REPORT
FINALEVALUATION
OF
CORDAIDSHELTERPROGRAMMEIN
HAITI2010‐2012
EspelanciaBaptistaMartenTreffers
PeterGiesen
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1. Background ............................................................................................................................................3 2. Introduction ...........................................................................................................................................4 3. Methodology .........................................................................................................................................5 4. ProgrammeEvolution ...........................................................................................................................7 4.1 EmergencyResponse ......................................................................................................................7 4.2 EmergencyShelter...........................................................................................................................7 4.3 TransitionalShelter .........................................................................................................................8
4.3.1 Management ............................................................................................................................8 4.3.2 LocationSelection,AssessmentsandProposals ...................................................................9 4.3.3 RuralProgramme...................................................................................................................11 4.3.4 UrbanProgramme .................................................................................................................14 4.3.5 ImplementationPartners ......................................................................................................16
5. Results ..................................................................................................................................................17 5.1 TechnicalResults ...........................................................................................................................19 5.2 SocialResults..................................................................................................................................23
5.2.1 Gender ....................................................................................................................................26 6. ConclusionsandRecommendations ..................................................................................................27 6.1 Dilemmas........................................................................................................................................27 6.2 Effectiveness ..................................................................................................................................28 6.3 Appropriateness ............................................................................................................................30 6.4 Impact.............................................................................................................................................32 6.5 Efficiency ........................................................................................................................................32
Annex1:KeyInformants ............................................................................................................................33 Annex2:TermsofReference .....................................................................................................................34 Annex3:RoleofGroup5............................................................................................................................42 Annex4:ImplementationOverview.........................................................................................................43 Annex5:SurveyDataOverview.................................................................................................................45
Acknowledgement
TheevaluatorswishtothankallCordaidstafffortheirsupportandopennessduringtheimplementationofthisevaluation.WewouldespeciallyliketothankourHaitiansurveyandFGDteamsfortheirhardworkinthefieldwithminimalsupportandpreparation.Aspecialthanksto
CarolynMuntz,copyeditorandSHOdonor,forproofreading.EspelanciaBaptista(AnthropologistandResearchSpecialist)
MartenTreffers(ArchitectandTechnicalSpecialist)PeterGiesen(SocialGeographer,TeamLeaderandReportEditor)
Amsterdam,13July2012
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Executive Summary
CordaidcommissionedthisfinalevaluationofitsSamenwerkendeHulpOrganisaties(SHO)1fundedshelterprogrammeinresponsetothe2010Haitiearthquake,inordertogiveaccounttothosewhodonatedfundsandtolearnlessonsfromtheimplementation.Foradetaileddescriptionoftheprogramme,pleaserefertosection4ofthisreportandtheToRinAnnex2.Cordaidcontractedathree‐memberteamofexternalconsultants,managedbytheCordaidemergencyprogrammeofficerinHQandtheHeadofMissioninthefieldandsupportedbyareferencegroup.Theteamimplementedsevenmethodologiestoanalysetheeffectiveness,appropriateness,efficiencyandimpactoftheprogrammeandconcludesthatCordaidsuccessfullyimplementedahighlyeffectiveshelterprogramme,especiallyintheruralareaofLeogane.Cordaid’surbanprogrammewillprobablyachieveashelterdeliveryeffectivenessofover90%.Cordaidwasnotentirelyabletoadapttheprogrammetothesocial,politicalandlegalcomplexitiesoftheurbancontextinPort‐au‐Prince,asdemonstratedbylargenumbersofpeopleremainingintentcamps.Itsownerdrivenhousingprogrammecomponentstartedlate.Waterandsanitation,livelihoodsandcommunalneedssuchasdrainageremainlargelyunaddressed,astheworkassociatedwiththeintegratedneighbourhoodapproachalsostartedlateandresultswillonlybereachedpartiallyintwopilotprojects.Activitiesspecificallydesignedtoimprovethebeneficiaries’livelihoodsactivitieswerenotimplementedatall.Beneficiariesdeemedtheprogrammehighlyappropriate.Arepresentativesampleof327beneficiariesscored80to90%satisfactionratesoneachofthefivequalityindicators:design,safety,size,assessmentandconstruction.Thiswasconfirmedby19focusgroupdiscussionsand48keyinformantinterviews.However,Cordaiddidnotreachthemostvulnerable,especiallyintheurbanareas.TheneedtobuildshelterswithinHaiti’slegalframeworksandpolicies,contributedtotheexclusionofmanyvulnerablepeoplealreadyduringtheassessmentstage.Largenumbersoftenants,illegallysettledpeople,andyoungadultfamilymembersremaintodayintentcampsinCordaid’soperationalareas.Itisextremelydifficulttoovercomepre‐existingfactors,whichcontributetothehugeinequitiesandextremepoverty,withthistypeofshelterapproach.AcceptingSHOfundingandtheneedtospendalargegrantwithinalimitedperiodoftime,droveaservicedeliveryapproach.Despitesomeofthesedesignissues,theprogrammehasbeguntodevelopthesocialcapitalrequiredtoachievelonger‐termimpact.Withthehelpofspeciallyformedcommittees,CordaidcreatedthesocialinfrastructureforaparticipatoryassesmentandconstructionapproachthatcanbeusedtoachieveCordaid’slonger‐termdevelopmentobjectivesinHaiti.Theextent,towhichthisinfrastructurewillbeabletoaddressinequitiesandinjusticeinHaitiinthefuture,isnowuptoCordaid’sdevelopmentstrategy.
1SHOisacollaborativefundraisingplatformofCordaidMenseninNood,ICCO,KerkinActie,OxfamNovib,SavetheChildren,StichtingVluchteling,TerredesHommes,UNICEFNetherlandsandWorldVisionNetherlands.TheHaiticampaignraisedatotalof€111million,€27millionofwhichwenttoCordaid.
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1. Background AnearthquakehitHaition12January2010andkilledover200,000people,injured300,000,leftmorethanonemillionhomeless,anddestroyedinfrastructure,servicesandhomes.ThecostofreconstructionisestimatedatUS$11.5billion.Haitiwasalreadythepoorestcountryinthewesternhemisphere,ranked149outof182countriesonthe2009HumanDevelopmentIndex,withabout78%ofthepopulationlivingonlessthenUS$2aday.Theearthquakehadarelativelyshallowfocus(lessthan10kilometresbelowtheearth’ssurface)andtheepicentrewasclosetoLéogâne,approximately25kmwestofPort‐au‐Prince,meaningthaturbanareas(withmanypoorly‐constructedbuildings)whereparticularlyhit.Léogânesufferedcloseto80%structuraldamage.Theearthquakeoccurredat16.53localtime,anhouratwhichmainlymanagersarestillatwork,asofficialofficehoursarefrom8amto4pm.Itisalsolikelythattherewasahighernumberoffemalecasualties,asmanywomenwereathomewhentheearthquakestruck,whilemenwereontheirwaybackfromwork.TheGovernmentestimatesthat250,000homesand30,000commercialbuildingswereseverelydamaged,whilethePost‐DisasterNeedsAssessmentidentified105,000completelydestroyedhomesandover208,000damaged.AccordingtoGovernmentfigures,approximately2.3millionpeoplelefttheirhomesatthepeakofthedisplacement.IDPspredominantlysettledeitherasindividualhouseholdsorinsmallhouseholdgroupingsclosetotheirformerareaofresidence.Manysettledinthestreetorparks,inspontaneoussettlementsitesvaryinginpopulationfromahandfulto50,000people,orincollectiveaccommodation.Initially,around1.5milliondisplacedpeoplesettledinthePort‐au‐Princemetropolitanarea,whilearound600,000lefttheaffectedarea,manyfacilitatedbytheGovernment.Othersusingprivatemeans,soughtshelterwithhostcommunitiesinnon‐affectedareas.Upto250,000ofthelatterhavesincereturnedtoPort‐au‐Princeorsurroundingcommunes,eitherashouseholdsorindividually.IOMreportsthatasofApril2012,anestimated421,000individuals(or105,000IDPHouseholds)continuetoresidein602campsandcamp‐likesettlementsacrosstheearthquakeaffectedarea.Thisreflectsadecreaseof14%(ofIDPindividuals)livinginIDPsitescomparedtoitspreviousreportofFebruary2012.
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2. Introduction Thisevaluationwasimplementedbyateamofthreeconsultants:anarchitect,aCreolespeakinganthropologistandasocialgeographer,whowasalsotheteamleader.Theteamhadonlyoneweektopreparefortheevaluation,asitsoriginalproposaltoundertakethisassignmenthadbeenrejectedbyCordaid.Theteam’sproposalwasreactivatedafterthepreferredcandidateprovednotavailable,butthismeantthattwoweeksofpotentialpreparationtimewaslost.Duringinception,theteamidentifiedcontradictionsanddefinitionproblemsintheToR,whichcontainedanumberofquestionspertainingtothequalityandroleofassessments.Thesehadalreadybeenaddressedbymid‐termreview(scopedmainlyaroundmanagement,HRandassessmentissues)andtheteamwasinstructedtoavoidduplicationofalreadyexistinganalysis.TheToRkeyquestionswerebasedondifferentdefinitionsthantheusualOECDDACGlossaryofKeyTermsinEvaluationandResultsBasedManagement,inparticularfortermssuchas‘effectiveness’and‘efficiency’.Effectivenessisusuallydefinedbytheextenttowhichobjectivesareachieved2,buttheToRsuggeststheuseofdecision‐makingandM&Equestionstoinformtheeffectivenessanalysis.SimilarlyCordaidposes‘policyimplementation’questionstoinformtheefficiencyanalysis,whereaspolicyquestionsnormallyreferto‘appropriateness’3.AnotherproblemwiththeevaluationofCordaiddecisionmakingprocessesisthatthesearepoorlydocumented,makingananalysislargelydependentonanecdotalinformationandan‘Informationandexplanationsheet’writtenbytheShelterManager,anexternalconsultantdeployedthroughthecontractwithGroup5.OtherthanthatwewereunabletovalidatethistypeofinformationwithotherofficialCordaidsources(approvedminutes,emails)orreferenceittoanagreedmanagementframework.Duetoalackofpreparationtimetheseissuescouldnotberesolvedpriortotheteam’sdeparturetoHaiti.TheToRprovedevenmoreproblematicwhentheteamarrivedinthefield,wherestaffseemedtohavedifferentexpectationsfromtheevaluation.TheteamsuggestedtotestanumberofhypothesesinanattempttoensurethattheevaluationanswersquestionspertinenttoCordaid’smanagementagenda.Althoughthereferencegroupgavefeedbackonhowtotestthehypotheses,itdidnotprovidefeedbackonhowtoformulatetheminordertoinformactualmanagementinformationneeds.Thisandthefactthatitwastoolatetodevelopthetoolsinawaythatwouldhaveallowedthehypothesestobetestedcausedtheteamtoabandonthisapproach.Theteamlostmorevaluabletimeinthefield,asithadtoorganiselogisticsforthebeneficiaryconsultations,contrarytoagreementsmadewiththosecommissioningtheevaluationinTheHague.Anotherlimitationwasthatallbutoneofthe(former)Cordaid’sHaitidevelopment
2OECDDACGlossaryofKeyTermsinEvaluationandResultsBasedManagement,p.203seealso:Evaluatinghumanitarian,actionusingtheOECD‐DACcriteria(ALNAP)
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programmepartners,declinedtospeakwiththeevaluationteam,excludingtheirperspectiveonsocialcapitalbuildingopportunities.Thisledtothefollowingapproachtoansweringtheykeyquestions:
• Shelter,WASHandsocialcapitalbuildingoutputsinformedtheanalysisofeffectiveness.
• Qualityasperceivedbythebeneficiariesaswellaspolicycomplianceinformedtheassessmentofappropriateness.
• Thepotentialoutcomesoflivelihoods,socialcapitalandprotectionactivitiestoassesstheimpactoftheproject.
• Existingevaluationreportsandotherdocumentsandkeystaffinterviewstoassesstheefficiencyofapproachandoperations.
3. MethodologyInordertoanalyseeffectiveness,appropriatenessefficiencyandimpact,theteamdevelopedsevenmethodologies:
1. Asurveyamongastatisticallyrepresentativesampleof327beneficiaries.2. 19FocusGroupDiscussions(FGDs).16withCordaidbeneficiaries(maleandfemale
separately)ineachofthe8operationalareasandthreeinareaswithnon‐Cordaidbeneficiaries(mixedmale,female).
3. Meetingswithalmostallthecommittees.4. Interviewswithkeystakeholders(KSIs),suchassuppliers,bosses,localNGOs,
internationalNGOs,authorities.5. InterviewswithCordaidkey‐staffinTheHague,Port‐au‐PrinceandLéogâne.6. Directfieldobservations,transversalwalks,ad‐hocmeetingswithbeneficiaries.7. Documentsstudy.
Fortheefficiencyquestions,oursourceswerelimited,butforeachoftheanalysesofappropriateness,effectivenessandimpact,weusedatleastthreemethodologies.Triangulationensuredthateveryconclusionisbasedonverifiedinformation.Thisgivesusalargedegreeofconfidenceinthevalidityofourfindings.EffectivenessofCordaid’sshelterprogrammefocusedonoutput,forwhichwetooktheobjectivesoftheDecember2010proposalsasourstartingpoint.Weanalysed(monthly)reportstomeasuretowhatextenttheseobjectiveswereachievedandthenverifiedthequalityoftheoutputsthroughthesurveys,theFGDs,theKSIsandourownobservations.WedesignedthesurveyquestionnairesintheNetherlandstomeasurebeneficiaryappreciationbasedon5qualityindicators:
1. Shelterdesign,2. Technicalquality,3. Security,
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4. Assessmentprocess,and5. Buildingprocess.
TheCreole‐speakingresearchspecialistontheteamrecruitedandtrainedtenstudentstoconductthesurveys.Thetrainingwasalsousedtotestthequestionnaires,aswedidnothavethetimetodothiswiththebeneficiaries.Surveydata4wereenteredintoanexcel‐sheetandanalysedbythetechnicalspecialistontheteam.ThisallowedustounderstandthequalityandappropriatenessofCordaid’soutputfromthebeneficiaries’perspective,whichwethentriangulatedwiththeresultsfromtheFGDs,KSIsandourownobservationsinthefield.Thesurveysgaveusasolidbasisofquantifiabledata.Weverifiedthesewiththequalitativeinformationweobtainedfromfocusgroupdiscussions,forwhichwerecruitedandtrainedFGDfacilitatorsandnotetakers.Wehadtoabandonourinitialideatoworkwithcontrolgroupsaswelackedsufficientlogisticssupportinthefield.NeverthelessweheldthreeFGDwithnon‐Cordaidbeneficiaries,givingussomebasisforcomparisonoftherelativevalueofbeneficiaryappreciationofCordaid’sprogramme.Wealsointerviewedaselectnumberofkeystakeholders,especiallyCordaidshelterpartners,sub‐contractors,representativesofcoordinatingbodiesandlocalauthorities.Tohelpustotriangulatetheissueoflegitimacy,wemetwithcommittees,beneficiaries’(surveys),andauthorities(KSIs).Staffinterviewsfocusedmainlyonprogrammeapproach,designandmanagementissues.Theresultswherethenverifiedbyinterviewswithkeystakeholdersandourownobservationsinthefield.Thisresultedinthisreport,whichcontainsthreemainsections:
- Chapter4:adescriptivesectionoftheevolutionoftheproject.Thesourcesforthissectionweremainlystaffinterviews5andprojectproposalsverifiedbydirectobservationsbytheevaluators.
- Chapter5:ananalysisofprojectresultsbasedonthebeneficiarysurvey,thefocusgroup
discussions,verifiedbykeystakeholderinterviewsanddirectobservations.
- Chapter6:asectionwhichconcludestheanalysisintermsoftheeffectiveness,appropriateness,efficiencyandtheimpactoftheprojectandrecommendationstostrengthenoperationsalongtheselines.
4Completesetinannex5.5Inkeepingwithevaluationethicalcodesandtheprincipleofconfidentiality,thenamesandpositionsofkeystakeholdersandstaffarewithheld.
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4. Programme Evolution
Thissectionofthereportgivesageneraldescriptionoftheprogrammeandhowitevolvedovertimeintheruralandurbancontext.
4.1 Emergency Response ImmediatelyaftertheearthquakeCordaidsenta‘reconnaissance’teamforitsfirstresponse,whicharrivedon14January2010.Theteamconsistedofacoordinator,alogisticsmanagerandacommunicationofficer.Inthefirstmonth,thisteamsupportedaCordaiddevelopmentpartner‐drivenemergencyresponseprogramme.Partner‐implementedrescue,non‐foodandfooddistributionswerefundedfroma‘solidarityfund’of€250,000.TheteamalsofacilitatedaCordaidmedicalteamandfocusedonpreparingalogisticsbaseinPort‐au‐PrinceandlaterinLéogâneforayettobedefinedprogramme.DiscussionstosupportCaritasHaiti(Cordaid’snaturalemergencypartner)didnotleadtosupportduetoongoingfinancialandadministrativechallengesinthisorganisation.CordaidstaffestimatedthatSHOfundraisingwouldraiseaminimumof€10million.Basedonfieldassessmentsofthecapacityofdevelopmentpartners,theemergencydepartmentraisedconcernsovertheirabilitytoimplementaprogrammeofthissize6.Takingintoaccountthesefactors,Cordaidemergencydepartmentdecidedtoembarkonanoperationalapproach,supportedbyatrustedshelterimplementationconsultancy(Group5),withwhichithadhadgoodexperiencesinIran,Aceh,PakistanandTurkey.OthercomponentsofCordaid’semergencyprogrammeincludedamentalhealthprogramme,butthisfallsoutsidethescopeofthisevaluation.4.2 Emergency Shelter Wewereunabletoestablishapapertrailfordecision‐making,butanecdotalinformationsuggeststhattheSectorManagerapprovedtherequestfromthefieldcoordinatorfor1,250tents.TheideaapparentlycameinresponsetoaCaritasInternationalrequestfromthecommunicationofficer,whohadinformationthatCordaidhadtentsavailableinPakistan.Adistributionreportindicatesthat1379tentsweredonatedtoCordaid’sdevelopmentpartners,whodistributed1133(82%)ofthese.18%remainunaccountedfor(eithermissing,stolenornodataonfile).Ourmethodologieshavenotenabledustolocatethetentsandformerfieldstaff,suggestedthatthetentshavedisintegratedanddisappeared.Wedidnotfindanyphysicalremainsthatcouldbeinspected.Astherewerenorecordswewereunabletoidentifyanybeneficiariestotalkabouttheirappreciationofthetents.6PerspectivesontheCordaidEmergencyIntervention–JaapVermeulenandJimMason,25August2010
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Staffandexternalshelterexpertsinterviewedindicatethattentsarenotagoodemergencysheltersolution(unlessperhapstheyarealreadyinthecountry).Theyareexpensive,logisticallydifficulttomanageandthematerialisnotappropriateforthehumidandhotconditionsofHaiti.Tarpaulinsareeasiertotransportandstore,moreversatile,canbeusedintransitionalsheltersolutionsandhencearepreferredovertents.TwoCordaidstaffmembersstatedthatalargenumber(14,000)oftarpaulinswerealsoordered.CordaidintendedtousetarpaulinsforT‐shelterwalls7.Thiswasnotimplementedresultinginemptyframes,insomecasesformorethanoneyear.Accordingtothesheltermanager,partofthestockwasdonatedtoother(emergency)agencies.4.3 Transitional Shelter ThissectioncoverstheT‐shelterprogrammeanditsevolutionintothebeginningsofapermanenthousingprogramme.Asthetwocomponentsareoperationallyintegrated8theyarepresentedinthesamesectionofthereport,withmanysub‐sectionsrelevanttoboth9.Subsections3and4thissectiondescribetheruralandtheurbanprogrammes,ofwhichthelatterincludestheevolutiontowardsan‘owner‐driven’andpermanenthousingapproach.Cordaiddecidedtoprovidehousingassistance(emergency,transitionalshelter),inearlyFebruary201010.
4.3.1 Management Thissectionanswersthefollowingkeyquestions:• Didthemajorpolicyandimplementationchoicescorrespondtothechangingneedsofthetarget
population?• Analyzethequality,efficiencyandtransparencyofthedecisionmakingprocessforthemainchoicesand
majorshifts.Decisionsmadebywhomandonwhichgrounds?SpecifyrolesandresponsibilitiesdefactoheldbyHQandFieldlevelsandcomparetodejuredesignoftheprocess.
• AnalyzetheeffectivenessandtimelinessofCordaid’seffortstoaccessbackdonorfunding.Cordaidestablishedadecision‐makingplatforminTheHague,calledthe‘Haititaskforce’,whichincludedtheSectorManagerDRR/Emergencies,theProjectOfficer(PV)forHaiti,andtheEmergencyDRRPolicyOfficer.CordaidemergencydepartmentinTheHaguecontractedGroup511,aRotterdam‐basedshelterconsultancyfirm,whodeployedaShelterAdvisor(wholaterbecameShelterManager)toCordaidHaiti.HereporteddirectlytoHQ(deputysectormanageremergencies)untilmidJune2010(strategy,implementationmodesandalternativesetc)anddevelopedproposalsandbudgetsandsentthemtothetaskforceforapproval.
7CordaidMarchandJuneproposals8 ‘ThetransitionalshelterdesigndevelopedbytheCordaidteamisinfactthefirstphaseoftheconstructionforapermanenthouse’(documentcalled:‘TRANSITIONALSHELTERSORPERMANENTHOUSES’)9Annex2providesanimplementationoverview.TheinformationmainlycomesfromCordaidHaitistaffbecausemonthlyprogressreportsdidnotprovidethiskindofoverview.10Informationandexplanationsheet11ForadescriptionofGroup5seeAnnex3.
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TheHeadofMission(HoM)andShelterManagersharedresponsibilitiesforprocurement,tendering,monitoringsystemdevelopment,logisticsandhumanresourcemanagement(exceptforNetherlandsbasedrecruitment).
Cordaidalsohiredanumberof‘barefoot’architects,youngandcommittedarchitects,recentlygraduatedfromuniversity,whoassessedshelterneedsinruralLéogâneandengagedwithbeneficiariestodeveloparangeofpossiblesheltersolutions.
Resultsfromstaffinterviewsindicatethatthisset‐upworkedwell,becauseitmaximisedimplementationrelateddecision‐makingdrivenfromthefield,withthetaskforceandlatertheemergencydepartmentplayingtheroleofverifyingproposals,designandimplementationagainstCordaid’spoliciesandbudget.4.3.2 Location Selection, Assessments and Proposals Thissectionofthereportanswersthefollowingkeyquestions:
• Makeaninventoryoftheassessmentprocessandmentionstrengthsandweaknesses.
• Howwerebeneficiariesselectedandwhatareeventualsideeffectsfrombeneficiaryselectionforcommunities.
Accordingtokeyfieldstaff,theshelterprogrammestartedinLéogâneforthreereasons:
1. CordaidhasanumberofdevelopmentpartnersbasedthereandgiventhefactthatCordaidfromthebeginningintendedtohaveaparticipatoryandsocialcapitalbuildingapproach,theideawastoinvolvethepartnersinthis.
2. Theareawasrelativelyneglectedbytheinternationalhumanitariancommunityinthe
earlystages,asmanyincomingINGOsandotheragenciesfocusedontheneedsclosetothelogisticallymoreaccessibleareasofPort‐au‐Prince,andtotheareaofPetitGoave,furthereastfromLéogâne,whereUNpresenceguaranteedmoresecurity.
3. TheLéogâneareasustainedveryheavystructuraldamageasaresultofitbeingthe
epicentre.ThefieldsuggestiontoprioritiseT‐shelterwasapprovedbythetaskforceinearlyFebruary2010.Seniorfieldstaffreportafocusontechnicalaspectsintheruralareas,aslandtenureandothertypesofsocialprotectionarelessofanissuethere.ThisallowedCordaidtoatrialanumberoftechnicalsheltersolutionsbydevelopingtemporaryshelterprototypes.Areviewofthefirstproposalsrevealsthatotherproposed,andlaterapproved,activitiesincludeddrinkingwater,latrines,infrastructureimprovements,disasterriskreduction,livelihoodsandsocialprotection.ThesamestaffreportthattheurbanneighbourhoodofSainteMarie(290families)waschosenbecausetherewerenoland‐issueproblems(duetochurchownership),andhencewas‘agoodandlowriskexperimentalground’.AccordingtotheSheltermanager,CordaiddeclareditsintentiontoworkinneighbouringVillaRosaasearlyasFebruary2010,asitsdevelopmentpartnerGRETalreadyworkedherepriortotheearthquake.
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InJuly2010,Cordaidindicateditsintentiontoworkintwowesternsuburbs(TisousandNanCocteau)intheareaofCarrefour,asaccordingtotheShelterManager,‘noothershelterorganisationswereactive,whiledamagewassevere’.However,CordaidwasnotabletocommenceconstructionactivitiesinPort‐au‐PrinceuntilDecember2010,eventhoughfieldstaffobtainedapprovallateFebruaryorearlyMarch2010for‘athreemonthstartupproposal’12whichincludedwaterandsanitationactivities.Afterapprovalaconsultantwashiredwho‘stronglyadvisedpermanentsolutions,andtostartwithahygienepromotioncampaign’.Thefactthattheneedforalonger‐termapproachcouldnotberesolvedwithintheapprovedshort‐termstrategyisgivenasthereasonfornotstartingactivitiesuntil2011.StaffreportthatarevisedruralprogrammeproposalinOctober2010andanewurbanproposalincludingadditionalshelters,communitydevelopment,socialprotection,DRR,WASHandlivelihoodcomponentswererejectedduetolackoffundsanddetail.ThisresultedinnewproposalsinDecember2010,whichHQapproved.Forunknownreasonsthebudgetdidnotmatchthenarrativeandfundswereonlyavailableforshelter.Theoperationalareawasexpanded,leavingnoresourcesavailableforsocialcapitalbuilding,WASHorlivelihoodactivities.FieldstaffmentionedthatHQdidnotcapitaliseonexternalfundingopportunitiesforT‐shelterfrominternationaldonors,whichcouldhavebeenusedtofreeupSHOfundsfortheothercomponents.AdeclineintherelativevalueoftheEuroduringimplementationalsolimitedthefundingbaseasbudgetsareinUSD.Fortheurbanprogrammeallocationsforothercomponentsbesidesshelterwereapproved.
CordaidarchitectsassessedthedamageintheruralareasandCordaidestablishedneighbourhoodcommitteestoselectthemostvulnerablebeneficiaries,whowouldbegivenpriority.InurbanareasCordaidselectedbeneficiariesbasedonthegovernmentdepartmentofMTPTC(MinisteredesTravauxPubliques,TransportsetCommunications)assessments.Cordaidstaffvisitedeachhouseholdinordertoassessthetechnicaldamageintheruralareas.MTPTCassessedthedamageintheurbanareas,requiringallhousestobetagged:
● Unsafeforhabitationandhavingtobedestroyedorretrofitted(red),● Needingrepairs(yellow)or● Safeandneedednowork(green).
CordaidstaffverifiedMTPTCdatainurbanneighbourhoodswithacommunitymemberandconducteditsownassessmentsintheruralareas.Thiswaslabourintensivework,especiallyinthevastareaof7ièmeGerard.TheMTPTCassessmentsintheurbanareashadtobeconductedwithoutthebenefitofaregisterorotherkindoflandorhomeownershipregistrationinthespontaneoussettlements.
12Informationandexplanationsheet
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Inadditiontoindividualbeneficiaryparticipationintheconstructionoftheirownshelters,localcommunitymembersparticipatedincommunityforumsandelaboratedcommunityactionplans(CAPs).Theseservedtwopurposes13:
1. Establishcommittees2. Needsidentification
ThecommitteesbecamethecommunitycommunicationandrepresentationplatformforCordaid’sshelterprogrammeandthemainfocusofitssocialcapitalbuildingstrategy.Committeesidentifiedthemostvulnerablebeneficiariesbasedonsuchcriteriaas:
● Lossofbreadwinner● Femaleheadedhousehold● Elderly● Pregnancy● Disability
Basedonthesecriteriacommitteesprioritisedthemostvulnerableamongtheeligiblebeneficiaries.Cordaidstaffverifiedthelists.DuringtheCAPprocessinbothruralandurbanareascommitteesalsoidentifiedotherneedssuchasWASH,infrastructureandlivelihoods.Accordingtokeystaff,Cordaidinitiallysoughttopartnerwithotherorganisations(TerredesHommes)toaddresstheseneeds,leadingtosomeWASHactivitiesandrubbishremovalaspartofpilotsinTisousandVillaRosa,preparingthebasisforastrategyforfulfillingtheobjectiveofcreating“safeandfriendlyneighbourhoods.”BuildinghighqualityT‐sheltersisarelativelyexpensiveapproachandseveralCordaidstaffmentionedthatspendingpressurereinforcedtheargumentstocontinueanelaborateapproachwithmorefeatures(walls)andimplementationin(sub)urbanareasofPort‐au‐Prince.Theadditionalresourceswerenotavailableforotheractivities.OnlyattheendoftheprogrammedidCordaidstarttoimplementabroader(integratedneighbourhood)approach,byincludingtherestorationandconstructionofretainingwalls,drainageandothersanitationsolutions.However,weverifieddirectlyduringfieldvisitstotheurbanareasthatsuchneedsremainlargelyunaddressedinotherCordaidoperationalareasattheendoftheproject14.Livelihoodactivitieswerelimitedtothetemporaryemploymentopportunitiesofferedtotradesmen(‘bosses’)andvocationaltrainingforyoungschooldrop‐outs,recruitedincollaborationwiththeNGOIDEJENintheruralareas.Staffmentionsalsolocalprocurementofconstructionmaterials,aspartofalivelihoodsstrategy.4.3.3 Rural Programme Theoriginalobjectiveoftheruralprogrammewastobuild2,300T‐shelters,3,300latrinesand16wellsandthephysicalrehabilitationoftheenvironment.Additionalobjectivesfocusedon
13CommunityActionPlanning,PracticalGuide(draft)–Haiti,December201014ourvisualinspectionsinSainteMarieandTisoustookplace6weekspriortotheendofCordaidactivities
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livelihoods,disasterpreparednessandsocialprotection15.Aswehavealreadyseen.thesewerenotcoveredbythefirstbudget.AfterCordaidarchitectsassessedthetechnicaldamageandestablishedneighbourhoodcommittees,theagencyengagedanumberofimplementationpartnersandsuppliersinordertodevelopshelterprototypes.Beneficiarycontributionswereinitiallylimitedtopreparingtheplotandassistingwiththeerectionoftimberframes.CordaiddesignedatimberframeshelterbecausethismaterialwasavailablefromsustainableproducersintheUSatareasonablecost.However,Haitihasashortageofskilledcarpentersduetothefactthatpeoplemorerecentlystartedtoprefertheuseofothermaterialssuchasconcreteandmasonry.Timberframeswereprefabricatedanddesignedinsuchawaythattwopersonscouldcarrythem.Theframeswereanchoredinconcretefeet,containedtrussescoveredbyCGIroofingsheetsandhadwallscladdedwithhighqualitytarpaulins.Thedimensionsoftheshelterswere20m2(Spherestandardsusinganaveragefamilysizeoffivepersonswouldrequireaminimumof17.5m2),andweestimatelifespantobeapproximately10years.Thecostforoneshelterintheruralareawasoriginallybudgetedat1,500USD.CordaiddevelopedthefirstprototypesincooperationwithsuppliersofthetimberframesandasearlyasFebruary2010andinvitedbeneficiariestocommentontwodemonstrationsheltersin7ièmeGerardandinLompré,leadingtomodifications.Theseprototypeswerethebasisforthefirsttwocontractsfor75shelterseach,atotalof150,producedbytwosuppliers(MaximaandPromobois)completedinMay2010.CordaidcontinuedtoconsultwiththepopulationinJulyandAugust2010,leadingtofurtherimprovementstothestructuralintegritysuch(certifiedhurricaneconnectorsandstraps)andmodificationstothedesign(thepossibilitytoaddaveranda,anaccessibleceilingforstorage,asecondfrontdoor,backdoor,andaflexiblesquarelayoutbasedon1metrewidepanels,flexibledoorsandwindowlocations).Animportantadditionalmodificationwasthereplacementofthetemporarytarpaulinswithmoresustainablewalls,whichduetoamanagementdisagreementwasnotimplemented,resultinginemptytimberframesforalongperiodoftime.Thesemodificationswereincludedinthedesignforthenextbatchof1850sheltersatanewcostof3,500USDpershelter.HQapprovedrequiredmodificationstothebudgetinJune2010.CordaidcontractedIPAtolaunchanopeninternationaltenderfor1850sheltersinfourbatches(startingendFebruary2010).Reportedlytheresponsewas‘insufficient’andtheemergencymanagerapproveda‘3quote’system,allowingdirectapproachofsuppliers.ThetenderopenedinMarch2010and3quoteswereobtainedinApril2010(Maxima–production,Acieried’Haiti–timbersupply,AllianceDistribution–2lotsforroofingsheetsandhardware).ConstructioninthefieldstartedendofOctoberandCordaiddelivered600shelterstoCARE.Thenexttenderfor940sheltersopenedinOctober2010andwasawardedendofDecember2010toSteelElementsInternational(SEI)–USAfor800shelters.140shelterscancelledforunknownreasons.SteelElementsexperiencedimportdelaysandCordaidawarded250shelterstoMaxima,whichprovedacheaperandmorereliablecontractorthanSEI16.
15CordaidprojectproposalDecember201016InformationandExplanationsheet
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Cordaiddefinedobjectivesandapproachintheruralareasandinformedandvalidatedthiswiththelocalauthorities,whoseimplementationrolewaslimitedastheylackedcapacities,whichwaspartofthereasonCordaidestablishedcommitteeswithwhichtowork.Theroleofbeneficiariesconsistedof:● diggingthefoundationholesandlevellingtheplot● safeguardingandtransport(sometimesoverconsiderabledistances)ofmaterialsfrom
pointofdeliverytoconstructionsite● assistingwitherectingtimberframesandroof● selectingtheboss,oftenCordaidproposedqualifiedbosses
CordaidengagedIDEJENstudentstoerecttheprefabricatedtimberframesandtocovertheshelterwitharoof,assistedbythebeneficiary.WorkingwithIDEJENgaveschooldropouts,oftencomingfrommarginalisedgroups,achancetolearnnewskills.Theauthoritiesintheruralareasonlyhadalimitedroleinthedesign,planningandimplementationoftheruralprogramme.CordaidliaisedwiththeLompreCasec,theMagistrateofGrandGoaveandthemayoranddeputyofLéogâne.However,operationally,Cordaidoptedtoworkthroughthecommittees,whichitregardedasmorelegitimateandeffectiverepresentativebodies.By the end of 2010, Cordaid reorganised the Léogâne office and confirmed its implementingapproach:
1. Thebeneficiarypreparesthelandorplot.2. Thesupplierdeliversthepre‐fabricatedtimberframes,roofsheetsandhardware;the
beneficiarysignsoff.3. Cordaidstaffsignsoffonqualityandquantityofproducts.Acopyofthewaybilliskept
inLéogâneoffice.Thesupplierinvoiceswiththesignedoriginalofthewaybill.TheseareverifiedwiththeLéogânecopiesbeforepaymentsaremade17.
4. IDEJENerectsthestructureandroof,assistedbythebeneficiary.Cordaidverifiesthequalityofconstructionandsignsoffforcompletion.
5. Cordaidpurchasesthesand,gravel,cement,chainlink;thebeneficiarysignsoffforreceipt.
6. Thebeneficiaryselectsabuildertoconstructthefloorandwalls.7. BeneficiaryandCordaidsignoffahand‐overdocument.
Laterin2011,followingtheexampleoftheurbanprogramme(SainteMarieandNanCocteau),Cordaidfundedtherepairsof204housesinGrandGoave,implementedbyFAU.Houserepairstookplaceinparalleltoshelterprovision,withanobjectiveof‘build‐back‐better’,requiringinvestmentsinearthquakeresistantreinforcedcolumnsandbeams.Otherrepairworksincludedroofing,doors,windowsandplastering.Toiletsweresometimesrestoredaswell.Thescopeofworkwaslimitedbythebudgetavailableperhouse.Inordertoassistthebeneficiarieswithrepairs,localtradesmen(‘bosses’)werecontracteddependingontechnicalskills,specificallyfortheshelterfloorandwallsprogram.Theyreceivedthreedaystrainingfrom
17Cordaidreducesrisksandliabilitybyavoidingownershipofshelterkitsinthisway.
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Cordaid,toimprovetheirbasicskillsandtocoachthemintheuseofnewtechniques.FAUtrainedaseparateworkforceforothertypesofrepairs.4.3.4 Urban Programme Theoriginalplanwastobuilt3,000T‐shelters,5,000latrines,repair1,000houses,improvedrinkingwatersupplyanddrainage18.Cordaidwascommittedtoworkwithinthegovernment’spolicyandlegalframeworksandthereforedependentontheoutcomeoftheassessmentsofMTPTC.Delaysinthedeliveryofbuildingstandardsandspecificationsfrustratedtheprocessofadaptingtheruraldesigntourbanconditions.Shortageofland,landtenureissues,delaysintheclearanceofrubbleandcomplexdiscussionsaboutwhetherornotandhowtoaddressdrainage,roadsandwatersupplyproblems,furthercompoundedthedelays.CordaidstarteditsurbanprogrammeinSainteMarieinJanuary2011withacommunityactionplanningexercise(CAP).InMay2011,shelterconstructionactivitiesstartedinTisous,NanCocteauandVillaRosa.Theapproachwasbasedontheruralprogramme,withtechnicalassessment,designandtheestablishmentofacommittee.However,theruraldesigndidnotallowforthepossibilityofasecondstory,acommondesignaspectinHaiti’sdenseurbansettlementsandoftenrentedoutaspartofanowner’slivelihoodstrategy.Smallplotsizeslimitedopportunitiesforothertypesofextensionsandimprovements.SainteMarieisaprivatesettlementwheretheCatholicChurchownsallland,whichismanagedbytheFoyer,itsadministrationoffice.Beneficiariespayatypeoftaxfortheprivilegeoflivingthereandforthesupplyofdrinkingwater(whichisthemaininfrastructuralprobleminthearea)andotherservices.Cordaidwasabletocomplete98sheltersbyAugust2011.StaffattributesthisrelativelyrapidimplementationtotheabsenceoflandtenureissuesinSainteMarie.AlmostsimultaneouslyCordaiddelivered150shelterstoCHFinRavinePintade.Accordingtothesheltermanager,the‘MoUwithCHFwasonlysignedinmid2011andimplementationdelayedsinceCHFcouldnotprepareplotssufficientlyforsheltererectiontotakeplace’.CHFstafftoldusthattheresidentialareaontheslopesofasteepravinewaslargelydestroyed.Thisenabledthemtoplananintervention,whichincludednewroads,pathsandpublicspaces.CHFalsorenovateddrainageandsanitationfacilitiesinthearea.CHFbuiltsteelframe,tarp‐clad,twostoryT‐shelters.Cordaidprovidedanadaptedversionofitsruraldesigntobeneficiarieswhosehouseswereheavilydamagedorcompletelydestroyed.InNovember2011,thepresidentdeclaredtheendoftheemergencyphaseandbannedtheprovisionofT‐shelters.CordaidstoppedT‐shelterconstructioninDecember2011andgavemoreprioritytobeneficiaryinvolvementandtorepairs.Itadoptedanownerdrivenhousing(ODH)approachinwhichthebeneficiarydecideshowtouseaCordaidgrant:completethegroundfloor,enlargethebuilding,repairs,newroof,etc..Cordaidalsoprovidestechnicaladvice
18CordaidProjectProposal,December2010
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fromanarchitectandanengineer.CordaidrolledoutthisstrategyinVillaRosa,NanCocteauandTisousfromMay2012.ODHisanimportantevolution,asitnolongerseesthebeneficiaryasarecipient,butalsoasanactivepartnerandparticipant,notonlyinplanninganddesign,butalsointheconstructionprocessitself.Italsosignalledthetransitiontopermanenthousingsolutions.CordaidHaitihadalreadysignedapartneragreementwithFAUinMay2011,coveringtherepairof855householdsinSainteMarie,GrandGoaveandNanCocteau.Thiswaslateradjustedto955households.FAUassessedanddesignedrepairworksand‘builtbackbetter’53housesinSainteMarie.FAUwasalsocontractedtorepairhousesintheruralareas,andinNanCocteauin2012.TheroleofFAUwastoundertakeadetailedassessment,makearepairplanandbudgetandcontractlocaltradesmen(‘bosses’)toimplementtherepairs,signacontractwiththebeneficiaryandhandoverthehouseaftercompletion.FAUpurchasedconstructionmaterialsfundedbyCordaidandalsomonitoredconstructionwork.Cordaid’sinvolvementwaslimitedtofundingandco‐signingthecontracts.Physicalpresencewaslimitedtothatoftheareamanagerduringsecurityincidents.Althoughonpaperowner‐drivenhousingstartedSeptember2011,ittookuntilDecember2011beforeCordaidstartedtoinvolvebeneficiariesdirectlyinconstructionactivitiesofitsurbanshelterprogrammeinthefield.TheVillaRosaCasecandthemayorofCarrefourbecamemoreactivelyinvolved,astheyassertedtheirroleaselectedofficialsanddutybearersintheprocessofdevelopingwaystosecurelandrightsforformeroccupantswithoutdocuments.CordaidpartneredwithUSbasedNGOBuildChangefortheimplementationofthisprogrammeinasimilarwaytoFAU.Aftertheassessmentandtheselectionofthebeneficiaries,thefollowingstepsaretaken:
1. BuildChangemakesthedesign,togetherwiththebeneficiary;2. BuildChangepreparesthebudgetforthework(iftheworkneededordesiredexceeds
thebudgetthebeneficiaryisaskedtocontributefinanciallyoradjustthedesigntoavailablefunds.
3. TheNeighbourhoodCommitteereceivesasmallfeefromthebeneficiaryforcheckingdocuments.
4. Cordaidverifiesdata(name,eligibilityetc.)andapproves.5. Thebeneficiaryreceivesahalf‐daytrainingfromBuildChange,learninghowtoselecta
boss,howtobuildwithqualitymaterialsandhowtosupervisetheexecutionoftheworks;
6. Thebeneficiaryselectsabossfortheconstructionworks;7. Ifthebossisnew,hereceivesa4daytraining,focusingonconcreteworksandearth
quakeresistantbuilding;8. Thebeneficiaryreceives3or4tranches(retrofitsandnewbuild)ofwhichthelast
trancheis5%ofthecontractamounttobepaidafterfinaldelivery;9. Thebeneficiarypurchasesthematerialsandcontractstheboss;10. Implementation,supervisedbythebeneficiary,assistedbyBuildChangeengineers
whenevernecessary;11. Finaldeliveryinpresenceofthebeneficiary,boss,BuildChangeandCordaid.
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Afinaldevelopmentistheso‐called‘integratedneighbourhoodapproach’(INA).CordaidalreadyparticipatedinaCHFimplementedprojectINAinRavinePintade.Themainideaistoincludesheltersolutionsasanintegratedaspectofurbanplanning,addressingawiderinter‐relatedsetofneeds,suchasWASH,landrights,publicspace,socialprotection,livelihoods,drainage,educationandhealth.Reportedly,INAwasalwaysforeseeninallprogrammeareas,howeverforavarietyofreasonsalreadymentioned,itwasinitiatedlate,neverfullyimplementedandremainslimitedtotwopilotprojectsinVillaRosaandTisous.4.3.5 Implementation Partners Thissectionofthereportanswersthefollowingkeyquestions:
• Wereactivitiescost‐efficientintermsoffinancialandhumanresources–takingintoconsiderationthecontextinwhichtheinterventionhadtobeimplemented,e.g.coststobeincurredtoreachthe
beneficiaries,andapplicationofbenchmarksforthecostingofsupportitems?TakenotethatinsomecasesCordaidoptedforoutsourcing,extendingthechainofpartners(internationalaswellaslocal),
contractors,subcontractorsandimplementers.Compareefficiencyofmoredirectimplementationwithoutsourcing.Contractingout
• Inlaterstages,moreemphasiswasplacedonpartneringwithotherinternationalNGOs(BuildChange,
FondationArchitectsd’Urgence,ArchitectureforHumanity,Care,etc.).Whatareconsequencesintermsofpolicycoherenceandcostefficiency.Howandbywhomwerethesepartnersidentified,what
werecriteriaforselection?Wasthecontractingprocedurecfmstandinginstructions.
Theimplementationoftheshelterprogrammerequiresinternationalandnationalstaffcapacities,whichCordaiddoesnotpossessonapermanentbasis.SeniorstaffacknowledgesthatCordaidlacksthecapacitytorecruitandsupportprofessionals(urbanplanners,engineers,architects,projectmanagersandcontrollers)forthistypeofoperation.Cordaidimplementedastrategytoboostitsimplementationcapacity:1. ItcontractedGroup5fortechnicaladvice,coordinationandimplementationandrecruited
teamsofinternational‘barefootarchitects’inLéogâneandinPort‐au‐Prince,supportedbyamanagementteamandnationalstaff.
2. ItcontractedtwoINGOs(FondationArchitectesd’UrgenceandArchitectureforHumanity)
toimplementurbanplanningexercisesandathird(BuildChange)toimplementtheownerdrivenhousingstrategy.FondationArchitectesd’UrgencealsoobtainedthecontracttorepairhousesinLéogâneandPort‐au‐Prince.Theirroleswere:
■ generalmappingoftheprojectarea.■ communityplanninganddesigns.■ micro‐planningofimplementation.■ coordinatingthecommunityexecutionofsomeinfrastructureworks
3. CordaidalsopartneredwithCAREtoprovide600sheltersinLéogâne.Cordaidhadthematerialsavailable,buthadnotyetestablisheditsimplementationcapacity(fieldstaff,beneficiaryselection,trainingofbuilders),whereasCAREdidnothavematerials,duelogisticalconstraintsbutdidhaveimplementationcapacity.OtheractivitiesreportedlyincludedthedevelopmentofcommunityinfrastructureandaWASHstudy.
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4. CordaidsignedanagreementwithIDEJENtoimplementcertainaspectsofshelterconstructioninbothruralandurbanareas.
5. CordaidsignedMoU’swithIDHI,PNAOSandGTIHforrubbleclearanceandwithCHFfor
shelterconstructioninRavinePintade.IOMdesignedandimplementedthelatrineconstructioninthepilots.
6. Italsotenderedorcontractedanumberofotherbusinesspartnersforthedeliveryof
materials,construction,trainingandotherservices.DuringtheselectionprocessCordaidhadtoovercomethedifficultyofsevereshortagesoflocalandinternationaltechnicalexpertise,duetotheextremelyhighdemandontheseservicesintheaftermathoftheearthquake.Cordaidusedtheclustermeetingstoidentifypotentialpartnersworkinginthesameareas.Thesheltermanager,whohimselfwascontracted,comparedorganizational,financial,administrativeandstaffcapacities,basedonexpertise,trackrecord,presenceandreputation.WewereunabletofindanyCordaidpoliciestosupportthesetypesofprocesses,eveniftheHoMdesignedsometoolstosupportthesheltermanagerinthisprocess.MostpartnerschargedtheirbackofficecoststoCordaid,whichmeansthatCordaidcontractedimplementationbutalsoqualityassurance,riskmanagement,policydevelopmentandotheroverheads.
5. Results Thissectionofthereportanswersthefollowingkeyquestions:
• Whatarebeneficiaries/communitiesperspectivesaboutneedsidentifiedoutsidethescopeofrepairsandconstruction(f.e.WASH,DRR,Livelihoodinterventions)
• HowsuccessfulwereCordaid’seffortstoengenderitsapproachandinteractwiththebeneficiaries?• Wastheinterventionappropriatewithregardtothespecificcharacteristicsofthedisaster:(semi)
urbansetting,scale,weakgovernance,damagetoinstitutionalstructures(governmentaswellasNGOs)?
• Weretheshelterprogramstrategiesandimplementationchoicescoherentwiththeclustersystem,nationalreconstructionplansandstrategies?
• Howdotheachievedresultsandthemannerinwhichtheyareachieved,compareagainstinternationalqualitystandardsCordaidstrivestoadheretoasdefinedintheSpherestandardsandtheCodeofConductfortheInternationalRedCrossandNGOsindisasterresponseprogrammes.
• WasthereanadequatesystemformonitoringandevaluationinplaceinCordaidHaiti?• Identifymajoreffects(negativeandpositive)atbeneficiaries,communitiesorotherstakeholders(
localgovernment),fosteredbytheprogramme• Werethereanyunintendedside‐effects(negativeorpositive)?
Resultswereinitiallyslowtoemerge.Accordingtokeyinternationalfieldbasedtechnicalstafftheplanningofimplementationseemstohavebeenratherad‐hocanddependentontheavailabilityandpresenceoftheHoMandShelterManagerduring2010.ThediscontinuityofasheltermanagerinLéogânewasmentionedbyCordaidstaffasthemainreasonforthelackofplanningfortheruralprogramme,whichcontributedtoalackofresultsduringthefirstyear.Formerfieldstaffmentionedthattheinitialpilotof150shelterswasnotimmediatelyfollowedbythecompletionof2,000sheltersasplanned,becauseofpoorlogistics,changing
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implementationstrategiesandalackofdirectionwhichendedbytheendof2010,whentheshelterteammoreclearlydefinedtheapproach,leadingtoanincreaseofoutputinearly2011.Fromthispointintime,planningofruralandurbanprogrammesimproved.Timeandactivityscheduleswereincludedinprojectproposals,indicatingactivityimplementationtargetsforallprojectareas.Howeverthesescheduleswerenotsystematicallyupdated,makingthemapoorbasisforprogressmonitoring.ComparisonofCordaidshelterprogrammestotheoriginalandtothemostrecentupdatedobjectivesdocumented(MarchandMay2012respectively),showsthatshelteroutputsandrepairshavebeenlargelyrealised,especiallyintheruralareas,wheredesignoriginatedandimplementationbeganearlier.Cordaidlargelyachieveditssocialcapitaldevelopmentobjectivesthroughtheestablishmentofthebeneficiarycommittees.Thereareevenearlysignsthatthesecommunityplatformsarealreadybecomingsustainable.OriginalintegratedneighbourhoodapproachandWASHobjectiveswerede‐prioritisedintheruralareasandremainedatthepilotphaseintheurbancomponentoftheprogramme.
Originalobjectives Updatedobjectives(March2012)
Results(May2012)
Ruralprogramme
2,300shelters 3,320sheltersprovided
3,003numberofsheltersprovidedandanunknownnumberoffamiliesreturned
1,200housesrepaired 340familieslivinginrepairedhouses
204numberofhousesrepairedand308numberoffamiliesreturned
Safeandfriendlyneighbourhoodinfrastructureandcommunityfacilitiescreated
Excluded NA
Water and sanitation facilities provided toensure3,300 families having andusing latrinesand5,000familieshavingaccesstowater.
Excluded NA
Areducedvulnerabilityofcommunitiestonaturaldisasters,suchashurricanes,floods,landslidesandearthquakes
Notchanged TrainingofbossesRiskmappingexercisesinallprojectareas
Increasedsocialprotectionbyensuringlandlessbeneficiaries(anestimated80%oftargetfamilies)landtenureprotection
Notchanged Theruralprogrammeincludesunknownnumbersofrenters(figuresnotyetavailable)
Socialcapitaldevelopedthroughstrengthenedorganisationof‐,andcooperationbetween,localgovernment,communitycommittees,andnon‐governmentalorganisations.
Notchanged ‐Bonding:settingupofcommittees,involvinglocalNGOs(e.g.IDEJEN),capacitybuildingtocommitteesstartingtotakeplace‐Bridging:thecommitteesthemselvesconsistofmembersfromvariouslocalCBO’s,PANOShasprovidedtrainingtodifferentcommitteesandameetingwithallruralcommitteeshastakenplace
Improvedlivelihoodandincomegeneratingopportunitieswithinthecommunities
Notchanged Labour(bosses,IDEJEN).Purchaseoflocalmaterials(sand,graveletcandintheUrbanODHprogrammeallmaterialsarepurchasedinorneartheneighbourhoods
Urbanprogramme
3,000shelters 856sheltersprovided800housesprovided=1.656shelters/houses
848sheltersfinished84housesfinished=934shelters/housesconstructedandxnumberoffamiliesreturned
1,000housesrepaired 1,059houses 146repairsfinished
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repaired 123housesretrofitted(ODHyellow)=269numberofhousesrepairedandxnumberoffamiliesreturned
Safeandfriendlyneighbourhoodinfrastructureandcommunityfacilitiescreated
Notchanged 2initialprojectsINAstarted2HousesofKnowledgeprovided
5,000 latrines andwatersupplyprovisions in4communities covering approximately 75,000people
340 latrines andwater supplyprovisions in 2communities(Tisous and VillaRosa)
Withinthetwoinitialzones(TandVR)Cordaidprovidesinfrastructureimprovementsincludingdrainage,directlybenefitingapproximately1,200persons.Retrofittingtheurbanhousesoftenincludestherepairsoftoilets(304completed).
Areducedvulnerabilityofcommunitiestonaturaldisasters,suchashurricanes,floods,landslidesandearthquakes
Notchanged OneurbancommitteebeingtransformedintoPlatformCommunautairetoensureformalparticipationingovernmentledurbandevelopment(16/6)3numberofHousesofKnowledgeprovidedTrainingtobossesandbeneficiariesRiskmappingexercisesinallprojectareasAwarenesscampaignsonbuildingstandardsandrisksinurbanareas
Increasedsocialprotectionbyensuringlandlessbeneficiaries(anestimated80%oftargetfamilies)landtenureprotection
Notchanged Theurbanprogrammeincludesunknownnumbersofrenters(figuresnotyetavailable)Theurbanprogrammeincludesanunknownnumberorlandownersthatreceivedtheirownershipthroughtestimonials
Socialcapitaldevelopedthroughstrengthenedorganisationof‐,andcooperationbetween,localgovernment,communitycommittees,andnon‐governmentalorganisations.
Notchanged ‐Bonding:settingupofcommittees,involvinglocalNGOs(f.e.IDEJEN),capacitybuildingtocommitteesstartingtotakeplace‐Bridging:thecommitteesthemselvesconsistofmembersfromvariouslocalCBO’s,PANOShasprovidedtrainingwithdifferentcommittees,theVRcommitteeisbeingtransformedintoaPlatformCommunautaire
Improvedlivelihoodandincomegeneratingopportunitiesincommunities
Notchanged Labour(bosses,IDEJEN,OwnerDrivenWorks)
5.1 Technical Results Thissectionanswersthefollowingquestionsfromthetermsofreference:● HowwerethetechnicaldesignsappreciatedbyCordaid,othersandbeneficiaries?● Whatwereotherneedsandwhatwasdonewiththose?● Whatlevelofparticipationwasachieved?● Wereapproachandresultswithininternationalstandards(Sphere,others)?● Howwassocialcapitaldeveloped?● Werethereunintendedsideeffects?● ComparetheresponsetimeofCordaid’sshelterinterventionswithsimilarshelterinterventionsof
otherNGOsinHaiti.Surveyresultsshowveryhighdegreesofbeneficiarysatisfactionwithfourqualityindicators:design,size,materials,andconstruction.
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● Design○ 27%highlysatisfied○ 61%satisfied
● Size○ 23%highlysatisfied○ 63%satisfied
● Qualityofmaterials○ 27%highlysatisfied○ 66%satisfied
● Executionoftheconstructionworks○ 26%highlysatisfied○ 65%satisfied
Arelativelylargeproportion(32%)ofbeneficiariesdidnotknowwhethertheirshelterissafe(earthquakeorHurricaneresistant),anindicationthatbeneficiariesarenotwellinformedabouttechnicalqualityissues.
● 72%ofbeneficiariesdonotknowthelifespanoftheirshelter● 65%believethattheywillbeabletomaintaintheirsheltersbythemselves● 48%ofmembersofbeneficiaryhouseholdsreceivedtrainingduringtheproject● 24%involvedinconstruction● 12%learnedadditionalskills
BeneficiariesappreciatedthesheltersprovidedbyCordaidnotonlyintermsofdesignbutalsointermsoftheparticipatoryapproachthatCordaidadopted.TheyreportedthatCordaidanditsstaffsoughttheirinputintermsofdesignandculturalappropriatenessoftheshelters,contributingtohighlevelsofsatisfactionaboutthedesignoftheshelters.
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Amongruralresidents,
● 32%ofoursurveyrespondentswerehighlysatisfiedwiththedesignoftheshelters● 62%weresatisfied.
Werecordedalowerlevelofsatisfactionamongurbanresidentswhere
● 16%ofsurveyresponderswerehighlysatisfiedand● 59%weresatisfied.
Urbanresidentsexpressedrelativelymoreoftendissatisfactionwiththedesignoftheshelter(17%),thanruralbeneficiaries(5%).Onelikelyreasonforthisisthatthedesignoriginatedfromtheruralsettingand,despitemodificationstookessentialurbandesignrequirementsinsufficientlyintoaccount.TheruralT‐shelterapproachbecamethedominantfeatureoftheprogramme,notsomuchasaresultofaCordaidpolicy,butaccordingtokeystaff,bydefaultfromitsruraldesignoriginsandthestronginvolvementofarchitects.OtherfactorsmentionedbystaffwereclusteragreementsandGovernmentrequests.Nevertheless,theappreciationoftheshelterdesigngoesbeyonditsculturalappropriateness.Focusgroupparticipantsandsurveyrespondersbelievetheshelterswillprovideahigherlevelofsafetyincaseoffutureearthquakesorhurricanes.Urbanresidentsexpressedthehighestlevelofconfidenceinthestructuralintegrityoftheshelters:
● 18%highlysatisfiedand● 53%satisfied.
Thelevelofsatisfactionwiththelevelofsafetyamongruralresidentswasdistributedmoreevenly:
● 29%highlysatisfied● 34%satisfiedand● 36%didnotknow.
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Althougharelativelyhighproportion(32%comparedto26%ofhighlysatisfiedand39%satisfied)ofbeneficiariesdidnotknowwhethertheirhouseissafe,thereisalsosomeanecdotalevidencethatatleastsomeofthemfeelconfidentwiththesafetystandards.Forinstance,onefocusgrouprespondentreportedthatduringarecenttremor,hestoodathiswindowandwatchedhisneighboursrunfromtheircementblochousesbecausehewasconfidentthattheconstructionanddesignofhisshelterwassolidenoughtowithstandthequake.Committeemembersparticipatedintheprojectevenwhentheyknewthattheywouldnotpersonallybenefitfromtheprojectandcontinuedtodosoevenwhenaspectsoftheprocessbecameproblematic.ThisillustratesconfidenceinCordaidandtheproject.CommitteememberstoldusthatbeneficiariesexpresseddisappointmentinthefactthatotherneedssuchaslivelihoodandWASHidentifiedintheCordaidfacilitatedCAPswerenotincludedintheprogramme.BoththeCAPsandtheproposalscalledforastrategyaddressingabroadspectrumofneeds.InseveralzonesthepopulationandthecommitteescriticisedthefactthatCordaidpromisedotherinterventionsbutdidnotfollowup.
ThisunfortunatelycreatedtensionamongthepopulationandtowardsCordaid.Somecommitteemembersreportedthattheyagreedtoparticipateintheprojectbecauseoftheirunderstandingthattheprojectwouldgobeyondsheltersothatpeoplewhowerenoteligibleforshelterswouldeventuallybenefitinsomeotherway.Committeemembersreportthattheywereheldaccountablebytheirconstituency,tocommitmentstodeliverforwhichinretrospecttheyfoundtheyhadnomandate.CordaidpartnerCHFimplementedanintegratedneighbourhoodapproachintheurbanslumofRavinePintade.CHFupgradedtheneighbourhood’slayoutandreservedpublicspacesforattractiveseatingareaswherepeoplecanmeet,readandstudy.Theypavedroadsandpathsandcoveredandcementedtheareasdrainagecanals.CHFprovidedtwostoreysteelframes,cladwithtarpaulinsandCordaidprovided150oftheirtemporaryshelters.
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BeneficiariesinRavinePintadeexpressedintheFGDhighlevelsofsatisfactionabouttheresults.Theyreportedthattheyarehappywithlifeintheircommunity.Accordingtooneparticipant:“Nowtheneighbourhoodlooksbetter.Mostofthedamagedhouseshavebeenrepaired.Theyhavetakendownthehousesthatcouldnotberepaired.Wearenowsafefromearthquakes.”UnlikemostotherneighbourhoodswhereFGDparticipantscomplainaboutsafetyandsanitationissues,RavinePintaderesidentsreportthattheyfeelsafebecausetheyhelpeachotherandalsodonotmentionsanitationproblemsasoftenasFGDsinCordaidneighbourhoods,probablyduetothefactthatCHFprovidedmoderntoiletsandrepaireddrainage.ResidentsinRavinePintadealsoexpresshighlevelsofsatisfactionwiththewaythedifferentpartsoftheprogrammewerecommunicatedtothemespeciallyduringthemeetingwheretheypresentedtheneighbourhoodplansanddiscussedtheplacementofthelocalpark.5.2 Social Results Thissectionofthereportanswersthefollowingkeyquestion:SocialCapital
• InitsshelterprogramCordaidHaitiaimstoapplyasupportdriven,people‐centeredreconstructionapproach.Throughcommunitybasedinterventions,involvingnationalpartnerorganizationandcommunitygroups,Cordaidaimstostrengthensocialcapital.Thestrategyalsofostersanincreaseovertimeintheresponsibilityoflocalcommunitiesandpartnerorganizations.Italsoaimstomaximizetheuseoflocalmaterials,locallaborandlocalskills/techniques.Theseobjectivesdonotnecessarilycontributetotimelinessandefficiencyoftheoperation.Howweretheseobjectivesdefinedandbywhom?Howdidstrategicchoicesdealwithpossibleconflictingobjectives.
Fromtheperspectiveofthebeneficiaries,oneofthemostimportantsocialresultsishousingsecurity.FGDparticipantsconsistentlyreportthat,becauseoftheirconfidenceinthedesignandconstructionofthenewshelters,theyfeelprotectedfromfuturedisastersandabletofocusonrebuildingotheraspects(economic,cultural,health)oftheirlives.FGDswithpeoplewhobenefitedfromtarp‐cladsheltersprovidedbyotheragencies,reportedthattheyfeeluncomfortableleavingtheirhousesforfearoflosingtheirpossessions.BecausetheCordaidsheltersaremadewithdurableand“theftresistant”material,residentsfeelcomparativelysaferandreportengaginginactivitiesthatwillenablethemtocontinuetorebuildtheirlives.Familieswhorented,sharedfamilyplots,orlivedillegallyonhazardousland(ravines,steepslopes,floodproneareas),althoughincludedintheMTPTCassessmentandpossiblytagged‘red’or‘yellow,’wereexcludedbyCordaidasownershipprovidedthelegalbasis.WewereabletoverifydirectlyinTisousandVillaRosathatmanywhowereexcludedfromtheinitialassessments,stillliveintentstoday.AnothergroupnotreachedbyCordaidwerethosewhohad“rien”nexttotheirname,indicatingthattheyhadnotreceivedanMTPTCtag.Staffreportthatithadinsufficientfundstoreachthisgroup,whichincluded:● Rentersorthoserentingaroomintheoccupier’shome.● Housesownedbyfamiliesthatwerenotpresentatthetimeoftheassessments.
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● HousesownedbyfamilieswhowereunwillingtoprovideinformationasaresultofassessmentfatigueorrumoursthatparticipationmightjeopardiseUSvisaapplications
● Plotsalreadyclearedbytheownerscouldnotbetagged.● Taggedwallsremovedbyownersinordertocleartheplotwereexcludedbecausethe
tagwasnotvisibleanymore.SomeownerssuccessfullyaskedMTPTCtobeincludedagain.
● Someofthered‐taggedhousesdidnotneedrepairs,butweretaggedassuchbecauseofneighbouringhazards.
● Coupleswhocouldnotbeaccommodatedbecausethesizeofthenewshelterdidnotprovideadequateprivacyforextendedfamiliesormultiplefamilyunits.
● Someyellowtaggedhousesrepairscostsbeyondthebudgetedamounts.● Fortheurbanprogrammeamajorconditionforselectionwasthepossibilitytobuildan
actualshelterorahouseontheplotownedbythefamily.Iftheplotwasonahazardouslocation,tooclosetoariverbedoriftheplotwastoosmallforashelter,Cordaidexcludedthehousehold.
DespitetheseproblemsCordaidcommunicatedthatitwouldcover100%ofthedamagedhousesinitsoperationalareas.Thiscausedproblemslater,asCordaidwasunabletodeliverfullyonthiscommitment,creatingtensionswiththecommunitiesandevensecurityincidentsinurbanareas.The“rien”categoryincludedresidentswhosehouseswerenottaggedbytheMTPTCorcaseswhereCordaidsurveyorscouldnotverifythetaggingdonebytheMTPTC.InsomecasesthewallonwhichtheMTPTCtagwasplaced,wasnotvisibletotheCordaidsurveyors.Accordingtocommitteemembers,thisgroupcontainedpeoplewhowouldotherwisehavebeeneligibletoreceivehelpfromCordaid.FGDreportsindicatedthatyoungcoupleswereoftenexcludedfromtheproject.Thedecisiononthesizeoftheshelterdidnottakeintoconsiderationmultifamilyhouseholds.YoungcouplesthatusedlivewiththeirparentspriortotheearthquakefoundthattheCordaidsheltersdidnotprovidethemwithadequateprivacy.Accordingtoonecommitteemember,Cordaid’ssurveyfocusedonhousesandnotpeopleandasaresultthesizeofshelterprovidedcouldnotaccommodatethenumberofresidentsthatthepre‐earthquakehousesheld.CordaidbuilthousesaccordingtoSpherestandards.However,thefactthatmanyextendedhouseholdswerenotabletocontinuelivingtogether,duetothesizeoftheT‐shelter,andmanyyoungadultsendeduphavingtoliveinnearbytentcamps,clearlyillustratestheshortcomingofstandardsdrivenapproach.Establishingsheltercommittees(insomecommunitiesknownas‘theCordaidCommittees’)ensuredaparticipatoryapproachbyarepresentativeandlegitimatecommunitybody.WiththeexceptionofNanCocteauwhosecommitteemembersweredrawnfromexistingcommunitybasedorganisations,thedifferentcommunitieselectedtheircommitteesatcommunityforumsorganisedbyCordaid.ByactingoncommitteerecommendationsCordaidensuredanappropriateshelterdesignintheruralareas.Whereparticipationwasmoreproblematic(e.g.inSainteMarieasaresultofftheinfluenceoftheFoyer),beneficiariesvaluedesignless.
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Thesignificanceofthecommunityforumsgoesbeyondtheselectionofthecommitteemembers.Throughtheforumsthedifferentcommunitiescreatedcommunityactionplans(CAP).WhilesomeoftheissuesidentifiedbytheCAPwerebeyondthescopeoftheCordaidproject,theynonethelessallowedthecommunitiestocometoacollectiveunderstandingofthemajorissuestheyfacedandplacedtheminabetterpositiontodevisesolutionstotheseproblemsinthefuture.TheCAPprocessalsoprovidedcommunitieswithatoolforcollectiveneedsassessmentandaconcreteplanwithwhichtheycannowlobbythestateorotherserviceproviders.Thestrategyisalreadybearingfruit,astheVillaRosacommitteerecentlybecameacommunityparticipationplatformintheHaitiangovernment’s16/6program19,anewjointgovernmentandUNhousingstrategyaimedatprovidingpermanentandintegratedhousingsolutionstothepopulationof16remainingtentcampsin6neighbourhoods.Withinthisframeworkthecommitteehavereceivedfurthertrainingandsupportinordertoparticipate.ThisrecognitionofaninformalCordaidfacilitatedcommunityforumasalegitimateformalcommunityconsultationplatformisanimportantandremarkableachievementandapositiveimpactongovernanceissuesinHaiti.MostFGDparticipantsreportthattheyparticipatedintheselectionofcommitteemembers,buteventhosewhodidnotaregenerallysatisfiedwiththeworkofthecommittee.However,inourmeetingswiththecommittees,membersexpressedanumberofconcernsaboutCordaid:● LackofdefinitionoftheirworkandrelationshipwithCordaid:
○ Whilecommitteememberswereawarethattheirpositionwouldnotberemunerated,theydecriedthefactthatsometimestheyfeltthattheirworkwastakenforgranted.
○ SomecommitteemembersclaimthatCordaiddidnottakeintoaccounttheexpensesassociatedwiththeirwork(e.g.theyhadtousetheirpersonalphonetotransmitmessagestobeneficiaries).
● ProblemsintheflowofinformationbetweenCordaid,Committeeandbeneficiaries.
○ Cordaidprovidedinformationlate.○ Committeememberswereharassedbybeneficiarieswhobecameimpatientbecause
ofdelaysinthedeliveryofconstructionmaterial.○ Somebeneficiariesweretoldtoclearthelandandtakedowntheiroldhousesand
hadtowaitalongtimeforconstructiontobegin.Wehaveseenacoupleoftimberframesstillwrappedwithtarpbecausecementandsandhadnotbeendelivered.
19“Theproposed16/6hasbeendesignedtorehabilitate16neighborhoodstorelocateresidentsofsixlargecampsinthemetropolitanarea.LaunchedinAugust2011,itwillcostsome78million[US]including30million[US]allocatedbytheFundfortheReconstructionofHaiti(HRF)whichmobilizes,coordinatesandallocatesincludingcontributionsfrombilateraldonorstofinancepriorityreconstructionprojectssuchasdefinedbytheHaitianGovernment”(MINUSTAH.org)
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● Wereceivedareportthatonecommitteememberbrokeredthesaleofashelter.Thisisinitselfanunfortunateincidentandinnowayasystemicproblem.However,itmayhavecontributedtoalackofconfidenceintheintegrityofothercommitteemembers,assomeofthemreportedbeingaccusedofdoingthesamethingespeciallyinsituationswherepeoplebelievethattheyarequalifiedbutdidnotreceiveshelters.
● CommitteesperceivethatCordaidunderutilisedlocalhumanresources.Severalcommittees
suggestedthat,ratherthanbringingdrivers,engineersandcommunityworkersfromPort‐au‐PrincetoLéogâne,communitymembersbelievethathiringworkersfromthelocalcommunitywouldhavegonealongwayintermsofdevelopingthecommunityandprovidingworkexperiencefortheyouth,unabletofindemployment.
● Somecommittee’smemberswereself‐appointed.
● SainteMarieCommitteehadnorealmandateastheFoyermadealldecisions.
● GiventhelatestartofCordaid’sworkinurbanareas,itisinterestingtonotethatthe
majorityofthebeneficiariesoftheurbanprogrammethinkthatthetimingoftheinterventionwasontimeandthatlessthan20%ofthebeneficiariesqualifiedtheinterventionas‘toolate’:
Theprogrammedidnotprioritiselocallyavailablehousingmaterials,butusedamoretechnicallyappropriateapproach.Environmentalandsupplyconsiderationsledthedecisiontoimportthetimberfortheframes.Otherbuildingmaterialswerepurchasedlocallynotnecessarilytobuildsocialcapital,butbecausetheyweretechnically,environmentallyandintermsoftimingthebestsolution.Usinglocallabourwasmaximisedandsurveysandinterviewsindicatedthatbeneficiaries,localtradesmenandyouthsallfeeltheyhaveacquirednewtechnicalskills,whichtheymaywellbeabletouseiftheartisanalconstructionmarketcontinuestogrow.
5.2.1 Gender Thissectionofthereportanswersthefollowingkeyquestion:
• Appropriatenessasperceivedbytargetgroup/endusers(makethisgenderspecific)
Weanalysedthefocusgroupdiscussionreportstoseeifwecoulddetectanydifferencesbetweenmenandwomeninthewaytheyreflectedontheresultsoftheprogramme.MenandwomenappreciatedtheCordaidshelterinsimilarwaysandweonlyfounddifferencesinemphasis.Womentendedtotalkaboutfamilysizeandthefactthatthehousesweretoosmallforthesizeoftheirfamilies.Womenalsoreportedthatbeforetheearthquakechildrenlivedinseparaterooms,whereasnowtheyallsleepintheoneroom.InterestinglyinTisouswomenreportedthattheyhavegoodrelationshipswiththeirneighbours,whilethemenreportedincreasedargumentsandtensionsbetweenneighbours.ThesetypesofdifferencesmerelyreflectthedifferentinterestsandrolesmenandwomenhaveinHaitiansocietyatlargeandperhapsthemoreharmoniousnatureofinterpersonalcommunicationbetweenwomen,comparedtothatofmen.InHaititheremaybegender
27
inequalitiesinafinancial,familial,andinterpersonalsense,butwhenitcomestosocialandcommunityparticipationwomenareaswellrepresentedasmen.Thiswasalsobroughtoutbytheactiveandequalparticipationofwomeninthecommitteesbothasmembersandintermsofvoicingtheiropinionsandconcerns.Vulnerabilitycriteriaincludedpregnantwomenandfemale‐headedhouseholds,illustratingthatbothCordaidandthecommitteestookgenderintoaccountinprogrammedesign.ThisisparticularlysignificantintheculturalcontextofHaitiwhereonemanmayhavemorethanonefamilyandcannotorisunwillingtosupportthemallequally.Committeesprovidedwomenwithaplatformtovoicetheirneeds.FGDreportsshowthatwomencommitteemembersinparticularemphasisedtheneedsofvulnerablefamilies.Giventhedifferenceinlifeexpectancybetweenmenandwomen,thefocusontheelderlyasvulnerabilitycriteriaalsocoversmorewomen,asmanyarewidowedandwithoutthefinancialsupportofapartner.Wealsobelievethatanintegratedneighbourhoodwouldhaveprovidedanopportunitytocreatemorewomenfriendlypublicspaces,mitigatingagainsttherelativelyhighlevelsofsocialviolenceinthedenselybuiltbidonvillesofPort‐au‐Prince.Humanitarianprojectsneedtotakeanygenderspecificdifferencesinneedsintoaccountandaddressthemwherepossible,butagainwehavefoundnoindicationsthattheneedsofmenandwomenweresignificantlydifferent:bothneededshelter.Maybewomenevenmoresothanmenandthechoicetodoshelterinitselfmayhavecontributedmoretotheneedsofwomen.
6. Conclusions and Recommendations
6.1 Dilemmas TheCordaidHaititeamssuccessfullymanagedcomplexdynamicsanddifficultdilemmasassociatedwiththetaskofdeliveringurgentshelterservices,whilstatthesamebeingaskedtobuildsocialcapital.Theneedtoimplementasizeablegrant20withinalimitedperiodoftimerequiredarigorousup‐scalingofimplementationcapacities,asthesewerenotavailablewithexistingpartners.Socialcapitalobjectiveshavebeenlargelyrealised,andwellintegratedintheshelterstrategy.Committeesareactive,seenaslegitimatecommunityrepresentativebodiesbybothbeneficiariesandauthorities.Theyarealsobeginningtoworktogetheronotherissues,asCordaidbroughtthemtogetherinaworkshopinvitingthemtofindsolutionstoremainingcommunityneeds.Anyconcernsthatsocialcapitaldevelopmentmayhaveaffectedtimelydeliveryhaveprovenunjustified.Notonesourcemadethisconnection.Cordaiddidnotaddressunderlyingissuesofpovertyandinequitywithitsemergencyshelterprogramme,norwasthistheobjective.Itwouldrequirethetypeofpoliticalactionandadvocacy,whichwouldnotnecessarilyfurthertheobjectiveofsupplyingthepopulationwithurgentlyneededsheltersolutions.Norwoulditcomplywithhumanitarianprinciplessuchasneutralityandimpartiality.20TotalSHOfundsgranttoCordaidwas€29million
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Thereishoweverahumanitarianobligationtoavoiddoingfurtherharmortoavoidexacerbatingsocialinequities.IfCordaidwouldnothavebeenunderpressuretomeettheveryurgentshelterneedsofaverylargegroupofpeopleandtospendalargesumofmoneyrelativelyquickly,itmayhavebeeninapositiontochoseamorerightsbasedapproach,lessbasedonservicedelivery:identifyandworkwiththemostvulnerable:tenants,landless,andotherwiseillegallysettledgroupswithfewemploymentopportunitiesandextremelysusceptibletohealthhazards,suchacholerainfection.Thiswouldhavemeantworkingoutsidethegovernment’spoliciesandMTPCTassessments.6.2 Effectiveness AnoverviewoftheadjustedobjectivesandrealisedsheltersolutionsasimplementedbyCordaiduntil12June201221indicatesthatCordaidbuilt3,935sheltersandhousesandrepaired/retrofitted876houses,representing81%and40%respectively.Pipelineanalysisshowsthattheadjustedtargetsof4,856shelters/housesand1,177repairswillmostlikelybemetbytheendoftheBuildChangecontract.
Rural Urban Total
objective realised objective22 realised Objective realised
Shelter 2,720 2,403 856 848 3,576 3,251
600 60023 600 600
Houses(ODHred) 680 84 680 84
subtotal 3,320 3,003 856 848 4,856 3,935
Repairs 204 204 403 146 607 350
Houses(ODHyellow) 570 123 570 123
subtotal 204 204 973 269 1,177 473
NotonlywillCordaidachieveitstemporaryshelteroutputtargets,italsodeliveredveryhighqualityoutputsasoursurveyandFGDresultsshow.Thefivebeneficiaryappreciationindicatorsusedforthisevaluationshow80%to90%satisfactionscoresforbothproductandprocess,indicatingthequalityofCordaid’sshelteroutputs.Theearthquake‐affectedpopulationofHaitirequiredshelter,oneofthepriorityneedsforsurvival.ItwasalsoclearwhatthosewhodonatedtotheSHOfundraisingcampaignexpectedCordaidtodeliver:houses.CordaidcannowrightlyandproudlyclaimtobetheNetherlands’leadingshelterproviderinthirdworldnaturaldisasters.
21CordaidMonthlyReportMay201222Maymonthlyreport23implementedbyCARE
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Theprioritisationofshelterinevitablycausedotherobjectivestoplaysecondfiddle.CommunityfeedbackduringFGDs,thesurvey,andcommitteemeetingsallconfirmthatwaterandsanitationobjectivesinparticularremainlargelyunaddressedbyCordaidevenifotheractorsincidentallycametotherescue.Theintegratedneighbourhoodapproachstartedlateandonlyaspilotprojects,meaningthatdrainageandsanitationproblemsforlargenumbersofpeopleremainanimportantissueattheendoftheproject.Cordaidalsometitssocialcapitalbuildingobjectives.Beneficiariesandauthoritiesreviewedtheroleofthecommitteesaspositive.Theirrolehasbeenparticularlycriticalinsituationswherestateinstitutionswereinactiveandillequipped.GrassrootssocialinfrastructurewassuccessfullydevelopedaroundtheshelterinterventionsandlaidsolidfoundationsforCordaid’sotherbusinessunits,UrbanMatters,ResilientLivelihoodsandConflictTransformationforrollouttheirlonger‐termdevelopmentstrategies.ItisunfortunatethatCordaid’spre‐existingdevelopmentpartnerscouldonlyplayaminorroleintheshelterprogramme.Ontheotherhand,Cordaidisnowbetterpositionedtostrategicallyaddresssocial,economicandpoliticalproblemsdirectlywithgrassrootssocialorganisationsinthehighlyurbanisedsocietyofHaiti.Feedbackfromkeyactors,includingIOM,UNHABITAT,andkeylocalauthoritiesconfirmthecommunityfeedback.ItisnowoneofthemosteffectiveshelterprovidersinHaiti.Itssub‐contractingandoutputdrivenmodelhasgreatlycontributedtomeetinghousingneedsinpostearthquakePort‐au‐PrinceandLéogâne.Despitetheeffectivenessoftheshelterprogramme,thereisalackofchecksandbalancesintheproject.Thiswasmanagedbyhavingtherightstaffintherightplace,formostofthetime.DuetoalackoftechnicalshelterknowledgeinTheHague,verificationofprogrammecontenttoensurecompliancewithqualitystandardswasinsufficient.ItwaslefttothediscretionoftheCordaidHaiti‐basedstaff,tojudgetheappropriatenessofsigningmultimillioneurocontractswithpartnersandsub‐contractors.Recommendation1:Cordaidrequiresmoretechnicalshelterexpertiseintheemergencydepartmenttoallowforpolicydevelopment,qualityassuranceandriskmanagementsupportforimplementationmanagersinthefield.
ThefeedbackfromtheHaitifielddebriefingconfirmedourobservationthatthebasisformonitoringatHoMandHQlevelswasinadequate,asdatawerenotcollectedandanalysedsystematicallyuntillateintheprogramme.Thesystempresently(frommid‐2011)usedforprogrammemonitoringwasdevelopedafterthefirstperiodofimplementationbyLéogânebasedstaff,supportedbyconsultants.EarlyattemptstointroduceFilemakerProfailed,asdidanotherattempttodevelopaprogrammeforassessments,incoordinationwiththesheltercluster.Theresultwasanumberofmismatchingdatabases24.ThismeantthatprogressreportscontainedmainlyanecdotalinformationandthatCordaidforalongtimelackeddataforprojectandapproachevolutionanddecision‐making,duetothelackofprioritygiventothisbyHQ,accordingtoseniorfieldstaff.
24Informationandexplanationsheet
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Programmemanagersreportedthedatabasetobeextremelyusefulasitprovidesthemwithqualityinformationforfollow‐uponprogressandresults.Thedatabaseisaccessibleandupdatedbyallrelevantshelterstaff,howeverthelogisticsdepartmentdoesnotuseit,eventhoughthisisanavailableoption.Cross‐checkinganddirectinformationsharingbetweendepartmentsisnotpossible.Recommendation2:Cordaidneedstoinvestinastandardiseddatabaseforshelterprogrammesinemergencysettings,andprioritisetherolloutearlyinprogramming.
Oneotherfunctionconsistentlymentionedas‘weak’bystaffmembersbothinTheHagueandinHaiti,waslogistics.TeamshavelearnedthatespeciallyinchallengingenvironmentssuchasHaiti,CordaidrequiresanexperiencedlogisticsteamwithgoodlocalknowledgeandstatedthattheyfoundCordaidhumanresourcedepartmenttolacktheexperience,knowledgeandnetworksrequiredfortherecruitmentofpeoplewiththeseskillsandbackgrounds.CordaidhiredexternallogisticalsupportfirmIPAtoassistwiththepreparation,bidopeningandevaluationofatenderfor1850shelters25.
Recommendation3:Cordaidneedstorecognisetheimportanceofastronglogisticsfunctionandelaboratethespecificationsinitsemergencypolicyaswellasensuringthatthisfunctionissupportedbytherecruitmentofexperiencedfieldlogisticsstaff.6.3 Appropriateness Appropriateness
• Whohasbenefitedfromtheprogram.Identifyif/whichvulnerablegroupswerenotreached.• Werethetechnicaldesigndecisionsand–solutions(i.e.thechoiceforsemipermanentshelters),
appropriatefortheendusers?
• Appropriatenessatotherlevels• Wastheinterventionappropriatewithregardtothespecificcharacteristicsofthedisaster:(semi)
urbansetting,scale,weakgovernance,damagetoinstitutionalstructures(governmentaswellasNGOs)?
• Weretheshelterprogramstrategiesandimplementationchoicescoherentwiththeclustersystem,nationalreconstructionplansandstrategies?
• Howdotheachievedresultsandthemannerinwhichtheyareachieved,compareagainstinternationalqualitystandardsCordaidstrivestoadheretoasdefinedintheSpherestandardsandtheCodeofConductfortheInternationalRedCrossandNGOsindisasterresponseprogrammes.
Thetechnicaldesignoftentsasanemergencysheltersolutionprovedinappropriateandinefficient.Expensivetobringintothecountry,notsuitablefortheclimatologicalconditionsandimpossibletointegrateintotheT‐sheltersolutionsweregivenasthemainargumentstoavoidingtheuseoftentsinthefuture.
25Informationandexplanationsheet
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Recommendation4:Cordaidshouldavoidtheuseoftentsasanemergencysheltersolution,unlesstheyarealreadyavailableinthedisasteraffectedlocationsandsuitprevailingclimateconditions.
Cordaid’sprogrammewaswellcoordinatedwithbothclusterandnationalpolicies.Beneficiaryeligibilityhadasoundlegalbasis:homeownership.Cordaidworkedwithinthegovernment’s(MTPTC)assessmentframeworks.Unfortunatelythisalsoinsertedsocialproblemsinherentingovernmentpolicies.BeneficiarieswereonlyeligibleforaCordaidshelteriftheyhadaccesstolandinCordaidoperationalareas.Tentcampscontinuetoexistintheseareas,indicatingthatmanypeopledidnotbenefitfromtheprogrammeandthataccesstolandwasalwaysthemostpertinentvulnerabilitycriteriaespeciallyinurbanareas.Cordaidespeciallystruggledwithanappropriateapproachinthemorecomplexpoliticalandphysicalurbansituation.ThefeedbackfromtheFGDsandindividualbeneficiariesshowsthattheyarelesssatisfiedaboutthesizeoftheshelter.UsingtheaveragefamilysizetodetermineaSpherestandardcompliantshelter,createdasheltertoosmallforlargerthanaveragefamilies.Recommendation5:CordaidshoulduseSpherestandardsasindicativeandnotasabsolutestandards.Indicatorsneedtobecontextualisedinconsultationwithbeneficiaries.Sheltersolutionsneedtobemodularsothatbeneficiariescanmoreeasilyadaptthemtotheirneeds(size).Thiswouldneedtoincludetheoptiontobuildtwostoreysindenseurbanareas,allowingextendedfamiliestostaytogetherortorentoutpartoftheirhouseaspartofalivelihoodsstrategy,whilstatthesametimeaddressingthehousingneedsoftenants.
OntheotherhandtheownerdrivenhousingapproachandintegratedneighbourhoodapproachpilotsinTisousandVillaRosaandCHFprojectinRavinePintadecontributedtomoreappropriatesheltersolutionsandprovidedimportantopportunitiestoconnectwithawidersetofneedsandpotentialforlivelihoodsdevelopment.However,duetothelatestartofthisapproach,ityieldedonlypartialresults.Recommendation6:Cordaidneedstoadoptanownerdrivenhousingandintegratedneighbourhoodapproachtoitsshelterprogrammingwhilstaddressingthebroaderneedsofthepopulation,inparticularWASHandlivelihoodsandshouldimplementthisconceptrightfromthebeginning.
Cordaid’simplementationfocusedonprovidingshelters.Otherneedswereidentified,butCordaid’sattemptstoaddressthesewereonlysuccessfulinthetwopilotprojectsintheurbanprogramme.Nevertheless,theintegratedapproachpilotedonaverylimitedscalegeneratedpromisingresultsinownerdrivenhousing,drinkingwaterandinfrastructure.Beneficiaryperspectivesofprogrammeoutputs(shelters)areverypositive.Thequalityandsustainabilityoftheshelters,theselfmanagedrepairsandhousereconstructionsresultingfromtheownerdrivenapproach,ishigherthanwhatnormallywouldbeconsideredT‐shelter,suggestingthatCordaidcanrightlyclaimtohaveprovidedpermanenthousingsolutions.
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6.4 Impact CommitteesbroughttogethermembersofthecommunityfromdifferentCBOswhopreviouslyhadhadlittleinteraction.Inthiswaytheyperformedanimportantbridgingfunctionbetweenthesegroups,strengtheningsocialcapitalandsocialinfrastructureforthefuturedevelopmentoftheirlocalcommunity.TheirinvolvementintheCordaidshelterprogrammeprovidedindividualcommitteememberswithskillsandunderstandingoftheircommunity,strengtheningtheirlegitimacyandmakethembetteradvocatesfortheircommunities.Focusgrouprespondentsreportedahighlevelofsatisfactionwiththeworkoftheircommittees.Eventhosewhodidnotparticipateintheselectionofthecommitteemembersstatedthatnoonecouldhaverepresentedthembetterthantheircurrentcommittee.Thecommunityactionplanningprocessprovidedthemwithanimportantexperience.Nevertheless,Cordaidcouldhavedonemoreintermsofcapacitybuildingthoughtrainingorfacilitatingmeetingsoftheeightareacommitteestodiscusscommonproblemsandsolutionsmoresystematically.Moreimpactmayhavecomefromanearlierandfullerimplementationofotherprojectcomponentsinparticularlivelihoodsandsocialprotection.Again,itneedstobepointedoutthatthesearenotnecessarilycomponentswhichcanbeimplementedinanemergencyphase,astheyrequirelonger‐termcommitmentsandspecificexpertise.Recommendation7:Cordaidbusinessunitswithresponsibilitiesinurbandevelopment,livelihoodsandconflicttransformationneedtoengageearlierandmoreproactivelyinordertoensurethatfutureemergencyprogrammeshaveevenmoreimpact.
6.5 EfficiencyTheaveragecost(includingalloverheads)foreachofthe6033sheltersolutionsisUSD447526,whichtakingintoaccountthesocialresults,seemsarelativelylowcostpersheltersolution.Unfortunately,thereisnobasisforcomparingdirectimplementationwithoutsourcing.Theargumentthatextendingthechainbypayingpartners’overheads,requiresadditionaltransactioncostscanbeeasilyoffsetbytheargumentthatCordaidalsooutsourcedandfundedtechnicalqualityassuranceandriskmanagement.CordaiddirectorsinTheHagueclearlyindicatedduringourinterviewsthatthereisnowaythattheincidentalnatureofemergencyfundingthroughchannelssuchasSHOcanbeusedasabasisfordevelopingtherequiredmanagementinfrastructureonapermanentbasis.
26basedonanoverallexpenditureof€27million.
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Annex 1: Key Informants
1. PaulBorsboom AdjunctSectorManager,Emergencies,CordaidTheHague
2. MichielMollen PolicyAdvisor,DRR,CordaidTheHague
3. EdithBoekraad SectorManager,DRRandEmergencies
4. MirandaVisch ProgrammeOfficerHaiti,CordaidTheHague
5. MartenTjaartRaadsveld FinancialExpertHaiti,CordaidTheHague
6. JeannetteHamersma ProgrammeofficerDRR,LatinAmerica,CordaidTheHague
7. AstridFrey ProgrammeOfficerConflictTransformation,CordaidTheHague
8. AnnaWachtmeister ProjectofficerUrbanMatters,CordaidTheHague
9. HenrivanEeghen ChiefOperationsOfficer,CordaidTheHague
10. IngeLeuverink PolicyOfficerEmergencyAid,CordaidTheHague
11. EricVanDerHorst ITadvisor,CordaidTheHague
12. WilldeWolf ReconnaissanceTeamLeader,Haiti(January2010–1March2010)
13. WimPiels HoMCordaidHaiti,
14. ReneGrotenhuis ChiefExecutiveOfficer,CordaidTheHague
15. PietSpaarman HeadofMission,Haiti
16. HenkMeijerink ShelterManager,Haiti
17. KoenWagenbuur ShelterManager,Haiti
18. JipNelissen AssistantShelterManager,Haiti
19. JamesMorgan RuralShelterProgrammeManager,Haiti
20. AgatheNougaret UrbanPlanner,Haiti
21. VeraKreuwels UrbanPlanner,Haiti
22. OcéanLuckson AreaManager,Haiti
23. PierreLenzDominique AreaManager,Haiti
24. RobertPhoa HeadofFinance,Haiti
25. JamesMorgan RuralProjectManager,Haiti
26. GubertSaintFleury AreaManager,Haiti
27. GilbertFortil AreaManager,Haiti
28. McKenley AreaManager,Haiti
29. KeesdeGier GeneralDirectorMaxima,Haiti
30. NiekdeGoeij HeadofProgramsCRS,Haiti
31. MaximeMichel CHF,Haiti
32. JeanSeoril CHF,Haiti
33. RobPadberg, BND,GeneralDirector,Haiti
34. GordonGoodell TeamLeaderBuildChange,Haiti
35. MadameMichel HeadofHumanResources,CordaidHaiti
36. FlaucinCivile CASEC,Lompre,Léogânearea
37. KarineFournier CanadianRedCross,Léogâne
38. JeanDantonLeger Depute,Leogane
39. JeanCristelDecine ExecutiveSecretary,Léogânemunicipality
40. SarcossinToure ConstructionManager,CAREHaiti
41. CarolinaCordero‐Scales ProgrammeDirector,CAREHaiti
42. Jean‐ChristopheAdrian CountryProgrammeManagerUNHABITAT
43. AdelineCarrier UrbanReconstructionAdvisor,UNHABITAT
44. MaggieStephenson SeniorTechnicalAdvisor,UNHABITAT
45. YvonJerome MayorofCarrefour,Haiti
46. RaoulPierreLouis KazecVillaRosa,Haiti
47. NancyDoran ProjectManagerArchitectureforHumanity,Haiti
48. BenoitBerge HeadofMissionArchitectesded’Urgence,Haiti
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Annex 2: Terms of Reference EvaluationoftheCordaidHaitiShelterProgram2010‐2012
1.Responsibilitiesandlinesofcommunication
TheevaluationwasinitiatedbyPaulBorsboom,HeadEmergencyAssistance
TheevaluationprocessismanagedbyPietSpaarman,HeadofMissioninHaiti.HewillcoordinatetheevaluationactivitiestogetherwiththeShelterProgramseniormanagement.
Theevaluationwillbeimplementedbyateamofatleast2externalevaluators.Utmosteffortwillbe
undertakentoenlisttheservicesofaHaitianconsultanttobepartoftheteam.TheteamwillhaveateamleaderreportingtoPietSpaarman.
TheevaluationwillbeguidedbyareferencegroupconsistingofMirandaVisch,deskofficerEmergencyAssistance,IngeLeuverink,PolicyOfficer,andaMonitoringandEvaluationExpertfromtheSHOQuality
WorkingGroup.Thereferencegroupadvisesthecoordinatingteam.ThereferencegroupwillcommentonthedraftTermsofReferencefortheevaluationandonthedraftfinalreport.Thereferencegroupwillconveneal
leasttwotimesduringthecourseoftheevaluation.
Theresultswillbesharedwith:
• TheCordaidHaitiofficeanditsshelterprogramstaff
• CordaidHQ:theHaitiDisasterRiskReduction/EmergencyAiddepartment,bothatdeskandmanagementlevel,theworkinggrouponshelter,relateddepartments/businessunitssuchasConflictTransformation,UrbanMatters,EntrepreneurshipandHealth.
• SHObackofficeandqualityworkinggroup
• theNetherlandsMinistryofForeignAffairs,anditsHumanitarianAidDivision(DMH/HH)inparticular
• CordaidHaitishelterpartnersandlocalcoordinatingmechanisms
• Beneficiaries
2.Contextandhistory
Formorethan30yearsCordaidhasbeensupportingover30churchandnon‐churchorganizationsinHaitiinthedomainsoffoodsecurity(HaitiNorth,PlateauCentralandtheSouth‐East),disasterriskreduction,health
&protection(especiallythemesrelatedtogenderbasedviolenceandHIV/AIDS),upgradingofslumareasandcivilsocietycapacitybuilding.DuringthelastfewyearsthissupporthadasizeofsomeEUR2.5mperyear(see
annex1,listofpartnerrelations2011).
FollowingtheJanuary12earthquakesomeofCordaid’spartnersbecameengagedinemergencyactivities,
mainlyfooddistributionsthroughtheBNDschoolfeedingprogramandthenetworksofotherlocalpartners.CaritasJacmel(food,hygienekits,clothing,medicine),SOEandURAMEL(primaryhealthcareservices).
Manypartnerssustainheavydamageduetotheearthquakeandareunpreparedandnotequippedtoembark
onlargescaleemergencyresponseactivitiesinthesenseofexpertise,designlogic,monitoringandadherencetosophisticatedstandardsofaccountability.Cordaidthereforeoptstobecomeoperationalandstartsan
emergencyofficeinHaitiinMarch2010.Atthesametime,Cordaiddeploysastaffmembertoassistpartnersindamageassessment(includingtheirown)andtoundertakequickresponseinterventionsinthefirstweeks.
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Cordaid’soperationalpresenceinHaiti
Cordaid,nowoperationalinHaiti,proceedstodesignandimplementagoodnumberofinterventionsinthe
directaftermathoftheearthquake.Amongthefirstresponseinterventionsinthefirstmonthsafterthetragedy,theprovisionoftemporaryshelter(nexttofood,water,medicalcare,partnersupport)constitutesa
significantpartoftheactivities.
Frommid2010onwards,theoverallCordaidHaitiProgram(excludingtheso‐calledMFS‐funds)amountstoEUR37,665,000andisallocatedtofivesectors(Shelter,Health,Livelihood,DisasterRiskReductionand
DisasterPreparedness,andEmergencyAidandProgramSupport).
TheShelterprogramconsistsofconstruction,repairs,neighbourhoodimprovement,andwater&sanitation,ithasabudgetofEUR21.852.689andexpectstoraiseanotherEUR5.292.311.
Twooperationalshelterprogrammesarelaunched:
• theRuralShelterprogramintheareaaroundLeogane.ActivefromMarch2010theprojecttargetedinitiallytheruralcommunitiesofLompré(1stand2ndsection)inLeoganeandthe7thsectionofGrandGoâvecommune.AtalaterstageGrandGoâvecitywasaddedwhenitwasascertainedthatthisareawasnotcoveredbyanyagency,whilethedamagewasveryhigh.
• fromNovember2011onwardtheUrbanShelterprograminCarrefourandTurgeau,twosectionsofPort‐au‐Princecontaininghardhitslumareas:TisousandCocteauandStMarie&VillaRosarespectively.
Thechoiceismadeforhighqualityshelterconstruction,optingforferro‐cementwallsandconcretefloorsthat
givetheTsheltersanexpectedlifespanof15years.Forrepairs,theoptionchosenwastoretrofitdamagedhousesinordertobuildbackbetter.Thefinishedhousescomplywithtechnicalstandardsandbeneficiaries
haveexpressedtheirsatisfactionduringregularmonitoringvisits.
InAugust2011theIntegratedNeighborhoodApproachandOwnerDrivenHousingareadoptedintheurban
setting.Inshort,thisentailsneighborhooddwellersorganizationstakeaholisticviewoftheirenvironmentandinterventionsbeingbasedontheirprioritiesinaninterlinkedway.Theseinterventionsinclude,butare
notlimitedtocommunity‐basedmapping,rubbleremoval,WASH,DRRandinfrastructureprojects.OwnerDrivenHousingsupposesthatfuturehouseoccupantstakechargeofconstructionorrepair,receivingtechnicalassistanceandsubsidiestocomplementtheirownfunds,onthebasisofverificationoftechnicalquality.
3.Purposeandintendeduse
ThemainobjectiveoftheEvaluationistoprovideinsightintheeffectiveness,efficiencyandappropriatenessoftheshelterprogramin2010and2011andtolearnfromtheprocessthroughwhichtheresultsareachieved.
Furthermore,theevaluationaservesanaccountabilitypurposebyreportinghowthefundsprovidedbytheMinistryandthegeneralpublicintheNetherlandshavebeenputtouseandtowhateffect.
Theevaluationwillservetwopurposes:
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1. ToprovidelessonslearnedforCordaidtoimprovetheeffectivenessoftheprocessesandappropriatenessandrelevanceoftheshelterrelatedinterventionsatbothfieldlevelandheadquartersinTheHague,TheNetherlands.
2. Toaccountfortheresultsachievedwiththeprogram,totheMinistryofForeignAffairs,mostnotablyonthreeaspects:
a. Appropriatenessoftheintervention
b. Efficiency
c. EffectivenessandTimelinessoftheintervention
Use
Inordertoensurewidedisseminationthefinalevaluationreportanditssummary(policybrief)willbe
publishedinEnglishandFrench.DisseminationwilltakeplacethroughprintedreportsaswellaselectronicallybypostingthereportonthewebsitesofCordaidHaitiandCordaidTheHague,theSHOandALNAP.
ItisenvisagedtoorganiseaworkshopinHaititovalidatetheprovisionalresultsandaworkshopinthe
NetherlandstodiscusstheevaluationreportwithCordaidseniorstaffandSHO,staffoftheMinistryofForeignAffairsandotherinterestedparties.
Theevaluationwillprovideacomprehensiveoverviewoftheactivitieswhichhavebeenimplementedin2010
and2011andwillassesstheirresults.PartsoftheCordaidshelterprogramarecommissionedorsubcontractedtolocalandinternationalorganizationssuchasIDEJEN,CARE,BuildChange,Fondation
Architectsd’Urgence,ArchitectureforHumanity.TheevaluationwillassesstheresultsobtainedbythesesubcontractorsandwilllookintotherationaleandqualityoftherelationshipwithCordaidHaiti.
4.Scope
Theevaluationwillcreateanoverview(mappingexercise)oftheexpenditures,allocationsandpolicyand
implementationchoicesbeingmadein2010and2011.Afirstsuccinctoverviewisfoundintheintroductoryremarksabove,under“contextandhistory”.
Projects:theevaluationwillincludeSHOfundedCordaidT‐shelterinterventionsinHaiti,projectnrs:102233
(EmergencyShelter2010),102705(RuralShelter),104606(UrbanShelter).
Theevaluationwillalsocover(attempted)activitiesrelatedtodirectconstructionandrepairs,suchascommunitydevelopment,WASH,DRR,Urbanandregionalplanningandlivelihood.
Timewise:Allactivitiesrelatedtotheabovementionedprojectin2010and2011,wherebytheendofDecember2011willbetakenasacut‐offpoint.ThisisalsotheperiodcoveredbySHO’s2010and2011report
whichisexpectedinApril2012.
Geographical:TheevaluationwillinprinciplecoverallSHOfundedactivitiesinallareasandneighbourhoodsthatformpartoftheshelterprogramgeographiccoverage.Inscopingtheevaluation,therelativeimportance
oftheseareaswillbetakenintoaccount.Forinstance,intermsofactualconstructiontheruralprogramformsthebulkoftheexpenditure.Therelativeweightofvariousinterventionmodeswillbeexpressedinthe
selectionofareastobereviewedinmoredetail.
5.Keyquestions
(note,“Cordaid”istakentomeantheCordaidHaitiofficeanditsaffiliates/subcontractors)
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Appropriatenessasperceivedbytargetgroup/endusers(makethisgenderspecific):
• Whohasbenefitedfromtheprogram.Identifyif/whichvulnerablegroupswerenotreached.
• Howwerebeneficiariesselectedandwhatareeventualsideeffectsfrombeneficiaryselectionfor
communities.
• Werethetechnicaldesigndecisionsand–solutions(i.e.thechoiceforsemipermanentshelters),appropriatefortheendusers?
• Whatarebeneficiaries/communitiesperspectivesaboutneedsidentifiedoutsidethescopeofrepairsandconstruction(f.e.WASH,DRR,Livelihoodinterventions)
• HowsuccessfulwereCordaid’seffortstoengenderit’sapproachandinteractwiththe
beneficiaries?
Appropriatenessatotherlevels
• Wastheinterventionappropriatewithregardtothespecificcharacteristicsofthedisaster:(semi)urbansetting,scale,weakgovernance,damagetoinstitutionalstructures(governmentaswellasNGOs)?
• Weretheshelterprogramstrategiesandimplementationchoicescoherentwiththeclustersystem,nationalreconstructionplansandstrategies?
• Howdotheachievedresultsandthemannerinwhichtheyareachieved,compareagainstinternationalqualitystandardsCordaidstrivestoadheretoasdefinedintheSpherestandardsandtheCodeofConductfortheInternationalRedCrossandNGOsindisasterresponseprogrammes.
Efficiency
• Wereactivitiescost‐efficientintermsoffinancialandhumanresources–takingintoconsiderationthecontextinwhichtheinterventionhadtobeimplemented,e.g.coststobeincurredtoreachthebeneficiaries,andapplicationofbenchmarksforthecostingofsupportitems?TakenotethatinsomecasesCordaidoptedforoutsourcing,extendingthechainofpartners(internationalaswellaslocal),contractors,subcontractorsandimplementers.Compareefficiencyofmoredirectimplementationwithoutsourcing.
• Didthemajorpolicyandimplementationchoicescorrespondtothechangingneedsofthetargetpopulation?
• Analyzethequality,efficiencyandtransparencyofthedecisionmakingprocessforthemainchoicesandmajorshifts.Decisionsmadebywhomandonwhichgrounds?SpecifyrolesandresponsibilitiesdefactoheldbyHQandFieldlevelsandcomparetodejuredesignoftheprocess.
Ofspecificinterest:
Humanresources
Thedecisiontobecomeoperationalandengageinafairlymassiveoperation(>100staff)is,asfaras
Cordaidisconcerned,exceptional.EvaluateidentificationofHRneeds(capabilitiesneededfortheprogramme)andHRdeploymentandhowdecisionsinHRaffectedtheprogrammeprocess.Onwhat
basisandbywhomwasthedecisionreachedtohirethislargenrofstaff?Werealternativesconsidered?Bywhichlevelsintheorganisation?Thedeploymentofanumberofyoung“barefoot”
expatriatearchitectsinmanagementpositionsisalsofairlyunique.Evaluateexpatandconsultancyinputsfortheprojectsandif/howthesecouldhavebeenmoreeffectiveovertimeconsideringHR
context(nationalandinternational)
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SocialCapital
InitsshelterprogramCordaidHaitiaimstoapplyasupportdriven,people‐centeredreconstruction
approach.Throughcommunitybasedinterventions,involvingnationalpartnerorganizationandcommunitygroups,Cordaidaimstostrengthensocialcapital.Thestrategyalsofostersanincrease
overtimeintheresponsibilityoflocalcommunitiesandpartnerorganizations.Italsoaimstomaximizetheuseoflocalmaterials,locallaborandlocalskills/techniques.Theseobjectivesdonot
necessarilycontributetotimelinessandefficiencyoftheoperation.Howweretheseobjectivesdefinedandbywhom?Howdidstrategicchoicesdealwithpossibleconflictingobjectives.
Contractingout
Inlaterstages,moreemphasiswasplacedonpartneringwithotherinternationalNGOs(BuildChange,FondationArchitectsd’Urgence,ArchitectureforHumanity,Care,etc.).Whatareconsequencesin
termsofpolicycoherenceandcostefficiency.Howandbywhomwerethesepartnersidentified,whatwerecriteriaforselection?Wasthecontractingprocedurecfmstandinginstructions?
Effectiveness&Timeliness
• Makeaninventoryoftheassessmentprocessandmentionstrengthsandweaknesses.Lookatfollowingelements:‐TORforassessmentformulatedandagreed/sharedHO/Field?
‐assessmentmethodologiesused;didtheyincludeparticipativeassessmentmethodologies?
‐relevanceofandgaps(ifany)inassesmentdata(inhindsight)
‐describehowassessmentdatawereusedindecisionmakingprocess?Inwhichphaseinthe
program,bywhom?
• WasthereanadequatesystemformonitoringandevaluationinplaceinCordaidHaiti?
• Identifymajoreffects(negativeandpositive)atbeneficiaries,communitiesorotherstakeholders(localgovernment),fosteredbytheprogramme
• Werethereanyunintendedside‐effects(negativeorpositive)?
• DidCordaidanalyseexistingcapacitiesaffiliates/partnersandanalyserequiredcapacitiesorcompetences(HRneedsassesment)indifferentprojectphasestoachieveobjectives?HowdidCordaiduseexistingcapacitiesofaffiliates/partners?
Makethistimeandperiodspecific:periodMarch‐November2010,December‐August2011,September‐
December2011.
• AnalyzetheeffectivenessandtimelinessofCordaid’seffortstoaccessbackdonorfunding
• ComparetheresponsetimeofCordaid’sshelterinterventionswithsimilarshelterinterventionsofotherNGOsinHaiti.
LessonsLearned
• Onthebasisoftheevaluationoutcome,formulatethemostimportantrecommendationsfor
Cordaid’sshelterresponse.Distinguishbetweenappropriateness,efficiencyandeffectiveness&timeliness.
• WhatareasintheinterventionorPMcycleincludingthedecisionmakingprocesscouldbeapprovedinordertoincreaseeffectivenessoftheintervention.Coulddecisionmakingprocessesbedesigneddifferentlyforbetterresults?
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6.Methodology
Itistheresponsibilityoftheconsultant,incollaborationwiththeHeadofMissionandthereferencegroup,to
developamethodology,in‐linewithNLRCstandards.Itissuggestedatthemomenttoconsiderasaminimum:
1. Deskstudy
a. InventoryofSHOfundedshelterinterventionsimplementedin2010and2011
b. analysisofrelevantprogrammedocumentation:Monthlyreports,needsassessments,CommunityActionPlans,project/programmeplans,progressandcompletionreports,reviewsandevaluationswhichwillenableto(partially)answertheevaluationquestions.
ThisinformationwillbeobtainedfromCordaidHaiti,thecontractedpartnersfortheshelter
program,CordaidHQ.
c. analysisofreviewsandevaluationswhichhavebeencarriedout(theCordaidrealtimeevaluationandtheIOBevaluation,aswellasotherreviewsandevaluationsconductedorcommissionedbyotheragencies)inordertobeabletotriangulatethefindingsofthecurrentevaluationandputthemintocontext.
2. Interviews
WithCordaidHaitistaffandformerstaff,managers/coordinatorsandtechnicaladvisersofeachof
thesignificantshelterpartnerorganisationstodiscussissueswhichemanatefromtheanalysisofthedocumentationmentionedunder1aand1b.
Throughhistoricanalysis,trendsandassumptionswillbecomeclear.Theinformationgatheredthroughsecondarysourceswillbecomplementedandverifiedbyconductinginterviewsatthe
headquartersleveland,inviewofthefastturnoverofkeystaff,withformerstaffmembers.Consultantsandadviserswherepossible.Theseinterviewswillamongstotherthingsprovidea
perspectiveonthewaysinwhichtheinterventionshaveevolved,whatassumptionshavebeenusedandhowtheprocessofstrategicdecisionmakinginprogramdevelopmenthasbeenstructured.
3. Detailedinvestigationatfieldlevel
Basedontheinsightsobtainedinthefirststage,apurposivesampleofactivitieswillbeselectedfor
moredetailedinvestigationatfieldlevel.Theevaluationteamwillindicatewhichactivitieswillbeinvestigated,andhowtheyareselected,aswellaswhichmethod(s)forinvestigationwillbedeployed
andinformCordaidbeforehand.
Thedetailedinvestigationwillentaila3weekmissiontoHaitiaimedatprobingdeeperintotheresultsanddataontheground,lookingatthewaysinwhichtheactivitieshavebeenimplementedas
wellasbringinginawide‐rangeofstakeholderperspectivesontheground.
7.Profileoftheevaluationteam
Experience
- Demonstratedexperiencewithevaluatinglargescaleemergency/reconstruction/recoveryprojects,preferablyshelterprograms
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- Up‐to‐dateknowledgeofcurrent(participatory)evaluationtoolsandmethodsforevaluation
- Atleast5yearsexperienceinDisasterManagement
- KnowledgeofCaritasstructuresandpreferredwaysofworkingisanadvantage
- KnowledgeoftheHaitiancontextbeforeandduringtheemergencyinterventionperiod
Skills
- Efficientcommunication
- Stronganalyticalskills
- abilitytoprocessandanalysedifferenttypesofdata
- Excellentinterpersonalskillsandculturalsensitivity
- Abilitytoworkeffectivelyininterculturalsettings
- Excellentcomputerskills;theevaluatorshouldbeanadvancedword‐userandabletodeliverattractivevisualpresentations.
- FluencyinEnglishandFrenchlanguage,Creoleispreferred
- Abilitytowriteconcise,yetcomprehensiveandattractivereports
- Abilitytomeetdeadlines
AgenderbalancedteamwithatleastoneHaitiannationalispreferred.Theteamwillbeheadedbyateam
leader.
8.Planning
Activity Timing/completiondate
PreparationofToR 7February2012
ReviewbyShelterstaffandpolicy/contractingparties(BC,FAU,AFH,\)
29Febr2012
ReviewofdraftToRbyreferencegroup 29February2012
FinalisationofToR 15March2012
Engageconsultants 1April2012
Deskstudyphase(incl.interviewsintheNetherlands) 9April–13April2012
ProvisionofinformationtoCordaidHaitionthefield
workstage(activitiesselectedandfieldworkapproachandmethods)
BylastweekofApril2012
Fieldstudyphase Intheperiod7May–17May2012(NB.fieldworkmightbeperturbedbyterritorialelectionsinMay)
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Analysisandpreparationofreport 18May‐23May2012
Draftreportforreviewbyreferencegroup 26May2012
Finalreport 1June2012
9.Deliverables
TheevaluatorwillwriteareportintheEnglishlanguageandoneintheFrenchlanguageontheconducted
evaluation.Theevaluationreportshallcontainnomorethan25pages(excludingannexesbutincludinganExecutivesummary(‘PolicyBrief’)ofmaximum5pages).ThereportmustcomplywithOECDDACEvaluation
QualityStandards.Thereportmustbesubmittedbefore26May2012.
Thereportshallcontainageneralsummaryandsectionscoveringmethodology,analysisandfindings.RecommendationswillneedtobeconcreteandapplicablewithintheCordaidresourcesandmandateand
haveclearresponsibilitiesattached.
ItisenvisagedtoorganiseaworkshopinHaititovalidatetheprovisionalresultsandaworkshopintheNetherlandstodiscusstheevaluationreportwithCordaidseniorstaffandSHO,staffoftheMinistryofForeign
Affairsandotherinterestedparties.
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Annex 3: Role of Group 5 byHenkMeijerinkCordaidemergencydepartmentcontractedGroup5(partofframeworkagreement/shelteradvisoryservices–HenkMeijerink).Group5reportedtoAdjunctsectormanageremergencies(AlbertdeHaan).Themanagerdiscussed(alternative)proposalsfromshelteradvisorwiththeTaskforceasbasisforstrategicdecision‐making.Assuchtheexternalshelteradvisorprovidesthe“on‐call”technicalshelterexpertisetoHQ(emergencydept/taskforce)uptillJune2010(seebelow).InearlyFebruary2010Cordaiddecidedtoprovidehousingassistance(emergency,transitionalshelter).CordaidrequestedG5toprepareaproposaltoimplementthefirstyearprogramme(t‐shelters).G5contactedpotentialcandidates(youngarchitects,engineers,logisticians).AweeklaterCordaidcamebackonthisrequestandhaddecided(taskforce?)toimplementtheprogrammethemselves,sinceitwastheintentiontoestablisha3to5yearoperationalfieldoffice.TheCVsoftheyoungprofessionalsweregiventoCordaid.Cordaidrecruitedmostofthem(plussomeadditionalstaff).Cordaidstartedtheadvertisement/recruitmentprocessforasheltermanager.Sinceprocedureswereexpectedtotakeapprox..3months,CordaidrequestedG5tosecondconsultantstoCordaidHaitiinthemeantime.TheseconsultantsreportedtotheHoM–PaulBorsboom(norelationshipwithG5,apartfromadmin).TheG5shelteradvisorreportedtotheHQ(AlbertdeHaanandWimPielsbeingtemporaryPV)andassistedinthestartupi.e.procurement(togetherwithIPA).InApril2010Cordaidcontractedasheltermanager(StephenAdams).ThesecondedG5consultantsremainedinvolvedasasst.sheltermanagerLeoganeandtoassistincommencementurbanprogramme.ThesheltermanagerbecameinfacttheRuralsheltermanager(tofurtherthet‐shelterconstructionprogramme).StephenAdamsleftafter3months(oneofthemainissueswastheworkingrelationwiththeHoM‐WimPiels,whotookoverthesheltermanagerposition,anddisagreementoverthechangeinstrategyregardingpermanentwallingversustarpaulins).Thelastmissionoftheshelteradvisor(HenkM.)ended15thJune2012(withtendersfor1850evaluatedandcontractsreadytosign)withareport(missionnotes)toHQ.InOctober2012theadvisorwasrequestedtoreturntoHaiti,withthemaintasktoadvicethenewHoM(RonLangford)re‐starttheconstructionoft‐shelterprogramme.AfteroneweekitbecameevidentthattheHoMdidnotneedanadvisorbutanimplementeri.e.ShelterManager.HQagreedandtheshelteradvisorbecame(temporary)ShelterProgrammeManagerfromthenon.CordaidsucceededtorecruitanUrbanShelterManagerinDecember2010andlong‐termShelterProgrammeManagerinJanuary2011(plusaprojectmanager).Unfortunatelythelong‐termShelterProgrammeManagerresignedafter3monthsandG5(HenkM)wasrequestedtotakeoverthatpositionagain.Sincetheconsultantcouldnotbeavailablefulltime(3to4weeksmax.)theHoMtookoverthepositionduringhisabsence.FromOct.2011thiswastakenoverbyanotherconsultant(KoenWagenbuur).FromJanuary2011theShelterProgrammeManagementwasoutsourcedtoG5(HenkM,KoenW,andJipNelissen).From16thApril2012thisincludedalsotheruralsheltermanager(JamesMorgan).