Fiscal Unions
Emmanuel Farhi, HarvardIván Werning, MIT
Currency Unions
Case for flexible exchange rates...Friedman (53)
Currency union...single monetary policy...can stabilize symmetric shockscannot stabilize asymmetric shocks
How to deal with asymmetric shocks?
Optimal Currency Area literature
factor mobility...Mundell (61)
openness...McKinnon (63)
fiscal integration....Kennen (69)
financial integration...Mundell (73)
Currency Unions
Optimal Currency Area literature
factor mobility...Mundell (61)
openness...McKinnon (63)
fiscal integration....Kennen (69)
financial integration...Mundell (73)
Currency Unions
This Paper
Mechanism design meets Keynesian economicsfiscal union as insurance in a currency unioncharacterize optimal arrangement
Dual role of transfersrisk sharingmacroeconomic stabilization
Key result: macro externality in insurance decisions
Within a currency union: social private
Fiscal and monetary unions go hand in handFiscal and financial integration not perfect substitutes
6=
This Paper
Implementation
Complete marketsmacro-prudential portfolio taxes
Incomplete marketsfiscal transfers
Implementation
Complete marketsmacro-prudential portfolio taxes
Incomplete marketsfiscal transfers
Households
U i(CiNT , C
iT , N
i; s)
Households
Country i households maximizes subject to
ZU i(Ci
NT (s), CiT (s), N
i(s); s)�(s)ds
ZDi(s)Q(s)�(s)ds 0
P iNTC
iNT (s) + PT (s)C
iT (s) W i(s)N i(s) + PT (s)E
iT (s)
+⇧i(s) + T i(s) + Di(s)
Households
Country i households maximizes subject to
ZU i(Ci
NT (s), CiT (s), N
i(s); s)�(s)ds
ZDi(s)Q(s)�(s)ds 0
P iNTC
iNT (s) + PT (s)C
iT (s) W i(s)N i(s) + PT (s)E
iT (s)
+⇧i(s) + T i(s) + Di(s)(1 + ⌧ iD(s))
Households
Country i households maximizes subject to
ZU i(Ci
NT (s), CiT (s), N
i(s); s)�(s)ds
ZDi(s)Q(s)�(s)ds 0
CiNT (s) =
✓Z 1
0Ci,j
NT (s)1� 1
" dj
◆ 11� 1
"
P iNTC
iNT (s) + PT (s)C
iT (s) W i(s)N i(s) + PT (s)E
iT (s)
+⇧i(s) + T i(s) + Di(s)(1 + ⌧ iD(s))
FirmsEach variety j of NT
produced monopolistically technology
price set one period in advance
Y i,jNT (s) = Ai(s)N i,j(s)
Government
Government budget constraint
Zero net international fiscal transfers
T i(s) = � iLWi(s)N i(s)� � iD(s)Di(s) + T̂ i(s)
ZT̂ i(s)di = 0
Equilibrium
Household FOCsFirm FOCGovernment budget constraintMarket clearing
CiNT (s) = Ai(s)N i(s)
ZCi
T (s)di =
ZEi
T (s)di
FOCsU iCT
(s)(1 + � iD(s))
Q(s)PT (s)=
U iCT
(s0)(1 + � iD(s0))
Q(s0)PT (s0)U iCT
(s)
PT (s)=
U iCNT
(s)
P iNT
�U iN (s)
W i(s)=
U iCNT
(s)
P iNT
.
P iNT = (1 + ⇥ iL)
⇤
⇤� 1
R Q(s)1+� i
D(s)W i(s)Ai(s) C
iNT (s)�(s)ds
R Q(s)1+� i
D(s)Ci
NT (s)�(s)ds
FOCs
U iCT
(s)
PT (s)=
U iCNT
(s)
P iNT
FOCs
U iCT
(s)
PT (s)=
U iCNT
(s)
P iNT
CiNT (s) = �i(pi(s); s)Ci
T (s)
pi(s) =PT (s)
P iNT
weak separability + homothetic
Alternative: Incomplete markets
Household budget constraint
Government budget constraint
Same implementability conditions!
P iNTC
iNT (s) + PT (s)C
iT (s)
W i(s)N i(s) + PT (s)EiT (s) +�i,j(s) + T i(s)
T i(s) = � iLWi(s)N i(s) + T̂ i(s)
openness
CNT
CT
openness
flex
CNT
CT
openness
flex rigid
CNT
CT
Planning Problem
Constrained Pareto frontier (weights )�i
ZCi
T (s)di =
ZEi
T (s)di
max
P iNT ,PT (s),Ci
T (s)
Z ZV i
✓Ci
T (s),PT (s)
P iNT
; s
◆�i⇡(s) di ds
Planning Problem
Constrained Pareto frontier (weights )�i
ZCi
T (s)di =
ZEi
T (s)di
U i
✓↵i(pi(s); s)Ci
T (s), CiT (s),
↵i(pi(s); s)
Ai(s)Ci
T (s); s
◆
max
P iNT ,PT (s),Ci
T (s)
Z ZV i
✓Ci
T (s),PT (s)
P iNT
; s
◆�i⇡(s) di ds
Optimality ConditionsProposition (Optimal Price Setting).Zero average labor wedge across states for each country:Z
�ip(s)C
iT (s)U
iCT
(s) ⇤ i(s)⇥(s) ds = 0
labor wedgeacross states for each country
across countries for each state
Optimality ConditionsProposition (Optimal Price Setting).Zero average labor wedge across states for each country:Z
�ip(s)C
iT (s)U
iCT
(s) ⇤ i(s)⇥(s) ds = 0
Proposition (Optimal Monetary Policy).Zero average labor wedge across countries for each state:Z
�ip(s)C
iT (s)U
iCT
(s) ⇤ i(s)⇥idi = 0
labor wedgeacross states for each country
across countries for each state
Optimal Risk Sharing
Standard risk sharing condition...... but with social instead of private marginal values
Fiscal and financial integration not perfect substitutes
Proposition (Optimal Risk Sharing).
V iCT
(s)
V i0CT
(s)=
V iCT
(s0)
V i0CT
(s0)
Optimal Risk Sharing
Standard risk sharing condition...... but with social instead of private marginal values
Fiscal and financial integration not perfect substitutes
Proposition (Optimal Risk Sharing).
U iCT
(s)
U i0CT
(s)
1 + ↵i(s)pi(s) ⌧
i(s)
1 + ↵i0 (s)pi0 (s)
⌧ i0(s)=
U iCT
(s0)
U i0CT
(s0)
1 + ↵i(s0)pi(s0) ⌧
i(s0)
1 + ↵i0 (s0)pi0 (s0)
⌧ i0(s0)
Two Implementations
Complete markets + macro-prudential portfolio taxes
Incomplete markets + fiscal transfers
⇥ iD(s) =�i(s)
pi(s)⇥ i(s)
T̂ i(s) = PT (s)(CiT (s)� Ei(s))
Two Implementations
Complete markets + macro-prudential portfolio taxes
Incomplete markets + fiscal transfers
⇥ iD(s) =�i(s)
pi(s)⇥ i(s)
T̂ i(s) = PT (s)(CiT (s)� Ei(s))
Non-Members
Outside currency union, same conditions, but...zero labor wedgesprivately and socially optimal risk sharing coincide no need for macro-prudential portfolio taxesfiscal unions replicate complete markets
Fiscal unions and currency unions go hand in hand
Moral Hazard
Up to now, no incentive issues
Introduce to capture concerns for moral hazard
Tradeoff insurance vs. incentives
More insurance in currency union (social vs. private)
Dynamic Model
Dynamic modelCalvo price settingall goods tradedopenness: home bias in preferencesfraction of HtM consumers with high MPCs (financially constrained)
Impulse Response (No HtM)
5% productivity shock
0 1 2 3 4 5-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0Output gap
0 1 2 3 4 5-0.1
-0.05
0PPI inflation
0 1 2 3 4 5-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0Output gap
0 1 2 3 4 5-0.1
-0.05
0PPI inflation
0 1 2 3 4 5-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0Output gap
0 1 2 3 4 5-0.1
-0.05
0PPI Inflation
1
Optimal Transfers (No HtM)
NPV transfers/GDP: half-life of shock and openness5% productivity shock
02
46
810
00.2
0.40.6
0.810
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
1
Stabilization (No HtM)
Stabilization: half-life of shock and openness
02
46
810
00.2
0.40.6
0.810
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1
Impulse Response (HtM)
0 1 2 3 4 5-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0Output gap
0 1 2 3 4 5-0.1
-0.05
0PPI inflation
0 1 2 3 4 50
0.002
0.004
0.006Transfer
0 1 2 3 4 5-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0Output gap
0 1 2 3 4 5-0.1
-0.05
0PPI inflation
0 1 2 3 4 50
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04Transfer
0 1 2 3 4 5-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0Output gap
0 1 2 3 4 5-0.1
-0.05
0PPI Inflation
0 1 2 3 4 50
0.05
0.1Transfer
1
5% productivity shock
Stabilization (HtM)
24
68
10
00.2
0.40.6
0.810
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1
Stabilization: half-life of shock and openness
Optimal Transfers
24
68
10
00.2
0.40.6
0.810
0.04
0.08
0.12
1
NPV transfers/GDP: half-life of shock and openness5% productivity shock
Transfers vs. Other Instruments
Transfers vs. Other Instruments
Transfers vs. Other Instruments
Transfers vs. Other InstrumentsTransfers: better for more persistent shocks, more closed economies, more sticky prices, fraction of HtM improves for more transitory shocks and more flexible prices
Capital controls: better for more transitory shock, more closed economies, more flexible prices
Government spending: less sensitive to persistence, openness, stickiness, HtM
Redistribution and deficits: only with fraction of HtM, better for more transitory shocks, more closed economies, more flexible prices
Baseline calibration: transfers dominate all other instruments
ConclusionSpecial argument for fiscal unions in currency unions
Key determinants of optimal insurance arrangementasymmetrypersistenceopennessfinancial constraints (HtM)
Baseline calibration: transfers dominate domestic fiscal policy and capital controls