" cluim h n . ~ hecnnbu:;cd and still may ben ':lOUrcc of ahune __

(c) Failure of the Ju..,;tice Department to pro ':lC-cutc any CIA personnel for c r i m e : - ~ publiclyadmitted to und crime.-1 di:4clo:: ed in

Govcmmcnt report: , and f:tilure of theJustice Department to give r c : ~ o m > forsuch nonprosccution, undermine the public':; belief in equal enforcement of the la.w.The Ju..,Ucc Department :;hould gh·crca..-;ons for decisions not to prosecute, atleast in certain limited circumstn nccs ___ _

(3) Remedic:'l nnd recommendations _________________ _

(n) In order to f l.cilitatc initiation of prosecutions, the prosecutor should mttkc nnindcpendcnt .and final decision of thesensiti\•ity of Government material ex-pected to be disclosed during prosecution_

·(b) A l:)pecial prosecutor- to prosecute crimescommitted by iiJtclligenec ngcncy personnel should bu nppointcd in order tofncilitnle prosecution, and deter future

intelligence ngcnc)' abuses and restorepublic confidence in equnl enforcement ofthe law ______________________________

(c) A stntuLe should be enacted which gives awccise and narrow definition to the term1nationnl security information" nnd which

pro\'idesfor the employment of a sufficientnumber of people ·who will declassify nllthe information which according to thedefinition of the statute, is overr.:lassified__

' .The dismissal of the indictment in a case where n CIA operative ac knowledged participation iu opium smuggling is an cxn.mple ofof n.buse of the 11national security clnim" and Justice Department

\cquiccsence to the CIA: indingsA. The fact.'> surrouuding the 1974 Justice Department dismissal

of an indictment ngainst a CIA operative on 11nationalsccurit.y" grounds pro\'idcs u step-by-step example-of hownntionnl security claims muy be used by intelligence :tgencicsnnd dcfen:-lc coun:>el to a\'oid prosecution of intelligenceagency personnel. The fncts indicate that the Justice Department improperly allowed the CIA to exercise prosecutorinl discretion by allowing the CIA to force dismissal ofthe indictments. Further, the disrnissul is un example ofthe Justice Dr pnrtmcnt complicity in setting the intelligenceagencies nbovc the l:tws ___________________ ___________ _

B. The CIA failed to fncilitate pro:;ccution of the crime _______ _C. The CIA refu:;a\ to conpcrnte \ \ l \ ~ h:t.'-ied in purL on pnlittcnl

_ rcnsons thnt had noLhing to do with protection of nationalsecurit\T ________ __________

D. Ilcfusal f the CIA to turn over the document,:, wns inconsist-ent with Federal court of uppcnls d e h ~ i o n ______________ _

E. The .Tu$tict Department ahrogutcd its responsibility to vigor

ously prosecute the c n s e ~ -F. The decision thn.t the information wn.s too sensitive to turn

O\'Cr wn.::; that of the CIA and not the Justice Department__

G. Conclusion ____ __H. Cl A __________________ ____________1. Nu.tionnl security c l a i m ~ nnd the rules of C\"idcnce _________ _

{ Recommendations_____________

-'·--

Pugo

17

17

1920

20

20

22

24

24

24

-25

20

26

2727282829

Union alendar No.9-hn CoNGRESS } HOUSE OF REPllESEKTA'l'IYES {fdd ession

RErORT

No. 94-00

JUSTICE DEPARTMENT

CASES lNVOLVIN G CIA

NATIONAL SECURITY

TREATME.\'T OF

l'ERSO:-.:NEL AND

CRIMINAL

CLAI.\1S OF

SEPTEMBER-, 1 9 7 6 . ~ C o m m . i t t e d to the Committee of the 'Whole ;House on the

State of the Union and ordered to be printed

REPORT •.

BASED ON A STUDY BY ' fHE GOVERNMENT INFORMATION A "fD INDIVIDUAL

RIGHTS SUBCOMMITTEE

On September-, 1976, t he Committee on Government Operationsa.pproved and adopted a report entitled "Justice Department Treatment of Criminal Cases Involving CIA Personnel and Claims ofNational Security." The chairman was directed to transmit a copy tothe Speaker of the House.

I. INTRODUCTION

This investigation was instituted by the Subcommittee on Government Information a.nd Individual Rights of the Committee on Government Operations pursuant to the subcommittee1s oversight jurisdictionof the Department of Justice. The purpose of this invest.igntion wns toconsider how best to make intelligence agency personnel accountableto the criminal laws of the United S t a ~ e s without compromising thenational security. ·

The question was raised initially by the almost totnl immunityintelligence a ~ e n c , Y personnel seem to 'have from the criminal lnw;.Evidence of tnnt Immtmit.y \Va.s and is the glaring absence of JusticeDcpaetmcnt prosecution of any CIA personnel despite the public ndmission and disclosure of massive illegulities.1

The commit.tee belie,,es thnt one o( the most effccti,·e methods ofpreventing future intellio-ence agency abuses i: > to bring inLelligcncecommunity members \Yi{Lin the coverage of the criminnr ln\'t in prac

tice as well as in theory. In furtherance o( that gofll, the committee1Let\t'r from CIA Director Colby to ' r ~ s l d l ' n t I_.on:\, D£c.2.'i, J 9 i ~ ("Y11.ll Report") "Report to the P r l ~ \

dent hy t w C o m m l ~ ~ l o n on CIA Actlvlth·s within t h ~ t"nitcd States," Jmw J )i5 (tlw Rockdt>\h•r rommission HE port); "Finn\ Report of the Sf'lcct Commlttru to Study ( iO\"H l l l \Ol inl Opt'ratlons wilh Uosp(ctto Intellig-ence Agenclto:s" (Church Commit ee), U n l t ~ d Stntt S Senate, A pr l : 6, Wi6 Dooks I, 11, II I.

( l)

•



2

studied Qtc past perform;r:'ce of the CIA and the Justice e ~ a r t m e n tin pursumg brosecuLion o q r ; t - p e - r : ~ o r u ; e r ; 9:ncl it-s-£\l(hetl Lhe egu;l a_ndpol LicHl Jto lt::lll:-> tnherCiiv tl publtc tnul 01 members of n commumty

\\·hieh gunrcls nntionul secrct.s. The studies were rnn,dc with ttn eye

; toward making: recommendations on ho\V to mt1kC intelligence agencies·

; more nccountablc in the future.

: Two key barriers to the prosecution of CIA pcrs6nne1 hn.vc beeni5Ucntificd. F i r ~ t is the use of the 11nntionnl sccurity11 clnim b_y in-

1

tclligcnce ngcnc.y oflicirrls nnd clcfcndnnts who wish to force dismissn.iof u prosecution, nnd sceond is the innhility, at this point1 of Congress

1or lh : public to review a prosecutor's decision not to mdict for nntiormlsccuntv· rcnsons.I UncCer the sixth amendment, a defendant is entitled to fi public

Irial and confroutntion of w i L n e ; . , ~ o ~ n g a i n ~ t . him. The llnnLionnl

security" c:laim is tho elnim mnde by either the intelligence agency orj the prosecutor thnt. information which will jeopardize the national

:security ncccssurily will he rcveulcd during the course of the trial.Attorncvs dc(ending intelligence agency per.sonnel therefore often nsk

;for tho broad discovery with the hope that the agency will refuse to' turn over a document tmd thus compel the trial judge to order a rnis:trial or t dismiss the indictment. P r o s e c u t o r ~ and intelligence agenciesuse the national security claim to stymie initial prosecution and in-

dictment because they anticipate ntlt.ional security information will,be revealed in tbe course of prosecution. The immunity has also been

,applied to illegalities by intelligence agency personnel unrelated to

their job activities as well as to others lutving knowledge or claiming toba.ve knowledge of ({national security 11 operations.

. Inexb·icnbly tied to the nutionaJ security claim is the seminal ques-

t ~ o n of what is national security information. Exactly what informa-

tion must be kept secret.?To date the definition has been vague and ranges fron1 information

which muy be pol'itically cmbnrrassing to either the United St>etes orthe Executive Brtmch of the government

1to a more precise definition

such ns t€chnicnl inforrnat.ion on weaponr:{, information on ongoing

negotiations with forei&'11 countries, and information revealing sources

nnd methods of covert operations which are leg>1l. Further, the definition hus been dependent U\Jon the parties with the power to define theterm. Until now, the in tel igencc ngencics and the Executive Branchgenerally huve hu.d the power to define. Not unexpectedly, they have

given the term tl broad definition, frequently usin¥11national security"

as a shicJd to. cover political mn.chinution.s and viOlations of the lnw. 2

The committee di:;eovercd thnt historicnlly1

the Justice Department

3ns given the CJA as u matter of pructicc and under a 1954 agreement,

~ h e exclusive power to decide whtlt information is too sensitive to he

·even led in 11 trinl of their own personnel. Not surprisingly, the CIAJcfined unationnl security" very brondly und hus found much infor-

nntion too sensitive to be revealed. -\;Vithout revcln.tion of the in forma-

jon which the CIA deem.ecl to be11nA.tiona1 security information 11

1

.he prosecutions could not proceed. 1n large meusure due to this

)Oiicy1 only two CIA employees have nctually been brought to trial in,he last twenty years.'

u :.r. Halp.:rin anti Daniel N. H o ~ m a n "Nntionnl St'eurlty, Ch·ll Liberties e.nd ConsUtutlonn\ Pro-~ d m e s • • { U l J m u ~ c r l p t , tOi6 unpublished at date o this report).

3 Lc ter o July tl, IU16 rom CU. D n•ctor 0 eor>:ll Bush to Congtt'£5\\'om:m Della S. l l ~ u ; .

-

3

The con1mittec believe:.; thnt two step:-> mu:..;t be tnkcn to remove the

national security claitn a:3 a bnrrier t p r o ~ e c n t i o n . Fir:->t1

legislationmust be adopted clearly and narrowly defining the term "Jllltionnl.sccurity 11 mid s e c o n d ~ the tittstice Dcpnrtmcnt. and Ecdernl jud(l'esmust be given access to nutionul security infoi'lll ltion und the p o \ ~ c rto decide independenth' whecher the informntion the intelligenceagencies wish Lo withlw"id during the cour:;c of di:icovcry or t;:ul i:ieither i r r c l e \ ~ n n t . or too :-:cn:-;ivitc to be revealed.

The .Ju:->tice Dcpnrtment rcfu:;cd to comment upon iLq failure toprosecute intelligence agency personnel. The clnim that in order Lo

protect the rcpuLntions and rights of the accu:;cd, the pro:;ccutor may

not report or comment on criminal ~ c t i v i t . v except. in lhe context. ofthe p r c ~ c n l a t . i o n of legally admi:-;siblc ~ v i d e n c e to u judge and jury in

open t:nurL. Undor .his pol iey t. Jo dcciswn to pro:;cdutc or not to p r o ~ - .ecute, known us proseculorinl discretion 1 is not reviC\vnblc. ·

The pust acquiescence of the Justice Department to tho CTA, undthe fuilure to prosecute despite widespread admissions, under oath, of

c r i m e ~ perpetrated aguin}.;L Lhc Americnn people and people of foreigncountries, undermines the public belief in the rule of law a:1d cul sinto question the poliey of mlence on decisions not to prosecute.

In order to restore Li)e confidence of the American people in the

equal enforcement of the crin1inal laws, while still protecting the

rights of the accused, this committee reconunends that the JusticeDepartment give reasons for failure to prosecute in cases of nationaLconcern, at least where public admissions of guilt have been made;

and it recommends that a Special Porsecutor, independent of the

Justice Department, but with the powers equivalent to t h o s ~ of the

Justice Department1

be appointed to prusecute illegal t1ctivitie;; ofintelligence a ~ e n c y personnel.

The followmg report explores in detail the performance of the

Justice Depurtment and CIA regarding prosecution of CIA personnelaud the prosecution of a CIA operative who acknowledged smuggling

opium into the United States. I t also explores generally the legal contours and questions raised by the prosecution of intelligence ugencypersonnel.

Hearings were held by the Government Information and Indi·,.idualRights Subcommittee on July 22, 23, 29,31 and August 1, 1975.'

1 Addltlonally, on July 14, 1975 a depos. t on was t:Rkm or James Wllderotter, former .-&.Ssodat( DeputyAttorne): Genurs . Some testimony on the mstter WI . also tnkau on Juna : 5, 1 175 In t1 hffirlng on a u o t b ~ rmnttorbe oruthlssubcommltteo.

7 7 4 i l - 7 0 - : .



II. TH 1954 A G R E E ~ E l ' : TFINDINGS

March 1, 196 , to December 19, 1974

I On iVIurch 1, 1954, then CIA Genom] Counsel Lawrence Houston,;eno then Deputy Attorney Gcneml William P. Rogers a memorun-.aum bused on earlier discussion between the two regarding problems~ h e CIA occasionally encountered involving criminal prosecution of~ g e n c y personnel and the. danger of the revelations of sensitive:Uformat.ion during an open trial on the matter.

l Following in the text of the memorandum sent by Houston to

Rogers.-5 The 1\Jemorundum constitutes t11e 11 1954 agreement":

MARCH 1' 1 954.\iemorandum for: Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice,

\Yashington 25, D.O.

iubject: Reports of criminal violations to the Department of .Justice.

Attachedis a

memorandumfor

the record,addressed to

the Direc

or, of my understanding of our conversation regarding the investigaion of possible criminal activities arising out of our activities. I f you

.nd no objection to this statement, please return and we will retain itl our iiles for future guidance.

LAWRENCE R. I-IousTON1

General C YI.msel.

FEBRUARY 23, 195<1.femorandum for: Director of Central Intelligence. 1

ubject: Reports of criminal violations to tlw Department of Justice.

1. From time to lime information is developed within the Agencytd.icating the actual or probable violation of criminal statutes. Nortally all such information would be turned over to the Department of

Jst.icofor

investigRtionand

decision as to prosecution. Occasionally1)Wever, the apparent criminnl activi ties uro involved in highly clnssi

and complex covert operations. Under these circumstances investittion by an outside agency could not hope for success without revealing1

Lhn.t ngency the full scope of the covert operation involved as well asiS Agency

1s unt horities and manner of handling the operation. Even

.en, the invcsfignlion could not succeed without. the full assistance ofl interested bnuwhcs of this Agency. In addition, if investigtttionveloped a primaAncic case of a criminal violation

1in ~ n n y cases it

\uld be rcadil.v apparent liHtt prosccuLion would be impossible withIt revealing highly clnssificcl matters to public scrutiny.

.2. The 1ttw is well settled t.htlt tl climinal prosecution cannot proceed: cnrn :'ra or on production of only part of the information. The

)vcrnrncnt must be willing to expose its entire in.forrnntion if it

sires to prosecute. In those ca::;cs involving covert operations, there. - -_

Thf' :\fernornnO.um h \...<;cnrlo'fld whh n It tlH.I memo from Houston to tl1e D n•dorof C( n rnl lntt>lllcrnceobruary ~ 1 . \ 1.\-1 rlf'5erihh 1r tht.< oral ru-:r 'cmrnt readwd hel\\ I'Cn Houston und Rogurs. The two memot f J h ~ - t h e r c o n s t i t u t e the 1 154 m : ' ~ e • • t n e n t . Tr. July 14,1 175, ]). 6•• at•.:;: H . e t y ~ d from copy ofmi;;lnnl.

i (4)

5

fore, there appears to be a balancing of interest between the duty toenforce the law which is in the proper jurisdiction of the Depurtrment of .Just.icc and the Director's responsibility for protecting intelligence sources and methods. This is further affected by practicalconsiderations.

3. I have recently had two con.-ersatiot<" with the Dcp,lrtmcnt of.Justice, the latter on IS February beinil with the Deputy AttorneyGeneral, Mr. '\Villiam P. Rogers. To illustrute the problem 1 tookwith 1nc the complete investigation, with conc u:-;ions nnd rccommcndutions1 of a cnse ·which indicated a variety of violnJions of thevarious criminal stu.tutcs relating to the h n n t l i n ~ of official funds. Thiscusc nroso during the review of a highly complex clunclestine operation. The information was developed by the Inspection and ReviewStaff, Deputy Director (Plans), and even in its completed form wouldbe almost unintelligible to a person not thoroughly familiar "ith theAgency and its ·operations due to the use of pseudonyms and covercompanies and to various circumstances arising out of operationalconditions.

4. I pointed out to the Deputy Attorney General that review by

my office indicated that the individual was almost certainly guilty ofviolations of criminal statutes, but that we had been able to dcviso

no charge under which he could be prosecuted which 'Would not requirereveltttion of highly classified information. Mr. Rogers said that under

these circumstances he saw no purpose in referring the matter to theDepartment of Justice as we were as well or, in the light of the peculiarcircumstances, perhaps better equipped to pass on the possibilities forprosecution. Therefore1 if we could come to a firm determination in

this respect, we should make the record of that determination as clearas possible and retain it in our files.

5. If 1 howeYcr, any information a r i s i n ~ out of our in-vestigation revealed the possibilities of prosecution, then we would have an obligation to bring the pertinent facts to tho attention of the Departmentof Justice. I agreed that any doubt should be resolved in favor ofreferring the matter to the Department of Justice. I a1so pointedout that even in cases where wC felt prosecution wn.s impossible, if

a shortage of funds ·were involved we took whatever collection actionwas feasible and 1 in spite of the problems arising out of the covert

nature of our operations, were frequently successful in recoveringthe funds, at lCast in part. I also illQntioned that our inve::;tigntionson1ctimes indicated possible tax evnsion or fruud which did not involve operations, and that we 1\·orkcd ~ · H h the Intemul ReYCI UCService in such situations.

6. :Mr. Rogers asked that we follow. through carefully on uny suchcaso with any uppropriata Govcmment auency. He stated that anunderstanding on these matters could be rccfuccd ton formal exchnngcof 1etters1 if it becomes necessa.ry, but that he sa\v· no reason v:hypresent practices could not be continued withouL further documenta

tion. I said it. had been my recommcnd.n.tion not. to formalize thesituation unless t.he n1u.tter were brought to an issue eithC'r by p n ~ s u g eof legislation and tt need for clnrificntion thereof or bv d i s c u s ~ i o n onspecific cases ·with the Criniinal DiYision of the Department ofJus ice.

LAWRE:\CE R HousT0:-.>1

General Co1tnsel.



6

TheJusticc Dep11rtmont h11s been unable to locn,te in its files a copyJ( the Houston memorandum,' The cxplanatio11 for this mny be the

ndicn.tion in I-fou<;ton's letter tha.t Rogers s h o ~ 1 l d return tho memo to1he CIA for inclusion in its files if the procedure outlined was ncceptnble:o him.: In August of the sumo year, Congress enucted 28 U.S.O. 535,f•hcreby all agency hotlds in the. Executive brnnch must report forth

i··ith to th.e Attorney G o n e r ~ I all possiblr illegal r r ~ t s of ~ h e i r employees.riouston IS unclc lrl but beheve.s that the chscussron Wlth Rogers rn:ly

lave ~ r o w n out of concern over this pending lcgislation.7

\ 28 U.S.C. 535(b) roads:

j Any informntion, ullcgntion, or comp1nint received in a

Idepartment or ngcncy of the exeeutive brnnch of the Govern-ment relating to violations of title 18 involving Go\Terruncnt

I officers and employees shall be expeditiously reported to the

l Attorney General by the bead of t.he department or agency. · u n l e s s ~

(1) the responsibility to perform an investigation with respect thereto i" specifically assigned otherwise by. <motherprovision of law; or

(2) as to any department or agency of the Governnient, the

Attorney General directs otherwise with respect to a specifiedclass of information, allegat.ion, or complaint.

under the 1954 agreement, as interpreted by the CIA, the CIA would

l:--st determine whct11er sensitive /(national sccu:rity 11 information

rould likely be produced in open court as evidence or tlu·ough dis'overy prior to and during the trial. I f so, the CIA would close the .filein the cllse and not refer it to the Justice Department.' In effect, the)IA would itself exercise both the investigatory power and the power

,f prosecutorial discretion bestowed specifically only upon the Justice

)epnrtmcnt under 28 U.S.C. § 515, 516.9

The 1954 agreement us interpreted by the CIA 11ppears to have beena v u l i d t ~ t e d by 28 U,S.C. 535, While section 535(b)(1) allows for dele:ntion of the investigatory power, it makes no provision for delegation

·f the pow·er to exercise prosecutorial discretwn. The m.cmorandum.escribmg the 1954 flbrrecrnent does not meet the requirements of 28J.S.C. 538(b)(2). Under 535(b)(2), an agency head is exempt fromhe requirement of 535(b) only where the Attorney General so directs.

I Tr. July H, 1'. 76, p, 2' .TTr. July ?2, 197b, p. 8,,1 The analysis of thu contlkt d w ~ n the ~ t a u t o r y rt1qu remonts or 28 U.S.C. b35 and the 1954. at;"reemcnt

le .ilkcn rom the trstlmony ol Philip A. Lncovam, fonnor Counsel, Waterguh• Special Prosecutor, b e o n : ~

s u h r o m m t t ~ e . Tt. July 2 ~ . 1975, Jlfl. 82-83..1'l'ho loot note Is us follows:

~ H i . ~ \ u t h m l t y for IL Cnl proc('('d ttKs: ccmmlsslon, o.'llh, nnd salary /or spoclel uttomors.,(n) ' l ' h t ~ Attomt•Y Oeuernl or any other ottlcur of tho D r p s . r t m ~ n t of Justice, or rmy attontoy s ~ i l l l l y

) p o i n t ~ d by the .\.ttomoy Gcncml under law, mn}', when speclflcally rllrt cted b r tlm Attornoy t.cn<Jral,•nduct u.ny klnrl of lr.glll proct . d l n ~ . dvll cr crlmlnnl, Including grnnd jury proceudltli;S nnd p r o c t ~ t l l n g sfore tonun tt ur: n m ~ s t m t e s , which Un tt••l S t a t e . < ~ f l t t u m ~ y s art nuthorlzed by law to o m l u e t , whetiJCr or

)I he s s rc.; dent or tho district In which the prOCe< dlng ls bnHlght. ·

~ b ) E&ch Attonwy S f X ' C l l l l l ~ · retninl d undor authority or the D e p t ~ r l m e n t of Jml ce shall eommlssloned:srx..-bi ass stunt to tht• Attornlly Oeneml or sp<:clul nttomEY, and shnll take tho oath r o q u l r ~ d b)' l lw.

~ r e l g : n Couns<Jl e m p l o y ~ d ln sp;.'C'ial C \865 un: not reqn[rctl to t lke thu oath. Tho Attorney Geucml shall fi.t.nncua S i ~ . : u y of [I SIJcdul assistant or ~ p ~ e l \ . 1 uttornuy nt not more than :$12,000.

~ 6 . Onriurt o lltlgut on rus. rn•d to Dcjlllrtmwt of Justice.~ u C C f J l n s o t h u r w l s ~ uuthorhd hy bw. t 1e rondlll't of litigation Itt which the U n l t t ; ~ d Slates, un n.gt"ncy, or. cer t h ~ r ~ o f Is a purty, oris lntcrc;>ted, unrt S•'t Uring evidence therefor, Is reserv ed to oftlcer of thc Departout of Justice, under the dJr.:et on of thtJ..AtLmwy Gene mi.

7 '

The written record of the untlerstunding falls fllr short of the kind ofclear directive ceding jurisdiction thut. C o n g r c : : : ~ contemplntcd. Themeilwrnndnni outlining the discussions sets forth no boundHrics forthe cession-whether the agreement is limited, for example, to rcportin& of nori job-relutcd crimes as opposed to job-related crimes, ornonviolent c r i m e ~ ns opposed to violent crime;;.

In any cnse, it is of little importnnce ufter 1954 whether the orir.6nul

1954 ngn•cment wns contemplnted to be included us an .AttorneyGcncrul directive under 5:l5(b)(2) or not. The record indicates thnt ·none of the Attorneys General after 1954 were eyen advised of the'existence of the ngrcement. I t would seem unlikely, therefore, thut thes u h ~ c q u e n t Attorneys Gencrnl could have continued directing t-hedelegfttion of their investigatory and prosecutorial powers to the CIA·under the 1954 ngreement.

The subcommittee. questioned, through staff interviews and letter,

many of the Attorneys General, and criminal division nnd internal

security division department heads holding office since 1954. None ofthem was fn.mili lr \vith any arrangement \ \ ~ l h the CIA similar to thntdescribed in the 1954 Houston memo. Houston and his successorJohn Warner h11ve testified that briefings were not given Justice

officials about the arrangement subsequent to 1954. Once havina

secured Ubl'Tccrnent 'i'icith Rogers} Houston believed 1 departmentalapproval had been secured and the CIA could follow that proceduread infinitum, eYen though subsequent Attorneys General might beunaware of it. 10

The procedure was followed until 1974, even though at least threeletters were sent over tho 20 years between 1954 and l 974 by succeeding Attorneys General to all Federal agencies to stress to agencyheads the referral requirements of section 535."

B. The Aweemcnt Was Brought to the Attentirm of the JUJJtice Depart-ment Again on December 19 1974

On December 19, 1974, CIA Director William Colby cnllcd thenActing Attorney General Lawrence Silbennan and asked for an ap

pointment to see him. On the same day Colby and John Warner,

General Counsel to the CIA, met with Slibermnn nnd then Associ,lteDeputy Attorney General James Wilderotter. At the meeting Colbyinformed Silberman of the existence of the 1954 agreement in the context of referring case to Justice in;1,1olving the uiieged perjury ofRichard Helms in 1974 testimony on CIA involYement in Chile beforethe Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Colby otntecl thnt thebelieved Helms was not covered by the 1954 ugreernent. Silbermanhnd· never before heard of the 1954 agreement, but when lt 'l'i ils

explained he agreed with Colby thnt tbe case did nol come under theagreement. '

C The Agreement lVas Not 0/ a.rly Terminated at the } feeling

t is unclear, however, whether the 1954 agreement \Vlls terminntedat ihe meeting. According to the testimony of James YVilderottcr

there was no clear language between Colb0: nnd Silberman to the

Tr.July22, 197.1, pp.4: -i5II :t emorandum to the Mds of AU Dt'Ptlrtments and Agencies in the E:te<."1.ttln Branch of the Gon•rn

mont, January 27, 19M from Attorney Grneml Herbert Dro·,..·nell, Jr.; :tlemornndunl to the neatb of allDepartments and Agenelrs ln tho E x < ' c u l v t ~ Branch from Attornoy General. Rohnt f Kcmwdr. :tlt•mornndum to the llmds of all Departmentsand Agencies In the Exl"CUtlve Drnnch of the Govunment, Feb. 7,l9ilfrom .\.t\()rner oenernl John N •• Utchel .



8

effect that the 1954 ngreement was terminatcd. 2 Wildcrotter claims,bowcver, that the import of the conversation between Colby and?ilbcrmun was to ternunute. the agreemcntY

b. At the Deeembsr 19, 1074 1\feeting, Jnstice Deprutmenl Offi-eials DidI . Nothing t Insnre thai the Agreement Usnrpi:ng Their Prosccutorial

IPowers Would Be Inoperative in the Future. They Terminated the

Agreement 0 lfieially Only After ·its P.ublic Disclo61Lrt in theI lloekefcllcr llezwl i

j Although, according to Wildcrotter, Silberman expresser\ surprise, if·not shock, at the ngrcement, and ulthough he knew or should ho.ve.k:now'll b.Y then that the CIA wns involved in massive illcgulitics,hcithcr Wilderotter nor Silberman issued uny memorandum or directive offlcit1lly terminating the ugrccmcnt.H Additionally, they failedlo jnfonn officials of the Criminal Division responsible for prosecution

bf crimes committed by CIA personnel thn" (1) the 1954 agreementBxlsled nnd (2) wus now terminuted. Finully

1 uoit.hcr Silbcrrnnn nor

Wilderotlcr made any 11ttempt to salvage tl1e usurped p r o s e c u t o r ~ n lpowers of lhe Department; they failed to even inquire whether thestatute of lirnitations had run on the Uil1'eferrcd cases. 5

li: Cases Referred nnd not Referred to the Jus cice Depart.mcnt Dnring the· 1954 Agreement

According to the CIA there were thirty-one cases between 1954 and1974 involving possible Federal crimes by CIA personnel. Twenty

cases were referred to the Justice Department and two were referred

to another government agency in accordance with 28 U.S. C. 535. Therernaining nine ·were not referred to Justice for 11nat.ional securityreasons." All 31 cases involved acts which were unauthorized by theCIA, or nets committed outside the line of duty. None involved the

massi"c CIA-authorized illegalities such as illegal wiretaps and the

muil intercept progrnm.16 The CIA supplied the subcommittee withthe list of the 20 referred cases, but upon subcommittee examination itbecame clear thttt at least two were not referred to Justice by the CIA,but were referred by other government agencies. On July 9, 1976, theCIA informed the subcommittee that:

Of Lhe 20 cases previouslY mentioned as having been

handled under the 1954 agfeen1ent, further investigation

has shown thnt only 14 of the cases should have been re

corded as "referred to Department of Justice by CIA."

u Tr. Deposition o Wllderotter July 14, t 175, p. 19. Lf .wrence Sllllimnau could not testHy p{'rsonally on~ h e 19, 197{ e;·ents l>ecnUStl he was In Belgmde at the Ume o tho hearings, sorv ng as Ambassador to'l."ugoslavia.

u Wilderotter based his he id on the fnct.' th9.t at tho m t : o t n ~ Si\bcmlan cxprrssod a respons blllty to p ~ son proset•utlonshimsrlfunctrrtla.· statuto, lnd during h u ~ o u r s o of the llt lt low wt•ob CIA referred a nwnber

crimfnrtl cn.st>.s lnvol villi: CIA po.rsounello Justice.Tr. Jlllr 14, 1975, p. 3: .' f r . July H, l ~ i 5 , p. IU. ·

III.A'lltr of July : I, I li5/rom John Wu.rner, CfA Genua\ Counsel to Kevin Muron11y Deputy Assistanti\.ttornoy (lcnt•ra : Tr. June 25, 1 ~ 7 5 , p, H:l d ~ e r i \ J n g tho } a ~ e . s which were nut referred. 'l 'hc nature of tho'llll'r,<'d crimes in tho 20 a s ~ s referred to Just co Wtlro: 1 accessory afler t h< fact to a murder, 1acto i Splo la e,I rentO\"ll\ of da .. l f i c d documents, luarcotic.s smnggl m:. 1 sclllng ol tlrnnrms, I sell ng of nrmnmonts, 5 thdls){ f:O\'Ilrtlmenl ftmtls, emllez.7.1t•mcnts, 2 frauds, 1 conJllct of lntl r\ St nnd possible muds, 1 forgery, 1 uls\ 1·:ntlon of govcrnnwnt papt'fS to obtllln a St'Cttr ty clfnrauco. llmpt•rsmmllon f : ~ m lltnry omcrr.

1'hc Dcascs which \l'o.:ru not referred hwo\;•cd: 1 blnckmarketcl'rlng, 1 extortion, 2 thefts, 3 miSUS<l o funds,l trond. I Iheft ol scrdces.

T he Cl A and tho Jnst co Department gave the sullcommlttce oaly brief nnd v a ~ u c r d o s c r l p t o n s of thec:tSes nnd fallL'\l to hlcntl r ll'hlch ngent')o' tho 2 other C lSIS \I"CT\l rr orred to. The: subcommittee round lhe

ntorfnnlion SUJJJillcd unncce[li.:l.ble u.s bclng too mlnimnl to ~ l l l t n t c the suhcowmlttee's oversighturtsdJctlon.

g

The subcommittee had also noted, from the brief and often vaaue

descriptions supplied on the 20 cases, certain mi::dcacling s t n . t c m c r ~ t : ; .On September 10, 1976, tho CIA acknowledged errors had been m•de

and agreed to reexamine its files and re-submit to the subcommittee'

with greater clarity and accuracy, more detailed descriptions of ettchof the cases. The answer hus not been supplied ns of the date of thisreport.

F. Scofc of the Agreement. wa.s only on llcporting of Illegal ActivitiesJ\ ot Anthorizcd by the G A

Thera was conflicting tcstirnony as to whether the arrrccmcn tcovered reporting of illegal activities authorized by the C I A ~ such nsn1nil opening, or whether the agreement was limilcd only Lo report of.

unau thorizcd illegalities. Accordi_ng to .James Wilderotter the ngrecrnent eovcrod both, and accordmg to John ':Vnrner nnd La\·trcnceIIouston the agreement only covered unauthorized ncLivities. 17

In any cnsc, none of Lhc numerous illcgnl CIA uet.ivitie3 enumerntcd

in the Hockcfcllcr Commission Heport and in the CIA Inspector General's Report of May 1973, were referred to the Justice Departmentby CIA. When former and present CIA General Counsel were questioned about these activities, they for the most part denier\ knowledge

of those aetivities before December 1974. They al'recd, however, thatnone of the following activities were referred by them to Justice, even

in those few instances where they admitted having knowledge ofthem:" the 20-year mail intercept prourarn/' Operation CHAOS,the CIA usc of 32 'i\iretaps, 32 instances of bugging and 12 brenk-ins,"

telephone n10nitoring between U.S. and Latin Americun/1and admin

istration of LSD to unsuspecting persons1 resulting in at least· onedeath." They sbmitted, however, that to their knowledge the JusticeDepartment was studying these illegalities.C. Di.sposition of t/te 20 Referred G a ~ e s

Of the 20 referred cases, four led to indictments. Of these, only twowent to trail and only one to conviction." In eight of the 20 cases prosecutions were dropped because of the attendant possibility of releasing

sensitive information during trial or discovery. Four of the eight caseswere dropped at CIA urging and the other four were dropped because Justice and CIA agreed that security reasons m i t i ~ a t e d againstprosecution.'' The Justice Department Uld ClA han failed to inform~ h e committee of the disposition of fotir cases, claiming the dispositionIS unknown.

IT Tr. July 14, 1975, pp. 8-11 (Wlldnrattor); Tr. July 23, 1975, pp. 7 -15 {Wurnor); Tr. July 22, 1975, 7p; JTiouston).u Tr. July 23, 1975, pp. 24-65 (Wnrncr); Tr. July :?2, 1975, pp. 4 9 - 5 ~ (Houstrm).

"RC>Ckdellcr Commission Roport" 1975, pp. 32, 102.ld., p. 30,

' ld., pp. 222-3.% ld., p. 227.l Lcttor o July 9, 1 176/rom CIA D l r ~ t o r Gr-orge Busl1 to C'ong. Belle. S. Abtug. .,

H Lotter of ulr 21, 1975 rom CIA Genernl Counsel John Warner to DeJHlty . - 1 . ~ \ ~ t n n t Attornoy Genrr:.lKevin M n r o n ~ y und L ~ t t e r o OctoberS, 1975 rom Ass.lstaut .-\ltorncy Gcncrnl R rhard Thorubw,;h t<J

Cong. Della S, .>\.btug.



r·

10

l. The .hstice Department Failed to Inquire Whether the 1954 Agreement '""" Legal, and lVhet ter the OJA hoA Violated any FederalI..a•cs by E:cercising Prosecutorio) Powers ·

· Discovery of the agreement should have raised some obvious qucsions ns to the lcgnlity of the agreement und us to the legttlity of CIA:Ctlons executed pursuant to the ngrccmcnt: ·

' (l) The Legality of the 1051, Agreement. -The

initial delegation of·rosccutorial power to the CIA in Murch 1954 was apparently not

\·ohibitcd by lnw. However, subsequent enactment of 28 U.S.O. 535) August 1954, nnd subsequent failure of the Justice Department toi)Ccificully continue delegation of the prosccutorin.l power indicate

1at exercise of that ]lo\,·cr by CIA after enuctment of 28 U.S.C. 535,~ n y have nmounte( to conspiracy to deprive tho goven11nent ofroper functioning of a ~ o v o n n n c n t ngcncy in violation of 18 u.s.a.7 L The failure of the CIA to report crimes of which it was aware,'owcvcr, in it.sclf, was not apparenLly a violation of criminulla·w, but

nly of section 5:15 .(2) 'l'he Allomey General i11o.y lJelcyate Prosecutorial Fowcr to Mcm

Cti:J of tlw E.rccu.lit/c U r a n c h ~ T h c power Lo ]H O:)tH:utn is vc8f.nd in t.bo:xecutivc bnwch, untl usually in t.ho Attorney General. Oon(tsc.ativn

IL';cs 74 U.S. (7 WulL) 454. (18(j8), United Stutes v. Cox, 342 }<'Zd 1G75th Cir.), ccrt. den. :381 U.S. Q35 (1%5). There is no constitutional

~ q u i r c m c n t , however, us to which ofiiccr of that brn.nch rna.y exercisehe power, nncl the Supreme Court, in United States v. Nixon 418 U.S.

83 (1 974) found no defect in a procedure whereby the Attorney Gen

ral, by duly promulgated regulation, delegated that power to the

pecial Prosecutor.(3) It is Unclear, However, Whether the Attomey General Act1wlly

)elegated Proseculorial Power to the CIA by the 1951, Agreement, and' tether that Delegation was Intended to Lastjo1· 20 Years.-Under 28

LS.C. 535(b), government oflicials who arc aware of possible wrongoing on the ·part of their government employees n1ust report those

1ct.s to the Attorney Genernl, ·who then arc to exercise investigativend proseculoriu.l powers. An agency is e.xempt fron1 the requirements

f Section 5:J5(b) only where the Attorney General expressly sojrecls.

From the uvni n.blc record, the operu tive ugreernent between the.:IA and the Justice Department flllls short of the kind of clear direcive ceding jurisdiction that Congress contemplated in enacting 28LS.C. 535(b). Tlte 1954 memomndum outlining the discussions b e - - ~~ v e e n Rogers and Houston sets no clcnr boundtlries for the cession and

~ t s forth no procedures for continuing internal Justice Depnrtinentwnri ncss or o'\Tersight of the agreement. Additionnlly, Section 535(b) 1

; silent on whether the Attomcy General may cede the power toivcstigatc ns well ns the power to prosecute.

('1) h.'urcise of Prosewtorial Discretion by Ihe GIA Under the Agreetent i1fay Hare Amonnted to Conspiracy to Dezll'it'e the Government of'roper Fnnc6oning of a Govcmme-nt .Agency.-18 U.S.C. 371 punishes

o n s p i r u ~ i c s lo Yiolatc :B"edera criminal laws tts well as conspirn:cics to

> •:'ho unnlysls of thl l lepll tr of tile l l.>-1 at:rcmumt Is tnkcn In large pnrt from tho Op ulons expressed hyh HP A. Lnco\-:.ua, former Counsel to thtl WatCfl:a\tl Spl elul P r o s e ~ u t o r , In his tcstlmonv before thls sub-· : m i l i ~ t c e . Tr. July :n, ltl75, pp. S0-100. ·

11

defraud the Unit.ed Stale<." GiYcn the nrnr errtainty thnl the 1Q54agreement wnsinvnlid nfter enzlelment of 28 U.::J.O. 5:35(b), lllC CIA

exerciSe of prosccutorinl powc1· which belonged to t.hc ,Ju:-:Liec Dcp:trtment, may ha...-e amounted to CIA e o n ~ p j m e y to d c p r i , ~ c the goYernmeut of proper functioniu7 of the .fu,;tic·r DrpartmenL

(.5) The A1ere Failore of lite 01.-l to licporl il • ('rimes Wets Not aFiolal ion oJ ihe Law.-Ac{;ording to the n n : 1 l y : - . i ~ of Philip A. L l H ~ O \ ' t t r t l .in his prepurcd stn.temcnt bdore this sub('ommit.tcc:

The fuilure of the CIA to di,;close information about possible criminal aclivity of which it hurl knowledge docs not byitself constitute n. violation of any crirninnl ~ L n t u l c .

VYhile ciLizcn may have n moral dut.y to report evidenceof crime to r c s p o n ~ i b l c officinls, he nppttrcntly hns no legnlduty to do so, ltt least where tlte Attorney General hus issueda vulid dispcnsu.tion under Section 53.5(b).

The rnisprison of felony statute, 18 U.S. C. § 4, on its lace

suggests thnt it is a crime to lui to report knowledge of the

eon11nission of n felony. But. from Lh(} cm·lil':->L duy; ; in Lhi:-;

COUil t .ry , ll:t in J ~ n g \ n n d the GOUI"L:-; IHlVO rend IIlLO H\H h

.:-iln.Lul.es ll..Tl clcnwnL of uc .ive eonc:culmcnt beyond a. mere

fni urc Lo dbclo:->c. '.J'o violntc this stuLuLe, one mu:->t nffirmntively untlcrtuke Lo prcvenL r e : : s p c m ~ i b l c officittl:-> from unc o v ~ r i 1 1 g evidence; silence u l a n ~ is not enough. _See, e.g.,Umtecl Stales ·v. Daddano, 432 li. 2d 1119 (7th Cu·. 1970),cert. di<missecl 401 U.S. 967 (1971), cert denied, 402 U.S.905 (1971); United States v. King. 402 F. 2d G94 (9th Cir.1968). -

Similnrly, failure to disclose informa tion of crime does not.,by itself, constitute obstruction of justice, as that crime ispresently defined. Also 18 U.S.C. 1503 has been construed toapply only to actually pending criminal proceedings. Sec,e.g., Un·ited States v. Metcalf, 435 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1970)

The more recent statute enacted to plug part of that loop-·

hole, 18 u.s. c. § 1510, has been construed by the courts ofappeals to require some forcible or fraudulent interference·with an investigation.

Sec, e.g., United Sta.les v. Williams, 470 F. 2d 13:39 (8thCir.) cert. denied, 411 U.S. 936 (1973)-"

Lacovara went on to add that it is conceivable that even if therewere no affirmative duty to report illegaliLie;;, the ac;Lions taken

(or not tuken) under the 1954 agreement could have inYolYed obstruction of justice.28

. In order to close the loophole whereby incriininating evidenee mt1.)'

J>Urposely be destroyed by the agency before there is an ongoingFederal invc:;.lignLion, Lacovara suggested that a statute could beenacted whereby purposeful, us opposed to innocent, destruction of

:t Section lS U.S.C. :m nnds as allows:"§ 3il. Consptracy to cum mit u f l l ~ l S t \ ur tu dll rnnd Uul rd St11tes.I two or mon: persons cunsplro d U J ~ l l o conunlt any o NIS l ~ ~ g n n s t the United S t u t t > ~ , or to ddoiUd tlw

Unlt('.d Statrs, or any n ; : : ~ u c y tlwrllo In any mam1ur or for any purposo, and one or mor{' ol <nch pNson$ tll•eny ad to e ft•ct tlle object of thu conspiracy, each shall lliu:U uotmur l ban $10,000 or mprlsoued uotmort" thaa n u years. or both. .

"I , howe\'er, t hu otionse, I he commission of which is t h ~ obJect oft ho consplrs.cy, Is a m l s d ~ n t t > a n o ; onlythe punish e n ~ for such consp rBuy shall not oxcellll the Jna:dmum p u n l s h m ~ n t pro\"ldeU for such mls·d o m ~ a n t J r . ' '



r

12

evidence of a criminal act, even prior to a Federal investigation,would be u crime.29

(5) Other Ju.stice De.z>artment Ayreemenl8 Were Not, Abu,sive.-TheJustice Department hns ngrccmenL"5 with agencie:J oLher thun the

,CJA for tl1c refcrrt1l Hnd noH-refcrrtll of'nllcgations of criminal acts by'agency employee:;.

: As fnr a c:; _is. ~ n o w n , : n ? ~ t o_f t h c ~ . c n ~ T e c m c n t s u r ~ simply for the.purpose of dJvJdmg the uututlmvcstign.twn of lllcgutrons between the

/lgency nnd the FB f (the invediga tive urm of the Justice Deptu·tment).

fl'here are also provisions for dividing prosecutorial powers when:there i: coneurrcnt jurisdiction in the Departments of Defense andffrensury (CotLot Guurd).

I The subcommittee stnff tLsked both the ,Justice Depurtment nnd allhgcncy heads within the JDxccutivc bmrwh Lo submit. copies of ngrce~ n c n t s between .Justice and the respective ngcneics thnt provide for~ l c l c g n t i o n o[ the .Jusliee DcpartmcnUs investigative or prosecutive~ o w c r s . The ngreement..s were submitted and made pnrt of the record.

l•'ollowina i; the l s ~ of ngencies known to this subcommittee whichhnve such agreements with the Justice Department: the Departmentbf Defense," the Dcpnrl.rucnt of the Treasury," the Department ofL n b o r , the Department. of 'l'rnnsporl.a.Lion,33 and Lhn l'ost.nl Snrviee.:H:I'hu suhcornrnit.Lee only m:nmincd eo pies of t.hc above n g n o m m d ~ 9 nnd

on their ftu.:c did not find them uhusivc of the prosecutorinl powers

of the Justice Depnrl.ment, since the Dcparl.mcnt has retained thepower to oversee and investigate any case where it considers itsparticipation is in order. Ho\vever, the subcommittee. did not investi

gate to determine whether the executions of tbe agreements arellbusive or not.

The 1954 Agreement: Summary of Findings and Conclusions

The e:o.istence of the 19.54 Agreement was publicly revealed in theRockefeller Comniission Report on June 12, 1975." The subcommittee,

pursuant to its oversight jurisdict.ion of the Justice Department,mmediately investigated the origins and effects of the agreement. On

June 25, 1975, CIA Director ColLy made a copy of the agreementtvailable to the subcommittee.

The committee finds generally Lhat the agreement prevented theJustice Department from fulfilling its duties to enforce the laws

l1 Jd a.t p. {/3.

)1: Momorendum No. 7 7, U.S. Department o/ Justice, datod Nov. 6, 1973 to nil Un ited SUites Attorneys,~ o m Henry E. Peterscn .Asslst.'lnt Attorney Oelleral, Criminal Dlvlsion,C:J.ptlo l ld " ~ o t l r l c u t l o n u n d r o p o r t ~o n ~ r n l n g vlolatlon.j of Fedcrnl Crlmlnnl statutus aud civil frauds committed by Department of DP onselvlllan personnel onL<ddu the territory of the United Stattls." IAltter dated N o v m n l r ~ r i S, 1955 by Warren~ l n < ' Y 111, Asslstlmt Attornuy QeJJCrnl, Crimina D \·ls on, U.S. Depurtmont of u s t ~ ( ) , with memo nttMhad;\lemornndum of U n d r r s t m u l n ~ netwoon the Dupurtmcnts of Just C<l and D c f ~ n s u Rulnt ng to tho In·estlgaUou and l'rO$i'CUtlon of Crimes 0\•or Wlllch th ITwo D partrmmtsHsvu ConcurrontJurlsdlctlon."

11 }..grGtnnent of February 4, H155, entitled " ~ l t • m o r . m d u m of Understanding Between the D l l p t ~ - r t m w t o/U5tlco nnd th6 Dods.rtment of 'l'ren.sury In Connection with Public Law 72.5 S3d Congn:ss, ApprO"''od1Uh11St 31, 195-i, an R e l n t l n ~ to thu I n v t . ' i t ~ : n t l o n of Al t•gcd I r r ~ u l a r l t l u s fn"''o\ving l'ersonnel of the De·e...-tment o tho Tref<.'lury." february 11, 1 1.17 ;\ltlmornntlum or Understanding Betwoon tbo Depurtmonts ofustlco and Treasury {Cou.st QUP.rd) Relut ng to the l n v e s t l ~ : n t l o n a n d PrOS{lcUtlon or Crimes Over WhichH T"IO Departments Have C o n c u r r o n t J u r l s t H c t l o n . . . ~ . " ."'.Mernorantlum of Undcrstam lng Bot ween tho Depnrtmonts of Justice l'.nt\ L8bor nalatlng to tho In·

estlgnUon and Prosctutlon of C l i m e . . ~ and Clvfl Enforcemout Actlon.s Under tho Le.bor·i\lnnagemonttf'pt)nlng nud D l : ; c l o s u r ~ Act ofl959 (Public. Law 86-257).u .\f emorantlum of Undcr:>tlmdim; Between the Departments o Justlcoand Transportatlou (COtJ.:>t Guard)

telatlng to the I n v e . . ~ t l g a U o n and Prosocutlon of Crhnt:s Over Wh ch the Two Departments Havo C o o ~J r t e ~ t Jurlsdlc.tlon.lJ lublJc Law 7:..5, enactt>d by Congres.s August 31, 195-t, as n.greod to by the Solicitor of tho Post Olllue

)l'fhlTtlntmt In a l.;t ter of Julv 1954.HuP'Jrt to thu P r ~ i d e n t . b y the Couuuiss on ou ClA A c t l v l t i ~ Wllh n tho United Stutes, ut 75.

i1

13

equally nnd to v i ~ o r o u : - : l y pro:o;<.'<.·ute Yiolnlions of :Fcdri'Hllnw. Addi

tionnlly1 by n.llow-mg the UJA to poli<.:c it:-;rlf1

the ngrermenL 8et the

CJA above lhc criminnllnw.

The committee finds thnt a l t h m 1 ~ h the agreement mny h11VC beenlegal" when entet·etl into in l\'lnrch 195- , it wus nlmo;-;_t. eertninly illcpli

once 28 U.S.C. 535 was cnnctcd in August 1954. CIA o ticiuls mnv

therefore hnvr. violnled IS U.S.C. :371 hy conspiring to dt•pri,·e th'r.government of t11e proper functionin?: or the , J u ~ t i c c Dt>pnrtment.. The

mere fRilure of CJA to report erimcs it. wus nwnrc of, however, nppor

cntly did not nmount. to violtttion of Fcdt'rul lnw where th<.·rc were noongoing ,Justice Department investi·gntions.

'l'hc 11grecmcnt covered only t.he reporting of illl'gnl ads which werenot auUwri%cd by the CIA. All 20 CIA cnses rl'ferrcd to ,Justicebetween 10,14 und 1074, nnd the nine whieh were noL r e f e r r ( ~ d ~ involvedcrimes connniUcd by CIA per:-;ontwl out,::;ide t i l t ' linr of duty. Theillegalities which were c:onunJUcd under CIA o r d e r ~ were not. cove.rcdby the agreement nnd were not reported by CIA to Justice.

Finally, the committee finds that the ,Justice Depnrtrnent wns laxin performing i ~ s du t.ies. After 1954 Justice Department officiuls werenot advised of the flgrcemcnt's nxistcncc unt.il Deeember 1074. Once

Justkn did hneowu ll\VHm of t.ltc n g n H ~ I l l c n L however, iL did not. net

properly to slavuge lL <i wmrped prosceutoriJd powers, nor did it. net.prornp(,\y to insure that the powers would not be usurped in the

future.

III. BARRIERS TO PROSECUTION 01+' l:r'{'fELLlGENCE AGE:-iCY 11E:-.lBERS

AFTER 1954 AGREEMENT IS TERIJ NATED: FtNDlNGS

The Committee finds that, dcspitB official lemlination of the 1954agreement, impediments stil l e.'cist to the prosecution of cuses involvingemployees of mtelligence agencies:" They are:

· A. Inadequate internal CIA investigative procedures and inade

qullte CIA procedures lor referring illegal activities of CIA per:;onnelto the Justice DcpaTtment.

B. The improper usc of the "national security" clnim whereby theintelligence agencies cause dismissal of prosecutions, or prevent their

initiatiOn, by refusinp to turn o-ver information which they incorrectly

deem to be too sens1Live to reveal-( ) The improper use of the national security clnim is lucilitated

by the Justice Department practice, whereby it gives· the CIA

the exclusive power to decide which information is too sensitiveto reveal.

(2) The term1'national security information" is Ytwfue anrl

htts been subject to nd hoc and subjeetive definition, ant fnr oomuch information is classified.

A The Internal Control;; anrllnvestigatory Procedures the Of.·\ hat'C

Been Insll.f icient to Facilitate Report of CIA Crime to the J11sticeDepartment

1'he Inspector General is responsible for internn inve:;tigations. ofClA crimes nnd the General Counsel is responsible for ndviswg

I' _A barrier to the prosecution of i n t e l l i g ~ n c 1\gency fMTWlllllll b ~ y o n d th<: 5CO X' of thl"- report 15th11 " N u r t ~ m h e r g d 'f,•nsn'' or the "mistake of law" defcnre whncby the lntelli :"cnco 6.f:('ncy 'niDloYl" clo.lmsthat he or sho was j ust following orders. S ~ · ~ l'nU1d Sial:& v. Harker, No. 7·1-lSSJ {D.C. Clr., ;\ t<y li, 1ilifi):Unittd tatu v. E/lrlichman, No, 7· -1882 (D.C. Clr., May 17, 1 :176).



r·· ... 14

ClA" on the le{Tn it.y of its ucti\•it.ie:-; nntl for reporting illcgn itic.s to

the .Justice D ~ p n r i m e n t . However, necording to the testimony ofboth CIA General Coun,;el .fohn Wnrner und fm·me1· CIA General

Counsel Lawrence llou=3ton, CIA ofHeinl:; fnileU to tldvi:-:.c thern ofmany of the illegn CIA opcmtions ~ · b i l e they were ongoingY Additionnlly, undt r t.he 1954 ngrcemcnt, di:-;cn:·;"scd supra pp. 1-19, the OJA.GencJ'nl Connsel did not refer nll known crime,; committed b

0• CIA

bcr.:ionnc lo lhe Justice Dcp ll'tmcnt.. The subeommitt.ec hn. ; not yet_invc;:;tigatcd the curTcnt. intcrnul irwe:-;Ligntive und rcportinO' pro

b.•dures of the U.IA to determine whcLhci· they huve been ~ u f l l ~ i e n t l yi·eformed to f>Jcilitnte rcfcrrnl of violations of lnw to the proper·prosecuting Hu thori tie;-;.

t The Committee f i n d ~ that nn invcMigntion of CIA internal pro-~ c d u r c ~ concerning Lids ~ u b j c c t ~ l w u l d be undcrtnkcu to in:-;ure thut

fuch proccdu1·cs tu·e ndcqunte lo 1 : - > ~ u r c Lhttt p.toseculorinl d i ~ t ~ r c t i o n1::; in the prosecutor ruther tlum in the Contrnl Intclligt\nce Agency.

U The Va.lional Securit y Glahn

i (I) Discussion.-Under the sixth umendmcnt to the Constitution,

I c1·iminnl defcndnnt is entitled to a. public triul and has Lhe right

'o confront w i t n e s : - ; c ~ a9.ninst him nnd compel testimony on hi:-J bchu f., According to the· 01A, public disclosure of information made

rursuant to n defendant's exercise of his or her sixth amendment

ights mny jeopardize the nntionnl security if the Jefendunt is a(lA employee or is nceuscd of a. crime involving nutionn.l security1formutwn. The CIA hns therefore chosen to discouruge or to block

ltogether prosecution of it:; personnel by refu::;ing, under the clnirnf "national sccurity'

1

, to revctll information which 1nust be di::;closedo a defendant under the sixth nmendmenL." Without production off ~ e ClA information, the case must be dismissed in most instances.,

)isclosure of Governmellt Infommtio l Through Exercise of the Sixth

Amendment

Congress hu.s en.nctcd the li'edernl Rules of Evidence and other

;ntutes to implement. and secure the gua.runtees of the sixth amend ent.39. Pur.snunt to those rules und ln.\\·s, u defendnnt is entitled tot.sclosure of certain information that the government ha..s in its pos:ssion. Under Rule lG of the Hedernl Rules of Criminal Procedure, 11.

~ [ e n d a n L may request before trinl 1 inter nlin., that tlte government per

.rt Uw defendnnt to inspecL1 copy and photograph books, }Jttpers,)Cuments, photographs1 reports of scientific tc.st.-; nnd expenments

1J1gible objeclo;, nncl buildings nnd plnce;-; wltich u.re in the govcrn

ent's possession or control nnd are mnterinl to the prcpueation of his

·her defense, ns well as prc1·ious statements of a. defendant rnude

Tr. July 22, 1975. pp. 2 & - ~ 1 .~ l n t c l l ~ l l 1 1 C o a ~ ( ' l c i l • S other thuu t h t ~ CU. make th{' Hn ional SL'Cllrltyciaim. Tho Commltttv.J Jhnlts ItsiUSSion to tho CIA onlJ• bt.'CllUse the CIA was lht' fo..:us of thu hNlrilll-'3 and lltl"t'Stigatlon.'Fed. R. Crim. P., Hulcs 1-55; Fed. H. Ev d. (Pnb. L. .13-&9.5, § 1, Junuary 2, ltii5, 8S Stat. 1043.)

I

15

before the grnn<l jury, OJ' that were knowingly made by the defendnntto n. g o v ~ r n m c n t n g c n ~

Rn.z. 16. D J ~ c o v E r . T ... \n I \srt :cTJos

(A) D Sl"LOSt:RE OF l:\"IDE:s-C£ flY Tl :: GO\" :R \:UES1'

{I) Information Sub} t to Dlulomu.

(A) Slutoncnt of Jrfrnrflllll.- l"pou rt'fJ\Ifst o a drfmdaut tlw go1•rnuuenl shall wrmlt tht d••ft•ndnut :o

lnspt>ct aad l">p;.· or photu.:rnph: nny rt•h•1·nnt wr t t•ll or r 'cart t•d Slll\t'llh'll(S m:ulc by lht' t l d ~ · l l l l : m t . orCOJllrs thcrror. within tla• JMl%t•ss on, t'Ustodr or control or l11o• gowrmm•nt, tilt' ~ · ~ s ~ u c • l or whfch known.or Uy thu rw:l'lst• ut lhll• cliHJ.:•'II\'r mnr lwco:Hn known, tu tl111 nti•H'IIr•y fur tilt• z.;ol•t•rnmNlt; the sui Sia Jc••of nny orul stntcJtl\'llt ll"h t•h th{' J.:OI',•mm<'lll intt•Juls to u1f n ht { ' \ ' l d t • n c t ~ n t tile trlnl nmtltl Uy lhe dl'lt•nt.lu ntwhtltiwr hcfor . r.r a tt•r nrn·st In . · ~ J ) U i l S e to iutc-rro;.'1.'1tlon hy uny p•.:rSQn tlll'n kuown to tlt< defendant to IJt n

go\"ernment nt:cnt; nntl recordetltestilllonyof the t.ldendnnt b<"fore a~ e n d

jury which relotr:t tot h ~

of1t•llsJcharge. \ \ ' h ~ r u tho d e ~ l l t b n t is a corporation, partnership. llSSUCiatlon or l ~ < h o r uu on, lht• court muy frantthc dofL•ndnnt, upon irs motion. dist•ovt·ry d n · h ~ 1 · a u t r r ~ . · u n l c t . l t i ' S t l m o n y of nny whm·ss l > t · f o r , ~ a ~ " : " l l l l l jurywhc (I) was. ut the tlm.. or his . r s ~ l m o n y , so si Uah•tlt\5 n11 ol ir,•r or ~ m p l o y t • • . > as w hrt\'t' bt'L'II t ~ U c • o•a.:ull}to h nd tiH• dcf,•ntl mt In r": Pt'Ct to l'mhlnct cunstltutlnl th" otft•llSt'. or(: ) 1ms. ut lite 1/mu or tilt' ollt•us .fl 'rSQrutlly Jnvnlvt-.1 ht tile tdh•gt•rll"llli IUL"I. cousllttllhll tl1e olft•lls. nm. so i t m t t ~ d n . ~ nn o llct•r or • • m p l o y ~ eus tu hllvt• h ~ t ' l l f t h l u l•·r:nlly to h mt t h ~ t]d.,utl lnt In n·6p•-cl to tiHtl nl r;:<'tl ruruluctlu whkh II<J v.ru J n v ( ) I V ~ d .

{H) l J t f c m l • m C ~ ) rfur lit curd. Upml fl;tjlll'Sl ()[till:; tlt·I••JUhtnl. tht• ; : o v t · r n m J ~ H t hulllurnl.1h to tile d t • n t l ~nnt such cupy nt his prior t:l'lmhmi record, If auy, 13 W th H ttw pJSS.·M rm, custody, or Clllltrol ol th"p,ovt:ruulent, tl1u t•Il:\t,.llt't o wlJ ch b l.:noWJJ, or )y the l'IerciS<:' of d u ~ dilll:ellce lli:JY l;(cornc known, totill 11ttunwy fur the ~ : u v c r n n l l ' n t .

(C) J J u c u m w t ~ awl 'l"rn•vtblt Objrrfj.-Upon f{'l llrst or t h ~ dt'lt•ndflut t h ~ Onrnmrnt ~ h 1 1 1 l pHmlt ll1eclcfclltlunt to hiSJH:ct nnd copy or p h o t o ~ · n i J l h books pnf)t'r:;, documculs, ~ h o t o ) ; m p h s , lnng lJit' ohkclS,lmlltllrlh':l or tllncN>, l l f cop]{':J or portions thl.'rt:of, whkh JJtt• within the po:>:Y'ss on, cnstot y or contrcl ul tht'.govo•rruncllt, ant which uro umtcrbl tu tiJll pn·rmrnt un o his tlcfcns.: or IHl' hllcntlt•'i for by the t:onm·urnmcnt us c v f l ~ n c u in chic It the trlnl, llr WIJre olHulned from or bdoug to the defendant.

(D) Heports of E rmftlflaliOilJ awl 7'tsl.t.-Upon request ol a d.'fendnnt the g o ~ · e r n m . , n t shnll p.mnlt t h ~defendant to hlSJWCl nnt.l CO[Iy or photohfuph nuy rrsults or reports of physical or mcntni e.tu.minalions, ruto sc cntlnc toots or cipcrlments, or copies thnco , w rleh ure wltltinthc p o s . ~ s s i o n , cu.stody, or control ofthll covcrnm\Jnt, tho e x f . ~ t c n c c o/ which is known, or by the eicrclro o due dllir,wcc IOll)" become l:noll·n, tothl.lattorncy for the o ~ · c r n m c n t , tu1d which ~ \ l l l l l \ t { ' r l u i to the pn•pamt on ol tl1e ddense. or are lnt<:ndedfor usc by tllo government as CY dcnco In chlcf at Um trio.\.

(2) lnforma/lon Not Sub}nt t D i . s c l o . t u u . - E l c ~ p t f S provldcd In pnragrnphs (A). (B). and (D) o 5Ub-

dlvls on (o.)(l), thls mlo does not nuthorite the dlscovny or nspectlotl o reports, ruemorn.nda, or otherlntonllll government docnmcnts made by the attorney lor the go\•emmcnt or Gther bO\'ernmcnt a::ent.s inconuection with tho investigation or prosecution of the case, oro statements made by goverumtmt i t n ~ s s . : sor prospoctivc goverruncnt witllrS.."<'S e1ccpt as provided ln 18 U.S.C. 3.>00.

(3) Grand Jurv T r a n ~ c r i p i . . - E . 1 : c e p t as provided in Rule 6 and subdivision (u)(I)(A) o t h L ~ rule, t h e . - ; ~m ks do not relate to di&:overy or lnspe<:tfon ol recorded proceedlng3 of a grtuJd jury. • • • •

(C) CO:s"nNtnNO PUTT ' 0 DISCI.OS :

If, prior to or dUring trial, s party discovers additionnJ cvldeowc or material previously requested orordcn:d, which s subject to cli&:overy or Inspection under this rnir. be sh lll promptly not ly the other p:u-tyor his nttomey or ~ h e court o the e:dstence of the n.dt.lltional ovldcuctJ or material.

(O) n.souw..no:-< or D .'ICOVERY

(1) Prolatl:.•t. ond Modlfving Orda.t.-Upon a sulltclent sbowlnJ; the court mnr 11.t Ml' time order that thedlscov<.'ry or lnspt"<llion e denied, restricted, or deferred or mnko such other order tiS s npllropriate. t."poumotbn hy a party, U c court may penn It the party to makosucb showinE, In whole orin pwt,Jn the form of awritten statement to lns\rected Uy the j u d ~ e alone. ll the court enters an crt & b"rnnt ng relief lo iowh1gsuch an e.t parte showing, t entire tc t t of the party•s slntement s H1ll be S { ' S ] ~ d and J l r c ~ n · ~ d In jll.' rec·ords of the court to bt>. m lde tlt'allablu to ll1e nppdltlt{' court In the event ol n.n upp.:al.

(. ) Poilrtrt. to Complv ith a R ,ucJI.-Il any Umo duriug the cuursc ol t h ~ : p r o . . : : w l n ~ It Is brought tothe attention of the court. tlmt a pruty hus fu.ilccl to comply with this rule, the e.ourt may ord.:r such party toflt1mtit the discovery orinspc<:tion, grant n cootlnuanctl, or prohibit the pru:ty from lntrodudug e\·ldl'ncc not

disclosed, or It may enter such othrr ardor as it dt:cms just under the c rcumst:J.llccs. Tho court may spt"<.:ilythe tlme, placo and nranner of n w . J . . : i n ~ ; : thu dlsco1•cry aud inspection and mny prescribe such U:nus andconditions u.s are just

• • •In order to facilitate a defendant's right to confront witnesses

through cross examination, a defendant 1nay request t.hc g o , ~ c r n m e n tunder 18 U.S.C. 3500 to p<·ovide a copy of am· slntemenl the go1·ent·mcnt hus in its possessiun 1 made by a goverlunent \\"itnc.s::; who hns

10 The te1t o Il.uiG HI folloW :



)

16

already testified, wl ich relates to the subject matter of that witness'testimony.i1

· ·

Under 18 U.S.C. 3504 a defendant is entitled to disclosure of government informatio n gnthcred fron1 unlawful interception of communications." And under Brady v. i\1aryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) 11nd Giles v.u11aryland, 386 U.S. 6G (1967), a criminal defendant is entitled to allexculpatory evidence in the government's possession. Additionally,

government information may be disclosed at triul upon defendant's

fross examination of the governmenfs witnesses.

I The CIA. Justificlltion for Refusing to Disclose the Information

j The evidence that must be presented hy the government to prove a·case against the defendant, and the information the defendant is~ n t i t l e d . to under the laws enumerated above 1 are together designed to~ o n s t r u c t an entire picture of the transaction of the crime, the credibility of the witnesses and the reliability of the evidence used to

\onstruct proof of the crime.\ According lo the CIA, if it releases all of the above informllt.ionjurrounding Lhe transaction. of Lhe crime in most cases involving' .j u The leit of lS U.S.C. 3500 /allows:~ 3 5 0 0 . Dcma•nls for production o statements and r t ~ p m t s of 'l'.'itnessM.l{a) In llllJ." crlm na\ prosttutlon hroU ;ht by lhe United Stn.t.:s, no statement or report In tho possC\.o.slon ofh<J Unite-d StatM whh:h was madu ]Jy u Oovermnent witness or prospO< tlvo Govemment witnesss (other

han tho dcfi ntlant) shnll be thtl suh ect ol subpQnB, <liscovery,o r l n s j k ~ t i o n

untll said wHuc:J.S has testifieddln'< t<Jxamination In tho trialo(the n s ~ ; ~ .; (b) Arter a wltucs.s cnl L•d by the United S t u t < l . ~ has tC'stlfied on dlroot oxam nat on, the court shall, onlOtion of tho d ~ l t ' H l n n t , order the Unit ltl States t.o produce nny statement (as herelnaftor defined) o thecit ness In tltt1 ~ X I S $ C S 5 i o n o the Unit Ll States which relatr.s to the subject rnattor:IS to which the wJtness hasf"'ified, If the eutir l contents n any such ~ t a t o m o n t rdfLte to t h ~ s u b J ~ c t matter of thl) testimony ot ~ h erltness, tlitlcnurtslls l order It t.o be ddlvcrcd tllre<:tly to tho defendant lor h s examinat ion mtd use.·(c) rr th'3 i i d t ~ c . S t a t e : ~ claims tllat any statement ordered to be produced und r this sec ion containsiatter which doe.' not r ~ l a t e to the subjl'< l n1altcr ol the testimony of tile witness, the court shall order theh1 U>d Stutes to ddlver such statcmem or t h e l n . ~ ) \ c t l o n o the court In camera. Upon .' Uch deli\'ory them:-1 shall ~ x c i s e the portions of such statement which do not mlate to the suhjcctmattcr of the testimony of

\I"Hncs.s. With such material excised, the court shall then dirt>Ctdelivcryo such stntem lnt to tho defendant1r his USt .l , pur.;uan_t to such pr<x:cdur", nny pert on or such statement s withheld from the defendant nnd

dt>r<. nthnt objects to such wlthholding, and the trial is contlnucd to an adjutlicntiou of the gunt of the~ f e : J d • m t , tho f'ntiru text o/ such s t a t e m ~ n t shall be p r e s ~ r v e d by the United States and, in tho event thee cndant npwals, shull bi made :wa ln Jle to thB upp.Jilnt<l court for the purpose of determining the correctrss l tlte ruling of tlln trill jndrie. Whenuver hllY str.tomcnt Is delivered to a dcfcntlunt pursuant to this'l:t on, thuoourt In its dlscn•twn, upon appl eat on of said dcfenclant, muy r e c ~ s s p r o c e c d n ~ lrt thll trial forrch tfmo a . ~ It mar dctMnlne to ho rciiSOnablr roqulrod for tho cxumlnaUon of such statement l>y s:1id do)fondlt and his pmpan\tllm for Its usoln thll trial.(d) f tho Un tt"J Stnh·s elects not to cOUIJIIY with an order o the court ttnder u b s e c t l o n (b) or (c) h ~ r L \ o r· e l i \ ' ~ r to t b ~ defendant uny such statement, or such portion thoroot as the court may direct, tho courtnl striko rom the r.>conl tllo testimony o tba w tnes:>, and tho trial slw.\1 p r o a ~ d u n ~ tho court ln Its

~ r e i ion shnll dt:lcnnlne that the Intorests of jnsUce require thr.t n mis trial be declare d.(o) The tnm "statement", ns used in subsi'Ctwm ( J), (c), and (d) of this soctlon in rellit On to an;.• witness.1100 by t h ~ ; : Unl\1.'1 Stnu·s, ml'ntlS-(1) a Wr llen StlitCllH nt made t.y Sllld wltn,\SS H ld s g m ~ d or otherw Sl' ldoptod or approved by him:(:: ) 11 steno;:.rnphic. me.::han cal, c\cctr ca , or other r t > C o r d i n ~ . 1lr 11 transcription thereol, which Is a subs nn

~ l l y votllut m red al of i l l \ om statement made by suld wltness and recorded contompor:>noously wl h thunklng or such om stntcmont;or(3) o statement, howavar tnk<Jn or recorded, or a tl'lillScriptitm thereof, lf any, mad3 by said witness to aand jury.u The text nr 18 U.S.C. ~ > 0 - l l s M follow ':1.501. Lltl =atlon concerning sources o/ evidence.(a) In any trial, hearing, or other p r o n - c d l n ~ In or b e f o ~ o anycourt, grnnd jury, d ~ p a r t m c n t ,

~ u l a t o r y bod}', or otherauthorltyol tho United Statrs- . .{ )upon n c nim by a party ~ ~ : r i o v e d that e\·[dence Is lnadm sslhltl because it JS lhu pnmary product of a al,law{u\ fiCI or l t ' C . ' \ U S ~ It W \S uhtn[HI'll hJ." the oxploltatlott of atl unlawful ad, the opponent of the clnlmall amnn or denr the c u r n • n c e o f theallegod un\aw ulnct;(2) dis.closure of ltf onun:lon for n dl'tllmtlnut cn Hcddt•ncc Is lnadmlssihk hf'cuusc it is the primary prod·t of an unbwftli net c x · ~ u r r i n g prior to Jttn{l 19, 1907, or because It w ~ s nbtninctl by the exploitation or an

~ a w 1 u l u c t occurring prior to JtlllL\ Hl, Hlr.S, s h : ~ l l u o t hu required unl .'SS such inlonnntio l ruuy l.lo relevanta '{':tding- ebhn of5Ueh inadmissibllity; and ·\3) no ctntm shall bt: considered that ev dt•nce of an e\'ent ~ I n a d m i s s i b l e oi1 the r.round thnt such ovldf'ncelS ohtahlt•rl by the explolt11tlon of an unlnwful act occurring prior to Jun" HJ, 1 163,1 ~ u c h event occurred1rc thnn Jlyr years f t ~ r such l l i ' ~ f . ' d l y un :nrfulact.

,q As U ~ e d in this stcliotl "unlawful net" m ~ a t t s nnY act th(lll.se or nny rlectronlc, m'-'< hflnlcnl, or o t h ~ r\ " I C ~ (M definrd In srctlon ~ 5 l O ( ; i ) of this title) in vio atio11 of the Constltutiott or laws o the United Statt:sany ri- ;\1\ntion or st undnrd promulguted pur surmt theroto,

.,

.,

17

CIA personnel, it could improperly reveal national secrets and secretongoing operations and sources n.nd methods in violation of. the CIAdirector's mandate under 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) to protect sourcesa11d methods,

(2) F KD :<GS

A. OIA Refusal to Disclose Information J1[ay Deter Initial Prosecutionor Lead to Dismissal of a Prosecution

Under Feel. R. Cr:im. P. 16, 18 U.S.C. 3.500, 18 U.S.C. 3504, and

Brady v. 1\{aryland, failure to provide the inform ation n1ay be groundsfor dismissnl of the case if the judge finds that the failure to produceis prejudicial lo the defcndatit."

The CIA refusal to provide the information therefore often leadsto dismissal of the case. Additionally, anticipation by the prosecutorof ll CIA refusal to release information often deters initiation of aprosecution in the first place.

(B) The National Securit y Claim Har Been Abused and StiU J11ay

be a Source of Abuse(i) The Justice Department hM improperly accepted the national

securil.y claims of the CIA without independent rwiew oj

the information which the Agency claimed wa s too sensit·ireto reveal d11 ring prosecution. The CIA shmlld not have.

exclus·ive power to mal.e these decisionrThe Justice Department has improperly given the CIA, as a matterof practice (and under the 1954 agreement) the exclusive power lodecide what information is too sensitive to be revealed in a trial ofits own personnel As discussed previously, when the CIA deemsinformation which is necessary for prosecution of a case to be. toosensitive, the case is usually dropped.

The power to decide what information is too sensitivc 1 therefore,is tantamount to the power lo decide that a case should not be prosecuted.

Accorcliug to Lawrence Silberman, former Acting Attorney General,and Philip Lacovara, former Counsel to tho Watergate Special Pro

secutor, it is improper to delegate the pmver of prosecut.orinl discretion to the CIA, especially when CIA personnel are accused of a

crime.According to fvfr. Lacovara;

Tho dangers of permitting a governmental agency to be thesole judge of the legality of its emplo)'ees' lotions nre by thistime all too painfully apparent. There is of course the d a l l ~ e rthu.L the agency \Y"i.ll quash an investigation to avoid cmbarrassment1 rather than to serve lecritimate go\·emm('ntnlobjectives. b

Even where the agency acts with the. best of n ~ o l i \ · ~ s -and most clo-it undoubtedly sees the various r a m l f l e t ~ t O n ~of n potcntitll prosecution fJ.om the pcr.:-;pccti\·c of it$ O\\"tl

particular rnissim1.One would think, for example, that given its mk;ion

the guardian of mnny of the nation's secrets, tbrCJAwould reurely conclude that the public interest would be

11 Su Rulo l6{d)(2), wpa, not ) 40; and 18 U.S.C. 3500(d), ~ u p r a , note 41; Brady\ .\ ary41nd,3i3 CS.

83,56 'l'J6.3).



r

18

best served by a pro;;ecution, "·ith all the disclosures of

information that 1::; inevitably involved. But one mustquestion whether the peculiar rni;;sion of the CIA reallymttkes it qualifi d to make the delicate 'vu.luc judgment

when the inlct'c.<t;; of the n ~ t l i o n ~ t l nre best served by publicprosecution of mi::lcrennt cmployces u

Of the twenty cnscs of CIA wrongdoing brought to the attention oflhe Justice Depnt·tmcnt between 19.54 and 1974, eight were dropped

been usc the CIA claimed thnt national security information would bej revealed. Additionally, nine other cuses were not referred to the

j Juslice Department for nntionnl security rensons. lvlore important,1 in a J974 cnse which did not come under the 1954 agreen1ent, that is,

I n a case with respect to which the .Justice Department had made noprevious ngreement to defer to CIA judgment, the Justice Department

Iallowed the CIA to decide what information was too sensitive to

reyenl. The case inYolved the indictment of" CIA operative for opium

smuggling. The CIA refused to turn the c\oc·uments over, claiming

1they contained national security information. 'rhe Justice Department:never asked to see the documents to make an independent assessment:of their sensitivity. The indictment hacl to be dropped because the;documents ·were not forthcoming. The cnse, which is discussed in

.detail, infra pp. 24-28 is an example ofthe

Justice Department's, otal acquiescence to CIA assessment of what mny be considerednational security information) and iL is an exurnple of J-ustice Depart

ment's improper delegation of ils prosccutorial pO\vercv-en outside the1954 agreement.

(ti) Justice Department acqniescence ha<J led to ?Jirt1tal GIAimmu.nity from the criminal law and has opened the nab"olial secw·it.y claim io Use as a tool of ab'ttSe

The Justice Department has assisted in setting the CIA above thelaw by allowing the CIA to decide which cases would be too sensitiveto prosecute, imcl by nllo\\•ing the CIA to withhold whatever information it sees fiL without independent review of Lhe information byJustice. Given the CIA's self-interest, it is not surprising that the

CIA chose to permit the prosecution of hut very few cases and found

much of its information too sensitive to Te\,..cal.ln 1arge n1easure dueto the Justice Department rolicy, only two CIA employees haveactually been brought to tria in tho last twenty years.

t has been said th lt the rcnnt.ionul security" defense has been usedto cover up lnrge-scale illegalities, such as in the CIA opimn srnugglingcase discussed above. t has been alleged that the ClA is or was in-volYcd in illegal drug traffic in the Golden Triangle in Burmn and

'l'hnilund.45

t is not inconceivable tlmt the CIA forced disrnissnl of Lheindictn1cnt in question through use of lhe nntion11l seCurity clnirn in

order to cover up CIA pnrticipnlion in the Golden Triangle drugtraffic (see cliscusswn of the cnse, infra pp. 24-28).

Tt has been claimed us well that public awareness of the CIA im

~ u m i t . y , nlso known as the11

nutional security defense", has in turn~ c n e r a t c > d other abuses. 'l'here ls a belief Lhnt the apparent immunity

~ f f e r t : d by the no tionnl security defense n1ay be u factor in encouragingH Tr. July "23, IIJ7b. at pp. M-87.

Tr. AU ,'mt 1, ·1 15, p.1:. II., tc.stlmony o Jose ph B. Jenkins, Special A }l.lnt, U.S. Customs Service.

L

19

the undertaking of new iltegalitie:>. It: would mnkc ~ c n : - : e for • c r i m i n a l ~involved in lnrge-scnle i l l c g n l i t i e ~ , :";uch us member:; of Lhc ).fnfin. totry to 111ly themselves \ \ ~ l h the CIA and pnrticip•ttc in CIA opcmtionsjusb for the immunity the CIA offer:; i t ~ n ~ : ; o c i t t c ; - ; . An e:mmplc of asmall scale attempt nt u:-;ing thi;-; plo.Y w n ~ .Jnmc ; ~ I c C o r d : - ; placing oftelephone calls to t-he l s r ~ t c l i und Chilenn cmbn:;;-;ic::> nftcr he Wtl.S

cnught at the 'Vnlcrgntc brettk-in. Hi:-; cn\1: ; were nppnrcntly attempts

to demonstrntc thnl. h i ~ \V1ltcrgnte nctivilic:; \VCrc somehow connected to foreigtl intclliaence. He belie,·cd that if he could estnblishthe connection, he would be able to hide behind the national sccm·itydefense, which would render him immune from prosecution for lhc ·

b r e n k h 1 . ~ ·

In addition, just recently, the indictment 'of FBI employees forillegal brenk-ins were met by informal interpo:=;ition of the nationalsecurity defense. According to newspaper r e p o r t ~ , the FBI defenseattorneys ive.rc going to n1ake a clairn that the illegal bretlk-ins werecarried out to gather information about groups associated withforeign groups. 47 ·

0) Failure of the Justice Department to Prosecute any CIA personnelfor crimes publicly admitted to and crimes disclosed in government7'eporl9, and failure of the Justice Department to gh•e reasons for

s-uch non-prosecution, ·underrn ' the public's belief ·in equal e ~ f o r c e ment of the law. The .Just.ice Department should gice reasons fordecisions not to prosecute, at least in certain lim·ited circumstances

To date not one indictment has been issued against CIA employeesfor any of the numerous illegal activities reported. in the CIA Inspector

General's report of May 21, 1973, the Rockefeller Conuni;sion Reporto£ .Jm e 6, 1975, and the Final Report of the Church Committee ofApril 26, 1976. The Justice Department has refused to comment. uponit.s fn.ilm:e to prosecute intelligence agency p e r s o n n e l . ~ The JusticeDcpnrtment's justification for its refusal to comment is th lt in orderto protect the reputations and rights of the accused, the prosecutionrnay not report or comment upon criminal nctivity except in the context of presentation of legally a d m i ~ s i b l e evidence, Loa judge and juryin open court. 48

b Under this policy, the decision to prosecute or not to

prosecute, known as prosecutorial discretion, is not. reviewable. Thecombination of pnst acquiescence of the Juslice Department. to theCI A 1 and the failure to prosecute despite ''"idcspread n d m i ~ s i o n s underoath, of crimes perpetrated agninst the American \)eople and peopleof other conntries1 undermines the public belief in t 10 rule of law unclculls into question the ,Justice Deparcment's policy of silence.

The committee recommends that the Justice Depnrtmcnt gh·c

reason for its failure to })rosecute, at least in the limited circ.umsbmce$where there is u cn.se o national concern nnd there huve been publicadmissions of guilt under oath. The committee belic\·es that no hnrm

will eomc to the r ~ p u t u t i o n or riahts of the per:-;on nnmcd onder t h o ~ rlimited circumstances, and thnt

lhe faith of the public mny therebybe at lease partially restored.

u l/tiJ·'· before the lut Comm. on P u ~ i d ~ n l / a l Camp< il}n Aclidlfa of /ht L .S. Srnalr, g3d Cotlf:. 1stm•trmalt and R r l n l ~ d Aclll i l in. l'ha'>l.• I Hitlrr Jn/( /JJt·utiQaliotu, Book I, 193, : ~ 3 (1 .173).

n ] ;rw Yark Timu, July IV. W7fl, S .'Ctlon l, p. I, Col. .u, L c t t ~ r o July 29, 1g75 rom Congn•sswomn.n Bell '. B. Abmg to .\.ttornty Gtnt>n\l Edi'I"Ud H. Lt·>l

~ u l l \ n t h · r o Aurust 13, Hl75 from Edwnrd H. ~ v i to Bt' Jn AhiUE".uu Sa '"l'ho Pros . C u t o r s H :lt in tho Ser.rch for 'Tho Truth' T h ~ \\"holo Truth ~ n d :-iothing Out the

Truth"" Rl•lJHHks ol Hlchun L. Thornburgh. A s s i s t ~ n t AuOrn<-Y G e t w r ~ \ 1 , Crlmin ll Dh·l. olou. t o thuCriminal Luw SNtlon, Stnto Bar of Wisconsin, Juno IS, 1Tt6.



20

(3) REMEDIES AND REC01fMENDAr:r:roNS

A) In order to facilitate i n i t i a t i o n ~ ~ prosecutions, the prosecutor shouldmake an independent\zndfinal decision on the sensitivity of govern-ment material expected to be di<closed during prosec1ilion

As discussed previously, the Justice Department hns been deterredfrom initiating Jll'osecution of CIA pemonnel because the CIA hasrefused tO· turn over documenls which CIA officinls decided were toosensitive. There hns been no independent review by the prosecutors.Little jnformntion has been ]Jassccl on and few prosecutions hn.veensued. The finH.l decision on t c sensitivity of documents before trialshould be mnde by the prosecutor, as CIA assessment of sensitivityrnny be basecl not on bona fide national security concerns, but onself-interest or u mistaken and overboard interpretation of national

s c c u r i t y . ~B) A special prosecutor to prosecute cr[mcs committed by inteUigence

agency personnel should be appointed in order to fadlitate prosecu.-tions, and deter future ·intelligence agency nbuses and restore publicconfidence in equal. enforcement qf the law

i) The nppointment of n special prosecutor is necessary

The 195± agreement, the recent Justice Department acquiescenceto the CIA in matters of prosecutorial discretion, the absence ofJustice Department indictments in the wake of tho numerous officialpublic disclosures of intelligence agency crimes

1and an apparent

Justice Department cottflict of interest in prosecuting CIA personnelsee pp. 2'1-28, infrn), point to the necessity of appointing a special

prosecutor to investigate and prosecute crimes by CIA p c r s o n n c l : ~The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice

provide t l m ~ a prosecuting ofilcer should hn.vc no conflict of interest orappenruncc of a conflict of interest. As Chesterfield SmiLh, past Presi-dent of the ABA, has noted:

Untler the Standn.rds, it would be improper for un in-vestigation . . . of the Executive Branch of the FedemlGovernment to be conducted by a. prosecutor subject to the

direction und control of the PresldcntY

The Justice Department has at least a.n appearance of conflict ofinterest regnrcling the CIA, fir.st, because of the 1954 agreement and

second, because the Justice Department is supposed to representintelligence officials who may be sued for civil damages as a. consequence of the disclosures beought about by Congressional investigations.

t is likely that failure of the Justice Department to prosecute CIApersonnel to date and the apparent conflict of interest which may beviewed as a Tenson for failuee to prosecute 1·cinforces public belief thatcrimes committed in high p l a c e ~ go unpunishcd_:"2

11 'rr. July 2.1, 1 174, pp. 86--S'i.l h ~ Stl\-<:inl prosocutc,r should he ap[X1lnte11 with prc:l(-e\ltorlal jurisdlctlon over all n t c l l i ~ n c e Wt'llcy

p1•rsonnel. ,\ any of tlw H·lL"'•ms St'l forth hem for Lh e appointment of n sp._'C\nl prost...::utor nre vul df o r t h ~ >

othermtel it;:e-ncc l l . l ' : c ' O C ~ > s , Including :he I<'Bl, whcrll the conftlcl of lntcn•st Is most acute. Wil limit our fl.'murks~ h e r e to t h ~ CIA to lw consistent with onr pn•vious repcrtlnKln hi: : i n v ~ : s t l g u t l o n .l 12 2 Con..-. Ht-c. 8. 130- ( la lvcd. Fehrun.ry . ~ . 1916).

. ::As repoi-t,_-.d In tl111 ConpcsS onnl Rt'<.'ord, thc Jlllhllc Is dt•Ctlly troubh:d by tho i n d l n ~ o tht' lnvestlga- Jons Into t h ~ ; ~ l n t e l l c ~ > n c t ' S I . r v l r e . In a lll'lrris ~ u r v e } ' , 74 pe.rct-nt U>:Tled t.he.t "It \1"1\.S wronf< for CIA to work

o u ~ n deal wllh .\le.fb dmrnclNS to try ISSass ne.Ung Castro" and 61 perc '-nt np-t:'ed "It was u v olntlon oflm.sic r i ~ h h /or t h ~ CIA nud FBI t:J conduct ~ p y l n g on promllwnt .Amerlcnns here ut llome" 12 2 Conr,. Hcc.

L : _130.j (dally cd. FollrUillj• 5, 1 176).

21

The government must move d e c i ~ i v c l y . To fi-Yoid c h f l r g e ~ n whitr-

wnsh, it is in the best interest of t.he ,Justice Department to disqualifviL-;clf in these cases. \Vhat is vital now is to gunrnntee a full 1 thorougl1and independent investigation. A special proseeutor should be uppointed for this pUl'pose and given sufficient authority to pcrfot·mthe tnsk of investigating ·and p r o s c c u t i n ~ ? = crimes by intelligencerwency personnel. 'l'he appointment of n ~ p c c i a l pro:=;ecutor should

u.fso help satisfy the concern of the intelligence agencies that e x p o ~ u r eof sensitive informr.tion·:be as limited n.s possible. The conccnlrntion ofpO'IYCr to investigate int"elligencc agencies in a small stnff will limit the·exposure of sensitive material to n smaller number thnn if the entire

Crimillfil Division of the J usticc Depnrtment hRcl access.The failure of the .Justice Department to prosecute unrloubtedly

reenforces a. belief on the part of intelligence ngcncy members thatthey are above the law. The committee believes that one of the mosteffective methods of insuring against fut.ure intelligence agency abuseis to give notice to intollil"ence agency officials that they will be pros·ecutcd for violations o the law. The be::;t way to convince them oftheir vulnerability to the law is for the government. to prosecute crimesalready committed by them. The appointment of an impartial specinlprosecutor for investigation and tj;rosecution or crimes of the in-

telligence community \Vill jmt inte ligence agency officials on noticethat their future crimes » ~ l not go unpunished.

(ii) Offiee of the Special Prosecutor

Congress may enact a law requiring the appointment o a specialprosecutor. United Stales Y. Nixon 418 U.S. 683 (1974).

In order to ensure the independence and high quality of the specialprosecutor, the special prosecutor should be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. His or her tenn should be limited tothree years, and the special prosecutor should be u person who hns beenneither n.n employee of an intelligence ugcncy

1nor a high official or a.

paid employee on the election campaign of an elected federal officialserving in office a.t the time of the appointment. The term. of the principal members of the special prosecutor's staff also should be limited to

three years.'l"he jurisdiclion of the special prosecutor should be to i n Y e s t i ~ n t eand prosecute crimes a ~ e . i n s t the United States which were committedby an official of the Federal governmeJJt or by any person on behnlf ofthe Federal goYernment in connection with or arising out of intelligenceactivities.

The power of the special prosecutor's office should include all·theinvestigati ve und prosecutive powers available to the Ju stice Dcpurl-ment, plus explicit provision for u c c e ~ s to nil sensiti\e goYcrnmeiit.information.

On Ju1y 21, 1976 the Senate passed the \YntergntP Heorgnnizntionand Reform Act of 1976 (S. 495)." Title J of the Act culls for theappointment by the President ·with ndvice and c o n ~ e n t of thr Sennte,of a permanent special prosecutor for n term of three y e n r ~ ~ who under

529(a)(1) has prosecutorial jurisdiction over the President, the \"icePresident, the Attorney General, the Diret'tor of the FBJ. any Foderulposition o m p e n ~ u t e d over level 11 of the E:-::ecutiYe ~ c h c c l u l e nnd nnymembers of Congres::; und the :Federal Judiciury.

u 12:2 Cnrm. nre.. S. 12tl7fl /dali\"l'd. Juh· :n. l l-:-fiL



• I

22

The special prosecutor is independent of the stipen'ision of the

Attorney Genernl, and under§ 593(5) of theAet, the special prosecutor

i$ specifically granted the right to receive nfLtional security clearances,nnd t.he right to contest in court, any claim of privilege ou nationalsccuritv grounds.

Given that 11 bill with tho ba.sic machinery and proper powers of aspecial- pro.sccutor's office has alrendy passed the Senate, it Inight

serve well simply to amend section 592(a) (l) of S. 495 to reflect theextension of the special prosecutor's jurisdiCtion under. S. 495 to include J·urisdiction Yer the intellicrencc agencies.:-t- ·

f t le \Yutergate Reorganization und Refonn Act of 1076 is not:enacted or not umcnded as suggested above, the committee Tecom:mends that a scpurittn stntutc be nnucted providing for the cstab1ish:ment of an office of special prosecutor for intelligence agencies with the:powers p r c \ ~ i o u s y ennmera ted. ·

(C ) A Btalute should be enacted 'vhich gi·ues a precise and narrow de.fini: tion to the term ll.nal-tonal security 1'11;.formation/1 and w dch provides

for the em71loyment of a sufficient number of people who will declassifyall the information ·which, according to the definition of the statute, isot·ercla iji d

. ~ ' h e term 11nationa1 securit.y 11 is too vu.gue and h11s been too broadlydefined. A statute should be enacted d e f i n i n ~ ; the term narrowly and.precisely. The brand definition has in turn lee to its improper use as a'shield Lo cover political acts nnd violations of law and has facililnted

CIA immunity from crimil1llllnws.Inextricably tied to the llfitional security claim is the question:

what exttctly is 11Ilutional security information": which n1n.-y properly

he. claimed to be too s e c r c ~ to be. revealed in prosecution of a cnse.To dRte the definition of unational securitY in[ormationn has been

v u . g ~ I e . t ra-nges from informn.tion which nln.y be. politically ernbn.rntssmg eit.hcr to the United States or the Executive Branch of the

gove1·nmt•nt., to n Jnore preeisc definition limited to national defenseinforl laLiun such tedn1iclLI detnils of weaponry, ttwtical militaryopcrnt.ions nnd ph1ns during wnr, defensive military c o n t i n g c n c . ~ r pln.ns

in ca.se of foreign invnsion, restricted data. under the Atomic EnergyAct of 1954-J and certnin di'lclosurcs pertaining to communicationintelligence uncl cryptogrnphic information already prohibited by1aw.55

Fmther, the definition hns been dependent upon the parties with therower to define Lhe term. Until now the intelligence agencies and the

Executive Branch generH.ll_y hnvc had the power to define the term.

l ' ~ "'t. surprisingly, they hllve given the term a brand definition, frcq u e n ~ l y using 11

national secuTity 1' ns a shield to cover political blunder.:.;

·und violation of the lnw. 50

.N } tlo 1 § ,'j'l. c.{ S. 4G.S rstublishes a S i \ p a r o t ~ OffiN o O o v m \ f f i l ' l l ~ C r l m ~ s which hns prGS<>cutorinl juris·dJC

11\0 over allt•:iminal v olntinus ur Fe-dHullnw IW n.ny i''l'{\r·ral t lllpi')y •o. n • h \ t ~ d dlre<:tly or iurl rcctly

or her wc.rl:, which violation d01.•s n o ~ comcundi'r t h ~ ]uris;liction r.r the Spedal prosecutor discussedB . 'o. ~ n : s u m u b y , the O llrao Govemment Crlmrs wou\<i h ~ w o ] n r i s d i c t l o n , thcrdon•, to prosecuto crimes

a ll t•lh,;cnct• l. :('lll·y PUISOlll\.'1. Jlo\l'o\',<r, it wnnlt.l nut ht• a satisfactory solut on because thu Oftlco og\·",rnml'nt Crimt"s Is not lndcp..-ndent of tho Attc.mey Gt>neml.,'lh':' bro3U (J .. ln tion Is tnkr-:1 rom tho discussion o .\1. Hnip }dll unU D. HoUman, Natirmal S1curitv,

C r,J l.ihrrlio md Con•lilutional Prowiurn ,,upru, n. 2; t w narrow def111 t on is summari<:tld from§ 301 o(i ~ ~ ~ / n t ~ U k w c t Actid l iu Cm1lrol Act ) o d e l l ~ : : i s l a t l o l t of the A m ~ r i c a u Civil Li urtios Union, Septcm Jcr

R ~ ~ .\1. Hu po:or n am\ D. Io:lmfi.U, ~ u w u , n. : , foro\ clltcu&.liOit of the politic:\\ machl:1utlons C:J\'crrdt lSI' of th•• n:nhum1 ' > ~ U r i t y shh•ld ~ m e tht• tlnH• o th,• cOIII\try•s hmndint::. Now 1\SpN \nl\y th<• P t • l l t . ' l ~ o n

· . - ~ ; - ~ ' r s _ 2 f - ~ ~ · - ~ ~ · l t : • ; ~ s - ; ~ P ~ . : " _ r : v • r ~ • . u ~ · · : u s : J . ~ i n t s Loos ami C ur.bodiu wcm hi l t I om thu Auw:-il':1 peoplo

23

Historically, t.he Justice Department has given the CIA, as a matter

of prn.ctice (n.nd under the 1954 n.grccmcnt)J the exclusive power todecide what information is too ~ C ' n ; - ; i t i v e to be rcYcnlcd in a trinl oftheir own personnel. l\ol unexpec;tedl_,., the CIA ha< defined "national

security" very brmHllY nnd found much informution too sensiti\we tobe revenJcd. ·The reSult \VHs a pnlcticnlly nonexistent number ofprosecutions of CIA perso liJOI.

'rhe committee recommends thnt fl nnrrow nnd _precise definition be

given to the lcrm 11 nn.tion:d security11

•

In recognition of t.he fn.ct thnt entirel.r too much information which·

i::; not e n ~ i t . i v c is c l n ~ s i f i e d , and in recognition of the f11ct1as describedpreviously, tha.t overclnssification of information in the government's

possession can lend to abuses1this committee recommends that a.

statute be enacted to provide for the expedited d e c l a s s i f i c ~ t t i o n ofinformution in t.hc possession of the Executive Branch. The declussifictttion should be consistent with a narrow definition of nationalsecurity information enacted in the statute previously e c o m m e n c l e d : ~

01 This r e c o m m e n d ~ l : l a n is mnde with the recogrJtion thRt Elet:Uilve Orders 116.'\2 and 11/H (March 10,1{172 o.s amended Apri 26, l l/3) 33 1-'W. Reg. 10'245 cnll for d<"C IS SI lcatlon of national security l n o m ~ t l t o nby thslnteraguncy Cl l3Sif cntion Review Bollrd set up punlSant to 116.52, The sugglstlon here Is that Cou·g.r-res enact ll.lglslat on to ovarsee the process and txp<.>d W t.s ro:ecutlon. -

.........•



iI

I V. THE Drs MISSAL QF THE It.mrcnrENT IN A CAsE WHERE A CIA

1OPERATIVE. c K ~ o w L E D G E D PARTICIPATION IN OPIUM Si\tUGGLING

Is AN ExA: I[PLE OF An us OF THE11

NATIONAL SECURITY CLAlM" AND· JusTrc E DEPART \[ENT AcqutESENCE TO THE CIA: FINDINGs

A The facts sw-ro11ndiny the 1974 Justice Department dismissal ~ f a n1 ~ n d i c t m e n t against a CIA operative on 11national securily11 gronnds provides a step-by-step example of how national security claims may be usedby intelligence agencies anJ defense connsel to a·uoid ]Jrosecution of

i·intelli_qence agency personnel. The facts indi cate that f.he J1tstice Depa.rt:ment improperly allowed the CIA to exercise priJsecutorial discretion by

a l o w i n ~ the CIA to .force tlismissa.l of the indictments. F u ~ l h e r , t ~ e disi mssa.l /.S an example Jusltce Department compl1c,ly m selttng the

l

,:ntelligenee agencies above the criminal ktws

A CIA operatiYe from Thailand, Puttaporn Khrumkhruan, was

,indicted in 1973 for participating in the illegal importation of25 kilosof raw opium into the United States. The ,Justice Department dislmissed the indictment ugninst him in 1974. T·he reason given for thedismissal was the refusal of the CIA to turn over documents which

lwere essential to the \)rosccution of I(hnunkhruan and another,defendant. The CIA c aimed the documents contained sensitivein farm ation.

In order to better understand how the Justice Department proceedswhen elairns of national security are raised in a criminal prosecution,the subcornmjt.tec held hearings on July 29, July 31 and August 1,1975 to examine Justice Dcpurt.mcnt and CIA treatment of the case.

3 The CIA .failed to facilitate prosecution of the crime

In December 1972 1 the opium wns ~ h i p p e d in film cannisters marked11

ttncxposcd filmn from Chiang ?\f ai, 'l'hnilnnd, to Chicago. In January1973, the shipment was det-ected by narcotie-sensitive dogs used by theU.S. O u ~ t o m s Service in 1\cw York. The. shi1)ment wns forwar ded toChicngo where it was seized nt the point of delivery. In examining ilscontents, an envelope identifying Puttaporn IChn1mkhruan wus foundtherein. In Mny I 973, U.S. Customs uskecl its Bangkok representative,to ~ e c k out 1\·[r Khrnmkhrunn in Chinng 1\•l ni, ut which time the

pustoms agent lcnrnecl he was n CIA operative attendirw un AIDsponsored program in the Unit d Stutes. Customs notified the CIA,

and accordina to 11 CIA report, on June 7, 1970, to assist the Burenu olCustoms, an°Agency officer introdueed the Onstoms investigators to[\]Hnmkhrnan, who wns then studying at SyrnGusc University in theA ID-sponsored p r o g r n m ~ On Jnnc 14, 197 3

1Customs advised the CIA

thcv· hncl discovered ndditionnl evidence thnt. 1\hramkhrunn wnsdirectly

inYolvedin

thesmuggling.

_Eventually, on August :3, 1973, seven pcrson;-;-six Americans undh.hramkhrunn-werc indicted for narcotics smuggling by the grand

jury in Chic:wo: three \vcre prosecutcd1

t-wo nrc fugitives from j u s t i c e ~fl.Il(i L w o - · K l ~ · n m k h n l n n . nnd l)r.ace Corps volunteer Bruce H o e f t ~

b ~ _ y e had their indictments d i ~ m i s s e d . The d i s m j ~ s n l s resulted from t.hc

25

CIA s refusal to turn oYer documenl which the U.S. Attorney s Officeconsidered e s ~ e n t i n l to :-;ucces:"3ful prosecution of their case ag;linstKhramkhruan and Hoeft. •

Originally1

J(hrnmkhruun wns to hnYe been culled r.s a governmentwitness; his testimony wn:-; considered crucial to conYict Hoeft. Under18 U.S.C. 3.500, the pro>ecution must produce for the d c f e n ~ c any

earlier statement or report in the posse::;sion of the government madeby the governmcnUs witness which rehlles to the subject matt-er of hisor her testimony. E hrarnkhruan subsequently decided not to cooperat-e·as a government witness and announced he was lcnving the country.

The Assistant U.S. Attorney, Jeffrey Cole, had Khrumkhruanarrested nnd served a superseding lnclictment numing him ns a defendant. I(hrumkhruan was publicly c l a i m i n ~ that part of his defensewould be thac che CIA knew about his opmm smuggling.

.John K. Greaney, the Associate General Counsel· of the CIA,who wns dealing with the Chicago :prosecutors

1initinlly promised

the prosecution full cooperation, whwh mennt to them that anynecessary related CIA documents would be turned over, and theCIA would provide a rebuttal witness to any claim Khramkhruan

might make that the CIA had advance knowledge of the Chicago

opimn shipment. Shortly before the case was to go to trial, however,Greaney notified the prosecutors that no documents would be turnedover. He told tho U.S. Attomey that the CIA would not produce the

documents necessary for discovery under Rule 16 of the FederalRules of Criminal Procedure or Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83(196B), if Khramkhman were to stand trial as a defendant, norwould he provide a rebuttal witness if Khramkhrur.n used as a defensethe fact that the CIA had advance knowledge of the opium smuggling.The CIA refused us well to provide prior statcmenlo made byKhramkhruan to government ollicia.1s nbout the Chicago shipment, asrequired by 18 U.S.C. 3500, if Khramkhruan were to be used as agovernment witness against Hoeft.

G. The CIA refusal to cooperate was based in part on poli.tical reasons

t/wt had nothing to do with protection of national sewrityGreaney gave lhe U.S. At.torneys two reasons for refusing to

turn over the documenls: (1) it would be a political embarrassment

if a. CIA operative were to be found guilty of snmggling opium,especially during the intensified s.nt.i-U.S. climate then prevailing inThailand; and (2) the documents, if exposed would re:eal sourceo;and methods o ongomg CIA operalwns m Soutbeu:;t Asl -1."8

•

D. Refus al of the CIA to turn over the documents w a ~ inconsistent wilha Federal Court of Appeals decision.

Greaney further stated that he flatly reft Sed to allm1· a Federal

judge to exumine the documents to determine whether the document::;were relevnnt to the prosecution aml whet-her their exposure \voulrljeopardize national security. He refused to accept the reliubilit.1• of

Federal judges to handle sensit.ive \nformntion. He-~ t t t t e d : 0

\Yehave made clenr th1tt the judges in litigution ure not alwnys in aposition for thnt.n 59

Tr. July 31, l l7.'l, pp. 1:]7-130.u 'I'r. July 31. W75, p. l.>S.



26

In response to subcommitt-ee qucstioninO', Greaney who wac; theCIA Associate General Counsel said that he was not fnmiliar withthe U.S. Court of Appeul:"; decision in Ni.ron v. Sirica 487 F.2d 700(D.C. Cir. 197:{), which held in a case rnisinO' the identical issue thn.tthe Pre."ident of the United States wus forced to turn over document..;deemed to be privileged to a Federal judge for in camera inspectionns to relevancv uncl privileO'e.

Additionally: the p e c t o ~ General of the CIA, who has re;;pon'-ib i l i ~ y to inve;;t.igate any crimes committed by CIA personnel, failedto mvestigate the mnt t.cr even after the indictment was handeddown against Khramkhruan.00

E The J ustice Department abrogated its responsibility to vigorou.sly1Jrosecnle the case

Th e Ju stice Department did not give support to the U.S. Attor-ney's office, and it acted with disturbing ineptitude and neglect inpursuing a case of such importance.

After the impasse over the documents wus ·reached, both the U.S.Attorney in Chicago and the CIA. sought the intervention of JusticeDepartment officials in Washington. The U.S. Attorney wan edJustice to compel the CIA to produce the documents, and the CIAsought Ju stice Department dismissal of the indictment. The result

was that the Ju stice Department supported the CIA rather thanth e U.S. Attorney .

On April15 , 1974, a meeting wns held between CIA General CounselJohn Wurner, John Greaney, Henry Petersen, Assistant -Attorney

G ~ n e r t t l for th e Crminal Division, and Deputy Assistant AttorneyGeneral Kevin Maroney. At the meeting, Greaney told Petersen onlythat a CIA operu.tivc was involved in a drug smuggling case beinoprosccutcd in Chicago and that prosecution of the case might revealsensitive information. He a.. ;ked for dismissal of the case. Petersen didnot nsk him the details of the cnse, although he testified that this wastho fin:;t CU 'e ·known to him where a CIA employee was involved indrng trafficking. He referred tho CIA h c ~ to the Chicago prosecutorswhom he sa id were familiar with the fn.cts n.nd therefore in a betterposit on to judge whether the case should be dismissed.

At Petersen's instruction, Deputy Assistant Attorney GeneralMaroney cnllcd Chicao-o prosecutor Cole, telling him that Petersenhad met with the CIA

0

0n th e case and that Cole ought to meet withGreaney to discuss the matter. According to Ma.roncy,61 the clenrimplication of the call, although th e words were not specifically spoken,1\as that Petersen supported the CIA request for dismissal.

Th e suggested meeting was held on April 30, 1974 nnd the CIA re)Catcd its refustll to provide the needed documents. At that point the

U.S Attorney in Chicago drew up Form 900 dismissnl papers.According to Ju stice Department regulations, U.S. Attorneys mo.y

lOt dismiss indictments without D epartment approval. The usual)rocedure is that the U.S. Attorney fills out a Form 900 ~ l - a>apcr explaining the reasons for dismi ssal and forwards it to the Jus

ice Department, where the Section Cl1ief in charge of the crime being., l'r. ~ ~ . pp. 1 - 1 2 - ~ .

' l 'r . July 31, 1975, pp . + - 1 2 5 .

l.i

prosecuted approYes the dismi..;.;n\. If the case is extraordinary and thedismi"lSal is deemed to wo.rrant further approval, the papers e.re sentup to the Deputy Assistant Attornr,· General for the Crimina. DiYision, and if further approval is n c c t : t r y , it is sent up to the A > i.:>tantAttorney General for the Criminal Di \·i:-;ion. '

In thi:; Ctl.:;e the Form 900 indicated that the reason for disiP..issa.l wnsCIA failure to produc.e the neces:-;ury documents. On the form, theU.S. Attorney once again asked Ju :-;tict' to compel CIA surrcndt'r of

the documents. Justice never even a ~ k e J to sec the controversial do cuments, but instead approved the dismi ss u.l in short order. De ;:;pite the ·U .S. Attorney's request for help, the pP.pcr:; ne\·er went beyond theNarcotics Section Chief, William E. Rytm, whose office approved thedismissal. Upon que:;t.ioning, Ryan and his as:-;istnnt, Morton Sitver,who actually examined the dismissal papers and approved them, saidth e dismissal was 'vithout further upward referral because Sitver hadreceived a call from someone higher up in Justice (presumably someonein Petersen's office) requesting thut dismissal be expedited. He there-

. fore believed that Pe tersen's office had considered the dismissal and

bad approved it.There was conflicting testimony from Petersen, who said that he did

not know of any phone call to expedite the dismissal having been made.H e stated that somehow the system had broken do\\'TI. He t estified

that he had sent CIA officials to Chicago to speak to the prosecutorsthere and expected the Chicago office t.o inform him of the facts, atwhich point he would make a decision on whether to dismiss or not.Although he denies having made a specific request for dismissal of thecase, Petersen admits that he never made s. request to have the information returned to him. The inform9.tion never came back to him.The dismissnl forms, when set to Justice from Chicago, never werereferred to him. The facts seem to point to studied neglect on Petersen'spart or, at the very least, disinterest and ineptitude.

F. The decision that tlLe information u·as too sensitive to turn O ver was thatof the CIA and not the Justice Department

Neither Ryan nor Petersen asked to see the documents in order tojudge whether they were relevant or too sensitive. They simply ac

cepted the CIA's assertion. The Justice Department never qucstwnedthe blanket national security claim. As Ryan testified, To be perfectlyhonest , there was accep tance of the assertion by CIA that they couldnot disclose the documents." 02

G. Conclusiont was common knowledge among drug law enforcement personnel

that the U.S. not only tolerated cultivation of poppv fields in theGolden Triangle of Burma, Laos , and Thailand, but that there werewidespread alleg ations that the U.S. was involved in the nctuol heroin

. traffic.63 t wu ; also common knowledge that approximately 70% of nilth e heroin in this country was imported from the Golden Triangle.

61

u Tr . Jul y 31, 1975, p. 20.u Tr. Aug. 1. 1Y7.'\, pp . 19, 20, Z1, : 5 , :l'J, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, -12 45.

61 Tr . July 31, 1975



28....

It. would r.hr•rcfonl s<'<'lll r.lud. n .Just.ie(l Dnp1u·Lrnont, intonL upon pt'tl''enling in1p ortntion of t.hr • : n s t n t i n ~ nnd n.Justico Dc p1tt'l111entirlll'IIL upnn t•nforci n[ the l1tws cqunlly, even n ~ 1 t i n s t i n t c ~ l l i ~ ; e n c c

slwuld h1tvo jumped ttt t,hc ehnnec to prosPc utc,.,...,..;j.L\J II'one t•tught. rcd-hnndt•d i m p n r t i opium from t.ho Goldt ll Tl i-

allgkBuL ns l< nd th<• ,Justice Dcpttrt.mcnt. shied nwtty from prosecution or

the I'IIStl. First, nllmn•d 1t U.S. At torney's oflieo unftuni li nr with

Lh n erA (,o hnndl t t.hc CHS(I,] t. would SCl Jll thnt if th o Dcpttl'tlll entrcnlly inlcrcst<·d in it.,; proscr:ulion, Justieo \,ould lmvc taken ovct· thot'ttsc. Second, the .Jus tice Dcp tu·Lrnent f1til ed to give the necessnrysu rpo rc to the U.S. At torney's ease, t t b r o ~ t t L i its res ponsibili ty topro:-;ec utc vigorously. Tiley nllowecl the CI to dictttte whethet· toprose cut.c Ly e : - ; t i o n i n ~ l y accepting CfA's th nt the

documents were se nsitive without rcquc -lting independent exnminutionoi the doenru rnts for sensitivity nnd relevancy. ,Ju stice, in cffcet, WU. 'l

u c t i n ~ under lhe I 05 4 e c m c n t nnd in ii :'l puzzlingly ncgleciful nndinepL l.JellllviM m1t)' lutve ttssistctl in u. cover-up of C IA purticipn.tion inSoutheast Asi an dr ug truffic. .

H . CI

The bdwviur of Ct offi ciu ls in this cn.so inclicn.te.s tlutt they st ill

bc>lievl\ t hat the n c y ond it.s emplnyceg aro tLLove tlto criminal hnv,tmd Uutt. CIA per:-.o tm el nuty bo set ttl.Jovo the law, by tLe mere iuvoctLtiun of " rutliorltll sL•t l trity".

The A ~ l ' u c y nr. td in disrcg,nd of it.s uuty to f1tcilitu.to enfon:emcnt,,r th '." e r i J n i w : - ~ 1 1 ~ 1 t i n . ; ~ it.s j'crsonncl. First , tl10 Agency hn<l noSI J'iuus t ~ l t it•ll or l a t i n ~ t \U prosecution of tho : - ~ n . In fttct itd isplllj'l'd Lnlld d isi II LI'W; t ill prostH: Il Lo n or tho t:ltsO with in Lh o Agt ll\('.y.Not sin :.:lLI I\ Itl'lllpl 11'1\:i 11\ltdO nt. ini.<H'Il ltl i n v ( ' : : ; t i ~ L i o n or WIIIIL IIIOSLWo1dd <orlsidt•t·lolH 11 scr iou: 1 c:rilnc.

s , ~ ( ' O t l l l , til t\ ( 1A up llllrrit•t':i lo jl iO:WCUliun or t.lto CLSO. Th eyr d u ~ to Iurn o,·,•r tWC l\ssnry doc:u rtH•nt.s l1 y i n v o k i r 1 ~ 1\ttt.ioonl se<:uri t.ye l u i m ~ . lt tld Ihl' ll , ill .Ito fu ce or lt FPd erul Court or Appcnb decision t.ot lt c contmry , Ltu:t.t• rd y rd 1st d t.o ullow Fcueml ~ ; o t.o extunino thoVL'I'aCity of their 11 1\ltlO tl U SL'l: lll'ity el1lilllS.

AdJitionnlly, th is cnsc ill ustmt l s tl111.t tLe CIA interprets un t ionu.lsccurit.y" will undue l11·cudllt . Politicul em l.HuTu.r.sment wus tenderedu.s u. ren.son to deny the nuttC'rin.l. Risking political cmbnrrussmcnt ofthe CI is not nml should not be d e e u H c . l synonymous with risking thosc('urity of the UnitcLl Stut.cs.

I . Nat-ional secwily claims and the rules of evidence

T his case illus t.mtcs l\O'v discovery und er Rule 1 (3 and Brady v.

Ma n;land and tri nl proce dure under 18 U.S.C. 3500, mu.y be used toforce , t l of n co.se when cltlims of nu.tion11l security disn.llowproduclion of the neccssu.ry documcn ts.

V. O ~ S1, A st 1tl uto shoultl bo <'lllll:tcd prov·iding . tlutL all llWtllhcrs, <'m

plon- t•s 111d ,,g rnts of the itlll'lli t' tH'l' l l l ~ c n c i < ' S expedi tiou,;J\' reportnil ·knowlL•dt-:•' violntions of tht• Cr iminol Code < = o r n m i t t r ~ l hy intclligt• ttc'C' J)('rsonnel to tht• pro.pC'r , r r o s e ~ u t t n g i e s .

2 . A ,;l 11tute shnnl d bo cnn ctcd m uklliJ 1t a cn me for utl\' rcr,.;on toknowingly {nil to report illeg ul ne ts of intelligence ngcnn: ofliciul:> tqt.hc Just ice D crortmcn t., regnn.llc,;s of whether there is· 1111 ongoinO'investign.t.ion by tho p r o ~ e c u t i n ~ 1Ul hori ty. "'

3. In order to fttcilitute prosecution,; nntl deter future intc·lli<>cncengenr;y abuses and rest ore public confid<• tH· e in cquul eufortctll;;ll ofLho l1tw, th e speciul prosecutor proposed in ,;uch pending \C'gislution11s S. 495 should be au thori zed und tlirC'c ed to prosecute crimes commi tted by in telligence ugency pel' 'onnc l.

'l'hc jurisdiction of the special pro,-cC'u tor in the intelli"rllcl' nrl'nshould be to invcstignte und prosecute climes nguinst tl1e l'nitC'd

Sttttcs wh ich were co mmi tted by 1\ll offi ciul of the Fet.l erttl gov('m·ment., or by uny person ac ting on lwhnlf of thL· Frdcnil g o v c r t t m ~ n in

c o n n e < t i o n wi th or nrising out of intellig<•ncr t\l' li \'iti rs of the Fl'Ul'rtl lgovernment.. The spccinl prosecutor und th e• spc•cinl o s e c u t o r 'stnfT should ltnve C C : C ~ S l o nil informnlion within th e COll tro l o( t\lcgovcrnltlcn t.

1. A stntute should ho ennct.cd whi t:h n pr t•l'i :-:r nml nnrrowddiuit ion to Ihe Icn n tw t iounl sc<·uri ty infornlltl ion" nnd wh ithp w v i d t \ ~ for l1 1t1 tll'dnssifk ntion, within n ren sonublt' ti111e, of nil infol'mntion whi ch, ncconlinr: to tho definition of the :-. tut u (', is nolongc t' entillt'd to Le cln::;stliL'II.

5: A stntutc should be enncled m o k i n ~ it. u crirllC' fo r nny in lcl ligenco ugency employee to tlcst roy uny inform ation gnthcrcd in un

inv e:;tigution of n Fed erul crime ullcgcd to httve bt•c

n co mmittC'd byin u.n invest igntion of n Fedcrnl crime ullcgcd to huve br<'n committedby ony employee of 11n i n t e l l i ngency. In order to in :'nre ugninstth e destruction of cddC'nce of u crime before the stntute or limi tati ons ]InS run, in tbc inwstigntion of U. fel on>· other \lltlll 0 cnpitnJofi'ense, the dumt ion of th e criminul prohibitiOn ngninst drst ructionof the informntion should be five yeurs from the d ~ t c or the nllcgC'tlcommission of thC' ('rllliC, if thu t date is known. See l S U.S.C. § 32::;2.The criminal prohibit ion ngt1i nst destruction of t t> informn tionshould hu.ve u dumtion of the life of the nccu:>rtl when n cnpitnloffense, us defi ned by IS U.S.C. section 32Sl, is beinl im·e :; tigut cd.. G. A stntute slw.ulcl Ll• enncted prodding for 1wriodic pu blicntion111 tlw Federnl H < ' ~ s t C r of nll ngrN•mcnts whrr 'by thc Justu:c Dcptll·tment dclegntes tli\Y of its criwinnl inve:::tiguti \' e pow(• rs to o ~ l tagencies.

7. An i n v c s t i ~ n t i o should be undertnken to study the intC'r lltlcontrols within the CIA r ela tiv e to the inY estigution nnt.l reportmg

29)

Date post:	03-Jun-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	aj-weberman
View:	223 times
Download:	0 times

FBI Instructions on CIA Cover-ups

Documents