Fixed Term Ee Juris

8/3/2019 Fixed Term Ee Juris

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Sometime in August 2000, respondent was charged with violating AMAs

Employees Conduct and Discipline provided in its Orientation Handbook

(Handbook),[7] as follows:

1) leaking of test questions;

2) failure to monitor general requirements vital to the operations of thecompany; and

3) gross inefficiency.

In a Memorandum[8] dated August 29, 2000, respondent refuted the charges

against him. Thereafter, respondent was placed on preventive suspension from

September 8, 2000 to October 10, 2000. Notices[9] of Investigation were sent to

respondent. Eventually, on September 29, 2000, respondent was informed of his

dismissal, to wit:

Dear Mr. Austria[,]

Please be informed that after a careful deliberation on the case filed against youand upon serious consideration of the evidences (sic) presented, the Management

has found you guilty of violating the following policies:

A. Loss of trust and confidence by management due to gross inefficiency.

(5.21 Very Serious/Grave Offense)

B. Failure to monitor general requirements vital to the operations of the

company.

(5.10 Medium Offense)

C.Leaking of test questions.(4.17 Very Serious/Grave Offense)

This resulted to the loss of trust and confidence in your credibility as a company

officer holding a highly sensitive position. In view of this, your services as Dean of

AMA Paraaque is hereby terminated effective immediately.

You are hereby instructed to report to the branch HR Personnel for further

instructions. Please bear in mind that as a company policy you are required to

accomplish your clearance and turn over all documents and responsibilities to the

appropriate officers.

You are barred from entering the company premises unless with clearance from the

HRD.[10]

On October 27, 2000, respondent filed a Complaint[11] for Illegal Dismissal, Illegal

Suspension, Non-Payment of Salary and 13th Month Pay with prayer for Damages


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and Attorney's Fees against AMA and the rest of the petitioners. Trial on the merits

ensued.

The Labor Arbiter's Ruling

In his Decision[12] dated December 6, 2000, the Labor Arbiter held that petitionersaccorded respondent due process. The Labor Arbiter however, also held that

respondent substantially refuted the charges of gross inefficiency, incompetence,

and leaking of test questions filed against him. But since respondent can no longer

be reinstated beyond September 17, 2000 as his designation as college dean was

only until such date, respondent should instead be paid his compensation and

transportation allowance for the period from September 8, 2000 to September 17,

2000, or the salary and benefits withheld prior thereto. Thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered orderingrespondent AMA Computer College, Paraaque to pay complainants proportionate

salary for the period beginning 8 September 2000 to 17 September 2000.

P30,000 x 10/30 days = P10,000.00 and his proportionate transportation

allowance.

P1,560.00 x 10/30 days = P520.00 and the salary/benefits withheld prior to 8

September 2000, if any.

All other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.Aggrieved, respondent appealed the said Decision to the NLRC.[13]

The NLRC's Ruling

On March 31, 2003, the NLRC, in its Decision,[14] found merit in respondent's

appeal. The NLRC opined that the petitioners did not contravene respondent's

allegation that he had attained regular status after

serving the three (3)-month probationary period required under the Handbook.[15]

Thus, while the NLRC sustained the Labor Arbiter's finding that petitioners failed to

establish the grounds for respondent's dismissal, it held that the Labor Arbiter erredin declaring that respondent's appointment was only from April 24 to September

17, 2000. Accordingly, the NLRC declared that respondent was a regular employee

and that he was illegally dismissed. Nevertheless, the NLRC held that reinstatement

would not promote industrial harmony; hence, the NLRC disposed of the case in

this wise:


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PREMISES CONSIDERED the Decision of December 6, 2000 is VACATED and anew one entered declaring complainant illegally dismissed. Respondents are

directed to pay complainant separation pay computed at one (1) month per year of

service in addition to full backwages from September 29, 2000 until December 6,

2000, or in the amount of one hundred thousand three hundred seventy eight-

pesos & 80/100 (P100,378.80).

SO ORDERED.[16]

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[17] assailing respondent's regular

status, which the NLRC in a Resolution,[18] denied for having been filed out of time

and for lack of merit. Respondent also filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,[19]

which the NLRC, in another Resolution,[20] denied for lack of merit.

Thus, petitioners went to the CA via Petition for Certiorari[21] under Rule 65 of the

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

The CA's Ruling

On March 29, 2004, the CA held that based on the Handbook and on respondent's

appointment, it can be inferred that respondent was a regular employee, and as

such, his employment can only be terminated for any of the causes provided under

Article 282[22] of the Labor Code and after observance of the requirements of due

process. Furthermore, the CA upheld the Labor Arbiters and the NLRCs similar

findings that respondent sufficiently rebutted the charges against him and that

petitioners failed to prove the grounds for respondent's dismissal. The dispositive

portion of the said Decision reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSEand DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the NLRC is AFFIRMED withMODIFICATION as above stated, with regard to the computation of backwages.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[23] of the said Decision, which the CA

denied, in its Resolution[24] dated June 11, 2004, for lack of merit.

Hence, this Petition based on the sole ground that the CA committed serious error

of law in affirming and then further modifying the erroneous decision of the NLRC

declaring that herein respondent was illegally dismissed by AMA.[25]

Petitioners argue that respondent, as college dean, was an academic personnel of

AMA under Section 4(m) (4)(c) of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools[26]

(Manual) and, as such, his probationary employment is governed by Section 92[27]

thereof and not by the Labor Code or AMA's Handbook; that under the

circumstances, respondent has not yet attained the status of a regular employee;


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that respondent's employment was for a fixed term as found by the Labor Arbiter

but the same was terminated earlier due to just causes; that the respondent,

whether he may be considered as a probationary or a regular employee, was

dismissed for just causes; and that the award of backwages in favor of the

respondent, up to the finality of the decision, is oppressive to the petitioners,

considering the absence of an order of reinstatement and the respondent's fixedperiod of employment.[28]

On the other hand, respondent counters that both the NLRC and the CA found that

respondent was a regular employee and that he was illegally dismissed; that the

instant Petition raises questions of fact - such as whether or not respondent is a

regular employee and whether or not circumstances existed warranting his

dismissal - which can no longer be inquired into by

this Court;[29] that petitioners assailed the regular status of the respondent for the

first time only before the CA; that they never raised as issue respondent's regularstatus before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC because they merely concentrated on

their stand that respondent was lawfully dismissed; that petitioners failed to

discharge the burden of proving the existence of a valid ground in dismissing

respondent as found by the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the CA; and that the CA's

award of backwages from the date of actual dismissal up to the date of the finality

of the decision in favor of the respondent is consonant with Article 279[30] of the

Labor Code, and hence, valid.[31]

From this exchange of arguments, we glean two ultimate questions that require

resolution, viz.:

1. What is the nature of respondent's employment?

2. Was he lawfully dismissed?

The first question, i.e., whether respondent is a regular, probationary, or fixed term

employee is essentially factual in nature.[32] However, the Court opts to resolve this

question due to the far-reaching effects it could bring to the sector of the academe.

As an exception to the general rule, we held in Molina v. Pacific Plans, Inc.: [33]

A disharmony between the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the National

Labor Relations Commission opens the door to a review thereof by this Court.

Factual findings of administrative agencies are not infallible and will be set aside

when they fail the test of arbitrariness. Moreover, when the findings of the National

Labor Relations Commission contradict those of the Labor Arbiter, this Court, in the

exercise of its equity jurisdiction, may look into the records of the case and

reexamine the questioned findings.


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The instant case falls squarely within the aforesaid exception. The Labor Arbiter

held that, while petitioners did not prove the existence of just causes in order to

warrant respondent's dismissal, the latter's employment as dean ceased to exist

upon expiration of respondent's term of employment on September 17, 2000. In

sum, the Labor Arbiter held that the nature of respondent's employment is one for

a fixed term. On the other hand, the NLRC and the CA both held that respondent isa regular employee because respondent had fully served the three (3)-month

probationary period required in the Handbook, which the petitioners failed to deny

or contravene in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter.

Prior to his dismissal, respondent held the position of college dean. The letter of

appointment states that he was officially confirmed as Dean of AMA College,

Paraaque, effective from April 17, 2000 to September 17, 2000. Petitioners submit

that the nature of respondent's employment as dean is one with a fixed term.

We agree.

We held that Article 280 of the Labor Code does not proscribe or prohibit an

employment contract with a fixed period. Even if the duties of the employee consist

of activities necessary or desirable in the usual business of the employer, the

parties are free to agree on a fixed period

of time for the performance of such activities. There is nothing essentially

contradictory between a definite period of employment and the nature of the

employees duties.[34]

Thus, this Court's ruling in Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora[35] is instructive:

The question immediately provoked. . . is whether or not a voluntary agreement on

a fixed term or period would be valid where the employee "has been engaged to

perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or

trade of the employer." The definition seems non sequitur. From the premise

that the duties of an employee entail "activities which are usually necessary or

desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer" the conclusion does not

necessarily follow that the employer and employee should be forbidden to stipulate

any period of time for the performance of those activities. There is nothingessentially contradictory between a definite period of an employment contract and

the nature of the employee's duties set down in that contract as being "usually

necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer." The concept

of the employee's duties as being "usually necessary or desirable in the usual

business or trade of the employer" is not synonymous with or identical to

employment with a fixed term. Logically, the decisive determinant in term

employment should not be the activities that the employee is called upon to


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perform, but the day certain agreed upon by the parties for the commencement

and termination of their employment relationship, a day certain being understood

to be "that which must necessarily come, although it may not be known when."

Seasonal employment, and employment for a particular project are merely

instances of employment in which a period, where not expressly set down, is

necessarily implied.

x x x x x x x x x

Some familiar examples may be cited of employment contracts which may be

neither for seasonal work nor for specific projects, but to which a fixed term isan essential and natural appurtenance: overseas employment contracts, forone, to which, whatever the nature of the engagement, the concept of regular

employment with all that it implies does not appear ever to have been applied,

Article 280 of the Labor Code notwithstanding; also appointments to the

positions of dean, assistant dean, college secretary, principal, and otheradministrative offices in educational institutions, which are by practice ortradition rotated among the faculty members, and where fixed terms are anecessity without which no reasonable rotation would be possible . . . .x x x

The instant case involves respondent's position as dean, and comes within the

purview of the Brent School doctrine.

First.The letter of appointment was clear. Respondent was confirmed as Dean of

AMA College, Paraaque, effective from April 17, 2000 to September 17, 2000. In

numerous cases decided by this Court, we had taken notice, that by way of practiceand tradition, the position of dean is normally an employment for a fixed term.[36]

Although it does not appear on record and neither was it alleged by any of the

parties that respondent, other than holding the position of dean, concurrently

occupied a teaching position, it can be deduced from the last paragraph of said

letter that the respondent shall be considered for a faculty position in the event he

gives up his deanship or fails to meet AMA's standards. Such provision reasonably

serves the intention set forth in Brent School that the deanship may be rotated

among the other members of the faculty.

Second. The fact that respondent did not sign the letter of appointment is of nomoment. We held in Brent School, to wit:

Accordingly, and since the entire purpose behind the development of legislation

culminating in the present Article 280 of the Labor Code clearly appears to have

been, as already observed, to prevent circumvention of the employee's right to be

secure in his tenure, the clause in said article indiscriminately and completely ruling

out all written or oral agreements conflicting with the concept of regular


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employment as defined therein should be construed to refer to the substantive evil

that the Code itself has singled out: agreements entered into precisely to

circumvent security of tenure. It should have no application to instanceswhere a fixed period of employment was agreed upon knowingly andvoluntarily by the parties, without any force, duress or improper pressure

being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any othercircumstances vitiating his consent, or where it satisfactorily appears thatthe employer and employee dealt with each other on more or less equalterms with no moral dominance whatever being exercised by the formerover the latter. Unless, thus, limited in its purview, the law would be made toapply to purposes other than those explicitly stated by its framers; it thus becomes

pointless and arbitrary, unjust in its effects and apt to lead to absurd and

unintended consequences.[37]

The fact that respondent voluntarily accepted the employment, assumed the

position, and performed the functions of dean is clear indication that he knowingly

and voluntarily consented to the terms and conditions of the appointment, including

the fixed period of his deanship. Other than the handwritten notes made in the

letter of appointment, no evidence was ever presented to show that respondents

consent was vitiated, or that respondent objected to the said appointment or to any

of its conditions. Furthermore, in his status as dean, there can be no valid inference

that he was shackled by any form of moral dominance exercised by AMA and the

rest of the petitioners.

Alternatively, petitioners also claim that respondent did not attain regular status,

relying on Section 92 of the Manualin connection with Section 4(m) 4(c) thereof

which provides for a three (3)-year probationary period for Academic Personnel.Petitioners submit that the position of dean is included in the provision school

officials responsible for academic matters, and may include other school officials.

As such, petitioners aver that the three (3)-month probationary period for officers

set forth in the Handbook is not applicable to the case of respondent.

The Handbook merely provides for two classes of employees for purposes of

permanency, i.e., Faculty and Non-Academic. However, the same does not

specifically classify the position of dean as part of the Faculty or of the Non-

Academic personnel. At this juncture, we find solace in the Manual of Regulations

for Private Schools Annotated,[38] which provides that the college dean is the seniorofficer responsible for the operation of an academic program, the enforcement of

rules and regulations, and the supervision of faculty and student services. We

already had occasion to state that the position of dean is primarily academic[39] and,

as such, he is considered a managerial employee.[40] Yet, a perusal of the Handbook

yields the interpretation that the provision on the permanency of Faculty members

applies to teachers only. But the Handbook or school manual must yield to the


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decree of the Manual, the latter having the character of law.[41] The specified

probationary periods in Section 92 of the Manualare the maximum periods; under

certain conditions, regular status may be achieved by the employee in less time.[42]

However, under the given circumstances and the fact that the position of dean in

this case is for a fixed term, the issue whether the respondent attained a regular

status is not in point. By the same token, the application of the provision in theManualas to the required probationary period is misplaced. It can be well said that

a tenured status of employment co-exists and is co-terminous only with the definite

term fixed in the contract of employment.

In light of the foregoing disquisition, the resolution of the second question requires

full cognizance of respondents fixed term of employment and all the effects

thereof. It is axiomatic that a contract of employment for a definite period

terminates on its own force at the end of such period.[43] The lack of notice of

termination is of no consequence because when the contract specifies the length of

its duration, it comes to an end upon the expiration of such period.[44]

Thus, the unanimous finding of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA that

respondent adequately refuted all the charges against him assumes relevance only

insofar as respondents dismissal from the service was effected by petitioners

before expiration of the fixed period of employment. True, petitioners erred in

dismissing the respondent, acting on the mistaken belief that respondent was liable

for the charges leveled against him. But respondent also cannot claim entitlement

to any benefit flowing from such employment after September 17, 2000, because

the employment, which is the source of the benefits, had, by then, already ceased

to exist.

Finally, while this Court adheres to the principle of social justice and protection to

labor, the constitutional policy to provide such protection to labor is not meant to

be an instrument to oppress employers. The commitment under the fundamental

law is that the cause of labor does not prevent us from sustaining the employer

when the law is clearly on its side.[45]

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED and the CA Decision in CA-G.R. SPNo. 78455 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter, dated

December 6, 2000, is hereby REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario, and Reyes, JJ.,

concur.


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[1] Dated July 8, 2004, rollo, pp. 3-25.

[2] Particularly docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 78455, penned by Associate Justice Juan

Q. Enriquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios (deceased) and

Fernanda Lampas-Peralta, concurring; id. at 27-33.

[3] Particularly docketed as NLRC NCR CA No. 030561-02; id. at 57-63.

[4] Also referred to as Rolando S. Austria in a Memorandum dated August 22, 2000;

id. at 78.

[5] Memorandum dated April 15, 2000; id. at 79.

[6] Supra note 4.

[7]Rollo, pp. 105-106.

[8] CA rollo, p. 84.

[9]Rollo, pp. 108-109.

[10] Letter addressed to respondent by one Edwin Santos, Senior Manager for

Human Resources of AMA; id. at 110.

[11]

Particularly docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 30-10-04319-00; records, p. 1.

[12]Rollo, pp. 68-73.

[13] Dated January 7, 2002; id. at 74-77.

[14] Supra note 3.

[15]Rollo, pp. 80-82.

[16]

Id. at 62.

[17] Dated May 12, 2003; id. at 83-89.

[18] Dated May 30, 2003; id. at 65-66.

[19] Dated April 29, 2003; id. at 90-91.


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[20] Dated June 30, 2003, records, pp. 175-176.

[21] Dated August 7, 2003, CA rollo, pp. 2-19.

[22] ART. 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an

employment for any of the following causes:

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful

orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;

(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his

employer or duly authorized representative;

(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of

his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized

representative; and

(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.[23] Dated April 19, 2004; rollo, pp. 153-161.

[24] Id. at 36.

[25] Petitioners' Memorandum dated July 28, 2006, rollo, pp. 201-224.

[26] Section 4. Definition of Terms. Except as otherwise provided, the terms below

shall be construed as follows:

x x x x

(m) Members of the school community refers to the general membership of

every private school established in accordance with law and duly authorized

by the Department to operate certain educational programs or courses. The

term includes, either singly or collectively, the following:

x x x x

(4) School personnel means the persons, singly or collectively, working in a

private school. They are classified as follows:

x x x x

(c) Academic personnel includes all school personnel who are formally

engaged in actual teaching service or in research assignments, either onfull-time or part-time basis, as well as those who possess certain prescribed

academic functions directly supportive of teaching, such as registrars,

librarians, guidance counselors, researchers, and other similar persons.

They include school officials responsible for academic matters, and may

include other school officials.

x x x x


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[27] Section 92. Probationary Period. Subject in all instances to compliance with

Department and school requirements, the probationary period for academic

personnel shall not be more than three (3) consecutive years of satisfactory service

for those in the elementary and secondary levels, six (6) consecutive regular

semesters of satisfactory service for those in the tertiary level, and nine (9)

consecutive trimesters of satisfactory service for those in the tertiary level wherecollegiate courses are offered on the trimester basis.

[28] Supra note 25.

[29] Respondent's Comment dated August 9, 2005; rollo, pp. 173-178.

[30] Article 279. Security of tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer

shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when

authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be

entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and tohis full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their

monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from

him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.

[31] Respondent's Memorandum dated August 28, 2006; rollo, pp. 264-272.

[32]ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Nazareno, G.R. No. 164156, September

26, 2006, 503 SCRA 204, 225; Rambuyon v. Fiesta Brands, Inc., G.R. No. 157029,

December 15, 2005, 478 SCRA 133, 141; and Benares v. Pancho, G.R. No. 151827,

April 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 652, 662.

[33] G.R. No. 165476, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 498, 517, citingDiamond Motors

Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 417 SCRA 46, 50 (2003).

[34]St. Theresas School of Novaliches Foundation v. National Labor Relations

Commission, 351 Phil. 1038, 1043 (1998).

[35] G.R. No. 48494, February 5, 1990, 181 SCRA 702, 710 & 714 (Emphasis

supplied).

[36]Aklan College, Inc. and Msgr. Adolfo P. Depra v. Rodolfo P. Guarino, G.R. No.

152949, August 14, 2007; Blancaflor v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R.

No. 101013, February 2, 1993, 218 SCRA 366; La Salette of Santiago, Inc. v.

National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 82918, March 11, 1991, 372 SCRA

89; Escudero v. Office of the President of the Philippines, G.R. No. 57822, April 26,

1989, 172 SCRA 783, 793; Sta. Maria v. Lopez, G.R. No. L- 30773, February 18,

1970, 31 SCRA 637, 655.


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[37] Supra note 35, at 716.

[38] Ulpiano P. Sarmiento III, Esq., First Edition, 1995, p. 164, citing Hawes and

Hawes, The Concise Dictionary of Education, 1982 ed., p. 62.

[39]General Baptist Bible College v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.

85534, March 5, 1993, 219 SCRA 549, 557;Sta. Maria v. Lopez, supra note 36 at

657.

[40]Cainta Catholic School v. Cainta Catholic School Employees Union (CCSEU), G.R.

No. 151021, May 4, 2006, 489 SCRA 468, 490;Cruz v. Medina, G.R. No. 73053,

September 15, 1989, 177 SCRA 565, 571.

[41]Espiritu Santo Parochial School v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.

82325, September 26, 1989, 177 SCRA 802, 807.

[42]Cagayan Capitol Catholic College v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R.

Nos. 90010-11, September 14, 1990, 189 SCRA 658, 665.

[43]Blancaflor v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 36 at 374.

[44]Pangilinan v. General Milling Corporation, G.R. No. 149329, July 12, 2004, 434

SCRA 159, 172.

[45]

Salazar v. Philippine Duplicators, Inc., G.R. No. 154628, December 6, 2006, 510SCRA 288, 308.

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G.R. No. 167714

[ G.R. NO. 167714, March 07, 2007 ]

ROWELL INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HON.COURT OF APPEALS AND JOEL TARIPE, RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This case is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil

Procedure seeking to set aside the Decision[1] and Resolution[2] of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74104, entitled, Rowell Industrial Corp., and/or Edwin

Tang vs. National Labor Relations Commission and Joel Taripe, dated 30 September

2004 and 1 April 2005, respectively, which affirmed the Resolutions[3] of the

National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated 7 June 2002 and 20 August

2002, finding herein respondent Joel Taripe (Taripe) as a regular employee who had

been illegally dismissed from employment by herein petitioner Rowell Industrial

Corp. (RIC), thereby ordering petitioner RIC to reinstate respondent Taripe with full

backwages, subject to the modification of exonerating Edwin Tang, the RIC General

Manager and Vice President, from liability and computing the backwages of herein

respondent Taripe based on the prevailing salary rate at the time of his dismissal.

The NLRC Resolutions reversed the Decision[4] of the Labor Arbiter dated 29

September 2000, which dismissed respondent Taripe's complaint.

Petitioner RIC is a corporation engaged in manufacturing tin cans for use in

packaging of consumer products, e.g., foods, paints, among other things.

Respondent Taripe was employed by petitioner RIC on 8 November 1999 as a

"rectangular power press machine operator" with a salary of P223.50 per day, until

he was allegedly dismissed from his employment by the petitioner on 6 April 2000.

The controversy of the present case arose from the following facts, as summarizedby the NLRC and the Court of Appeals:

On [17 February 2000], [herein respondent Taripe] filed a [C]omplaint against

[herein petitioner RIC] for regularization and payment of holiday pay, as well as

indemnity for severed finger, which was amended on [7 April 2000] to include

illegal dismissal. [Respondent Taripe] alleges that [petitioner RIC] employed him

starting [8 November 1999] as power press machine operator, such position of


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which was occupied by [petitioner RIC's] regular employees and the functions of

which were necessary to the latter's business. [Respondent Taripe] adds that upon

employment, he was made to sign a document, which was not explained to him but

which was made a condition for him to be taken in and for which he was not

furnished a copy. [Respondent Taripe] states that he was not extended full benefits

granted under the law and the [Collective Bargaining Agreement] and that on [6April 2000], while the case for regularization was pending, he was summarily

dismissed from his job although he never violated any of the [petitioner RIC's]

company rules and regulations.

[Petitioner RIC], for [its] part, claim[s] that [respondent Taripe] was a contractual

employee, whose services were required due to the increase in the demand in

packaging requirement of [its] clients for Christmas season and to build up stock

levels during the early part of the following year; that on [6 March 2000],

[respondent Taripe's] employment contract expired. [Petitioner RIC] avers that the

information update for union members, which was allegedly filled up by[respondent Taripe] and submitted by the Union to [petitioner] company, it is

stated therein that in the six (6) companies where [respondent Taripe] purportedly

worked, the latter's reason for leaving was "finished contract," hence, [respondent

Taripe] has knowledge about being employed by contract contrary to his allegation

that the document he was signing was not explained to him. [Petitioner RIC]

manifest[s] that all benefits, including those under the [Social Security System],

were given to him on [12 May 2000].[5]

On 29 September 2000, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision dismissing

respondent Taripe's Complaint based on a finding that he was a contractual

employee whose contract merely expired. The dispositive portion of the saidDecision reads, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring thiscomplaint of [herein respondent Taripe] against [herein petitioner RIC] and Mr.

Edwin Tang for illegal dismissal DISMISSED for lack of merit. However, on groundof compassionate justice, [petitioner RIC and Mr. Edwin Tang] are hereby ordered

to pay [respondent Taripe] the sum of PHP5,811.00 or one month's salary as

financial assistance and holiday pay in the sum of PHP894.00, as well as attorney's

fees of 10% based on holiday pay (Article 110, Labor Code).[6]

Aggrieved, respondent Taripe appealed before the NLRC. In a Resolution dated 7

June 2002, the NLRC granted the appeal filed by respondent Taripe and declaredthat his employment with the petitioner was regular in status; hence, his dismissal

was illegal. The decretal portion of the said Resolution reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, [herein respondent Taripe's] appeal isGRANTED. The Labor Arbiter's [D]ecision in the above-entitled case is herebyREVERSED. It is hereby declared that [respondent Taripe's] employment with[herein petitioner RIC and Mr. Edwin Tang] is regular in status and that he was

illegally dismissed therefrom.


16/36

[Petitioner RIC and Mr. Edwin Tang] are hereby ordered to reinstate [respondent

Taripe] and to jointly and severally pay him full backwages from the time he was

illegally dismissed up to the date of his actual reinstatement, less the amount of

P1,427.67. The award of P894.00 for holiday pay is AFFIRMED but the award of

P5,811.00 for financial assistance is deleted. The award for attorney's fees ishereby adjusted to ten percent (10%) of [respondent Taripe's] total monetary

award.[7]

Dissatisfied, petitioner RIC moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid

Resolution but it was denied in the Resolution of the NLRC dated 20 August 2002.

Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorariunder Rule 65 of the 1997

Revised Rules of Civil Procedure before the Court of Appeals with the following

assignment of errors:

I. THE [NLRC] GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND IS IN EXCESS OF ITS

JURISDICTION WHEN IT MISINTERPRETED ARTICLE 280 OF THE LABOR CODE ANDIGNORED JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT DECIDED THAT [RESPONDENT TARIPE] IS A

REGULAR EMPLOYEE AND THUS, ILLEGALLY DISMISSED.

II. THE [NLRC] GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND IS IN EXCESS OF ITS

JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED [EDWIN TANG] TO (sic) JOINTLY AND

SEVERALLY LIABLE FOR MONETARY CLAIMS OF [RESPONDEN TARIPE].

III. THE [NLRC] GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND IS IN EXCESS OF ITS

JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED PAYMENT OF MONETARY CLAIMS COMPUTED

ON AN ERRONEOUS WAGE RATE.[8]

The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision on 30 September 2004,

affirming the Resolution of the NLRC dated 7 June 2002, with modifications. Thus, it

disposed -

WHEREFORE, the Resolutions dated [7 June 2002] and [20 August 2002] of [theNLRC] are affirmed, subject to the modification that [Edwin Tang] is exonerated

from liability and the computation of backwages of [respondent Taripe] shall be

based on P223.50, the last salary he received.[9]

A Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision was filed by petitioner RIC,

but the same was denied for lack of merit in a Resolution[10] of the Court of Appeals

dated 1 April 2005.

Hence, this Petition.

Petitioner RIC comes before this Court with the lone issue of whether the Court of

Appeals misinterpreted Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, andignored jurisprudence when it affirmed that respondent Taripe was a regular

employee and was illegally dismissed.


17/36

Petitioner RIC, in its Memorandum,[11] argues that the Court of Appeals had

narrowly interpreted Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, and disregarded a

contract voluntarily entered into by the parties.

Petitioner RIC emphasizes that while an employee's status of employment is vestedby law pursuant to Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, said provision of law

admits of two exceptions, to wit: (1) those employments which have been fixed for

a specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been

determined at the time of the engagement of the employment; and (2) when the

work or services to be performed are seasonal; hence, the employment is for the

duration of the season. Thus, there are certain forms of employment which entail

the performance of usual and desirable functions and which exceed one year but do

not necessarily qualify as regular employment under Article 280 of the Labor Code,

as amended.

The Petition is unmeritorious.

A closer examination of Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, is imperative to

resolve the issue raised in the present case.

In declaring that respondent Taripe was a regular employee of the petitioner and,

thus, his dismissal was illegal, the Court of Appeals ratiocinated in this manner:

In determining the employment status of [herein respondent Taripe], reference

must be made to Article 280 of the Labor Code, which provides:

x x x x

Thus, there are two kinds of regular employees, namely: (1) those who are

engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual

business or trade of the employer; and (2) those who have rendered at least one

year of service, whether continuous or broken, with respect to the activity in which

they are employed. [Respondent Taripe] belonged to the first category of regular

employees.

The purported contract of employment providing that [respondent Taripe] was hiredas contractual employee for five (5) months only, cannot prevail over the

undisputed fact that [respondent Taripe] was hired to perform the function of power

press operator, a function necessary or desirable in [petitioner's] business of

manufacturing tin cans. [Herein petitioner RIC's] contention that the four (4)

months length of service of [respondent Taripe] did not grant him a regular status

is inconsequential, considering that length of service assumes importance only

when the activity in which the employee has been engaged to perform is not


18/36

necessary or desirable to the usual business or trade of the employer.

As aptly ruled by [the NLRC]:

"In the instant case, there is no doubt that [respondent Taripe], as power press

operator, has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary ordesirable in [petitioner RIC's] usual business or trade of manufacturing of tin cans

for use in packaging of food, paint and others. We also find that [respondent

Taripe] does not fall under any of the abovementioned exceptions. Other that (sic)

[petitioner RIC's] bare allegation thereof, [it] failed to present any evidence to

prove that he was employed for a fixed or specific project or undertaking the

completion of which has been determined at the time of his engagement or that

[respondent Taripe's] services are seasonal in nature and that his employment was

for the duration of the season."[12]

Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:

ART. 280. REGULAR AND CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. -The provisions of writtenagreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of

the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has

been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the

usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has beenfixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which

has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the

work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for

the duration of the season.

An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the precedingparagraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of

service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular

employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment

shall continue while such activity exists. [Emphasis supplied]

The aforesaid Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, classifies employees into

three categories, namely: (1) regular employees or those whose work isnecessary or desirable to the usual business of the employer; (2) projectemployees or those whose employment has been fixed for a specific project orundertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at the

time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to beperformed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the

season; and (3) casual employees or those who are neither regular nor projectemployees.[13]

Regular employees are further classified into: (1) regular employees by nature of

work; and (2) regular employees by years of service.[14] The former refers to those

employees who perform a particular activity which is necessary or desirable in the


19/36

usual business or trade of the employer, regardless of their length of service; while

the latter refers to those employees who have been performing the job, regardless

of the nature thereof, for at least a year.[15]

The aforesaid Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, however, does not

proscribe or prohibit an employment contract with a fixed period. It does notnecessarily follow that where the duties of the employee consist of activities usually

necessary or desirable in the usual business of the employer, the parties are

forbidden from agreeing on a period of time for the performance of such activities.

There is nothing essentially contradictory between a definite period of employment

and the nature of the employee's duties.[16] What Article 280 of the Labor Code, as

amended, seeks to prevent is the practice of some unscrupulous and covetous

employers who wish to circumvent the law that protects lowly workers from

capricious dismissal from their employment. The aforesaid provision, however,

should not be interpreted in such a way as to deprive employers of the right and

prerogative to choose their own workers if they have sufficient basis to refuse anemployee a regular status. Management has rights which should also be protected.[17]

In the case at bar, respondent Taripe signed a contract of employment prior to his

admission into the petitioner's company. Said contract of employment provides,

among other things:

4. That my employment shall be contractual for the period of five (5) months which

means that the end of the said period, I can (sic) discharged unless this contract is

renewed by mutual consent or terminated for cause.[18]

Based on the said contract, respondent Taripe's employment with the petitioner isgood only for a period of five months unless the said contract is renewed by mutual

consent. And as claimed by petitioner RIC, respondent Taripe, along with its other

contractual employees, was hired only to meet the increase in demand for

packaging materials during the Christmas season and also to build up stock levels

during the early part of the year.

Although Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, does not forbid fixed term

employment, it must, nevertheless, meet any of the following guidelines in order

that it cannot be said to circumvent security of tenure: (1) that the fixed period of

employment was knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties, without anyforce, duress or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and

absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent; or (2) it satisfactorily appears

that the employer and employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms

with no moral dominance whatever being exercised by the former on the latter.[19]

In the present case, it cannot be denied that the employment contract signed by

respondent Taripe did not mention that he was hired only for a specific undertaking,


20/36

the completion of which had been determined at the time of his engagement. The

said employment contract neither mentioned that respondent Taripe's services were

seasonal in nature and that his employment was only for the duration of the

Christmas season as purposely claimed by petitioner RIC. What was stipulated in

the said contract was that respondent Taripe's employment was contractual for the

period of five months.

Likewise, as the NLRC mentioned in its Resolution, to which the Court of Appeals

agreed, other than the bare allegations of petitioner RIC that respondent Taripe

was hired only because of the increase in the demand for packaging materials

during the Christmas season, petitioner RIC failed to substantiate such claim with

any other evidence. Petitioner RIC did not present any evidence which might prove

that respondent Taripe was employed for a fixed or specific project or that his

services were seasonal in nature.

Also, petitioner RIC failed to controvert the claim of respondent Taripe that he wasmade to sign the contract of employment, prepared by petitioner RIC, as a

condition for his hiring. Such contract in which the terms are prepared by only one

party and the other party merely affixes his signature signifying his adhesion

thereto is called contract of adhesion.[20] It is an agreement in which the partiesbargaining are not on equal footing, the weaker party's participation being reduced

to the alternative "to take it or leave it."[21] In the present case, respondent Taripe,

in need of a job, was compelled to agree to the contract, including the five-month

period of employment, just so he could be hired. Hence, it cannot be argued that

respondent Taripe signed the employment contract with a fixed term of five months

willingly and with full knowledge of the impact thereof.

With regard to the second guideline, this Court agrees with the Court of Appeals

that petitioner RIC and respondent Taripe cannot be said to have dealt with each

other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance exercised by the

former over the latter. As a power press operator, a rank and file employee, he can

hardly be on equal terms with petitioner RIC. As the Court of Appeals said, "almost

always, employees agree to any terms of an employment contract just to get

employed considering that it is difficult to find work given their ordinary

qualifications."[22]

Therefore, for failure of petitioner RIC to comply with the necessary guidelines for a

valid fixed term employment contract, it can be safely stated that the aforesaid

contract signed by respondent Taripe for a period of five months was a mere

subterfuge to deny to the latter a regular status of employment.

Settled is the rule that the primary standard of determining regular employment is

the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the


21/36

employee in relation to the casual business or trade of the employer. The

connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and

its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety.[23]

Given the foregoing, this Court agrees in the findings of the Court of Appeals and

the NLRC that, indeed, respondent Taripe, as a rectangular power press machineoperator, in charge of manufacturing covers for "four liters rectangular tin cans,"

was holding a position which is necessary and desirable in the usual business or

trade of petitioner RIC, which was the manufacture of tin cans. Therefore,

respondent Taripe was a regular employee of petitioner RIC by the nature of work

he performed in the company.

Respondent Taripe does not fall under the exceptions mentioned in Article 280 of

the Labor Code, as amended, because it was not proven by petitioner RIC that he

was employed only for a specific project or undertaking or his employment was

merely seasonal. Similarly, the position and function of power press operatorcannot be said to be merely seasonal. Such position cannot be considered as only

needed for a specific project or undertaking because of the very nature of the

business of petitioner RIC. Indeed, respondent Taripe is a regular employee of

petitioner RIC and as such, he cannot be dismissed from his employment unless

there is just or authorized cause for his dismissal.

Well-established is the rule that regular employees enjoy security of tenure and

they can only be dismissed for just cause and with due process, notice and hearing.[24] And in case of employees' dismissal, the burden is on the employer to prove that

the dismissal was legal. Thus, respondent Taripe's summary dismissal, not beingbased on any of the just or authorized causes enumerated under Articles 282,[25]

283,[26] and 284[27] of the Labor Code, as amended, is illegal.

Before concluding, we once more underscore the settled precept that factual

findings of the NLRC, having deemed to acquire expertise in matters within its

jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but finality especially when

such factual findings are affirmed by the Court of Appeals;[28] hence, such factual

findings are binding on this Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. TheDecision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 and 1April 2005, respectively, which affirmed with modification the Resolutions of the

NLRC dated 7 June 2002 and 20 August 2002, respectively, finding herein

respondent Taripe as a regular employee who had been illegally dismissed from

employment by petitioner RIC, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitionerRIC.


22/36

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, and Nachura, JJ., concur.

Callejo, Sr., J., on leave.

[1] Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta with Associate Justices

Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Josefina Guevara-Salonga, concurring, rollo, pp. 17-

27.

[2] Id. at 28.

[3] Penned by Commissioner Victoriano R. Calaycay with Presiding Commissioner

Raul T. Aquino and Commissioner Angelita A. Gacutan, concurring, id. at 36-48;

NLRC Records, pp. 147-148.

[4] Penned by Labor Arbiter Natividad M. Roma, id. at 29-35.

[5] Id. at 18-19.

[6] Id. at 35.

[7] Id. at 45-46.

[8]

Id. at 21.

[9] Id. at 26.

[10] Supra note 2.

[11]Rollo, pp. 98-104.

[12] Id. at 22-23.

[13]Pangilinan vs. General Milling Corporation, G.R. No. 149329, 12 July 2004, 434

SCRA 159, 169.

[14]E. Ganzon, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 123769, 22

December 1999, 321 SCRA 434, 440.

[15]Pangilinan vs. General Milling Corporation, supra note 13 at 169-170.


23/36

[16] Id. at 170.

[17]Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 106654, 16 December 1994,

239 SCRA 272, 279.

[18] CA rollo, p. 27.

[19]Philippine National Oil Co.-Energy Dev't. Corp. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 97747, 31

March 1993, 220 SCRA 695, 699.

[20]Fabrigas vs. San Francisco del Monte, Inc., G.R. No. 152346, 25 November

2005, 476 SCRA 247, 263.

[21]Qua Chee Gan vs. Law Union and Rock Insurance Co., Ltd., 98 Phil. 85, 95

(1955).

[22]Rollo, p. 25.

[23] Lopez vs. Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, G.R. No. 154472, 30

June 2005, 462 SCRA 428, 453.

[24] Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation vs. Angara, G.R. No. 142937, 15

November 2005, 475 SCRA 41, 61.

[25]

ART. 282. TERMINATION BY EMPLOYER. - An employer may terminate anemployment for any of the following causes.

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders

of his employer or representative in connection with his work;


(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his

employer or duly authorized representatives;

(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his

employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized

representative; and

Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

[26] ART. 283. CLOSURE OF ESTABLISHMENT AND REDUCTION OF PERSONNEL. -

The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the

installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or

the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the


24/36

closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a

written notice on the worker and the Ministry of Labor and Employment [now

Secretary of Labor] at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In

case of termination due to the installation of labor saving devices or redundancy,

the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at

least one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service,whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of

closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to

serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent

to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of

service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be

considered as one (1) whole year.

[27] ART. 284. DISEASE AS GROUND FOR TERMINATION. - An employer may

terminate the services of an employee who has been found to be suffering from any

disease and whose continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial tohis health as well as to the health of his co-employees: Provided, That he is paid

separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month salary or to one-half (1/2)

month salary for every year of service, whichever is greater, a fraction of at least

six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year.

[28]Land and Housing Development Corporation vs. Esquillo, G.R. No. 152012, 30

September 2005, 471 SCRA 488, 494.






G.R. No. 148102


25/36

[ G.R. NO. 148102, July 11, 2006 ]

BERNARDINO LABAYOG, CRESENCIO GRANZORE, JEANETTEGONZALES, NOEME DADIZ, GEMMA PANGANIBAN, DALISAY

BUENVIAJE, VICTORIANA RUEDAS, MA. VICTORIACABALONG, AMALIA SALVARRI, ROWENA FERNANDEZ, DELIALOZARES, LUNINGNING ANGELES, ROSEMARIE SALES,VIVIAN VERZOSA, MARILYN JOSE, ROSANNA ROLDAN,

HERMINIO CARANTO, ANITA SALVADOR, JORGE SALAMAT,ROBERTO ODIAMAR, EFREN LACAMPUINGAN, NOEL

TAGALOG, MARCOS DE LA CRUZ, ELIAS BELO, DARIUSEROLES, HELEN BARAYUGA,[1] CRISTOPHER HILARIO, JOEL

ESGUERRA, BERNABE DUCUT, JOSEPH TANAUY, EDWIN CEA,NOEL VILLASCA, ERNESTO ALFONSO, FERNANDO CEBU AND

REYNALDO SESBRENO,[2] PETITIONERS, VS. M.Y. SANBISCUITS, INC. AND MEW WAH LIM, RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N

CORONA, J.:

The subject of this petition for review on certiorari is the resolution[3] of the Court of

Appeals (CA) dated January 31, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 51390, the dispositive

portion of which read:

WHEREFORE, private respondents' motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. Thedecision of this court, promulgated [on] September 12, 2000, is REVERSED andSET ASIDE. The decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dated August22, 1997 and its resolution dated November 24, 1997 are hereby AFFIRMED. Nocosts.

At the outset, this petition should have been denied for lack of proper verification

and certification of non-forum shopping. Of the 35 petitioners, only Bernardino

Labayog, Luningning Angeles and Rosanna Roldan signed.[4] But even if, in the

exercise of its discretion and in the interest of substantial justice, this Court grants

a liberal interpretation of the rules on verification and certification of non-forum

shopping, this petition should nonetheless fail for lack of merit.

The facts follow.

On various dates in 1992, petitioners entered into contracts of employment with

respondent company as mixers, packers and machine operators for a fixed term.


26/36

On the expiration of their contracts, their services were terminated. Forthwith, they

each executed a quitclaim.

On April 15, 1993, petitioners filed complaints for illegal dismissal, underpayment of

wages, non-payment of overtime, night differential and 13th month pay, damages

and attorney's fees. The labor arbiter ruled their dismissal to be illegal[5] on theground that they had become regular employees who performed duties necessary

and desirable in respondent company's business. The labor arbiter ordered the

reinstatement of petitioners with award of backwages, 13th month pay and service

incentive leave pay. The claim for moral and exemplary damages was denied for

failure to establish bad faith on the part of respondents. All other claims were

likewise denied.

On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), the decision of the

labor arbiter was set aside.[6] Having entered into their employment contracts freely

and voluntarily, they knew that their employment was only for a fixed period andwould end on the prescribed expiration date. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration

was denied.[7]

In a petition for certiorari filed by petitioners, the CA set aside the NLRC decision

and reinstated the decision of the labor arbiter.[8] However, on respondents' motion

for reconsideration, the CA reversed itself. The CA reasoned that, while petitioners

performed tasks which were necessary and desirable in the usual business of

respondent company, their employment contracts providing for a fixed term

remained valid. No force, duress, intimidation or moral dominance was exerted on

them. Respondents dealt with petitioners in good faith and within the validparameters of management prerogatives.[9] Petitioners' motion for reconsideration

was denied.[10] Hence, this recourse.

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

The Labor Code states:

Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written agreement to

the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties,

an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been

engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usualbusiness of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a

specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been

determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or

services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the

duration of the season.

Where the duties of the employee consist of activities which are necessary or

desirable in the usual business of the employer, the parties are not prohibited from


27/36

agreeing on the duration of employment. Article 280 does not proscribe or prohibit

an employment contract with a fixed period[11] provided it is not intended to

circumvent the security of tenure.

Two criteria validate a contract of employment with a fixed period: (1) the fixed

period of employment was knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the partieswithout any force, duress or improper pressure being brought to bear on the

employee and without any circumstances vitiating consent or, (2) it satisfactorily

appears that the employer and employee dealt with each other on more or less

equal terms with no moral dominance whatever being exercised by the former on

the latter. [12] Against these criteria, petitioners' contracts of employment with a

fixed period were valid.

Each contract provided for an expiration date. Petitioners knew from the beginning

that the employment offered to them was not permanent but only for a certain

fixed period.[13] They were free to accept or to refuse the offer. When theyexpressed their acceptance, they bound themselves to the contract.

In this case, there was no allegation of vitiated consent. Respondents did not

exercise moral dominance over petitioners. The contracts were mutually

advantageous to the parties. While respondents were able to augment increased

demand in production by hiring petitioners on an as-needed basis, petitioners found

gainful employment if only for a few months.

Simply put, petitioners were not regular employees. While their employment as

mixers, packers and machine operators was necessary and desirable in the usualbusiness of respondent company, they were employed temporarily only, during

periods when there was heightened demand for production. Consequently, there

could have been no illegal dismissal when their services were terminated on

expiration of their contracts. There was even no need for notice of termination

because they knew exactly when their contracts would end. Contracts of

employment for a fixed period terminate on their own at the end of such period.[14]

Contracts of employment for a fixed period are not unlawful. What is objectionable

is the practice of some scrupulous employers who try to circumvent the law

protecting workers from the capricious termination of employment. Employers havethe right and prerogative to choose their workers. "The law, while protecting the

rights of the employees, authorizes neither the oppression nor destruction of the

employer. When the law angles the scales of justice in favor of labor, the scale

should never be so tilted if the result is an injustice to the employer."[15]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The resolution of the Court ofAppeals dated January 31, 2001 is AFFIRMED.


28/36

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

[1] "Helen Varayuga" in some parts of the records.

[2] In the motion for extension of time to file petition for review, Cecilia Buhay and

Jhuliet Cenidoza were also named as petitioners but they were excluded in the

petition for review.

[3]

Penned by Associate Justice Oswaldo Agcaoili and concurred in by AssociateJustices Wenceslao I. Agnir, Jr. (now retired) and Jose L. Sabio, Jr. of the Special

Former Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals; rollo, pp. 53-64.

[4]Rollo, pp. 48-49.

[5] Penned by Labor Arbiter Pedro C. Ramos dated March 31, 1995; rollo, pp. 67-81.

[6] Penned by Commissioner Vicente S.E. Veloso and concurred in by Presiding

Commissioner Bartolome S. Carale and Commissioner Alberto R. Quimpo of the

First Division, dated August 22, 1997; rollo, pp. 103-112.

[7]Per curiam resolution of the First Division; rollo, pp. 120-125.

[8] Penned by Associate Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili (now retired) and concurred in

by Associate Justices Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez (now Associate Justice of the

Supreme Court) and Wenceslao I. Agnir, Jr. (now retired) of the Fifth Division of the

Court of Appeals, dated September 12, 2000; rollo, pp. 189-201.

[9] The assailed January 31, 2001 resolution.

[10] Dated May 7, 2001; rollo, p. 66.

[11]Pangilinan v. General Milling Corporation, G.R. No. 149329, 12 July 2004, 434

SCRA 159.

[12] Philippine National Oil Company Energy Development Corporation v. National

Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 97747, 31 March 1993, 220 SCRA 695.


29/36

[13] The duration of the contracts ranges from 3 months to 6 months.

[14]Supra at note 9.

[15]St. Theresa's School of Novaliches Foundation v. NLRC, 351 Phil. 1038 (1998).






Petitioner RIC emphasizes that while an employee's status of employment is vested

by law pursuant to Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, said provision of law

admits of two exceptions, to wit: (1) those employments which have been fixed for

a specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been

determined at the time of the engagement of the employment; and (2) when thework or services to be performed are seasonal; hence, the employment is for the

duration of the season. Thus, there are certain forms of employment which entail

the performance of usual and desirable functions and which exceed one year but do

not necessarily qualify as regular employment under Article 280 of the Labor Code,

as amended.

The Petition is unmeritorious.

A closer examination of Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, is imperative to

resolve the issue raised in the present case.

In declaring that respondent Taripe was a regular employee of the petitioner and,

thus, his dismissal was illegal, the Court of Appeals ratiocinated in this manner:

In determining the employment status of [herein respondent Taripe], reference

must be made to Article 280 of the Labor Code, which provides:

x x x x


30/36

Thus, there are two kinds of regular employees, namely: (1) those who are

engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual

business or trade of the employer; and (2) those who have rendered at least one

year of service, whether continuous or broken, with respect to the activity in which

they are employed. [Respondent Taripe] belonged to the first category of regularemployees.

The purported contract of employment providing that [respondent Taripe] was hired

as contractual employee for five (5) months only, cannot prevail over the

undisputed fact that [respondent Taripe] was hired to perform the function of power

press operator, a function necessary or desirable in [petitioner's] business of

manufacturing tin cans. [Herein petitioner RIC's] contention that the four (4)

months length of service of [respondent Taripe] did not grant him a regular status

is inconsequential, considering that length of service assumes importance only

when the activity in which the employee has been engaged to perform is notnecessary or desirable to the usual business or trade of the employer.

As aptly ruled by [the NLRC]:

"In the instant case, there is no doubt that [respondent Taripe], as power press

operator, has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or

desirable in [petitioner RIC's] usual business or trade of manufacturing of tin cans

for use in packaging of food, paint and others. We also find that [respondent

Taripe] does not fall under any of the abovementioned exceptions. Other that (sic)

[petitioner RIC's] bare allegation thereof, [it] failed to present any evidence toprove that he was employed for a fixed or specific project or undertaking the

completion of which has been determined at the time of his engagement or that

[respondent Taripe's] services are seasonal in nature and that his employment was

for the duration of the season."[12]

Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:

ART. 280. REGULAR AND CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. -The provisions of writtenagreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of

the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has

been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the

usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has beenfixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of whichhas been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the

work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for

the duration of the season.

An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding

paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of


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service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular

employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment

shall continue while such activity exists. [Emphasis supplied]

The aforesaid Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, classifies employees into

three categories, namely: (1) regular employees or those whose work is

necessary or desirable to the usual business of the employer; (2) projectemployees or those whose employment has been fixed for a specific project orundertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at the

time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be

performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the

season; and (3) casual employees or those who are neither regular nor projectemployees.[13]

Regular employees are further classified into: (1) regular employees by nature of

work; and (2) regular employees by years of service.[14] The former refers to those

employees who perform a particular activity which is necessary or desirable in theusual business or trade of the employer, regardless of their length of service; while

the latter refers to those employees who have been performing the job, regardless

of the nature thereof, for at least a year.[15]

The aforesaid Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, however, does not

proscribe or prohibit an employment contract with a fixed period. It does not

necessarily follow that where the duties of the employee consist of activities usually

necessary or desirable in the usual business of the employer, the parties are

forbidden from agreeing on a period of time for the performance of such activities.

There is nothing essentially contradictory between a definite period of employmentand the nature of the employee's duties.[16] What Article 280 of the Labor Code, as

amended, seeks to prevent is the practice of some unscrupulous and covetous

employers who wish to circumvent the law that protects lowly workers from

capricious dismissal from their employment. The aforesaid provision, however,

should not be interpreted in such a way as to deprive employers of the right and

prerogative to choose their own workers if they have sufficient basis to refuse an

employee a regular status. Management has rights which should also be protected.[17]

In the case at bar, respondent Taripe signed a contract of employment prior to hisadmission into the petitioner's company. Said contract of employment provides,

among other things:

4. That my employment shall be contractual for the period of five (5) months which

means that the end of the said period, I can (sic) discharged unless this contract is

renewed by mutual consent or terminated for cause.[18]

Based on the said contract, respondent Taripe's employment with the petitioner is

good only for a period of five months unless the said contract is renewed by mutual


32/36

consent. And as claimed by petitioner RIC, respondent Taripe, along with its other

contractual employees, was hired only to meet the increase in demand for

packaging materials during the Christmas season and also to build up stock levels

during the early part of the year.

Although Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, does not forbid fixed termemployment, it must, nevertheless, meet any of the following guidelines in order

that it cannot be said to circumvent security of tenure: (1) that the fixed period of

employment was knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties, without any

force, duress or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and

absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent; or (2) it satisfactorily appears

that the employer and employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms

with no moral dominance whatever being exercised by the former on the latter.[19]

In the present case, it cannot be denied that the employment contract signed by

respondent Taripe did not mention that he was hired only for a specific undertaking,the completion of which had been determined at the time of his engagement. The

said employment contract neither mentioned that respondent Taripe's services were

seasonal in nature and that his employment was only for the duration of the

Christmas season as purposely claimed by petitioner RIC. What was stipulated in

the said contract was that respondent Taripe's employment was contractual for the

period of five months.

Likewise, as the NLRC mentioned in its Resolution, to which the Court of Appeals

agreed, other than the bare allegations of petitioner RIC that respondent Taripe

was hired only because of the increase in the demand for packaging materialsduring the Christmas season, petitioner RIC failed to substantiate such claim with

any other evidence. Petitioner RIC did not present any evidence which might prove

that respondent Taripe was employed for a fixed or specific project or that his

services were seasonal in nature.

Also, petitioner RIC failed to controvert the claim of respondent Taripe that he was

made to sign the contract of employment, prepared by petitioner RIC, as a

condition for his hiring. Such contract in which the terms are prepared by only one

party and the other party merely affixes his signature signifying his adhesion

thereto is called contract of adhesion.[20]

It is an agreement in which the partiesbargaining are not on equal footing, the weaker party's participation being reduced

to the alternative "to take it or leave it."[21] In the present case, respondent Taripe,

in need of a job, was compelled to agree to the contract, including the five-month

period of employment, just so he could be hired. Hence, it cannot be argued that

respondent Taripe signed the employment contract with a fixed term of five months

willingly and with full knowledge of the impact thereof.


33/36

With regard to the second guideline, this Court agrees with the Court of Appeals

that petitioner RIC and respondent Taripe cannot be said to have dealt with each

other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance exercised by the

former over the latter. As a power press operator, a rank and file employee, he can

hardly be on equal terms with petitioner RIC. As the Court of Appeals said, "almost

always, employees agree to any terms of an employment contract just to getemployed considering that it is difficult to find work given their ordinary

qualifications."[22]

Therefore, for failure of petitioner RIC to comply with the necessary guidelines for a

valid fixed term employment contract, it can be safely stated that the aforesaid

contract signed by respondent Taripe for a period of five months was a mere

subterfuge to deny to the latter a regular status of employment.

Settled is the rule that the primary standard of determining regular employment is

the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by theemployee in relation to the casual business or trade of the employer. The

connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and

its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety.[23]

Given the foregoing, this Court agrees in the findings of the Court of Appeals and

the NLRC that, indeed, respondent Taripe, as a rectangular power press machine

operator, in charge of manufacturing covers for "four liters rectangular tin cans,"

was holding a position which is necessary and desirable in the usual business or

trade of petitioner RIC, which was the manufacture of tin cans. Therefore,

respondent Taripe was a regular employee of petitioner RIC by the nature of workhe performed in the company.

Respondent Taripe does not fall under the exceptions mentioned in Article 280 of

the Labor Code, as amended, because it was not proven by petitioner RIC that he

was employed only for a specific project or undertaking or his employment was

merely seasonal. Similarly, the position and function of power press operator

cannot be said to be merely seasonal. Such position cannot be considered as only

needed for a specific project or undertaking because of the very nature of the

business of petitioner RIC. Indeed, respondent Taripe is a regular employee of

petitioner RIC and as such, he cannot be dismissed from his employment unlessthere is just or authorized cause for his dismissal.

Well-established is the rule that regular employees enjoy security of tenure and

they can only be dismissed for just cause and with due process, notice and hearing.[24] And in case of employees' dismissal, the burden is on the employer to prove that

the dismissal was legal. Thus, respondent Taripe's summary dismissal, not being

based on any of the just or authorized causes enumerated under Articles 282,[25]


34/36

283,[26] and 284[27] of the Labor Code, as amended, is illegal.

Before concluding, we once more underscore the settled precept that factual

findings of the NLRC, having deemed to acquire expertise in matters within its

jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but finality especially when

such factual findings are affirmed by the Court of Appeals;[28] hence, such factualfindings are binding on this Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. TheDecision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 and 1

April 2005, respectively, which affirmed with modification the Resolutions of the

NLRC dated 7 June 2002 and 20 August 2002, respectively, finding herein

respondent Taripe as a regular employee who had been illegally dismissed from

employment by petitioner RIC, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitionerRIC.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, and Nachura, JJ., concur.

Callejo, Sr., J., on leave.

[1] Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta with Associate Justices

Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Josefina Guevara-Salonga, concurring, rollo, pp. 17-

27.

[2] Id. at 28.

[3] Penned by Commissioner Victoriano R. Calaycay with Presiding Commissioner

Raul T. Aquino and Commissioner Angelita A. Gacutan, concurring, id. at 36-48;

NLRC Records, pp. 147-148.

[4] Penned by Labor Arbiter Natividad M. Roma, id. at 29-35.

[5] Id. at 18-19.

[6] Id. at 35.

[7] Id. at 45-46.

[8] Id. at 21.


35/36

[9] Id. at 26.

[10] Supra note 2.

[11]Rollo, pp. 98-104.

[12] Id. at 22-23.

[13]Pangilinan vs. General Milling Corporation, G.R. No. 149329, 12 July 2004, 434

SCRA 159, 169.

[14]E. Ganzon, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 123769, 22

December 1999, 321 SCRA 434, 440.

[15]Pangilinan vs. General Milling Corporation, supra note 13 at 169-170.

[16] Id. at 170.

[17]Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 106654, 16 December 1994,

239 SCRA 272, 279.

[18] CA rollo, p. 27.

[19]Philippine National Oil Co.-Energy Dev't. Corp. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 97747, 31

March 1993, 220 SCRA 695, 699.

[20]Fabrigas vs. San Francisco del Monte, Inc., G.R. No. 152346, 25 November

2005, 476 SCRA 247, 263.

[21]Qua Chee Gan vs. Law Union and Rock Insurance Co., Ltd., 98 Phil. 85, 95

(1955).

[22]Rollo, p. 25.

[23] Lopez vs. Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, G.R. No. 154472, 30

June 2005, 462 SCRA 428, 453.

[24] Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation vs. Angara, G.R. No. 142937, 15

November 2005, 475 SCRA 41, 61.

[25] ART. 282. TERMINATION BY EMPLOYER. - An employer may terminate an


36/36

employment for any of the following causes.

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders

of his employer or representative in connection with his work;


(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by hisemployer or duly authorized representatives;

(d) Commission

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