+ All Categories
Home > Documents > Figueiredo 2002

Figueiredo 2002

Date post: 10-Apr-2018
Category:
Upload: david-ludvig-lohmann-christensen
View: 222 times
Download: 0 times
Share this document with a friend
22
Research Policy 31 (2002) 73–94 Does technological learning pay off? Inter-rm differences in technol ogical capability-ac cumulati on paths and operati onal performance improvement Paulo N. Figueiredo  Brazilian School of Public Administration of the Getulio Vargas Foundation (EBAP-FGV), Praia de Botafogo, 190 4th oor room 426, 22.253-900 Rio de Janeiro, RJ Brazil Received 21 September 2000; received in revised form 14 November 2000; accepted 3 January 2001 Abstract This paper focuses on the practical implications of technological capability-accumulation paths for inter-rm differences in operational performance improvement in the late-industrialising context. This relationship is examined over the lifetime of two large steel rms in Brazil: USIMINAS (1956–1997) and CSN (1938–1997). The study has found that the techno- logica l capab ility-a ccumul ation paths follo wed by the two case- study companie s were divers e and have each proceeded at differing ways and rates over time across different technological functions. The different ways and rates at which the two companies have improved their key operational performance indicators were strongly associated with their technological capability-accumulations paths. This paper suggests that the rate of operational performance improvement can be accelerated if deliberate and effective efforts to accumulate and sustain capabilities for different technological functions-through the underlying learning processes-are made within the rm. This paper also suggests that these efforts are likely to generate nancial benets for the rm. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. Keywords: Te chnological capability-accumulati on paths; Operational performance improvement; Technological learning; Late-industria lising rm; Latecomer company literature; Te chnological frontier company literature 1. Intr oduc tion Over the past two decades there was a profusion of studies str ess ing the importance of ‘le arn ing and ‘capability’ for rms’ competitive performance. However, there still is a misty idea of the practical implications of rms’ efforts on learning and tech- This paper is part of a broader research for the author’s Ph.D. thesis approved in March 2000 at SPRU-Science and Technology Policy Research, University of Sussex, UK. Corresponding author. Tel.: +55-21-559-5742; fax: +55-21-553-8832.  E-mail address: [email protected] (P.N. Figueiredo). nolo gica l capa bility accu mula tion for comp etiti ve advantage, particularly within the late-industrialising context. Indeed, certain questions remain unanswered in the literature. To what extent the way and the rate at which rms accumulate their technological capa- bilit ies exp lain inter-rm dif fere nces in oper ation al performance improvement? What managers need to do in order to improve rms’ competitive performanc e on the basis of technological capability accumulation? Are learning efforts likely to generate nancial ben- ets for the rm? If so, how? The focus of this paper is how the tec hnolo gic al cap abi lit y-a ccu mul ati on path s inue nce inter -rm dif fere nces in oper ation al (and nancial) performance improvement. 0048-7333/02/$ – see front matter © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. PII: S0048-7333(01)00106-8
Transcript
Page 1: Figueiredo 2002

8/8/2019 Figueiredo 2002

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/figueiredo-2002 1/22

Research Policy 31 (2002) 73–94

Does technological learning pay off? Inter-firm differencesin technological capability-accumulation paths and operational

performance improvement

Paulo N. Figueiredo∗

 Brazilian School of Public Administration of the Getulio Vargas Foundation (EBAP-FGV),

Praia de Botafogo, 190 4th floor room 426, 22.253-900 Rio de Janeiro, RJ Brazil

Received 21 September 2000; received in revised form 14 November 2000; accepted 3 January 2001

Abstract

This paper focuses on the practical implications of technological capability-accumulation paths for inter-firm differences

in operational performance improvement in the late-industrialising context. This relationship is examined over the lifetime

of two large steel firms in Brazil: USIMINAS (1956–1997) and CSN (1938–1997). The study has found that the techno-

logical capability-accumulation paths followed by the two case-study companies were diverse and have each proceeded at

differing ways and rates over time across different technological functions. The different ways and rates at which the two

companies have improved their key operational performance indicators were strongly associated with their technological

capability-accumulations paths. This paper suggests that the rate of operational performance improvement can be acceleratedif deliberate and effective efforts to accumulate and sustain capabilities for different technological functions-through the

underlying learning processes-are made within the firm. This paper also suggests that these efforts are likely to generate

financial benefits for the firm. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Technological capability-accumulation paths; Operational performance improvement; Technological learning; Late-industrialising

firm; Latecomer company literature; Technological frontier company literature

1. Introduction

Over the past two decades there was a profusion

of studies stressing the importance of ‘learning’and ‘capability’ for firms’ competitive performance.

However, there still is a misty idea of the practical

implications of firms’ efforts on learning and tech-

This paper is part of a broader research for the author’s Ph.D.

thesis approved in March 2000 at SPRU-Science and Technology

Policy Research, University of Sussex, UK.∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +55-21-559-5742;

fax: +55-21-553-8832.

  E-mail address: [email protected] (P.N. Figueiredo).

nological capability accumulation for competitive

advantage, particularly within the late-industrialising

context. Indeed, certain questions remain unanswered

in the literature. To what extent the way and the rateat which firms accumulate their technological capa-

bilities explain inter-firm differences in operational

performance improvement? What managers need to

do in order to improve firms’ competitive performance

on the basis of technological capability accumulation?

Are learning efforts likely to generate financial ben-

efits for the firm? If so, how? The focus of this paper

is how the technological capability-accumulation

paths influence inter-firm differences in operational

(and financial) performance improvement.

0048-7333/02/$ – see front matter © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

P I I : S 0 0 4 8 - 7 3 3 3 ( 0 1 ) 0 0 1 0 6 - 8

Page 2: Figueiredo 2002

8/8/2019 Figueiredo 2002

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/figueiredo-2002 2/22

74 P.N. Figueiredo / Research Policy 31 (2002) 73–94

Being centred on late-industrialising firms, the

focus of analysis in this paper differs from most of 

the recent studies on learning and capabilities in tech-

nological frontier firms. In these firms, innovativetechnological capabilities already exist. Latecomer

firms, however, move into a business on the basis of 

technology they have acquired from other firms in

other countries. Therefore, during their start-up time

they lack even the basic technological capabilities. To

become competitive and catch up with technological

frontier firms they first have to acquire knowledge

to build up and accumulate their own technological

capabilities. In other words, they need to engage

in a process of technological ‘learning’. The term

technological ‘learning’ is usually understood in two

alternative senses.

The first sense refers to the trajectory or path along

which the accumulation of technological capability

proceeds. The way paths proceed may change over

time: technological capability may be accumulated

in different directions and at differing rates. The sec-

ond sense refers to the various processes by which

knowledge is acquired by individuals and converted

into the organisational level. In other words, the pro-

cesses by which individual learning is converted into

organisational learning.

Learning here is referred to in the second of thetwo senses outlined above. Hereafter, learning will be

understood as a process that permits the company to

accumulate technological capability over time. Tech-

nological capability is defined here as the resources

needed to generate and manage improvements in pro-

cesses and production organisation, products, equip-

ment, and engineering projects. They are accumulated

and embodied in individuals (skills, knowledge, and

experience) and organisational systems (Bell and

Pavitt, 1995).

The issues of technological capability buildingand the underlying learning processes have been

addressed in two bodies of literature. One of them is

the latecomer company literature (LCL) (e.g. Katz,

1976, 1987; Katz et al., 1978; Dahlman and Fon-

seca, 1978; Maxwell, 1981; Lall, 1987, 1992, 1994;

Bell, 1982, 1984; Bell et al., 1982, 1984; Hobday,

1995; Kim, 1995, 1997a, 1997b; Dutrénit, 1998). The

other is the technological frontier company literature

(TFCL) (e.g. Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Pavitt, 1991;

Garvin, 1993; Iansiti and Clark, 1994; Patel and Pavitt,

1994; Pisano, 1997; Iansiti, 1998; Pavitt, 1998 among

others). Other studies in the TFCL have provided a

more conceptual approach to these issues (e.g. Argyris

and Schön, 1978; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi,1988; Senge, 1990; Dosi and Marengo, 1993 among

others). Only a few studies have provided an empiri-

cal treatment to the intra-firm learning processes (e.g.

Leonard-Barton, 1990, 1992a, 1992b, 1995; Iansiti,

1998; Bessant, 1998). Although both the TFCL and

the LCL argue that firms would follow diverse paths

of technological capability accumulation associated

with different patterns of performance, a greater em-

pirical content of this notion is badly needed.

This study is concentrated on steel companies.

Technological capability development in steel produ-

cers has played a substantial role in the develop-

ment of the technology and the industry in different

countries over time. World-wide, the steel industry

is passing through a series of transformations. These

are associated with the emergence of new process

and product technologies and the demand for thinner,

lighter, and more resistant steel for a wide range of 

applications: from car-making to the manufacture of 

surgical instruments and implants. By focusing on

late-industrialising steel, this study extends and builds

on previous empirical studies on technological capa-

bility focusing on steel, though from different per-spectives (e.g. Dahlman and Fonseca, 1978; Maxwell,

1981, 1982; Bell et al., 1982; Viana, 1984; Lall, 1987;

Pérez and Peniche, 1987; Piccinini, 1993; Bell et al.,

1995; Shin, 1996).

Section 2 outlines the conceptual and analytical

frameworks to examine the relationship between tech-

nological capability-accumulation paths and opera-

tional performance improvement. Section 3 briefly

outlines the research design and methods. Sections 4

and 5 focus on the empirical discussion on inter-firm

differences in technological capability-accumulationpaths and their implications for inter-firm differences

in operational performance improvement. The closing

Section 6 outlines the paper conclusions.

2. Conceptual and analytical frameworks

This Section presents the frameworks for firms’

technological capability-accumulation paths and its

implications for operational performance improvement.

Page 3: Figueiredo 2002

8/8/2019 Figueiredo 2002

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/figueiredo-2002 3/22

P.N. Figueiredo / Research Policy 31 (2002) 73–94 75

Page 4: Figueiredo 2002

8/8/2019 Figueiredo 2002

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/figueiredo-2002 4/22

76 P.N. Figueiredo / Research Policy 31 (2002) 73–94

Page 5: Figueiredo 2002

8/8/2019 Figueiredo 2002

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/figueiredo-2002 5/22

P.N. Figueiredo / Research Policy 31 (2002) 73–94 77

Page 6: Figueiredo 2002

8/8/2019 Figueiredo 2002

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/figueiredo-2002 6/22

78 P.N. Figueiredo / Research Policy 31 (2002) 73–94

As far as the framework to describe paths is con-

cerned, this study draws particularly on the frame-

works available in the LCL. The study makes use of 

the term ‘technological capability’ in the sense definedin Bell and Pavitt (1993, 1995), which is in line with

earlier definitions of the term (e.g. Bell et al., 1982;

Dahlman and Westphal, 1982; Katz, 1976, 1987). In

addition, the paper uses a disaggregation of different

types of technological capability to describe paths

following the framework developed in Bell and Pavitt

(1995), adapted from Lall (1992). This framework 

was modified to examine technological capabilities in

steel firms, as indicated in Table 1.

The columns set out the technological capabilities

by function; the rows, by level of difficulty. They are

measured by the type of activity expressing the levels

of technological capability, in other words, the type of 

activity the company is able to do on its own at differ-

ent points in time. The framework consists of seven

levels of capability across five technological func-

tions: (i) facility user’s decision-making and control;

(ii) project engineering; (iii) process and production

organisation; (iv) product-centred; and (v) equipment.

Functions (i) and (ii) will be examined together under

the heading of ‘investments’.

In addition, the framework disaggregates ‘routine’

capability into Levels 1 and 2 for process and pro-duction organisation, product-centred, and equipment

activities: (i) the capability to operate steel facili-

ties on the basis of minimum accepted standards of 

efficiency in the industry, hereafter ‘routine basic

capability’; and (ii) the capability to operate steel

facilities on the basis of international standards, or

recognised international certification, hereafter ‘rou-

tine renewed capability’. This latter draws on the

definition of ‘enabling capability’ (Leonard-Barton,

1995). As far as routine capabilities for investments

Fig. 1. The study analytical framework.

are concerned, they are disaggregated into Levels 1–4.

‘Innovative’ capabilities are disaggregated into Levels

3–7 for process and production organisation, product-

centred, and equipment activities. Innovative capabili-ties for investments are disaggregated into Levels 5–7.

This study traces the paths over as long a period as

possible throughout the companies’ lifetime. This allo-

wed the rate of accumulation to be tackled, in other

words, the number of years needed to attain each level

and type of technological capability for different tech-

nological functions. The accumulation of a level of 

capability is identified when a company has achieved

the ability to do a technological activity that it had not

been able to do before. In addition, the paper takes

into account the building, accumulation, sustaining (or

weakening) of technological capability for different

technological functions, in other words, the consis-

tency of the paths.

As argued in Dosi (1985), there is a permanent

existence of asymmetries between firms in terms of 

their operational performance. Firms can be generally

ranked as ‘better’ or ‘worse’ according to their dis-

tance from the technological frontier. In other words,

inter-firm differences in performance are interpreted

as an implication of different accumulation of tech-

nological capabilities (Dosi, 1985, 1988). Operational

performance improvement is a critical issue for com-panies in general. The issue seems even more critical

for latecomer companies since they start with levels

of performance far below world standards. To catch

up with international levels of performance, their rates

of performance improvement have to grow faster than

the rates of companies operating at the technologi-

cal frontier. The achievement of world competitive

performance depends on how fast they accumulate

their technological capability (Bell et al., 1982; Bell

et al., 1995). Only a few studies in the LCL have

Page 7: Figueiredo 2002

8/8/2019 Figueiredo 2002

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/figueiredo-2002 7/22

P.N. Figueiredo / Research Policy 31 (2002) 73–94 79

investigated operational performance improvement

associated with the firms’ technological capability

(e.g. Hollander, 1965; Katz et al., 1978; Dahlman

and Fonseca, 1978; Bell et al., 1982; Mlawa, 1983;Tremblay, 1994). However, systematic inter-firm

comparative analysis of the implications of the way

and the rate of technological capability-accumulation

paths for inter-differences in operational performance

improvement has been scarce in both the LCL and

TFCL. This relationship form the basic analytical

framework of this study, as represented in Fig. 1.

It should be noted that the original study from

which this paper is derived (Figueiredo, 1999) analy-

sed how the key features of learning processes influ-

ence inter-firm differences in paths of technological

capability accumulation and, in turn, in operational

performance improvement. This paper, however, con-

centrates on the relationship between the last two

issues. 1 Inter-firm differences in paths of techno-

logical capability-accumulation are understood here

as a reflection of the inter-firm differences in the

underlying learning processes.

3. Research design and methods

Central to this paper are the implications of thetechnological capability-accumulation paths for the

inter-firm differences in operational performance

improvement. The research is based on comparative

in-depth case studies. The choice for this strategy

was conditioned by the need to tackle these issues

with an adequate level of detail over the long term.

In addition, careful selection of the case studies was

crucial to tackle these issues. The selection process

went through four stages, as described in more detail

elsewhere (Figueiredo, 1999): exploratory work, pilot

1 I am grateful to one of the anonymous referees for commenting

on the issues related to the focus of this paper. Indeed, the paper

is not addressing the knowledge generation activities. However,

these activities, which are an important part of the analysis, were

tackled in detail elsewhere (Figueiredo, 1999) as the underlying

learning processes. The framework for learning in that study

identifies four distinct processes: external and internal-knowledge

acquisition, knowledge-socialisation and knowledge-codification

processes. These are analysed on the basis of four features: va-

riety, intensity, functioning, and interaction. However, this issue

is beyond the scope of this paper.

work, main field work, and during the writing pro-

cess. As a result, the study concentrated on two of 

the largest flat steel companies in Brazil using similar

process technologies: Usinas Siderúrgicas de MinasGerais SA (USIMINAS) and Companhia Siderúrgica

Nacional SA (CSN).

To achieve a meaningful comparison of the techno-

logical capability-accumulation paths across the two

companies, the study drew on the framework in Table

1. Additionally, as the start-up dates and ages of the

case-study companies were different, a framework of 

three common phases was created: start-up and ini-

tial absorption phase, conventional expansion phase,

and liberalisation and privatisation phase. These

frameworks were the key methodological ‘tools’ to

implement research activities such as fieldwork plan-

ning, interview guide design, use of the information

sources, organisation and analysis of the fieldwork 

material, and the writing of the case studies. This

study is primarily based on empirical information

gathered from informants in different areas of two

large steel companies. Complementary information

was gathered from steel industry institutions in Brazil.

There were four sources of information within the

steel companies: open-ended interviews, casual con-

versations, direct-site observations and company’s

documentary archival records.The study involved more than 100 interviews in

both companies during the pilot study and main field-

work. The preparation for the fieldwork activities,

consisted of sending letters to the companies, logisti-

cal plan and the preparation of interview guides. A key

activity was the elaboration of the ‘research interme-

diate categories’. They were ‘intermediate’ because

their level of disaggregation was between the main

research questions and the interview questions. They

were built to clarify the ‘kinds of information’ needed

to illuminate the research questions. The way eachactivity was operationalised in the field (e.g. getting

started, doing the interviews, casual meetings, direct

site-observations, and decision to leave each company)

are outlined in detail elsewhere (Figueiredo, 1999).

The analysis of the empirical evidence started

during the fieldwork. A ‘memo-book’ was used where

‘notes for analysis’ were written on the basis of: (i) the

interview cards produced during the day; and (ii) the

notes on casual conversations and site-observations

(e.g. differences between companies, implications of 

Page 8: Figueiredo 2002

8/8/2019 Figueiredo 2002

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/figueiredo-2002 8/22

80 P.N. Figueiredo / Research Policy 31 (2002) 73–94

interviews and findings for the research questions, in-

sights for the study conclusions). Following the main

fieldwork, the analysis of the empirical evidence con-

sisted of a systematic building of analytical tables.Each table focused on one research issue in each

case-study company across time. These tables were

accompanied by short analytical texts. As the build-

ing of tables progressed, depth and level of detail of 

analysis of each variable increased.

This exercise evolved through four painstaking

stages permitting: (i) the identification of a different

evolution of the variables in each company; (ii) the

identification of relationships between variables with

an adequate level of accuracy; and (iii) the identi-

fication of the influence of the underlying learning

processes and intervening variables (e.g. external con-

ditions, leadership behaviour) on the paths. Addition-

ally, a systematic analysis of operational performance

improvement consisted of grouping and re-grouping

indicators into categories and contrasting them across

companies to highlight inter-firm differences. During

this stage, the combination of the quantitative with

the qualitative information was fruitful to interpret

the inter-firm differences. This process of analysis

permitted a reliable examination of the inter-firm dif-

ferences in the relationships between the variables to

make plausible interpretations and of the empiricalevidence.

Table 2

Differences in the rate of technological capability accumulation between USIMINAS (1962–1997) and CSN (1946–1997) a ,b,c

Capability levels Technological functions

Investments Process and production

organisation

Product-centred Equipment

USIMINAS CSN USIMINAS CSN USIMINAS CSN USIMINAS CSN

Routine

(1) Basic 10 15 10 45 10 40 10 20(2) Renewed 10 15 10 50 10 50 10 45

(3) Extra basic 10 20

(4) Pre-intermediate 25 40

Innovative

(3) Extra basic 10 45 10 40 10 15

(4) Pre-intermediate 25 50 15 45 20 40

(5) Intermediate 30 0 35 0 25 50 30 0

(6) High-intermediate 35 0 0 0 35 0 35 0

a Approximately the number of years needed to attain each level and type of capability.b Source: own elaboration based on the research.c In this case, the initial years refer to the operations start-up year.

4. Inter-firm differences in technological

capability-accumulation paths

This section compares the differences betweenUSIMINAS and CSN in the paths of technological

capability accumulation across four technological

functions: (i) investments (involving facility user’s

decision making and control and project planning and

implementation); (ii) process and production organ-

isation; (iii) product-centred; and (iv) equipment. In

the light of Table 1, this section begins by outlining

the inter-firm differences in the rates of technological

capability-accumulation, as indicated in Table 2.

In general, USIMINAS took 10 years to accumulate

Levels 1 and 2 across all four technological functions.

In parallel, USIMINAS proceeded, continuously, to

the accumulation of technological capability beyond

Level 4. Within 35 years USIMINAS had built up,

accumulated, and deepened innovative capability at

Level 5 (process and production organisation) and

Level 6 (investments, product-centred, and equip-

ment). In contrast, CSN took more than 45 years to

complete the accumulation of Levels 1 and 2 routine

capabilities, particularly for process and production

organisation and product-centred. During more than

40 years CSN did not move beyond the accumulation

of capability at Level 4, except for product-centredactivity. Inter-firm differences in the accumulation of 

Page 9: Figueiredo 2002

8/8/2019 Figueiredo 2002

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/figueiredo-2002 9/22

P.N. Figueiredo / Research Policy 31 (2002) 73–94 81

capability across the four technological functions are

discussed below in more detail.

4.1. Investments capability

USIMINAS followed a path of continuous accu-

mulation of capability from Levels 1–6. Although

USIMINAS did not move into the accumulation of 

Level 7, the company sought to deepen and routinise

Level 6 innovative capability. In contrast, CSN accu-

mulated investments capability at Level 4. During the

1990s both firms reduced their in-house investment

activities. USIMINAS moved into the deepening of a

strategic part of that capability (e.g. basic engineering

and overall project management). This permitted the

company to be in full control of strategic investment

activities and to increase the revenues from technical

assistance provided for other companies. The evi-

dence suggested that by the mid-1980s, CSN seemed

to aim for the accumulation of capability at Level 5.

However, during the 1990s, CSN went through a more

radical reduction in the in-house investment activities.

As a result, the company moved into a weaker posi-

tion in relation to USIMINAS as far as full control

and execution of strategic investment activities were

concerned.

4.2. Process and production organisation capability

USIMINAS moved from the accumulation of capa-

bility at Levels 1 and 2 to Level 5. However, USIM-

INAS was not so fast at accumulating capability for

processes as it was for products. Additionally, the

evidence suggested that in parallel with the accumu-

lation of innovative capabilities, USIMINAS routine

operating capability (Levels 1 and 2) was continu-

ously strengthened over time. As a result, much of 

the innovative activities (e.g. ‘capacity-stretching’or integrated automation) were supported by routine

capability for process and production organisation.

These activities were also associated with the capa-

bility for equipment and investments (Level 4). In

contrast, in CSN it was not until the early-1990s that

the accumulation of Levels 1 and 2 capability was

completed. This incomplete accumulation of basic

operating capabilities must have constrained CSN’s

efforts, during the 1950–1980s period, to move into

the accumulation of capability at Levels 3–4. It was

not until the 1990s that CSN moved into the accumu-

lation of capability at Level 4.

4.3. Product-centred capability

USIMINAS began by accumulating Levels 1 and

2 routine capability. In parallel, the company moved

into the accumulation and deepening of capability up

to Level 6. As USIMINAS proceeded into the accu-

mulation of innovative capability for products, the

company continuously strengthened capability at Lev-

els 1 and 2. The evidence suggested that USIMINAS

would not have achieved such a fast rate of product

development capability (Levels 5 and 6) if routine

capability at Levels 1 and 2 had not been adequately

accumulated. In contrast, in CSN, it was not until the

1990s that the accumulation of capability at Levels

1 and 2 for products was completed. Although CSN

sought to accumulate innovative capability for prod-

ucts (Level 4 beyond), this was achieved only slowly

and inconsistently. As suggested by the research, one

of the reasons for this inconsistency of accumulation

in CSN was the absence of an adequate accumulation

of capability at Levels 1 and 2.

4.4. Equipment capability

Both USIMINAS and CSN engaged in the accu-

mulation of Level 1 routine capability for equipment.

However, USIMINAS moved into the accumulation

of innovative capability up to Level 6. In contrast,

CSN accumulated capability up to Level 4. By the

late-1980s, both firms were affected by the crisis in

Brazil’s capital goods industry. As a result, by the

early-1990s, both had reduced their in-house equip-

ment activities. However, although USIMINAS redu-

ced the scale of equipment activities in relation to the

1980s, it engaged in deepening the strategic part of its capability (e.g. equipment basic engineering, large

equipment manufacturing, and technical assistance

in revamping engineering). In addition, USIMINAS

sought to stretch Levels 1 and 2 routine equipment

capability into the early stages of car-manufacturing.

In contrast, CSN adopted a more radical reduction

in its innovative equipment activities. Therefore, by

the 1990s, CSN had moved into a weaker position

in relation to USIMINAS, as far as capability for

equipment activities was concerned.

Page 10: Figueiredo 2002

8/8/2019 Figueiredo 2002

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/figueiredo-2002 10/22

82 P.N. Figueiredo / Research Policy 31 (2002) 73–94

5. Implications for inter-firm differences in

operational performance improvement

This section focuses on the inter-firm differencesin operational performance improvement between the

two case-study companies. The analysis draws on dif-

ferent indicators of performance in the two integrated

steel plants. The study combines descriptive quanti-

tative evidence with qualitative evidence to explain

inter-firm differences in operational performance

improvement. Most of these differences are expressed

in terms of changes in the level of indicators and

their rate of improvement. The inter-firm comparison

of the performance of individual facilities [blast fur-

nace (BF) and steel shop] is structured on the basis

of time-periods in the facilities’ lifetimes rather than

phases. The reason for this is that the operational

units started at different dates within and across the

two companies. However, as mentioned earlier, the

two companies have followed different paths of tech-

nological capability accumulation during the three

phases. Therefore, the analysis here also refers to

these phases. Specific procedures for comparison are

outlined in each subsection below.

The analysis of inter-firm differences in operational

performance is based here on 10 different indicators.

For space limits other four indicators are not shownhere, although they were analysed in the original

study (Figueiredo, 1999). These indicators are or-

ganised here in three groups: (i) ironmaking process

performance (Section 5.1 below); (ii) LD steelmaking

process performance (Section 5.2); and (iii) overall

plant performance (Section 5.3).

5.1. Inter-firm differences in the ironmaking

 process performance

This Section analyses the inter-firm differences inthe ironmaking process, particularly BF performance.

BF performance is normally examined on the basis

of three indicators: (i) coke rate (kg/t of pig iron); (ii)

BF productivity (t/m3 /day); and (iii) hot metal quality.

They are examined in Sections 5.1.1, 5.1.2, and 5.1.3,

respectively, followed by the role of technological

capability accumulation in influencing the inter-firm

differences in these indicators.

In order to provide a clear perspective of the evolu-

tion of these indicators, they are initially examined on

the basis of two time-periods: (i) the initial 10-year

period, covering the start-up year to the tenth year

of operation (Y 1–Y 10) approximately; and (ii) over a

longer period (Y 1 to 1989). In this way, the compar-ison will be roughly covering the start-up and initial

absorption phases. The indicators are then compared

during the 1990–1997 period. This period is related

to the liberalisation and privatisation phase. The com-

parison for coke rate and BF productivity takes into

consideration the change in the level of indicators and

the average annual rate of decline and/or increase (per-

cent/year). Although the three indicators are analysed

separately, this section interprets BF performance as

a whole, not on the basis of individual indicators. In

other words, it considers all three indicators to obtain

a meaningful inter-firm comparison.

5.1.1. Coke rate (kg/t of pig iron)

Coke rate is the amount of coke consumed per ton

of pig iron produced. It should be noted that coke is a

critical input into the BF. It represents about 70% of 

the total cost of raw materials. The coke rate level can

be affected by the vintage of the technology embod-

ied in the furnace. Additionally, the coke rate can be

affected, positively or negatively, by factors such as

coal quality, refractory conditions, process activities

(e.g. manipulation of the burden preparation and dis-tribution, etc.), and external conditions (e.g. strikes,

raw materials supply, energy crisis, etc.). Coke rate

tends to increase slowly during the BF campaign. This

is the result of natural alterations in the internal re-

fractories. Although today it would be recommended

to assess the fuel rate (coke+ injected fuel rates), this

Section analyses coke rates more systematically than

fuel rates. The comparisons are outlined below.

5.1.1.1. Blast furnace 1. The USIMINAS BF 1 was

built in the late-1950s, embodying a later vintage of technology than BF 1 at CSN, which had been built

in the early-1940s. Consequently, the initial levels of 

performance differed. However, the key issue here is

the rate of change from those differing initial lev-

els. The differences in coke and fuel rates decline

between USIMINAS and CSN for BF 1 are outlined in

Table 3.

It should be noted that during the 1970–1976

period, under the first energy crisis, the fuel rates in

USIMINAS declined from 561 to 479 kg or by 2.59%

Page 11: Figueiredo 2002

8/8/2019 Figueiredo 2002

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/figueiredo-2002 11/22

P.N. Figueiredo / Research Policy 31 (2002) 73–94 83

Table 3

Differences in coke and fuel rates decline between USIMINAS and CSN: blast furnace 1a

Periods Decline in the coke and

fuel rates level (kg/t)

Average annual rate of 

decline (percent/year)

USIMINAS

Coke rates BF 1 (1962–1972) 731–485 −4.02

BF 1 (1962–1989) 731–446 −1.81

BF 1 (1990–1997) 489–399 −2.86

Fuel rates BF 1 (1970–1976) 561–479 −2.59

CSNb

Coke rates BF 1 (1950–1960) 820–814 −0.07

BF 1 (1950–1989) 820–565 −0.95

BF 1 (1990–1991) 523–514 −1.70

Fuel rates BF 1 (1970–1976) 674–690 +0.39

a Source: own elaboration based on the research.b The years 1946–1949 and 1992 are not being considered. As mentioned in the company’s documents, during the 1940s CSN had

irregular coal supply. This probably had adverse effects on the coke rate level. In January 1992, the furnace was shut down permanently.

annually on average. In contrast, in CSN, the fuel rate

increased from 674 to 690 kg or by 0.39% annually. 2

5.1.1.2. Blast furnace 2. Again the initial levels of 

performance in USIMINAS’ 1965 vintage plant were

higher than in CSN’s 1954 vintage plant. However,

the subsequent rates of improvement differed. The

differences in coke rate decline between USIMINAS

and CSN for BF 2 are outlined in Table 4. It should

be remembered that during the 1970s both companies

were operating under the same energy crises.

5.1.1.3. Blast furnace 3. In this case, the vintages

of plant were similar, but the levels and rates of 

performance improvement differed across the two

companies. The differences in coke rate decline

between USIMINAS and CSN for BF 3 are outlined in

Table 5.

USIMINAS had continuously been achieving coke

rates below 500 kg since 1972. In contrast, it was

not until 1992 that CSN began to achieve coke ratesbelow 500 kg continuously. From the companies’ age

perspective, in USIMINAS coke rates below that level

were achieved from the age of 10. In contrast, in

CSN they were achieved only from the age of 46.

2 Data related to fuel rates were obtained from: (i) USIMINAS;

Dados operacionais dos Altos Fornos, setembro 1997, the Technical

Information Centre, and interviews in the company; (ii) CSN,

Historico da Produção (Setor Aço), 1996, and interviews in the

company.

In CSN, higher rates of coke rate decline were only

achieved during the 1992–1997 period. Indeed, during

the 1980s, and particularly during the 1990s, CSN BF

3 even outperformed USIMINAS’ in the rate of coke

rate decline.

The fast rate at which coke rates have declined

in USIMINAS has permitted the company to catch

up earlier than CSN with world standards. By the

late-1970s, when USIMINAS was 16 years of age,

its coke rates were between 430–466 kg, while theaverage coke rates in Japan were 425–430 kg and

in Germany 490 kg. 3 In contrast, by the late-1970s,

when CSN was 33 years of age, its coke rates were still

between 513–643 kg. By 1988–1989, at the age of 27,

USIMINAS’ coke rate was in line with those of Japan

(around 470 kg). 4 In contrast, it was not until the early

1990s that CSN achieved internationally competitive

coke rates below 400 kg, as in the case of BF 3.

5.1.2. Blast furnace productivity (t/m3 /day)

This Section examines the inter-firm differences inBF productivity. This is defined as tonnes of pig iron

produced per m3 of the internal volume of the furnace

in a day. There are other definitions for BF produc-

tivity (e.g. useful volume), but this study follows the

definition used in the case-study companies. The inter-

firm comparisons across the three BFs are outlined

below.

3 See CEPAL (1984, p. 132).4 See Piccinini (1993, p. 405).

Page 12: Figueiredo 2002

8/8/2019 Figueiredo 2002

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/figueiredo-2002 12/22

84 P.N. Figueiredo / Research Policy 31 (2002) 73–94

Table 4

Differences in coke and fuel rates decline between USIMINAS and CSN: blast furnace 2a

Periods Decline in the coke and

fuel rates level (kg/t)

Average annual rate of 

decline (percent/year)

USIMINASb

Coke rates BF 2 (1965–1974) 612–468 −2.93

BF 2 (1965–1989) 612–446 −1.31

BF 2 (1990–1997) 491–397 −2.99

Fuel rates BF 2 (1970–1974) 571–511 −2.73

BF 2 (1970–1978) 571–479 −2.17

BF 2 (1980–1989) 486–446 −0.95

BF 2 (1991–1997) 486–500 +0.47

CSNc

Coke rates BF 2 (1954–1964) 809–657 −2.06

BF 2 (1954–1989) 809–562 −1.03

BF 2 (1990–1997) 542–412−

3.8Fuel rates BF 2 (1970–1974) 612–598 −0.57

BF 2 (1970–1976) 612–629 +0.45

BF 2 (1982–1989) 553–562 +0.23

BF 2 (1991–1997) 494–523 +0.95

a Source: own elaboration based on the research.b The furnace was shut down for revamping during the 1975–1977 period.c The furnace was shut down for revamping and reconstruction during the 1977–1981 period.

Table 5

Differences in coke and fuel rates decline between USIMINAS and CSN: blast furnace 3a ,b

Periods Decline in the coke and

fuel rates level (kg/t)

Average annual rate of 

decline (percent/year)

USIMINAS

Coke rates BF 3 (1975–1979) 486–466 −1.04

BF 3 (1975–1989) 486–491 +0.07

BF 3 (1980–1989) 529–491 −0.82

BF 3 (1990–1997) 492–407 −2.67

Fuel rates BF 3 (1975–79) 519–508 −0.53

BF 3 (1975–1989) 519–491 −0.39

BF 3 (1980–1989) 533–491 −0.90

BF 3 (1995–1997) 511–510 −0.09

CSN

Coke rates BF 3 (1977–1979) 509–513 +0.39

BF 3 (1977–1989) 509–475 −0.57

BF 3 (1980–1989) 499–475 −0.54

BF 3 (1990–1997) 492–386 −3.4

Fuel rates BF 3 (1977–1979) 509–520 +1.07

BF 3 (1977–1989) 509–496 −0.21

BF 3 (1980–1989) 500–496 −0.08

BF 3 (1995–1997) 489–508 +1.92

a Source: own elaboration based on the research.b For a meaningful comparison, and since the furnaces started in December 1974 in USIMINAS and in May 1976 in CSN, their start-up

years are not considered.

Page 13: Figueiredo 2002

8/8/2019 Figueiredo 2002

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/figueiredo-2002 13/22

P.N. Figueiredo / Research Policy 31 (2002) 73–94 85

Table 6

Differences in BF productivity increase between USIMINAS and

CSN: blast furnace 1a

Periods Increase in the

productivity

level (t/m3 /day)

Average annual

rate of increase

(percent/year)

USIMINAS

BF 1 (1962–1972) 0.57–1.45 +9.78

BF 1 (1962–1989) 0.57–2.47 +5.58

BF 1 (1990–1997) 1.9–2.24 +2.38

CSNb

BF 1 (1950–1960) 0.79–0.87 +0.96

BF 1 (1950–1989) 0.79–1.36 +1.40

BF 1 (1990–1991) 1.33–1.30 −2.25

a Source: own elaboration based on the research.b In January 1992 the furnace was shut down permanently.

5.1.2.1. Blast furnace 1. The differences in produc-

tivity increase between USIMINAS and CSN for BF

1 are outlined in Table 6. It should be noted that dur-

ing the 1946–1956 period, CSN’s BF 1 went through

three campaigns. In January 1949, its first campaign

was interrupted by a crack in the crucible. In October

1949, its second campaign was again interrupted

and by a similar problem. Its third campaign (1949–

1955) was limited by problems in the top and in the

crucible. 5 USIMINAS’ BF 1 went through one cam-

paign within the initial 9-year period 1962–1971, 6

without the frequent stoppages that took place in

CSN. These stoppages in CSN, which may reflect

inadequate process and production organisation and

equipment capabilities, clearly had negative implica-

tions for BF productivity.

5.1.2.2. Blast furnace 2. The differences in produc-

tivity increase between USIMINAS and CSN for BF 2

are outlined in Table 7. In USIMINAS over the 24-year

period 1965–1989, productivity increased from 0.77

to 2.47 t/m3 /day or by 4.97% annually on average. Incontrast, in CSN during the 35-year period 1954–1989,

productivity increased from 0.59 to 0.94 t/m3  /day or

by only 1.34% annually, more than three times less

than the rate of improvement in USIMINAS. It should

be remembered that these periods were equivalent to

the start-up and conventional expansion phases in both

5 See CSN, Historico da produção do Setor Aço, 1996, op. cit.6 See USIMINAS, Dados operacionais dos Altos Fornos, 1997,

op. cit.

Table 7

Differences in BF productivity increase between USIMINAS and

CSN: blast furnace 2a

Periods Increase in the

productivity

level (t/m3 /day)

Average annual

rate of increase

(percent/year)

USIMINAS

BF 2 (1965–1974)b 0.77–1.41 +6.95

BF 2 (1965–1989) 0.77–2.47 +4.97

BF 2 (1990–1997) 1.81–2.30 +3.48

CSN

BF 2 (1954–1964) 0.59–0.87 +3.96

BF 2 (1954–1989) 0.59–0.94 +1.34

BF 2 (1990–1997) 0.97–2.46 +14.21

a Source: own elaboration based on the research.b Shut down for revamping between 1975 and 1977.

companies. In addition, during the 1990–1997 period,

CSN BF 2 substantially outperformed USIMINAS’ in

the rate of productivity increase.

5.1.2.3. Blast furnace 3. The differences in produc-

tivity increase between USIMINAS and CSN for BF

3, a similar vintage plant, are outlined in Table 8.

Performance of BF 3 is compared here under sim-

ilar time periods. In USIMINAS during the 4-year

initial period 1975–1979 productivity increased from

1.60 to 1.79 t/m3  /day or by 2.84% annually. In CSN,

during the initial 1977–1979 period productivity

dramatically increased from 1.29 to 1.58 t/m3 /day or

Table 8

Differences in BF productivity increase between USIMINAS and

CSN: blast furnace 3a ,b

Periods Increase in the

productivity

level (t/m3 /day)

Average annual

rate of increase

(percent/year)

USIMINAS

BF 3 (1975–1979) 1.60–1.79+

2.84BF 3 (1975–1989) 1.60–2.56 +3.41

BF 3 (1980–1989) 1.69–2.56 +4.72

BF 3 (1990–1997) 2.12–2.47 +2.20

CSN

BF 3 (1977–1979) 1.29–1.58 +10.67

BF 3 (1977–1989) 1.29–1.61 +1.86

BF 3 (1980–1989) 1.74–1.61 −0.85

BF 3 (1990–1997) 1.61–2.38 +5.74

a Source: own elaboration based on the research.b Again, for a meaningful comparison, the start-up year of the

two furnaces are not considered.

Page 14: Figueiredo 2002

8/8/2019 Figueiredo 2002

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/figueiredo-2002 14/22

86 P.N. Figueiredo / Research Policy 31 (2002) 73–94

by 10.67% annually on average. Despite this substan-

tial rate of increase, the level of productivity of the

similar vintage plant in the 1970s in CSN was still

inferior to USIMINAS’.During the 1990s in USIMINAS productivity

increased from 2.12 to 2.47 t/m3 /day or by 2.20% on

average. In CSN, it was not until 1993 that the fur-

nace began to achieve productivity above 2 t/m3 /day.

Productivity in BF 3 increased from 1.61 in 1990

to 2.38 t/m3  /day in 1997, or by 5.74% on average.

Although in the 1990s CSN BF 3 achieved this high

rate of increase, CSN could still not catch up with the

level of USIMINAS (2.47 t/m3 /day). In CSN, as was

the case in BF 1, BF 3 suffered from sudden stop-

pages and unstable production operations, particularly

during the 1980s. Indeed, 1997 was the first year, it

operated continuously. This might have been associ-

ated with difficulties in stabilising its operations, and

significantly influenced the decline in productivity

during the 1980s.

By the late-1970s, at the age of 17, USIMI-

NAS had achieved BF productivity of 1.8 t/m3 /day,

while the average productivity in Japan in 1981 was

1.9 t/m3 /day. 7 By that time, at the age of 33, CSN had

achieved BF productivity of only 1.0 t/m3 /day. From

the companies’ age perspective, USIMINAS began

to operate with BF productivity above 1.5 t/m3 /dayfrom the age of 10. In contrast, CSN began to oper-

ate continuously with productivity above 1.5 t/m3 /day

only from the age of 41. By 1991 BF productivity

in the 29-year-old USIMINAS was 2.35 t/m3 /day on

average, while in the Japanese Kiaitsu average produc-

tivity was 2.28 t/m3  /day in that same year. 8 In 1991,

average BF productivity in Japan was 2.03 t/m3 /day.

In June 1994, USIMINAS achieved a world record

of 2.71 t/m3 /day. In contrast, in 1991, the 45-year-old

CSN had achieved average BF productivity around

1.5 t/m

3

  /day. The evidence suggests that USIMINAShad been able to achieve and sustain internationally

competitive levels of BF productivity over time. In

contrast, CSN did not achieve world standards until

1992. Therefore, USIMINAS was faster than CSN in

achieving substantial improvements in BFs produc-

tivity and sustaining them at rising world competitive

levels over time.

7 For data on the Japanese mills see Gupta et al. (1995).8 See Gupta et al. (1995).

Table 9

Differences in silicon (Si) content in the pig iron between USIM-

INAS and CSNa

Periods Silicon content in the pig iron (%): average

USIMINAS CSN

1962–1969 0.89 N.A.

1970s 0.67 0.80

1980s 0.52 0.80

1990–1997 0.41 0.45

a Source: USIMINAS and CSN.

5.1.3. Hot metal quality

This Section examines the inter-firm differences in

the hot metal quality on the basis of silicon (Si) content

(%) in the pig iron. The Si content is associated with

the consumption of fuel in the BF. Reduction in Si

content is associated with the operational stability of 

the BF which, in turn, is associated with the good

quality of the metallic charge. High hot metal silicon

levels have an adverse influence on BF productivity,

flux use, and also steelmaking process yield. Thus,

steel mills seek to reduce Si content. The assessment

of hot metal quality may also include the sulphur (S)

and phosphorous (P) contents in pig iron, but these

are not explored in this study. The differences between

USIMINAS and CSN are summarised in Table 9.It should be remembered that by the late-1970s both

companies were operating under the second world

energy crisis. This put pressure on energy consump-

tion world-wide, reflected in the Si content. However,

the evidence suggests that the Si content declined in

USIMINAS but remained unchanged in CSN.

In sum, during the lifetime of the three BFs USIMI-

NAS was able to combine a fast rate of decline in coke

rate (except in BF 3) with a fast rate of increase in pro-

ductivity and fast rate of decline in Si content. These

achievements certainly had positive implications forother indicators (e.g. overall energy consumption). In

contrast, in CSN, particularly during the 1950s–1980s

period, the BFs experienced slow rates of coke rate

decline (except for BF 3), a slow rate of productiv-

ity increase, and a slow rate of Si content decline.

This must have had negative implications for overall

energy consumption and steelmaking process yield in

CSN. It was not until the 1990s, and particularly from

1992 that BFs performance improved substantially in

CSN. Indeed, in the 1990s CSN even outperformed

Page 15: Figueiredo 2002

8/8/2019 Figueiredo 2002

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/figueiredo-2002 15/22

P.N. Figueiredo / Research Policy 31 (2002) 73–94 87

USIMINAS in terms of the rate of coke rate decline in

BF 2 and 3, and productivity increase in BF 2. How-

ever, over the long term, and on the basis of the three

indicators (including fuel rates), USIMINAS had asubstantially better overall BF performance than CSN.

Those indicators can be affected by a number of 

factors, which may even obscure the role of tech-

nological capability. For instance, they can be influ-

enced by the vintage of plant, the conditions of the

refractories, the quality of the raw materials (coal),

the supply of raw materials (local or foreign), energy

crises, strikes among others. The coke consumption

may also be reduced through the use of the Pulverised

Coal Injection (PCI) technology or use of imported

coal. Even so, the role of technological capability can

be explored.

The evidence suggests that the period during which

CSN did not accumulate adequate in-house techno-

logical capability for process and production organ-

isation, particularly at Levels 1 and 2 (1940–1980s),

was associated with slow rate of performance im-

provement in the ironmaking process performance.

However, the period in which CSN began to accumu-

late Levels 1 and 2 routine and then Levels to 3–4

innovative capabilities for process and production

organisation (from the early-1990s) was associated

with better performance improvement. USIMINAS,however, had achieved competitive performance ear-

lier and more continuously over its lifetime. In sum,

USIMINAS’ experience suggests that CSN could have

achieved better performance over the 1950–1980s

period if the company had accumulated adequate

in-house technological capability.

5.2. Inter-firm differences in the LD steelmaking

 process performance

This Section analyses the inter-firm differences inthe LD steelmaking process performance in USIMI-

NAS (1963–1997) and CSN (1977–1997). In USIM-

INAS there are Steel Shops 1 and 2. In CSN, it is

considered as one Steel Shop, but this Section exam-

ines the performance of the Steel Shop as a whole.

The comparison is based on periods over the lifetime

of the plants. They cover the periods 1963–1976,

1977–1989, and 1990–1997 for USIMINAS, and

1977–1989 and 1990–1997 for CSN. This is to make

the comparison more meaningful.

One initial comment is important at this stage: the

levels of the performance indicators used here are

much less determined by the level of technology em-

bodied in the vintage of plant. Indeed, the level of theindicators is more influenced by the daily operational

practices—technical and organisational -in the Steel

Shop. This Section reviews three key indicators of 

the LD steelmaking process: ‘tap-to-tap’ or heat time

(min); 9 re-blow rate (%); 10 and hit rate (%) or rate

of simultaneous achievement of carbon and tempera-

ture. 11 Since they are inter-related, the indicators are

analysed together.

5.2.1. Differences in the LD steelmaking process

 performance between USIMINAS (1963–1997)

and CSN (1977–1997)

The inter-firm differences across the indicators are

summarised in Table 10. In USIMINAS, the improve-

ments over time in the tap-to-tap and re-blow rates

during the 1963–1997 period may reflect the increase

in the hit rate from 36 to 85–90% during that period.

The evidence from USIMINAS indicates a substantial

performance improvement across the three indicators

during the lifetime of the Steel Shop. Although data

on hit rates in CSN is not available, the evidence on

tap-to-tap and re-blow rates suggest that its hit rates

would be much lower than in USIMINAS over thelifetime of the Steel Shop. Considering the average

ratio of the levels of re-blow rates in USIMINAS and

CSN for the 1990–1997 period, the rates in CSN were

2.7 times higher than in USIMINAS. This implies that

CSN must have accumulated higher production costs

9 The elapsed time, in minutes, between the heats in the LD

converter.10 The proportion of heats that needs to be re-blown by oxygen

for correction in the steel composition and/or temperature. In aSteel Shop, following the analysis of the molten steel samples

from the LD converter, it is decided whether to tap the heat or

to make corrections. If corrections are needed, they can be made

(a) through oxygen re-blowing; (b) through the addition of metals

(e.g. manganese) preceded by cooling procedures.11 The proportion of heats in which the steel composition

(carbon) and temperature, desired by the heat order, is simulta-

neously achieved at the heat end-point. A critical task for any

oxygen-based Steel Shop is to achieve high hit rates to prevent

time-consuming and costly oxygen re-blows or cooling procedures.

These add costly minutes to the heat time reducing the potential

productivity of the process.

Page 16: Figueiredo 2002

8/8/2019 Figueiredo 2002

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/figueiredo-2002 16/22

88 P.N. Figueiredo / Research Policy 31 (2002) 73–94

Table 10

Differences between USIMINAS and CSN in key steel making

process indicatorsa

Companies Tap-to-tap

(min)

Re-blow

rate (%)

Hit rate

(%)

USIMINAS

USI (1963–1976) 45–40 25–20 36–48

USI (1977–1989) 40–32 20–10 48–85

USI (1990–1997) 32 10–6 85–90

CSN

CSN (1978–1989) 62.3–38.4 36–25 N.A

CSN (1990–1997) 35–34 25–16.7b N.A.

a Sources: USIMINAS, ‘USIMINAS 25 anos’, Metalurgia

ABM, 1987, op. cit. USIMINAS [Aciaria: controle dinâmico de

fim de sopro com sublança (undated)]. Interviews in the company.

CSN, Historico da Produção: Setor Aço, 1996; ‘CSN atinge a

marca historica dos 100 milhões’, Metalurgia & Materiais, 1997,op. cit. Interviews in the company.

b Up to May 1997.

than in USIMINAS as a result of greater use of oxy-

gen, fluxes, and coolants associated with re-blows.

As mentioned earlier in the paper, Si content in the

pig iron also has an adverse influence on the steel-

making process yield. While USIMINAS entered into

the 1990s with a Si content of 0.36–0.40%, CSN’s

averaged 0.60%. This suggests that USIMINAS ente-

red into the 1990s with higher yield in the steelmak-

ing process than CSN. Additionally, in USIMINAS

the consumption of the refractories (kg/t of molten

steel) in Steel Shop 2 in 1989 was 1.9 kg/t of steel.

By 1993, it had declined to 0.69 kg/t and 0.65 kg/t in

1994. In contrast, in CSN in 1989 consumption was

9 kg/t of steel. By 1993, this had declined to only

7.3 kg/t of steel. This was the lowest level of refrac-

tories consumption CSN ever achieved, but it was

still more than 10 times higher than in USIMINAS.

These differences had positive implications for the

cost of steel produced in USIMINAS and a negative

influence on steelmaking costs in CSN.It should be remembered that during the initial

4-year period 1963–1967, USIMINAS controlled

the process parameters manually. During 1968–1975

period that control was based on the ‘catch-carbon’

strategy. 12 Nevertheless, several technical and

12 ‘Catch-carbon’ is an operational procedure whereby the desired

level of carbon is achieved by blowing oxygen to oxidise the

carbon during the steelmaking process. As a result, it brings the

carbon down to the desired level, say, 0.4% when it is ‘caught’.

production organisation modifications contributed to

improving the process parameters. Drawing on Levels

3 and 4 investment capabilities to search and select

technologies, USIMINAS introduced in 1976 the‘static charge control’. 13 This was in operation un-

til 1982. Drawing on Level 4 innovative capability,

USIMINAS developed in-house (by the Automa-

tion Unit, the Research Centre, and the Steel Shop)

mathematical models for this control system. This

contributed to the rapid decline in the tap-to-tap and

re-blow rates in the first year of the introduction of 

this automated process control system.

The improvements over time in the strategies for

process control, reflect USIMINAS’ Levels 4 and

5 innovative capability for process and production

organisation. They also reflect USIMINAS’ Levels

5 and 6 innovative capabilities for investments. The

achievement of low consumption of refractories in

USIMINAS was associated with efforts to increase

the lifetime of the refractory lining of the converters.

These are associated with techniques for preventive

and/or corrective maintenance and improvements

in the operating conditions, among others. In other

words, they reflect the accumulation of capability for

equipment and process and production organisation.

The evidence from CSN suggests that these techniques

had not been developed. In contrast, by the 1990s,USIMINAS had been providing technical assistance

in steelmaking process control across Latin America.

The evidence suggests that the slow rate of improve-

ment in the steelmaking performance in CSN during

the 1970 to early 1990s period was associated with:

(i) lack of organisational units to develop in-house

process control systems and mathematical models;

(ii) poor interaction between the Steel Shop and the

Research Centre for process problem-solving; and

(iii) the long time taken to improve the daily produc-

tion organisation practices in the Steel Shop, althoughit was technically assisted during 1985–1989 period.

In other words, USIMINAS’ experience suggests that

a more effective steelmaking process control could

have been achieved earlier in CSN if the company

13 The ‘static charge control’ strategy is based on statistical,

predictive–adaptive control from static models. This control seeks

to prescribe the adequate combination of the charge materials (e.g.

hot metal, scrap, fluxes, and oxygen) required to meet the endpoint

conditions.

Page 17: Figueiredo 2002

8/8/2019 Figueiredo 2002

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/figueiredo-2002 17/22

P.N. Figueiredo / Research Policy 31 (2002) 73–94 89

had accumulated Levels 1–4 capability for process

and production organisation during the 1970–1980s.

5.3. Inter-firm differences in overall plant  performance

This Section examines the inter-firm differences in

overall plant performance in USIMINAS and CSN on

the basis of four additional indicators.

5.3.1. Overall energy consumption (Mcal/t of steel)

This refers to the overall energy consumption in the

plant in relation to tonnes of steel produced. The dif-

ferences between USIMINAS and CSN are outlined

in Table 11. During the whole period in USIMINASthe indicator was stabilised around 6.200 Mcal/t. In

contrast, in CSN it varied more frequently reaching

the peak of 7.684 Mcal/t in 1984. In CSN, the con-

sumption in 1979 was considered a ‘record’ in the

company. Although data for the previous period is

not available, this suggests that consumption would

be higher. The stable trajectory of the indicator in

USIMINAS suggests that the company had a more

effective energy performance than CSN over time. 14

Differences in overall energy consumption (Mcal/t)

clearly reflects the fast accumulation of higher levels

of capability for process control in USIMINAS in con-trast to CSN. For instance, by the mid-1980s, USIM-

INAS engaged in efforts to build the Energy Centre

within the plant. This organisational unit sought to

improve the energy performance of the company. It

should be noted that a large part of the structuring of 

that unit was done by USIMINAS independently. The

evidence from CSN suggests that systematic in-house

efforts for energy efficiency improvement over the

1970–1980s were limited. It was not until the 1990s

that the company engaged in more effective efforts to

reduce energy consumption.The evidence in this Section suggests that the more

effective performance of USIMINAS in relation to

CSN in overall energy consumption reflects their

differences in ironmaking and steelmaking processes

performance, as examined earlier. In addition, differ-

ences in the overall energy performance would have

14 USIMINAS’ more effective overall energy performance in

relation to Companhia Siderurgica Paulista (COSIPA) during the

1977–1991 period was analysed in Piccinini (1993).

Table 11

Differences in overall energy consumption (Mcal/t steel) between

USIMINAS (1977–1997) and CSN (1979–1998)a ,b

Year USIMINAS CSN Difference(CSN in relation

to USIMINAS) (%)

1977 6319 N.A –

1978 6222 N.A. –

1979 6371 7264 +14

1980 6461 6582 +1.8

1981 6851 6458 −5.7

1982 6453 7092 +9.9

1983 6225 6870 +10.3

1984 6105 7684 +25.8

1985 6069 7085 +16.7

1986 6349 6944 +9.3

1987 6206 6757 +8.8

1988 5764 7138 +23.8

1989 5646 7446 +31.8

Average annual

rate of decline

(%): 1979–1989

−1.20 +0.25

1990 6144 7584 +23.4

1991 5927 7360 +24.1

1992 6071 6756 +11.2

1993 6073 6752 +11.1

1994 6045 6749 +11.6

1995 6138 6944 +13.1

1996 6153 6863 +11.5

1997 6273 6634 +5.7

1998 N.A. 6696 –

Average annual

rate of decline

(%): 1990s

+0.29 −1.54

a Sources: USIMINAS, interview with a manager in the Energy

and Utilities Unit (Energy Centre); Technical Information Centre;

annual reports (1976–1990). CSN, interview with the adviser to

the director of the steel sector; annual reports (1975–1993).b Data for USIMINAS was provided as Mcal/t of crude steel

and for CSN as Mcal/t of molten steel. Since production volume

expressed in the latter form is slightly higher than the former, this

difference would be reflected in the data for CSN.

had greater positive implications for operating cost

reduction in USIMINAS than in CSN.

5.3.2. Labour productivity (t/man/year)

This refers to the number of operational employ-

ees in relation to the tonnes of steel produced in a

year. The evolution of the indicator is summarised

in Table 12. By the late-1980s, at 26 years of age,

USIMINAS had achieved labour productivity of 

347 t/man/year, therefore, catching up with, and even

Page 18: Figueiredo 2002

8/8/2019 Figueiredo 2002

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/figueiredo-2002 18/22

90 P.N. Figueiredo / Research Policy 31 (2002) 73–94

Table 12

Comparative evolution of labour productivity in USIMINAS and

CSNa

Companies Periods Evolution of  

labour productivity

(t/man/year)

USIMINAS 1963–1970 15–164

1971–1980 185–263

1981–1989 182–382

1990–1997 300–524

CSN 1950–1970 32–75

1972–1980 73–83

1982–1989 97–155

1990–1997 160–542

a Sources: companies’ annual reports.

overcoming, indicators achieved in France (386), US(429), Japan (351), and Germany (316). 15 In con-

trast, CSN by the late-1980s was 43 years of age and

had achieved productivity of 155 t/man/year. How-

ever, it was not until 1996 that CSN achieved produc-

tivity of 406 t/man/year. By 1996, USIMINAS had

achieved labour productivity of 492 t/man/year. Dur-

ing the 1990s, both companies reduced their number

of employees thereby contributing to increasing the

indicator level. For instance, during the 1990–1996

period USIMINAS reduced its number of employees

from 13 413 to 9210 or by 31.3%. During that sameperiod, CSN reduced its number of employees from

18 222 to 11 086, or by 39.1%. 16

From 1996 to 1997, the number of employees in

USIMINAS reduced from 9210 to 8359 or by 9.7%.

Interviews in CSN suggested that particularly from

1996, the company adopted a more radical approach

to the reduction of its employees: from 11 086 in

1996 to 9059 in 1997, or by 18.2%. CSN’s approach

to reductions in the number of employees did not

seem to consider the loss of qualified and experienced

individuals, in other words, the implications for the

company of the loss of tacit knowledge.

5.3.3. Number of patents

During the initial 20-year period 1962–1982,

USIMINAS had accumulated 83 patents, while

15 See ’The Brazilian Steel Institute, 1989. See also M.Sc. disser-

tation in Peixoto (1990).16 USIMINAS: annual reports, 1990–1996; Technical Information

Centre; CSN: annual reports; ‘Average operational productivity

1989–1997’ (one page, undated).

CSN had accumulated only one. During the 14-year

period 1983-1997, USIMINAS had accumulated 250

patents, with 23 overseas across 18 different coun-

tries. In contrast, during the 1983–1997 period, CSNhad accumulated 46 patents in Brazil only. These dif-

ferences reflect the differences in intensity and variety

in the original improvements to production process

control, equipment, products, and engineering across

the plant. They may also reflect the inter-firm differ-

ences in efforts on the underlying knowledge-sharing

and knowledge-codification processes, as analysed in

detail elsewhere (Figueiredo, 1999).

5.3.4. Number of product quality certificates

During the 27-year period 1962–1989, USIMINAS

accumulated 15 product quality certificates. In con-

trast, no certificate had been accumulated in CSN

during the 45-year 1946–1991 period. During the

1990–1997 period, USIMINAS obtained 26 new

certificates leading to the total of 41 certificates

accumulated over its lifetime. In contrast, it was not

until 1992 that CSN achieved its first certificate.

During the 1992–1997 period, only seven certifi-

cates were accumulated over the company’s lifetime.

The number of certificates in USIMINAS during the

early years reflects the continuous improvements in

in-house quality systems. In other words, it reflectsthe accumulation and strengthening of Levels 1 and 2

capability for products and processes and production

organisation. In CSN, the absence of quality certifi-

cates in the 1940–1980s period reflects the incom-

plete accumulation of those types of capability during

that period. However, the award of seven certificates

during the 1990s for CSN reflects the improvements

across its production lines as a result of the TQM

programme.

The evidence suggests that the achievements of 

competitive product-related performance (e.g. numberof product quality certificates) in USIMINAS were

strongly associated with the accumulation of product

capability at Levels 1 and 2 and Levels 3–4 within

10 years (e.g. continuous upgrading of its quality

systems). In CSN, the improvement in the number of 

quality certificates during the 1990s was strongly asso-

ciated with the completion of accumulation of Levels

1 and 2 and also innovative Levels 3–4 capability

for products (e.g. the TQM programme and efforts to

improve product quality control in the rolling mills).

Page 19: Figueiredo 2002

8/8/2019 Figueiredo 2002

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/figueiredo-2002 19/22

P.N. Figueiredo / Research Policy 31 (2002) 73–94 91

Table 13

Operational income margin (%)a in USIMINAS and CSN during the 1982–1990 periodb

Companies 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

USIMINAS (1.0) 8.5 19.9 23.2 9.7 13.0 8.0 31.8 19.7CSN (14) (25) (9) (2.5) N.A. N.A. (44.1) (2.5) (78.1)

a Operating income/net sales. Numbers in brackets mean negative OIM; N.A.: not available.b Sources: USIMINAS, annual reports (1982–1990); CSN, annual reports (1982–1990).

Table 14

Key financial differences between USIMINAS and CSN in their privatisation processesa

Details USIMINASb CSNc Ratio USIMINAS/CSN

Sale proceeds (US$ million)d 1941 1495 1.29

Installed capacity in the year of privatisation (million tonnes) 4.2e 4.6f  0.91

Crude steel production volume in the year of privatisation (million tonnes) 4.1 4.3 0.95Sale proceeds/installed capacity (US$ million) 462 325 1.42

Sale proceeds/crude steel production volume (US$ million) 473 347 1.36

a Sources: BNDES (1994, 1999), USIMINAS (annual reports 1990–1991 and the Technical Information Centre); CSN (annual reports,

1992–1994).b Privatised in April 1991. The second phase of the privatisation process was completed in September 1994.c Privatised in October 1993.d It should be noted that during the main privatisation auction (April 1991), USIMINAS was sold at a price 14.3% higher than the

minimum price fixed by BNDES. In contrast, CSN was sold at the minimum price.e That refers to the ‘stretched’ capacity. The nominal capacity was 3.5 million tonnes/year.f  That refers also to nominal capacity.

However, these improvements took place in CSNmuch later than in USIMINAS. Nevertheless, during

the 1990s, CSN showed substantial improvements

across a number of indicators, which were associated

with the accumulation of levels of technological capa-

bility that the company had not accumulated before.

5.4. Some implications for inter-firm differences in

  financial performance

Although this study did not explore improvements

in production costs, it suggests that differences insome indicators of operational performance could have

affected production costs differently in USIMINAS

and CSN. These effects may have been reflected in

the operating income margin (OIM) of these compa-

nies. 17 For instance, during the 1980s, USIMINAS

went through a sequence of positive OIMs. In con-

trast, during this same period, CSN went through a

17 Operating income margin = operating income/net sales.

sequence of 8 years of negative OIMs, as indicated inTable 13.

As pointed out in the annual report of CSN for

1990, the company had an average negative OIM

equivalent to US$ 314 million/year during the 8-year

period 1982–1990. In contrast, as indicated in Table

13, USIMINAS experienced more effective financial

performance during that period. By the 1980s, USIM-

INAS had consolidated its leading position in terms

of financial performance among the state-owned steel

companies in Brazil. It was not until 1991 that CSN

engaged in continuous achievement of positive OIMs.Over the 1990s, USIMINAS continued achieving

positive OIMs.

The inter-firm differences in operational perfor-

mance improvement also seem to have been reflected

in the final prices at which the two companies were

sold in their privatisation processes. USIMINAS was

privatised in October 1991 and CSN in April 1993. On

the basis of data from the National Bank for Economic

and Social Development (BNDES), the organisation

responsible for the privatisation programme in Brazil,

Page 20: Figueiredo 2002

8/8/2019 Figueiredo 2002

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/figueiredo-2002 20/22

92 P.N. Figueiredo / Research Policy 31 (2002) 73–94

the proceeds from the sale of USIMINAS were US$

1.941 billion and of CSN were US$ 1.495 billion. 18

Table 14 outlines the key financial differences between

the two companies in their privatisation process.As indicated in Table 14, USIMINAS’ assets were

given a market value nearly 45% higher (US$ 462

million/t of installed capacity) than CSN’s assets

(US$ 325 million/t of installed capacity). It is rea-

sonable to consider that a large part of this difference

reflected the greater knowledge that was embodied

in USIMINAS’ physical, human and organisational

capital. In a similar vein, one might reasonably argue

that if CSN had accumulated knowledge as effec-

tively as USIMINAS over preceding decades, and had

embodied it effectively in physical capital, people,

organisation and procedures, it might have increased

the market value of its assets by as much as US$ 630

million.

6. Conclusions

This paper has explored the role of technological

capability accumulation in influencing the differences

between USIMINAS and CSN across different in-

dicators of operational performance improvement.

In sum, the experience of USIMINAS suggests thatif CSN had accumulated technological capability at

similar rates to USIMINAS over the 1940–1980s

period, the company could have achieved faster rates

of performance improvement earlier and caught up

with world competitive levels much more rapidly.

The paper suggests the following conclusions.

1. At least in the steel industry, the long-term accu-

mulation and sustaining of high-level innovative

technological capability (Level 5 and beyond) for

individual technological functions are influenced

by the way and rate at which other types of capa-

bilities are accumulated and sustained over time.

In other words, particularly from Level 5, capabil-

ities become highly interdependent. In addition, it

is unlikely that the latecomer company can move

further towards the technological frontier without

accumulating and sustaining capabilities at the

same high level across a wide number of techno-

18 See BNDES (1994); see also Paula (1998).

logical functions. Therefore, capabilities across all

five technological functions need to be accumu-

lated and sustained in parallel.

2. The evidence also suggests that the accumula-tion of routine operating capability (Levels 1

and 2) plays a critical role in the accumulation

and sustaining of innovative capabilities. For in-

stance, USIMINAS would not have achieved rapid

accumulation of product development capability

if it had not developed and strengthened Levels 1

and 2 routine capability for products and process

and production organisation. Neither would the

company have been able to engage successfully in

the development of ‘capacity-stretching’ capabil-

ity if it had not accumulated Levels 1–4 routine

capability for investments. Indeed, interviews with

managers at different levels in USIMINAS even

recognised the presence of two trajectories of capa-

bility (operating and innovative) running inside the

company. In contrast, in CSN (1940–1980s), the

slow rate and inconsistent way of accumulation

of product development capability was associated

with the incomplete accumulation of routine oper-

ating capability (Levels 1 and 2) for products and

process and production organisation.

3. There is a strong association between rates of 

operational performance improvement and the rateof accumulation and the consistency over time of 

the paths of technological capability accumula-

tion. Indeed, at least in the steel industry, the fast

improvement of operational performance depends

on the fast accumulation and sustaining of differ-

ent types and levels of ‘routine’ and ‘innovative’

technological capabilities.

4. As analysed in detail elsewhere (Figueiredo, 1999),

the key features of the underlying learning pro-

cesses exert a strong influence on the inter-firm

differences in paths of technological accumula-tion. Thus, if these processes are deliberately and

effectively manipulated over time they produce

positive implications for the accumulation of tech-

nological capability. This, in turn, has positive

implications for the rate of operational performance

improvement and is likely to generate financial

benefits for the company. In other words, continu-

ous and effective in-house efforts on the building,

accumulation and sustaining of different types

and levels of routine and innovative technological

Page 21: Figueiredo 2002

8/8/2019 Figueiredo 2002

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/figueiredo-2002 21/22

P.N. Figueiredo / Research Policy 31 (2002) 73–94 93

capabilities—through different learning processes

do pay off.

5. Nevertheless, as argued elsewhere (Figueiredo,

1999), in addition to the learning processes andtechnological capability accumulation, other fac-

tors are also necessary to accelerate the rate of 

operational performance improvement: an effec-

tive corporate leadership and a competitive market

environment.

Acknowledgements

I am deeply grateful to Martin Bell at SPRU and

John Bessant at CENTRIM—Centre for Research

in Innovation Management—at the University of 

Brighton, UK, for their superb guidance during my

doctorate work. I am also deeply grateful to Keith

Pavitt at SPRU and Sanjaya Lall at the University of 

Oxford, UK, for their constructive comments during

the oral examination. Also, I wish to thank the two

anonymous referees for their encouraging comments.

I am tremendously indebted to the two steel compa-

nies for their invaluable co-operation in this study.

Finally, I am indebted to CAPES—the Brazilian

Government Agency for postgraduate support—for

funding for this research.

References

Argyris, C., Schön, D., 1978. Organizational Learning: A Theory

of Action Perspective. Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA.

Bell, M.,1982. Technical Change in Infant Industries: A Review of 

the Empirical Evidence. SPRU, University of Sussex, Mimeo.

Bell, M., 1984. ‘Learning’ and the accumulation of industrial

technological capacity in developing countries. In: King, K.,

Fransman, M. (Eds.), Technological Capability in the Third

World. London, Macmillan.

Bell, M., Scott-Kemmis, D., Satyarakwit, W., 1982. Limitedlearning in infant industry: a case study. In: Stewart, F., James,

J. (Eds.), The Economics of New Technology in Developing

Countries. Frances Pinter, London.

Bell, M., Ross-Larson, B., Westphal, L.E., 1984. Assessing the

Performance of Infant Industries’. World Bank Staff Working

Paper no. 666, The World Bank, Washington.

Bell, M., Pavitt, K., 1993. Technological accumulation and

industrial growth: contrasts between developed and developing

countries. Industrial and Corporate Change 2 (2), 157–211.

Bell, M., Pavitt, K., 1995. The development of technological

capabilities. In: Haque, I.U. (Ed.), Trade, Technology and

International Competitiveness. The World Bank, Washington.

Bell, M, Hobday, M., Abdullah. S., Ariffin, N., Malik, J., 1995.

Aiming for 2020: a demand-driven perspective on industrial

technology in Malaysia. Final Report for the World Bank 

and Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment,

Malaysia. SPRU, University of Sussex, Mimeo.Bessant, J., 1998. Developing continuous improvement capability.

International Journal of Innovation Management 2 (4), 409–429.

BNDES (The National Bank for Economic and Social

Development), 1994. Programa Nacional de Desestatização.

Relatório de Atividades. Rio de Janeiro, BNDES.

BNDES (The National Bank for Economic and Social

Development), 1999. Programa Nacional de Desestatizacão:

Sistema de Informacões. Rio de Janeiro, BNDES.

CEPAL (The Economic Comission for Latin America), 1984. La

industria Siderurgica Latinoamericana: Tendencias y Potencial.

Naciones Unidas, Santiago.

Dahlman, C., Fonseca, F.V., 1978. From Technological Dependence

to Technology Development: the Case of the USIMINAS SteelPlant in Brazil. Working Paper no. 21, IBD/ECLA Research

Programme.

Dahlman, C., Westphal, L., 1982. Technological effort in industrial

development—an interpretative survey of recent research. In:

Stewart, F., James, J. (Eds.), The Economics of New Technology

in Developing Countries. Frances Pinter, London, pp. 105–137.

Dosi, G., 1985. The microeconomic sources and effects of 

innovation. An Assessment of Some Recent Findings. DRC

Discussion Paper no. 33, SPRU, University of Sussex, Mimeo.

Dosi, G., 1988. The nature of the innovative process. In: Dosi,

G., Freeman, C., Nelson, R., Silverberg, G., Soete, L. (Eds.),

Technical Change and Economic Theory. Pinter Publishers,

London.

Dosi, G., Marengo, L., 1993. Some elements of an evolutionarytheory of organisational competencies. In: Proceedings of 

the Tenth World Congress of the International Economic

Association. Moscow, Mimeo.

Dutrénit, G.B., 1998. From Knowledge Accumulation to Strategic

Capabilities: Knowledge Management in a Mexican Glass Firm.

D. Phil. Thesis, SPRU, University of Sussex, Mimeo.

Figueiredo, P.C.N., 1999. Technological Capability-Accumulation

Paths and the Underlying Learning Processes in the Latecomer

Context: a Comparative Analysis of Two Large Steel Companies

in Brazil. D. Phil. Thesis, SPRU, University of Sussex, Mimeo.

Garvin, D.A., 1993. Building a learning organisation. Harvard

Business Review 71 (4), 78–91.

Gupta, K.S., Das, S.N., Chandra, N., 1995. Indian blast furnace

practice: myths, facts and potentials. Transaction of Indian

Institute of Metallurgy. 48 (5), 409–435.

Hobday, M., 1995. Innovation in East Asia: The Challenge to

Japan. Edward Elgar, Aldershot.

Hollander, S., 1965. The Sources of Increased Efficiency: A Study

of Du Pont Rayon Plants. MIT Press Cambridge, MA.

Iansiti, M., 1998. Technology Integration. Harvard Business School

Press, Boston, MA.

Iansiti, M., Clark, K., 1994. Integration and dynamic capability:

evidence from product development in automobiles and

mainframe computers. Industrial and Corporate Change 33 (3),

557–605.

Page 22: Figueiredo 2002

8/8/2019 Figueiredo 2002

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/figueiredo-2002 22/22

94 P.N. Figueiredo / Research Policy 31 (2002) 73–94

Katz, J., 1976. Importación de Tecnologia, Aprendizage y

Industrialización Dependiente. Fondo de Cultura Economica,

México.

Katz, J., 1987. Domestic technology generation in LDCs: a review

of research findings. In: Katz, J. (Ed.), Technology Generationin Latin American Manufacturing Industries. St. Martin’s Press,

New York.

Katz, J., Gutkowski, M., Rodrigues, M., Goity, G., 1978.

Productivity, Technology, and Domestic Efforts in Research

and Development. Working Paper no. 14, Buenos Aires,

ECLA/IDB/IDRC/UNDP Research Programme on Scientific

and Technological Development in Latin America.

Kim, L., 1995. Crisis construction and organisational learning:

capability building in catching-up at Hyundai Motor. In: Pro-

ceedings of the Hitotsubashi-Organization Science Conference.

Tokyo, Kim.

Kim, L., 1997a. The dynamics of Samsung’s technological

learning in semiconductors. California Management Review

39 (3), 86–100.

Kim, L., 1997b. Imitation to Innovation: The Dynamics of 

Korea’s Technological Learning. Harvard Business School

Press, Boston, MA.

Lall, S., 1987. Learning to Industrialise: The Acquisition of 

Technological Capability by India. Macmillan, London.

Lall, S., 1992. Technological capabilities and industrialisation.

World Development 20 (2), 165–186.

Lall, S., 1994. Technological capabilities. In: Salomon, J.-J.,

et al. (Eds.), The Uncertain Quest: Science Technology and

Development. UN University Press, Tokyo.

Leonard-Barton, D., 1990. Implementing New Production

Technologies: Exercises in Corporate Learning. In: M.A. von

Glinow and S.A. Mohrman (Eds.), Managing Complexityin High Technology Organisations. Oxford University Press,

New York.

Leonard-Barton, D., 1992a. Core capabilities, core rigidities:

paradox in managing new product development. Strategic

Management Journal 13, 111–125.

Leonard-Barton, D., 1992b. The factory as a learning laboratory.

Sloan Management Review 34 (1), 23–38.

Leonard-Barton, D., 1995. Wellsprings of Knowledge: Building

and Sustaining the Sources of Innovation. Harvard Business

School Press, Boston, MA.

Maxwell, P., 1981. Technological Policy and Firm Learning Efforts

in Less Developed Countries: A Case Study of the Experience

of the Argentina Steel Firm Acindar SA, D. Phil. Thesis, SPRU,

University of Sussex, Mimeo.Mlawa, H., 1983. The Acquisition of Technology, Technological

Capability and Technical Change: A Study of the Textile

Industry in Tanzania, D. Phil. Thesis, SPRU, University of 

Sussex, Mimeo.

Nelson, R., Winter, S., 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic

Change. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

Patel, P., Pavitt, K., 1994. Technological Competencies in theWorld’s Largest Firms: Characteristics, Constraints and Scope

for Managerial Choice’. STEEP Discussion Paper no. 13,

Brighton, SPRU.

Paula, G., 1998. Privatização e Estrutura de Mercado na Siderurgia

Mundial. Tese de Doutorado, D. Phil. Thesis, Universidade

Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Instituto de Economia (UFRJ/IE),

Brasil.

Pavitt, K., 1991. Key characteristics of the large innovating firm.

British Journal of Management 2, 41–50.

Pavitt, K., 1998. Technologies, products and organization in

the innovating firm: what Adam Smith tells us and Joseph

Schumpeter does not. Industrial and Corporate Change 7 (3),

433–451.

Peixoto, H.L., 1990. Organização versus ambiente: o caso

da USIMINAS. Das origens a privatização, Dissertação de

Mestrado, M.Sc. Dissertation, UFMG.

Pérez, L., Pérez y Peniche, J., 1987. A summary of the principal

findings of the case-study on the technological behaviour of 

the Mexican steel firm Altos Hornos de Mexico. In: Katz., J.

(Ed.), Technology Generation in Latin American Manufacturing

Industry. St. Martin’s Press, New York.

Pisano, G., 1997. The Development Factory: Unlocking the

Potential of Process Innovation. Harvard Business School Press,

Boston, MA.

Piccinini, M., 1993. Technical Change and Energy Efficiency: A

Case Study in the Iron and Steel Industry in Brazil, D. Phil.

Thesis, SPRU, University of Sussex, Mimeo.Prahalad, C., Hamel, G., 1990. The core competence of the

corporation. Harvard Business Review 90 (3), 79–91.

Senge, P., 1990. The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the

Learning Organisation. Century Business, London.

Shin, J.-S., 1996. The economics of the latecomers. Catching-Up,

Technology Transfer and Institutions in Germany, Japan and

South Korea. Routledge, London.

Tremblay, P., 1994. Comparative Analysis of Technological

Capability and Productivity Growth in the Pulp and Paper

Industry in Industrialised and Industrialising Countries, D. Phil.

Thesis, SPRU, University of Sussex, Mimeo.

Viana, H.A.P., 1984. International Technology Transfer,

Technological Learning and the Assimilation of Imported

Technology in a State-Owned Enterprise: The Case of SIDORSteel Plant in Venezuela, D. Phil. Thesis, SPRU, University of 

Sussex, Mimeo.


Recommended