Winter 2014 32 Timesweek

Behind the ProPaganda

and PuBlic relations

of isisThe actions of the radical Islamist group ISIS have drawn international condemnation and military inter-vention. Why have thousands of Muslims, domestic and foreign, pledged their lives and deaths to the cause?

by Will TrueOctober 17th, 2014

Winter 2014 54 Timesweek

In mid-July, a video featuring Canadian-born Andre Poulin be-gan spreading around the Inter-net. Poulin, who had converted

to the religion of Islam six years prior and vaguely resembles John Lennon, looks directly into the camera with an assault rifle resting against his right shoulder and the flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) waving over his left. He implores Muslims of the Western world to abandon their lives and come to Syria to fulfill their religious obligation and fight against the kuffar (non-Muslims).

Later in the video, Poulin is seen fir-ing a rocket toward a Syrian airfield before storming the battlefield. The camera is rocked by an explosion, and a dust cloud covers the screen. In the next scene, Poulin is found slumped against a wall, unmoving. His death is celebrated as that of a martyr by the faceless narrator of the video.

Since their declaration of statehood in June, ISIS has experienced an influx of foreign-born fighters. By mid-Septem-ber, ISIS’s foreign mujahideen (soldiers of Islam) numbered 15,000 in Syria, including 2,000 Westerners. These out-siders join the ranks of Iraqi and Syrian radical Islamists in their 12,000-plus square miles of conquered territory.

But what prompts people to fight for ISIS? How does the Islamic State con-

vince Muslims to abandon their daily lives and take up arms against their ideo-logical opponents? What do they have to offer to the citizens of their state?

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) has done extensive research on the ideology and reasoning behind ISIS’s publicity campaign and internal mach-inations, and the answer is deceptively simple: a strong claim to religious au-thority, and effective government.

As the media is fond of noting, ISIS’s public relations campaign is of an ex-traordinarily high quality. The propa-ganda videos produced by ISIS, also known as the Islamic State, are ex-pertly edited and place a high premi-

um on emotional manipulation. Their most impressive work can be found in their monthly publication Dabiq, an English-language magazine. It is beau-tifully crafted, brutally graphic and an intricately detailed representation of ISIS activity and their Islamist ideology.

In her report “Dabiq: The Strategic Mes-saging of the Islamic State,” research assistant Harleen Gambhir analyzed the first two editions of the magazine for the ISW. The small town of Dabiq is located in Syria, where the West and Is-lam meet in apocalyptic battle accord-ing to hadith (traditional Islamic liter-ature). Titling the magazine with this end-of-days rhetoric “implies that ISIS wants to be seen as the jihadist group that will lead the Muslim community into worldwide domination” as the re-sult of the West’s destruction at Dabiq.

ISIS’s claim to religious authority is explicitly stated in their propagan-da, and relies on passages from the Qu’ran and widely known hadiths. Us-ing these core texts, ISIS creates com-plex logical arguments supporting the formation of a true khilafa (caliphate, or supreme Islamic state).

Aside from justifying their religious au-thority, Dabiq’s secondary purpose is to bring Muslims into their ranks from all over the world. In the beginning of each issue, Dabiq’s staff asserts that it is every Muslim’s religious duty to perform hijrah (migration) and come to the Islamic State.ISIS assures im-

migrating Muslims that they and their families will be well taken care of.

To emphasize this, Dabiq features ac-counts of their military victories, as-suring their readers that this is what awaits them in the Islamic State. By contrast, Dabiq also publishes graph-ic photographics of dead opposition fighters, sending the message that apostates and nonbelievers are des-tined for the same fate.

If a Muslim cannot perform hijrah, it is their duty to hold localized bayat (pledges of allegiance) to ISIS and its khalifah (religious leader) Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. If possible, these bayat should be recorded to promote a sense of unity among Muslims and “fill the hearts of the kuffar with painful agony.”

This is a sentiment echoed by Andre Poulin in his posthumous propaganda video: “If you cannot fight, then you can give money. If you cannot give money, then you can assist in technology.”

In its Middle East security report “ISIS Governance in Syria,” the ISW examines the government that was installed in their regional capital of Raqqa, which

was captured in January of 2014.

Authors Charles Caris and Samuel Reynolds find that “ISIS has built a holistic system of governance,” offer-ing services and goods once offered by the Syrian government before civil war threw the country into turmoil. This model of government is touted by ISIS as a significant reason for fel-low Muslims to join them in their war against the kuffar.

Unlike similar radical Islamist sects like al-Qaeda, which try to establish

religious authority first and foremost, ISIS believes that a functional govern-ment is the first step toward establish-ing a legitimate caliphate.

To ensure that their state is home to like-minded Muslims only, ISIS forces rival rebel groups out of newly con-quered territory and either excommu-nicates or executes apostates and dis-senters. One of the first things ISIS does upon entering a new location is hold an outreach meeting called a da’wah, in which ISIS teaches the public about their brand of Islam in a welcoming manner, so as not to stir up controversy.

When ISIS informally conquers a city or province, they establish ru-dimentary governmental offices in two branches: administrative and service-oriented. The administrative branch establishes their brand of Is-lam as law among the people, estab-lishing a court system, a police force, and an Islamic education system.

Additionally, the citizens of war-torn regions benefit greatly from ISIS’ “Muslim services,” their term for hu-man services. They provide their Mus-lim constituents with any basic needs they require, including food, gasoline and medical aid. They also control

“If you cannot fight, then you can give money. If you cannot give money, then you can assist in technology.”

— Andre Poulin, deceasedCanadian-born ISIS fighter

Andre Poulin, pictured in an ISIS propaganda video. (New York Times)

The first two covers of Dabiq, ISIS’ propaganda magazine. (The New Republic) Members of ISIS in Azaz, holding outreach meetings to win public support. (Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, Brown Moses)

Winter 2014 76 Timesweek

power. In one story, a Chicago teen was arrested on October 6 at the airport for attempting to join the extremist group. In another, two teenage girls fled their home country of Austria to join ISIS, and are now married to ISIS fighters and expecting children.

These stories help spread ISIS’s content through more traditional media, and play a significant factor in their recruit-ment of Muslim extremists worldwide.

On September 10, President Barack Obama announced to the public that the United States would begin conduct-

ing airstrikes on strategic ISIS locations in Iraq and Syria. Joining the US in ac-tion against the international threat is a coalition of forces from countries as diverse as the United Kingdom, Austra-lia, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

Just prior to that announcement, ISIS released the third issue of Dabiq. In the following month, no new editions of the magazine appeared online, leading some to conclude that ISIS’s propa-ganda efforts had taken a hit. Howev-er, on October 14, the fourth issue of Dabiq hit the web, this time covered by a picture of the Vatican with the flag of the Islamic State flying overhead.

With the fate of the Middle East in the balance, decisive action will be taken in the coming months. For the time being, the war against ISIS will be fought on two fronts: on the battle-field, and in digital media.

Will True is a graduate student in professional writing at Carnegie Mellon University.

Information for this article provided by Jihadology, Al Jazeera, The Atlantic, the Clarion Project, the Institute for the Study of War, the Daily Mail, and CNN.

Cover photo: ISIS fighters marching during a parade at the Syrian town of Tel Abyad. (Reuters)

several bakeries which provide cheap food for the local population.

After gaining full control of the territo-ry, ISIS tightens its grip with stricter re-ligious enforcement and further-reach-ing human service efforts. Instead of letting electricity and water systems fall to ruin, they repair damaged power lines and dams, keeping the local popu-lation somewhat complacent.

However, in eliminating ideological op-position, they often eliminate the tech-nical expertise that would be needed to expand their efforts. To address this, ISIS calls upon foreign Muslims not only to fight but to help maintain their more technical services. Incoming Muslim professionals could bolster the sustain-ability of the Islamic State and further increase the power of their caliphate.

Every week, it seems, a new twist in the ISIS propaganda narrative rears its head. Whether it be a new issue of Dabiq, a journalist reciting ISIS talking points under threat of death, or the brutal beheading of a Western aid worker, ISIS finds new ways to spread their message across the world.

This brutal message of religious extrem-ism appears to be working anecdotally, giving the messengers that much more

A map of ISIS-controlled locations across Syria and Iraq, as of September 10th. (ISW)

The featured article from the first issue of Dabiq. (ISW)

An infographic found in Dabiq, illustrating ISIS’ path to statehood. (ISW)

In their first major feature, Dabiq lays out a clear five-step process by which ISIS can become a legitimate Islamist state. The magazine draws upon the beliefs of fallen al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) leader Abu al-Zarqawi, whom ISIS asserts as the spiritual successor to their movement. Before its eventu-al dissolution, AQI gained notoriety for its caliphate-centric rhetoric and used tactics similar to ISIS in order to establish a pseudostate.

Zarqawi served with al-Qaeda in Af-ghanistan alongside Osama bin Lad-en, but did not submit to his author-ity. This allows ISIS to differentiate itself from al-Qaeda within the region and lay legitimate claim to sole reli-gious authority.

ISIS seeks to replicate the rhetorical and practical success of Zarqawi in the re-gion by following his words and actions:

1. Hijrah: ISIS urges Muslims world-wide of all capabilities and profes-sions to abandon their lives and join them in the Islamic State.

2. Jama’ah: After the call to hijrah, a large body of dedicated jihadist Mus-lims (a jama’ah) is necessary to form a base of operations.

3. Destabilize Taghut: The jama’ah engages in warfare against the taghut ( false idol) enemy forces, creating cha-os with vehicle bombs and IEDs.

4. Tamkin: After provoking panic or withdrawal of taghut forces, the ja-ma’ah is to bring together conquered territory and forces and capitalize on the chaos created.

5. Khilafah: With enemy forces scat-tered and consolidated territories, the foundation for a caliphate has been created.

Five Steps to an Islamic State

President Barack Obama, announcing planned action toward ISIS. (WBUR)