Policy Studies Review, Autumn 1989 V O ~ . 9, NO. 1, pp. 69-78

FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SURFACE MINING POLICY

Richard Harris

In 1977, responding to mounting criticism of how strip mining operations were despoiling the nation's natural resources, Congress enacted the Sur- face Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA, PL 95-87). SMCRA instituted a comprehensive program to regulate the surface mining of coal throughout the United States, and within the Department of Interior created the Office of Surface Mining (OSM) to implement and administer the law. Clearly, SMCRA has a federal initiative; the national government took i t upon itself to draft and enforce rules governing surface mining in the various s ta tes and regions.

While SMCRA established national performance standards for surface mining and national permitting procedures with which coal firms had to comply, i t also provided for "state primacy." The principle of s ta te primacy, which already existed in several other environmental statutes, was both simple and intuitively appealing. Because the s ta tes did not have the economic, technical, or political resources to regulate effectively, t he federal government would develop a comprehensive regulatory program and establish criteria to guide individual states in preparing their own programs. When federal regulators were satisfied that those criteria had been met, individual states would be granted authority to administer their respective programs. Under SMCRA, s ta te primacy meant specifically that OSM would turn over i ts regulatory duties and jurisdiction to those states that developed satisfactory surface mining control and reclamation programs. OSM, however, re ta ined t h e prerogative to review s t a t e programs and, if one were found wanting, to revoke that state's authority until the s ta te reestablished its ability to implement the law.

The advantage of s ta te primacy i s that i t provides for flexibility in implementation. Different states exhibit different ecological, political, and economic conditions and each is in the best position, presumably, to judge its own interests within the general parameters set by a national law. Ultimately, s ta te primacy is an experiment in "cooperative federalism," a sharing of authority and responsibility between the states and the federal government to insure both the general welfare and a sensitivity to local conditions. The history of SMCRA is instructive because i t points out the pitfalls of cooperative federalism and the critical role of the courts in making s ta te primacy schemes work.

THE CARTER LEGACY

Although Senator Henry Jackson opened hearings on surface mining legislation a s early as 1968, it was not until 1977 that SMCRA was finally enacted. That decade was characterized a t the outset by an acrimonious contest between opponents and proponents of the legislation. An early

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House bill introduced by Ken Hechler (D-WV) even proposed a total ban on surface mining. After 1972 it was obvious that there would be a federal surface mining law. The only question, it seemed, was how draconian it would be. As this political reality set in, various elements of the coal industry adopted different positions on SMCRA, based on the environmen- tal and economic factors that distinguished one firm from another (Harris, 1985). By the time President Carter signed SMCRA, many large firms, primarily those with substantial operations in the western states, had reconciled themselves to SMCRA. Still, there remained a hard core of firms implacably opposed to the law. These were mostly smaller firms that could ill afford the considerable compliance costs of the law or firms with opera- tions in Appalachia where SMCRA's requirement t ha t mined land be returned to its "approximate original contour" (AOC) would be particularly onerous. The Appalachian states, moreover, tended to support the positions expressed by the coal firms within their borders (Harris, 1985).

Environmentalists and their allies in Congress generally were suspicious of the states, fearing that some would connive with coal firms to circumvent the law. Indeed, to guard against circumvention, OSM wrote the original regulations in exacting detail, especially with respect to design criteria for surface mines. While this hard-line approach was not surprising given the mistrust harbored against many states and elements of the coal industry, i t proved politically damaging for the fledgling OSM.

Many firms and states that had been cautiously optimistic about SMCRA became incensed with the agency, especially with what they perceived as a cavalier attitude in some of OSM's regional offices. This attitude spread with the publication of a National Academy of Sciences report on SMCRA that criticized the implementing regulations, suggesting that OSM should emphasize performance standards rather than strict design criteria in en- forcing the law (cited in Senate Committee, 1981, p. 137). In addition, the Academy argued that the uncompromising OSM position on AOC was un- warranted, and a more flexible approach with greater allowance for grant- ing var iances to f i rms could be adopted wi thout endanger ing t h e environment (House Committee, 1981, pp. 162-163; Senate Committee, 1981, p. 7).

OSM's hard line ultimately led i t into direct conflict with the states. Because i t adopted specific design criteria as standards for compliance with SMCRA and because the law required that s ta te programs be a t least "as stringent as" the federal regulations, s ta te primacy meant, in practice, that the states had to adopt OSM's program unless they wanted to write more stringent rules. Under these circumstances, the notion of cooperative federalism was undermined because the states had little inclination and insufficient resources to develop more stringent programs. Thus, de facto, the federal program became their program, a result tha t irritated even some governors who had supported the law. Wyoming's governor Ed Herschler, for example, had felt that his state, a leader in surface mining regulation, would easily satisfy OSM's criteria for s ta te primacy. After three and one-half years of frustration, Herschler sent Nancy Freudenthal, his personal representative, to tell t he Congress:

In the past, Wyoming has had serious disagreements with the Denver [regional] Office over OSM's proper role in life. We battled

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overzealous inspectors . . . and day-to-day conflict over the ap- propriate permitting and regulatory requirements. I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, tha t Wyoming will not tolerate a repeat of these frustrations, and that State primacy will come either from the Secretary [of Interior] or from the courts. (House Committee, 1981, p. 65)

By 1980, t h e s t a t e s subject t o SMCRA ei ther had adopted OSM’s regulatory program or were fighting i t tooth and nail. Of all the states involved with SMCRA, Virginia was clearly the most strident in its opposi- tion. Indeed, Virginia coal mining firms even challenged (unsuccessfully) SMCRA’s constitutionality. However, by the end of the Carter Administra- tion, Virginia was hardly alone when its Commissioner of Mined Land and Reclamation complained:

Since the enactment of the law and the implementation of the interim [OSM’s] regulatory program, the Commonwealth of Vir- ginia has endeavored to institute a permanent regulatory program . . . in order to achieve primacy. . . . Detailed requirements . . . were dealt with through the so-called s ta te window approach with the intent of providing alternative regulations which took the unique geological and topological conditions of Southwest Vir- ginia into account. All of these alternatives. . . were disapproved by former Interior Secretary [Cecil] Andrus . . . as being in conflict with the provision of the act. (Senate Committee, 1981, p. 85)

OSM’s quest for strict, uniform regulation derived from experience in the struggle to pass SMCRA and led i t to t reat potential friends and enemies among the s ta tes with equal heavyhandedness. In effect, the idea of s ta te primacy became a dead letter as environmentalists and many at OSM feared that the “state window“ provision, allowing for state-by-state variations in the exact regulations, would be exploited by opponents of the law.

THE REAGAN PROGRAM

When Ronald Reagan assumed office in 1981, regulatory relief was a cornerstone of his economic policy (Kraft & Vig, 1984). OSM, perhaps more than other bureaus, was singled out for energetic deregulation since even in the waning days of the Carter Administration it was a target of strong protest from the states as well as from business. The vigor of the Reagan challenge to OSM was signaled by the appointments of James Watt as Secretary of Interior and James Harris as Director of OSM. Watt was an ardent opponent of SMCRA, having fought i t both in Congress and in the courts. For his part, Harris had helped to challenge (unsuccessfully) the constitutionality of SMCRA. Together, they initiated a two-pronged attack on the federal surface mining law. On the one hand, they sought to restruc- ture OSM to exercise more control over the regional offices. This restruc- turing resulted (intentionally, many alleged) in a reduction of enforcement personnel and resources, as well as a physical separation of OSM inspectors from technical personnel essential to enforcement actions. On the other

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hand, they began a thorough review of all existing and pending regulations written pursuant to SMCRA.

One of the most ambitious of the regulatory reviews dealt directly with the s ta te primacy provision. Under the original language in section l O l ( f ) of SMCRA, and elaborated in 30 CFR, 730.5(b), s ta te p,rograms, in order to be approved by the Secretary of Interior, had to be "as stringent as" the federal programs. This language had been the real sticking point in the development of s ta te programs, and it minimized the impact of the s ta te window provision. Director Harris proposed changing the operative phrase to "as effective as." On its face, this change was in accord with the Academy of Science report (cited in Senate Committee, 1981) and the demand from coal firms for performance standards rather than design criteria. In prac- tice, though, i t served to increase the ease with which s ta te programs could be approved. Expeditious approval of these programs was a top priority, and January 1, 1982, was set as a deadline for approving all s ta te programs.

This policy of rapid approval created a basic problem. SMCRA mandated that permanent OSM regulations serve as the base line for judging proposed state programs, even if those programs were to be "as effective as" ra ther than "as stringent as" the permanent regulations. Watt and Harris, how- ever, were in the midst of rewriting much of the federal regulatory program. To overcome this apparent contradiction of no permanent federal program against which s ta te proposals could be assessed, they accepted s ta te programs subject to subsequent review. And to operate with this added flexibility, they had to eliminate another OSM rule (30 CFR, 503 [al[71) tha t required s ta te regulations to be "consistent with the regulations issued by the Secretary (of Interior) under this Act (SMCRA)." While more rapid approval might have been advisable for some states, such a s Wyoming, others either were not ready or saw approval as an opportunity to return, as nearly a s possible, t o t h e situation prior to SMCRA's enactment. Whatever the original aims of such regulatory relief, the practical result was to generate uncertainty in surface mining regulation.

The uncertainty a t OSM translated into a wide range of experience with s ta te primacy. This range of performance was exactly what SMCRA's sup- porters had feared and had tried to prevent with a strong initial set of regulations. The Reagan administration's policy of regulatory relief, and especially the haphazard approval of s ta te programs, opened the door to inconsistency and abuse rather than cooperative federalism.

I t was in Appalachia, where the greatest resistance to SMCRA had always existed, tha t the greatest problems of enforcement and compliance natural- ly developed in the 1980s. One of the most notorious means of alleviating pressure on Appalachian coal firms entailed the abuse of a SMCRA provision allowing for the exemption of two-acre mines. The intent of this provision was to shield small "mom and pop" operations from the high costs SMCRA would impose, thereby cushioning the economic effect of the law on an already depressed region. However, states in the region allowed many medium or larger firms to subdivide their mining operations into two-acre plots. According to O.SM's own estimate, by 1987 approximately 55% of the 4,000 two-acre exemptions were run as subdivisions of larger mines (Marx, 1987, p. 124).

This problem was exacerbated in many instances by other suspect prac- tices. In Virginia for example, t he s ta te program allowed firms to subtract

Harris: Federal-State Relations in the Implementation. 73

public deeded haul roads from the acreage of their mines, thereby easing the possibility of acquiring the two-acre exemption (Senate Committee, 1984, pp. 51-52). Another scheme surfaced in Kentucky whereby firms took advantage of a SMCRA exemption permitting firms to mine without return- ing the land to its approximate original contour if the mining was part of a public development project. In their original permit papers, firms would include plans for projects such as condominiums, parks, or schools, only to abandon them after the coal had been extracted (Senate Committee, 1985).

In the Appalachian region, yet another common practice was to set performance bonds a t unacceptably low levels. Thus in some states surface miners found it more cost effective to forfeit their bonds than to comply with the law. Under these circumstances, in order to prevent landslides, localities could face reclamation costs in the hundreds of thousands of dollars, while mining firms had posted bonds under ten thousand dollars.

Even in s t a t e s t h a t made good-faith efforts to establish reliable regulatory programs, the laxness and lack of strong direction a t OSM created a difficult situation. Not only were these states unsure of OSM's commitment to enforce the law, they were put in a position of placing their own mines a t a competitive disadvantage with mines in states that acted less vigorously. This became an even greater problem in the 1980s as the American coal mining industry in general experienced pressure from foreign competitors, such as Colombia, that operated under no regulatory constraints (National Journal, 1984, pp. 1522-1527; Senate Committee, 1985). In the end, all s ta tes were forced to adopt a lower standard of regulation and enforcement than was envisioned in 1977 when SMCRA became law.

REVIVING SMCRA AND OSM

In 1987, the occasion of SMCRA's tenth anniversary brought with i t a renewed determination to make OSM into a vigorous agency. After six years of alternating hostility and indifference from the Reagan administration, which prompted ineffectual or uncertain regulation a t the s ta te level, environmentalists, their congressional allies, and important elements of the coal industry were intent upon forcing OSM to assume the leadership role envisioned for it under SMCRA.

Throughout t h e Reagan administration, environmental groups had regularly used the courts to challenge the regulatory relief initiatives of Watt and Harris. However, these groups had fought a "holding action" to keep the law intact, while many firms continued to flout the law and states failed to collect fees or reclaim abandoned mines. At a 1987 hearing held by the Environmental Subcommittee of the House Government Affairs Com- mittee, Chairman Mike Synar (D-OK) summed up the frustrations with SMCRA, concluding that under the Reagan administration OSM had become "a broken agency" (New York Times, June 7 , p. L24).

With Donald Hodel as Secretary of Interior, the Reagan administration began to respond to the mounting political pressure to do something about OSM. Although he could hardly be described as an uncritical supporter of SMCRA, Secretary Hodel apparently recognized that some action had to be taken. Under his stewardship, the Department of Interior began to address some of the more troubling aspects of s ta te regulation. Hodel reported to

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Congress that a program of random federal inspections of 2,000 two-acre mines in Kentucky uncovered 800 serious violations of the exemption provision. Accordingly, Hodel endorsed a repeal of the two-acre exemption from SMCRA. Supported by environmentalists and major trade associations of the coal industry, this repeal passed Congress on April 21,1987 (New York Times, April 24,1987, p. A18). Perhaps even more importantly, OSM, acting pursuant to its oversight authority in section 521 of SMCRA, took over the regulatory programs of Oklahoma and Tennessee. Even though these takeovers were in states with relatively small coal mining industries (probably a tactical decision, since abuses were just as egregious in some major coal producing states), this action sent a clear message to all states and recalcitrant firms that OSM was serious about eradicating abuses of SMCRA.

Later that year, in fact on August 3, the tenth anniversary of SMCRA, OSM's new full-time director, Jed Christensen, proposed an ambitious federal inspection program to combat illegal surface mining in Appalachia. The Department of Interior would allocate $1.5 million for three years to finance a 12-person federal strike force that would be dispatched to the region. This federal/state enforcement team, moreover, was given the authority to arrest violators on the spot. It was exactly this sort of unam- biguous federal leadership that was required to salvage OSM's reputation and to make SMCRA's provision for state primacy work. SMCRA had swung from uncompromising federal intervention to uncompromising federal op- position, and finally began to settle into the middle zone of federal leader- ship required by cooperative federalism. Through the 1980s, even though SMCRA remained intact and the courts overturned almost every major regulatory rewrite, the law essentially did not work because, while it was conceived in the spirit of cooperative federalism, it was administered as "anything goes federalism." While the overbearing federal intervention of the Carter years was unacceptable to the states and the coal industry, at the same time it was not appropriate to turn over a complex regulatory program to the states without strong federal direction and assistance.

COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND THE COURTS

For cooperative federalism schemes to succeed, they must be imple- mented with a careful balance between federal leadership and state autonomy; neither is sufficient alone. Inevitably, achieving such a balance raises fundamental constitutional questions, and, indeed, the federal courts have been called upon to play a central role in putting SMCRA's state primacy provision into practice. Ultimately, cooperative federalism re- quires not only strong central direction, but also a relatively unfettered role for the states. Just over 150 years ago, Alexis de Tocqueville neatly ex- pressed the desired relationship as one of "governmental centralization" provided by Washington, D.C., combined with "administrative decentraliza- tion" supplied by the states.

On paper, SMCRA comes very close to this ideal. The legislation assigns a leading and directing role to the national government, while it provides for state jurisdiction in the day-to-day operation of the program. Unfor- tunately, in the late twentieth century it is extremely difficult to distin-

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guish governance from administration. The courts have had to referee a contest for control between federal regulatory agencies and the states.

SMCRA, in fact, has been the target of lawsuits in which states have challenged i t s constitutionality on t en th amendment grounds. The Supreme Court, however, has spoken forcefully on this question. In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Association the Court severely circumscribed state challenges (452 US. 264, 1981). The central claim in this suit alleged that SMCRA's section 309 (e) coerced state expen- ditures, thereby restricting a state's ability to structure its integral opera- tions and violating i ts sovereignty. The Court held tha t regulatory expenditures in fact were not coerced since the state is always left with a choice under state primacy. If i t prefers not t o spend the monies necessary t o get federal approval of a regulatory program, it can cede authority to the federal government (Lilley, 1982, p. 274). Even though the cost of running its own program may lead a state to conclude that it "has no choice," the law itself does not coerce the expenditures. In the Hodel case the Supreme Court left little doubt that the central government is the senior partner in SMCRA's cooperative federalism. Nevertheless, federal courts have at- tempted to set limits on the discretion OSM can exercise under state primacy. In these efforts, district courts have shown a great deal of insight and creativity.

Specifically, the courts have restricted OSM's ability to alter decisions made by s ta te regulatory bodies operating under federally approved programs. The two critical cases in this line of legal argument are Excello Coal Corp. v. Clark (unpublished, No. CIV 3-84-904, E.D. Tenn. 1984) and Drummond Coal Co. v. Hodel (610 F. Supp. 1489). In the Excello case, the Tennessee Department of Surface Mining issued a notice of violation (NOV) t o Excello Coal. Excello successfully appealed the NOV to a state ad- ministrative law panel, the Board of Reclamation Review (BRR), which vacated the NOV. One month after the BRR's decision, OSM took over Tennessee's program and federal inspectors issued a NOV t o Excello Coal for the same problems. Again Excello appealed, but this time a federal administrative law judge upheld the NOV. Excello then appealed t o a federal district court which, citing the principles of res judicata (no relitiga- tion of a claim) and collateral estoppel (no relitigation of an issue), held that once a state body adjudicates a case, federal regulators cannot reopen the same claims or issues (McCleod & Means, 1986).

The district court further stipulated that OSM's contention that it was not a party to the original NOV was invalid because once primacy was granted to Tennessee, that state's Department of Surface Mining became OSM's "virtual representative." This limitation on federal authority was clear, but fairly narrow in scope: I t applied only to cases in which an administrative body (the BRR in this instance) acted to resolve a factual dispute. Subsequently, district courts le t stand administrative law decisions that upheld OSM authority t o issue specific NOVs, even though states enjoying primacy had granted a general approval to a mine reclama- tion plan (Office of Hearings Appeals Docket CH5-20-R ALJ Miller 8/30/85; Docket NX1-118-R ALJ Torbett 7/26/85).

The Drummond case had much broader implications. After the state of Alabama granted an extension to Drummond Coal for a reclamation plan, OSM issued a NOV for "untimely reclamation." As in Excello, a district court

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overturned an administrative law judge. In this case, the court instructed OSM tha t it could not “second guess“ a s ta te regulatory authority. Under SMCRA, OSM could seek judicial review of the specific s ta te action, or i t could invoke section 521 and take over the s ta te program. However, if s ta te primacy were to mean anything, OSM could not act in a direct administra- tive capacity after granting primacy (McCleod & Means, 1986).

The federal courts, in sum, were defining cooperative federalism in a way that echoed Tocqueville’s formula of governmental centralization and ad- ministrative decentralization. OSM, it was decided, had ultimate authority, but could not intervene in the administration of SMCRA once primacy was granted. Undoubtedly, the courts will have to resolve more issues to define both the constitutional and practical implications of s ta te primacy. Thus far, they have been performing this function admirably under SMCRA.

LESSONS ABOUT COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM

The experience with SMCRA provides some useful lessons about coopera- tive federalism. The first lesson is a t once disarmingly simple and extraor- dinarily difficult to put into practice. Cooperative federalism requires tha t federal and s ta te regulators agree on both the ends and the means of a regulatory program. From the standpoint of ends this is difficult, because the federal government will always find i t easier to focus on one or two main objectives. In the 1970s the Carter appointees were intent on holding states and firms to the letter of the law. In the 1980s OSM turned 180 degrees as t h e Reagan adminis t ra t ion subordinated t h e agency to its vision of regulatory relief. In both cases, fairly clear objectives guided the agency.

The states, however, are pushed and pulled by conflicting forces. They must respond to their local coal industry a s well as to environmentalists and federal agencies. Moreover, the configuration and relative influence of competing interests varies a great deal from state to state. Unless there is general agreement, different states will pursue different visions of the law. When it comes to putting policy into practice, s ta te primacy can work only if federal and s ta te regulators agree on such specifics as what constitutes a two-acre exemption or an adequate performance bond. Without this agree- ment, cooperative federalism is doomed.

A second lesson from SMCRA is that even with consensus, a strong federal program is essent ia l for s t a t e primacy to work. A s tudy of Pennsylvania’s experience under SMCRA concluded that surface mining regulation improved greatly after the involvement of the federal govern- ment. The study, produced by an official of Pennsylvania’s own Department of Environmental Review, noted that this improvement was linked directly to the enactment of a federal program (Dernbach, 1986). A strong Federal program anchors s ta te programs concretely with clear enforcement respon- ses established for particular offenses, improved information systems, and highly specific regulations. Even with a clear set of parameters established in Washington, federal leadership in cooperative federalism is a must if states are to withstand the economic pressure to regulate a t the lowest common denominator.

What SMCRA shows is tha t cooperative federalism is a highly malleable system. Under SMCRA, OSM could be overly intrusive, as in the 1970s, centralizing administration as well as government (to use Tocqueville’s

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terminology), and running amok with the states and private interests. I t also could behave with calculated indifference, as it did in the 198Os, ceding far too much to the states. Neither alternative is acceptable. The federal government must assume a senior role without enervating the states or giving them too much license. Defining this delicate balance is a task tha t can be performed only by the courts. Thus, t he final lesson is that the judiciary is the critical actor in apportioning authority between federal and state regulators.

Cooperative federalism and s ta te primacy hold out the promise of com- bining national regulatory standards with assurances tha t legitimate parochial concerns will not be ignored. National standards a re especially critical in the case of environmental programs since ecological problems cannot be confined within s ta te borders. Yet local ecological and economic differences preclude inflexible implementation. Cooperative federalism also can promote local control and, as the Pennsylvania case illustrates, a happy marriage of federal resources and invaluable s ta te experience. In the end, cooperative federalism requires Washington to be a forthcoming senior partner, not a meddling big brother or a long-lost cousin.

REFERENCES

Dernbach, J.C. (1986, Summer). Pennsylvania’s implementation of the Sur- face Mining Control and Reclamation Act: An assessment of how coopera- tive federalism can make s ta te regulatory programs more effective. University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, 903-968.

Drummond Coal Co. v. Hodel. (1985). 610 F. Supp. 1489. Excello Coal Corp. v. Clark. (1984). Unpublished, No. CIV 3-84-904, Eastern

District Tennessee. Harris, R.A. (1985). Coal firms under the new social regulation. Durham,

NC: Duke University Press). Hodel v . Virginia Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Association.

(1981). 452 U.S. 264. House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. (1980). Implementation

of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. Oversight Hearings before the House Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, 96-43. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. (1981). Implementation of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. Oversight Hearings before the House Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, 97-17. Washington, DC: U S . Government Printing Office.

Kraft, M., 8z Vig, N. (1984, Fall). Environmental policy in the Reagan presidency. Political Science Quarterly, 415-40.

Lilley, M. (1982, Fall). The tenth amendment and environmental legisla- tion. Environmental Law, 265-78.

McCleod, J.A., 8z Means, T.C. (1986). Preclusion under primacy: The effects of prior s ta te determinations on federal oversight and enforcement under the Ssurface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. West Virginia Law Review, 88, 567-85.

Marx, W. (1987, March). Can strip mining clean up its act? Readers Digest,

National Journal. 121-25.

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New York Times. Office of Hearings Appeals Docket CH5-20-R. August 30, 1985. ALJ Miller. Office of Hearings Appeals Docket NX1-118-R. July 26, 1985. ALJ Torbett. Senate Committee on Energy and Environment. (1981). Implementation of

the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. Oversight Hearings, 97-77. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. (1984). Implementa- tion of t he Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act in the Ap- palachian Region. Oversight Hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources, 98-904. Washington, DC: U.S. Govern- ment Printing Office.

Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. (1985). State of the coal industry in Oklahoma. Hearing Before the Senate Subcommittee on Natural Resources Development and Production, 99-104. Washington, DC: U S . Government Printing Office.