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Findings and Recommendations Global 2001 NCW Innovation Cell

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Findings and Recommendations Global 2001 NCW Innovation Cell. CAPT Don Inbody Director, Joint C4ISR Decision Support Center. Approach. Scientific Method Control, Experiment Test hypotheses Analytic Rigor Measures of Force Effectiveness Measures of Effectiveness Measures of Performance. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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UNCLASSIFIED Findings and Recommendations Global 2001 NCW Innovation Cell CAPT Don Inbody Director, Joint C4ISR Decision Support Center
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Page 1: Findings and Recommendations  Global 2001 NCW Innovation Cell

UNCLASSIFIED

Findings and Recommendations Global 2001

NCW Innovation Cell

CAPT Don InbodyDirector, Joint C4ISR Decision Support Center

Page 2: Findings and Recommendations  Global 2001 NCW Innovation Cell

UNCLASSIFIED

  Approach

• Scientific Method– Control, Experiment– Test hypotheses

• Analytic Rigor– Measures of Force Effectiveness– Measures of Effectiveness– Measures of Performance

Page 3: Findings and Recommendations  Global 2001 NCW Innovation Cell

Re-establish status quo in

JOA

Risk (inside/outside

AOR)Casualties

Time to Achieve Policy

Objectives

Maneuver forces to gain dominant advantage

Precisely engage adversary systems

Sustain forces in JOAProtect forces and non-

combatantsCommand/Direct Forces &

Support

e.g. Centers of Gravity held at risk

e.g. Kills Per Sortie - Losses - Damage

e.g. Sortie Rate e.g. Avoidable Lossese.g. % Acts Consistent w/Commanders Intent

Gain assured access to JOA

e.g. Ship-Days in Gulf orForce Able to Mass Effects

Achieve high OPTEMPO

e.g. Rate of Effective Ops vs. Centers of Gravity

Measures Of Performance Disrupted By Obstacles To NCW (Programs of Record)

Info Availability (Exchange/Collaboration)

Timeliness (speed, timing)of Decision-making

Assessment Accuracy

“Counter-fire” effectiveness

Susceptibility / Vulnerability of HVTs

TPFD Closure Capacity

Flexibility/Adaptability of Forces & Suppliers

Visibility of Supply & Demand

Target track accuracy and holding time

Launch platform surviviability

Movement/reaction delay

ISR/Info Search Rates(anti-access systems, COGs)

Data-to-Knowledge Processing Capacity

Mobility of forces and support

Max weapon or effect range

Area Defended(air threats, irregular threats)

Timeliness of Indications & Warning

Awareness of terrain and battlespace

Mobility of forces and support

Force efficiency

Movement/reaction delay

Max weapon or effect range

% HVTs ID’d(& Held at Risk)

Target(s)-Weapon(s) Pairing Effectiveness

Weapon (Effect) Performance(Range, Accuracy, PK)

Target track accuracy and holding time

Launch platform surviviability

“Footprint” in JOA

TPFD Closure Capacity

Flexibility/Adaptability of Forces & Suppliers

Visibility of Supply & Demand

“Counter-fire” effectiveness

Susceptibility /Vulnerability of HVTs

“Counter-fire” effectiveness

Susceptibility / Vulnerability of HVTs

TPFD Closure Capacity

Flexibility/Adaptability of Forces & Suppliers

Visibility of Supply & Demand

Target track accuracy and holding time

Launch platform surviviability

Movement/reaction delay

Mobility of forces and support

Max weapon or effect range

Area Defended(air threats, irregular threats)

Timeliness of Indications & Warning

Awareness of terrain and battlespace

Force efficiency

Target(s)-Weapon(s) Pairing Effectiveness

Weapon (Effect) Performance(Range, Accuracy, PK)

ISR/Info Search Rates(anti-access systems, COGs)

Data-to-Knowledge Processing Capacity

Mobility of forces and support

Max weapon or effect range

% HVTs ID’d(& Held at Risk)

“Footprint” in JOA

Info Availability (Exchange/Collaboration)

Timeliness (speed, timing)of Decision-making

Assessment Accuracy

Movement/reaction delay

Target track accuracy and holding time

Launch platform surviviability

TPFD Closure Capacity

Flexibility/Adaptability of Forces & Suppliers

Visibility of Supply & Demand

“Counter-fire” effectiveness

Susceptibility /Vulnerability of HVTs

Page 4: Findings and Recommendations  Global 2001 NCW Innovation Cell

Re-establish status quo in

JOA

Risk (inside/outside

AOR)Casualties

Time to Achieve Policy

Objectives

Maneuver forces to gain dominant advantage

Precisely engage adversary systems

Sustain forces in JOAProtect forces and non-

combatantsCommand/Direct Forces &

Support

e.g. Centers of Gravity held at risk

e.g. Kills Per Sortie - Losses - Damage

e.g. Sortie Rate e.g. Avoidable Lossese.g. % Acts Consistent w/Commanders Intent

Gain assured access to JOA

e.g. Ship-Days in Gulf orForce Able to Mass Effects

Achieve high OPTEMPO

e.g. Rate of Effective Ops vs. Centers of Gravity

Info Availability (Exchange/Collaboration)

Timeliness (speed, timing)of Decision-making

Assessment Accuracy

“Counter-fire” effectiveness

Susceptibility / Vulnerability of HVTs

TPFD Closure Capacity

Flexibility/Adaptability of Forces & Suppliers

Visibility of Supply & Demand

Target track accuracy and holding time

Launch platform surviviability

Movement/reaction delay

ISR/Info Search Rates(anti-access systems, COGs)

Data-to-Knowledge Processing Capacity

Mobility of forces and support

Max weapon or effect range

Area Defended(air threats, irregular threats)

Timeliness of Indications & Warning

Awareness of terrain and battlespace

Mobility of forces and support

Force efficiency

Movement/reaction delay

Max weapon or effect range

% HVTs ID’d(& Held at Risk)

Target(s)-Weapon(s) Pairing Effectiveness

Weapon (Effect) Performance(Range, Accuracy, PK)

Target track accuracy and holding time

Launch platform surviviability

“Footprint” in JOA

TPFD Closure Capacity

Flexibility/Adaptability of Forces & Suppliers

Visibility of Supply & Demand

“Counter-fire” effectiveness

Susceptibility /Vulnerability of HVTs

Measures Of Performance Disrupted By Obstacles To NCW (Future Programs)

Page 5: Findings and Recommendations  Global 2001 NCW Innovation Cell

UNCLASSIFIED

Findings

• The Joint force will fail to achieve its full potential effectiveness without implementation of Network Centric Warfare principles

• Current programs of record are insufficient to implement NCW principles

• Future planned programs provide only incremental improvement

• Further innovation is necessary to implement NCW – Full integration across program and system lines – Doctrine– Organization– Training

Page 6: Findings and Recommendations  Global 2001 NCW Innovation Cell

UNCLASSIFIED

Principal Issue

• “Impedance mismatches” in information transfer usually fall along systems, program, mission, and service lines.

• ergo: – any organization or program that appears to fall along

service lines is suspect– acquisition programs not under a system of systems

integration umbrella is suspect

Page 7: Findings and Recommendations  Global 2001 NCW Innovation Cell

UNCLASSIFIED

Recommendations

• Doctrine and Training– New/modified TTP/CONOPS/Doctrine to fully

achieve the capabilities offered by the new technologies

– Create a T&E force (JFCOM?) using CONUS-based forces to organize a JTF that will train jointly developing and using NC principles

Page 8: Findings and Recommendations  Global 2001 NCW Innovation Cell

UNCLASSIFIED

Recommendations

• Systems Integration (Acquisition)– Integrate acquisition programs under NCW focused mission

capability area umbrellas with mechanism to balance funding and ensure technical compliance/interoperability (e.g.)

• SIAP SE• Link-16/JDN/WIN-T/JTRS/JTI• GCCS• DCGS

– Invest in distributed, modeling & simulation environments (such as JDEP, Dnet, and ACETEF) to enable concurrent doctrine and systems development to link warfighter with acquisition communities and rapidly field NCW focused capabilities

• Doctrine/tactics development• System development and test• Provide consistent methods to measure and compare system

performance

Page 9: Findings and Recommendations  Global 2001 NCW Innovation Cell

UNCLASSIFIED

Recommendations

• Organization– Create standing JTF Headquarters (at

JFCOM?) to train to Joint standards of organization able to respond to world-wide crises, tasks.

– Organize (at JTF level) by warfare function (Fires, Maneuver, Resources) vice service (ARFOR, LCC, NAVFOR, JFMCC, JFACC)

Page 10: Findings and Recommendations  Global 2001 NCW Innovation Cell

UNCLASSIFIED

Global 2001

Innovation Game

Network Centric Warfare Cell

Page 11: Findings and Recommendations  Global 2001 NCW Innovation Cell

UNCLASSIFIED

Developing a Joint Task Force Headquarters

A Path Ahead

April 21, 2023

Page 12: Findings and Recommendations  Global 2001 NCW Innovation Cell

UNCLASSIFIED

Current Situation:

• Existing capabilities are available now• Joint Mobile Ashore Support

Terminals• AN/MSQ-126: Integrated Mobile

MARFORPAC Command Post• Multiple ACTDs add additional

capability

Necessary Functions:• Communicate (Up/Down, Sideways including

Coalition and NGO)• General Situational Awareness (Red & Blue)• Logistics (Situational Awareness &

Management)• Dynamic Retasking of Intel• Direct Fire• Direct Maneuver• Net Assessment (Effects-based Operations)• Information Operations • Rapid Execution

Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters

Known Shortfalls:

• Standard Operating Procedures• Trained Staff• System Flexibility• Knowledge Management /

Information Superiority• Interoperability• Information Operations / IA /

OPSEC

Programs Examined by DSC:

• 48 Advanced Concept Tech Demos• 5 DARPA Programs• 7 Joint Test & Evaluation Projects• 26 Concepts

Page 13: Findings and Recommendations  Global 2001 NCW Innovation Cell

UNCLASSIFIED

Most Attractive Candidate Systems / Concepts

Communications• Airborne C4ISR Node

• Extending the Littoral Battlespace

• Joint Interface Control Officer Support System

Command and Control• Joint Continuous Strike Environment

• Automated Deep Operations Coordination System

• Federated Assessment Target Enhancement

• Adaptive Courses of Action / CINC 21

Logistics• Joint Logistics/Joint Theater Logistics/Coalition Theater Logistics

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance• Integrated Collection Management

Information Operations• Information Operations Planning Tool

Page 14: Findings and Recommendations  Global 2001 NCW Innovation Cell

UNCLASSIFIED

The JTF HQ Shortfalls

DoctrineNo clear command relationshipsCurrent SOPs and TTPs are not integratedSeparate planning and execution processesSensor control (physical)Dynamic collection managementData disseminationInfo Assurance / OPSEC

MaterielCommunications capabilitiesCommon Operating PictureJoint logistics planningDynamic sensor retaskingLow Density / High Demand ISR PlatformsSpace Based InfraredJoint FiresInteroperabilityInfo Ops/ Assurance/ OPSEC

PersonnelNo assigned personnelAdditional Intelligence data to analyze

FacilitiesNo dedicated facilitiesNo common facilitiesISR Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, Dissemination

OrganizationNo permanent staffNot fully using reachback capabilitiesNeed to integrate JTF HQIdentify and train staff earlyCollocation of DCGS with JTF

LeadershipChain of command and command relationships must be specifiedDecentralized operations require understanding of commander’s intent

TrainingEstablish a school houseJoint operational training is secondary to tactical trainingTime Critical Targeting cycle

Page 15: Findings and Recommendations  Global 2001 NCW Innovation Cell

UNCLASSIFIED

Materiel Fixes Solutions

DoctrineNo clear command relationshipsCurrent SOPs and TTPs are not integratedSeparate planning and execution processesSensor control (physical)Dynamic collection managementData disseminationInfo Assurance / OPSEC

PersonnelNo assigned personnelAdditional Intelligence data to analyze

FacilitiesNo dedicated facilitiesNo common facilitiesISR Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, Dissemination

OrganizationNo permanent staffNot fully using reachback capabilitiesNeed to integrate JTF HQIdentify and train staff earlyCollocation of DCGS with JTF

LeadershipChain of command and command relationships must be specifiedDecentralized operations require understanding of commander’s intent

TrainingEstablish a school houseJoint operational training is secondary to tactical trainingTime Critical Targeting cycle

MaterielACN (DARPA)ELB ACTDJICO Support SystemACOA ACTDJL/JTL/CTL ACTDICM ACTDJCSE ACTDADOCS ACTDFATE SystemIOPT ACTD

Page 16: Findings and Recommendations  Global 2001 NCW Innovation Cell

UNCLASSIFIED

Field Capabilities(Initial FY03/04)

(Update as Required)

CJCS Proposed SJTF HQ Model(11/03)

Review & Modify as Necessary(9-12/02)

Approach to Field Standing JTF Headquarters (SJTF HQ)

Test in Millennium Challenge 02 with

CINC support(7-8/02)

• CINC Ownership• Synergy of Full-Time

Staff• Improved Capabilities• Available for Current

Operations• Firm Doctrine and

Training Foundation

Spiral Development

Continues

Add Other Attractive Initiatives(9/02 - ?)

Build on Existing Capability (JMAST)

(9/01)

Add Most Attractive Initiatives(9/01-4/02)

JFCOM Experimental SJTF HQ Standup

(2/02)

CJCS Plan for SJTF(3/02)

Page 17: Findings and Recommendations  Global 2001 NCW Innovation Cell

UNCLASSIFIED

Back Up Slides

Page 18: Findings and Recommendations  Global 2001 NCW Innovation Cell

UNCLASSIFIED

Proposed Budget

$ in MillionFY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06

RDT&E 16.0$ 61.0$ 63.8$ 44.2$ 14.0$ PROCUREMENT 10.3$ 13.7$ 30.0$ 23.0$ 51.9$ O&M 1.8$ 3.2$ 5.7$ 6.7$ 9.7$ MILCON 3.0$ 5.0$ 8.0$ 2.0$ -$ Civilian Personnel 2.0$ 6.0$ 9.0$ 12.0$ 15.0$ Military Personnel (cumulative) 55 55 110 220 275Total Funding 33.1$ 88.9$ 116.5$ 87.9$ 90.6$ Fielded JTF HQ 1 2 4 5

Includes: • 5 Upgraded Joint Mobile Ashore Support Terminals or similar• Top 10 Recommended Programs

NOTE: Issue paper being developed for FY02-07 budget through Council of Colonels with COL Krieger

Page 19: Findings and Recommendations  Global 2001 NCW Innovation Cell

UNCLASSIFIED

MethodologyExamined:

• 48 Advanced Concept Tech Demos• 5 DARPA Programs• 7 Joint Test & Eval Projects• 26 Concepts

Measures:

• Ability to satisfy shortfalls• Schedule• Include all C4ISR functional areas

Sources of requirements/shortfalls:

• JTF C2 Study (Joint Staff/DSC)• Other DSC studies• Joint Mission Force• JFCOM Joint Experiments• Global Info Grid/Joint Operational

Architecture

0

20

40

60

80

100

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Rank (% of Best)

Uti

lity

(%

of

Bes

t)

Top 10

Page 20: Findings and Recommendations  Global 2001 NCW Innovation Cell

UNCLASSIFIED

Program Ranking: Top 10

ADOCS 9 3 3 3 18 1 18JCSE 9 3 3 3 18 1 18ACOA 3 3 3 9 18 1 18FATE 3 3 3 3 9 21 0.8 16.8ELB 3 9 3 15 0.8 12ACN 3 9 12 0.6 7.2JICO 3 9 12 0.6 7.2IOPT 9 9 1 9ICM 9 9 0.8 7.2JL/JTL/CTL 3 3 9 15 0.9 13.5

Quality Score:9 - Adds New Capability3 - Improves/Integrates Existing Capabilities1 - Automates Manual Process

Maturity Factor:1 - FY02.8 - FY03.7 - Started - IOC Unknown.6 - FY04+

Page 21: Findings and Recommendations  Global 2001 NCW Innovation Cell

UNCLASSIFIED

Program Ranking: The Rest

Fully tr

ained C

omm

ander JTF a

nd JTF H

Q Sta

ff

Standard

Opera

ting P

roce

dures

JTF A

ug Stru

cture

JTF F

unctio

nality,

flexib

ility

and a

dapability

Ability

to id

entify

and satis

fy C

CIRs

KM fo

r info

superio

rity

Ability

to k

eep pace

with

ops

Execute

join

t forc

e pla

nning

Inte

ropera

bility

IO/IA

/OPSEC

Total

Matu

rity

Factor

Final

JIVE 9 3 12 0.8 9.6CINC 21 3 3 9 1 16 0.6 9.6ABA 3 1 3 7 0.8 5.6C2&D 3 3 6 0.7 4.2TIPS 1 1 1 3 0.7 2.1JeMPRS 0 0CSEL 0 0CID 0 0CCID 0 0PRESS 0 0IDM 3 3 1 6 0.7 4.8TELEPORT 0 0EC5G 0 0JDIICS-D 0 0PKI 3 3 1 3Adv ISR Mgt 9 9 0.7 6.3JISR 3 3 3 1 10 0.6 6BDA in JTT 3 3 3 9 0.6 5.4HUMINT (HICIST) 3 3 6 0.8 4.8HAE UAV 3 3 1 3RTV (RBV) 3 3 1 3SAIP 3 3 1 3CAESAR 1 3 4 0.6 2.4CC&D 3 3 0.7 2.1ESG 3 3 0.7 2.1CMMA 3 3 0.7 2.1UGS 1 1 1 1AJP 0 0TAPS/VSS 0 0

Page 22: Findings and Recommendations  Global 2001 NCW Innovation Cell

UNCLASSIFIED

JTF Concepts/Programs Reviewed

• USJFCOM - Millenium Challenge 02 (MC 02) JTF-HQ Forward

• USCENTCOM - Joint Deployable C2 Center ACTD • USPACOM - Joint Mission Force (JMF) Systems &

Applications• USCINCPAC - Mobile C4 Command Post to Support

Contingency JTF Operations– USN Joint Mobile Ashore Support Terminal (JMAST)

• USN - Joint Command & Control Capability JCC(X)• USAF - Air Operations Center (AOC) Weapon System • Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE)

Page 23: Findings and Recommendations  Global 2001 NCW Innovation Cell

UNCLASSIFIED

Baseline JTF C2 Systems & Applications

COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENTGlobal Broadcast System (GBS)SHF SATCOM TerminalTACSAT UHF Terminal (CINC 1/JTF NET)Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) USSOCOM SCAMPI (UHF) TerminalHF/UHF/VHF (Voice & Data)TACTICAL SWITCH Commercial Private Branch Exchange (PBX)CryptoINFORMATION PROCESSING EQUIPMENTUNIX Work StationsPersonal Computers (PCs)JWICS VTC EquipmentRadiant MercuryAUTODIN/Defense Messaging System (DMS)APPLICATIONSGlobal Command and Control System (GCCS) GCCS-Integrated Imagery and Intelligence (GCCS-I3) Personal Computer Integrated Imagery and Intelligence (PCI3)Command and Control Personal Computer (C2PC)Theater Battle Management Core System (TBMCS)Global Combat Support System (GCSS)Joint Operational Planning System (JOPES)Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS)NET MeetingJoint Defense Information Infrastructure Control System - Deployed (JDIICS-D)Personal Communications System (PCS) PCS Data Access Service (PDAS)

NETWORK ACCESS / SERVICESCINC 1/JTF NET (Via TACSAT)DoD TELEPORT/Standardized Tactical Entry Point (STEP)Tactical Data Links in formats A, B, and J (TADIL A/B/J)Defense Red Switch Network (DRSN)Defense Switch Network (DSN)TACTICAL SWITCH NETWORK (LIMITED)Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS)Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS)Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET)Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET)INTELINKElectronic Key Management System (EKMS)Local/Wide Area Networks (LAN/WAN) NEWSGROUPS (WWW Access)Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS)Improved Data Modem (IDM)Wireless Web

Page 24: Findings and Recommendations  Global 2001 NCW Innovation Cell

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 25: Findings and Recommendations  Global 2001 NCW Innovation Cell

UNCLASSIFIED

Deployable JTF HQ Options

11th Signal Brigade/EAC

The 11th Signal Brigade is a totally mobile unit headquartered at Fort Huachuca, Ariz. It is the primary provider of rapid-deployment tactical communications anywhere in the world. Using switch, satellite, microwave, cable and tropospheric scatter, the brigade is capable of providing service to units no matter where they are in the world. It provides both long distance and local service.

11th Signal Bde Similar

Communications Capabilities to JCSE

* Normally used to backfill JCSE

Page 26: Findings and Recommendations  Global 2001 NCW Innovation Cell

UNCLASSIFIED

Responsibilities

• OSD– C3I

• Advocacy and oversight of entire program

– AT&L• Acquisition oversight

• Joint Staff– Advocacy and JROC oversight

• CINCs– CINCEUR, CINCCENT, CINCPAC, and CINCSOUTH - Integration, execution,

coordination, and local operational control– JFCOM - operational execution, interoperability

• Defense Agencies - support– DISA– NSA

• Services– Army and Air Force - coordination and support– Navy - planning, programming, budgeting, acquisition management, and

program execution

Page 27: Findings and Recommendations  Global 2001 NCW Innovation Cell

UNCLASSIFIED

Joint Mobile Ashore Support Terminal (JMAST)

• GCCS-M• OTCIXS/TADIXS• Message Handling (DMS0• Environmental Data/Weather• Tactical Decision Aids• Imagery• Resource Mgt. (MS Office)• Projectors/Briefing Equipment• Phone Switch• Integrated Services Digital Network• HF/VHF/UHF LOS• UHF SATCOM• X-band SHF SATCOM• INMARSAT• SINCGARS

CINCPACFLT Programmed UpgradesJTF Enhancement Package

• Link-11• SIPRNET LAN, Terminals• NIPRNET LAN, Terminals• Battle Force email• VTC• Secure Telephone • Fax/Secure Fax• GPS• Generators• Power Distribution• Fuel Storage• UPS• HVAC• DRASH Shelters

Current Capabilities / Hardware

• Tactical Telephone Switch• Coalition Data Network• GCCS (COP, JOPES)• TBMCS• JDIICS-D• Additional Secure Phones• Additional DSRN• Additional SIPRNET• Additional NIPRNET• Additional Coalition Data Terminals

Unprogrammed Upgrades• JWICS (TRE/TRAP)• Link-16/22• HaveQuick• Network Encryption System• Upgraded Phone Switch• Prime Movers


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