Fernand Braudel and the concept of the...

historisk tidskrift 130:4 •2010

FernandBraudelandtheconceptofthepersonBy Admir Skodo

Thisarticleoffersaninterpretationandanalysisofthepresuppositions

ofhistoricalthought.1Whenthehistoriansetsouttothinkaboutapast

objectcertainconditionsmustbefulfilledforthinkingtobeatallpossible.

Theaimofapresuppositionalanalysisistoarriveataconceptualisation

thatarticulatestheconditionsnecessaryforaparticularbodyofthought.

Thepointofentryintotheanalysisisthis:observingthepracticesofapar-

ticulardisciplineoneseesfairlysoonthattherearecertainconceptsand

proceduresthatdistinguishitfromotherdisciplines.Thereisofcourse

overlapbetweensomedisciplines, suchasbetweenphilosophyandhis-

tory.Butbetweenotherdisciplinesthereisnooverlapthatwouldyieldan

appropriateandconsistentsharedtheory,suchasisthecasewithhistory

andmathematicsforinstance.Nevertheless,sometimesscholarstransgress

disciplinaryboundaries.AprominentexampleistheFrenchhistorianFer-

nandBraudel(1902–1985).

Analysisisadescriptiveundertakingbutbecausealldescriptionscon-

tainnon-descriptiveelementsanalysis isnecessarilynormativeaswell.

For this reason, theanalysis isonlyacceptablebyhistorianswhoshare

itsmainpresupposition–namely,thattheobjectofhistoricalthoughtis

theperson.2Itaketheanalysistobejustifiedandappropriateonlygiven

1.Confessedly,mymainareasofresearchlieinintellectualhistoryandthephilosophyofhis-tory.Consequently,mythoughtisprimarilydrawnfromanddirectedtowardsthosedisciplines.However,IstillbelievethatwhatIamabouttoproposeholdstrueforothersub-disciplinesinhistoryaswell.

2.InSwedishacademicdiscoursewordslike”individ”and”aktör”aremoreakintowhatIhaveinmindthan”person”.Idonotquarreloverwords,andonlyconcernmyselfwiththecontentgiventothem.

Fil.mag.M.Res.AdmirSkodo,f.1984,ärdoktorandihistoriavidEuropeiskauniver-sitetsinstitutetiFlorensdärhanforskaromdenmodernabrittiskaidéhistoriensochhistoriefilosofinshistoria.Hanärmedredaktörför”CompaniontoR.G.Collingwood”(underutgivning)ochsomexempelpåpubliceradeartiklarkannämnas”Outlineofatheoryofthepersonforhistorical-biographicalstudy”,The international journal of the humanities(2009). Adress:AdmirSkodo,EuropeanUniversityinstitute,Departmentofhistoryandciv-ilization,BadiaFiesolana,ViadeiRoccettini9,50014SanDomenicodiFiesole,Italien E-post:[email protected]

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716 Admir Skodo

thenatureoftheobject,orconcept,analysed.Thereismuchconfusion

amonghistoriansconcerningthiskindofhigher-orderthinkingabouttheir

discipline.Braudelisagoodcaseinpoint.Therefore,inthefollowingtwo

sectionsIshallinterpretBraudel’sthoughtonthepresuppositionsofhis-

tory.BysodoingIwilldemonstratetwothings.Ontheonehand,Iwill

showbywayofimplicationthatBraudelpostulatesthepersonastheobject

ofhistoricalthoughtofanyorder,andthatthismighthavebeenprompted

byverypersonalexperiences.WiththisinterpretationIhopetocontri-

butetore-directingourunderstandingofBraudel.3Ontheotherhand,

IwillshowthatBraudel’spresuppositionsarewhollyinappropriategiven

thenatureoftheperson,andsoifitcanbeshownthatoneofthemost

prominentstructuralisthistoriansstrovetounderstandpersonsandnot

structures,thenthisstronglysuggestsnotonlythathistoriansshoulddoa

person-orientedhistory,butthattheyusuallydo.4Andfromthisderives

thevalueoftheanalysis:tomakeexplicitthecommitmentsofthisdoing

ofours.Theanalysisisundertakeninthelastthreesections.5

The object of historical thought: The person

WeknowthatinthehandsofLeopoldvonRankehistorybecameabody

ofthoughtthatresoundssubtlybutfirmlyincontemporaryhistoricalsc-

holarship.6Rankeidentifiedtheobjectofhistoricalthoughtexclusivelyas

politicalanddiplomaticeventsatstateandinternationallevel.Thestudy

oftheseeventsRankegroundedincertainrulesofsource-criticism,which

hehadadoptedanddeveloped fromclassicalphilology.The innovative

epistemicleaptakenbyRankelayinhisprivilegingofcertainkindsof

pastremnantsastheonlysoundbasisofevidence.TheprincipleRanke

workedoutcanperhapsbeformulatedalongtheselines:foranyeventto

bethoughtabout,sufficientevidenceforitmusttaketheformoftwo,or

3.Thisinterpretationhasnotbeenconsideredbefore.Seee.g.JaumeAurell,”Autobiographicaltextsashistoriographicalsources:rereadingFernandBraudelandAnnieKrieger”,Biography 29:3(2006)p.425–445.

4.IshouldwishthereadertobearinmindthatBraudel’srelationshiptothephilosophiesofhistoryofhistimewasrecalcitrant.SeeFernandBraudel,”Enmargeouaucœurdel’histoire?”,Annales: histoire, sciences sociales 4:3(1949)p.311–315.

5.Ishouldliketoaddthatboththeinterpretationandtheanalysiscouldeasilybeturnedintobook-longstudies.

6.ForagoodphilosophicaldiscussionofRanke’smethodseeAviezerTucker,Our knowledge of the past: a philosophy of historiography (Cambridge2004).Tuckers’sunderstandingofRankeisinsomewaysanachronisticandshouldthereforebecomplementedwithGeorgG.Iggers&JamesM.Powell(ed.),Leopold von Ranke and the shaping of the historical discipline(Syracuse1990).

717


717Fernand Braudel and the concept of the person

more,fromeachotherindependentdocuments,writtenbydirectobser-

versoftheeventinquestion.Iftheybothstateessentiallythesamestate

ofaffairs,thentheycanbeusedasevidenceforthestatementthatsuch

andsuchactuallyhappened.

InSwedenitwasthebrothersCurtandLauritzWeibullatLundUni-

versitywho,duringthefirsthalfofthetwentiethcentury,broughtabout

achangeinfavouroftheRankeancriticalapproachtohistory.7InFrance,

criticalhistorywasinstitutionalisednotleastbytheSorbonneshistorians

Charles-VictorLangloisandCharlesSeignobos.Les sorbonnistes,asBrau-

delcametocallthem,hadadoptedanddiffusedtheRankeanprinciples

throughtheir1897Introduction aux études historiques.8Braudelgainedhis

Ph.D.attheSorbonnesduringatimeinwhichthesorbonnistesstillhadfirm

controloverthepresuppositionsofhistoricalthought.9

Braudel’sdoctoralthesis,firstpublishedin1949andtheninarevised

formin1966,hasthetitleLa Méditerranée et le monde médititerranéen à

l’epoque de Philippe II.Itistrulyamonumentalpieceofhistoricalscholar-

shipandworthreadingformanyreasons.Itbeganasanexerciseinconven-

tionalpolitical-diplomatichistory.However,Braudelsoonshiftedhisfocus

drastically.DuringhisarchivalstudiesinAlgeria,10Braudelreceivedalet-

terfromacertainLucienFebvre,whomhehadfirstmetinParisin1937.11

FebvrewasahistorianfromStrasbourgwhohadstudiedattheprestigious

ÉcoleNormaleSupérieure(ENS)inParis.Therehehadcomeunderthe

influenceofthegeographerPaulVidaldelaBlancheandhisconception

ofhumangeography.Blancheheldthathistory,asitwasconceptualised

inFrance,wasmisguidedandfailedtoseetheessentialfoundationsof

7.InstitutionallyLauritzsecuredLund,CurtGothenburg,andtheirstudent,thefamousErikLönnroth,Uppsala.BirgittaOdén,”Detmodernahistorisk-kritiskagenombrottetisvenskhistoriskforskning”,Scandia41:1(1975)p.5–29.

8.Tomyknowledgeit isstillamatterofdebateaboutwhether,orperhapstowhatextent,SeignobosinfluencedthebrothersWeibull.RolfTorstendahlisconvincedthatthisisthecase.SeeRolfTorstendahl,”CurtWeibull:enanteckning”,Scandia 58:2(1992)p.151–156.

9.ForBraudel’sbackgroundseee.g.J.H.Hexter,”FernandBraudelandtheMonde Braudelien…”,Journal of modern history 44:4(1972)p.480–539;TraianStoianovich,French historical method: the Annales paradigm: with a foreword by Fernand Braudel (Ithaca&London1976);GeorgG.Iggers,New directions in European historiography: revised edition(Middletown1984);andFernandBraudel,”Personaltestimony”,The journal of modern history44:4(1972)p.448–467.

10.BraudelwasinAlgeriabecausehewasassignedhisfirstteachingposttherein1923.SeePauleBraudel,”LesoriginesintellectuellesdeFernandBraudel:untémoignage”,Annales: histoire, sciences sociales47:1(1992)p.237–244,239.

11.Braudel(1992)p.237.

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718 Admir Skodo

theconstitutionofman(homme).12Febvrehadcometobeconvincedthat

thepersoncouldonlybeunderstoodthroughinterdisciplinarywork.This

wouldmeancombiningeffortsfromhumangeography,history,ethnology,

anthropology, sociology,economy,demography, linguistics, andpsycho-

logy.Allthesescienceswere ”sciencesde l’homme”, sciencesofman. It

wastopromotesuchinterdisciplinarystudythatFebvre,alongwithhis

colleagueMarchBloch(whomBraudelonlymetthreetimesbetween1938

and1939),hadfoundedthejournalAnnales in1929.

ItwasFebvrewhoconvincedBraudeltoshifthisfocus.Heencouraged

Braudeltotakeintoaccountmuchmorethanmerepoliticalanddiploma-

ticevents.BraudelfollowedFebvre’sexhortation.Heretainedtheinitial

partonpoliticsanddiplomacy,butaddedtwomore.Moreover,Febvrehad

persuadedBraudeltoreversetheorderofimportanceofhistoricaltime.

Insteadofbeginningwiththeshortest,thepoliticsofandaroundPhilipp

II,hewastobeginwiththelongest,whichmeanttheMediterraneanqua

human-geographictotality.Inbetweenhewastohavethetimeofmiddle

longevity. Itwasmuch,thoughnotexclusively,basedonthistripartite

carvingoutofhistoricaltimethatBraudelwouldcometoworkouthis

presuppositionsofhistory.ButBraudelseemstohavemadeaclearpicture

inhismindofLa Méditerranée quitelate,perhapsaslateas1944.13Andhis

systematictheoreticalaccountisfoundforthefirsttimein1958.14Aswe

willseeshortly,these,aresignificantfacts.

Toputitbluntly:Braudelpostulatesthepersonastheobjectofhistorical

thought.NotonlyBraudel,butuponcloserscrutinywefindthatthemost

importantdomainsthattheAnnaleshistoriansingeneralhaveinvestigated

arementalitiesofpeoplewhohadnomeansofsavinginformationabout

themselvesforposterity.Theirstudiesare(almost)alwaysaboutpersons.15

These studies view the person from certain assumptions about what

thepersonis,andsotheseassumptionswemustexcavateandevaluate.

Braudel’sgreatincisionintothefabricofhistoricalthoughtwastoseethe

12.ThoughHenriBerrandMarcBlocharetwoessentialactorsfortheformationoftheAnnales School,BraudelalwaysheldFebvreclosesttohisheart.InBraudel(1972)hewritesthatFebvrecametobelikeafathertohimandthathewouldneverhavemanagedtofinishLa Méditerranée withouthissupportandhelp.Cf.Braudel(1992).

13.Braudel(1992)p.243.14.FernandBraudel,”Histoireetsciencessociales:lalonguedurée”,Annales: économies, sociétés,

civilisations 13:4(1958)p.725–753.15.ThisisperhapswhythelatergenerationsofAnnales historiansaffirmedtheircommitment

tostudyingpersonsbyturningtobiography.

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personinthepassive mode.Withhisownwordsfromhisinaugurationat

theCollègedeFrancein1950:”‘Manmakeshistory’.No,historytoomakes

menandfashionstheirdestiny–theanonymous,profound,andevensilent

history[…]”.16Evenso,forBraudelhistoricalthoughtalwaysbegins withthe

person,anditistothepersonthatitalwaysreturns.Asthedoyen himself

writes,historyisconcernedwith”[…]thesocialexperiencefromwhich

everythingmustbegin,andtowhicheverythingmustreturn”.17

AninterestingexampleofBraudel’spostulationofpersonasthehis-

toricalobjectofstudyishisrecountingofhistimeasaGermanprisoner

ofwarbetween1940and1945.InthesepassagesweseeBraudelrecogni-

zingcertainelementsasbeingconstitutiveoftheperson,hisperson,but

whichruncontrarytohisotherpresuppositions. In fact, itwasduring

thiscaptivitythatBraudelfinishedthefirstdraftofLa Meditérranné.At

hisdisposalhehadonlyhisgoodmemory,andpenandpaper.18Thiswas

anarduoustimeforBraudel,oneconsistingofwhathewastocall”évené-

ments”.Braudelargues,aswewillsee,thateventsbelongtothemostfleeing

temporaldimension,hardlyworthyofserioushistoricalthought.Yet,such

unimportanteventshadsuchastrongeffectonBraudelthathesoughtto

thinkbeyondthem:

Ihaveduringthecourseofarathermoroseimprisonmentfoughthardtoescapethelongevityofthosedifficultyears(1940–1945).Torefusetheeventsandthetimeoftheeventsmeantplacingoneselfonthemargin,outofharmsway,soastoseethemfromlittlemoredistance,judgethembetter,andbelieveinnoneofthemtoomuch.19

16.FernandBraudel,”Lesresponsabilitésdel’histoire”,inRoselyndeAyala&PauleBraudel(ed.),Les écrits de Fernand Braudel: II: les ambitions de l’histoire(Paris1997)p.97–117,102.”’Leshommesfontl’histoire’.Non, l’histoirefaitaussi leshommesetfaçonneleurdestin–l’histoireanonyme,profondeetsouventsilencieuse[…]”.

17.Braudel(1958)p.746,”l’expériencesocialedonttoutdoitpartir,oùtoutdoitrevenir”.Con-siderwhatwaswrittenintheAnnales in1951,quotedandtranslatedbyHexter(1972)p.491:Itis”[m]anliving,complex,confused,asheis”,that“les sciences humaines mustseektounderstand”,this”[m]anwhomallthesocialsciencesmustavoidslicingup,howeverskilfulandartisticthecarving”.

18.Thisprobablyexplainswhytherearenographsortablestobefoundinthefirstedition.Thesecondone,incontrast,isfullofthem.

19.Braudel(1958)p.748,”J’aipersonnellement,aucoursd’unecaptivitéassezmorose,beaucoupluttépouréchapperàlachroniquedecesannéesdifficiles(1940-1945).Refuserlesévénementsetletempsdesévenéments,c’étaitsemettreenmarge,àl’abri,pourlesregarderd’unpeuplusloin,lesmieuxjugeretn’ypointtropcroire”.SeealsoBraudel(1978)p.453–454.

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720 Admir Skodo

Here,Icautiouslysubmit,Braudelistryingtounderstandhimself.Hedoes

sobydenyingthatsuchparticulareventshaveanysignificanceforhistori-

calthought.Inotherwords,therearestrongindicationsofverypersonal,

phenomenal,20motivationsunderwritingBraudel’sthoughtandworks.The

supportforthisinterpretationbecomesstrongeroncewerealisethatit

wasnotanuncommonsentimentBraudelvoiced.ManyWesternacademics

wholivedthroughthetwoworldwarswereprofoundlyaffectedbytheir

experiences,andtheeffectswereechoedin,indeedsometimestookover,

theirworks.WecanseethisintheworksofthehistoriansGastonRoup-

nel,21ReinhartKoselleck,22andHerbertButterfield23forinstance.

Aswewillseeshortly,Braudeldeniesparticulareventsanydetermining

forcebydisplacingtheconstitutivelogicoftheperson’sthinkingandliving

totemporalandspatialdimensionsofabeyond-personalorder.Fornow,

considerwhatBraudelwritesabouthowonepersoncomestoknowanother.

EchoingthepsychoanalysisofJacquesLacan,hewritesthat”denyingthe

other,thatistoalreadyknowhim”.24Whattheforegoingdiscussionmakes

evidentisthatBraudelhimselfrecognizestheconstitutivepowerofsuch

elements, althoughhedenies themvehementlyelsewhere.This creates

atensioninhishistoricalthoughtthatBraudelneverreallymanagesto

resolve.

TheimportanceofpersonhoodforBraudelfarexceedshispersonalex-

periences.Itistobefoundattheheartofhispurportedstructuralism.

Forinstance,considerhowBraudelappliesconceptsthatareappropriate

tounderstandinghumanstoobjectsofwhollydifferentkinds.Structu-

res,ports,towns,withoutrecoursetopersons,areattributedplanning,

intention, organising, agency, consciousness, unconsciousness, and courage.

20.Seethefinalsectionforanexplicationofthisterm.21.SeeGastonRoupnel,Histoire et destin (Paris1943).BraudelinfactidentifiedwithRoupnel’s

experiences,ashemakesevidentinBraudel(1958)p.748.BraudelhadinfactreviewedRoupnel’sHistoire et destin,areviewwithwhichRoupnelwasmostpleased.SeeFernandBraudel,”Faillitedel’histoire,triomphedudestin?”,Mélanges d’histoire sociale 6(1944)p.71–77.SeealsoRoupnel’slettertoBraudel,publishedin”Lesmortsdel’histoirevivante”,Annales: histoire, sciences sociales 2:4(1947)p.479–481.

22.IdarenotsayhowKoselleck’sexperienceasaSovietprisonerofwarhas influencedhiswork,asmyknowledgeonhimisminimal.ButIamfairlycertainthatithas,especiallyinhislaterwritings.

23.Seee.g.HerbertButterfield,The Englishman and his history (Cambridge1944).24.Braudel(1958)p.726,”nierautrui,c’estdéjàleconnaître”.Tomyknowledge,Braudeland

Lacanhadsomesortofapersonalrelationship.Certainlytheybothshareastrongconceptualcom-mitmenttothethoughtofLévi-Strauss.

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ThisculminatesintheMediterraneanherselfbeingseenasaperson(the

quotedsentencesinthelongquotethatfollowsareBraudel’sownwords

translatedintoEnglish):

Thelongue durée,however,hepopulateswithnon-peoplepersons–geo-graphicalentities,featuresoftheterrain.ThusintheMediterraneanpeninsulas ’arekeyactors [...]haveplayedleadingroles [...]Theyarealmost persons ...whomay ormaynot be conscious of themselves’.Townsarevestedwithintentions,Constantinople,forexample,with’thedeterminationtoimposesettlement,organizationandplanning’ontheOttomans.It’triumphedoverandbetrayed’them,luringthemintothewrongwarswiththewronggoals.Theprotagonistofthissomewhatpeculiarlycasthistoricaldrama,ofcourse,istheMediterraneanitself,orratherherself.Shehasdesignsorpurposesofherown,whichshesometimessucceedsinfulfilling.She’contributed[...]topreventingtheunityofEurope,whichsheattractedtowardhershoresandthendividedtoherownadvantage’.AndinthesixteenthcenturythroughGenoashe’longallocatedtheworld’swealth’.Times,too,getpersonalized.’Thesixteenthcenturyhadneitherthecouragenorthestrength’toeradicatetheancientevilsofthegreatcities,and‘ModernTimes[’la Modernité ’]suddenlyprojectedtheterritorialstatetothecenterofthestage’.25

Inshort,Braudeldoesnotbelievethat”theonlyactorsmakingnoiseare

themostauthenticones”,because(noticeagainthesilenceofhistory)”there

areothers,silentones;butwhodidnotknowthatalready”?26Bywayof

concludingthissection,IwishtopointoutthatIsharewithBraudelthe

following:itiswiththeconceptofthepersonthatananalysishastodeal,

anditistheunderstandingofparticularpersonsthathistoricalresearch

shouldresultin.WherewedifferisthatIexplicitlyfollowthroughonsuch

presuppositions,whereasBraudelgoesontoconstructpresuppositions

standingincontradictiontoandevenderisionofthem.Letus,then,take

acloserlookatthesepresuppositionsofBraudel’s.

25.Hexter(1972)p.519.26.Braudel(1958)p.738,”lesseulsacteursquifontdebruitsoientlesplusauthentiques”;”il

enestd’autresetsilencieux–maisquinelesavaitdéjà?”.

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722 Admir Skodo

Braudel’s presuppositions of historical thought

ItisnotunreasonabletoseeaconnectionbetweenBraudelandthelogical

positivists.27Thelogicalpositivistssawthemethodsofallsciencesasbeing

reducibletoasingleone,thatofthephysicalsciences.Theybelievedthat

allthesciencessharedacommonlogicallanguage.Braudeltoobelieves

thatallhumansciences”speakthesamelanguage,orcanspeakit”.28He

believesinthepossibilityofacommonmethodforallhumansciences.His

maininfluence,though,wasnotthelanguageofthephysicist,butrather

thatofthestructuralist.Braudellivedinanintellectualsettingthatsaw

theriseofstructuralisminthehumansciences.29Wecansingleoutthe

anthropologistClaudeLévi-Straussasthemostimportantstructuralist

influenceonBraudel.ThereferencestoLévi-Straussareoverwhelmingin

Braudel’swork.Andasamatteroffactthetwokneweachotherpersonally,

afterhavingmetattheUniversityofSãoPaolo.

Braudelrejectsthepresuppositionsofthesorbonnistes whoonlystudy

persons as ”quintessentialised heroes”.30 A personworthy of historical

inquirythesorbonniste takestobeapoliticallyimportant,rational,and

consciouslyactingman.Thehistorianistostudytheeventsthatsucha

personbroughttolife.Itshouldcomeasnosurprisetothereadertofind

Braudeldiscardingthenotionoftheconsciousandrationalityasneces-

saryforhistoricalthought.Braudel’shistoryisthusabout”theunconscious

formsofthesocial”.This”socialunconscious”istobefoundintheunsaid

orsilentinthepast.InBraudel’sownwords,itisa”semi-obscurity”.31It

isLévi-Strauss’thoughtthatsetsthelandscapeforthiswordpainting.In

linewithdiscardingtheseelementsthatcontrivetomaketheperson(the

conscious,rationality,agency)Braudelgoesontorejectthemeaning ofthe

spokenorwrittenasanecessaryelementforhistoricalthoughtaswell.

Languageisindeedcrucialforhistoricalthought,Braudelcontends,but

27.SeeCarlG.Hempel,”TheFunctionofGeneralLawsinHistory”,Journal of Philosophy 39:2(1942)p.35–48.ItisworthwhiletonoticethatHempelpostulatestheobjectofhistoricalexplana-tiontobeeitheraspecificpersonality,orsomethingthatistheresultofhumanbehaviour.Hebelievesthatsuchobjectscanbereducedtoacertaintypeofevent,whichcanbeexplainedthroughtheapplicationofuniversallyconditionalhypotheses.

28.Braudel(1958)p.734,”parlentlemêmelangageoupeuventleparler”.29.Forhistory,seee.g.FrançoisDosse,Histoire du structuralisme: le champ du signe, 1945–1966

(Paris1991). 30.Braudel(1997)p.102,”hérosquintessenciés”.31.Braudel(1958)p.740,”desformsinconscientesdusocial”,”uninconscientsocial”,”cette

demi-obscurité”.

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itisthelanguageofthephonemes,thesmallestsoundelementsoflangu-

age,whicharewhollydetachedfrommeaning.Hedoesnotcaremuchfor

culturalpracticesandsubjectivemeaningsasexplanatoryconcepts.His

preferredmodeofexplanationisthemodel.ThemodelBraudeldefines

asasetofsystematicandexplicativehypotheseseitherintheformofthe

equation(”this isequivalenttothis”)orthefunction(”thisdetermines

this”).Heevenspeaksofasocial mathematicthroughwhichmodellingcan

beconceptualized.32Modelsareofthehighestvaluebecausetheycanbe

applied”acrosstimeandspace”.33ButwitnesshowBraudelimmediatelyre-

turnstothepersonwhenhesaysthatmodels”varyinfinitelyallaccording

totheirusers’temperament,calculationorgoal”.34

Theannaliste,inoppositiontothesorbonniste, arguesthattheperson

andeventdoesnotconstitutethewholeofsocialreality.Forhimthehis-

toricaltimewhichsuchpersonsarepartofisof ”themostcapricious,the

mosttreacherousofdurations”.35Suchatimedoesnottakeintoaccount

othersocialkindsofman,especiallythosewithoutwritingandpower.

InBraudel’saccount,historyshouldbeaboutcivilisations,whichhede-

finesvaguely.Thecontentofacivilisationentailslanguage,science,law,

institutions,religions,beliefs,technologies,customs,andeveryday life.

Braudelspeaksoftheneedtoacknowledge”themostmodestcultures”,

andthereforeoftheneedfora”microhistory”.36Indeed,Braudelwantsto

takeintoaccountallpossibleaspectsofmaninhistory.Fromthisstems

hisnotionofl’histoire globale orl’histoire totale.Buttohiscredit,hewas

fullyawarethatitwasan”impossibletotalscienceofman”thathesought

toconstruct.37Inmyview,whatmakesitimpossibleisthatitnevergives

anynotableattentiontopersonsandtheir timeinlife.38Iagreewiththis

32.Braudel’sfatherwasamathematicianInoteinpassing,and,accordingtotestimony,averystrictman.SeeBraudel(1992).

33.Braudel(1958)p.740.”àtraversdetempsetespace”.34.Braudel(1958)p.740.”varientàl’infinisuivantletempérament,lecalculoulebutdes

utilisateurs”.35.Braudel(1958)p.728.”lapluscapricieuse,laplustrompeusedesdurées”.36.FernandBraudel,”L’histoiredescivilisations:lepasséexpliqueleprésent”,inRoselynde

Ayala&PauleBraudel(ed.),Les écrits de Fernand Braudel: II: les ambitions de l’histoire(Paris1997)p.197–243,224.

This articlewasfirstpublished in1959 in volume20 ofL’Encyclopédie française, editedbyFebvre.

37.BraudelquotedinStoianovich(1972)p.121.”impossible science globale de l’homme”.38.Cf.PeterBurke,”Historyofeventsandtherevivalofnarrative”,inPeterBurke(ed.),New

perspectives on historical writing: second edition(Cambridge2001)p.283–301,p.287.

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724 Admir Skodo

multi-dimensionalapproachtohistory,butnotwiththepresuppositions

thatBraudelconstructsforit.

Braudel’smainsuggestionforwhathistoricalthoughtshouldpresuppose

istheargumentthatthreetemporaldimensionsdeterminepersons’actions

andthoughtsduringacertaintimespace.ThesedimensionsBraudelcalls

structuresor”structuraldurations”(durées).Hecomparesthemto(notice

thechoiceofword)prisonswhendefiningtheirconstrainingeffectson

mentalities.39Ofthethree,Braudelstresses”theexceptionalvalueofthe

longdurations”,thelongues durées.40

Stressingaparticulardurationinresearchwillconstituteaparticular

kindofhistoryaccordingtoBraudel.So,thehistoire évenémentielleishistory

thatfocusesontheshortestdurée.Thisisthehistoryofpoliticalevents,

whichareexplosive,fleeingandalmostinsignificantforhistoricalthought.

Braudel’slukewarmattitudetowardsthisdurationshouldbeunderstood

inrelationtohispersonalanxietiesandhardships.Nextisthehistoryof

les conjonctures,atermborrowedfromcontemporaryeconomicalthought.

Braudelexpandstheconcept,andidentifiesthreekindsofconjonctures.

Thiskindofhistorystudiessocial,economic,andmentalstructures.Fi-

nally,thereisthehistoryofles longue durées.Thishistoryseeksoutthe

longeststructuraldurations,whichare”arealitythriftilyspentbytime,

andcarriedforalongwhile”.41Braudelrefusestospecifyforhowlong;it

canbeamatterofseveralcenturiesorafewdecades.Heevenholdsthata

longdurationcanbeshort.Itisdifficultinprinciple,hesays,tokeepapart

thedifferentdurations,andononeoccasionhehyperbolicallyspeaksof

historyashavingahundredfaces.42Indeed,itisdifficulttounderstand

whatBraudelwantstocapturewiththesedistinctions.Theyallseemto

overlapinaninextricablyentangledmanner.

WhatIwillbeproposinginthenextthreesectionscanbeconsideredas

areappraisalofthehistoire évenémentielle,becauseIbelievethat,if properly

analysed,itcanbeshowntolieattheheartofhistoricalthought.Inprin-

ciple,Ihavenoproblemwiththehistoire des conjonctures either,because

ifoneviewssuchahistoryasacolligationoraggregatefrommorebasic

elements(persons),thencertainlyamorelong-termviewonhumanlifeis

39.Braudel(1958)p.731,”lescadrexmentaux,aussi,sontprisonsdelalonguedurée”.40.Braudel(1958)p.727,”lavaleurexceptionelledutempslong”.41.Braudel(1958)p.731,”uneréalitéqueletempsusemaletvéhiculetréslonguement”.42.Braudel(1958)p.727,”l’histoireauxcentsvisages”.

725



ofgreatvalue.TheonlyconceptIdismisstout court,then,isla longue durée,

butthenagainsodoesBraudel.Wecanseethisinthecontent thatBraudel

giveshislongdurations:italwaysboilsdowntoparticularpersons.When

Braudelthusexemplifieshislongdurations,e.g.theideaofthecrusade

andmarketcapitalism,italwaysnecessarilyinvolvesrecoursetoindividual

humans.Inotherwords,timeandagainweseethatBraudelistryingto

understandpersons.But,crucially,weconstantlyseehimhopelesslytrying

tomovebeyondthetimeduringwhichtheylived.Isayhopelesslyforwe

repeatedlyseehowheendsuppersonalisingthesedurations.Thiscreates

aconceptualtempestthatisnotwithouttracesofpersonaltragedy.

Braudel’slongestdurationsbelongtotherealmofdemographyandcli-

matestudies.ItisimportanttonotethatBraudeldoesnot believethat

there isacorrelationbetweenclimaticanddemographicstructureson

theonehand,and,socialandeconomiconesontheother.43Inotherwords,

bywayofimplication,thelonguesdurées are nugatoryintheactivityof

understandingpersons.Itisironic,then,thatthemostdisseminatedof

Braudel’sconceptsturnsouttobeilldefinedandoflittleepistemicvalue!

Inconsequenceweshouldnotgiveprimacytotheconceptoflongue durée

inattemptstoproperlyunderstandBraudel’sthought.Insteadweshould

paycloserattentiontotherelationithastohispersonallife.

WhatwouldtheanswerbeifweapproachedBraudel’sworkwiththe

question:”Dostructuresdeterminepersons,orpersonsstructures,oris

thereadialecticalrelationbetweenpersonsandstructures”?Notaclear-

cutone.Sometimesstructuresdeterminepersons,sometimesstructures

arelikepersons,andsometimespersonsstretchtherigourofstructures.

Surely,weneedtogobeyondBraudelinordertoproperlydrawoutthe

conceptsappropriatetohistoricalthought.

Ontological determination and epistemological underdetermination

IthereforebidfarewelltoBraudel’sirksomewaysofthinkingaboutthe

businessofhistory,andturntowhatIbelieveisamoreappropriateway.

Theontologicaldeterminationofpastpersons,orindeedanykindofpast

object,isthefirstpresuppositionIwishtoestablishasnecessaryforhis-

toricalthought.ItismybeliefthatImightbeabletoshednewlightona

problem(ornon-problem)thatstillhauntsthehistoricaldisciplinetoacer-

43.Stoianovich(1976)p.82–83.

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726 Admir Skodo

tainextent.Iamspeakingoftheproblemoftheobjectivityofpropositions

aboutsomepastobject,theirtruth-value,orwhateveronewantstocall

it.Thepresuppositionisformulatedthus:aperson’sparticularthoughts

andactionsexistedduringacertain timeinthepast,andcannotbechan-

gedinanywayby(consciousorunconscious)thought,(conscious)actions

or(unconscious)behaviourinsomesubsequenttemporalduration.Our

languagerevealstousthatthingsdonotexistin time,butratherduring a

certain time.Forexample,inordertobeinformativeinamannerrelevant

toourneedsandwantsweusuallyspeakintermslike”att1Xoccurred”,

”betweent1andt

2Yoccurred”,”itallstartedatt

1”(implyingthatitisongo-

ing,finished,orwillfinishatsomeothertime).Now,ofcourseconnections

canbemadetoothertemporalstatesinorderforustogainmorerelevant

knowledgeaboutXorY,but,crucially,suchconnectionsdonotseemto

presupposeall pastandpresenttemporalstates.No,knowledgeaboutX

orYhingesonparticular temporalstates.Moreover,somethinganalogous

tothiscanbesaidofthenotionof”context”,”convention”,or”tradition”,

thatis,athingisnotunderstoodin acontext,butasrelated to certain other

things, but not to others.Therestoftheargumentinthissectionaimsto

revealthattheuseofourlanguageaboutsuchtemporalstatesimpliesa

commitmenttowhatIcallontologicaldetermination.Theargumenthas

theformofathoughtexperiment,andiseasytocomprehend.

Supposeyouarewritinganarticlewhensomeonecomesuptoyouand

says”I’mgoingtoshowyousomefactswhichcontradictyourclaim,and

you’regoingtobeashamedwhenyouseethem”.Aftertheutterancehe

showsyousomefacts,perhapsinsomedocumentyouhavenotreadbefore.

Yougothroughthesefacts,anditturnsoutthattheydonotdisproveyour

claimatall.Youareofcoursenotashamed,andyourightfullydismiss

him.Butsupposethatthesamepersonreturnsthedayafter,withthe

sameaiminmindasthedaybefore.Thistimeheactuallyhasfactsthat

willcontradictyourclaim,andmakeyoufeelashamed,maybebecause

theywerethererightinfrontofyoureyesandyetyoufailedtoseethem.

Letusfinallyassumethatyouhave lostallmemoryof thedaybefore.

Ourdiscloseroffactshasnomoralqualms;hewantstotakeadvantageof

thissituation,thatis,hewantstomakeyoubelievethathehasneverat-

temptedandfailedtoshowyoucontradictingfactsbefore.Whathecan say

thenis”IjustwantedtoremindyouofyesterdaywhenIshowedyousome

factswhichcontradictedyourclaims,andyouwereashamedwhenyou

727



sawthem”.Hecannotsay”I’mgoingtoshowyousomefactscontradicting

yourclaimyesterday,andyou’llbeashamedwhenyouseethemyesterday”.

Theclosestthingtosuchanexpressionhecancome,andthereisreallyno

closenesshere,is”YesterdayIshowedyouthatyou’recontradicted,andyou

wereashamedofit”.Butthispresupposesthathehasalreadyuttered”I’m

goingtoshowyousomefactswhichcontradictyourclaim,andyou’regoing

tobeashamedwhenyouseethem”.Inturn,thispresupposes,expressedin

theintentionalityoftheexpression,thatyouhaveasamatterofconscious

perceptionseenthisfactandbeenashamed.Butforyoutobeabletosay

andbelieve”yes,Isawthem,andIwasashamed”,itisnecessarilypresup-

posedthatyourseeingandfeelingashamedwasstoredinyourmemory,

andthatthememoryinasubsequentsituationwasbroughttoyourconsci-

ousnessessentiallyrepresentingthecontentoftheutterancethatyousee

themandareashamedofit.

Ourdiscloseroffactsisfullyawarethatyourmemoryisgone,andis

therebycommittedtoacceptingthepossibilitythatheeitherdidnotsee

youatallyesterday;or,thathesawyou,presentedthefacts,butthatthey

didnotcontradictyourclaim,normadeyoufeelashamed,thatis,heis

committedtoacceptingthathecannotchange,ashewants,whathasonce

occurred.Considerwhatwouldhappen ifhewastothink,actandspeak

consistentlywiththebeliefthathecoulddowhateverhisheartdesired

withobjectsontologicallydetermined.Hewouldthensay”Ihavenofood

today,butIhadsomeyesterday,soI’lleatyesterday”.Or,”Ihumiliatedhim

twoweeksago,andhekilledhimself,butI’llnothumiliatehimtwoweeks

ago,sohewon’tkillhimself”.

Ifourfactshowerwouldbeconsistentinhisthinkingthiswayhewould

notbeabletomakehimselfunderstoodtoothers,norwouldhebeable

toliveinasocialcommunity.Toonlynominallydenyontologicaldeter-

minationisaparadoxorself-contradiction;todenyitinactualuseisa

disaster.

However,even if somepastpersonhasactualizedaparticularnum-

berofpossibilitiesofthoughtandaction,itisnonethelessthecasethat

ourunderstandingofthatpersonisepistemologicallyunderdetermined,

thatis,wecannotgiveacompletedescriptionofsomepastperson.Itisa

matterofpresuppositionthatseverallogicallyincompatibledescriptions

ofthesameobjectcanexist.Butconsiderthateven if thisontological

determinationispresupposed,ifthatobjectexistedinthepast.Inorder

728


728 Admir Skodo

toencourageafruitfulbasisforreflection,Iwouldsaythatwhatepiste-

mologicalunderdeterminationcommitsustoissimplythatweshouldbe

neitherreductionists,norcompatibilists.Therecanbenoultimateviewof

theworld,nordoallviewscoherewitheachother.

Thatourthinkingisunderdetermineddoesnotstopusfromperceiving

things,fromunderstandingthem,fromliving,fromgoingonwithourlives,

fromlivingwithothers.Evenlifeformslikewarorcapitalismarehuman

lifeforms,becauseyouwouldnotsaythatotherspecieshaveaconceptof

warorcapitalism,wouldyou?Anditisinourlanguagethatwefindour

lifeforms,thelogicofsocialactivity.44

Understanding the person: The cognitive aspect

Sofartheanalysishasbeennegative.Ithasdrawncertainlogicalbounda-

riesthatthehistorianshouldnottransgress.Intheremainderoftheessay

Iwillbeconcernedwithworkingouttheconstitutionofthelogicalspace

thatfallswithinthoseboundaries.45

Asamatterofpresuppositionthehistorianshouldattributecognitive

attitudestohispersonofstudy.46First,thehistorianmustattributethe

attitudeofdesire.Thelogicalformofadesireisthataperson,X,wants,

wishes,something,Y (expressed in a linguistic sentence, y),tohappen,occur,

tobebroughtaboutorbepossessed. Inotherwords,adesirewantsthe

worldtomirrorit.Thesecondattitudetobeattributedisthatofbelief.

Thelogicalformofbeliefisthataperson,X,believesaproposition,y, to

betrueorfalseaboutsomeconcreteobjectorevent,Y.Third,wehave

theattitudeofjudgement,theformofwhichisthataperson,X,valuesor

appraisessomeobjectorevent,Y (expressed in a linguistic sentence, y).All

threeofthesecognitiveattitudesareintentional–theyareallaboutor

directed towardparticularobjectsorevents.47Theyareallcapableofbeing

44.Languageandlogictoohavetheirhistory,whichofcourseoverlaps.”Logic”isnotjustlogic,butpredicatelogic,propositionallogic,deonticlogic,settheory,modallogic,meta-logic.Allthesecertainlysharefamilyresemblances,butdoesoneentailalltheothers?Doeseachoneentaileveryother?

45.Bearinmindthatthedistinctionsdrawninwhatfollowsareofalogicalkindanddonotpurporttoenounceanythingabouttemporalpriorityandsuccession.

46.Iofcoursetakeitforgrantedthathistoricalunderstandingisnotpossiblewithoutevidence,linguisticorotherwise,whichembodiespastperson’sactivities.Ialsotakeforgrantedthathistori-ansknowhowtogoaboutfindingrelevantevidenceandjudgingitsworthforresearch.

47.DuetopracticalreasonsIwillsaynothingofthegrammaticalandlexicalformoftheselogicallydistinctattitudes.

729



heldinhigher-orderandlower-order(sub-conscious)cognitivemodesas

well.Forexample,notonlycanIdesiretowriteabook,Icanalsobelieve

thatmydesireisunattainable.Or,Icanbeunawarethatthetoneofvoice

inmesaying”Idon’tlikeyourfriend,whatareyoutalkingabout”strongly

impliesthatIdolikeher,butthatIamforsomereasonnotwillingtoadmit

it,eventomyself.

”HowcanImakeadistinctionbetweenthoughtandlanguage”,acritic

mightobject.”Arenotalllinguisticexpressionsunderstoodonlybymeans

ofreferencetootherlinguisticelementsina‘chainofsignifiers’?Wecould

neverhopetobreakoutoftheprisonhouseoflanguage”.Sogoesthecharge.

Theanswertosuchanobjectioninvolvespointingoutadistinctionbetween

threedifferentkindsofmeaning.48First,anexpressionhas”linguisticmea-

ning”(l-meaning),whichisunderstoodsufficientlybyidentifyingitsgram-

matical,syntactic,morphological,andconventionalproperties.Second,it

has”semanticmeaning”(s-meaning),whichissufficientlyunderstoodby

meansofitslogicalproperties,e.g.itsextension.Now,eventhoughbothof

thesearenecessaryfortheretobe”personmeaning”(p-meaning),theydo

not sufficientlydeterminethecontentofanexpressionofp-meaning.

Letustakeanexampletoshowtheupshotofthesedistinctions.Imagine

twofriends,JudithandPaul,walkingdownastreetdiscussingtheconcept

ofintention.Botharephilosophers.Judithisapost-structuralist(notso

farremovedfromanannaliste,asinthecaseofthehistorianArletteFarge)

whoarguesthatintentionsareungraspable,andPaulisaphilosopherwho

believesthattheyaregraspable.JudithsaystoPaul,”Barthesarguesthat

languagebarsaccesstointentions”.Assheissayingit,theybothnoticea

kidbeingcaughtbyasecurityguardoutsideofastore.Thekidcallsthe

guard”pig”.Paulsays,”That’ssostupidofhim”.Now,thoughwecangetat

thel-meaningands-meaningofthisexpressionwithoutanyrecourseto

whatwasp-meant,wecannotstopatthatifwewanttoknowwhatPaul

meant.CertainlyJudithwouldliketoknowwhatwasp-meant.Nothingin

thelinguisticandsemanticcontextwillhelpusinfindingoutwhatPaul

48.HereIdrawonR.G.Collingwood,The idea of history: revised edition(Oxford1994);Lud-wigWittgenstein,Philosophical investigations(Oxford1968);H.P.Grice,”Utterer’smeaningandintention”,The philosophical review40:2(1969)p.147–177;MarkBevir,The logic of the history of Ideas (Cambridge1999);andA.P.Martinich,”FourSensesof ‘Meaning’ inthehistoryofideas.QuentinSkinner’stheoryofhistoricalinterpretation”,Journal of the philosophy of history 3:3(2009)p.225–245.Thedistinctionscanbemadefiner,asisdonebyMartinichandGrice,butformypurposestheonesdrawnwillsuffice.

730


730 Admir Skodo

p-meant,fornothinginsuchcontextshasanindividualviewpoint,and

anabilitytoexpressandcommunicatethatviewpoint.SowhenJudith,

probablysomewhatangrily,asks,”Whatdoyoumeanbythat”,sheisnot

inquiringintotheconventionalormorphologicalpropertiesofPaul’sex-

pression,orwhat”that”referstoof itself.Ifshedid,shewouldnotneedto

askPaul.No,shewantstoknowwhatPaulmeant.AndPaulcanthensay,

”Imeantthatit’ssostupidofthatkidtoshoplift”,oreven”Imeantthatit’s

abadargument”.Broadlyspeaking,inawaytobedeterminedmorespe-

cifically,itiswithsuchp-meaning(sofaridentifiedintermsofcognitive

attitudes)thathistoriansshouldbeinterestediniftheyareinterestedin

understandingpersons.

Itisfullypossibletoidentifycognitiveattitudesinahumanwhowas

notawareofthem.Whatisofessencewhenthehistorianidentifiessuchat-

titudesisthathemustbeawarethatheisdoingso,andhisunderstanding

ofunconsciousstatesmusthaveafairlyrationalformeveniftheidentified

unconsciousattitudesareseentoexhibitirrationality.ByirrationalityI

meanparticularcognitiveattitudesheldbyaparticularpersonthatare

foundtobelogicallyincompatiblewitheachother.BystructureImean

afairlysystematicbodyofrelatedcognitiveattitudes,relationsbetween

suchcognitiveattitudes,andactionsorbehaviourbroughtaboutbythem.

Thisgoesforallhumanformsoflife,sowhatconstitutescultural,social,

legal,etc,structuresisunderwrittenbythesamesetofpresuppositions.

Suchstructuresdonotliveontheirown;theydonotact,think,andfeel.

Theclosestthingastructurecancometoliving,ifthiscanbecalled”clo-

seness”,iswhenpersonsbehaveinanunconsciousway.Perhapsinthatcase

itmightbeappropriatetopostulateanunconsciousdefinedasasemi-

independentagencywithintheperson.Itrustthereaderwillnoticethe

crucialdifferencesbetweenmyconceptsoftheunconsciousandstructure,

andBraudel’s.

Now,aperson’s actionorbehaviour isunderstoodby identifying the

expressedreasonsforit,whichsimplymeanstheidentificationofrelevant

cognitiveattitudes.Theirformofexplanationisarationalone,anditisnot

compatiblewiththeformoftheequation,functionorlogicaldeduction.49

49.InsomecaseshoweverIbelievethatitmightbeappropriatetoinvokethenotionofmecha-nismtounderstandthebehaviourproduced,perhapstothedismayoftheanti-naturalists.Iwillnotgointothisaspecthere.Seemy”Outlineofatheoryofthepersonforhistorical-biographicalstudy”,The international journal of the humanities 7:1(2009)p.59–70.

731



Inadditiontothethreekindsofcognitiveattitudesjustdiscussed,I

willaddtothelistonemorethatisakintothesethreeinthatittoois

intentional.Ihaveinmindspeech acts.Aspeechact,Y,isalinguisticex-

pression,y,utteredorwrittenbyaperson,X,whichby and only by means

ofitsexpressionbringsaboutanactionorfact.Inotherwords,aspeech

actinaveryrealwaymakesthe(social)world,forwhatitbringsaboutis

necessarilyconditioneduponbeingexpressedlinguistically.50Examples

includenaming,marrying,andordering.OfcourseQuentinSkinnermust

bementionedinthiscontext,becausehewasthefirsttoconstructatheory

basedonspeechactsforintellectualhistory.IdisagreewithSkinnerinthat

Idonotseetheinvocationofspeech-acttheoryasnecessaryevenforSkin-

nerianintellectualhistory,forSkinnerianintellectualhistoryisessentially

aboutunderstandingtexts.Asking,asSkinnerdoes,”whatwasXdoingin

writingy”,andansweringsomethinglike”Xwasdefendingthemonarchy

inwritingy”,issurelylogicallydifferentthanaskingsomethinglike,”What

wasXdoinginsaying’Yes’tothequestion’Doyoutakethiswomantobe

yourlawfulweddedwife?’”,theanswerbeing”Xwasgettingmarried”.In

thelattercase,Xbrings aboutamarriageifandonlyifhesays,”Yes”.Inthe

formeritisnotnecessarilythecasethatX,bydefendingthemonarchy

inatext,managestobring aboutanactualdefenseofthemonarchy.This

revealsthathissuccessinthewriting (or saying)ofydoesnotnecessarily

bringaboutthatwhichitwantstobringabout.

Aparticularhumandoesnotholdoneorsomeparticulardesires,speech

acts,aimsandjudgementsthatarethereasonsforheractionsandbehavi-

our.No,shelivesbyverymany,andchanging,ones.Thehistoriancannot

understandanyoneof themwithout connecting themto anextensive

amountofothers.Evenseeminglysimpleactionsrequirethisprocedurein

ordertobeunderstood.Thehistorian,however,typicallydealswithcom-

plexcases,suchwherethelargercontextsaresomuchricherandattimes

evenforeigntoher.Still,theformofunderstandingisthesameintrivial

asinnon-trivialcases.Inprinciple,themorethepersontobeunderstood

actedandbehavedinwaysforwhichwecannotseeanyreasons,themore

researchisneededtoidentifythosecognitiveattitudesthatwillproveto

beconsistentwiththem.Agoodhistoriandoesjustthis;shemakesthe

50.SeethecollectionofhisphilosophicalpiecesinVisions of politics: volume I: regarding method(Cambridge2002).IreviewSkinnerinmy”Post-analyticphilosophyofhistory”,Journal of the phi-losophy of history 3:3(2009)p.308–333,309–314.

732


732 Admir Skodo

seeminglyunintelligibleturnouttobeintelligible.Apresuppositionthat

isimpliedinallofthis,whichInowmakeexplicit,isthatthepersonisa

holisticentity,andforourunderstandingtobepossibleatall,ittoomust

beofaholisticcharacter. IfBraudelandtheotherannalistes didmuch

topromoteholism,itisaholismofthewrongkind–somuchshouldbe

evident.Ifsometimesthehistoriandoesnotfindreasons,orifsometimes

therearenoreasonstobefound,thenwhat?Well,thisisjustallpartof

beingahuman,andnotheorycanadequatelydealwithit,ifatall.

Wemusttakeintoconsiderationthesocialsituationwhenweunderstand

others.Ianalysetheconceptofsocialsituationasalimitedspace-timein

whichtwoormorepersons,act,re-act,andcommunicatewitheachother

inaccordancewithcertaintypesofnorms andrules.Normsandrulesare

fairlysystematicprincipleswhoseroleistoregulatewhatcanandcannot,

orshouldandshouldnot,bedoneandsaidinacertainsocialsituation.So-

cialstructuressimplyconsistofnormsandrules.Cognitiveattitudesare

constitutive ofsuchstructures,sotothatinordertounderstandthemthe

historianmustnecessarilyseethecognitiveattitudeslyingbehindthem.

Itiscertainlyapresuppositionthatsomeactionsorbehaviourhaveunin-

tendedorunwantedconsequences.Itisalsotruethatacertainpersoncan

misunderstandcertainnormsandrules,soevenifthepersonthinkshehas

compliedwiththem,hehasasamatteroffactnot.Butwhatispresupposed

inmisunderstanding,misapplication,unintendedconsequences,andthe

like,isthenecessarypossibilityofproperunderstandingandcompliance.

Itissafetosaythatwhatintereststhehistorianmostishowcertain

structuresareupheld andchanged.Togiveananalysisofthisrequiresthe

invocationofself-consciousness andself-reflectiveness.Thisisthedimension

wherethepersoninquestionisawarethatitisshewhohasthoughts,and

thatit isshewhohasactedwithintheconstraintsofsomerules.From

thishighestorderofconsciousnessthepersoncangoontoevaluatepast

andpresentcognitiveattitudesandactions,whetherherownorthoseof

others.Shecanplanforthefuture,andfairlyrationallycommittofulfil-

lingthoseplans,e.g.makeapromisetosomeoneandkeepit.Suchactions

andcommitmentscannotbeunderstoodiftherewasnopresupposition

ofself-consciousnessandself-reflectiveness.Nobodyisconstantlyinthis

state,oranyotherstateforthatmatter.

Forasocialstructuretobeupheldforalongerperiodoftime,itisneces-

sarythatthepersonsinthatsituationfollowitsrulesornorms,whether

733



consciouslyorunconsciously.Butifthesepersonsareself-awareandself-

reflectiveaboutthesenorms,theirownbeliefs,andsoon,thentheyhave

thepowernottofollowtherule,theyhavethepowertodeliberateabout

itsjustification,andtheyinsomecasesevenhavethepowertogoonand

changetherule.Inprinciple,rulesornormsarenotsufficientdeterminants

ofaperson’sthoughtandbehaviour.51Inordertounderstandhowandwhy

particularsocialstructuresareconstituted,upheldandchangedthehis-

torianmustnecessarilyrelatethemtoparticularpersonsinparticularsi-

tuations.Suchanunderstandinginvolvesindentifyingtherelevantactions,

behaviourandthebehindthemlyingcognitiveattitudes,whetherconsci-

ousorunconscious.Andagain,thewayIproposehistoriansshouldviewthe

socialworldisdrasticallydifferentfromwhatBraudel’sproposed.

Understanding the person: The phenomenal aspect

Understandingapersonasanalysedintheprevioussectionisaboutatt-

ributing cognitivementalstatesbasedonevidenceinlinguisticorother

form.Surelywemustpresupposethatthepersonwestudyheldbeliefs,

desires,andthelike.Wecannot,however,assumethathedrewthesame

connectionsbetweenhiscognitiveattitudes,asthehistorianwillcometo

draw.Whatismore,hemightnothavebeenawareofsomeofthem,and

yetexpressedthemsomehow.Thenagain,hemighthavewithheldsome

actualconvictionsandvalues,whichhetookpainstoneverexpress.All

thisistosaythatnothinginmyanalysis(ofcognition)ensuresusthatwe

willcometounderstandaparticularpersonasheunderstoodhimself.The

logicalconsequenceofthisanalysisisthatinthisattributingofourswe

willundoubtedlylayaparticularemphasis,accentifyouwill,oncertain

aspectsofaperson’sbeing.Inotherwords,thecognitivedimensionisa

matterof third-personunderstanding,which implies that it is in some

crucialwayscutofffromthewayapersonunderstoodherself.Thiskind

ofunderstandingisarathercoldendeavour,ifthemetaphorisapt.Put

differently,wemightbemakingtheunintelligibleintelligibleonlyfor us.I

submitthatourveryhumanity,personhood,hingesonhavingbothcogni-

tiveandphenomenalcapacities.

Ihave ina (ratherpoor)previousessay sketchedout somenecessary

meta-theoretical principles for historymuch in the same vein as I am

51.Iamsidesteppingtheimportantissueofpower,butthemainimplicationsofmyanalysisconcerningpowershouldbesomewhatclearbywayofimplication.

734


734 Admir Skodo

proceedinghere.Understandingis,Iproposedthere,acognitive-pheno-

menalactivity.52Ifitwasonlyaquestionofcognition,thenwewouldbe

unabletounderstandsuchdeeplyhumanaspectsaslove,trust,revenge,

personality,irony,andstyleofwriting.Howtritehistorywouldbeifthis

wasso!Ofcoursethesecharacteristicsarenothomologousbut,crucially,

noneofthemcanbeproperlyunderstoodonlybymeansofattributionof

cognitiveattitudes.53Tobesure,inhistoryunderstandingphenomenallyis

necessarilyrelatedtograspingp-meaning;nevertheless,andcrucially,itisa

differentdimensionofunderstandingthantheonediscussedsofar.

Wemustthereforedistinguishbetweencognitiveunderstandingand

phenomenalunderstanding,becauseinsomecasesgraspingwhataperson

p-meantisnotenoughforgraspinghisactionorwhatthecontentofhis

linguisticexpressionis.LetmeillustratewhatImean.Imagineawhite

middle-agedAmericanmanX,asuccessfulbusinessman,walkingdown

astreetinNewYorkwithanexpensiveiPhoneinhishand.Firstimagine

anotherAmericanmiddle-agedwhiteman,Y,whodoesnotknowX.Y,who

iswearinganexpensivesuit,runsuptoXandasks”excusemeSir,canI

borrowyourphone,it’sreallyimportant”.Nowimagineanalternatesitua-

tionwhereayoungAmericanblackman,Z,comesuptoX.Thetwomen

donotknoweachother.Z,dressedinsomebaggyclothesandabackward

hat,asksthesamequestion,buthistoneofvoiceisdifferent,andhemight

evenphrasehimselfslightly differently,like”heyman,canIuseyourphone,

it’s important”.Thep-meaning isthesameinbothquestions–namely,

thatbothYandZwanttouseX’sphonebecausetheysayit’simportant

thattheydoso.ButinsomecasesXwilltendtotrustYandlendhim

thephone,buthewillfeeldistrusttowardsZ,andatleastbesuspicious

astothesincerityofhismotives,andsowillbereluctanttogivehimthe

phone.Now,ofcoursecognitiveattitudesareatworkhere,e.g.X’sbelief

thatyoungblackmalesdressedinacertainwayaretobesuspectedof

criminalbehaviour.Wecouldgoontoidentifyrelevantcognitiveattitudes

thatwouldhelpusunderstandsayX’srefusaltogiveZthephone.Butit

isevidentthatwemisssomethingcrucialifweleaveitatthat.ForXfeels

something,hedoesnotreasonandconceptualise,anditisthefeelingthat

52.SeeSkodo(2009).53.Thephenomenaldimensionofunderstandinghasbecomeaneminentlydefendablesetof

thesesinthephilosophyofmind,andthecognitive-andneurosciences.Forphilosophy,seee.g.PeterGoldie,On personality(London&NewYork2004),whoalsoreviewsfindingsinthecognitive-andneurosciences.

735



promptshisbehaviourinawaydifferentthanareasondoes.Hisattitude

ismoredirect,closertoperceptionandemotionthanitistoreflection.

Cognitivelywe”takeastepback”whenweunderstand.Phenomenally”we

leapforward”,attunedtothewaywefeelandperceive.Indeed,intuition,

sympathy,imagination,andthelike–theseshouldbepartandparcelsof

thehistorian’smind.

Isthisreallyimportantforthehistorian’spractice?Duringthelastfifty

yearsorsohistoriansandphilosophersofhistoryhavedismissedthisdi-

mensionassomethingbelongingtoabygoneage;theannalistes andtheir

emphasisonsocial,sometimesbeyond-personal,formshadaconsiderable

parttoplayinthisdismissal.ButIurgethereadertorecallsomeofthe

seminars,lectures,andmeetingswithcolleaguesheorshehasattended.

And Iask:doyoudoubtthatattimestherewere feelings,moods,and

personalitiesexpressedwhichwerecrucialtoyourunderstandingofwhat

thepersonyouwerelisteningortalkingtowassaying?Didyounothave

feelingsofyourown?Thinkofthisnow:howeasyis ittosidestepthis

phenomenalaspectwhenweconductahistoricalinquiry!Weneglectit

bothinourselvesandinthepersonwearestudying.54

AsawayofroundingupthisessayIwishtoputforwardanexample

thatillustratestheimportanceofthephenomenaldimensionforhistorical

studies.55 It isthatofMichelFoucault.56Foucaultstudiedattheultra-

prestigiousENSinthe1940s.DuringthistimeitisknownthatFoucault

hadsevereboutsofdepressionduringwhichhehurthimselfphysicallyand

evenattemptedsuicide.Itisreportedthathespenttimeinthesanatorium

oftheENS,andwenttotherapyandpsychoanalysis.57WhywasFoucault

depressed?Thisquestionwecananswerfairlyeasily,asitis”widelyac-

cepted”thatitwasduetotheinnerconflictFoucaultwasstrugglingwith

incomingtotermswithhishomosexuality.58Thus,wecanperhapsinvoke

54.Forthisreason,althoughhegoestoofar,IhavesympathywithAnkersmit’sSublime historical experience (Stanford2005),becauseheacknowledgesit.

55.Icouldgivemanymanymore,butalas,thespacedoesnotallowit.56.IwouldhavechosenBraudel,butunfortunatelyIdidnothavethetimetodigdeeperinto

theconnectionsbetweenhispersonallifeandhiswork.57.Depressionis(andIdonotmeantosoundopinionedinsayingthis)aconditionthatwefind

aboundsamonggreatthinkersandartists.AnotherexampleisWilliamJames,whoinalecturedrewonhisdepressiontoformulateaphilosophicalquestion–namely,howtoconvincesomeonewhowantstokillhimselfthatheshouldgoonliving.Indeed,Itooaskmyselfthat.ThelectureispublishedinOn a certain blindness in human beings(London2009).

58.DavidMacey,Michel Foucault(London2004)p.29–30.

736


736 Admir Skodo

thestrongdesiretobewithmen;thebelief thatthisdesirewasnotan

acceptednorminVichyFrance;thebelief thathewasworthlessthanmost

people,andthathewasabnormalbecauseofhisdesire.Finally,because

thesedesiresandbeliefswereinconsistentandyetallheldbyFoucault,he

couldnotcopewiththem,andthereforefeltthatkillinghimselfwouldre-

solvehisnegativecondition.CertainlythishelpsustounderstandFoucault

cognitively,butsurelythereaderwillagreethatwearemissingsomething

fundamentalinthiskindofunderstanding, inthiskindofcase.For, in

oneofFoucault’sdepressions,surelyhisbody feltdifferentthanwhenhe

thoughtaboutaphilosophicalissue;surelyhesaw thingsdifferentlyand

evenreflected onthemdifferently;surelyhefelt intensely.Mighttherenot

besomethingcrucialtotakeintoconsiderationherewhenwetrytoun-

derstandFoucault’spreoccupationswiththehistoryofmadness,sexuality,

andtheverypresuppositionsofsubjectivity?

Letthefinalquestionbemyconcludingremark.No,letitbeanexpres-

sedexperiencethatbidsthehistorianandphilosopheraliketoponderits

natureandplaceinourlife,whetherpastorpresent.

FernandBraudelochpersonbegreppet

IdennaartikelanalyserasFernandBraudels(1902–1985)teorieromhistorie-vetenskapensförutsättningar.EngrundläggandetesärattBraudel(implicit)postulerardenmänskliga individen somhistorievetenskapens främsta stu-dieobjekt.DettakantyckasståimotsättningtillBraudelsstrukturalistiskavetenskapssyn,meniartikelnhävdasattdettakanförklarasutifrånBraudelserfarenhetersomtyskkrigsfångeunderandravärldskriget.EftereninledandepresentationochtolkningavBraudelsuppfattningomhistorievetenskapensförutsättningarföljerenkritiskgranskningsomvisarattBraudelsmetatän-kandeomhistorikernsobjekt, influeratavdenstrukturalistiskaantropolo-gin,begreppsligt intehängersamman.Dennakritikutgörgrundenfördenföljandediskussionendärartikelförfattarenförsökerurskiljanödvändiga,omänintetillräckliga,villkorfördethistorievetenskapligatänkandetochhisto-rieforskningen.Denövergripandetesenäratthistoriskforskningbörägnasigåtattförståenskildapersoner.Förattenhistorikerskakunnaförståengivenpersonmåsteföljandevillkoruppfyllas:historikernmåstegenometturvalavrelevantakälloridentifieradekognitivaattitydersomframbringadepersonenshandlingarochbeteenden,såsomdessagestaltadesiginomdestrukturella

737



ramarsomvarrådandeviddenaktuellatidpunkten.Genomanalysenblirdetmöjligtattförklarahurgivnastrukturerkonstitueras,upprätthållsochför-ändras.Iartikelnframhållsattdetärpersonersomkonstituerar,upprätthållerochförändrardessastrukturer.Historikernbördessutomförsökaurskiljadensåkalladefenomenalaaspektenhosengivenperson.Dennaaspektinbegriperkänslaochpersonlighetochärlogisktdistinktfråndenkognitivaaspekten.Ettannatviktigtresultatavanalysenvisarattdeturdennadimensionframkom-merhandlingarochbeteendensomintekanförståsenbartgenomtillgripandetavkognitivaattityder.Historikernbördärförävenbeaktadesåkalladefeno-menalaaspekternahosenskildapersoner.

Keywords:FernandBraudel,theperson,presuppositionalanalysis,understand-ing,historicalthought

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