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MEGAPROJECT Case Study
Basic Project Information
Case compiled by: ...............................
Contact details: ...............................
Project Title High Speed 1 (HS1) – Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL)
Location LONDON-KENT, UK
Purpose Regional HSR in UK: increase rail capacity and reduce journey times between Londonand the Channel Tunnel. Link London with Paris and Brussels.
Scope Integrated with Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T)
LENGTH: 113KMIN TUNNEL: 26KM
Total Project Value 9.63bn (In 2010 USD)
Project Status(i.e.. initiation, planning,
construction, operation, dismantling)
Planning start date: 1974Construction start date: 10/1998
Operation start date: 11/2007
Relevant Physical
Dimensions (e.g. height, width,volume, length)
LENGTH: 113KM; IN TUNNEL: 26KM NUMBER OF BRIDGES: 152
COST PER KM (2010 USD): 0.085BNThe Link was built in two sections – Section 1: Channel Tunnel to Fawkham Junction (constructed
from October 1998 to September 2003) and Section 2: Southfleet Junction to St Pancras (constructedfrom July 2001 to November 2007).
SECTION 1 - BASIC PROJECT INFORMATION
!"#$%&' )*+,- .&/0$&1 2.3
MEGAPROJECT Case Study
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MEGAPROJECT Case Study
Basic Project Information
Case compiled by: ...............................
Contact details: ...............................
Contractual Framework
(e.g. fixed price, cost-plus etc.)!"#$%#&' )*+ ,"-.%/ 0 12+ ,3%4567
SECTION 1 - BASIC PROJECT INFORMATION
MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder Identification
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Stakeholder
Category
Case-Study Comments
(e.g. maturity, previous
experiences of
stakeholders, skills,influence on project)
I n t er n al
Supply-Side Client BRITISH RAIL (BR) & DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT
Financiers LCR (WITH GOVERNMENT BACKING)
Sponsors BRITISH RAIL (BR) & DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT
Client’sCustomers
General public (passengers)
Client’s Owners UK Government
Other internal
supply-side
categories
( please specify)
Category Case-Study
(Stakeholders with a direct legally sanctioned relationship with the project)
SECTION 2 - PROJECT STAKEHOLDERS
MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder Identification
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Stakeholder
Category
Case-Study
I n t er n al
Demand
Side )
Principal Contractor CONCESSIONAIRE: LONDON & CONTINENTAL RAILWAYS (LCR) composed by Arup,
Bechtel, Halcrow and SystraRAIL LINK ENGINEERING/LCR. Union Railways (URL) is formed to pursue the project.
First Tier
Contractors
RAIL LINK ENGINEERING (RLE) / LCR Project Manager
General:
Union Railways (URL). The LCR (acquiring ownership of Union Railways Ltd and European
Passenger Services Ltd).
Main contractors on section 1:
Alfred McAlpine Construction, Co-contractor AMEC Civil Engineering
Eurolink JV (Miller Civil Engineering, Dumez GTM, Beton-und Monlerbau), Co-contractor
Beton- und Monierbau Gesellschaft.m.b.H. Morgan Est, Vinci Construction Grands Projects
Hochtief/Norwest Holst JV, Co-contractor Hochtief (UK) Construction Ltd, Norwest Holst
Construction. Kvaerner Construction Ltd, Skanska Construction UK Ltd. Balfour Beatty
Construction
Second Tier
Consultants
Over 40 consultants were involved together with the Treasury, DOE and DTp.
Professional
Services Providers
London Regeneration Consortium (the developers of the 135 acres of derelict railway lands at
King's Cross). Foster Associates are the Masterplanners. Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners.
Consulting service
Other internalsupply-side
categories
Category Case-StudyRailtrack is created to operate, maintain and develop the railway infrastructure of
England (and Scotland and Wales). In 1998 LCR won its concession.
(Stakeholders with a direct legally sanctioned relationship with the project)
SECTION 2 - PROJECT STAKEHOLDERS
MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder Identification
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689 7:;:?9:@AB 5CC9CC?9:@ />:CDB@A:@C
I n t er n al
(Stakeholders with a direct legally sanctioned relationship with the project)
SECTION 2 - PROJECT STAKEHOLDERS
MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Identification
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Stakeholder
Category
Case-Study Comments
E x t er n al
Public RegulatoryAgencies
Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR)LOOK FOR SAFETY REGULATORY
Local Government Local authorities along the route, Newham Council (East London) in particular.
National
Government
UK Parliament
Department for Transport (DfT) / Department of Transport (DoT)
Other internal
supply-side
categories ( please
specify)
Category Case-study
Pressure Groups
Forums & meetings (Chaired by the Minister of Transport, comprised
representatives from all local authorities along the route)Land acquisition for Section 1 was carried out by Union Railways
(South) as agent of the Secretary of State.
Private Local residents The Rail Link Countryside Initiative (RLCI)
Local Landowners RLCI
Environmentalists RLCI
Conservationists
Archaeologists
Other ExternalPrivate
stakeholders
(please specify)
Category Case-study Unsucessful Bidders, they promoted different roads
The CTRL Complaints Commissioner, was established as a result of an
Assurance given to Parliament during the passage of the CTRL Bill.
King's Cross Railway Lands Community Development Group
MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Identification
SECTION 2 - PROJECT STAKEHOLDERS
(Stakeholders with a direct interest in the project but with no legal contract)
MEGAPROJECT Stakeholder Relationship Maps
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E9F'
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=9BAJ>:C8N5I@>=
$9CI=: >N=9BAJ>:C8N=9BAJ>:C8
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E9F'
G ,=>H9I@ 5I@>=
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=9BAJ>:C8N5I@>=
$9CI=: >N=9BAJ>:C8N=9BAJ>:C8
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SECTION 2 - PROJECT STAKEHOLDERS
y
ExternalStakeholder
External Stakeholder’s Attitudeto this Project
External Stakeholder’s Influenceon project
Impact of Projecton ExternalStakeholder
Phase of Project ofGreatest Interest
(initiation, planning,
construction,operation, dismantling)
Kent CountyCouncil
Significantly influenced thesouthern route of the Link andinsisted on the inclusion of Ashford
as one of the stations.In 1989, They refuse the routes
contained in the BR report in 1988.
Impact of fasterand more frequenttrains
Initiation/Planning
CamdenCouncil’s
In 1988, it notes the need toimprove the transport interchange,
provide housing, employment andrecreation for local people.
Initiation/Planning
National mediainterest, protestgroups formed,
Local residents
In 1988/89, public reaction waswholly adverse. Demonstrationsby S. London & Kent communities
which culminated in a majordemonstration in Trafalgar
Square.
The east London route was
extensively supported by lobbygroups such as the Stratford
Promoter Group.
82 petitions lodged in Parliamentagainst Private Bill authorisingconstruction of CTRL Terminal at
King's Cross
Initiation/Planning
MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Attitude Analysis
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SECTION 2 - PROJECT STAKEHOLDERS
ExternalStakeholder
External Stakeholder’s Attitudeto this Project
External Stakeholder’s Influenceon project
Impact of Projecton ExternalStakeholder
Phase of Project ofGreatest Interest
(initiation, planning,
construction,operation, dismantling)
LondonBorough ofNewham
Became a serious opponent of theKing’s Cross Bill, and inNovember 1989 organized a
conference as part of its efforts topromote an easterly approach with
a station rather than a terminus atStratford – an idea supported byJohn Prescott, the Labour shadow
Secretary of State for Transport.
It lobbied successfully for aninternational station at Stratford aspart of a wider urban regeneration
project.
Initiation/Planning
ECCommissioner
Infringement Proceedings arebrought against the UnitedKingdom Government for the
Environment in respect of theimplementation of EC Directive
85/337/EEC on the EnvironmentalImpact Assessments of theChannel Tunnel Rail Link.
Initiation/Planning
EbbsfleetInternationalStation
MEGAPROJECT Project Management
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Project Organisation
Client Project Team Size &Structure
Contractor Project Team Sizeand Structure
Sub-Contractor Project TeamInvolvement
Project Tools and TechniquesPlease ! if present, x if absent , leave blank if unknown
Life-Cycle Costing Approaches"
Stakeholder Involvement"
Building Information Modelling (BIM)"
Project Management Software"
Relationship Management Tools"
Project Knowledge Management Tools"
Lessons Learnt Transfers"
Team Building Tools"
Competency framework"
+/45$"/6&/078 *7/79&6&/0 !:;0&6
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HR Management Processes Present (describe below ) !Not Present ! No Information!
Procurement Management Processes Present (describe below ) !Not Present ! No Information!
Integration Management Processes Present (describe below ) !Not Present ! No Information!
Scope Management Processes Present (describe below ) !Not Present ! No Information!
Time Management Processes Present (describe below ) !Not Present ! No Information!
Cost Management Processes Present (describe below ) !Not Present ! No Information!
Quality management Processes Present (describe below ) !Not Present ! No Information!
Communications Management
Processes
Present (describe below ) !Not Present ! No Information!
SECTION 3 - PROJECT MANAGEMENT
!
MEGAPROJECT Project Performance
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Aspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Project Right
Original Targets and changes to targets Actual Achievements Against
TargetsPerformance relating to
timeConstruction start:
Section 1 – Forecast: 1998, Actual: 1998
Section 2 – Forecast: 2001, Actual: 2001
Construction completion:
Section 1 – Forecast: 2003, Actual: 2003Section 2 – Forecast: 2007, Actual: 2007
Months in planning: 264Months in construction: 109
Project completed: 48 months
behind schedule
SECTION 4 - PROJECT PERFORMANCE
MEGAPROJECT Project Performance
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Aspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Project Right
Original Targets and changes to targets Actual Achievements
Against TargetsPerformancerelating to
cost
BR’s cost estimates for the Link increased steadily from GBP0.4bn in 1986 to GBP 1.255bn for Section 1 alone in 1990.
At Royal Assent in December 1996, the estimated construction
cost of the Link was GBP 3bni (USD 6.13bn at 2010 prices).
In 1998 the target construction cost agreed between LCR and the
UK Department of Transport, for sections 1 and 2 includingallowances for inflation, was GBP 5.233bnii.
The final cost for Sections 1 and 2 was GBP 5.8bn (USD 9.63bn
at 2009 prices) – 10% above the cost agreed in 1998 and 57%
above the cost estimated at Royal Assent in 1996, adjusted forinflation.
Costs (in 2010 USD)Predicted cost: 6.14bn
Actual cost: 9.63bn
Project completed: 57%
over budget
SECTION 4 - PROJECT PERFORMANCE
MEGAPROJECT Project Performance
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Aspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Project Right
Original Targets and changes to targets Actual Achievements Against Targets
Performancerelated to achieving
specification
7D=>C@A=Q @89 8
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Aspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Right Project
Stakeholder orStakeholder Grouping
Original Aims of ProjectInvolvement and Changes to these
Aims
Achievement of these Aims
Described in PROJECT PROFILE
SECTION 4 - PROJECT PERFORMANCE
!6' ($, *) %2-7 0)&' 80'
MEGAPROJECT Project Environment
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Legal and Regulatory Environment
Legal and
Regulatory ProjectEnvironment
(regionally, nationally
and Europe wide)
5: 9:;:?9:@AB
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Political Environment
PoliticalProject
Environment
3>D@9 C9B9IJ>: LAC A B9:O@8F K=>I9CC B:C:CQ @89 9?9=O9:I9 >N C@=A@9OK?9:@ K>@9:JAB A:P I>?K9J:O AO9:PACT
%: @89 F9A=C 9:5>?=@ @89 KA=@F L9= ;9=:?9:@ A::>D:I9C @8A@ /63. I>:C@=DI@9P AC A KDMB 689 /63. -DC9 >N />??>:CT
!9MT 9::5 .>:P>: A:P />:J:9:@AB 3A MDK9=A@9 /63. N>BB>LI9CCT
mA:T 9::=G5K=;9=:?9:@ A::>D:I9C @8A@ ./3 A=9 D:AMB9 @> =A I>:C@=DI@
/63.T ./3 L>=R >: A =9C@=DI@D=N @89 V:A:I= @89 K=>H9I@TmD:T 9::; 689 &>;9=:?9:@ AII9K@C ./3bC =9C@=DI@D=K>CABC N>= @89 I>:C@=DIJ>:Q >K9=AJ>: A:P
V:A:IN @89 /63.T $>6Q ./3Q A:P 3A
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Economic Environment
EconomicProject
Environment
The project’s reliance on private sector funding dates from its conception and was at the insistence of the Prime Ministerof the time (Margaret Thatcher). This situation (at least in its rhetoric) continued beyond 1997, despite the change ingovernment. LCR was responsible for financing its construction and operation, but the government agreed to provide
GBP 1.7bn funding and development rights around Kings Cross and Stratford stations, and guaranteed LCR’s debt.However, LCR was unable to raise the GBP 0.8bn equity and GBP 3-4bn debt finance needed to build the Link.
Escalating costs and reduced passenger forecasts were cited as reasons. The government refused to provide more grantfunding, but agreed a financial restructuring with LCR, involving the sale and leaseback of trains, in 1998. Revenue andpatronage have continued since to be below forecast. In 2010, the 30 year concession was sold to a Canadian pension
plan for GBP 2.1 bn.
SpecificEconomic
Events
impacting on
the project
/
Financing
and funding
1987: The Channel Tunnel Act specifically said that no Government support would be forthcoming for the construction ofa new rail link.The fixed link was to be privately financed, owned and operated – no public subsidy could be given. But, under the
Channel Tunnel act the public sector was legally obliged to:- procure, at its own expense, substantial (connecting) new and upgraded infrastructure works plus rolling stock
for international passenger and freight services;- set (jointly with SNCF) fixed tolls (subject to a guaranteed minimum) revenue to Eurotunnel for a given period
in return for half the operating capacity (necessary for Eurotunnel to raise finance).
1991: The BR & Eurorail joint venture had originally required £1,900 million of public sector money to be either committedor placed at risk during the early stages of construction. The Government felt that some of the risks could be better
managed by the private sector and therefore decided that the project should proceed as part of the Private FinanceInitiative (PFI).1997: LCR approached the Department of Transport to obtain a relaxation of the contract – this effectively asked the
Department to increase its financial risk in the project by £230 million.LCR's announcement that second stage financing could not be reached, the Department of Transport considered itsoptions and instructed its advisers to scrutinise the demand forecasts for Eurostar UK.
1998: The Deputy Prime Minister announced the failure of LCR to raise funds to build the CTRL without a further sum of£1.2 billion from the Government. LCR would have to find the money some other way.
1999: Re-financing completed with a successful bond issue (£2.65bn).
SECTION 5 - PROJECT ENVIRONMENT
MEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities Timeline
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Events and activitiesrelating to project
stakeholders
Events and activitiesrelating to project
management
6%`7
SECTION 6 - PROJECT TIMELINE
2*12
CONCEPTION:British Railways(BR) & French
Railways (SNCF)work on
combined rail
scheme between2 capital cities
BR proposed a
new terminal. AnInterchange inSellindge (Kent)
was alsoproposed by BR
should Frenchtrains not be ableto penetrate
further into UKwithout theconstruction of a
new line.
2*1)
CONCEPTION:BR firstproposes link
2*1X 2*1\2*YX
INITIATION:British andFrench
Governmentsagreed that a
bored railtunnel underthe Channel
would be a
good
investment.
2*YY
INITIATION: An agreementwas signed
for the privatesector to build
and finance atunnel –Government-
guaranteed
loans would
cover most ofthe cost.
INITIATION: The UK andFrench
governments,SNCF, BR and
the British andFrench tunnelcompanies
signed
contracts,
which ;laterresulted in aTreaty (1986)
Major publicoppositionresulted, in light
of fears about theimpact of faster
and morefrequent trains.
INITIATION:TheGovernment
abandoned theChannel Tunnel
idea anddecided toconcentrate
(with France)
which was an
easier politicaloption.
Events and activitiesrelating to project
environment
Events and activitiesrelating to project
performance
MEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities Timeline
6%`7
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Events and activitiesrelating to project
stakeholders
Events and activitiesrelating to project
management
6%`7
SECTION 6 - PROJECT TIMELINE
CONTEXT:UK andFrance sign
ChannelTunnel Treaty
2*[Y 2*[1
CONTEXT:Channel Tunnelact rules out
public funding forinternational
services
2*[2
INITIATION:BR andSNCF
reachedagreement to
build atunnel.
INITIATION: Secretary of Statefor Transport of
both countriesannounce willing
to give thenecessary politicalguarantees to
facilitate fixed link
(however withoutpublic financialsupport).
2*[X
The ChannelTunnelconcession was
awarded to TransManche Link (later
Eurotunnel).
Constraintpoints forpassenger
services at Ashford were to
be remodelled
and a newInternational
Stationconstructed.
INCEPTION: BR study of routeand terminal
capacity.Four terminal
options was
defined: White City,King's Cross,
London Bridge andStratford.
INCEPTION: BR invitestenders for
joint venturepartner.
Eurorailselected
2*[[ 2*[*
Governmentestablished theprinciple of private
sector involvement.
Events and activitiesrelating to project
environment
Events and activitiesrelating to project
performance
MEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities Timeline
6%`7
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Events and activitiesrelating to project
stakeholders
Events and activitiesrelating to project
management
Events and activitiesrelating to project
performance
Events and activitiesrelating to project
environment
6%`7
SECTION 6 - PROJECT TIMELINE
2**_
DELAY:BR’s jointventure with
Euroraildisbanded
2**2
Evaluation ofroute options
Governmentannounces
constructionwill be jointventure under
private finance
initiative
Publicconsultationon preferred
route.Channel
Tunnel RailLink bill inparliament
2**X 2**\ 2**Y
CONTEXT:Thamesgateway
planningframework
published
CTRL bill gainsroyal assent.Environmental
impact study.LCR
Appointed asconcessionaire(./3 AIaD
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Events and activitiesrelating to project
stakeholders
Events and activitiesrelating to project
management
Events and activitiesrelating to project
performance
Events and activitiesrelating to project
environment
6%`7
SECTION 6 - PROJECT TIMELINE
2**10*[
DELAY:LCR unable toraise sufficient
finance. Financialrestructuring
agreed
CONSTRUCTION:Construction ofstage 1 begins
)__2
The Deputy PrimeMinister signsagreement to
secure completionof the CTRL.
DELIVERY:Stage 1 opens
)__Z )__1 )__*
DELIVERY:Stage 2 opens
DELIVERY:Impact study
)_2_
DELIVERY:Concessionsold to
Canadianpension plan
CONSTRUCTION:Construction ofstage 2 begins
MEGAPROJECT Case StudyCase compiled by: ...............................
! )*+,- . 0 2.3
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Basic Project Information
Contact details: ...............................
Project Title !"#$%&' )*&+ ,-./012304.526
Location '#&78"+9$:#'#& ,;!#&978)7-6
Purpose *2?/.2@A52@B ?.@20C5.? BD2E F.@209#1.5C/@2 &/?G5.EH;.500945.3/. ./ID52@B 3/J/B5CK/2?)5L@B @D.C5.? BD2E
Scope TransnationalIntegrated with Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T)
Total Project Value MHNO42 9 ?122/B0P OHQ42R [email protected]/P OHSS42R 4.D3I/0P NHT42 (in 2010 USD)
Project Status(i.e.. initiation, planning,
construction, operation, dismantling)
Planning start date: 1984Construction start date: 10/1993
Operation start date: 07/2000
Relevant PhysicalDimensions (e.g. height, width,volume, length)
F!F8) )#&>F=P UM+7"8*)P MV+7 R "!8'P SV+7 R W"*'>#P UHX+7 R F%&)P M+78"F*Y*;*8) *$)8&'P NHS+7V
SECTION 1 - BASIC PROJECT INFORMATION
!"#$%&' )*+,- .&/0$&1 2.3
MEGAPROJECT Case StudyCase compiled by: ...............................C d il
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Basic Project Information
Contact details: ...............................
ContractualFramework(e.g. fixed price,cost-plus etc.)
Y%&'*&>P NOOZ
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Stakeholder
Category Case-Study Comments
(e.g. maturity, previous experiences of
stakeholders, skills, influence on project)
I n t er n al
Supply-Side Client Denmark and Sweden Governments /The Oresundbro Consortium (OC)
Financiers The Oresundbro Consortium
Sponsors The Oresundbro Consortium, OC (AS Oresund,
Denmark and Svedab AB, Sweden)
Ownership was split equally between theSwedish and Danish states. was
responsible for performing theenvironmental impact assessment (EIA),
projecting, financing, negotiatingcontracts, constructing and operating the
fixed link.
Client’s
Customers General public (passengers)
Client’s Owners Danish and Swedish Governments
Other internal
supply-side
categories
( please specify)
Category Case-Study
SECTION 2 - PROJECT STAKEHOLDERS
Stakeholder Case-Study Comments
MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder Identification(Stakeholders with a direct legally sanctioned relationship with the project)
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Category (e.g. maturity, influence on project)I n t er n a
l
Demand
Side ) Principal Contractor Oresund Consortium (SPEs) was responsible for negotiations
with the contractors
First TierContractors
Consortia:The Öresund Tunnel Contractors, a consortium consisting of NCC AB (SE), Dumez-GTM SA (F), John Laing Ltd (UK), E. Pihl & Søn(DK), and Boskalis Westminster (NL) AndÖresund Marine Joint Venture, a consortium of Per Aarsleff A/S(DK), Ballast Nedam Dredging b.v. (NL) and Great Lakes Dredge &Dock Co (USA).
were responsible for theconstruction of the artificial islandand dredging
AndSundlink Contractors, a consortium of Skanska AB (SE), Højgaard &
Schultz (DK), Monberg & Thorsen (DK), and Hochtief AG (Germany)
Responsible for the construction ofthe bridges.
Second Tier
Consultants Consultant VBB VIAK Conducted investigations covering
topics such as sedimentary and
mapping of environmentally
polluted areas
Consultants COWI and VKI Provided investigations and impact
analysis regarding marine fauna
and flora.
Professional
Services Providers
IVL, the Swedish Environmental Research InstituteSwedish national rail administration and Peab AB
Consulting services
Other internal
supply-side
categories
Category Case-Study
SECTION 2 - PROJECT STAKEHOLDERS
MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder Identification(Stakeholders with a direct legally sanctioned relationship with the project)
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I n t er n al
78*& ;!&F"8;F$
SECTION 2 - PROJECT STAKEHOLDERS
MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Identification(Stakeholders with a direct interest in the project but with no legal contract)
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Stakeholder
Category Case-Study Comments
(e.g. maturity, previous
experiences of
stakeholders, skills,influence on project)
E x t er n al
Public RegulatoryAgencies
Swedish National Board for EnvironmentProtection (SNBEP)
Local Government The municipalities of Malmö and Copenhagen. Responsible forplanning tasks such
as land acquisitions.
NationalGovernment
Department of communications (DOC) and the Ministry of traffic (MOT) in theSwedish and Danish governments.
Representatives and officials from the Swedish Road Administration (SRA), the
Swedish Rail Administration (SRAIL), the Swedish State Railways (SSR) andtheir Danish counterparts (DSB)
Denmark Parliament (responsible for juridical authority)
responsible forbackground
investigations andreports as well as
negotiations belowminister level in the
early stages of thepre-construction
phase.
Other internal
supply-side
categories ( please
specify)
Category Case-study
The WRC and the SNBEP were the two main juridicalauthorities for the SwedishEIA.
SECTION 2 - PROJECT STAKEHOLDERS
MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Identification(Stakeholders with a direct interest in the project but with no legal contract)
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Stakeholder
Category Case-Study Comments
e.g. maturity, previous
experiences of
stakeholders, skills,influence on project)
E x t er n al
Private Local residents
Local Landowners
Environmentalists Environmental Protection Act (EPA), the Natural Resources Act (NRA) and theWater Act (WA). Organized Groups.
Conservationists
Archaeologists Municipality of Malmö Carry out extensivearchaeological
investigationsOther External
Private
stakeholders
(please specify)
Category Case-study was very active inlobbying for the fixed
link.Chamber of Commerce and Industry of SouthernSweden
Private regional actor
The Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute(SMHI) and the Danish Hydraulic Institute (DHI)
were deeply involvedin hydrologicalinvestigations
SECTION 2 - PROJECT STAKEHOLDERS
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MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Attitude Analysis External
StakeholderExternal Stakeholder’s Attitude to
this ProjectExternal Stakeholder’s
Influence on projectImpact ofProject onExternal
Phase of Project ofGreatest Interest(initiation planning
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SECTION 2 - PROJECT STAKEHOLDERS
External
Stakeholder
(initiation, planning,construction, operation,
dismantling)
Danish policy Not to allow a link across theOresund before one had been builtacross the Great Belt.
Wider political issues influencedthe timing of the project.
The controversy overenvironmental impacts delayedthe approval process in Sweden.
Initiation/Planning
Swedish NationalRailway Administration
The fixed link across the Oresundwould not imply any strategicimprovement unless a promise of alink across the Fehmarn Belt wasalso discernable somewhere alongthe line.
Initiation/Planning
Department offinance (DOF)
A principal issue was the pricingmechanisms for road and rail traffic.The Danes were adamant that thepricing mechanism for road trafficshould be based on the ferry taxes.
Blocked many proposals andagreement texts.
Initiation/Planning
European Round
Table ofIndustrialists (ERT)
Comprising several important
business representatives, arguedfor a fixed link in its ScanLinkproposal.
Initiation/Planning
The organisationStoppabron(stop the bridge)
They were opposed to the link. Initiation/Planning
MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Attitude Analysis
ExternalStakeholder
External Stakeholder’s Attitude to this Project External Stakeholder’sInfluence on project
Impact of Projecton ExternalS
Phase of Projectof Greatest
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SECTION 2 - PROJECT STAKEHOLDERS
Stakeholder Interest
The socialdemocratic
leadership ofthe Swedishgovernment
Were strong proponents of the combined road andrailway link between Copenhagen and Malmö, but
there were deep rifts within the party and the issuecaused lots of controversy.
During the 30th social democratic party congressheld in 1987 the issue was hotly contested. Manywithin the party were highly sceptical toward thealternative favoured by the leadership, a commonlypreferred alternative consisting of the railway tunnelbetween Copenhagen and Malmö.
The referendumregarding the
leadership!s proposalwas postponed and aninternal study groupresponsible for furtherinvestigations wasappointed.
Initiation/Planning
Danishsocialdemocrats
Who, although not in government at the time, wereseen as crucial actors.
Danish social democrats. The general opinionseemed to favour a railway tunnel, but the opinionwould however eventually swing in favour of thecombined road and railway link after intensepressure from the Swedish delegation.
Unless the Danish socialdemocrats were positiveabout the project therewas no way for thegovernment in power tosecure support for theproposal in the Danishparliament.
Initiation/Planning
The
Chamber ofCommerceand Industryof SouthernSweden
which, together with its
Danish counterpart, wasvery active in lobbyingfor the fixed link.
Initiation/Planning
MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Attitude Analysis
ExternalStakeholder
ExternalStakeholder’s Attitude
t thi P j t
External Stakeholder’s Influence on project Impact of Projecton ExternalSt k h ld
Phase of Projectof Greatest
I t t
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SECTION 2 - PROJECT STAKEHOLDERS
to this Project Stakeholder Interest
The Swedish
National Boardfor EnvironmentProtection(SNBEP)
In 1993, they rejected the application for
permission to build and operate the fixed link(from OC) on the following grounds:•
the project might harm the ecologicallysensitive Baltic Sea;
• it might also harm the immediatelysurrounding sea, which was an importantfishing area of national interest; and
• it was viewed as counter-productiveregarding strategies towards an
environmentally adapted transport system.
Initiation/Planning
The municipalityof Malmö
The municipal level hasa very strong position inthe Swedish planningsystem.
Land use reservations for the link and connectinginfrastructure were made as early as themid-1950s.
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Risk Management Processes Present (describe below ) !Not Present ! No Information !
HR Management Processes Present (describe below ) !Not Present ! No Information !
Project Processes
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Procurement Management Processes Present (describe below ) !Not Present ! No Information !
Integration Management Processes Present (describe below ) !Not Present ! No Information !
Scope Management Processes Present (describe below ) !Not Present ! No Information !
Time Management Processes Present (describe below ) !Not Present ! No Information !
Cost Management Processes Present (describe below ) !Not Present ! No Information !
Quality management Processes Present (describe below ) !Not Present ! No Information !
Communications ManagementProcesses
Present (describe below ) !Not Present ! No Information !
SECTION 3 - PROJECT MANAGEMENT
!
MEGAPROJECT Project Performance
Aspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Project Right
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Original Targets and changes to targets Actual Achievements AgainstTargets
Performancerelating to time
Construction start:Forecast: 1993
Actual: 1995
Construction completion:
Forecast: 2000 Actual: 2000
Months in planning: 112Months in construction: 81
Project completed:
#$ %&'()*+(
SECTION 4 - PROJECT PERFORMANCE
MEGAPROJECT Project Performance
Aspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Project Right
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Original Targets and changes to targets Actual AchievementsAgainst Targets
Performancerelating to
cost
The main source of cost overrun is the connecting infrastructureon the Danish side, which was close to 70% higher than theestimates made in 1991, but the actual coast-to-coast link andthe connecting infrastructure on the Swedish side were alsosubject to substantial cost overruns.
Costs predicted:
1987: $#+ QHS42 ,#%" NHUM42 D2 VOOU C.DL/061991: $#+ NTHXVT42 ,#%" VHN42 D2 VOOU C.DL/061997: '++ NMHUT42 ,#%" VHSQ42 D2 VOOU C.DL/062000: #%" SHOQU42
The escalating costs are attributed to maritime safety efforts,environmental protection and a third category simply labelled
“other”. Maritime safety efforts account for around 42% of theescalation, while the other two categories account for 34% and24% respectively.
Costs (in 2010 USD)Predicted cost: 2.96 bn
Actual cost:
Total: 4.10 bnTunnels: 0.9BN
Marine: 0.33BNBridges: 1.5BN
Project completed:
SQZ ![#" W%'>#F
SECTION 4 - PROJECT PERFORMANCE
MEGAPROJECT Project Performance
Aspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Project Right
O i i l T t d h t t t A t l A hi t
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Original Targets and changes to targets Actual AchievementsAgainst Targets
Performancerelated toachieving
specification
FORECAST TRAFFIC
(2007):
Road: 15,732 VPDRail: 28,000 PPD
ACTUAL TRAFFIC
(2007):
Road: 18,432 VPDRail: 26,600 PPD
SECTION 4 - PROJECT PERFORMANCE
MEGAPROJECT Project Performance
Aspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Project Right
Original Targets and changes to targets Actual Achievements
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Original Targets and changes to targets Actual AchievementsAgainst Targets
Performancerelated toachieving
specification
(cont.)
FORECAST TRAFFIC
(2007):
Road: 15,732 VPDRail: 28,000 PPD
ACTUAL TRAFFIC
(2007):
Road: 18,432 VPDRail: 26,600 PPD
SECTION 4 - PROJECT PERFORMANCE
Aspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Right Project
Stakeholder or Original Aims of Project Achievement of these Aims
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Stakeholder orStakeholder Grouping
Original Aims of ProjectInvolvement and Changes to these
Aims
Achievement of these Aims
SECTION 4 - PROJECT PERFORMANCE
!,- ./0 12 3456 728- 97-
MEGAPROJECT Project Environment
Legal and Regulatory Environment
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Legal andRegulatory
ProjectEnvironment
(regionally,nationally andEurope wide)
The Oresund link was the first infrastructure project in Sweden entirely financed outside thestate budget. According to a paragraph in the budgetary law, infrastructure should normally be
paid for by state grants using state revenue as the only source of funding.
In Sweden the formal procedure implied that the project had to be tested against different legalframeworks in several juridical instances before gaining approval.Georg Andersson, then minister of communications, explained that the environmental inquirycould influence the shape and design of the fixed link, but not the actual building of it.
In Denmark a special law is usually passed for large projects. This law, which is formulated by
the responsible ministry (in this case the ministry of traffic), regulates the entire project andconsists of elements from the legislative framework which are deemed appropriate for theproject.
The level of user fees for road traffic are regulated by the Oresund Consortium but according tothe 1991 agreement between the governments the price for crossing the link must be set usingthe price of the ferry route between Helsingborg and Elsinore as a point of departure.
Specific Legal
and Regulatoryevents
impacting on
the project
1985: Denmark signed the EC directive regarding environmental impact assessments (EIA).1991: The preparations of the law concerning the fixed link a number of environmentalinvestigations were carried out which were presented in the report Miljö Öresund
SECTION 5 - PROJECT ENVIRONMENT
MEGAPROJECT Project Environment
Political Environment
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PoliticalProject
Environment
Since the 1950s a great number of investigations and reports (more or less realistic and/orpolitically feasible) about the benefits of a fixed link across the Oresund were produced in both
Sweden and Denmark. An agreement to build a fixed link was signed by the governments in1973, but the energy and economy crisis, as well as Denmark!s decision to join the EC andincreasing environmental awareness meant that the plans came to a halt.
Since a fixed link across the Oresund had been a vision backed by the political establishmentin Malmö for a much longer time than in Copenhagen the matter of land acquisition differs quitesubstantially between the two municipalities. In Malmö land for the connecting infrastructurehad been reserved since the 1950s. In the 1956 general plan a zone was reserved for the
connecting infrastructure (then thought of as a highway).
SpecificPolitical
Events
impacting on
the project
1987-1991: The handling of the project was shifted towards the political sphere with theleading politicians in the Swedish and Danish social democratic parties as the main players(Both countries regarded the need to get approval for the project within the social democraticparties. Initially there was widespread resistance to the project amongst the social democratsin both countries.)
1994: The OC handed over the revised plans and the government gave permission for theproject to proceed. The minister of environment stepped down from his post, but the centreparty remained in the government and thus a political crisis was averted. Elections were heldand the coalition lost power to the social democrats.
SECTION 5 - PROJECT ENVIRONMENT
MEGAPROJECT Project Environment
Economic Environment
Economic The combined road and railway link was recommended by the OD on it was the best solution
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Project
Environment
from an economic viewpoint given the evaluation of traffic volumes at the time.
Despite the fact that it is common practice in Sweden to use socio-economic cost-benefit analysisas a basis for decisions regarding infrastructure investments, this was never the case for theOresund link. The analyses that were carried out focused on economic profitability, since this wasa prerequisite given the loan-based financing of the project. The funding structure based on userfees for road traffic as the main source of financing meant that the volume of road traffic and theprice level of user fees in relation to the construction cost became the ultimate criteria forappraisals.
SpecificEconomic
Events
impacting on
the project
1985: Regarding financing it was agreed that the project had to be financed outside the statebudgets and to be profitable on business economic (rather than socio economic) terms.
1989: A report was presented and two premises were guiding: the condition that no state budgetgrants should be used (business economic profitability); and that the structure of the link shouldnot affect the water flow in the Sound.
1991: The agreement between the Swedish and Danish governments is signed. The chosen
alternative of a combined road and railway link between Sweden is viewed as the best alternativefrom an economic perspective. The agreement also states that the connecting infrastructureshould be funded by revenues from the coast-to-coast section of the link.
SECTION 5 - PROJECT ENVIRONMENT
MEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities Timeline
F*7#
NQXT NQXa NQXU NQQONQUS NQXM NQQN
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Events and activitiesrelating to project
stakeholders
Events and activitiesrelating to project
management
SECTION 6 - PROJECT TIMELINE
CONCEPTION:Swedish-Danishgovernmentsagree to buildfixed link
Events and activitiesrelating to project
environment
Events and activitiesrelating to project
performance
CONTEXT:European roundtable perceivedas lobbying forroad link
INCEPTION:Oresunddelegation
appointed
CONCEPTION:DelegationproposesHelsingborg-HelsingørRailway Tunnel &Malmö-CopenhagenRoad Bridge.
State fundingruled out
CONTEX:Great beltbridge decisionbreaks Danishdomestic policyblock on otherfixed links
CONCEPTION:Delegationrecommendscombined road/rail bridge butcontinues toconsider railtunnel option
INCEPTION:Swedishparliamentsupportscombinedbridge option,Danish leadersfollow suit
INCEPTION:Negotiationson fundingstructure
INCEPTION:Twogovernmentssign bindingagreement.Constructionto start in1993 andfinish in 2000
MEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities Timeline
F*7#
NQQM NQQTNQQV NQQS NQQUbX NQQQ VOOO
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Events and activitiesrelating to project
stakeholders
Events and activitiesrelating to project
management
SECTION 6 - PROJECT TIMELINE
INCEPTION:Redesignapproved bySwedishGovernment
INCEPTION:OresundbroConsortiumformed,applies forplanningpermission
Events and activitiesrelating to project
environment
Events and activitiesrelating to project
performance
CONSTRUCTION:Danish LandInfrastructure worksin preparation
DELAY:Permissionrefused bySwedish NationalBoard, finallygranted by waterrights court butconditional onredesign
CONSTRUCTION:Construction starts.OC contracts withthree consortia
CONSTRUCTION: 1997: First tunnelsection in place
1998: First bridge
section in place
DELIVERY:First cardrivesthroughtunnel
DELIVERY:Handoverandinauguration
The finished structuredid not affect thewater flow betweenthe North and BalticSeas – Zero impact“solution!
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!"#$%&%'( *+,%('(- .,(/( %0 #12 341%56/(0(1& *+&7/ #0 8%(4(10 #19 :/((1;(#+(< =,#& #/( &,( 86>0 ;/(0(1& %1 3?>:* @#0( 8&"9%(0<
A>:>BC-
B3 !" $% &'" ()*%*&"
D>8 !" $% ()*%*&"
UNITED KINGDOM DENMARK-SWEDEN GERMANY FRANCE NETHERLANDS
CHANNEL TUNNEL RAIL LINK The Oresund Link Motorway A20 TGV Mediterranean BENELUXLIJN (Metro line)
YES YES NO NO NO
No mentioning of Siemens in OMEGA reports.But, Siemens is stated as supplier of signaling
No mentioning of Siemens in OMEGA reports.But, Siemens is stated as a supplier of some
No mentioning of Siemens in OMEGAreports. Plus, I didn't find any reference of
No mentioning of Siemens in OMEGA reports. Plus, Ididn't find any reference of Siemens on Internet
No mentioning of Siemens in OMEGA reports. There issome information on Internet: The signalling is
3?>:* @(1&/( @#0( 8&"9%(0
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, pp g g
and train control systems on the website:
, pp
equipment.
p , y
Siemens on Internet regarding this project.
y
regarding this project.
g g
supplied by Alstom. All lines have been constructedbefore the Beneluxlijn are supplied by Siemens.
http://www.railway-technology.com/projects/chunnel/ Siemens trains was meant to go on services fromFrankfurt to southern France via the new LGV Rhin-
Rhône, and subsequently within Germany and onother international services to France, Belgium,Switzerland and the Netherlands. No mentioning of
Siemens in TGV Mediterranee line.
http://retmetro.nl/cms/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id
=260&Itemid=62
http://www.railway-technology.com/features/feature-top-ten-fastest-
trains-in-the-world/
YES YES YES NO YES
No mentioning of any existing environmentalgroup activities in OMEGA reports. However, in
the book: Environmental Protest in WesternEurope, Oxford University Press 2007, page 48, it
is said: 1988.-1989, the number of Greenpeacesupporters increased almost two times and in1992. the protests were more organized.
No mentioning of Greenpeace in OMEGA reports.On Internet we found the follow: International
groups such as Birdlife International andGreenpeace & Transport & Environment have also
looked into the issue of the Oresund link.Environmental groups, who worried thatconstruction of the link would disturb the flow of
water and ecosystem of the Baltic Sea, still worryabout increased auto emissions. "We activelycampaigned against the bridge for three years
until the final decisions were made by thegovernments," says Mats Abrahansson, aspokesman for Greenpeace.
It is mentioning in OMEGA Centre reports."Many environmental agencies, such as
BUND and Greenpeace, as well as smallerlocally organised agencies, criticized the A
20. The strongest point of criticism is theroute option chosen in Schleswig-Holstein".
No mentioning of Greenpeace in OMEGA reports.Plus, I didn't find any reference of Greenpeace on
Internet regarding this project.
No mentioning that any organization opposed theproject in Omega reports. It is written there public
consultation was conducted. During the design andconstruction phase, intensive external project
management was carried out. From previousexperience, the project team understood theimportance of good communication.
http://books.google.rs/books?id=8ybVHakcYQkC&pg=PA48&lpg=PA48&dq=greenp
eace+protests+channel+tunnel+rail+link&source=bl&ots=dZqzILv8go&sig=d8Pct-
K3LLXG3uMIn4jS14cO9Cg&hl=en&sa=X&ei=yckNU_HUD4KM7AbAtoHgBA&ved=
0CC8Q6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=greenpeace%20protests%2
http://gurukul.ucc.american.edu/ted/oresund.htm
There is some information on the Internet:
http://www.csmonitor.com/1997/0410/041097.intl.intl.3.html/(pag
e)/2
http://sepp.xylou.de/a/DgA/23093a69/fr%C3%BChen_20._Harkenblec
k_.html
OMEGA report: A wide array of different
organisations opposed to the link were organisedunder the umbrella organisation Stoppabron (stopthe bridge). The organisation comprised of over 30
individual organisations ranging fromenvironmental NGOs to the labour.
YES YES YES YES NO
CONCESSIONAIRE: LONDON &CONTINENTAL RAILWAYS (LCR) composedby Arup, Bechtel, Halcrow and Systra
The Oresundbro Consortium, OC (AS Oresund,Denmark and Svedab AB, Sweden)
Federal Road Agency (DEGES) SNCF (Société Nationale des Chemins de ferFrançais; "French National Railway Company")
Two public sector organisations were responsible forconstruction: Gemeentewerken for the rail track, andRijkswaterstaat for the tunnel section.
Act of Aceleration of Transport
Infrastruture Planning (VerkPBG)
SNCF, as a public rail agency formed special entity for
project management on this project, was responsiblefor the project and the future operator of the high
speed line.
RFF (Réseau Ferré de France)
As owner of the rail network, RFF is responsible fordevelopment and maintenance as well as usage
charges and timetable management.
The SNCF operates the country's national railservices. Its functions include operation of railwayservices for passengers and freight, and maintenance
and signalling of rail infrastructure owned by RFF.
Siemens
Greenpeace
SPEs(Graham Winch's
definitions)
!"#$%&%'( *+,%('(- .,(/( %0 #12 341%56/(0(1& *+&7/ #0 8%(4(10 #19 :/((1;(#+(< =,#& #/( &,( 86>0 ;/(0(1& %1 3?>:* @#0( 8&"9%(0<
A>:>BC-
B3 !" $% &'" ()*%*&"
D>8 !" $% ()*%*&"
NETHERLANDS NETHERLANDS GREECE GERMANY GERMANY
HSL ZUIDRANDSTADRAIL, THE HAGUE-
ROTTERDAMAthens Metro (Sepolia - Dafni &
Monastiraki - Ethniki Amyna)New ICE Cologne– Rhine/Main line Tiergarten Tunnel - Berlin
YES NO YES YES YES
No mentioning of Siemens in OMEGA reports.Plus, I didn't find any reference of Siemens on
The OMEGA material mentioned that Siemens are mentioning in OMEGA reports :"Equipment technology works, including
Siemens are mentioning in OMEGA reports:Siemens was one of the contractors working on
3?>:* @(1&/( @#0( 8&"9%(0
Siemens are mentioning in OMEGA reports: The trackand signaling systems were developed by Infraspeed
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Internet regarding this project. catenaries, signalling equipment,telecommunications, switching stations, powersupply and electric engineering, were carried
out by a group headed by Siemens PLC (nowSiemens Transportation Systems)".
road tunnel.
Electromechanical WorksSIEMENS AKTIENGESELLSHAFT BERLIN-MUENCHEN
are one of the members of the consortiumOLYMPIC METRO (the contractor of theproject).
YES NO YES ? NO
No mentioning of Greenpeace in OMEGAreports. Plus, I didn't find any reference of
Greenpeace on Internet regarding this project.
No mentioning of Greenpeace in OMEGAreports. However, on internet we found a report
of Greenpeace which say: "A new metro linehas been built, gas-fuelled buses have been
introduced (Athens has now the largest gas-fuelled bus fleet in Europe), and some 3 billion ! have been spent in public transport (extension
of metro, introduction of tramway and suburbanrail, modernisation of bus and trolley fleets,tripling of bus-only lanes)".
No mentioning of Greenpeace in OMEGAreports. However, on Internet, Greenpeace are
conected to the project.
No mentioning of Greenpeace in OMEGAreports. Plus, I didn't find any reference of
Greenpeace on Internet regarding this project.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect
/cmtran/writev/rail/m94.htm
NO NO YES ? ?
Attiko Metro SA, a government-ownedcompany, was set up in 1991 to act as clientand project manager.
Siemens
Greenpeace
SPEs(Graham Winch's
definitions)
(a consortium of Fluor Infrastructure, SiemensNederland, Koninklijke BAM Groep, Innisfree andHSBC Infrastructure), under a DBFM contract.
Not Greenpeace but others: "Influential in thedebate, but not so much for the end result, was the co-
operation between several interest groups fromdifferent backgrounds. This broad coalition, as it was
called in the media, consisted of Stichting Natuur enMilieu, an environmental group, the ANWB, a union forusers of transport with wheels, LTO Nederland, an
organization for agri- and horticultural entrepreneursand employers, the Chambers of Commerce of theregion of The Hague, and the WWF. This coalition
started a strong lobby campaign in favor of the linkingof infrastructure along existing tracks and with a stopin The Hague."
It seems there was not an SPE formed, but there arestrong elements of it: The transport ministry remained initiator, client and main financier throughout
the project, and owns the line. The project teamworked under its supervision and included employees
of its implementation agency, Rijkswaterstaat, andexternal consultants.
Management of the project was shared betweenthe two regional governments, their transportoperators, and the local governments
concerned, and a project management teamrepresenting the various organisations was set
up to co-ordinate construction. The regionaltransport provider, RET, was responsible forconstruction of the Rotterdam sections, and the
city of The Hague for the sections under itsownership (as the transport provider, HTM, hadbeen privatised).
GFR (DB AG from 1992) acted ascommissioning client and project manager, andDE Consult was responsible for design. The
Federal Railways Agency, established in 1994,took over supervisory and approval roles.
Although the inter-agency planning team wasresponsible for co- ordinating the project as awhole, the city government oversaw the
construction of the road tunnel and DB AG therail connection and stations. There was no main
contractor, with separate contracts let forspecific parts of the project.
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STSM Report
5.6.
Quantitative analysis comments for UK Channel Tunnel Rail Link and Oresund Bridge
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1. PROJECT TITLE: CHANNEL TUNNEL RAIL LINK, LONDON‐KENT, UK
RESPONSE (DEPENDANT)
VARIABLE is PROJECT
PERFORMANCE
CHANNEL
TUNNEL
RAIL LINK,
LONDON‐
KENT, UK
Comments
Project Phase In operation
Planned Completion date 2003 It is said actual completion was 48 months later than planned. And actual completion was 2007.
Actual
Completion
date 2007
It
is
operation
start
date
Planned Budget 6.4bn 2010 prices
Actial Budget 9.63bn 2010 prices
CTRL OVERBUDGT 1
DELAY during the construction phase
1
Delay during the planning phase 1 The planning phase was also prolonged and lasted 264 months.
A1
2.1
Stakeholders ‐
Project has a foreign EPC
company
0
STSM Report
Internal
Siemens is involved as a
contractor in the project
0
No mentioning of Siemens in Omega material. But, Siemens is stated as supplier of signaling and train control systems for the CTRL on the web site:
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A2
contractor in the project http://www.railway‐technology.com/projects/chunnel/ Also, some of the trains are bought from Siemens.
A3
THE CLIENT IS ALSO THE EPC OR
MAIN CONTRACTOR
0
A4
The EPC has a clear goal ???
Instead of EPC, a Concessionaire is present here (London and Continental Railways – LCR). The contract model is BOT. Therefore, a new attribute is proposed: BOT (yes ‐1, no – 0). Regarding the "Clear goal" attribute, no information in Omega material, no information on LCR's website.
The
project
is
mono
Cultural
(SEE
BELOW)
A5
A) CLIENT AND EPC HAVE THE
SAME NATIONALITY (N/A IF
THEY ARE THE SAME)
1
Client and Concessionaire are the same nationality. Those are top two levels when the project is delivered as BOT, such as this one. The third level would consist of design and construction companies. They were
international.
A6
B) CLIENT AND EPC AND ALL THE
IMPORTANT FIRST TIER
CONTRACTOR
HAVE
THE
SAME
NATIONALITY
0
A7
More than 50% share of the
client is under goverment
control (EVEN IF FOREIGN
GOVERNMENT)
1
A8
An experienced project director
is present
N/A No data in Omega Material, nor on web.
A9
2.2
Stakeholders ‐
External
ALREADY EXISTING
ENVIRONMENTAL GROUP (SUCH
AS GREENPEACE) HAVE
OBJECTED TO THE PROJECT
1
No mentioning
of
any
existing
environmental
group
activities
in
Omega
Centre material. However, in the book: Environmental Protest in Western Europe, Oxford University Press 2007, page 48, it is said: 1988.‐1989, the number of Greenpeace supporters increased almost two times and in 1992. the protests were more organized.
STSM Report
THERE WAS PUBLIC
ACCEPTABILTY TO THE PROJECT
AT NATIONAL LEVEL (NO
0
1974. Major public opposition in light of fears about the impact of faster and more frequent trains.
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A10 PROTEST)
A11
THERE WAS PUBLIC ACCEPTABILTY TO THE PROJECT
AT LOCAL LEVEL (NO PROTEST)
0
A12
Environmental activists and
regulators have been engaged
ex‐ante, not ex post (N/A never
engaged or don't know)
1
Comprehensive Environmental Statement was prepared and then, as authorisation was obtained through the Parliamentary process that resulted in the CTRL Act, a series of ‘environmental standards’ were agreed. Also: The RLCI was set up as an independent charity to support local communities, landowners and organisations to realise their ideas for environmental enhancement along the CTRL route. The
Initiative received initial funding of £2m from the CTRL developers.
And also:
"Local authorities affected by the CTRL route and station options development process were variously consulted throughout the project preparation period. Their prime focus was on avoiding and mitigating potential environmental impacts within their areas."
A13
LOCAL LEVEL PROTESTS
OCCURED DURING
CONSTRUCTION OR
COMMISSIONING NOT DURING
PLANNING (N/A IF NO PROTEST
AT ALL)
0
5.1 Project
Environment ‐
Legal
The project has a strong
regulation system as evidenced
by:
B1
a) The authority stopped the project or similar projects in
0 Not sure if the Government can be considered as the authority here. If yes, then it is 1, because:
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STSM Report
Institute of Economic Affairs, 2007, Chapter 6 The Channel Tunnel (1985‐1994‐2007), pages 131‐132) D R Myddelton notes that the d i i t d ith th Ch l T l ( d b i ti th
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decision to proceed with the Channel Tunnel (and by association the CTRL) spanned several different governments in the UK, as follows: “In the twelve years 1964‐75 the party in power in the UK changed three times and there were six different ministers of transport. Given BR’s lukewarm attitude towards the Tunnel, so much chopping and changing can hardly have helped. But the project itself was not party‐political. Douglas‐Home’s Conservative government started it, Wilson’s (first) Labour government signed an agreement ‘in principle’, and Heath’s Conservative government signed legal contracts and the Treaty. Finally
Wilson’s (second) Labour government cancelled the first high quality rail
link to London, then the
Tunnel itself.
In the early 1980s Mrs Thatcher expressed interest in a fixed link between England and France, which she had supported as a member of the Heath government. The French were keen, in order to regenerate the Nord‐Pas de Calais region. At first she and Francois Mitterand, the French President, preferred a road to a rail link (as had Heath): he wanted a bridge while she favoured a drive‐through tunnel. But she ruled out any government finance, and doubted whether
a private enterprise tunnel would pay.” Not sure what should be the values for this attribute and values for
attributes b, c, d.
B7
b) Support of the local government NO CENTRAL
0
STSM Report
GOVERNMENT
C) SUPPORT BY BOTH 0
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B8
LOCAL
AND
CENTRAL
B9
D) NOT SUPPORTED BY EITHER LOCAL AND CENTRAL
1
C1
3. Project
Manangement
THE MEGAPROJECT IS
COMPOSED OF MORE THAN 1
IDENTICAL INDEPENDENT UNIT
(E.G. WIND TURBINES TO MAKE
A FARM, 2 NUCLEAR PLANTS IN
THE SITE,
10
LARGE
ASHIPS
ETC…)
0
C2
Heavy usage of planning by
milestones
N/A No data. Omega centre did not go into details about PM aspects.
C3
Heavy usage of Formal project
management tool and technique
N/A No data. Omega centre did not go into details about PM aspects.
C4 Usage of performance metrics
N/A No data. Only some about environmental planning. Omega centre did
not go into details about PM aspects.
C5
LUMP SUM
‐Turn
key
contract
between Client and EPC (main
contractor)
(N/A IF CLIENT AND EPC ARE THE
SAME)
0
C6
There was a formal litigation
procedure (e.g. international
chamber of commerce) during
the contract
between
Client
and
EPC (IF THEY ARE DIFFERENT ‐ IF
THE SAME OR PROJECT STILL IN
PLANNING STAGE THEN N/A)
0
C7
Project has a well developed
FEED
???
STSM Report
Modular project ‐ consider only
the related sentences below ‐
D1
a) The project is modular ‐dependent modules
0
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7. Technology
D1 dependent modules
D2
b) The project is modular ‐
independent modules 1
The project was split into 2 independent sections (see below), but inside the sections, modules were dependent (such as tracks and stations). "The 1998 restructuring split the construction of the Link into two sections: Section 1 (the southern part, from the Channel Tunnel to near Ebbsfleet on the outskirts of London) and Section 2 (the northern part, from near Ebbsfleet to St. Pancras). For contractual purposes the construction of the sections were undertaken in separate LCR subsidiaries: Section 1 by Union Railways (South) Ltd and Section 2 by Union Railways (North) Ltd."
D3
FOAK WIDE DEFINTION: FOAK
AT LEAST IN THE COUNTRY (e.g.
the first EPR reactors in the
country) OR FOR THE EPC OR
UNIQUE (LIKE THE MOSE IN
VENICE)
1
Britain’s first high‐speed railway
D4
FOAK STRONG, NARROW
DEFINITION: FOAK EVER (first
EPR ‐OL3)
or
unique
Project
(like
Venezia mose)
1
It is not the first high speed rail ever, but it could be considered as the first high speed rail trough the channel under the sea, connecting two countries. It depends how we define the attribute. It has the following
elements of strong FOAK: In 1994, the American Society of Civil Engineers elected the tunnel as one of the seven modern Wonders of the World (wikipedia). St Pancras International Station is the largest of its kind in Europe and is expected to handle some 50 million passengers per year (omega material).
It is aslo said: "In 2007, it will take just 7 minutes to get from St Pancras to Stratford
STSM Report
International station, which is a platform for creating Stratford City ‐ the largest single mixed‐use urban regeneration project in Europe.
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in Europe.
The upgraded transport infrastructure was instrumental in London winning the bid to host the Olympic Games."
E1
Not classificad
OFFSHORE PROJECT 0
E2
Financial Support from the
European Union
0
E3
Financial Support from the
national governament
1
F1
RESPONSE
(DEPENDA
NT)
VARIABLE is
EXTERNAL
PRIVATE
STAKEHOLD
ER
ACCEPTABILITY
Previous national similar project
was ON TIME AND BUDGET (N/A
FOR foak)
N/A
F2
Unemployment in the area
above national average
0?
I suppose the unemployment rate in London was not higher than national average, but I could not find exact figures. There are also following doubts about this attribute: When it is about the line infrastructure projects, there could be differences in unemployment rate between areas through which the
infrastructure goes. In case of CTRL, it is said that
Economic development and employment opportunities were some of the
main arguments for the project.
"The Channel Tunnel Rail Link presents the opportunity to provide high speed services for commuters into London, with significantly reduced journey times. This will attract new business and employment opportunities and open up access from Kent for employment opportunities in Stratford, the Lower Lea and Docklands, and opportunities for reverse commuting."
STSM Report
It is probable that unemployment rate was different in London than in South‐eastern part of England, where the line goes. However, more jobs in relation to this project are probably offered in and around London. Even in the city there could be areas with different unemployment rate.
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y p y
For example, it is also said for area around Ashton: "Local economic performance has lagged behind a rising rate of housing development despite a generous supply of employment land."
And unemployment rate can change over time also. That is interesting for this case, because the project was developed in a very long period of
time. About the project, it is written: "CTRL project workforce totaled some 8,000 persons (max) When completed, CTRL will have consumed some 50 million man‐hours."
F3
THE MAJORITY OF THE
NATIONAL POPULATION
TRUST
THE NATIONAL AUTHORITY
N/A
No data about the trust to authorities in Omega material. It is already mentioned about protests and that even the Government itself stopped the project. On wikipedia, it is said that much more support to the project in early
phases (1987) was given in France, with its long tradition of infrastructure investment. In contrast to the situation in UK, the project garnered widespread approval. In April 1987 the French National Assembly gave unanimous support (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Channel_Tunnel).
F4
The Compensation of local
community above 0,1% of the
total budget
0
It is 0, if the following can be considered as the compensation for local community: The RLCI was set up as an independent charity to support local communities, landowners and organizations to realize their ideas for environmental enhancement along the CTRL route. The Initiative received initial funding of £2m from the CTRL developers.
F5
The density of population of the
province is below the national
average
0 Both London and region of South East have the population density above the national average.
STSM Report
G1 EXTRA LINES
AVAILABLE
The project is nuclear 0
G2 SPE
1
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NEW ATTRIBUTE PROPOSED:
1.
BOT: 1 (yes), 0 (no)
IMPORTANT COMMENTS ON EXISTING ATTRIBUTES DEFINITION:
1.
Regarding INTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS attributes: Instead of levels:
Client
EPC
First Tier Contractors
More general level names are proposed, which would be adequate also for BOT model:
The first level (Client)
The second level (EPC or Concessionaire, depends on the contract model)
First Tier Contractors (contractors, or design and construction companies, depends on the contract model)
2.
Regarding the attributes: support of the central/local Government:
What if the attitude changed over time, as in this project ? (Kent Community Council at one point refused all the proposed
routes alternatives. How to consider this ? Is this no support from local government ? And the central Government also gave up
from project at one point.) – Giorgio answered it should be considered as no support from local Government.
NO DATA IN OMEGA MATERIAL ABOUT:
Project Management
National trust to the authorities
Some aspects of stakeholders, both internal and external (such as Siemens and Greenpeace)
STSM Report
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0
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STSM Report
It was not foreign, but it was international consortium. The two governments signed an agreement in 1991, committing them
both to form state‐owned stock companies. The companies would
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A1
2.1
Stakeholders ‐
Internal
Project has a foreign EPC
company
0
form a consortium responsible for the financing, design, construction and operation of the link, with loans raised on the international finance market, repaid by revenues from user fees and guaranteed by the two states. The Oresundbro Consortium (AS Oresund, Denmark and Svedab AB, Sweden) signed contracts with three consortia: Oresund Tunnel Contractors; Oresund Marine Joint Venture, for construction of the artificial island and dredging; and Sundlink Contractors, for bridges. Consortium ownership was split equally between the Swedish and Danish states.
A2
Siemens is involved as a
contractor in the project
0
No mentioning of Siemens in Omega material. But, Siemens is stated as a supplier (not a Contractor) of some equipment (file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/342_acee490f4574a9f696014a385
5e32709.pdf) on the Web.
A3
THE CLIENT IS ALSO THE EPC OR
MAIN CONTRACTOR
1
A4
The EPC has a clear goal 1?
No data about this in Omega material. The EPC is the Consortium, which is an SPE. However, on the web, it is written that the company's main purpose is to run an efficient and safe link between Denmark and Sweden and to create a sustainable business. (http://uk.oresundsbron.com/page/1103)
The project is mono Cultural
(SEE BELOW)
A5
A)
CLIENT
AND
EPC
HAVE
THE
SAME NATIONALITY (N/A IF
THEY ARE THE SAME)
N/A
A6
B) CLIENT AND EPC AND ALL
THE IMPORTANT FIRST TIER
CONTRACTOR HAVE THE SAME
NATIONALITY
0
The OC was responsible for negotiations with the contractors. After negotiations held from July to November 1995, deals were signed with three consortia. The Öresund Tunnel Contractors, a consortium consisting of NCC AB (SE), Dumez‐GTM SA (F), John Laing Ltd (UK), E.
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STSM Report
completion. Even though other issues such as the impact on traffic volumes and land use initially were seen as important, the main issue has been the question of how the structure would affect the water flow between the Baltic and the North Sea.
N d t b t l l t t i O t i l b t th i t
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A11
THERE WAS PUBLIC
ACCEPTABILTY TO THE PROJECT
AT LOCAL LEVEL (NO PROTEST)
0
No data about local protests in Omega material, but the impact on the nearby ecologically sensitive island of Saltholm was also a matter of concern. It was deemed that the construction work would cause serious disturbance to 24 nesting bird populations. The existing seal population of the island was deemed to be in danger of being permanently removed from the area. on the web (http://gurukul.ucc.american.edu/ted/oresund.htm) it is
written:
After the Water Court gave its approval,the Swedish Environmental Minister, Olof Johanssen, opposed this project so strongly that he resigned his position. (13) Even with the approval of the Water Court, Johanssen felt that the delicate balance of the Baltic Sea would be upset. (14) He was concerned about the possible effects of the bridge on the wild birds inhabiting an island in the sound and the effects of a decrease in water flow on the fish and other living
organisms in the sea. Environmental groups in Sweden felt the same way. Most environmentalists and biologists in Sweden are still opposed to building the crossing. As recently as July and September of 1996, these groups have staged protests against this project, still feeling that water flows and species within the Oresund Sound will be disturbed.
A12
Environmental activists and
regulators have
been
engaged
ex‐ante, not ex post (N/A never
engaged or don't know)
0
The project remained controversial in Sweden, particularly as the
environmental impact assessment took place only after the agreement to build the link was signed.
A13
LOCAL LEVEL PROTESTS
OCCURED DURING
CONSTRUCTION OR
0 Environmentalist groups from both Denmark and Sweden have opposed this project from the beginning. (http://gurukul.ucc.american.edu/ted/oresund.htm)
STSM Report
COMMISSIONING NOT DURING
PLANNING (N/A IF NO PROTEST
AT ALL)
The project has a strong
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5.1 Project
Environment ‐
Legal
regulation system as evidenced
by:
B1
a) The authority stopped the project or similar projects in the same country
0
The Swedish National Board for Environmental Protection refused planning permission, but its competence was questioned and the government referred to the Water Rights Court instead. The WRC
granted permission, on condition that the project had no impact on water flow: this necessitated a redesign and further approvals.
This
became
known
as
„the
zero
impact
solution‟
,
and
as
a
result
the
OC had to adjust the construction plans and submit these to the WRC again.
B2
b) The authority fined the EPC (main contractor) or one of the internal stakeholders in the project
0
No information that this occurred.
B3
c) ACTIONS FROM THE AUTHORITY POSTPONED THE
FINAL COMPLETION OF THE
PROJECT
1
It is 1, although I am not sure about the difference between this
attribute and
the
one
before
the
previous
(a).
The Swedish National Board for Environmental Protection refuse