Fill the void for the taking

Chapter Fifteen

From Obscurity to Notoriety: Cuban Slave Merchants,

and the Atlantic World

Jos Guadalupe Ortega

Although they were both newcomers to the Atlantic slave trade, Mariano Carbo and his associate, Pedro Diago, hired Capt. Ignacio Pica, a crew, and outfitted the Nuestra Seora del Carmen with goods and provisions for a slaving expedition in 1794. While sailing in the Caribbean, Capt. Pica found himself under siege by the French corsair Brutus. Outgunned, outclassed, and outmaneuvered, Capt. Pica and his crew concluded that resisting the French corsair would be futile and surrendered to Capt. Jean Garican without incident. Placing Nuestra Seora del Carmen in tow the French sailors set sail with their prize to Charleston, South Carolina.

But just five days after seizing Nuestra Seora, the French crew of the Brutus caught sight of a far more desirable prize on the horizon, a frigate returning from the African coast, laden with 207 slaves and bound for Havana. Refusing surrender Capt. Archibald Galbrach, a seasoned English slave trader, briefly eluded capture before engaging the French. No match for the combat-ready crew of the Brutus, Galbrachs evasive tactics proved crippling if not fatal for the Dos Hermanos. The Brutus naval assault disabled the Dos Hermanos; the ships cannons inflicted catastrophic structural damage, destroyed its food and water provisions, and fatally wounded one of its captives. Ironically, by capturing the two slaving vessels the French crew now faced a practical dilemma: abandon the Nuestra Seora or forsake the readily exchangeable and highly lucrative cargo of the Dos Hermanos.

The entrepreneurial Ignacio Pica offered Jean Garican a practical solution to their problem: why not sell the salvaged Dos Hermanos and its slave cargo to him? Possessing few alternatives, Garican agreed and waited twenty-six hours before finalizing the transaction in the middle of the Caribbean Sea. Thus the ships sailed to Charleston where Ignacio Pica duly exchanged a note worth $25,000 pesos for 207 slaves and a battered ship. Upon his return to the port of Havana, Pica discovered that news of his escapades on the high seas had preceded him. Indeed, Felipe Allwood, the financier of the Dos Hermanos requested an injunction from the Merchant Tribunal, demanding that Pica return the 207 slaves.

With notable exceptions, the historiography of the Cuban slave trade emphasizes the larger political manifestations and demographic transformations of this commerce. Few of these works focus on trade organization and merchant development. For example, Odious Commerce by David Murray primarily reviews British diplomatic and military efforts to suppress the Cuban slave trade. Moreno Fraginales classic work on the sugar industry remarks on various significant social and economic aspects of the slave trade, but the authors analysis is rather decentralized. David Eltis exceptional study outlines an integrated Atlantic world by employing quantitative evidence. Spanish imperial control and political largesse take center stage in Pablo Torneros text. Sherry Johnson comments on antagonisms between elite ranks of slave merchants in the Atlantic slave trade. However, the strength of her contribution rests on the discussion of the inter-Caribbean trade carried out by petty merchants during the early stages of liberalization.

By and large, analyses place Cuban slave merchants at a distinct disadvantage vis--vis other Atlantic merchants. According to interpretations, Cuban slave merchants were either outpaced by North American domination, dependent on North Americans, or they relied heavily on American and British carriers. That English, American, and Portuguese shippers possessed a competitive advantage in this specialized field in the early nineteenth century is undeniable. However, the language employed by scholars (domination, dependency, and reliance) implies a unilateral association that often overlooks the more nuanced dimensions of economic and social relationships. The interactions between Cuban and North Atlantic merchants were not necessarily based on economic domination or commercial dependency. Indeed, throughout this era, Cuban slave merchants expanded their knowledge of the slave trade by manipulating existing North Atlantic commercial and financial networks to their advantage.

The Dos Hermanos incident transcends the traditional interpretations of imperial economic and political hegemony in the Atlantic world. While North Atlantic powers altered the dynamics of the slave trade through geopolitical struggles and abolitionist policies in the early nineteenth century, it was the sum of individual human encounters and exchanges that formed this community. Essentially, Felipe Allwoods commercial defeat on the high seas represents the graceful decline of British commercial influence in the Cuban slave trade while Mariano Carbos and Pedro Diagos interloping activities symbolize the steady and systematic emergence of Cuban participation in a crowded and complex industry carried out through adaptation and improvisation. While emphasizing the theme of individual connections and interactions in the Atlantic world, this essay will also outline the economic structural hurdles encountered by Cuban merchants in the early 1800s, and illustrate the international and domestic commercial infrastructures established by these individuals to overcome initial growth problems.

For Cuban slave merchants, the period between the 1790s and 1820s is characterized by three capitalist productive phases, namely competition, growth, and efficiency. Cuban participation in a highly competitive environment marked by geopolitical instability between 1789 and 1807 yielded lackluster results for the up-and-coming domestic industry. However, from 1808 to 1817, Cuban slave merchants expanded their commercial knowledge, experience, and financial capabilities to continue the process of growth and development. By the 1820s, Cuban slave merchants were fully entrenched in the Atlantic slave trade and linked their activities to the domestic production of sugar. While political shifts looming in the background altered the Atlantic world, it was movement, or the human element that propelled the expansion of the Cuban slave trade.

Cuban slave merchants anchored their successes in the Atlantic world by developing early models of vertical integration and by establishing supplemental commercial services, such as shipping and insurance. Indeed, as a social identifier the term slave merchant is limiting and misleading since these individuals performed multiple functions in Cuban society and economy; they could have been aptly labeled merchant-bankers (refacionistas) or landowners (hacendados) as well. The term is a misnomer popularized by the British abolitionist movement, which was later adopted by historians. Because of its longevity and its usefulness in comparative historical articulation, the application of the term is most appropriate for the task at hand. However, when describing specific economic functions other labels will be employed to reflect such transformations. The mature Cuban slave merchant of the 1820s was financing slave voyages to Africa, exporting sugar to North Atlantic economies, financing sugar mills, and acquiring plantations and urban real estate. Immediately following the limited successes of Cuban slave merchants in the 1790s, this new group of slave merchants ascended in the early 1800s and consolidated a clear economic and social presence in Havana by the early 1820s.

Policy Changes, Inertia, and Foreign Competition, 17891807

Despite unbridled enthusiasm exemplified by merchants such as Carbo and Diago, transitioning from general maritime commerce into a highly specialized business occupied by more experienced North Atlantic powers proved difficult for Cuban merchants. Without a doubt, island merchants lacked not only the practical experience and technical knowledge for participation in such a complex venture but also the requisite social and economic infrastructure in the Atlantic world. As merchants soon discovered, entering the Atlantic slave trade was not a simple matter of provisioning a vessel and sailing it to West Africa. The process involved a number of intricate and interrelated stages on both sides of the Atlantic in which Cuban merchants were not competitive during the initial liberalization of the slave trade. Several limitations, including a dearth of marketable goods, a shortage of trained sailors and slave factors, vague trading regulations, underdeveloped commercial contacts in West Africa, and the absence of Spanish slave factories stifled the growth of a stable trading apparatus for two decades following Spains 1789 decree liberalizing the slave trade.

Specifically, the residual effects of centuries-old mercantilist traditions hampered the initial expansion of the Cuban slave trade. Because of antiquated commercial networks, Cuban merchants lacked the requisite trading goods to purchase slaves in West Africa. While the Spanish Crown declared free trade in 1778 with much pomp and circumstance, the concept of free trade was far from the classic nineteenth-century definition of the phrase. Instead, the royal decree continued to safeguard mercantilist principles. While Cadiz merchants lost their legal stronghold on trade with the Americas, they maintained a de facto monopoly with New Spain. The regulations lacked the institutional incentives to encourage Spanish merchants to seek other markets. For the merchants of Cadiz, Havana continued to represent a commercial backwater of the Spanish empire with limited market appeal vis--vis Mexico. The requisite commodities for exchange in West Africa were unavailable in Cuba or were relatively more expensive than those found in other North Atlantic ports. Frustrated by the crowns flawed free market legislation, Cuban merchants organized and advocated for change. Along with hacendado groups, Cuban merchants proposed a political and economic framework based on sugar and slavery that would ultimately transform the island. Swayed by active lobbying efforts, the crown tacitly recognized the growing commercial potential of its citadel colony.

In the wake of Spanish merchant demands and political upheaval in Saint Domingue, the crown introduced a number of administrative incentives designed to stimulate the Cuban sugar economy; the liberalization of the slave trade in 1789 formed the cornerstone of such efforts. Despite the liberal trading concessions introduced by the crown in the 1790s, Cuban slave merchants did not immediately capitalize from imperial policies. For at least ten years after the 1789 edict, Spanish merchants supplied the island with slaves from readily available secondary markets in Jamaica, Dominica, New Providence, and Charleston. Even so, the number of Spanish expeditions and imports from these destinations were relatively inconsequential compared to the combined imports of French, Dutch, English, and American efforts. Smaller Spanish carriers, trading an assortment of goods and foodstuffs besides slaves, led most of these expeditions. Indeed, a high proportion of inter-Caribbean expeditions arriving in Havana transported fewer than five slaves per voyage. In all likelihood, these merchants were profiting from newly enacted Spanish trading provisions granting export tax exemptions on colonial goods shipped to foreign ports for the purpose of importing slaves into Cuba. American merchants adopted a similar commercial pattern, selling shipments of flour in Havana with four or five slaves imported from the nearby Dutch islands to circumvent the Spanish ban on direct trade with its colonies. Cargoes of petty Cuban slave merchants were similarly mundane, consisting of foodstuffs from New England and St. Augustine, and lumber from New Orleans. More than a decade after the liberalization of the trade, Cuban merchants were failing to meet domestic demand for slaves on the island, prompting individuals newly entrenched in this industry to assess their own shortcomings and institute methods to address them.

A relative newcomer to Havana, Santiago de la Cuesta y Manzanal represented the second wave of slave merchants, who as a group consolidated a domestic commercial apparatus by the 1820s. His critical treatise of 1803 outlines the structural difficulties still haunting Cuban slave merchants in the early nineteenth century. Clearly frustrated with royal indifference to long standing demands by Spaniards in Cuba for the liberalization of the slave trade, Cuesta y Manzanal stopped short of blaming the crown for the general lack of domestic experience in transatlantic commercial ventures. According to Cuesta y Manzanal, Spanish political laxity to merchant demands combined with foreign monopolies impeded the development of a Havana based domestic slave-trading system. New royal regulations establishing quotas for Spanish sailors aboard Cuban slaving vessels actually produced unintended consequences. By discouraging Cuban merchants from hiring foreign nationals exclusively, the decrees reduced the free exchange of commercial information and thereby diminished the overall growth of the industry. Yet several Cuban slave merchants largely evaded imperial policies by pursuing free market principles. Regardless of royal regulations, individuals such as Cuesta y Manzanal maintained close ties with British and American slave traders.

By purchasing shipments on consignment or hiring foreign captains and crews, Cuban slave merchants gained the critical expertise that escaped them in the eighteenth century. It was no coincidence that Cuban slave merchants preferred English shippers. The closing of the eighteenth century saw Liverpool merchants occupying a sizeable portion of the North Atlantic slave trade. Indeed, the impetus of the Industrial Revolution promoted economic efficiency among all English merchants; Liverpool slave merchants were no different, excelling in this particular field as well. On a similar plane, Rhode Island slave merchants had been offering their services to Cubans since the mid-1780s. Cuban slave merchants consigned British cargoes and hired American crews because they were the most efficient carriers of the time. Nevertheless, Cuban merchants were unwilling to resign themselves to the domestic side of the trade.

In 1803 several Cuban slave merchants developed a prospectus for the African Company of Havana, a firm conceptualized as a forum for the unfettered exchange of Atlantic commercial knowledge. The companys primary mission was to organize and finance slave expeditions to Africa directly from the island and to establish a physical presence on the continent. In a departure from previous stillborn efforts of the 1790s, the African Company of Havana abstained from calling for a commercial monopoly. The proposal outlined the structural commercial duplication of Liverpool merchant houses. Indeed, these merchants were actively seeking guidance from their English counterparts. The proposed method of absorption centered on the creation of Spanish merchant houses in London and Liverpool that would transmit credit, provisions, and coordinate direct voyages to Africa from Cuba. Cubans proposed the formation of floating slave factories anchored off the coast to compete with Portuguese, French, English, and American slave factories in Africa. Each floating slave factory would consist of a principal ship warehoused with general merchandise purchased in England. Spanish slavers would rendezvous with the primary ship, exchange information on the current state of the trade and acquire the necessary goods to trade with African merchants. As part of the floating slave factory complex, smaller and faster ships would sail to London and Havana, communicate with financiers and report the status of their dealings. The entire commercial apparatus was billed as a floating slave trade school where the Spanish would gain valuable experience in the Atlantic slave trade.

Throughout most of the 1810s the social and economic ties established between British and Spanish slave traders in previous decades continued. Yet the nature of such relations began changing, no longer were Spanish merchants junior partners. Indeed, the relationship between Spaniards and North Atlantic merchants developed a symbiotic character, with Spanish merchants increasingly staffing vessels with national crews. However, despite continued growth, Cuban merchants continued to encounter commercial and structural bottlenecks impeding their unrestrained progress.

Structural Inadequacies and Unregulated Growth, 18081817

Acquiring technical knowledge for the Atlantic slave trade was not difficult and Spanish merchants were no less capable than their European counterparts in matters of commerce. However, familiarity with the pitfalls of conducting business on the African coast coupled with notable human losses on the high seas were some of the characteristics that marked the second major phase of Cuban participation in the Atlantic slave trade.

The topographical complexities of the West African coastline placed a premium on excellent seamanship. High surfs from December to April made landings difficult and often dangerous, sometimes resulting in significant losses, injuries, and death. Avoiding such hazards required that a vessel seek the safety of deeper waters rather than anchoring near the shore. Nevertheless, inexperienced crews occasionally anchored too close to the shore, hoping to streamline the loading of their human cargo, thus sometimes efficiency came at a high price. Strong winds and violent waves could batter vessels, shove them, and drive them onto bars or reefs. Despite some losses, Spaniards acquired the requisite specialized nautical skills from British and Americans crews by the 1810s.

Obtaining the practical knowledge for the maintenance of human health during the voyage to the Americas was somewhat of an elusive task for Cuban and foreign merchants alike in the early nineteenth century. Typical prerequisites for a successful voyage included a seasoned crew with prior experience in slave trading, a doctor with a familiarity in caring for captives on long journeys, and a captain with a general concern for slave nourishment and hygiene. The development of health regulations and standards for human cargo came about relatively late in the Atlantic slave trade. With the passage of Dolbens Act in 1788, British legislators established guidelines that became the industry standard. In short, Dolbens act emphasized health and hygiene, mandated a fixed ratio of five slaves per three tons, and compelled ship owners to hire trained surgeons.

Paralleling the English experience of the previous century, heavy human losses in the Atlantic characterized the Spanish slave trade of the early 1810s. After several well-publicized maritime disasters, administrative officials in Havana feared that seafaring illnesses would infect the general population. As modern bureaucrats, Havana officials focused their attention on a general disregard for maritime regulations by Spanish merchants. Although slave merchants were not beyond reproach, unlike the British codes of 1788, early Spanish slave trade regulations lacked specific guidelines for slave welfare during the voyage to the Americas. The general maritime codes of the Royal Regulations of the Council of Cadiz of 1791 suggested staffing all commercial voyages with a surgeon or barber (bleeder) when ferrying passengers. However, most Cuban ships bound for Africa never met the requisite surgeon-to-passenger ratio with crewmembers alone. Ship owners violated the spirit, if not the letter of the commercial codes when their returning vessels, loaded with hundreds of slaves, lay beyond the reach of Spanish bureaucrats. Like their British counterparts, merchants and officials in Havana hypothesized that a direct correlation existed between excessive slave deaths and the availability of onboard surgeons. Following a high disproportion of seemingly preventable deaths of both slaves and crewmembers on the frigates Dos Amigos, Consejero, Brillante Rosa, and Amistad in the early 1810s, the Havana municipal council established an investigative committee led by Tomas Romay, the director of surgery and medicine.

Dr. Romays medical report was a rendition of modernity and barbarity, juxtaposing advancements in law and logic with the immorality, greed, and ignorance of Cuban slave merchants. Dr. Romay chastised two ship owners in particular for their tightfisted approach to an already depraved business by declaring, As a result of a complete disregard of stated regulations, or perhaps because of the miserly economy and stinginess of two individuals 192 have perished. It seemed incomprehensible to Dr. Romay that slave merchants could not envision the logic of spending 1,000 pesos for a surgeons salary if the outlay would have been recouped by saving three slaves. To emphasize his position Dr. Romay added the following to his harangue,

With how much vehemence and justice against such a barbarous commerce would not Argelles and Alcocer declare if they understood the depravity of such truth? Is the agricultural development of the island and the prosperity of a few individuals preferable to the life of even one man?

While Romays tone certainly echoed the British abolitionist rhetoric of the era, it did not actually call for a cessation of the slave trade. In fact, Romay was an ardent supporter of the civilizing aspects of slavery. Romay may have sympathized with the wretched state of slaves during their voyage to the Americas and the manner in which blacks were ripped from their homes and entombed in the abyss of the sea but he nonetheless displayed the typical European condescension if not outright contempt for African culture. For Dr. Romay, Africans err in the jungle, without a home, without laws and without religion. Nevertheless, Dr. Romay believed that blacks became royal vassals, subject to Spanish legal protection and the benefit of religion the moment they entered a slave ship.

Romays fact-finding mission led him to Capt. Jos Pereira Sira of the Portuguese brigantine Buen Amigo, which had docked in Havana before sailing to Pernambuco. The 130-ton Buen Amigo sailed from Africa with 319 slaves for thirty-four days, losing one captive during the voyage. The vessel conspicuously lacked a surgeon but nevertheless managed the maintenance of a far superior survival rate than similar Spanish ships of the time. When queried about his success, Capt. Pereira responded that the key to his transportation achievements was his fair and moral treatment of slaves. Apparently, Capt. Pereira adopted measures for their relative comfort below deck and permitted the slaves to regularly walk the deck and breathe the pure air. Pereira added that he kept ill treatment and terror to a minimum. However, Pereiras most important recommendations related to the quantity and quality of food and the abundant supply of drinking water administered to slaves during their captivity.

Based on empirical investigations, Romays conclusions emphasized the general neglect and poor treatment slaves received from Spanish crews during their voyage to the island. Romay especially believed that tight packing was economically inefficient because it resulted in high death rates. For example the Amistad, which lost 545 of its 733 captives at sea, exceeded the recommended tonnage requirements outlined by the British regulations of 1788. The doctor hypothesized that because the vessel left the African coast during the rainy season, the weather generated squalid living and foul breathing conditions, resulting in respiratory problems for all onboard. Romay also discounted the idea that providing slaves with ample provisions would have reduced the number of deaths. However, Romays conclusions contradict the extensive historiography on the topic of tight packing, which does not find any correlation between overloading and death rates. Regardless of the validity of its conclusions, Romays committee and the investigative apparatus it employed point to a discernable exchange of slave-trade knowledge among Atlantic merchants. Overall, the information that the committee gathered and presented sought to improve the efficiency of this rapidly expanding but loosely regulated Spanish industry.

Indeed, Romays findings do provide clues, which may have accounted for the excessive death rates on the Consejero and the Brillante Rosa. Unlike their Portuguese counterpart the Buen Amigo, the voyages of both Spanish frigates surpassed the Portuguese vessel by twenty to thirty days. Scholars have indicated that death rates among slave ships varied between points of embarkation, suggesting that epidemics played a relatively small role and that food and specifically water supplies were far more important considerations. The daily ration of a pint of water for slaves proved to be physically debilitating. Inadequate water supplies and the Spanish approach to slave purchases in Africa may have been the primary causes of high death rates on Cuban vessels.

Throughout the 1810s Spaniards lacked national slave factories in Africa, thus captains were compelled to sail along the coast and purchase slaves on a piecemeal basis. This commercial reality inadvertently extended the duration of the voyage. Additionally, as captains sailed the coast to complete their cargo, previous slave purchases were kept below deck where temperatures reached up to 130 degrees, increasing perspiration and dehydration. Such commercial procedures taxed foodstuffs and water supplies, consequently challenging the immune systems of slaves and crewmembers alike. Additionally, the avoidance of the hurricane season in the Caribbean between the months of July and September compelled Spanish expeditions to sail for the African coast between November and May, the hottest months in Africa. Thus the provision of foodstuffs and water, and the coordination of departure and travel times to and from West Africa proved to be causal factors in human mortality.

Knowledge and experience in determining the season of departure may have influenced the incidence of illnesses among both crew and slaves. The height of the African wet season may have also exposed trading ventures to unnecessary economic risks. One particular incident in 1815 illustrates how poor planning and inexperience hampered a Cuban expedition to West Africa, which ultimately resulted in contagion. Primarily financed by Ysidro Ynglada a Barcelona merchant based in Havana, the schooner Restaurada arrived in Port Bonny in the middle of the wet season. Approximately between June and October, depending on the coast, the African wet season presented a number of commercial and practical problems that invariably increased the likelihood of illness among the crew and slave cargo. Because of impassable roads, the number of slaves available for sale in Africa decreased during the rainy season, which in effect extended the duration of slaving expeditions.

The administrative investigation of the Spanish schooner Restaurada illustrates these points. Pounded by torrential rains, Capt. Santiago Valdez failed to meet his consignment obligations. Compounding matters, the crew and the slave cargo became seriously ill soon after setting sail. An onboard epidemic resulted in the deaths of fifty-two slaves, Capt. Valdez, and the boatswain. A lack of provisions and medical assistance further debilitated the health of everyone onboard. The general disarray distressing the voyage proved to be so severe that a British naval crew who boarded the Spanish vessel abandoned efforts to capture the prize, allowing the Restaurada to sail for Havana unimpeded. However, the ship never reached Havana; instead it lumbered into Santiago de Cuba. Suffering from serious bouts of fever and dysentery the remaining slaves were sold at a discount to slave traders dealing in unhealthy slaves.

The consequences of lacking a network of Spanish slave factories on the African coast became especially apparent for merchants from the mid- to late 1810s. During this period, Spanish captains reported significant slave shortages in Africa, a fact that compelled them to alter their purchasing patterns. Instead of purchasing one or two large contingents of Africans, Spanish merchants during this phase acquired them in groups of less than ten. Sailing the entire coast to gradually purchase slaves was not uncommon. But such an inefficient method prompted noticeable shipping delays. For example, the brigantines Antlope and Noticicioso traveled the African coast for six months, each purchasing approximately 200 slaves. Capt. Moran counted thirty-three major vessels waiting for slaves in the Rio Pongo during this time. On these new commercial circumstances Moran remarked, I am convinced that this voyage will be exceedingly long and take no comfort in saying that the (slave) cargo has reached its upper limit. Moran purchased a total of sixty-one slaves in just over a three-month period. His previous five expeditions for the House of Ynglada averaged 552 slaves per voyage. As supplies of slaves fluctuated on the African coast in the late 1810s, slave factors proved to be highly valuable contacts.

Another facet influencing the growth of any Cuban firm was its degree of association with intermediaries and foreign factors on the African continent. While access to national slave factories may have increased the profitability of the Spanish slave trade in the long run, merchants adapted to logistical and spatial shortcomings of the 1810s by dealing with foreign slave factors directly. For example, in 1816 Juan, Antonio, and Jos OFarrill, who were descendants of Ricardo OFarrill y ODaly, the eighteenth-century slave merchant, formed a company with Jacob Faber, an American, and a Mr. Goss, an Englishman, for the direct importation of African slaves into Havana. Both Faber and Goss were seasoned traders with well-established social and economic ties to African slave traders at Gallinas River, Sierra Leone.

Faber and Goss owned slave factories in Rio Pongo, near Guinea and maintained active personal relationships with two local tribal chiefs, Charles and William Gmez, sons of a Portuguese slave trader. Biracial and multi-cultural, both Charles and William were educated in England and were fluent in three languages, in many ways following the classic career pattern of African intermediaries. Faber and Goss benefited handsomely from socio-political unrest in western Africa and transmitted their good fortune to their associates in the Americas. Commercial networks with African slave factors increased efficiency and profitability for Cuban firms because direct contact with foreign merchants brought financiers increased accountability and detailed market information. Trust was at a premium at this juncture because the opportunity for embezzlement was relatively high. Indeed, the OFarrills quickly discovered the penalties of dealing with unproven factors on the African coast.

Providing Faber with 34,082 pesos worth of merchandise for the purchase of slaves, the enterprise failed to yield steady returns for the OFarrills. Initially, the thirty-to-ninety-day shipping delays engendered concern among the OFarrills but their anxieties were mollified as slaves started trickling into Havana. However, as the two-year association with Faber matured the OFarrills earlier apprehensions were validated. The OFarrills discovered that Faber systematically sold their slave shipments to other traders. Based on an investigation of the companys financial records, the Havana Merchant Tribunal concluded that Faber embezzled well over 100,000 pesos and 108 slaves. The fact that the incident illustrates the failure of a Cuban firm in the Atlantic slave trade is purely incidental. More importantly, this episode demonstrates that as Cubans increasingly financed direct voyages to Africa the commercial and social ties between merchants on both sides of the Atlantic expanded as well.

Social Transformation and Economic Consolidation, c. 18181835

Despite economic bottlenecks in the 1810s, Cuban slave merchants successfully integrated many of the commercial techniques that had made their Liverpool counterparts so successful in the Atlantic world in the eighteenth century. While smaller slave merchants continued investing in slaving expeditions, individuals or firms such as Cuesta Manzanal y Hermano, the OFarrills, the Lombillos, Joaqun Gmez, and Pablo Sama occupied extensive segments of the Cuban slave trade by integrating other related commercial enterprises. In essence, these individuals represented the highest tier of Cuban merchants. Still directly involved in the slave trade late in their lives they nevertheless reached a level in their careers where it was no longer necessary to personally deal with slaves. At this social juncture these merchants served as administrators or directors who facilitated and financed almost every aspect of the Atlantic sugar commercial complex. As directors of merchant houses, these individuals usually offered a multitude of services which were directly or indirectly related to the slave trade including purchasing vessels, provisioning ships, paying customs officials, exporting sugar, leasing royal slave barracks, providing credit for domestic slave purchases, and financing sugar mills. The Spanish Commercial Codes referred to these individuals as ship owners or provisions merchants (armadores), however such titles were not commonly applied or used at least through the 1820s. Individuals serving multiple economic and social functions still referred to themselves generically as merchants. While ship owning among larger merchants was not unusual, ownership was incidental to the aforementioned interests and activities. Strategies of vertical integration on the Atlantic side of the business were also not unusual, however they involved providing services that supplemented shipping cargo such as ship brokering, consignment, and stevedoring. The merchant in charge or the merchant house he directed was responsible for hiring a captain and crew, a doctor, and interpreters, as well as advancing their salaries. Still, it was not uncommon for a merchant house to hire a captain and his ship on a consignment basis. Doing so insulated the company from additional costs and risks, such as slave shortages on the African coast and the growing threat of capture and condemnation by the British Navy after 1817. Certainly, the notoriety that larger slave merchants achieved late in their careers implies a highly specialized field, however the slave trade remained interconnected with other related commercial activities such as buying and selling sugar and insuring African expeditions.

Incorporated in 1795, the Maritime Insurance Company of Havana (MICH) was part of a larger bourgeoning Cuban commercial and financial infrastructure utilized by merchants to gradually consolidate the sugar and slave industries by the 1820s. The companys charter, like other European insurance firms of the period indemnified against the usual perils of the seas including, fire, thieves, pirates, as well as seizures and restraints from friends and enemies. Typical coverage included the total loss of the vessel, goods, freight, and anticipated profits. Bolstering its business portfolio beyond the port of Havana, the company dispatched agents to several Spanish ports including Cadiz, Barcelona, Santander, Corua, Tenerife, Veracruz, New Orleans, Cartagena, and Buenos Aires.

In the early 1800s the primary office and meeting place of MICH was the home of Mariano Carbo, located near the commercial district of Havana. For Mariano Carbo, underwriting voyages formed one of many commercial functions he performed in Cuba. In addition to his underwriting and slaving activities, Carbo owned two of the largest sugar mills in Western Cuba. This career pattern was not unlike many of the other investors in MICH who described themselves as either hacendados or merchants but at times possessed facets of each social type. The board of directors included Joseph Manuel Lopez, Gabriel Raymundo de Azacarte, Bonifacio Larrinaga, Bernabe Martinez de Pinillos, and Pedro Diago; all were prominent members of society and were involved in a number of commercial activities such as slave imports, financing plantations, or landowning. Indeed, the structure and organization of MICH reflects the lack of specialization in Spanish commerce in the early nineteenth century.

The list of common investors was a veritable whos who of Cuban society at the turn of the nineteenth century and, aside from the usual counts and countesses, they represented a cross section of the different social groups within the sugar mill complex, including petty merchants, merchant-bankers, established import export firms, slave factors, slave merchants, the patrician landed elite, and newly established peninsulars such as Cuesta y Manzanal. In essence, MICH included almost every major type of individual in Cuban society with the exception of slaves, of course. While not organized in the classic corporate structure, MICH provided an important venue for the collection and dissemination of information related to shipping and commerce and served as a vital nexus for social and economic associations in Cuban society.

Slave merchants were also part of a larger financial network that invested heavily in the domestic sugar industry. As slave merchants gained capital many became merchant-bankers (refaccinistas). Merchant-bankers were critical components in the expansion of the Cuban sugar industry because formal banking institutions were underdeveloped. Throughout the first decades of the nineteenth century, merchant houses based in Havana developed and maintained financial links with hacendados in rural Cuba. Among the few members of Cuban society with surplus liquid capital, slave merchants positioned themselves as the primary investors of sugar mills. The refaccin contracts between merchants and hacendados included financing for almost every aspect of the sugar production process. Simple agreements consisted of direct loans permitting hacendados ultimate discretion of the credits disbursement. Typically, however, sugar contracts consisted of advances against future crops including specific stipulations addressing the quantity and quality of sugar and agreements on final market prices. Far more complex arrangements included supplying hacendados with agricultural tools, machinery, clothing, food, and slaves for one or several succeeding harvests.

As mediators between domestic and world markets, merchants acquired the necessary knowledge to exploit the vagaries of price fluctuations through sugar mill contracts. The provision of comprehensive goods and services oftentimes compounded the roles of merchant-bankers, transforming them into de facto administrators or trustees of the sugar mills under contract. While not necessarily in charge of the day-to-day operations of the sugar mill, their overarching responsibilities placed merchant-bankers in positions of significant influence over their clients, especially those with smaller and medium-sized sugar mills. By serving as a broker between a hacendado, his suppliers, and sugar exporters the merchant-banker wielded significant economic clout over his clients. Ultimately, the manipulation of credit structures enabled merchant bankers to dispossess landowners of their sugar mills. As their careers developed, many slave merchants followed a pattern of becoming merchant-bankers and eventually landowners. The reason for such a phenomenon could be attributed to the objective among merchants of augmenting their social significance vis--vis patrician hacendados. However, the merchant acquisition of land also formed part of the initial process of vertical integration or, for that matter, the result of simple investments of surplus capital.

Economic growth coupled with rapid expansion in international trade, driven by sugar exports transformed the fortunes of many individuals on the island. However, since plantation owners, regardless of the size of their sugar mills, relied on merchant-bankers for a steady influx of slaves, goods, services, and financing, the social influence held by Cuban merchants increased disproportionately. With such specialized roles, merchant bankers became the most dynamic social group of the Cuban economy, rapidly acquiring wealth, privilege, and status.

Conclusion

Within a generation, Cuban slave merchants mastered and improved the commercial techniques utilized by British and American slave merchants in the Atlantic world. However, slave merchants not only maintained an Atlantic perspective, but also looked within the imperial system by investing their slave trade profits domestically. Cuban slave merchants established a viable and competitive economic presence on the island as well. As a result of executing almost every aspect of the slave trade, including provisioning, insurance, and finance, Cuban merchants expanded a commercial and financial infrastructure in Havana that generated the islands economic growth. By and large, Cuban merchants abandoned mercantilist philosophies and the commercial monopolies in favor of practical knowledge exchanges with their Atlantic counterparts and the formation of free market mechanisms. Indeed, the social and economic milieu inhabited by slave merchants in the 1820s was truly a world of their own creation.

This essay utilizes the term Spanish merchant when discussing the interests of both creole and peninsular merchants. The application of the term Cuban is directed at merchants who, regardless of origin, not only conducted business on the island but also established economic and social roots in Cuba. The current study is one aspect of the authors dissertation that examines the generation of Spaniards, Cubans, and Africans who formed the sugar commercial complex of the early nineteenth century. Often times the use of the peninsular-creole dichotomy implies a clear division of interests between distinct groups and therefore cannot fully describe the involved social and economic relations among individuals.

ANC, Tribunal de Comercio, Leg. 113, No. 6, Mariano Carbo sigue consecuencia de los autos que sigue Felipe Alwood, como apoderado de los interesados en la fragata Los Dos Hermanos sobre el inters de unos servios que conduca Ignacio Pica. . See Manuel Moreno Fraginals, El ingenio: complejo econmico social cubano del azcar (La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1978) vol. 1, p. 50.

David R. Murray, Odious Commerce: Britain, Spain, and the Abolition of the Slave Trade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). Corwins earlier work explores similar themes as Odious Commerce from within the Spanish imperial system, see Arthur F. Corwin, Spain and the Abolition of Slavery in Cuba, 1817-1886 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1967). Other essential studies include, Herbert S. Klein, The Middle Passage: Comparative Studies in the Atlantic Slave Trade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); David Eltis, Economic Growth and the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987); Pablo Tornero Tinajero, Crecimiento econmico y transformaciones sociales: Esclavos, hacendados y comerciantes en la Cuba colonial (17601840) (Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, 1996); Jos Luciano Franco, Comercio clandestino de esclavos (La Habana, Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1996). A bit ambitious but nevertheless useful is the encyclopedic work of Hugh Thomas, The Slave Trade: or The Story of the Atlantic Slave Trade 14401870 (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1997). Primarily written for a larger audience its footnotes are rather sparse. Johnson emphasizes the exclusion of creole interests after 1797, though this conclusion may be related to her reliance on ship registers, which identify the captain, vessel, place of registry, and time of arrival but do not denote the financiers of the expedition. Nevertheless, her work sheds much needed light on the early development of the Cuban slave trade; see Sherry Johnson, Rise and Fall of Creole Participation in the Cuban Slave Trade, 17891796, Cuban Studies (2000): pp. 5275. Likewise, Enrique Sosa Rodrguez truncates his work during the mature period of the Cuban slave trade. Rodrguez discussion is chiefly based upon commercial correspondence between three merchants in Cadiz, Barcelona, and Havana. While the study is primarily descriptive it does outline important trading and commercial networks in the Atlantic. See Enrique Sosa Rodriguez, Negreros Catalanes y Gaditanos en la trata Cubana, 1827-1833 (La Habana, Fundacin Fernando Ortiz, 1998). While Millers work mentions the Cuban slave trade only tangentially, its approach and scope merits attention. Miller analyzes the Angolan slave trade with Brazil in great detail but it is truly a work that considers the Atlantic world at large, examining every aspect of the trade from embarkation to point of arrival. The breadth of the analysis includes the commercial and logistical aspects of the trade, the role of the slave trade in the socio-economic transformation of Brazil, the consequences of the Angolan slave trade and the Brazilian economy for Portugal, and the impact of the slave trade in western central Africa. Millers work points to the scholarly potential for examining the Cuban slave trade after 1789; see Miller, Way of Death.

Johnson, Rise and Fall of Creole Participation, p. 52, Franco, Comercio clandestino, p. 89. Eltis approach is slightly more neutral, Economic Growth and the End of the Transatlantic Slave Trade, p. 44.

Ramirez asserts that despite royal privileges, Spanish commercial efforts were hampered by a general lack of organization and the inability to establish direct trade with western Africa in the eighteenth century; see Bibiano Torres Ramirez, La compaia gaditana de negros (Sevilla: La Escuela de Estudios Hispano Americanos, 1973), pp. 111118.

A longtime representative of Liverpool slave merchants Peter Baker and John Dawson, Havana agent Felipe Allwood also represented the waning interests of British control of the Cuban slave trade. For the better part of a decade Baker and Dawson maintained exclusive Spanish licenses for the importation of slaves into Cuba. Lobbying efforts by Baker and Dawson for an extension of their commercial monopoly generated significant opposition and rancor from domestic merchants. Spanish merchants, who were clamoring for the liberalization of the slave trade, resented the English factors presence on the island, for Allwood symbolized the unwelcome vestiges of a mercantilist era. Indeed, in the 1790s perennial appeals to the crown resulted in Alwoods expulsion from the island; see Fraginales, El ingenio, vol. 1, p. 51, p. 71.

This study follows the traditional political periodization of the early Spanish slave trade, marked by Spanish liberalization in 1789, English abolishment in 1807, and Spanish abolishment between 1817 and 1820. While recognizing the interplay between geopolitics and society, the discourse nonetheless emphasizes the fundamental social and economic interactions between individuals in the Atlantic world.

For the period under study, Cuban slave merchants identified themselves as merchants, or comerciantes, not as slave merchants or negreros. In nineteenth-century Cuba the term comerciante was a generic term applied to any individual associated with the import-export trade, this included merchants exporting sugar, importing slaves, and refaccinistas or merchant-bankers. A refaccinista, or merchant-banker provided landowners with revolving credit accounts and financial services for a mills yearly operation. The term mercader was reserved for retail merchants. For an overview of the historiography on Spanish American merchants see James Lockhart, The Merchants of Early Spanish America, Ibero-Amerikanisches Archiv, 20(1994):34, pp. 223245. For linguistic mutations of the terms mercader and comerciante see Fred Bronner, Urban Society in Colonial Spanish America, Latin American Research Review, 21(1986):1, p. 15.

Geographically, the trade was limited to thirteen Spanish ports on the peninsula and most colonial ports in the Americas, but royal stipulations specifically excluded Veracruz, a dynamic trading port since the conquest period, and Caracas, a burgeoning port in the late colonial era. The logic maintained that New Spain, which represented the largest and richest commercial market, would garner excessive attention from peninsular merchants and newly enfranchised ports, while underdeveloped possessions in the Americas would remain neglected. During this period it was Caracas, not Havana that garnered most of the attention from peninsular merchants, representing the second largest commercial market after Veracruz. Even in the late colonial period, Havana possessed very few commercial options; smaller regional ports on the peninsula had not developed an extensive commercial infrastructure with the island. Other peninsular ports were restricted from trading directly with Veracruz. For Spanish merchants, New Spain continued to be their most lucrative market well into the 1800s. Indeed, between 1797 and 1819, Cadiz averaged 77% of all Spanish exports to the Americas. For the same period, 55.2% of Cadiz exports were shipped to New Spain, while the West Indies absorbed a mere 6.5% of total exports. John Fisher, Imperial Free Trade and the Hispanic Economy 1778-1796, Journal of Latin American Studies, 13(May 1981):1, pp. 2223, p. 39, p. 45; John R. Fisher, Commerce and Imperial Decline: Spanish Trade with Spanish America, 17971820, Journal of Latin American Studies, 30(October, 1998):3, p. 462, p. 470, p. 473, p. 476.

For an analysis of the administrative inconsistencies in Spanish commercial policy at the turn of the nineteenth century, see Fisher, Commerce and Imperial Decline, p. 478.

Dale Tomich, The Wealth of Empire: Francisco Arango y Parreo, Political Economy, and the Second Slavery, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 45 (2003), pp. 428. Arango y Parreo advocated that technology and innovation would modernize Cubas sugar industrial complex and establish a competitive edge against foreign producers; see Francisco de Arango y Parreo, Discurso sobre la agricultura de la Habana y medios para fomentarla, in Obras, 2 vols., (La Habana, Direccin de Cultura, Ministerio de Educacin, 1952), Vol. 1, pp. 137138.

Albeit with minor restrictions the slave trade was now open to all foreigners and Spaniards alike, thus eliminating a long tradition of granting monopolies to a few firms. By expanding the docking rights in Havanas harbor for foreign vessels from eight to forty days, the Spanish Crown enabled merchants to fully negotiate fair market prices for their slaves while potentially reducing the number of illicit sales on the island. In turn, crown concessions to Spanish merchants authorized the exportation of any commodities deemed necessary for the successful completion of African expeditions. ANC, Real Consulado, Leg. 74, No. 2836, Real Cedula de 2 de abril de 1804, Sobre trafico de negros bozales.

James Ferguson King, Evolution of the Free Trade Principle in Spanish Colonial Administration, The Hispanic American Historical Review, 22(February 1942):, p. 54.

Linda K. Salvucci, Atlantic Intersections: Early American Commerce and the Rise of the West Indies (Cuba), Business History Review, 79 (Winter 2005), p. 803. Murray, Odious Commerce, p. 14.

Johnson, The Rise and Fall of Creole Participation in the Cuban Slave Trade, 17891796, p. 57.

ANC, Real Consulado, Leg. 74, No. 2836, Observaciones de la Compaia de Cuesta Manzanal y Hermano referentes al Comercio de negros. Seeking a dynamic Spanish royal commercial policy, Francisco Arango y Parreo and the Havana based Royal Consulate actively sought the perspectives of Havana slave merchants to bolster their demands for an expansion of slave trade, see Franco, Comercio Clandestino, pp. 9293.

Cuesta y Manzanal and his close associates, Francisco Hernandez and Martin Tarafa, maintained active commercial ties with foreign slave merchants for the purpose of trade-knowledge acquisition; see Ibid., November 23, 1803; ANC, Tribunal de Comercio, Leg. 345, No. 6, Don Simon Poey sobre que el Capitn del Bergantin Nancy, Tomas Cottrell de cierta Declaracin; ANC, Tribunal de Comercio, Leg. 157, No. 10, Don Pedro Diago y Don Nicolas de Mendive como sindicos del concurso de Don Mariano Carbo contra el Americano Don Guillermo Marterton sobre unos negros.

B.K. Drake, The Liverpool-African Voyage c. 17901807: Commercial Problems, in Roger Anstey, P.E.H. Hair, Liverpool, the African Slave Trade, and Abolition: Essays to Illustrate Current Knowledge and Research (Liverpool: Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire, 1976), p. 126.

Along with expertise, the neutral status of American carriers was an attractive commercial alternative to Cuban merchants during a time of political instability in the Atlantic and an era of British naval control of the sea-lanes. Slave imports into Havana from Rhode Island slave merchants increased substantially after the outbreak of European hostilities in 1793. By 1795 American merchants possessed 51% of the slave market in Havana. Coughtry credits the war between Spain and England for the inflated prices of the era; see Jay Coughtry, The Notorious Triangle: Rhode Island and the African Slave Trade, 17001807 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1981), p. 174. However, Bergad, et. al., attribute the sharp rise in prices after 1795 to the pent up demand for tropical products in the aftermath of the Haitian Revolution, see Laird Bergad, Fe Iglesias Garca, Mara del Carmen Barcia, The Cuban Slave Market, 1790-1880 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 21.

In the early 1790s a group of Spanish merchants petitioned the crown for monopoly rights to the Atlantic slave trade see, Franco, p. 147, Johnson, p. 62, and Tornero, pp. 5455.

ANC, Asuntos Polticos, Leg. 106, No. 9. The proposal stated, We should precisely gain knowledge under the auspices of the slave trading nations, and by this we mean the English. Adding, Both the English and the French have actively maintained the requisite knowledge and the best establishments in Africa with a great deal of preponderance and without interruption.

Ibid., Expediente relativo a la formacin de una compaia nacional para emprender el comercio directo de esclavos de la costa de Africa, January 12, 1803; Prospecto de la Compaia Africana de la Havana, and Prospecto General de las Primeras Operaciones que se Propone la Direccin de la Compaia Africana de la Havana, April 11, 1804.

George Brooks, Yankee Traders, Old Coasters & African Middlemen; A History of American Legitimate Trade with West Africa in the Nineteenth Century (Brookline, Massachusetts: Boston University Press, 1970), p. 80.

Ibid. Poor seamanship and leadership on a Cuban vessel resulted in fatal consequences. Amidst conflicting advice from crewmembers Captain Juan Agustin Conill sailed the polacre San Francisco de Paula up the Bight of Biafra, anchoring near the Port of Calabar. Soon after loading 301 slaves, winds and fierce waves thrashed the vessel, positioning it on top of a sandbar. Anchored and failing to employ its sails the San Francisco took the brunt of the tumultuous storm. Unable to sail, the vessel capsized and began its steady descent into the sea. Most of crewmembers abandoned ship and were rescued by nearby vessels. However, the slaves remained imprisoned for six hours as the ship continued to sink. All 301 slaves perished. Ranking officers, including the captain were of Spanish origin. The harbor pilot was English. ANC, Tribunal de Comercio, Leg. 134, No. 3, Juan Agustin Conill Capitan de la Polacra San Francisco de Paula sobre un cargamento de negros.

The effectiveness of mandating surgeons on slave ships is questioned by Richard H. Steckel; Richard A. Jensen, New Evidence on the Causes of Slave and Crew Mortality in the Atlantic Slave Trade, The Journal of Economic History, 46 (1986):1, pp. 5777.

ANC, Junta de Fomento de la Isla de Cuba, Expediente No. 752, Leg. 150, No. 7409, April 1, 1811, July 17, 1811.

Ibid., July 12, 1811.

Ibid; Smith argues that as African intermediaries, Portuguese merchants played a vital role in the Spanish Atlantic slave trade. Smiths second assertion, that the Portuguese financed slave voyages to Cuba is not as discernable, see, Gervase Clarence-Smith, The Portuguese Contribution to the Cuban Slave and Coolie Trades in the Nineteenth Century, Slavery and Abolition, 5(May 1984):1, pp. 24-33.

The Middle Passage by Herbert Klein, is still the most authoritative account on matters of life and death on the high seas.

The report was submitted to the Royal Consulate, a commercial committee occupied by Spanish merchants and planters. For an overview on the importance of Spanish Royal Consulates see Robert Smith, The Spanish Guild Merchant: A History of the Consulado, 1250-1700 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1940). Lampros argues that planters in Havana controlled the Royal Consulate during the early nineteenth century, see Peter Lampros, Merchant-Planter Cooperation and Conflict: The Havana Consulado, 1794-1832 (Ph.D. dissertation, Tulane University, 1980), p. 19.

David Eltis, Mortality and Voyage Length in the Middle Passage: New Evidence from the Nineteenth Century, The Journal of Economic History, 44 (June 1984):2, pp. 301-308; James C. Riley, Mortality on Long-Distance Voyages in the Eighteenth Century, The Journal of Economic History, 41:3 (September 1981), pp. 651-656; Kenneth F. Kipple; Brian T. Higgins, Mortality Caused by Dehydration During the Middle Passage, Social Science History 13(Winter 1989):4, p. 422, p. 424.

ANC, Tribunal de Comercio, Leg. 260, No. 1, March 1, 1819, Brooks, Yankee Traders, p. 79; Kipple and Higgins, Mortality Caused by Dehydration during the Middle Passage, p. 425. B.K. Drake does not find a correlation between seasonality of departure and climactic considerations with Liverpool-based slave voyages. Utilizing four separate analyses from Liverpool to Africa, in the years 179194, 1798, 1799, and 180407 Drake demonstrates that between 4860% of all voyages left during the defined wet season, implying that the season of departure played a minimal role in the planning of Liverpool slave expeditions; see B.K. Drake, The Liverpool-African Voyage c. 17901807: Commercial Problems, in Roger Anstey, P.E.H. Hair, Liverpool, the African Slave Trade, and Abolition: Essays to Illustrate Current Knowledge and Research (Liverpool: Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire, 1976), pp. 130-132.

ANC, Tribunal de Comercio, Leg. 287, No. 4, February 21, 1819. Dysentery is the inflammation of the mucous membrane and glands of the large intestine and is accompanied by bloody discharges. For a description of the effects of dysentery on slaves during the Middle Passage and a discussion of the varieties of this ailment see, Sheridan, Guinea Surgeons of the Middle Passage, pp. 34.

ANC, Tribunal de Comercio, Leg. 32, No. 8, Ramon y Mariam de Mendive sobre acreditar los perjuicios que ha sufrido la casa de seguros de que son directores por apresamiento de buques que aseguraron.

ANC, Tribunal de Comercio, Leg. 260, No. 1, November 8, 1821, March 1, 1819.

For a genealogical history of the OFarrill clan in Cuba, see Francisco Xavier de Santa Cruz y Malln, Historia de Familias Cubanas (La Habana: Editorial Hercules, 1950), Vol. 3, pp. 334349. Ricardo OFarrills involvement in the illicit slave trade is often celebrated by Cuban historians but details of his career and contributions are few, see Jos Luciano Franco, Comercio Clandestino de Esclavos (La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1996), p. 22. For statistics on Havana slave imports in the eighteenth century see, Colin Palmer, Human Cargoes: The British Slave Trade to Spanish Americas, 1700-1739 (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1981), pp. 104106.

ANC, Tribunal de Comercio, Leg. 467, No. 3, Jacobo Faber, con Martin Zavala, sobre sociedad establecimiento de Factoria de negros (est. 1816.).

The use of intermediaries was not exclusive to the English. Spaniards quickly developed other functional methods of acquiring African intermediaries. Additionally, slave acculturation need not occur in the formal educational settings that the English established. Indeed, the practical backdrop of the Atlantic Ocean and slave trading ports proved to be a most effective method of cultural absorption. For example, Captain Miguel Moran, leader of six expeditions for the Havana based House of Ynglada acquired two slaves, named Ambrosio and Pablo from slave barracks in Africa in 1814 for his personal use. Both slaves were part of a perquisite package Moran negotiated with other Spanish merchants financing the voyage. On his fourth voyage to Africa in 1817, Ambrosio and Pablo accompanied Moran as interpreters on the African coast and assisted him in caring for the slaves on their voyage to Havana. Moran also negotiated an annual salary of $360 pesos for each slave interpreter with the financiers of the expedition. This example not only emphasizes the importance of African interpreters in the Atlantic slavery but it also suggests a relatively rapid acculturation [I am not sure what you mean by seasoning here] process, see ANC, Tribunal de Comercio, Leg. 260, No. 1, Second Book, March 20, 1822, February 7, 1823.

In order to generate slave sales to Faber and Goss, the Gmez brothers would systematically initiate warfare between their communities , capture each others prisoners for slaves, and subsequently divide the profits. For a moral critique of the Spanish slave trade by an American sailor, see George Howland, Captain George Howlands Voyage to West Africa, in Norman R. Bennett, George E. Brooks (eds.), New England Merchants in Africa: A History Through Documents, 1802 to 1865 (Boston, Boston University Press, 1965), p. 87.

ANC, Tribunal de Comercio, Leg. 467, No. 3, Jacobo Faber, con Martin Zavala, sobre sociedad establecimiento de Factoria de negros (est. 1816.), Tribunal de Comercio, Leg. 166, No. 9, Autos seguidos enter Don Jacobo Faber y Don Martin Zavala sobre cuentas, mandado formar por separarse para la informacion de insolvencia que ha promovido la parte del primero. Reales Cedulas y Ordenes, Leg. 83, No. 45, Jacobo Faber, Martin de Zavala y consortes en cobro de pesos por una Compaa que formaron para el trafico de negros.

Goss, Jacob Fabers partner, resided on the coast ten years and amassed quite a fortune. Soon after making plans to return to Liverpool, Goss died from edema, a condition causing the swelling of the abdomen, brought about from repeated fevers, see George Howland, Captain George Howlands Voyage to West Africa, in Norman R. Bennett; George E. Brooks, New England Merchants in Africa: A History Through Documents, 1802 to 1865 (Boston: Boston University Press, 1965), p. 80, pp. 8293.

The slave trade generated enormous profits generated for the generation of 1789. For example, by 1830 the Lombillos amassed a fortune valued at nearly $2,200,000 pesos by integrating every productive aspect of the sugar mill complex. Their wealth consisted of five urban households, three sugar mills, located near Havana, four coffee plantations, two cattle ranches, and 1,503 plantation slaves. Additionally, the totals ignore the value of maritime slave expeditions in transport during the same year, see ANC, Escribanas, Salinas, Leg. 192, No. 2642, Testamentaria del Conde de Casa Lombillo. Born in Val de San Lorenzo in 1778, Santiago de la Cuesta y Manzanal arrived in Cuba in the early nineteenth century. Along with his brother Tirso, Santiago founded one of the foremost slave merchant houses in Havana: Cuesta Manzanal y Hermano. Quickly assimilating into Cuban society he acquired the post of alcalde ordinario of Havana, as well as several honors and accolades including Knight of the Order of Isabel the Catholic, Royal Steward of the Holy Week, and the most prominent title, the first Count of Reunion of Cuba. By marrying the daughter of Bonifacio Gonzlez Larrinaga, a prominent merchant-banker, Cuesta y Manzanal established one of the most powerful Cuban dynasties in the first half of the nineteenth century, see Santa Cruz y Malln, Historia de Familias Cubanas, Vol. 7, p. 389. Sixteenth Report of the Directors of the African Institution (London: Ellerton and Henderson, 1822), p. 105, p. 108. Hailing from Cadiz and arriving in Havana in the early nineteenth century, Joaqun Gmez is the archetype of the successful Cuban slave merchant. From humble peninsular beginnings to the accumulation of nearly two million pesos in Havana, Gmez ascended from obscurity to notoriety and became one of the most influential members of Cuban society. A cousin of Ramon Hano y Vega, his family ties formed the basis for the acquisition of his early knowledge of the slave trade. While slave trading provided the foundation for the formation of surplus capital, his interests and skills lay beyond matters of the slave trade. Owning and directing several large sugar mills, Gmez was also a prominent merchant-banker and a major exporter of sugar. Through his occupation as a merchant-banker or creditor, he foreclosed, acquired or subsequently sold vast tracts of real estate in and around Havana. Even after serving in a number of other social roles, Gmez continued to participate in the slave trade well into the 1820s, however because of the official Spanish prohibition, direct references to his involvement were deliberately vague. Documents that would implicate Gmez with the slave trade in the latter half of the 1820s merely refer to him as Sor Don J.G. Unlike other well-known slave merchants Gmez never obtained a noble title. Nonetheless, Gmez acquired several government posts including serving as consul and head magistrate for the Merchant Tribunal, leader of the council for the promotion of white immigration, alderman for the Havana Municipal Council, member of the Council of Emancipated Slaves, administrator of funds for public works, and Director of the Bank of Fernando VII. Sources differ on Joaqun Gmez marital status but all agree that he never fathered any children. However, in the classic Spanish merchant tradition he became quite close to his nephew Jos Mara Cagigal. Gmez transferred his wealth and knowledge of the slave trade to Cagigal. As a trusted associate, Cagigal subsequently acquired important duties as a dealer of unseasoned slaves and emancipated slaves, Santa Cruz y Malln, Historia de Familias Cubanas, Vol. 5, p. 131; Turnbull, Travels in the West, p. 96, p. 397; Eusebio Valds, Los antiguos diputados de Cuba y apuntes para la historia constitucional de esta isla, (La Habana, Imprenta el Telegrafo, 1879), p. 18, p. 23, p. 24, p. 169, p. 215, p. 225, p. 232, p. 234, p. 238; Biblioteca Naional Jos Mart, Correspondencia reservada del Capitn Don Miguel Tacon (La Habana, Consejo Nacional de Cultura, 1963), p. 318; Rodrguez, Negreros Catalanes y Gaditanos, pp. 34-38; Fraginales, El ingenio, pp. 266267.

ANC, Tribunal de Comercio, Leg. 30, No. 1, ANC, Escribanas, Pontn, Leg.143 No. 7, August 29, 1824, September 2, 1824, September 4, 1824, September 6, 1824, November 25, 1824, and December 2, 1824.

ANC, Tribunal de Comercio, Leg. 260, No. 1, October 30, 1821.

Turnbull notes that while initially conceived by Cuban slave merchants as a parallel commercial service, MICH eventually diversified its portfolio, see David Turnbull, Travels in the West; Cuba with Notices of Porto Rico and the Slave Trade (London: Longman, Orme, Brown, Green, Longmans, 1840) p. 141. For MICH losses to the British abolitionist campaign, see ANC, Tribunal de Comercio, Leg. 32, No. 10, Ramon de Bustillo y Mariam de Mendive sobre acreditar los perjuicios que ha sufrido la casa de seguros de que son directores por apresamento de buques que aseguraron.

A. D. M. Forte, Marine Insurance and Risk Distribution in Scotland before 1800, Law and History Review, 5(Autumn, 1987):2, pp. 393412; Solomon Huebner, The Development and Present Status of Marine Insurance in the United States, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 26 (September 1905), pp. 241272; John G. Clark, Marine Insurance in Eighteenth-Century La Rochelle, French Historical Studies, 10 (Autumn, 1978):4, pp. 572598. For Cuban examples of qualification and justification of anticipated profits attributed to total losses of slave cargo for insurance purposes, see ANC, Tribunal de Comercio, Leg. 513, No. 29 and Tribunal de Comercio, Leg. 260, No. 5.

Calendario manual y gua de forasteros de la Isla de Cuba para el ao de 1795, (Havana: la Imprenta del Capitan General, 1795), p. 69.

ANC, Tribunal de Comercio, Leg. 116, No. 12, April 9, 1799, May 31, 1799, June 14, 1799, June 15, 1799.

Jos Marti Cuban National Library, Compaia de Seguros Maritimos, establecida en la ciudad de la Havana en 1795. Jess Maria Valdaliso, The Rise of Specialist Firms in Spanish Shipping and Their Strategies of Growth, 1860 to 1930, The Business History Review 74(Summer, 2000):2, pp. 267300.

ANC, Escribanas, Guerra, Leg. 500, No. 6564, Document No. 6, No. 9, February 7, 1804, July 30, 1814, October, 3, 1814, September 25, 1834.

ANC, Escribanas, Daumy, Leg. 804, No. 1, July (day illegible), 1824, November 4, 1824, August 16, 1824.

ANC, Escribanas, Pontn, Leg.143 No. 7, August 29, 1824, September 2, 1824, September 4, 1824, September 6, 1824, November 25, 1824, and December 2, 1824.

ANC, Audiencia de La Habana, Leg. 267, No. 11, June 30, 1832.

After Carbos bankruptcy proceedings, Ramon Hano y Vega purchased the sugar mill Jess Nazareno, in the early nineteenth century and his cousin, Joaqun Gmez subsequently acquired San Ignacio several years later, see ANC, Escribanas, Pontn, Leg. 162, No. 14.

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