Clint Irwin 1

National Identity and Football Tactics: Spain and the Netherlands in the 2010 World Cup

Clint Irwin

Elon University

November 23, 2010

Clint Irwin 2

Abstract

This study will examine the relationship between national identity and international

football tactics. Specifically, this study focuses on the national identities of Spain and the

Netherlands and how these identities affect the tactics used by their national football teams in the

2010 World Cup in South Africa. While most studies keep these two fields separate, this study

considers the relationship between these two variables. National identity is an important field in

political science and international studies. In this study, the independent variable national

identity is measured by an extensive investigation into the scholarly literature regarding national

identity in both Spain and the Netherlands. This dual case study approach uses official FIFA

statistics as well as prominent tactical analysis websites to analyze the dependent variable,

tactics. The study finds a seemingly solid relationship between national identity and tactics in

both cases. In both cases it appears that there is a relationship between current national identities

and the tactics employed by each team.

Introduction

Since the beginning of human life, politics have existed in some form. Politics has existed

as a way to organize people. In addition, humans have attempted to entertain themselves through

various different media. One of these media has been sport, in which, humans are the main

participants. Football is one sport which has blended entertainment, politics and sport into an

astonishingly popular worldwide phenomenon with importance to human affairs (Taylor 1988).

One way in which people organize themselves is around a national identity (Krauss

2003). Another area that provides a cohesive structure for society is communal viewing of

international football matches (Allison 1986; Brammer 2005; Cha 2009; Coelho 1998,

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Giulianotti 1999; Guttman 2003; Hobsbawm 1990; Krauss 2003; Lechner 2007; Martin 2005;

Taylor 1988). This study will examine the effect of national identity on international football

tactics.

First, this study will examine previous scholarship on national identity and international

football tactics. Next, the case studies will be examined. The study will be broken into two case

studies: Spain and the Netherlands. As the independent variable, Spanish national identity will be

measured through an examination of prominent research from studies and books. Next, Dutch

national identity will be measured in the same way.

The dependent variable, tactics, will also be broken into two case studies: tactics used by

Spain and the Netherlands during the 2010 World Cup in South Africa. This study will examine

each match that the teams play in, culminating in the 2010 World Cup final when the two nations

faced each other. The study will attempt to examine certain hypotheses regarding national

identity and its effects on football tactics. After the variables have been sufficiently

operationalized, the study will move into a detailed analysis of the findings.

National identity is an important area of study in the political science and international

studies fields. The literature regarding national identity is extensive. However, little scholarly

work exists regarding the effect national identity has on football tactics. While quality work has

been done on the national identities of both Spain (Aguilar and Humlebaek 2001;Ball 2003;

Bollen and Diez Medrano 1998; Guibernau 2000;Hooper 1995; Martinez-Herrera and Miley

2009; Medrano and Gutierrez ) and the Netherlands (Essed and Trienekens 2008; Kramer 2006;

Kuper 2010; Lechner 2002; Prins and Saharso 2008; Scheffer 2000; Winner 2008), scholarship

has remained quiet on the effect this has on football tactics.

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International football tactics has experienced an explosion of written work in the past

decade. Websites devoted to the analysis of tactics have become increasingly prevalent and a

published book by Jonathan Wilson (2008) entitled Inverting the Pyramid: The History of

Football Tactics have brought tactics to the forefront of the study of why teams win and lose.

Other authors have concentrated their studies on the football identities of individual countries

with a smattering of tactical analysis. Phil Ball (2003) writes columns regarding the regional

identities in Spanish football culminating in his book Morbo: The Story of Spanish Football.

David Winner (2008) writes about the history and development of football in the Netherlands in

his book Brilliant Orange: The Neurotic Genius of Dutch Soccer. This study will attempt to

combine both the study of national identities and tactics into a scholarly work that examines why

teams play a certain way.

Literature Review

Rarely do scholars measure national identity in quantitative formulas. Formulas to

ascertain national identities are difficult to create as national identity is more how one “feels” or

how one “identifies” themselves (Cha 2009; Krauss 2003). The literature in this field of study

presents some key findings: (1)International football helps people to identify with themselves,

others and their nation (Allison 1986; Brammer 2005; Cha 2009; Coelho 1998, Giulianotti 1999;

Guttman 2003; Hobsbawm 1990; Krauss 2003; Lechner 2007; Martin 2005; Taylor 1988); (2)

National identity can exist in the forms of tribalism (Allison 1986; Brammer 2005; Edwards

1998); and (3) Globalization is changing national identities (Hall et. al 1992; Lechner 2003;

Martin 2005).

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The importance of international football goes far beyond that of just a game. Temple

(1992) summarizes the drama best:

It’s not just games you’re watching. It’s soap operas, complete with story lines

and plots and plot twists. And good guys and villains, heroes and underdogs. And

all this gets scripted into cliffhanger morality plays…And you get all caught up in

this until you begin to believe it really matters (29).

Temple’s (1992) statement shows the intensity of the passion that arises due to football. Football

moves past simple entertainment into areas like politics that “really matter.” Cha (2009) answers

that football and sports are simply another playing field for interstate competition and

cooperation. Not only that, but sports lend themselves to “prideful self-identification” (40).

Scholarship must start with the definition of identity. Taylor (1988) and Widdicombe

(1998) state their own unique definition. According to their work, identities are not something

that people “are.” Rather identities are something that people “do,” be it in a social activity or

other activity (Widdicombe 1998). Football is one of these social activities in which people “do”

an identity. Krauss (2003) defines national identity as “the fact of being personally identified

with supposed national characteristics…imposed upon me whether I like or not” (198). When

international football events occur nearly every two years, people tend to try on the identity of

the country they support (Krauss 2003).

Scholars have noted the connection between sport and national identity using many

different studies. Some scholars examine national identity in relation to the Olympic Games

(Smith and Porter 2004). Most examine national identity through the lens of international

football. The consensus among many scholars is that international football competition between

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national teams provides an outlet for nationalist sentiment (Allison 1986; Brammer 2005; Cha

2009; Coelho 1998, Giulianotti 1999; Guttman 2003; Hobsbawm 1990; Krauss 2003; Lechner

2007; Martin 2005; Taylor 1988). These scholars note that football “shapes and cements

national identities” (Giulianotti 1999a, 330). National identity is thus shaped by representative

football teams. Cohesion on the football pitch is translated as cohesion in international affairs

and in domestic politics. Cha (2009) provides a powerful explanation stating that sport acts as a

“prism” in which national identity is refracted; victories symbolize everything well within one’s

identity in a “cathartic” and “emotional” experience (40).

Some scholars disagree with the theory that international football shapes national identity

(Giulianotti 1999a; Giulianotti and Robertson 2004; Taylor 1988). Instead, they note that football

is really individual characteristics that come together for rare international football events

(Giulianotti, 1999a; Taylor 1988). For example, Giulianotti (1999a) finds that the most fervent

support of football is found specifically at the club and local level. Echoing the sentiment that

“all politics is local,” international football only brings out national identities episodically. Since

international teams play tournaments primarily during the summer months and rarely every

summer, Giulianotti (1999a) argues that national identity cannot fully form in the sporadic

international fixtures. Even qualifying tournaments, which pop up about every month of the

year, are insufficient in drumming up any sort of national identity. On the other hand, club and

local sides play nine month seasons every year with one to two games per week, deepening the

ties between spectator and club. Giulianotti and Robertson (2004) find that the so-called “global

game” is really a “glocal game.” In the use of an English example, spectators may love the

English national team when the World Cup or European Championships are being played but

identify themselves first as Arsenal, Chelsea, Liverpool or Manchester United fans.

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Delving deeper into the subject of national identity, some scholars note the effects of

tribalism and personal identity (Allison 1986; Brammer 2005; Edwards 1998). Helpful to this

study is the work of Brammer (2005) who finds that international football creates “tribes” of

supporters. Tribalism encourages supporters and citizens from different regions to create identity

with the help of their football teams. Specific social, political and religious attributes come to

the fold during international football competition. The public arena of international football

competition allows these characteristics, some previously known, others not, to be on full

display. In effect, international football creates formidable cultures that lie dormant during non-

event years. Sport, football in specific, empowers these sometimes undesirable cultural

characteristics to emerge. Edwards (1998) also comments on the aspects of tribalism in

international football. Key to this group of scholars is the notion that international football teams

can be seen to represent the “collective personalities and qualities of a whole people” (Taylor

1988: 538). Citizens of nations identify themselves with the players on the field or in

competition. The characteristics of these players become the characteristics of the citizens of the

country and vice a versa. Events are taken to reflect on the state as a whole and loyalties are

more akin to that of a tribe than a modern institution (Allison 1986).

Other scholars disagree with this simplified theory. Martin (2005) asserts that national

identity is merely one part of an individual’s collective identity. Therborn (1995) and Martin

(2005) argue that these national identities are really overlaps of regional, national and supra-

national identities. To break these identities apart ignores their “uncertain,” “multi-

dimensional,” “hybrid” nature. National identity is simply one part of an individual or

spectator’s social or collective identity. Other scholars state that national identity itself,

especially in the realm of international football, is “imagined” (Lechner 2007; Anderson 1983).

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These identities are imagined because members of the community, for example international

football spectators, are unlikely to meet, interact or share their identities with others of the same

identity although the spectators may share the same interests (football, the national football team)

(Anderson 1983). Lechner (2007) uses the example of the Dutch national team and its spectators

as an example of the “imagined” national identity. He argues that media coverage turned a myth

of Dutch togetherness into a “reimagined national community.” Like Lechner (2007), Anderson

(1983) also finds that the media plays a role in constructing these “imagined” communities.

Scholars assert that national identity is an important part of international football.

However, certain scholars also find that international football teams are used to uphold a

constructed reputation and in some cases, to change an undesired reputation (Krauss 2003).

Different characteristics are garnered through the perception of one’s national team. The German

example serves as a clear example of this reputation, according to Krauss (2003). The ‘Miracle

of Berne’ of 1954, in which Germany became world champions marked the beginning of the

German “rebirth” following its defeat and humbling after World War II. Franz Beckenbauer, the

German captain of the 1974 World Cup Team and manager of the 1990 team became the totem

of this new German self-confidence. His style was seen as “light-footed, elegant and technically

well-versed” according to Krauss (2003: 209). As Krauss (2003) successfully notes,

international football causes citizens to identify with their respective national teams as teams

“engender bodily styles” and “reflect national characteristics” (200). Beckenbauer himself stated

that, “Football is still the best ambassador for Germany’s reputation in the world” (Krauss 2003,

210). Taylor (1988) also comments on the global representation presented by successful football

international teams. Taylor (1988) argues that success in sport can be presented by governments

as evidence of “national vitality” and the effectiveness of social organizations within that

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country. Further, the argument follows that states choose to give sport a central role in their

foreign policies in the belief that success in the international sport arena will support their larger

diplomatic and economic interests. Taylor (1988) goes further stating that the German

Democratic Republic used international sports competition and the following successes to

establish its own separate identity. Lechner (2007) argues from the Dutch case noting that the

international football team’s accomplishment represented the success of a small country on the

global stage. The event, the 1988 European Championship in which the Dutch team won,

cemented the Netherlands reputation as a small country that could compete with other much

larger countries not just on the football pitch. The Netherlands success also mirrors the triumphs

of similar sized countries in international competition such as Uruguay’s advancement to the

semifinals of the 2010 World Cup in South Africa. Krotee (1979) notes, well before Uruguay’s

most recent success, that Uruguay’s national identity lies primarily in its national football team.

The country’s main international ambitions as a small landlocked country in South America are

in international football competition.

Globalization is seen by many scholars as an important factor in the deconstruction of

national identities (Hall et. al 1992; Lechner 2003; Martin 2005). While globalization broadly

covers many areas of socio-economic factors, international football matches have functioned as

carriers of cultures and values to many parts of the world. Hall et. al (1992), Lechner (2003) and

Martin (2005) note that the phenomenon of globalization has chipped away at the idea of

national identity. These scholars argue that the shifting of people, ideas and goods has led to the

dissolution of singular, fixed national identities. Further, Martin (2005) believes that the

increased integration of Europe due to the European Union will increase supra-national

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identities. Martin (2005: 364) calls this new, “imaginable” identity “Europeanness.” What this

means for national identities in international football remains unclear.

The relationship between national identity and tactics executed by international football

teams has seen little to no scholarly research. Krauss (2003) touches briefly on the subject in his

discussion of national characteristics. The study cites three instances of national identity on the

pitch first with Argentina characterized by the “el pibe” tradition, literally “the boy.” “El pibe” is

characterized as a romantic version of football in which tactics and formations mean less than

simply playing for the joy of the game. Less emphasis is placed on formations and greater

emphasis on free-flowing movements. England receives the description of “fair play,” a

reflection of conservative, insular England in which the developments of the game are ignored in

favor of the philosophies of the country that invented the game. Finally, the German

characteristic is one of “virtue, discipline and combativeness” (Krauss 2003, 200). Giulianotti

(1999b), the seminal researcher in the field, provides a brief aside regarding tactics. Recalling

globalization, the study notes that South American countries borrowed tactics from established

European countries. Lechner (2007) mentions the groundbreaking Dutch tactic known as ‘Total

Football’. Specifically contrasted with the “dour, mechanical” German model, Dutch ‘Total

Football’ was known as a quick, passing game in which players interchanged positions on the fly

with great freedom (216). Such was the irrepressible nature of this style that the team became

known, due to their kit color, as ‘Clockwork Oranje.’ Part of Dutch national identity lies in the

belief that this tactic, much like a scholarly work, has added to the international football

community.

While brilliant work has been done in the journalistic field by the likes of Ball (2003),

Winner (2008), and Wilson (2008) to bring to light specific tactics and possible relations with

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national identity, scholars have neglected the evaluation and operationalization of each. The

2010 World Cup conducted in South Africa provides a valuable moment to evaluate national

identity and tactics at the most prestigious international football tournament. For this study, the

two finalists, Spain and the Netherlands will provide the case studies. Each team was lead by a

fellow countryman, Vicente del Bosque and Bert van Marwijk, respectively, simplifying the

evaluation of national identities. Whereas England may have provided an interesting case, yet

findings may be misleading since the English team was led by an Italian, Fabio Capello.

Interestingly, all four semifinalists were led by men of the same country (Germany with Joachim

Loew and Uruguay with Oscar Tabarez).

Research Design

This study intends to examine the conditions in which national identity affects

international football tactics in the case studies of Spain and the Netherlands, two nations who

have never won the World Cup. Certain hypotheses arise when examining this question. Many

scholars suggest a relationship between national identity and football tactics (Allison 1986;

Brammer 2005; Cha 2009; Edwards 1998; Giulianotti 1999a, 330; Krauss 2003; Krotee 1979;

Lechner 2007). These scholars find elements of national identity meshed with international

football competition in a symbiotic relationship; countries adopt certain identities during

international competition while teams take on the identity of their constituents.

Other scholars disagree with the above relationship (Anderson 1983; Giulianotti 1999a;

Giulianotti and Robertson 2004; Martin 2005; Taylor 1988; Therborn 1995). These scholars

state that international football competition occurs too sporadically to cement national identities.

This hypothesis may be true. National identity may have no effect on international football

tactics. National identities may actually be “imagined” as Anderson (1983) notes.

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An expected outcome of this research would be that a diverse national identity will lead

to a dynamic, attacking tactical strategy. The mixing of different ethnicities, religions and

regions would seemingly produce a tactical structure that was varied and malleable. Tactically,

teams with an unclear national identity would be expected to play a formation that was

interchangeable and hard to pin down. Research would be expected to show a mixture of long

passes, medium passes and short passes. This team would be expected to score many goals as

cohesion amongst the different identities, key in building a strong defense, would be stifled.

Attacking characteristics would be very strong as the attacks would take on an unpredictable

nature due to many different “styles” of play within the team.

In opposition, a traditional stagnant national identity will lead to a rigid defensive tactical

strategy. If a nation has a national identity that has remained unchanged for many years with

little diversity, the tactical strategy would reflect this. The team would be expected to play a

rigid tactical system in which defensive responsibilities trump offensive individuality. Long

passes would likely be the result of this as they are classified as a “direct” style of football takes

less skill than short and medium passes played at a high rate around the field. We would expect

to see an increase in the number of fouls and cards issued for “tactical fouls” used to slow the

rhythm of the other team.

Specifically, it would be expected that Spain’s fragmented national identity will lead to

less cohesion as a unit. With the many different autonomous regions within Spain and the

history of strained relations, one would expect difficulty in melding a team with many different

identities. Catalan and Basque identities would not be expected to meld well with those from

central and southern Spain. Ball (2003) mentions this expectation: “Many reasons have been

cited as contributory factors to Spain’s underachievement, but regional tension is one which is

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almost never mentioned by the Spanish themselves. This is interesting, since foreign observers

often wonder whether the presence of players from separatist regions in the national team causes

friction in the dressing room” (219). Less possession and passing would be the outcome of these

conflicting regional identities. Overall, fewer goals would be scored and the team would achieve

as much.

This study’s dependent variable is tactics used by the international football teams of

Spain and Germany during all games of the FIFA World Cup in South Africa in the summer of

2010. For Wilson (2009), tactics involves shape and space, the intelligent deployment of players

and their movements within that deployment. For the purpose of this study, tactics will be

defined as the decisions made by team managers, staff and players regarding positioning of

players on the field, style of play (type of passing, physicality, defensive or attacking), and

strategic adjustments made game to game used with the intention of winning games. This study

uses 8 different measurements of tactics: (1) formations, (2) Distance run, (3) long passes,

medium passes, short passes, (4) Fouls, yellow cards, red cards, (5) goals, (6) attacks, (7) tackles

and (8) post-game player and manager comments regarding tactics. Each of these will be

measured using official FIFA statistics and post-game interviews found on the FIFA website. 1

Formations will be analyzed using FIFA lineup as well as websites that study tactics. This study

explores one independent variable: national identity. National identity was measured by an

extensive examination of the literature.

National Identity

Dutch National Identity

                                                                                                                         1  These figures can be seen in chart form in Appendices A and B.  

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In the Dutch case, current national identity perplexes many scholars. In current

scholarship regarding the Dutch national identity, certain characteristics were prominent. Present

Dutch national identity can be seen through the issues of changing demographics brought about

by immigration, the evolution of Dutch tolerance and the country’s status as a small nation

(Essed and Trienekens 2008; Kramer 2006; Kuper 2010; Lechner 2002; Prins and Saharso 2008;

Scheffer 2000; Winner 2008).

According to Winner (2008), Dutch politics is characterized by “intense participatory

democracy” developed in Amsterdam in the 1960s and 70s. Further, Dutch politics is “based on

an elegant, slow-moving system of consultation, discussion, checks and balances that slowly

drains away all traces of drama or sudden changes of direction” (Winner 2008:81). In Holland,

the best decision is one decided on unanimously by a group decision, a tradition handed down

from the regenten2 (Winner 2008). Dutch democracy according to Winner (2008) is “based less

on ideology than on the country’s habitual reliance on contractual rights and agreements” (83).

For some, the Dutch propensity for more democracy is the result of its geographic

conditions (Winner 2008). As a small country that lies mostly under sea level, cooperation was

paramount, according to Winner (2008). “The usual explanation for Dutch democracy is one of

hydraulics: because of their watery landscape, the Dutch have always had to co-operate with

each other to keep their land dry” (Winner 2008:80). Dirk Simjons, a prominent Dutchman, finds

that this hyperdemocracy sometimes cripples legislation, “We really have a strange political

system with far too many parties – about twenty. We have far too much co-operation, too much

consultation” (Winner 2008:81).

                                                                                                                         2  Dutch plural for “regent.” Cabals of wealthy men who ran the Dutch Republic during the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries (Winner 2008).  

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While politics is just one part of national identity, another issue remains key in measuring

Dutch national identity. The Netherlands’ spatial identity is integral in understanding the overall

larger national identity. Winner provides a key insight into what he calls “a nation of spatial

neurotics” (Winner 2008):

Because of their strange landscape, the Dutch are a nation of spatial neurotics. On the one hand they don’t have nearly enough of the stuff. Holland is one of the most crowded and most intensively planned landscapes on earth. Space is an inordinately precious commodity, and for centuries the use of every square centimeter of every Dutch city, field and polder has been carefully considered and argued over. The land is controlled because as a matter of national survival it must be. The Dutch water system has to be regulated tightly because more than fifty per cent of the country is below sea level (47).

As the Dutch aphorism goes, “God made the world but man made Holland (Winner 2008: 48).

Mastery over landscape appears to be a key element of Dutch national identity. Winner (2008)

goes further noting the country’s Protestant history calling the Netherlands, “a world of order

and peace, sense and judgment, where shapes tessellate and the pieces join together neatly. A

land in which roads go around landholdings and farms, not through them…a nether-land, whose

constant struggle against the encroaching water is somehow intertwined with its Protestant ethic

of order and control” (48).

Further, notable observers find that this ‘small’ mentality leads to Dutch moralizing

(Scheffer 2000; Winner 2008). Paul Scheffer notes that it is easier for a small country to be

“good” in the moral sense than to be “strong” economically, diplomatically and militarily.3

Kuper (2010) goes on to note that the Netherlands once saw itself as a moral "guide land." 4

Scheffer goes on, “We are small and lack power, cut we think the whole world will adopt us as a

model of enlightenment. We have such a strong sense of moral superiority that it’s not so                                                                                                                          3 Simon Kuper, S. (2010). “What happened to the Holland I knew?” Financial Times.  4 Simon Kuper, (2010). “What happened to the Holland I knew?” Financial Times.

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important to us if we win or lose. It’s like the self-legitimitation of a small country which says

it’s no scandal to lose against a superior military force when outnumbered” (Winner 2008).

Scheffer comments in Winner (2008) on his fellow citizens, “We think we are the best (203).”

Another important aspect of Dutch national identity prevalent in the literature is the idea

of Dutch tolerance. Surveying the Dutch attitude towards tolerance Winner (2008) notes:

With sixteen million people crowded into a physically small space, the Dutch opted for a policy of openness, hospitality and multiculturalism. The way the Dutch see their personal relationships appears to mirror the openness of their traditional landscape. In Holland there is space for freedom, to a degree unthinkable in some other democratic countries – think of gay marriage or the liberal drugs policies or the way people can make a personal choice for euthanasia.’ The Dutch also make ample space for cultural expression – witness the high level of government support for the arts, the high number of artists in the Netherlands. But there is also space for fun and gezelligheid, recreational activities, special and immaterial concerns (52).

Scheffer is careful to note that the Dutch reputation around the world as a “Venice of the North”

is surprising. “It’s the rather astonishing way Amsterdam is called the Venice of the North.

Perhaps we are the Venice of the North, but we are certainly not the Brazilians of the North,

although many people seem to think that we are, because we indulge in carnavalesque behavior

once in a while” (Winner 2008: 260 ). Instead, Dutch society is more like the “rather boring

Swiss.” Winner (2008) witnesses this juxtaposition as well, “Not so long ago Amsterdam was

one of the most frumpy and tedious capitals in Europe. This takes some imagining: Amsterdam’s

present image as a cosmopolitan world city luxuriant with sensuality and sin, beauty and

sophistication is merited” (Winner 2008: 5).Scheffer goes on to note that Dutch tolerance is in

the context of something highly organized and is used for consensus building and conflict

avoidance in order to keep the peace. However he qualifies that, “It has never been a laissez-

faire tolerance” (Winner 2008: 261).

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According to the literature, Dutch tolerance has been challenged by the “multicultural

drama” of significant immigration (Scheffer 2000). After the September 11 terrorist attacks, the

Netherlands has reexamined it’s identity as a tolerant nation. Prior to the attacks, the

Netherlands had been a destination for immigrants from Surinam, the Dutch Antilles, Turkey and

Morocco (Lechner 2002). Simon Kuper, a Dutch expatriate recounts his experience when

returning back to the Hague, “I experienced a sequence of surprises: A traffic jam on a Sunday!

A barber shop open on a Sunday! The barber shop is called "Istanbul"! What the Dutch see now

when they cycle down their high street are mosques, cheap telephone shops for calling Turkey

and Africa and Moroccan teenagers hanging around. The Netherlands is no longer the place [I]

grew up in.”5

In 1961, there were only three Moroccans living legally in the Netherlands. By 2006,

more than one tenth of the Dutch population was of non-western origin (Kramer 2006). The

changing demographics have led to conflict. In 2002, the far-right politician Pim Fortuyn was

murdered by a white Dutchman after Fortuyn had made exacerbating comments regarding Islam

and Muslims (Kramer 2006). In 2004, filmmaker Theo van Gogh was murdered by a Dutch-

Moroccan Muslim while he cycled to work. Van Gogh had made a film critical of Islam’s

treatment of women (Kramer 2006).

These murders have brought “multiculturalism” to the forefront of Dutch identity

discussions. Observers note that, “Within a short period of time, the Netherlands transformed

itself from a relatively tolerant country to a nation that called for cultural assimilation, tough

measures and neo-patriotism” (Prins and Saharso 2008: 2). In an editorial Dutch political

scientist Paul Scheffer states that, “The current policy of widespread acceptance and limited

                                                                                                                         5 Simon Kuper (2004). “Trouble in paradise.” Financial Times.

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integration increases inequality and contributes to a sense of alienation in society. The tolerance

is groaning under the weight of overdue maintenance. The multicultural drama that is taking

place is the greatest threat to social peace.”6

Dutch size, politics, tolerance and attitudes toward immigration blend together and leave

the nation with an unclear national identity (Lechner 2002; Lechner 2007; Winner 2008). The

country is undergoing questioning of what it means to be or become Dutch, what tradition can

the country claim and why should it matter (Lechner 2002)? Winner (2008) quotes Paul

Scheffer:

The Dutch take an almost nationalistic pride in denying that we have a national identity. We like to think of ourselves as an open, trading nation, a transparent crossing-point, a place mediating between our neighbors. We are world travelers, international traders who have overcome nationalism and made the nation state obsolete. We think the whole world should move in our direction—but of course we are not nationalists (203)!

Dutch reluctance to engage in nationalism reflects a greater problem for Scheffer (Winner 2008):

We lack the ability to describe who we are. We know who we are, but we deny ourselves the idea of describing it because we seek our identity in the denial of that identity. We make it difficult to mobilize our own national energy or use national symbols for ourselves. For a Dutchman to cry for the flag would be considered obscene. Yet there’s a sense of uncertainty of our place in the world. We deny ourselves the possibility to reflect on who we are. Not every idea about nationalism is the same as hardcore nationalism. Perhaps it’s time to adopt a less schizophrenic attitude to this question. I never use the words “healthy nationalism” but that’s what I mean (203).

Lechner (2007) finds that Dutch national identity is undergoing a transition under which

many other nations are undergoing as well. He deems Dutch identity as “cosmopolitan

nationalism” which is “characterized by a revived attachment to things national that remains at

                                                                                                                         6 Paul Scheffer (2000). “Het multiculturele drama.” NRC Handelsblad.

 

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the same time outwardly oriented. In this strand of identity discourse, the nation is neither

bulwark nor empty shell but one type of communal identity in need of renegotiation” (Lechner

2007: 209).

Spanish National Identity

The case study of Spain’s national identity presents different issues than that of the

Netherlands. An extensive examination of the literature regarding Spanish national identity

presents a view that regionalism is the key to understanding Spanish identity (Aguilar and

Humlebaek 2001; Ball 2003; Bollen and Diez Medrano 1998; Guibernau 2000; Hooper 1995;

Martinez-Herrera and Miley 2009; Medrano and Gutierrez).

Following the end of Franco’s rule in Spain in 1977, the provisional government moved

to transform Spain from a centralist non-democratic regime to the Autonomous Communities

System (Guibernau 2000). Presently, Spain is made up of seventeen autonomous communities

of which three are historically and culturally distinct, Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia

(Guibernau 2000). These seventeen communities make up the nation of Spain. The explosion of

regionalism, notably by the Basques and the Catalans is widely attributed to the wording of the

Constitution (Ball 2003; Bollen and Diez Medrano 1998; Guibernau 2000). Ball (2003) notes,

“As far as the constitution is concerned (drawn up after Franco’s death) the Basque Country and

Catalonia are just two autonomous regions among many—Galicia, Asturias and Andalucia, for

example all having equal status and equal legislative powers” (Ball 2003: 220). The constitution

also provides linguistic protection for the autonomous states in marked contrast to Franco’s

outlawing of all languages and symbols other than Castilian ones (Guibernau 2000). While

Castilian is the Spanish state’s official language, the constitution provides that the Basque

Country, Galicia, Catalonia, the Balearic Islands and the Community of Valencia may use their

Clint Irwin 20

own languages as long as it does not jeopardize the use of Castilian (Bollen and Diez Medrano

1998). Guibernau (2000) shows how this structure functions:

Once full autonomy has been achieved, the constitution makes no distinction between the communities. Regardless of these variations, all communities are similarly structured: each has a regional legislative assembly consisting of a single chamber; deputies are elected on the basis of proportional representation, and the leader of the majority party or coalition usually assumes the Community presidency. The President heads a regional executive—ministers run administrative departments which, for the most part, though not in every case, follow the pattern of central government, depending on how much power is devolved to the respective autonomous community (61).

These democratic values contrast with the conservatism and centralization characteristic of life

under Franco. Hooper (1995) notes the flourishing Spanish democracy stating, “Ordinary

Spaniards have taken to democracy like ducks to water. All sorts of decisions…are nowadays

routinely submitted to a show of hands. The habits that go with democracy have put down

equally strong roots. The respect the Spanish are prepared to extend to the views of other is

nowadays virtually unlimited” (439).

It is important to note though that periodic calls for full independence have been heard

from both nationalist parties in the Basque Country and in Catalonia (Ball 2003). However,

Basque and Catalan nationalism are not deemed threatening enough to the central government

even with allusions to the uniqueness of the Basque race and blood in the very early formulations

of the Basque nationalist doctrine (Guibernau 2000: 59). Ball (2003) reassures that, “Catalan

nationalism is more about holding Madrid to as much ransom as possible, while its seats in the

Spanish parliament determine the balance of power in the country as a whole” (82). However,

the central government cannot ignore the autonomous regions, specifically the Catalans. “Central

government can never push things too far any more. Upset the Catalans and you risk losing

Clint Irwin 21

office. Calls for independence are not canny enough for the people of this region. They have

plenty of autonomy” (Ball 2003: 82).

Scholars note the effects of this regionalism on the national identity of Spain (Ball 2003;

Hooper 1995). Hooper (1995) states that, “More than most people in Europe, Spaniards tend to

put loyalty to their region on a par with, or even ahead of loyalty to their country” (Hooper 1995:

371). More currently though, Martinez-Herrera and Miley (2009) find that, “There are always

more people who regard Spain as their ‘nation’ or ‘country’ than who confer on their region the

category of ‘nation’” (21). While citizens of different communities have begun to warm to the

idea of Spain, Aguilar and Humlebaek (2001) find that nationalist parties are reluctant to

proclaim an attachment to Spain because of the negative connotations that allegiances gained

under Franco:

Most of them referred to the “Spanish state,” or even to the “Spanish kingdom,” but they were, and still are, very reluctant to use the term “nation” to refer to Spain, regarding Spain merely as a political structure composed of different nations such as the Basque, the Catalan and the Galician, along with some other areas with regionalist attachments and distinctive cultures. Moreover, it was difficult to use any Spanish discourse of nationalist affirmation due to its monopolization during the Francoist period. For any Spaniard who had lived under the dictatorship, expressions such as “Spain” and the “Spanish Nation” or cheers of “Viva España” immediately evoked Francoist discourse (123).

Paradoxically, in the World Value Survey, Spain’s score on the “national pride” spectrum is

consistently among the highest in Europe; over 85 percent of Spaniards feel either very or quite

proud of being Spanish (Aguilar and Humlebaek 2001). Evidence from a study conducted by

Medrano and Gutierrez (2010) states much the same, finding that respondents in their sample

identify most with Spain, followed by their autonomous community.

Clint Irwin 22

The Spanish Tactical Case: World Cup 20107

Spain came to the 2010 World Cup in South Africa as overwhelming favorites after their

victory in the European Championships in 2008 (Hill 2010). They were able to continue this

success and produced a “double” victory of winning their continental championship and the

World Cup in succession. Tactically, Spain held fast to 4-2-3-1 formation for the tournament

(FIFA 2010; Run of Play 2010; Zonal Marking 2010). While there were minor variations, Spain

largely stuck with a lineup of four defenders, two holding or defensive central midfielders, three

attacking midfielders that roamed and one forward. The one-man striker system allows Spain to

flood the midfield with five men and dominate possession allowing the execution of “simple, yet

magnetic pass and move football.”8 This possession is characterized by always playing the ball

to the open spot on the pitch with low-risk passes.9

In Spain’s first game, the Spanish team was surprisingly beat 1-0 by Switzerland. Spain

fielded their expectant side. A back four of Joan Capdevila, Carles Puyol, Gerard Pique, Sergio

Ramos with Iker Casillas in goal; two holding midfielders in Sergio Busquets, Xabi Alonso;

three attacking midfielders in Iniesta, Xavi, David Silva; one forward in David Villa. In the

game, Spain generated 24 shots with 8 on goal. The team committed eight fouls, took twelve

corner kicks and held possession for 63% of the game which resulted in 42 minutes of actual

possession. By all accounts, Spain dominated the game yet did create many clear scoring

opportunities. Hill (2010) noted, “The Swiss midfield and defence kept a very compact shape,

                                                                                                                         7 Appendix C provides a glossary of unfamiliar terms. 8 Tim Hill (2010). “The Dutch turn to their national anthem for their World Cup strategy.” Talking About Football. Retrieved from http://timhi.wordpress.com/2010/07/12/world-cup-final2010/. 9 Brian Jacobs (2010). “Thirteen World Cup Theses.” Run of Play. Retrieved from http://www.runofplay.com/2010/07/09/thirteen-world-cup-theses/#comment-10218.  

Clint Irwin 23

allowing Spain to dominate possession and control the match.”10 Zonal Marking (2010) noted,

“The favourites played absolutely awfully.”11

After the game, comments from managers and players were telling. Spanish manager

Vicente del Bosque said, “There’s always a chance you can lose, and their football didn’t

deserve such a big reward. We fought hard for the win but it wasn’t to be.” Switzerland’s

manager Ottmar Hitzfeld stated, “I’m well aware we made history. We’ve never beaten Spain

before and I’ve always said there would be a first time. I could see they were getting nervous

because they were the favourites, and we are absolutely thrilled with these three wholly

unexpected three points. We really concentrated on the job and we closed down space in the

midfield”. Noting the upset, Swiss midfielder Gelson Fernandes summed up the feeling of

many, “We were a little bit lucky.”12

The second game produced a more favorable result for the Spanish team. The opponent,

Honduras, was defeated 2-0. The Spanish team made two adjustments to the team that faced

Switzerland. Jesus Navas replaced David Silva on the right of midfield giving the team more

width as a true wide midfielder. Fernando Torres replaced the injured Andres Iniesta which

moved David Villa to the left sided midfielder role as Torres went to the lone forward spot.

Spain produced 22 shots, 8 shots on goal, 9 fouls and twelve corners. Possession was down

slightly but was still a staggering 57% for a real time measure of 38 minutes. After the game,

Spain’s dominance and attacking play was noted. Del Bosque said, “We created a lot of

                                                                                                                         10 Tim Hill (2010). “On the sixth day of World Cup, South Africa gave to me: A strong Swiss defence & a system change for Uruguay.” Talking About Football. Retrieved from http://timhi.wordpress.com/2010/06/19/sixth-day-world-cup/. 11 Zonal Marking (2010). “Spain 0-1 Switzerland: Spanish failings the main reason for the scoreline.” Zonal Marking. Retrieved from http://www.zonalmarking.net/2010/06/17/spain-0-1-switzerland-tactics/. 12 FIFA (2010). Spain-Switzerland: Quotes. Retrieved from http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/matches/round=249722/match=300111112/quotes.html.  

Clint Irwin 24

goalscoring situations and we ought to have won by more goals”. Spanish forward David Villa

stated, “We’re happy about the way we played. We won and looked convincing, because we

played a lot of attacking football and had a lot of possession”. Honduras forward David Suazo

also agreed, “They were able to dictate the tempo of the game”.13

In the final group game, Spain needed a victory against Chile to ensure progression into

the knockout stages of the tournament. Spain prevailed 2-1. Andres Iniesta returned to the

Spanish line up replacing Jesus Navas on the right side of midfield. Villa retained his role on the

left with Torres again the lone forward. In a tougher game for Spain, they produced nine shots

with three on goal, committed thirteen fouls and took four corners. While these statistics show a

more difficult game for Spain than the previous two, Spain still posted a possession ration of

59%, real time 39 minutes. Del Bosque mentioned the increased difficulty, “It was an intense

game against opponents who deserve plenty of praise for putting in a performance of incredible

energy. I give a lot of credit to the Chileans, who've done a great job, and I wish them all the

best.”14

With the victory, Spain advanced to the Round of 16 where they faced their Iberian

neighbors Portugal. Spain won the game 1-0 in which it was dominant. Del Bosque fielded an

unchanged line up from the win against Chile. Spain registered 19 shots with 10 on goal, 13

fouls and one yellow card and six corner kicks. Spain again monopolized possession at a rate of

61% which translated to 45 real minutes.

                                                                                                                         13 FIFA (2010). Spain-Honduras: Quotes. Retrieved from http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/matches/round=249722/match=300061494/quotes.html. 14 FIFA (2010). Chile-Spain: Quotes. Retrieved from http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/matches/round=249722/match=300061491/quotes.html.  

Clint Irwin 25

Del Bosque remained bullish in his post-match comments, “We looked comfortable out

there today. We played well and we were vigilant in defence and when we were on the ball we

created a lot of good chances. When we're in that form it's difficult to stop us. The players who

came on did a good job for us. Fernando Torres did what he had to do and we all felt pretty

comfortable with how we played”. Portuguese manager Carlos Quieroz echoed del Bosque’s

comments, “Spain had more possession and it was no surprise they dominated play. It was a fair

result when you consider the possession they had and the chances they created.”15

After the Portugal win, Spain advanced to the quarterfinals to face Paraguay. Spain

prevailed with a score of 1-0. Del Bosque persisted with the same team that beat Chile and

Portugal. In the game, Spain took 16 shots with six on goal, committed twelve fouls with two

yellow cards and had seven corner kicks. Spain again dominated possession statistics with 59%

translating to 37 minutes in real time. In the post-match comments del Bosque lamented, “We

didn’t play well and we never looked comfortable, but that was partly down to Paraguay. Even

so, I think we deserved to go through and the best thing about the game was the result. We are

delighted to be in the last four and these are happy times for Spanish football.”16

In the semifinal, Spain faced a surging Germany side that had produced some of the most

impressive play.17 Spain made one personnel switch with Pedro coming in for the ineffective

Fernando Torres. David Villa went back to the central forward position. Pedro went to the left

attacking midfield position with Iniesta out to the right and Xavi taking up the central attacking

role. In a more even match, Spain produced thirteen shots with five on goal, seven fouls and

                                                                                                                         15 FIFA (2010). Spain-Portugal: Quotes. Retrieved from http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/matches/round=249717/match=300061498/quotes.html. 16 FIFA (2010). Spain-Portugal Quotes. Retrieved from http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/matches/round=249717/match=300061498/quotes.html. 17 Zonal Marking (2010). Germany-Spain tactical preview. http://www.zonalmarking.net/category/worldcup2010/page/3/.  

Clint Irwin 26

seven corners. In a surprising statistic, possession between the two teams was almost even.

Spain had 51% with 39 real minutes.

Del Bosque hailed his team’s performance while also emphasizing the importance of

Spain’s ball possession, “We played very well in every sense and my lads gave it everything.

There were some great performances out there. We’ve still got one more match to play and let’s

see if we can stay comfortable on the ball. If we can keep doing that, it’ll make things easier,

although the Netherlands will be tough opponents for sure.”18 German manager Joachim Low

applauded the Spanish performance and hinted at the tactical advantages the Spanish exploited

saying:

All credit to the Spanish. They've been the best team around in the last two or three years, and I think they'll win the tournament. They're just such good footballers, and that showed up our current limitations today. They stifled us in certain areas, and we were never able to break free. Their passing game is so good, you spend practically all your time just chasing the ball. We were unable to win possession in the key areas which would have allowed us to switch from defence to attack at speed. Overall, my young team has had a magnificent tournament, but it's not worked out the way we wanted it today. It's a shame, we're sad, and we're all disappointed, but at the end of the day, Spain were terrific.19

German defender Marcell Jansen echoed his manager’s assessment, “Spain's organisation and

tactics are in a different league. When they attack, the whole team comes forward, and when they

defend, they all work together to keep it tight. We knew we'd have to be patient, and we resisted

the pressure for as long as possible, but Spain were the better team today.”15 comments, It was

Spain’s most impressive game to date, they firmly had control over the game’s proceedings,

                                                                                                                         18 FIFA (2010). Germany-Spain Quotes. Retrieved from http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/matches/round=249719/match=300111114/quotes.html. 19 FIFA (2010). “Germany-Spain: Quotes.” Retrieved from http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/matches/round=249719/match=300111114/quotes.html.  

Clint Irwin 27

controlling and dominating midfield, able to weave passes together in close quarters in strange

ways and play their constant ‘give and go’ game.”16 In this game Spain put its overarching

tactical plan into devastating effect. Spain pressed high into the German defense and retained

possession meaning the Germans did not have the ball to attack and ended up dropping deep to

cope with Spain’s passing and movement. This left the Germans few numbers to attack.20

The final statistics reveal even more about the Spanish team. As a team, the Spaniards

covered 767 km during the tournament, the most in the tournament. Overall the Spanish team

completed 3,803 of 4,752 total passes at a rate of 80%. In short passes, Spain completed 873 of

1,088 for an 81% completion rate, 2,481 of 2,956 medium passes for a rate of 84% and 446 of

708 long passes for a rate of 63%. Short passes constituted 23% of all attempted passes,

medium passes 62% and long passes 14%. The Spanish tactical game plan was based on short to

medium passes rather than long passes. The completed passes by the Spanish also registered as

the top amount in the tournament with Germany next closest with 2,865 completed passes. Spain

outscored opponents eight to two, took 121 shots while launching 107 attacks and gaining 56

corner kicks, all tops in the tournament. Defensively, Spain tallied six clean sheets with 45

defensive clearances and 32 successful tackles made, relatively low numbers considering the

seven games played but reflective of Spain’s offensive dominance.

The Dutch Tactical Case: World Cup 2010

The national football team of the Netherlands entered the 2010 World Cup tournament as

“dark horse” contenders. Netherlands has never won a World Cup despite many promising

performances and worldwide acclaim for their brand of ‘total football’ imbued from the great

                                                                                                                         20 Tim Hill (2010). “Spain’s system review and a look at the importance of Robin Van Persie.” Retrieved from http://timhi.wordpress.com/2010/07/10/spain-system-review-wc2010/.

Clint Irwin 28

1970s Dutch team and Dutch club Ajax (Kuper 2010a; Winner 2008, Winner 2010).21 Prior to

the tournament Dutch hopes resided on an attacking quartet of Robin van Persie, Wesley

Sneijder, Rafael van der Vaart and Arjen Robben known as the golden generation, yet question

marks remained over the strength of the defense (Kuper 2010b; Winner 2008). The Dutch

fielded a 4-2-3-1 formation under manager Bert van Marwijk. Hill (2010) comments that, “This

4-2-3-1 system is perfect for the Dutch philosophy, it allows for deep players to move forward as

people move infield and allows for intricate triangles where van der Vaart, Sneijder and van

Persie, all peerless in technique, can create extra space.”22 This formation is based around two

defensive central midfielders who provide stability for the defence.23 Further, Hill (2010) finds

that Dutch manager Bert van Marwijk has embraced Dutch individualism into a system that

echoes the values of ‘total football.’18

The first group stage match for the Dutch was against another European team in

Denmark. The Netherlands fielded its strongest possible side in a 4-2-3-1 formation set out by

manager Bert van Marwijk. The back four consisted of Giovanni van Bronckhorst, Joris

Mathijsen, Johnny Heitinga and Gregory van der Wiel with Martin Skelenburg in goal. The two

holding midfielders were Nigel de Jong and Mark van Bommel. In front of them resides the

attacking trident of Rafael van der Vaart, Wesley Sneijder and Dirk Kuyt. Robin Van Persie

lined up at the lone forward position. The mercurial winger Arjen Robben missed the game due

                                                                                                                         21 Total football is an attacking strategy that prides itself on “being the most cosmopolitan, creative conception of the game; a perfect balance between collective responsibility, equality and individualism, a system that allowed every player to excel and express himself” (Winner 2008: 200). The underlying tactical principles involve relentless attack, pressing and squeezing space to make the pitch ‘small’ in order to win the ball, spreading the field in possession and high speed ball circulation with simple short to medium length passes in triangular patterns(Winner 2008). Traditionally, this is executed with a 3-4-3 or 4-3-3 formation. 22 Tim Hill (2010). “On the fourth day of World Cup, South Africa gave to me: a lesson on how to defend against the Dutch.” Talking About Football. Retrieved from http://timhi.wordpress.com/2010/06/15/fourth-day-of-world-cup/ 23 FIFA (2010). 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa: Technical Report and Statistics. Retrieved from http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/technicaldevp/01/29/30/95/reportwm2010_web.pdf.  

Clint Irwin 29

to injury. The Dutch team won the game 2-0 in a game in which Denmark played for a draw

attempting to negate Dutch strengths by playing a high-line and a packed midfield. Specifically,

the Danes closed down the space and the intricate triangles that Sneijder, van der Vaart and van

Persie all love to play.18 The statistics from the game reveal Dutch superiority. The Dutch

produced 18 shots with 7 on goal, committed 13 fouls with two yellow cards and took six corner

kicks. Overall, the Dutch held possession for 58% of the game or 38 real minutes.

Post-match quotes corresponded well to the actual match. Van Marwijk commented on

the Danish defensive strategy, “The Danes are very strong defensively. When things aren’t

working you have to be patient, and we did that well. Scoring just a minute after the restart was

perfect. Then the Danes had to come out and attack, which gave us more space. From then on we

controlled the game and hardly gave them anything. By the end we had shown everyone that we

can play good football.” Danish defender Simon Poulsen acknowledged the Danish defensive

plan, “In the first half everything went perfectly for us, our plan worked well.”24

In the second group game, the Dutch faced Japan. The Dutch fielded an unchanged side

from their win against Denmark. Again, the Dutch came up against a tactical game plan that

attempted to stifle their attacking instincts.25 The Dutch prevailed though 1-0. This time, Japan

executed their tactical plan better than the Danes, limiting the Dutch to 9 shots and only 5 on

goal and 4 corner kicks. The Dutch, wary of Japan’s counterattack committed 18 fouls with one

yellow card. The Dutch dominated possession with a figure of 61% and 38 real time minutes.

The post-match comments revealed that the Dutch did not play to their best. Bert van Marwijk

noted, “We can play better than that.” Dutch holding midfielder Mark Van Bommel stated,                                                                                                                          24 FIFA (2010). “Netherlands-Denmark: Quotes.” Retrieved from http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/matches/round=249722/match=300061478/quotes.html. 25 Zonal Marking (2010). “Holland 1-0 Japan: Little tactical excitement.” Retried from http://www.zonalmarking.net/2010/06/19/holland-1-0-japan-tactics/.  

Clint Irwin 30

“Japan were very defensive, which we didn't expect. We thought they'd come at us. We had to be

patient.”26

The third group game opponents for the Dutch was Cameroon. After two wins in the first

group games, the Dutch had secured top spot in the group. Bert van Marwijk brought in Khalid

Boulahrouz for Gregory van der Wiel at right full back in a familiar 4-2-3-1 formation. This

game was notable for the impact made by winger Arjen Robben who made his first appearance

after an injury sidelined him for the first two group games. The Netherlands managed to win the

game 2-1 in a fairly even contest. The Dutch produced 15 shots with 8 on goal, 15 fouls and

three yellow cards and only one corner kick. The Dutch were out possessed only just with a

figure of 49% which in this match amounted to 33 real minutes.

After the game, comments emphasized the balance between the two teams. Van Marwijk

said, “Winning three times in a row at a World Cup obviously looks good at first sight, but I'm

not really satisfied with our performance today. It was good enough in the first half, but we

started very poorly after half-time. We spent too much time on the back foot and gave Cameroon

far too much space. We were more in control in the other group games, but we could easily have

lost today.” Paul Le Guen, manager of Cameroon noted the Dutch superiority, “I think we

played some good football in our previous matches too but we weren't able to come up with

enough to beat the Netherlands today. They're stronger than us. We've given it our best shot,

we've stood up to them and tried to beat them, but it wasn't enough, especially towards the

end.”27

                                                                                                                         26 FIFA (2010). “Netherlands-Japan: Quotes.” Retrieved from http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/matches/round=249722/match=300111117/quotes.html. 27 FIFA (2010). “Cameroon-Netherlands: Quotes.” Retrieved from http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/matches/round=249722/match=300061473/quotes.html.

Clint Irwin 31

With progression to the knockout stage secured, the Dutch met Slovakia in the round of

16. Bert van Marwijk made one tactical switch for the game, bringing on the resurgent Arjen

Robben for the injured Rafael Van Der Vaart. Robben and Kuyt switched wing roles, Robben

moved right, Kuyt left. The rest of the squad and formation remained unchanged. The Dutch

won the game 2-1 in a “quiet but effective” way yet without playing their best.28 Analysis of the

statistics reveal a game in which the Dutch retained a slim advantage. The team had 16 shots

with 9 on goal, committed seventeen fouls with two yellow cards and had five corner kicks. The

Dutch had more possession with 52% for 33 minutes.

The post-match comments reemphasized the Dutch advantage. Bert van Marwijk stated,

“We played well for the first half-hour. We were good at the start of the second half too, but we

failed to add a second goal.” Slovakia manager Vladimir Weiss found that, “The Netherlands

were tough opponents. We were courageous and we threw our hearts into it. We’re proud we

made it into the last sixteen, but the better team is through to the next round.” Dutch winger

Arjen Robben said, “It's a tremendous result, but that wasn’t exactly our best performance.

Winning was the most important thing. We’ve yet to turn in anything close to a perfect

performance.” 29

After the win over Slovakia, the quarterfinals the Dutch faced pre-tournament favorites

Brazil. Dutch manager Bert van Marwijk set out the same side that beat Slovakia with one

enforced change as Andre Ooijer replaced Joris Mathijsen who was injured during the pre-match

warm-up. In a comeback victory, the Netherlands shocked Brazil 2-1. The key to the game was

the halftime changes made by van Marwijk. The Dutch defended with heavier pressing and                                                                                                                          28 Zonal Marking (2010). “Holland 2-1 Slovakia: long balls towards wingers win it for the Dutch.” Retrieved from http://www.zonalmarking.net/2010/06/28/holland-2-1-slovakia-long-balls-towards-wingers-win-it-for-the-dutch/. 29 FIFA (2010). “Netherlands-Slovakia: Quotes.” Retrieved from http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/matches/round=249717/match=300111113/quotes.html.  

Clint Irwin 32

increased attacking down the right side which nullified Brazilian strengths and exploited their

weaknesses, key to pulling the upset.30 Statistics show the overall evenness; Brazil dominated

the first half while the Dutch were better in the second. Overall, the Dutch posted 11 shots with

five on goal, committed 19 fouls with four yellow cards and four corners. Possession was nearly

even with the Dutch managing 51% and 30 real minutes.

The post-match comments also revealed the separateness of the two halves. Van Marwijk

felt that, “It took us about 25 minutes of today's game to deal with our nerves, and I was pleased

to be only 1-0 down at the interval. During the break I told them to play their usual game during

the second half.” Brazil’s manager Dunga underlined the upest, “There's no doubt we're all

down because, even though we knew this would be a very tough game, we weren't expecting

this. After the interval we weren't able to play with the same style or level of concentration as we

had in the first half” Dutch winger Arjen Robben commented, “It was a great game for the fans.

Both teams played top-class football. For the first 20 minutes we struggled to find our feet, we

were maybe a bit nervous. But in the last 15 minutes of the first half and throughout the second

period we played much better, we created chances and we deserved the win. We kept trying to

put their defence under pressure.”31

The Dutch advanced to the semifinals where they faced Uruguay. Van Marwijk made

some enforced changes as Nigel de Jong and Gregory van der Wiel were suspended due to

yellow card accumulation. Van Marwijk also restored the healthy Joris Mathijsen in favor of

Andre Ooijer. The Dutch remained in their familiar 4-2-3-1 formation. The Netherlands won

the game 3-2 in which all the goals were scored in the second half. Uruguay attempted what                                                                                                                          30 Zonal Marking (2010). “Holland 2-1 Brazil: poor defending from set-plays costs Dunga.” Retrieved from http://www.zonalmarking.net/2010/07/02/holland-2-1-brazil-tactics/. 31 FIFA (2010). “Netherlands-Brazil: Quotes.” Retrieved from http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/matches/round=249718/match=300061507/quotes.html.

Clint Irwin 33

many teams have tried against the Dutch: stop them from playing “between the lines”.32 The

Dutch took 11 shots with 7 on goal, were called for 16 fouls and three yellow cards and were

awarded five corner kicks. The team held possession for 53% of the game which corresponds to

37 real minutes.

Bert van Marwijk, recalling aspects of national identity, was understandably ecstatic in

the post match comments:

We're in the Final – unbelievable. When I took this job two years ago, I said to the players, 'We're on a mission, and we just have to believe in ourselves'. We're only a small country but we're through to the Final, that's just unbelievable. We last made the Final 32 years ago, so what we've achieved is, and I'll say it again, unbelievable. I love beautiful football, but I also want to win. In the second half, we proved we're a decent footballing side. We took control of the match. We actually should have made it 4-1, but it was a close-run thing at the end.33

Uruguay manager Oscar Tabarez resigned that, “It's the right result and we accept it.” Dutch

midfielder Mark van Bommel revealed some of the tactical keys, “We pieced together our moves

from the back and then got the ball out wide. In the first half, we saw exactly what happens if

your organisation breaks down. It was much better in the second half, our build-up play was

better and we released our wingers more often. We know what Arjen [Robben] can do if he's

given the space. Dutch football has become a lot more disciplined.”29

In all seven games, the Dutch registered the lowest distance out of the four semifinalists

with 751 kilometers run. This does not mean that the Netherlands were not “working hard” but

rather reflects the Dutch tactical strategy to wait in their defensive half to win the ball from their

opponents and launch quick counterattacks. Also, the Netherlands’ second highest clearance total

                                                                                                                         32 Tim Hill (2010). “Uruguay’s system undone by van Bronckhorst and van Marwijk’s half time change.” Talking About Football. Retrieved from http://timhi.wordpress.com/2010/07/07/uruguay-holland-report/. 33 FIFA (2010). “Uruguay-Netherlands: Quotes.” Retrieved from http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/matches/round=249719/match=300061512/quotes.html.  

Clint Irwin 34

of 65 shows that defending was a key part of the Dutch tactical plan. The Dutch completed

2,665 out of 3,738 attempted passes, third highest in the tournament, for a 71% success rate, 17th

highest in the tournament. The Dutch completed 541 out of 797 attempted short passes, 1,763

out of 2,233 medium passes and 361 out of 708 long passes. Short passes made up 21% of all

Dutch passes, medium passes were used 60% of the time and long passes 19%. Long passes were

used nearly as much as short passes, showing that the Dutch valued a more “direct” approach.

The Dutch possessed the ball at an average rate of 52% with an average real time of 35 minutes.

The Netherlands took 93 shots with 43 on goal the lowest out of the teams that played seven

games and behind both Ghana and Argentina who only played five games. While the Dutch took

a low amount of shots and had a low amount of attacks in 69, their 12 goals was second highest

in the tournament, demonstrative of Dutch opportunism. The Dutch team conceded six goals

against, almost one per game. The pre-tournament worries of a weak defense were qualified. In

a telling statistic, the Netherlands were penalized for 126 fouls and 22 yellow cards (with one red

card) which were both the highest totals in the tournament. These statistics indicate a Dutch

propensity for physical play which may have been a deliberate tactical strategy.

The Final: Spain versus the Netherlands

Spain and the Netherlands advanced to the 2010 World Cup final. Spanish manager

Vicente del Bosque fielded his side in a 4-2-3-1 formation with his first choice defensive lineup

of Joan Capdevila, Carles Puyol, Gerard Pique and Sergio Ramos, two holding midfielders in

Xabi Alonso and Sergio Busquets, three attacking midfielders in Iniesta, Xavi and Pedro and

David Villa as the lone forward. Bert van Marwijk also put out a 4-2-3-1 formation with four

defenders in Giovanni van Bronckhort, Joris Mathijsen, Johnny Heitinga and Gregory van der

Wiel, Nigel de Jong and Mark van Bommel as holding midfielders, Dirk Kuyt Wesley Sneijder

Clint Irwin 35

and Arjen Robben as attacking midfielders and Robin van Persie in the forward position.34 Spain

won the World Cup final match in dramatic fashion as Iniesta scored in extra time after Jonny

Heitinga had been sent off for a second yellow card. The game itself was characterized by the

Netherlands’ “aggressive, sometimes malicious tackling”.35 Hill (2010) notes, “Despite the

Dutch best efforts at kicking lumps of chest, thigh, and leg out of the Spanish, the European

Champions were able to overcome a frankly unruly Dutch team.”30 Kuper (2010d) notes that

overtly physical Dutch approach was “a masterclass in how to combat a better team.”36 In

addition, the Dutch attempted to press the Spanish midfield to offset their passing based game.

However, Spain’s passing wore down the Dutch team and after having Heitinga sent off, Iniesta

exploited the absence of the center back to score the winner.37

Statistically, Spain exerted an advantage. The Spanish team had 18 shots with 6 on goal

and eight corner kicks. On the other side, the Dutch tallied 13 shots with five on goal and 6 six

corner kicks. The Netherland’s deliberate physical strategy resulted in a remarkable 28 fouls,

nine yellow cards and one red card for a second bookable offense. In response to Dutch

physicality, the Spanish committed the most fouls in any of their previous games with 19 fouls

and 5 yellow cards. Spain maintained an impressive advantage in possession 57% (48 minutes)

to the Dutch’s 43% (36 minutes).

In the post-match comments, Spanish manager del Bosque emphasized the strength of the

Dutch side, “We have to congratulate our rivals because they made it very difficult for us. The                                                                                                                          34 Consult Appendix D for a depiction of the general formation of each team throughout the World Cup. 35 Tim Hill (2010). “The Dutch turn to their National Anthem for their World Cup final strategy.” Talking About Football. Retrieved from http://timhi.wordpress.com/2010/07/12/world-cup-final2010/. 36 Simon Kuper (2010). “Netherlands kick, Spain score in World Cup final.” Financial Times.

37 Zonal Marking (2010). “Spain 1-0 Holland: Iniesta settles a tight game.” Retrieved from http://www.zonalmarking.net/2010/07/12/spain-1-0-holland-iniesta-world-cup-final-tactics/.

 

Clint Irwin 36

Final was all about attacking football and both sides tried to play the game the way it should be

played.” Bert van Marwijk applauded Spain as worthy winners, “You have to say the better team

won, but losing the World Cup Final is hard to take. Spain created far more chances.” Dutchman

Dirk Kuyt agreed stating, “Spain are a terrific team.” while Dutch captain Giovanni van

Bronckhorst bemoaned, “We gave them too much space in midfield at times.” 38

Analysis

Spain

Spain’s tactical approach can be summed up by its emphasis on teamwork and

possession. Kuper (2010e) notes, “Spain have finally found their own style: a game that

venerates the pass. They are the most authentic team here. They don't worry about opponents and

don't bother trying to score on the break.”39 The possession and teamwork come in marked

contrast to the hypothesis that Spain’s fragmented national identity would lead to less cohesion

as a team. While Ball (2010) presents the observation that the presence of players from

separatist regions would cause less cohesion, this could not be more untrue. In the Spanish squad

there were three players from the Basque country (Xabi Alonso, Fernando Llorente, and Javier

Martinez) and nine players from Catalonia (Sergio Busquets, Joan Capdevila, Francesc Fabregas,

Iniesta, Pedro, Gerard Pique, Carles Puyol, Xavi and Victor Valdes). Seven of these players

played a major role for the team on the pitch. However, as the possession statistics and

comments show, Spain remained one of the most cohesive sides in the tournament.

Spain’s dominant, possession oriented, positive attacking side may be seen as an

extension of the diverse national identity present. In the 2010 World Cup matches, it appears                                                                                                                          38 FIFA (2010). “Netherlands-Spain: Quotes.” Retrieved from http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/matches/round=249721/match=300061509/quotes.html. 39 Simon Kuper (2010). “Spain finally ready to pass biggest test.” Financial Times.  

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that Spain’s growing comfort with “Spanish-ness” has finally been reconciled with the regional

identities previously noted. While the team was made up of many different regional identities, it

still managed to produce dynamic, attacking football which gained the respect of other teams and

many observers overcoming the criticism from Ball (2010) of the “complicated, neurotic” pride

of Spain.

Netherlands

For the Netherlands, the tactical strategy employed by the national team during the 2010

World Cup may be seen as an extension of their national identity. The Dutch tactics did not

result in necessarily less possession as hypothesized but instead produced more “direct”

possession. However, a counterattacking strategy was certainly employed by the Dutch national

team. Whether this was a result of the Dutch identity as a “small” country remains unclear. In

regards to the hypothesis stating that a stagnant national identity would lead to a rigid defensive

shape, the conclusion also remains ambiguous. Parts of the Dutch national identity remain

stagnant while other parts are in a dynamic transition. Dutch tactics reflect this as well. The

Dutch were fairly rigid defensively yet their attack produced the most goals out of any team in

the tournament.

With Dutch national identity in a transitional state, the findings of this study indicate that

Dutch football also appears to be in a tactical transition (Essed and Trienekens 2008; Kramer

2006; Kuper 2010; Lechner 2002; Prins and Saharso 2008; Scheffer 2000; Winner 2008). The

new “total football” instead incorporates multiculturalism, tolerance and relative democracy

within a team structure. It must be noted that under Marco van Basten’s management in 2008,

the Dutch players decided to switch from 4-3-3 to the current 4-2-3-1 (Winner 2008). This

Clint Irwin 38

example of democratic decision making and flexibility can be seen as an effect of the national

identity of regenten affecting tactics.

The change in Dutch football tactics is also demonstrative of the changing Dutch society.

As Dutch football pundits debate ways to play, Dutch society is debating ways to confront its

new multicultural society (Scheffer 2000). Internally, the debate rages over how Dutch football

should be played. Johann Cruyff, the embodiment of the Dutch tradition of “total football,”

commented that anything other than total football jeopardizes national heritage (Kuper 2010d).

Cruyff (2010) went further stating:

I hate this style. I thought that my country wouldn't dare to and would never renounce their style. I said no because, without having great players like those of the past, the team has its own style. I was wrong. Of course I'm not hanging all 11 of them by the same rope, but almost. They didn't want the ball. And regrettably, sadly, they played very dirty. So much so that they should have been down to nine immediately, then they made two [such] ugly and hard tackles that even I felt the damage. It hurts me that I was wrong in my disagreement that instead Holland chose an ugly path to aim for the title. This ugly, vulgar, hard, hermetic, hardly eye-catching, hardly football style, yes it served the Dutch to unsettle Spain. If with this they got satisfaction, fine, but they ended up losing. They were playing anti-football.40

Further, Dutch newspapers dismissed the Oranje’s success as “repugnant and irritating” (Kuper

2010d). This moralizing, characteristic of Dutch society appears to have made its way into the

sporting sphere in regards to how the game should be played (Scheffer 2000; Winner 2008).

The Dutch national team though, itself is an example of multiculturalism at work.

Gregory van der Wiel’s ancestors come from Curacao while Giovanni van Bronckhorst is the

product of an Indonesian father and a Moluccan mother. Ryan Babel, Edson Braafheid, Eljero

                                                                                                                         40 The Guardian (2010). “World Cup final: Johan Cruyff hits out at ‘anti-football’ Holland. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2010/jul/12/world-cup-final-johan-cruyff-holland.

 

Clint Irwin 39

Elia and Nigel de Jong are of Surinamese descent. Ibrahim Affelay and Khalid Boulahrouz are of

Moroccan descent and Demy de Zeeuw was born in the Netherland Antilles. The national team,

filled with ancestors of immigrants has confronted the new multiculturalism seemingly without

conflict. Cruyff’s comments echo Kuper’s (2004) realization that this was not the Netherlands

many used to know. This is also not the Dutch football many used to know. As Lechner (2003)

notes, globalization is chipping away at established national identities and the Netherlands is

experiencing this effect as evidenced by its muddled national identity and traditional yet modern

tactics.

The reality remains though, that the Dutch employed a form of “total football.”

According to the official FIFA technical report (2010), “The Dutch fielded an attacking trio

behind their lone striker, Van Persie. Robben and Kuyt played on the wings, but they were

always looking to push forward to create a three-man attack with Van Persie. Robben and Kuyt

often rotated and swapped positions during matches. If the other attacking midfielder, Sneijder,

was regarded as part of the midfield, then the Dutch also operated in a form of 4-3-3” (FIFA

2010: 49). This appears a relic of “total football.” Winner (2008) also reminds that the “total

football” of the 1970s also had an aggressive character focused on results. “They were only

trying to win. They could play rough and hard. And they attacked relentlessly because it was the

best way to dominate and overwhelm, not simply because it was beautiful. They saw themselves

not as artists but as winners” (156). The Dutch physical style applied in the World Cup then,

should not be seen as an anomaly but rather an extension of the old “total football” style. Former

Winner (2008) quotes former German national team player Gunter Netzer who agrees that Dutch

football has changed, “The old style has been replaced by this new realism and you can only

hope that the Dutch will have some success with it. But the beauty has faded. I only see a team

Clint Irwin 40

with very good players, but very result-oriented” (Winner 2008: 263). The comments of van

Marwijk and van Bommel echo this “new realism.”

Conclusion

This study was unable to examine the effects managers had on the tactics of the team.

Managers have their own ideas regarding tactics and to say that they have no effect on how a

team plays would be foolish. Managers bring their own experiences and football philosophies

and apply it to their teams. This area of research could provide further study for other scholars

The relationships described above remain tenuous at best. Other researchers may find no

relationship between national identity and tactics or analyze the variables differently. Questions

that also arise in this field of study include how the ability of the players affect the tactics of the

national team. Do weaker players require simpler tactics? Also, does the nationality of the

manager have an effect on the tactics employed by the national team? These questions could

provide for subsequent research. In addition, it may be prudent to add more independent

variables. Suggestions may include government structure or statements made by elites.