Flagships, Feeders, and the Texas Top 10% Law: A Test of the “Brain Drain” Hypothesis

Marta Tienda

and

Sunny Xinchun Niu

Abstract

Using a representative sample of Texas public high school seniors to determine whether the top 10% law fostered a “brain drain,” crowding out high performing graduates from the most competitive secondary schools in favor of top-ranked students from low performing schools. We find no empirical support for a “brain drain” due to crowding.

This research was supported by grants from the Ford, Mellon and Hewlett Foundations. We

gratefully acknowledge institutional support from the Office of Population Research, Princeton University. Marta Tienda is Maurice P. During '22 Professor in Demographic Studies and Professor of

Sociology, Princeton University; Sunny Xinchun Niu is Research Associate in the Office of Population Research, Princeton University.

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Flagships, Feeders, and the Texas Top 10% Law: A Test of the “Brain Drain” Hypothesis

Introduction

Affirmative action came under assault during the mid 1990s with the passage of

Proposition 209 in California, the 1996 Hopwood decision in Texas,i and the enactment

of Initiative 200 in Washington State. In response to the judicial ban on the use of race-

sensitive criteria in college admissions decisions, in 1997 the Texas legislature passed

H.B. 588—popularly known as the top 10% law—guaranteeing automatic admission to

any public university to high school students who graduate in the top decile of their class

(THECB, 1998). Building on extensive empirical evidence that high school grades are

strong predictors of college success (Bowen & Bok, 1998) and the philosophical

principle of equal educational opportunity (Coleman, 1990; Jencks, 1988), the architects

of H.B. 588 sought to maintain the hard won ethno-racial diversity at the public flagship

universities.

The top 10% law changed the terms of the debate about merit and access to the

State’s most selective public institutions. Affirmative action was criticized for privileging

allegedly under-qualified minority students for admission to the most competitive post-

secondary institutions; the top 10% law is criticized for giving students from

underperforming schools this unfair advantage (Flores, 2003; Nissimov, 2003; Glater,

2004). In effect, the terms of exclusion changed from members of minority groups

(blacks and Hispanics, specifically) to underperforming schools.

Notwithstanding the appeal of a merit-based admission policy that is applied

uniformly across high schools, H.B. 588 has become as controversial as the race-sensitive

admission regime it replaced (Flores, 2003; Glater, 2004; Nissimov, 2000). Many

salutary consequences have played themselves out, but so too have unanticipated

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difficulties. On the positive side of the ledger, early results indicated that the law had

some capacity to restore ethno-racial diversity at the State’s public flagships (Walker &

Lavergne, 2001; Tienda, et al., 2003; UT Office of Public Affairs, 2003). Additional

benefits include greater geographic diversity of incoming students (Montejano, 2001),

stronger institutional ties between secondary schools and the public flagships via

expanded outreach efforts (Goodman, 2003), and additional evidence that class rank is a

more reliable predictor of college success than standardized test scores (Rooney, 1998;

Walker & Lavergne, 2001; Faulkner, 2000, 2002; Glater, 2004). When the outcome of

the Michigan litigationii was uncertain, these promising early results were widely

celebrated.

On the negative side of the ledger, most concerns center on institutional saturation

with top decile graduates and growing anxiety that graduates from highly competitive

high schools are “squeezed out” of the public flagships. As the demand for access to the

public flagships surged, admission rates fell for students ranked below the top decile

(Jayson, 2003a; THECB, 2003). In 1996, the year of the Hopwood decision, about 43 to

44 percent of freshmen enrollees at the University of Texas at Austin (UT) and Texas

A&M (A&M) ranked in the top decile of their senior class. Three years later, this share

rose modestly to 47 and 51 percent, respectively, at these institutions.iii Although the

share of students automatically admitted to A&M reached a plateau just over 50 percent,

at UT the number of top decile applicants continued to rise such that 70 percent of the

applicants during 2003-04 qualified for automatic admission (THECB, 2003; Jayson,

2003b; Lavergne & Walker, 2003; Nissimov, 2003; Wolfson, 2004).

Predictably, institutional saturation with automatically admitted students triggered

discontent among a highly vocal constituency, namely graduates from academically

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competitive high schools with strong college-going traditions who did not graduate in the

top decile of their senior class (Yardley, 2002; Nissimov, 2000).iv Several prominent

critics of H.B. 588, including Texas Governor Rick Perry (Wolfson, 2004), argued that

the “best and brightest” are leaving the state—a “brain drain” of sorts—in response to

“crowding out” of second decile students from competitive high schools by top 10

percent admits from low performing high schools. As the saturation of UT applicants

with top 10% graduates surpassed 70 percent, opponents of H.B. 588 called for its

rescission on grounds that its negative consequences outweighed the early benefits and

that the 2003 Supreme Court rulingv no longer justified the top 10% law (Nissimov,

2003; Flores, 2003; Glater, 2004; Irving, 2004).

The “brain drain” hypothesis, which we evaluate empirically, maintains that high

achieving students who graduate from competitive secondary schools but fail to qualify

for automatic admission to one of the public flagships leave the state for college.

Virtually all the evidence supporting such claims derives from anecdotes about

disgruntled students rather than a rigorous evaluation of college choice under the uniform

admission regime. Therefore, to empirically evaluate the “brain drain” hypothesis, we

address three questions about college choice using a representative sample of Texas high

school seniors whose admissions were governed by H.B. 588. First, how does type of

high school attended influence seniors’ college preferences for and enrollment in a Texas

versus non-Texas postsecondary institution? Second, how do college preferences and

enrollment decisions differ by school type for top decile graduates? Finally, is there

evidence that second decile students who graduate from the most competitive public high

schools leave the state because they are crowded out of the two flagships?

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In addition to testing the “brain drain” hypothesis, our findings are theoretically

important for the philosophical debate about what must be equal for educational

opportunity to be equal; and they are practically relevant for the national debate about the

prospects for devising race-neutral admissions standards. President George W. Bush cited

percent plans, and the Texas plan in particular, as viable alternatives to race conscious

admissions in the White House brief filed on behalf of Grutter and Gratz (Jones, et al.,

2002a, 2002b).vi In the wake of the Grutter decision, which permits a narrowly tailored

consideration of race in college admissions, the declared successes of the Texas percent

plan invigorated opponents of affirmative action to reassert the value of percent plans as a

race neutral alternative to affirmative action.

In what follows, we first develop a classification scheme that characterizes high

schools according to their relative affluence and college-going traditions. Subsequently,

we formulate a strategy to empirically test the “brain drain” hypothesis. We conclude

with a brief summary of the main findings and a discussion of the broader implications of

the Texas experience for the nation as a whole.

The Top 10% Law Highlights

Under the top 10% law, top decile students qualify for an automatic admissions to

any public postsecondary institutions in Texas, but qualifying students must complete the

university’s application (including essays) and a college entrance exam (either SAT or

ACT). Test scores are not considered in the admission decision or course placement.vii In

Texas class rank is reported by the students’ high schools, not by the University Systems,

as in California. The admission guarantee is good for two years following graduation

provided that students do not register at another college (Leicht and Sullivan, 2000).

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Students who do not qualify for the admission guarantee are admissible, within the

bounds of institutional carrying capacity, based on their overall academic record. viii

For students who do not graduate in the top ten percent of their class, student

merit is based on a broad range of objective and subjective criteria, including

standardized test scores, completion of required high school curriculum, scores on two

essays, demonstrated leadership qualities, extracurricular activities, region of residence,

school characteristics, awards/honors, work experience, public service, and special

circumstances [such as socioeconomic status, family responsibilities, and school

conditions, among others] (Walker & Lavergne, 2001: 20). Our multivariate models take

such factors into account in evaluating the “brain drain” hypothesis.

If the Texas top ten percent plan appears to be a radical change in admissions

policy, it is not, in fact. Class rank has always been seriously considered and heavily

weighed in admissions decisions at the public flagships. In fact, before 1995, students

graduating in the top decile of their class were automatically admitted to the University of

Texas at Austin (Walker & Lavergne, 2001).ix What IS “new” about the Texas college

admissions policy is the explicit de-emphasis of test scores, for students who graduate in

the top decile of their class, and the explicit prohibition of considering race and ethnicity

in decisions.

Data

Evaluating the merits of the “brain drain” hypothesis requires a statistically

representative sample of senior high students across a range of secondary schools and

information about their ranked college preferences and eventual enrollment decisions.

The survey data collected under the auspices of the Texas Higher Education Opportunity

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Project (THEOP) meets these requirements. In spring 2002, a representative sample of

Texas public high school seniors was surveyed (wave 1) and a random sub-sample of the

senior cohort was re-interviewed (wave 2) the following spring. The baseline sample was

drawn using a two-stage stratified sampling design. In the first stage, 62 primary

sampling units (PSUs) were randomly chosen to represent the high school-age population

in Texas. For the second stage, 108 public high schools were randomly drawn from the

universe of secondary schools that included both 10th and 12th grades and had a senior

class of 10 or more students.x

From the sampled high schools, 13,803 seniors were interviewed using a paper

and pencil in-class survey instrument. For cost reasons only a sub-sample of 5,800

seniors, or about 42 percent of the original sample, were re-interviewed one year after

high school graduation. To guarantee the maximum possible precision for blacks and

Asians, all baseline respondents from these groups were included in the longitudinal

sample; proportionate samples of Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites were randomly

drawn for the sample balance. Weights ensure representativeness of the sample to the

population of Texas high school seniors in 2002.

The response rate for the wave 2 interviews was 70 percent, and sample weights

for the follow-up interviews were recalibrated to the original population. The major

strength of the longitudinal survey design is that it avoids selection biases inherent in

other studies by asking students’ college preferences prospectively rather than

retrospectively. In addition to basic demographic, socioeconomic and standard tracking

information, the baseline survey included a battery of questions about college plans,

including up to five rank-ordered college preferences, whether applications were

submitted and the admission decisions. The first follow-up survey (wave 2) recorded

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whether respondents actually enrolled in college one year after high school graduation,

and if so, where.

All colleges in students’ choice sets—both their stated preferences in the baseline

survey and their enrollment institutions—were assigned Integrated Postsecondary

Education Data System (IPEDS) codes. This permits appending college characteristics to

individual records, which is necessary to classify preferences and enrollment decisions by

institutional type (e.g., junior college, four-year public or private, etc.) and selectivity of

admissions (Niu, et al., 2004). Using a database maintained by the Texas Education

Agency, we also appended high school attributes to individual student records in the

baseline survey. This information allows us to derive a classification scheme of

secondary schools according to their socioeconomic status and college-going traditions.

College Preferences and Enrollment Decisions

Because the “brain drain” hypothesis is about the barriers that hinder students’

access to the public flagships, we examine students’ first college preference and their

actual enrollment decision to determine who succeeded in realizing their college goals.

Specifically, we classify students’ first college choice into six categories: (1) no college;

(2) UT or A&M; (3) other Texas 4-year institutions; (4) Texas 2-year institutions; (5)

non-Texas 2- or 4-year institutions; and (6) unspecified preference. Enrollment decisions

use these same categories sans the unspecified preference. Other public selective

institutions, such as Texas Tech, University of Houston, and University of Texas at

Dallas also recruit students from competitive high schools who wish to remain in cities,

but the “brain drain” hypothesis is mostly focused on crowding out of second decile

graduates from the public flagships, hence we focused on UT and A&M.

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Class Rank and High School Type

The two primary individual attributes for testing the “brain drain” hypothesis are

students’ class rank and the type of high school attended. Self-reported class rank,

measured in deciles, is either known to students or estimated by them when unknown.

Rank can be based on coursework completed either during spring semester of the junior year,

or fall or spring of the senior year, depending on the semester of application. This partly explains why

almost 20 percent of the college choice sample is ranked as top decile graduates, but there

is also a known upward bias in self-reported class rank.xi

To portray socioeconomic variation among secondary schools, we devised a

typology that differentiates resource poor and affluent high schools from those of average

resources. Among affluent high schools, we further distinguish between those with low

and high college-going traditions. Feeder high schools are a subset of the affluent

schools with very strong college-going traditions, including large numbers who

historically attended the two public flagships. Operationally, feeder high schools are the

top 20 high schools based on the absolute number of students admitted to UT-Austin and

A&M in 2000 (Tienda et al., 2003). At A&M, the top 20 feeder high schools accounted

for 15 percent of students admitted in 2000, and 14 percent of enrolled freshmen. For

UT, the corresponding figures are both 23 percent. Because of the considerable overlap

between the two sets, the combined list of feeder schools represent only 28 high schools

out of a possible 1,644 public high schools in 2000 (TEA, 2001). Survey results reveal

that feeder and other affluent schools are located in suburban areas around major cities in

the eastern part of the state. Not surprisingly, about two-thirds of feeder school graduates

have college-educated parents and the vast majority live in owned rather than rented

homes.

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Among the resource-poor high schools, we distinguish between those with low

college-going traditions that have been targeted by UT-Austin and A&M to receive

Longhorn or Century scholarships, and other poor schools.xii These two scholarship

programs were designed to enable top decile students who attend schools with high

shares of economically disadvantaged students to enroll at the public flagships.

Approximately one-third of seniors from resource poor schools live with parents lacking

a high school education. Our 5-category classification scheme enables us to compare

“feeder” high schools (as defined above), other affluent schools, resource-poor schools,

and poor schools designated for Longhorn or Century scholarship awards with a residual

category that represents typical Texas high schools as of 2002.

Table 1 provides an overview of college preference and enrollment decisions

among Texas public high school seniors in 2002. First, nearly three-fourths of all high

school graduates pursue some form of post-secondary education. Second, college

intentions and enrollment rates are substantially higher among top decile graduates – over

90 percent report post-secondary plans and actually enroll within a year of leaving high

school. Third, (non-flagship) 4-year Texas public colleges and universities are the modal

college choice, as over one-third of 2002 high school graduates designated such

institutions as their first preference. Fourth, one-in-three top decile graduates indicated

one of the flagships as their first preference and actually enroll there within a year of high

school graduation.

(Table 1 About Here)

Not surprisingly, feeder high school students have a very strong preference for

both the public flagships and non-Texas institutions. This is especially so for the top 10%

graduates, who are quite successful in realizing their enrollment goals (Niu, et al., 2004).

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Specifically, over one-third of feeder high school students who graduated in the top 10%

of their class named UT or A&M as their first college choice and almost two-thirds of

these actually enrolled at one of the flagships. For second decile feeder high school

graduates, the corresponding shares are 43 and 47 percent.

Estimation Strategies

To estimate how individual characteristics determine college decision-making, the

recent college choice literature uses the multinomial logit model (Manski & Wise, 1983;

Cortes, Tienda, & Niu, 2004). We also use this approach to examine how school type

influences Texas high school seniors’ college preference and enrollment decisions.

Formally, the probability that student i chooses college category j is,

eβ(j)W(i)

Prob(Yi = j) = ———— (1)

ΣK eβ(k)W(i)

where k=1,…, 6 for first preference decisions, and k=1,…,5 for enrollment decisions. In

this formulation W is the vector of student characteristics known to influence college

choice, which includes gender, race/ethnicity, college orientation, class rank, parental

education, home ownership and several high school characteristics, including location

and type according to our classification scheme (Karen, 2002; McDonough, 1997).

Appendix 1 provides the summary statistics for these covariates. Maximum likelihood

estimation of coefficients β(j) provide the marginal effect of individual characteristics on

the probability of choosing college category j over the reference category, designated as

Texas 4-year post-secondary institutions other than UT or A&M.

We first estimate model (1) for all students (controlling for class rank) to examine

variation in college preferences and enrollment decisions by type of high school attended.

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We expect students from affluent schools with strong college-going traditions will be

more likely to choose one of the public flagships as their first preference and to enroll

there the following fall. Furthermore, except for a handful of private universities in

Texas, post-secondary institutions with admission standards more selective than the two

flagships are located outside the State. Therefore, we expect that graduates from affluent

high schools will prefer and, conditional on admission, actually enroll in non-Texas

institutions relative to less selective Texas alternatives.

To examine the influence of school type on college preferences and enrollment

choices of high performing students, we estimate model (1) separately for the top and

second decile graduates. Because H.B. 588 guarantees automatic admission to any Texas

public institution to all top 10% graduates, we expect relatively uniform preferences and

enrollment outcomes at the two flagships among top 10% students across high school

types. Evidence that feeder high school students who graduate in the second decile of

their class are more likely to enroll at non-Texas institutions than their rank counterparts

who graduate from typical high schools does not constitute proof of a fostered “brain

drain” because students may leave by choice. Fortunately, the THEOP survey allows us

to examine whether students who enroll at non-Texas institutions do so because their

preferred college is located out-of-state.

Information about ranked preferences is crucial for testing the “brain drain”

hypothesis, which we evaluate using three empirical strategies. First we estimate the

multinomial logit model separately by school type, using top decile students as the

reference group. Because top decile students are privileged with guaranteed admission to

the Texas public flagships, their preference for and enrollment in a non-Texas institution

serves as the benchmark for assessing whether lower ranked students are crowded out.

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We assume that second decile students are not more likely to enroll out-of-state than their

top decile counterparts, which Table 1 supports. If second decile feeder high school

graduates are more likely to prefer and enroll in a non-Texas institution compared with

top decile statistical counterparts, this potentially signals a “brain drain” due to crowding.

However, if they are less or equally likely both to prefer and enroll at a non-Texas

institution, evidence of “crowding out” is much weaker.

Conceivably, second decile feeder high school graduates choose a non-Texas

institution as their top preference due to their perceived lower admission chances at the

public flagships. To consider this possibility, as a second empirical strategy we cross-

examine first and second preferences among feeder high school students who graduate in

the second decile of their class. Evidence that students whose first preference is one of

the flagships actually name a non-Texas institution as their second preference potentially

indicates a “brain drain.” However, if second decile students whose first preference is a

non-Texas institution name another non-Texas institution as their second choice, then the

“brain drain” claims would appear to be groundless.

Our third and final strategy to test the “brain drain” hypothesis is essentially a

“reality check.” Specifically we investigate the likelihood that second decile feeder

school graduates who prefer attending one of the flagships actually succeed in realizing

their goal. Evidence that most of these students actually enroll at a non-Texas institution

would support the “brain drain” hypothesis. However, if most of these students succeed

in enrolling at one of the flagships, then claims that highly deserving students are being

crowded out of Texas public institutions are empirically unfounded, media anecdotes

notwithstanding.

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Findings

Feeder School Students’ Advantage

Table 2 reports multinomial logit results for students’ first preference and

enrollment decisions, estimated separately for all seniors and for top and second decile

graduates. The upper and lower panels report the influence of school type on first college

preference and the enrollment decisions, respectively. Four years after H.B. 588 went

into effect, graduates from feeder high schools retained preferential access to the Texas

flagships. Compared with graduates from typical Texas high schools, feeder high school

graduates are 2.2 times as likely to prefer UT or A&M over other Texas 4-year colleges

and universities, but even more likely—3 times as likely—to actually enroll at one of the

public flagships the year following high school graduation. At the same time, they are

2.8 times as likely as the average graduate to prefer a non-Texas institution, but their

odds of matriculating out-of-state is lower—only 2 times as likely.

(Table 2 about here)

Graduates from Longhorn/Century high schools are no more likely than typical

high school students to express a preference for and actually matriculate at UT or A&M

relative to other 4-year Texas institutions. Possibly because of heavy recruitment by

admissions personnel, Longhorn/Century high school seniors were 30 percent more likely

to express a preference for an out-of-state institution over other Texas 4-year institutions.

That these students are no more likely to prefer a 2-year college over a non-flagship 4-

year college, but are 60 percent more likely to matriculate there, attests to the persisting

financial barriers to college access (Cortes, et al., 2004).

Seniors from other resource-affluent high schools also enjoy preferential access to

the two flagships, but to a lesser extent than graduates from feeder high schools.

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However, students from resource-poor schools are clearly disadvantaged in their access

to the two public flagships. Not only are they about half as likely to prefer UT or A&M

over other Texas 4-year institutions, but their odds of actually matriculating at one of

these institutions is even lower—only about 40 percent as likely as graduates from typical

Texas high schools. Contrary to claims proliferated in the print media, these results

demonstrate that feeder high school students enjoy a substantial advantage in their access

to the Texas flagships, even four years after H.B. 588 was in effect.

College Access for Top Decile Students

Because H.B. 588 guarantees top 10% graduates admission to any Texas

institution, there is much less variation in enrollment decisions by school type compared

with preferences. Top 10% seniors from feeder high schools are twice as likely to prefer

attending one of the public flagships as their rank counterparts who graduate from typical

Texas high schools, but they have even stronger preferences—3.6 times as high—for out-

of-state institutions compared with other Texas 4-year institutions. Conditional on

admission, their enrollment odds are equal across institutional types.

The comparable preference and enrollment odds at UT or A&M for top decile

graduates from Longhorn/Century schools do not differ from students who graduate from

typical Texas high schools. Top-ranked graduates from feeder high schools, other

resource-affluent schools, and other resource-poor high schools are as likely as graduates

from typical high schools to pursue 2-year or non-college options. However, the results

for Longhorn/Century schools reflect a strong selection process. Compared with top-

ranked graduates from typical Texas high schools, top decile students who graduate from

a Longhorn or Century high school are 3.7 times as likely to opt for no college, 4.8 times

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as likely not to enroll at any post-secondary institution, and 3.3 times as likely to enroll at

a 2-year Texas college. Top 10% graduates form Longhorn/Century high schools who

both prefer and actually enroll at a 4-year institution are a very selective subset of this

high performing pool. Thus, the seemingly equal enrollment probabilities among high

performing students across school types result because a large segment of the eligible

pool from Longhorn/Century schools is effectively excluded.

Top ranked students from other resource-affluent schools share similar

preferences to feeder high school graduates. However, their strong preferences for the

public flagships and non-Texas institutions are equalized in their matriculation behavior,

as they are equally likely to enroll either at a Texas flagship or non-Texas institution as

their statistical counterparts who graduated from a typical Texas high school. However,

top ranked graduates from resource-poor high schools are only 40 percent as likely to

prefer, and only 20 percent as likely to enroll at one of the public flagships.

Second Decile Feeder School Graduates and the “Brain Drain” Hypothesis

The last set of results in the upper and lower panels of Table 2 report high school

variation in college choices of second decile students—those allegedly at high risk of

being crowded out of competitive Texas colleges because of H.B. 588. Second decile

graduates from feeder high schools have very strong preferences for both the Texas

public flagships and non-Texas institutions. In fact, these students enjoyed preferential

access to both institutional types. Compared with second decile students from typical

Texas high schools, second decile feeder high school students are 3.9 times as likely to

prefer one of the flagships over other 4-year Texas institutions, and their matriculation

odds are even higher—4.5 times as likely. Moreover, they are 4.4 times as likely as their

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rank counterparts who attend typical Texas high schools to prefer an out-of-state over

another 4-year Texas institution, but their matriculation odds are slightly lower—3.8

times. Of course, their higher preferences for and enrollment odds at out-of-state

institutions do not constitute prima facia evidence of a “brain drain” because they may

actually prefer a non-Texas college, as we demonstrate below.

The college-going behavior of second decile feeder high school graduates is

especially germane for assessing the extent to which qualified students who graduate

from highly competitive high schools are “crowded out” of the public flagships. Table 3

reports multinomial logit results estimating the influence of class rank on first college

preference and enrollment decisions among all seniors, and separately by high school

type. The reference group is top decile students, whose decisions to leave the state serve

as the benchmark for appraising a possible “brain drain.” Results for all Texas graduates

show that, on average, second decile students are less likely than top decile graduates to

prefer and to enroll at non-Texas institutions. Compared with top 10% students, they and

second decile seniors from other resource-affluent schools probably lack the academic

qualifications for admission to the most selective colleges and universities outside of

Texas.

(Table 3 about here)

However, this generalization does not apply to feeder high school graduates. In

fact, seniors who graduate from feeder high schools ranked in the second 10% of their

class are equally likely to prefer and to enroll out-of-state as their top decile counterparts.

We suspect that the demanding curriculum and strong college-going traditions of these

high schools enable second decile feeder high school students to compete for admission

at the most selective colleges and universities outside Texas. This result is a vital test of

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the “brain drain” hypothesis. To confirm our interpretation, we examine the list of out-of-

state institutions attended by second decile feeder high school graduates (Appendix 2).

The list includes the most competitive private schools, such as the University of Southern

California, Washington University in St. Louis and Brigham Young University, as well

as competitive state public institutions in neighboring states, such as the University of

Oklahoma and the University of Colorado.

Of course, it is also conceivable that second decile feeder high school graduates

would be less likely to prefer and to enroll out-of-state in the absence of the top 10% law.

In other words, owing to a perceived lower chance of admission to the public flagships,

second decile graduates from feeder high schools who identify an out-of-state institution

as their first preference may actually prefer to remain in Texas and attend either UT or

A&M. To examine this possibility, Table 4 cross-classifies the first and second

preferences for Texas college-bound high school seniors, providing more detailed

breakdowns for feeder school graduates. Only about half of college-bound seniors report

a second institutional preference, yet the cross-classification of first and second choices

reveals a strong inclination for Texas high school graduates to remain in the state.

(Table 4 about here)

The upper panel reveals that most students who identify a Texas institution

(flagships, other Texas 4-year institutions or Texas 2-year institutions) as their first

preference choose another Texas 4-year institution as their alternative. Evidence that

students who identify a non-Texas institution as their first choice split their second option

between other Texas 4-year institution versus another out-of-state institution, with a

slight inclination for the latter undermines claims of the “brain drain” hypothesis.

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The lower panel indicates that feeder high school graduates have strong

preferences for out-of-state institutions. For example, almost half of top decile seniors

who graduate from feeder high schools and identify either UT or A&M as their first

preference name an out-of-state institution as their alternative. Moreover—and contrary

to the predictions of the brain-drain hypothesis—the majority of feeder high school

students who identify an out-of-state institution as their first preference choose another

out-of-state institution as their second alternative. Although 57 percent of top decile

graduates do not name a second preference, 28 percent name another out-of-state

institution, and 14 percent name UT or A&M as their second choice. The corresponding

shares for students ranked in the second decile, are 56, 29 and 7 percent, respectively.

That most of these students select yet another out-of-state institution as an alternative

appears to indicate that students choose to leave the state rather than being crowded out.

More top decile than second decile students select a public flagship as their second

choice, probably because admission to non-Texas institutions is uncertain (Niu, et at.,

2004). Essentially H.B. 588 is an admission insurance policy for top decile graduates

who set their sights on non-Texas institutions.

The “brain drain” hypothesis partly rests on the enrollment outcomes of second

decile feeder school students who prefer UT or A&M, but are potentially “crowded out”

by top decile graduates from less competitive high schools. To address this question

Table 5 cross-classifies first college preference, recorded during the senior year, and

actual enrollment the following year, based on the follow-up interview. For the state as a

whole, 62 percent of all Texas seniors who specify UT or A&M as their first choice

actually enroll at these institutions the year after high school graduation. Compared with

the most selective institutions nationally, this represents a high probability of enrollment,

19

and it also is consistent with the published 2002 institutional admissions at UT and

A&M.

(Table 5 about here)

Of special relevance for the “brain drain” hypothesis, these tabulations show that

feeder high school graduates are more successful realizing their goal of enrolling at UT or

A&M – 74 percent – compared with the average Texas senior who attends a typical high

school. All top decile feeder high school students whose top college choice was one of

the public flagships actually matriculated there the following fall. Moreover, and

contrary to media anecdotes that second decile feeder school students denied access to

UT or A&M leave the state, our data show that 96 percent of second decile feeder high

school graduates who identify UT or A&M as their first preference actually matriculate

there in the following fall. The remainder matriculates at other Texas 4-year and 2-year

institutions, and only trivial shares enroll out-of-state. Based on these data, it is difficult

to argue that second decile feeder school students’ access to the public flagships has been

undermined by H.B. 588. If anything, the very few second decile feeder school students

who are denied admission to one of the flagships enroll at other Texas institutions, not

out-of-state. Of course, it is conceivable that prior to H.B. 588 even higher shares would

name UT or A&M as their top college choice and actually matriculate, but this begs the

question about whether even higher levels of advantaged access to the public flagships

was justified in the first place.

Among seniors aspiring to attend non-Texas institutions, only about half realize

their college goal, but this is true of students nationally because most states give

admission priority to their own residents. Preference for in-state residents is particularly

high in Texas, where by law, 80 percent of the student body at public institutions must be

20

Texas residents. Of students who prefer other Texas 4-year and 2-year institutions, 66

and 71 percent succeed in enrolling there. At the same time, 13 percent of students

aspiring to attend non-Texas institutions do not enroll anywhere, compared with 5 and 7

percent, respectively, for those whose first preference is UT/A&M or another Texas 4-

year institution. Moreover, one-in-four students who prefer a Texas 2-year institution fail

to enroll there or anywhere. This exposes a significant problem in Texas higher

education, namely the large numbers of college-eligible students who do not enroll at any

institution of higher education.

The difficulty of actualizing out-of-state enrollment plans also affects students

from feeder high schools, among whom less than half of those seeking admission to non-

Texas institutions actually succeed in enrolling. Although students ranked in the top two

deciles of their graduating class are more successful enrolling out-of-state—about 60

percent realize non-Texas college plans—this is significantly lower than their success

enrolling at Texas institutions. Less than 10 percent of top decile feeder school students

who identify an out-of-state institution as their first preference actually matriculate at one

of the flagships, lending support to our claim that UT and A&M serve as backup

insurance against the odds of rejection from a selective non-Texas institution. However,

for second decile graduates from feeder high schools, the public flagships no longer

provide back-up insurance. Surely this is the main source of dissatisfaction with H.B.

588, but it hardly constitutes evidence of “crowding out” given that second decile feeder

high school graduates enjoy appreciably higher access to the public flagships compared

with 2nd decile graduates from typical Texas high schools.

21

Conclusion

We examined the college preferences and enrollment decisions of a representative

sample of Texas high school seniors who graduated in 2002, four years after the top 10%

law was implemented. We find that feeder school students enjoy a substantial advantage

in their access to the Texas public flagships, and that conditional on admission, top 10%

graduates’ enrollment odds are similar to their counterparts from typical Texas high

schools. Most importantly, and in contrast to claims based on anecdotes, empirical

evidence does not support the “brain drain” hypothesis. Specifically, feeder high school

students ranked in the top two deciles of their senior class have strong preference for out-

of-state institutions, and second decile feeder high school students are no more likely than

their top decile counterparts to prefer and to enroll out-of-state. Furthermore, most feeder

high school students ranked in the top 20% of their class who identify a non-Texas

institution as their first college preference choose yet another out-of-state institution as

their second choice. Virtually all second decile feeder school students who identify one of

the public flagships as their first preference enroll there the following fall. In the main,

our examination of ranked preferences leads us to conclude that students who enroll out-

of-state do so largely by choice, within the constraints of admission, affordability, and

opportunity to leave the state. In fact, students’ ranked preferences indicate that even

greater numbers would leave the state if they were admitted to their preferred non-Texas

institution.

Throughout we assume that students’ top-ranked institution is their preferred

choice, but it is conceivable that an environment of constrained choices may lead some

students to rank out-of-state institutions higher than Texas institutions. In other words,

the distinction between forced and voluntary departures from the state may be less

22

defined. Even though we can not perfectly distinguish between choosing to leave or being

squeezed out of state, the “brain drain” appears to be chimerical.

Our findings lead us to question the broad educational mission of public

institutions, particularly in Texas, where relatively low tuition makes college accessible

to students from a broad range of income strata. Whether by design or default, the Texas

top 10% law has heightened awareness of the criteria used to allocate slots at public

institutions of varying selectivity: how should equity considerations be weighted in

devising criteria for leveling the playing field in the future?

The bold Texas experiment with a uniform admission system has many lessons

for the national struggle to devise criteria for broadening access to higher education in a

highly unequal playing field. First, the success of H.B. 588 in diversifying the ethno-

racial composition of the freshman class depends both on the presence of a large minority

population and on pervasive segregation (Tienda & Niu, 2004), a condition which few

states can meet (Tienda, 2001; Orfield & Lee, 2004).

Second, the Texas experiment has again challenged the premise that standardized

test scores are important predictors of college success. By admitting students without

regard to ACT or SAT scores, Texas colleges and universities have reaffirmed the

superiority of performance-based over test-based merit criteria. For example, at UT top

decile students not only outperform their lower ranked counterparts with test scores 200 –

300 points higher (Faulkner, 2000, 2002), but they also defy predictions that high

achieving students from underperforming schools are destined for failure because they

are ill-prepared for college level academic work.

A third powerful lesson is that the success of percent plans in broadening

educational opportunity beyond high school requires strong outreach efforts to encourage

23

rank-eligible students to apply for admission (Walker & Lavergne, 2001). Having refused

to consider race in college admissions, administrators at Texas A&M well appreciate that

outreach activities are more effective in broadening college access to underrepresented

groups than a uniform admission guarantee (Spencer, 2004). But, even with strong

outreach efforts, Texas flagships have not equalized the enrollment odds of students from

high schools with low college-going traditions compared with students from typical high

schools.

This raises a final dilemma for higher education generally, namely the rising

demographic pressure on higher education as the children of baby boomers reach college

age. Nationally, but even more dramatically in Texas, higher educational opportunities

have not kept pace with the rapid demographic growth. To some extent the admissions

squeeze at the selective Texas public institutions merely reflects the growing demand for

access to the most competitive institutions when most of the growth in post-secondary

opportunities has occurred in two-year colleges. This squeeze only accentuates the

challenge of broadening access to higher education while maintaining standards and

rewarding academic achievement.

24

Sample Mean Feeder

Resource-Affluent Average

Resource-Poor

Longhorn/Century

N 12778 732 3252 5198 1176 2420

Student Characteristics % Female 0.49 0.54 0.50 0.50 0.44 0.50

Race/Ethnicity % Black 0.13 0.04 0.09 0.12 0.06 0.20 % Hispanic 0.37 0.11 0.12 0.30 0.70 0.62 % Asian-American 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.02 % Non-Hispanic White 0.45 0.74 0.65 0.46 0.12 0.08 % Other Race – 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 % Missing – 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.12 0.08

First Thought About College % Always 0.58 0.72 0.65 0.58 0.50 0.46 % Middle High School 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.15 % High School 0.18 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.24 0.25 % Don't Know 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 % Missing 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.09

Socio-Economic Status

Parental Education % Less Than High School 0.17 0.04 0.07 0.13 0.31 0.33 % High School 0.21 0.12 0.20 0.24 0.19 0.22 % Some College 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.24 0.15 0.17 % College and Higher 0.24 0.53 0.33 0.24 0.12 0.07 % Don't Know 0.16 0.07 0.14 0.15 0.23 0.20

Home Ownership % Rent 0.16 0.09 0.10 0.18 0.13 0.24 % Own 0.73 0.87 0.79 0.72 0.70 0.63 % Don't Know/Missing 0.11 0.04 0.11 0.10 0.17 0.13

School Characteristics Percent of Students Who Passed Algebra 34.06 57.00 45.43 28.51 25.57 27.86

(21.29) (23.61) (19.75) (17.74) (24.23) (16.34) Total High School Drop-Out Rate 1.59 0.81 1.01 1.73 1.65 2.25

(1.08) (0.57) (1.03) (0.98) (0.89) (1.07)

Location % North-East 0.25 0.18 0.34 0.19 0.00 0.41 % North-West 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.00 % South-East 0.54 0.82 0.57 0.53 0.85 0.27 % South-West 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.13 0.32

Source: Texas Higher Education Opportunity Project, Senior Wave 1 Data

Appendix 1: Descriptive Statistics for Covariates: Means or Percents

School Type

(standard deviation)

25

Top 10% In Texas Barron's Index obs.CORNELL UNIVERSITY-NY STATE STATUTORY COLLEGES N Most competitive 1DARTMOUTH COLLEGE N Most competitive 1RICE UNIVERSITY Y Most competitive 1UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY N Most competitive 1UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA N Most competitive 1THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN Y Highly competitive 17UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH-MAIN CAMPUS N Highly competitive 1UNIVERSITY OF PUGET SOUND N Highly competitive 1BAYLOR UNIVERSITY Y Very competitive+ 3OUACHITA BAPTIST UNIVERSITY N Very competitive 1SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY, DALLAS TX Y Very competitive 1TEXAS A & M UNIVERSITY Y Very competitive 10UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON-DOWNTOWN Y Noncompetitive 1RICHLAND COLLEGE Y Community College 1TOMBALL COMMUNITY COLLEGE Y Voc. & Trade School 1

2nd 10%UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA N Most competitive 2WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY N Most competitive 1BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY N Highly competitive 3GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY N Highly competitive 1SOUTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY Y Highly competitive 2THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN Y Highly competitive 17BAYLOR UNIVERSITY Y Very competitive + 2SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY Y Very competitive 1SOUTHWEST TEXAS STATE UNIVERSITY Y Very competitive 2TEXAS A & M UNIVERSITY Y Very competitive 15THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS Y Very competitive 1TRINITY UNIVERSITY Y Very competitive 1UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO AT BOULDER N Very competitive 1UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA NORMAN CAMPUS N Very competitive 1EMBRY-RIDDLE AERONAUTICAL UNIVERSITY N Competitive 1STEPHEN F AUSTIN STATE UNIVERSITY Y Competitive 1TEXAS CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY Y Competitive 1TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY Y Competitive 3UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS Y Competitive 1PRAIRIE VIEW A & M UNIVERSITY Y Less competitive 1SAM HOUSTON STATE UNIVERSITY Y Less competitive 1FLORIDA COLLEGE N Noncompetitive 1TEXAS SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY, HOUSTON TX Y Noncompetitive 1UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON-DOWNTOWN Y Noncompetitive 2NORTH HARRIS MONTGOMERY COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST Y Community College 1TOMBALL COMMUNITY COLLEGE Y Voc. & Trade Schools 3

Source: Texas Higher Education Opportunity Project, Senior Wave 1 Data

Appendix 2: College Enrollment: Texas Feeder High School Students by Class Rank

26

Student Characteristics Female 0.5 *** 0.6 *** 1.1 0.7 *** 0.5 *** Missing 1.2 1.2 1.0 0.6 1.3

Race/Ethnicity Black 0.6 *** 0.4 *** 0.5 *** 1.3 * 1.2 Hispanic 1.1 0.9 0.8 ** 0.8 1.0 Asian-American 0.4 *** 1.3 * 0.6 ** 0.7 * 1.3 Other Races 1.5 * 1.0 0.8 1.2 1.3 * Missing 0.8 0.5 0.5 * 1.1 1.6 **

First Thought About College Middle High School 1.8 *** 0.9 1.3 ** 0.9 1.3 *** High School 2.5 *** 0.6 *** 1.8 *** 0.9 1.4 *** Don't Know 6.6 *** 0.5 * 1.3 1.1 2.0 *** Missing 58.4 *** 0.4 0.7 1.0 29.8 ***

Class Rank Top 10% 0.3 *** 4.4 *** 0.3 *** 2.1 *** 0.6 *** Second 10% 0.3 *** 2.2 *** 0.5 *** 1.2 0.6 *** Rank Estimated Dummy 2.4 *** 0.9 1.7 *** 1.2 2.3 ***

Socio-Economic Status

Parental Education Less Than High School 1.4 *** 0.7 ** 1.2 1.1 1.5 Some College 0.7 *** 1.0 0.8 ** 1.0 1.0 College and Higher 0.5 *** 1.4 *** 0.5 *** 1.5 *** 1.0 Don't Know 1.4 *** 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.9 ***

Home Ownership Rent 1.4 *** 0.8 1.0 1.1 0.9 Don't Know/Missing 1.5 *** 0.9 1.2 1.1 1.1

School Characteristics

Percent of Students Who Passed Algebra 1.00 1.01 ** 1.00 1.01 *** 1.00 ** Total High School Drop-Out Rate 1.07 * 1.02 1.03 0.99 1.09

School Type Feeder 0.7 ** 2.2 *** 0.4 *** 2.8 *** 1.0 Resource-Affluent 0.8 * 1.3 ** 0.7 *** 1.5 *** 1.1 Resource-Poor 0.6 *** 0.5 *** 0.8 * 0.5 *** 0.7 *** Longhorn/Century 1.2 ** 0.8 0.9 1.3 * 0.8

Location North-East 1.2 * 0.8 1.4 *** 1.6 *** 1.1 North-West 0.6 *** 0.3 *** 1.8 *** 1.8 *** 0.8 South-West 0.7 *** 0.7 ** 0.5 *** 2.2 *** 1.0

Source: Texas Higher Education Opportunity Project, Senior Wave 1&2 Data

No Preference

Appendix 3: Relative Risk Ratios for 1st College Preference:Texas Public High School Seniors, 2002

(Other Texas 4-Year is the comparison group)

No College UT/A&M TX 2-Yr Non-TX

27

Student Characteristics Female 0.9 0.7 *** 1.3 *** 1.1 Missing 1.0 1.3 1.4 0.8

Race/Ethnicity Black 0.5 *** 0.5 ** 0.6 *** 1.2 Hispanic 0.9 0.7 * 1.0 0.6 * Asian-American 0.7 * 1.2 0.8 0.4 *** Other Races 0.6 0.8 0.5 * 1.1 Missing 0.4 * 0.7 0.7 1.5

First Thought About College Middle High School 1.5 *** 0.8 1.2 1.0 High School 2.7 *** 0.4 *** 1.5 *** 1.0 Don't Know 3.7 *** 0.7 1.6 * 0.9 Missing 4.4 *** 1.1 1.4 * 1.3

Class Rank Top 10% 0.2 *** 16.7 *** 0.2 *** 2.0 *** Second 10% 0.3 *** 5.0 *** 0.4 *** 0.9 Rank Estimated Dummy 2.7 *** 0.4 ** 2.0 *** 1.4

Socio-Economic Status

Parental Education Less Than High School 1.5 ** 1.0 1.4 ** 1.3 Some College 0.6 *** 1.3 0.9 0.9 College and Higher 0.3 *** 1.5 * 0.7 *** 1.3 Don't Know 1.4 * 1.2 1.7 *** 1.6

Home Ownership Rent 1.6 *** 0.6 * 1.0 0.8 Don't Know/Missing 1.0 1.1 0.8 1.0

School Characteristics

Percent of Students Who Passed Algebra 1.00 1.00 1.01 ** 1.02 *** Total High School Drop-Out Rate 0.98 0.92 0.95 0.89

School Type Feeder 0.3 *** 3.0 *** 0.5 *** 2.0 ** Resource-Affluent 0.7 ** 1.5 * 0.9 1.3 Resource-Poor 0.8 0.4 ** 0.7 * 0.3 ** Longhorn/Century 2.0 *** 0.9 1.6 *** 1.3

Location North-East 1.2 0.6 ** 1.7 *** 1.9 *** North-West 1.1 0.3 ** 1.3 3.3 *** South-West 1.0 0.5 ** 1.1 2.7 ***

Source: Texas Higher Education Opportunity Project, Senior Wave 1&2 Data

Appendix 4: Relative Risk Ratios for Actual Enrollment:Texas Public High School Seniors, 2002

Not Enrolled UT/A&M TX 2-Yr Non-TX

(Other Texas 4-Year is the comparison group)

28

Endnotes

i Hopwood v. University of Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (1996) ii Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) iii Anticipating an enrollment squeeze as the demand for automatic admission rose, in 2000 UT President Larry Faulkner temporarily increased the size of the freshman class, but this increase was rescinded in 2002 as the University exceeded its carrying capacity (see Faulkner, 2000; Jayson, 2003b). iv In a highly provocative article published in the NYT Magazine (April 14, 2002), Jim Yardley reported on twin sisters who were graduating from an elite Texas public high school. One twin was admitted automatically to UT, but her sister was initially deferred and she did not get in to her preferred major when she was later admitted. Noting that both were admitted to University of North Carolina and both were committed to attend the same institution, Yardley implied the “brain drain” hypothesis. Subsequent allegations have been more direct. v Grutter v. Bollinger, see note 2. vi See note 2. vii SAT I and ACT tests are not used in course placement decisions, but SAT II and other tests may be so used. E-mail, Gary Lavergne, 16 January 2003. viii Institutions actually have more control over the overall enrollment cap than they concede because they can modify the number of transfer or graduate students, but the overall carrying capacity is bound by physical infrastructure. ix In 1996 the practice of automatically admitting applicants who were ranked in the top ten percent of their class was changed because the Faculty Council and the University Admissions Committee wanted a rigorous admission process that was more consistent with a selective school. Essays were used for the first time in 1996. These changes were underway totally independent of the court case about affirmative action. x Of these, three schools were ineligible because they were special-needs schools, and 98 of the remaining 105 schools cooperated by permitting in-class administration of the survey (86) or providing student addresses (12) so that a mail survey could be administered. Only two of the non-cooperating schools were outright refusals and the remaining five were long-term recalcitrant. The school-level cooperation rate of 93.3 percent (98/105) is considered outstanding. xi Higher ranked students are more likely to know their class rank, to state an institutional preference, and to actually enroll in college, which also contributes to the disproportionate share classified as top decile graduates among college-bound students, but so too does upward bias in response error. xii Longhorn and Century schools were targeted by UT and A&M, respectively, based on two criteria, namely high shares of economically disadvantaged students and low college-going traditions. Many of these schools have high concentrations of minority students. See Goodman, 2003.

29

References

Bowen, W. G. & Bok, D. (1998). The shape of the river: Long-term Consequences of considering race in college and university admissions. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Coleman, J.S. (1990). Equality and achievement in education. Boulder: Westview Press. Cortes, K., Tienda, M., & Niu, S. (2004, October). Diversity by design or default: Race and ethnic differences in college enrollment under Texas top 10% law. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Associate for Public Policy Analysis and Management, Atlanta, GA. Faulkner, L. R. (2000, October 25). ‘Top 10 percent’ helps students. San Antonio Express-News, p. 5B. Faulkner, L. R. (2002, April 5). Class rank predicts student success. USA Today, p. 11A. Flores, M. (2003, September 26). Senator wants college rule axed; Official: Automatic admission for top 10% in high schools is unfair. San Antonio Express News, p. 1B. Goodman, K. (2003). Longhorn scholars program opens avenues for underrepresented students in Texas. Diversity Digest 7(3), 1-3. Glater, J. (2004, June 13). Diversity plan shaped in Texas is under attack. New York Times, p. A1. Irving, C. (2004). Texas returns to affirmative action: Readjustment and confusion in the aftermath of recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions. National Crosstalk, 12(1), 1, 15-16. Jayson, S. (2003a, March 25). Top 10% students pack UT’s fall roster. Austin American-Statesman, p. A1. Jayson, S. (2003b, September 16). UT is smaller but still biggest; Freshman class has greater proportion of minorities than 2002. Austin American-Statesman, p. A1. Jencks, C. (1988). Whom must we treat equally for educational opportunity to be equal. Ethics 98(3), 518-533. Jones, B. W., Olson, T. B., Boyd, Jr., R. F., Clement, P. D., & Salmons, D. B. (2002a). Brief for the United States as amicus curiae supporting petitioner, Grutter v. Bollinger. Accessed Online (July 21, 2004) at: http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/02-241/02-241.mer.ami.usa.pdf. Jones, B. W., Olson, T. B., Boyd, Jr., R. F., Clement, P. D., & Salmons, D. B. (2002b). Brief for the United States as amicus curiae supporting petitioner, Gratz v. Bollinger. Accessed Online (July 21, 2004) at: http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/02-516/02-516.mer.ami.usa.pdf.

30

Karen, D. (2002). Changes in access to higher education in the United States: 1980-1992. Sociology of Education 75, 191-210. Lavergne, G. M. & Walker, B. (2003). Implementation and results of the Texas automatic admissions law at the University of Texas at Austin. Austin: University of Texas at Austin, Office of Admissions Research. Leicht, K. & Sullivan, T. A. (2000). Minority student pipelines before and after the challenges to affirmative action. Available Online at: http://www.texastop10.princeton.edu/publications/leicht052500.pdf. Manski, C. F. & Wise, D. (1983). College choice in America. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. McDonough, P. M. (1997). Choosing colleges: How social class and schools structure opportunity. Albany: State University of New York Press. Montejano, D. (2001). Access to the University of Texas at Austin and the ten percent plan: A three-year assessment. Austin: University of Texas at Austin. Nissimov, R. (2003, June 24). Supreme Court actions; UT to reintroduce race-based criteria; President wants cap on ‘top 10 percent’ students. The Houston Chronicle, p. A4. Nissimov, R. (2000, June 4). Meet Russell Crake; He graduated from Bellaire High School with a 3.94 GPA and an SAT Score of 1240. So why is he holding a rejection letter from the University of Texas?; Students run into top 10 percent law. The Houston Chronicle, p. A1. Niu, S., Tienda, M., & Cortes, K. (2004, April). College selectivity and the Texas Top 10% Law: How constrained are the options? Paper presented at the 2004 annual meetings of the Population Association of America, Boston, MA. Orfield, G. & Lee, C. (2004). Brown at 50: Dream or Plessy’s nightmare? Unpublished manuscript, The Civil Rights Project, Harvard University, Cambridge. Rooney, C. (1998, September). Test scores do not equal merit: Enhancing equity & excellence in college admissions by deemphasizing SAT and ACT results. Cambridge: The National Center for Fair and Open Testing. Spencer, J. (2004, November 20). A&M President pitches school to minorities; Gates pays visit to area students as university tries to boost diversity. Houston Chronicle, p. B3. Texas Education Agency [TEA]. (2001). Pocket Edition: Texas Public School Statistics. Austin: Texas Education Agency Division of Performance Reporting.

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Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board [THECB]. (2003). Participation and Success Forecast, 2003-2015: Texas Institutions of Higher Education. Austin: Division of Planning and Information Resources. Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board [THECB]. (1998). Report on the effects of the Hopwood decision on minority applications, offers, and enrollments at public institutions of higher education in Texas. Austin: Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board. Tienda, M. (2001). College admissions policies and the educational pipeline: Implications for medical and health professions. In B. D. Smedley, A. Y. Stith, L. Colburn, & C. H. Evans (Eds.), The right thing to do, the smart thing to do: Enhancing diversity in health professions (pp. 117-142). Washington, DC: National Academy Press for the Institute of Medicine. Tienda, M. & Niu, S. (2004, February). Capitalizing on segregation; Pretending neutrality: College admissions and the Texas top 10% law. Paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Seattle, WA. Tienda, M., Leicht, K., Sullivan, T., Maltese, M., and Lloyd, K. (2003). Closing the gap? Admissions & enrollments at the Texas public flagships before and after affirmative action. Unpublished manuscript, Princeton University, Princeton. University of Texas (UT) Office of Public Affairs. (2003, June). Incoming freshman class at The University of Texas at Austin to have highest academic qualifications, largest Hispanic representation. Austin: University of Texas. Walker, B. & Lavergne, G. (2001). Affirmative action and percent plans: What we learned in Texas. The College Board Review 193, 18-23. Wolfson, M. (2004, June 25). Universities urge caps to top 10 percent rule: Schools want flexibility in admissions. Corpus Christi Caller-Times. p. B3. Yardley, J. (2002, April 14). Desperately seeking diversity: The 10 percent solution. The New York Times, p. 28 (Education Life Supplement).

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% College Bound UT/A&M Other TX 4-Yr TX 2-Yr Non-TX Unspecified Na

All SeniorsFeeder 89 23 33 4 26 14 656Resource-Affluent 79 15 34 14 14 23 2683Average 74 13 37 19 10 21 3874Resource-Poor 74 7 46 19 5 23 872Longhorn/Century 63 8 39 19 12 22 1531Total 75 13 37 16 13 21 9691

Top 10%Feeder 97 36 20 0 38 6 109Resource-Affluent 97 39 29 4 21 8 445Average 95 31 38 5 17 9 699Resource-Poor 91 18 53 9 8 10 164Longhorn/Century 84 21 45 8 16 11 260Total 94 31 36 5 19 9 1667

Second DecileFeeder 96 43 20 7 28 7 118Resource-Affluent 92 22 46 9 13 10 529Average 87 13 46 17 11 13 764Resource-Poor 87 10 50 18 5 17 180Longhorn/Century 80 6 48 17 14 15 281Total 88 17 44 13 13 12 1872

1st College Preference Among College-Bound

Table 1: 1st College Preference and Actual Enrollment:

(in percent) Texas College Bound/Going Public High School Seniors in 2002 by School Type and Class Rank

33

% College Going UT/A&M Other TX 4-Yr TX 2-Yr Non-TX Nb

All SeniorsFeeder 88 23 43 17 17 295Resource-Affluent 76 13 34 43 10 1191Average 73 10 38 44 7 1703Resource-Poor 67 5 47 46 2 378Longhorn/Century 61 6 29 58 7 679Total 73 12 37 43 9 4246

Top 10%Feeder 93 64 10 4 22 46Resource-Affluent 97 41 32 13 14 230Average 97 35 42 11 12 372Resource-Poor 85 17 69 10 3 70Longhorn/Century 80 22 40 25 13 144Total 93 36 39 12 13 862

Second DecileFeeder 90 47 27 3 22 67Resource-Affluent 78 17 43 31 8 228Average 87 9 49 33 8 363Resource-Poor 76 6 50 40 4 72Longhorn/Century 82 3 30 61 6 149Total 83 14 43 34 9 879

Source: Texas Higher Education Opportunity Project, Senior Wave 1 & 2 DataaCollege BoundbCollege Going

College Enrolled Among College-Going

Table 1: Continued

34

All SeniorsFeeder 0.7 ** 2.2 *** 0.4 *** 2.8 *** 1.0Resource-Affluent 0.8 * 1.3 ** 0.7 *** 1.5 *** 1.1Resource-Poor 0.6 *** 0.5 *** 0.8 * 0.5 *** 0.7 ***Longhorn/Century 1.2 * 0.8 0.9 1.3 * 0.8

Top 10% GraduatesFeeder 1.9 2.1 * 0.0 3.6 *** 1.6Resource-Affluent 1.3 1.7 ** 0.5 2.1 *** 1.8 *Resource-Poor 1.0 0.4 *** 1.4 0.5 * 0.9Longhorn/Century 3.7 *** 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.3

Second 10% GraduatesFeeder 0.9 3.9 *** 0.3 4.4 *** 1.2Resource-Affluent 0.5 ** 1.5 * 0.3 *** 1.4 1.1Resource-Poor 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.6 1.0Longhorn/Century 1.8 * 1.4 0.8 1.7 * 1.2

All SeniorsFeeder 0.3 *** 3.0 *** 0.5 *** 2.0 **Resource-Affluent 0.7 ** 1.5 * 0.9 1.3Resource-Poor 0.8 0.4 ** 0.7 * 0.3 **Longhorn/Century 2.0 *** 0.9 1.6 *** 1.3

Top 10% GraduatesFeeder 1.7 2.3 0.9 2.3Resource-Affluent 1.5 1.4 0.9 1.5Resource-Poor 2.0 0.2 *** 0.6 0.2 *Longhorn/Century 4.8 ** 0.7 3.3 ** 0.9

Second 10% GraduatesFeeder 0.6 4.5 *** 0.3 3.8 **Resource-Affluent 0.6 1.5 0.7 1.2Resource-Poor 2.0 1.2 1.1 0.8Longhorn/Century 2.1 * 1.7 2.9 *** 1.8

Source: Texas Higher Education Opportunity Project, Senior Wave 1&2 Data*** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05aModels include individual characteristics, socio-economic status, school charateristics and location. See Appendix 1.The model for all seniors also includes class rank.bTypical high school is reference category

Table 2: Relative Risk Ratios for 1st College Preference and Actual Enrollment by School Type:Texas Public High School Seniors, 2002a

UT/A&M TX 2-Yr Non-TX No PreferenceNo College1st College Preference

(Other 4-Year Texas Institution is Reference Category)

College Enrollment

High School Typeb and Class Rank Stratum

Not Enrolled UT/A&M TX 2-Yr Non-TX

All SeniorsSecond Decile 1.3 0.5 *** 1.7 *** 0.5 *** 1.1Third Decile and Below 3.7 *** 0.2 *** 3.2 *** 0.5 *** 1.8 ***

FeederSecond Decile 0.9 0.9 c 0.6 1.0Third Decile and Below 1.3 0.2 *** c 0.3 *** 1.3

Resource-AffluentSecond Decile 0.7 0.4 *** 1.5 0.3 *** 0.8Third Decile and Below 3.5 *** 0.1 *** 5.1 *** 0.3 *** 1.5 *

AverageSecond Decile 2.1 ** 0.4 *** 2.1 *** 0.5 *** 1.2Third Decile and Below 6.8 *** 0.2 *** 3.1 *** 0.5 *** 2.0 ***

Resource-PoorSecond Decile 1.8 0.7 1.5 0.5 1.7Third Decile and Below 4.7 *** 0.3 ** 2.7 ** 0.5 1.8

Longhorn/CenturySecond Decile 1.3 0.5 * 1.9 1.0 1.2Third Decile and Below 2.7 *** 0.3 *** 3.4 *** 0.8 1.7 *

All SeniorsSecond Decile 1.5 ** 0.3 *** 2.0 *** 0.5 ***Third Decile and Below 5.7 *** 0.1 *** 4.6 *** 0.5 ***

FeederSecond Decile 0.6 1.0 0.5 0.6Third Decile and Below 2.2 0.1 *** 2.5 0.5

Resource-AffluentSecond Decile 0.7 0.4 *** 1.9 * 0.4 **Third Decile and Below 3.6 *** 0.1 *** 5.9 *** 0.5 **

AverageSecond Decile 2.3 ** 0.2 *** 2.1 *** 0.4 **Third Decile and Below 10.2 *** 0.0 *** 5.3 *** 0.4 ***

Resource-PoorSecond Decile 2.1 0.4 5.0 ** 0.8Third Decile and Below 3.4 ** 0.1 ** 10.7 *** 1.3

Longhorn/CenturySecond Decile 1.6 0.2 ** 2.0 * 0.9Third Decile and Below 6.9 *** 0.0 *** 3.6 *** 0.9

Source: Texas Higher Education Opportunity Project, Senior Wave 1 & 2 Data*** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05aModels include individual characteristics, socio-economic status, school charateristics and location. See Appendix 1.The model for all seniors also includes class rank. bTypical high school is reference categorycCoefficients are too big to be meaningful due to the tiny number of top decile feeder school students who prefer a 2-year Texas institution.

1st College PreferenceNo Preference

Table 3: Relative Risk Ratios for 1st Preference and Actual Enrollment School Type and Class Rank:Texas Public High School Seniors, 2002a

High School Typeb and Class Rank Stratum UT/A&M TX 2-Yr Non-TXNo College

(Other 4-Year Texas Institution is Reference Category)

College EnrollmentNot Enrolled UT/A&M TX 2-Yr Non-TX

35

36

1st College Preference UT/A&M Other TX 4-Yr TX 2-Yr Non-TX Unspecified N

All Seniors UT/A&M 9 34 6 9 42 1296 Other TX 4-Yr 7 33 8 5 47 3730 TX 2-Yr 4 28 14 3 52 1353 Non-TX 7 19 4 25 46 1131 Unspecified 0 1 0 0 99 2133

Feeder School Seniors UT/A&M 8 32 6 18 35 179 Non-TX 8 9 0 36 47 147

Feeder School Top 10% Seniors UT/A&M 4 15 0 45 36 48 Non-TX 14 2 0 28 57 36

Feeder School Second 10% Seniors UT/A&M 14 24 0 7 54 52 Non-TX 7 8 0 29 56 30

Source: Texas Higher Education Opportunity Project, Senior Wave 1 Data

2nd College Preference

Table 4: Cross-Classification of 1st by 2nd College Preference: Texas College Bound Public High school Seniors, 2002

(in percent)

37

1st College Preference Not Enrolled UT/A&M Other TX 4-Yr TX 2-Yr Non-TX N

All Seniors UT/A&M 5 62 13 19 1 621 Other TX 4-Yr 7 1 66 24 2 1740 TX 2-Yr 25 0 3 71 1 526 Non-TX 13 5 13 18 51 492 Unspecified 24 3 22 47 4 866

Feeder School Seniors UT/A&M 4 74 13 9 0 91 Non-TX 21 3 14 16 47 62

Feeder School Top 10% Seniors UT/A&M 0 100 0 0 0 24 Non-TX 22 9 3 8 59 13

Feeder School Second Decile Seniors UT/A&M 0 96 2 2 0 34 Non-TX 32 0 3 2 62 13

Source: Texas Higher Education Opportunity Project, Senior Wave 1&2 Data

Table 5: Cross-Classification of 1st College Preference by Actual Enrollment: Texas College Going Public High school Seniors, 2002

Actual Enrollment

(in percent)