This case was written by James Costantini, Affiliate Professor of Strategy at INSEAD. It is intended to be used as a basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation.
Additional material about INSEAD case studies (e.g., videos, spreadsheets, links) can be accessed at cases.insead.edu.
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“Flat screens are everywhere, but no one earns money making them.”1
“I thought turning around the PlayStation business was going to be the toughest challenge of my career, but I guess not… It's one issue after another.”
Kaz Hira, head of Sony’s television business, on the challenge of restoring profitability2
“No, I am not feeling the pricing pressure from the big consumer electronics companies… We have already been aggressive at passing on price reductions. It's a race to zero... We are here to stay.”
Laynie Newsome, co-founder and vice president of sales, Vizio, an entrant in the US market3
Flat-screen televisions have become increasingly popular, with retail sales of televisions growing around 9% per year from 2005 to 2010 to reach $180 billion (see Exhibit 1). Initially the main technologies were plasma and liquid-crystal display (LCD), LCD emerging as the dominant technology (see Exhibit 2). More recently, televisions based on light-emitting diodes (LED) have become popular, and other screen technologies such as organic light-emitting diodes (OLED) are on the horizon. The shift from old-style television sets primarily based on cathode-ray tubes (CRT) coincided with a more general shift from analogue to digital technology, in part driven by the adoption of digital broadcasting signals around the world.4 The appeal of large flat-screens is strong, with peaks in interest around major sporting events such as the soccer World Cup. Flat-screen televisions have become increasingly affordable thanks to a substantial price decline over time and rising incomes in emerging markets. But despite the growing market, the performance of TV manufacturers has diverged. Globally, Samsung has risen to industry leadership, displacing Sony (see Exhibit 3) which suffers on-going losses in its television division.5 The competitive dynamics vary across geographic markets. In the US, for example, new entrant Vizio gained over 10% market share within a few years of entry.6
Larger & Cheaper Televisions...
In the early 2000s, flat-screen televisions were primarily smaller LCD televisions or larger plasma televisions. Over the course of the decade, LCD screen producers, in particular Sharp, Samsung and LG, stood out by making larger and larger screens. For Sharp, construction of a $1.4 billion LCD plant in Kameyana, Japan, in 2001 allowed cost-effective production of
1 “Cracking up”, The Economist, 21 January 2012 2 “New Sony Chief Executive Reveals Fast-Forward Plans”, by Daisuke Wakabayashi, The Wall Street
Journal, February 2012 3 “TV Makers Confront a Shakeout --- Big Manufacturers Start to Squeeze Smaller Rivals as Sales, Prices
Shrink”, by Daisuke Wakabayashi and Christopher Lawton, The Wall Street Journal, 20 January 2009 4 “TV makers predict sharp jump in sales”, by Robert Harding, Financial Times, 14 May 2010 5 “Sony warns of grim picture for TVs”, by Jonathan Soble, Financial Times, 21 December 2010 6 “Vizio eclipses bigger rivals in LCD TV sales”, by Chris Nuttall, Financial Times, 23 November 2007
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larger screens.7 Each new generation of manufacturing plants tended to enable production of larger screens (see Exhibit 4), but new plants required substantial investment, running to billions of euros, and the co-location of key suppliers, such as for glass.8 However, as each generation of screens matured, prices declined, partly due to screen producers learning how to cut costs and partly to stronger competition as more and more screen producers started production. For instance, by late 2007 Sharp, Sony and Samsung were producing high volumes of 52" LCD televisions to compete with plasma televisions, whereas most generic LCD manufacturers made televisions with smaller screens of up to 47".9 Year-on-year price declines (for the same screen size) of 20-30% were not unusual (see Exhibits 5 and 6).10
Screens were a key input to the manufacture of televisions owing to the proportion of cost they accounted for (see Exhibit 7). Manufacturers that wanted the latest, largest screens early in the 2000s could secure access to supply by establishing joint venture agreements with screen producers, such as Sony’s joint ventures to source screens from Sharp and Samsung.11 Plasma screens also increased in size over time, requiring similar levels of investment in plant and equipment. By the end of the decade, sales of LCD-based televisions had grown much faster than plasma-based televisions. In the last quarter of 2008, year-on-year sales growth was 64% for LCD versus 6% for plasma.12
However, to the average consumer the difference between similarly large, flat televisions was not always clear. Commenting on Vizio selling televisions at almost half the price of the major manufacturers in 2007, industry analyst Eric Haruki from IDC noted that: “The big boys are keeping their prices fairly high, but the mainstream public is saying 'I just want a flat TV, and I can't see much of a difference' in quality”. 13 Indeed, “Some call retail displays the ‘wall of death’ because it is so hard for a model to stand out.” 14
In response to this challenge, leading manufacturers of flat-screen televisions made substantial investments in research and development, mainly to improve image quality, features, design and thinness. Marketing involved major media campaigns as well as trade support. Sony, for example, invested $160 million from 2005 to 2007 in its European advertising campaign.15 Sharp emphasized that screens for its televisions were “Made in
7 “Sharp Focuses on Manufacturing - A $9 Billion Plant In Japan Will Make LCD, Solar Panels, by Yukari
Iwatani Kane, The Wall Street Journal, 9 July 2008 8 “Sharp to invest Y380bn in LCD plant”, by Mariko Sanchanta, Financial Times, 1 August 2007 9 “The Picture Gets Fuzzy For TV Deals --- Holiday Discounting Slows As Supply Glut Dwindles; In LCDs,
Bigger Looks Better”, by Christopher Lawton, The Wall Street Journal, 6 December 2007 10 “Firms Navigate New Order of LCD-TV Dominance”, by Yukari Iwatani Kane, The Wall Street Journal,
22 December 2007 11 “Sony, Sharp Form Venture to Make LCD-TV Panels”, by Yukari Iwatani Kane, The Wall Street Journal,
27 February 2008 12 “Matsushita to build LCD factory”, by Mariko Sanchanta, Financial Times, 18 February 2008 13 “Sony Unveils New HD TVs for Holiday Push”, by Yukari Iwatani Kane, The Wall Street Journal, 30
August 2007 14 “Is Even-Higher Definition Next Big Thing for TVs?”, by Don Clark, The Wall Street Journal, 8 January
2008 15 “Sony Paints in Lavish Hues to Sell LCDs”, by Jorge Valencia, The Wall Street Journal, 3 August 2007
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Japan” at its own factories.16 Some manufacturers provided funding to retailers for special in-store displays and service provision, such as dedicated areas or shop-in-shops that might display of a range of products (not just televisions) supported by dedicated staff.
Manufacturers also sought to provide features that differentiated their products, such as an emphasis by the major players on 3D, which was expected to increasingly feature on televisions (see Exhibit 8). Different types of 3D systems were promoted, for instance Samsung’s active-shutter glasses versus LG’s passive glasses.17 Sony’s involvement with 3D was extensive, beyond televisions to include working with film studios and providing other equipment such as cameras.
In the competition to introduce televisions with the newest screen technologies such as LED and OLED,18 Samsung was an early mover (in 2010) into LED backlighting, which allowed for thinner LCD televisions that also used less power.19 By the end of 2011, most US shoppers wanted an LED television, taking the lead from LCD20 (see Exhibit 9). Sony made an early investment in OLED screens but manufacturing costs remained high and screen size small. While continuing to invest in OLED, from early 2012 Sony was displaying products based on a different technology, Crystal LED Display, that provided better contrast, thinner frames and lower energy consumption.21 By 2010, Samsung and LG were increasing their investments in OLED as a potential next-generation screen technology, displaying products in early 2012 with the aim of starting commercial sales in late 2012.22
...and Link to Online Services…
Input for ‘what’s on’ television came from terrestrial broadcasts, cable and satellite TV, devices such as DVD players and game machines and, more recently, computers. With the increasing use of the internet and penetration of broadband came a greater focus on linking televisions to the internet so that choice of content was through the TV interface, with corresponding forecasts for the growth of internet-enabled televisions in the future (see Exhibit 10).
In early 2008, Panasonic announced the sale of internet-connected televisions in the US. Yoshi Yamada, chief executive of Panasonic Corp of North America, commented: “As manufacturers, we don't like a commodity-only business. We need to add some value for
16 “Sharp Makes Cellphone Push Into China --- Other Japanese Makers Have Quit the Market; The TV-Set
Connection”, by Yukari Iwatani Kane, The Wall Street Journal, 13 June 2008 17 “TV set makers jostle to realize 3D vision”, by Jonathan Soble and Song Jung-a, Financial Times, 29
September 2010 ; “Samsung, LG Takes Different Tack on 3-D Glasses”, by Daisuke Wakabayashi, The Wall Street Journal, 10 January 2011
18 “TV's Next Big Things: Television-set makers are looking for cutting-edge features to lure consumers; Here's what's coming”, by Christopher Lawton, The Wall Street Journal, 8 December 2008
19 “Internet and 3D force TV makers to think outside the box”, by Chris Nuttall, Financial Times, 1 June 2010 20 “LED-Backlit TVs Now Preferred by More US TV Buyers “, by Lisa Hatamiya, IHS iSuppli Research, 2
February 2012 21 “Sony Taps New Type of Screen for TV Sets”, by Daisuke Wakabayashi, The Wall Street Journal, 10
January 2012 22 “Samsung and LG display shared screen vision”, by Song Jung-a, Financial Times, 8 July 2010; “The
future of gadgets is all about simplicity”, Nuttall, Chris, Financial Times, 13 January 2012
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consumers – and anything content-related is adding value”23 Linking to Google’s internet-based television service was one approach leveraged by manufacturers. In 2010, Sony started to sell televisions compatible with this service.24 By 2012, Samsung, LG and Vizio were planning to include the Google service in some of their televisions. Manufacturers were not exclusive in their partnerships: for instance, Sony and Vizio also collaborated with Yahoo on its service for televisions.25 Samsung also made investments and partnerships in firms developing advertising for connected televisions, as did other major TV manufacturers.26 Apple was expected to make a move into smart TVs.27
…but Mixed Outcomes for Manufacturers
From the end of the 1990s, when CRT televisions still dominated the market, the competitive landscape had evolved. Two major players had emerged, Samsung and LG. Samsung invested aggressively in LCD and plasma technology, starting at the end of the 1990s, and continued to invest to increase screen size. It leveraged internal collaboration between component businesses (such as screen production) and finished products, and in sales and marketing focused collaboration and support, e.g., on large electrical retailers in the US.28
Other players had exited or substantially restructured. For instance, the slower growth in plasma had put added pressure on some players. In 2007 Funai exited plasma televisions.29 Pioneer, an early entrant into plasma televisions, restructured its TV business by stopping production of plasma screens: “Our TVs sell for about twice as much as competitors . . . we had to do something to cut costs,” said President Tamihiko Sudo.30
Panasonic, the leader in plasma, had increased its investment in LCD televisions. In early 2008, plans were for investment of Y300 billion ($2.8bn) in an LCD factory that would start producing in 2010, while continuing to expand plasma production.31 However, by late 2011, Panasonic was scaling back output of panels by almost half and closing production lines in
23 “All eyes switch to 'smart' televisions”, by Mariko Sanchanta and Paul Taylor, Financial Times, 9 January
2008 24 “Sony warns of grim picture for TVs”, by Jonathan Soble, Financial Times, 21 December 2010 25 “Google Adds LG to List Of Television Makers Using Its Technology”, by Shara Tibken and Don Clark,
The Wall Street Journal, 6 January 2012; “Samsung To Sell Google TV”, by Jung-Ah Lee, The Wall Street Journal , 10 January 2012
26 “Samsung participated in a $12 million round of financing for YuMe and partnered with Tremor Video: “Advertisers Tune In to Web-Connected TV Sets”, by Ty McMahan, The Wall Street Journal, 30 November 2011
27 “All eyes on Google and Apple's smart-TV battle: Web-ready sets to become key for technology firms: LG will unveil Android TV at Vegas electronics show”, Juliette Garside, The Guardian, 7 January 2012
28 “Sony versus Samsung”, Sea-Jin Chang, 2008, John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pte. Ltd., Singapore, pgs. 55-58 and 76-77
29 “Firms Navigate New Order Of LCD-TV Dominance”, by Yukari Iwatani Kane, The Wall Street Journal, 22 December 2007
30 “Pioneer Expects Plasma-Panel Loss”, The Wall Street Journal, 8 March 2008 31 “Matsushita to build LCD factory”, by Mariko Sanchanta, Financial Times, 18 February 2008
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Japan. Losses were driven primarily by the decline in prices, which accounted for six times the decline in profits compared to the effect of the strong yen.32
Competitive dynamics varied by geographic market. In the US, Vizio had entered the market in the early 2000s and by 2007 had 13% market share, with a staff of around 90 (see timeline in Exhibit 11). According to vice-president of sales, Laynie Newsome, “…it will be difficult for larger competitors to continuously pass along similar value propositions to Vizio HDTVs when you consider their massive operating and marketing expenses. We are very lean and mean, and we make decisions and react to the latest in product development very quickly”33 (see vision, mission and core values in Exhibit 12). By 2009, staff had increased to 300. Sales grew from $142 million in 2005 to $2.5 billion in 2009 (the profitability of privately held Vizio is not disclosed).34
Some Asian contract manufacturers had increased their commitment to the television industry. For instance, Amtran had an equity stake in Vizio. Electronic products maker Hon Hai moved into TV manufacturing by acquiring some of Sony’s production facilities and some related technologies.35 Hong Kong-based TPV Technology, the largest manufacturer of computer screens, aimed to build a TV business, relying on a large manufacturing base in China as well as around 1,000 engineers on its staff, of which half worked on televisions.36 Starting out as a contract manufacturer, such as to major retailers, TPV expanded beyond contract manufacturing through a joint venture with Philips. TPV became the majority partner in 2011 as part of Philips’ exit from the television business.37
During the 2000s, Sony slipped to second place behind Samsung in terms of market share. Sony had risen to industry leadership in the 1970s based on its Trinitron television technology. The transition to flat-screen televisions had proved challenging: for the five years to Q4 2011, Sony’s TV division recorded an operating profit in just one quarter, despite repeated attempts at restructuring.38 In 2007, Sony blamed poor performance on placing too much emphasis on rear-projection televisions, which had poor sales.39 In 2008, it sought to restore profitability by standardising designs and increasing its presence in lower-end televisions, while still hoping to restore its position as top producer of flat-screen televisions.40 However, despite sales growth of 33% of LCD televisions in the year to March
32 “Panasonic forecasts $5bn full-year loss”, by Jonathan Soble, Financial Times, 31 October 2011;
“Restructuring Costs Weigh on Panasonic Results; Electronics Maker Posts Loss Due to TV and Chip Restructuring”, by Juro Osawa , Wall Street Journal, 1 November 2011
33 “Vizio eclipses bigger rivals in LCD TV sales”, by Chris Nuttall, Financial Times, 23 November 2007 34 “Consumer Electronics Show: Vizio Extends Battle Plan --- Company to Unveil Tablet, Cellphone With
Same Strategy as Its Low-Cost TVs” by Yukari Iwatani Kane, The Wall Street Journal, 3 January 2011 35 “Japan tunes into Taiwanese plants”, by Robin Kwong in Taipei, Kathrin Hille in Beijing and Robin
Harding in Tokyo, Financial Times, 31 May 2010; “China Takes Leading Role in TVs” by Lorraine Luk, The Wall Street Journal, 10 June 2010
36 “TPV poised for assault on TV market”, by Peter Marsh in London, Financial Times, 26 May 2008 37 “Philips Sells Majority of its TV Stake to Focus on New Growth Areas”, Euromonitor International, 19
April 2011 38 “Sony warns of grim picture for TVs”, by Jonathan Soble, Financial Times, 21 December 2010 39 “Firms Navigate New Order of LCD-TV Dominance”, by Yukari Iwatani Kane, The Wall Street Journal,
22 December 2007 40 “Sony plans $18bn BRIC push”, by Jonathan Soble, Financial Times, 26 June 2008
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2008, the TV business remained unprofitable,41 in part due to broader economic conditions: “Even though we were able to improve our own standing with the restructuring plans, the market conditions have worsened to the point that it overtook those improvements,” said Naofumi Hara, a senior vice-president at Sony. “The No. 1 factor is that the economic environment has gotten far worse than we expected.”42 In 2010, Sony sold part of its manufacturing plants to Hon Hai, aiming to increase outsourcing of production from about 20% to 50%.43 However, the cost savings, and a 60% increase in LCD volumes, were not enough to compensate for declining prices.44 Sony exited the panel supply joint-venture with Samsung so as to purchase cheaper panels on the open market, part of a major shift over time in sourcing of panels (Exhibit 13).45 In late 2011, Sony re-set its target medium-run sales to 20 million units, half the level planned two years earlier.46 A key driver of the changes during 2011 was the new head of its TV division, Kaz Hirai, who took charge in April 2011. In January 2012 he was promoted to CEO (with effect from April 2012) to replace Howard Stringer, who remained as chairman.47
For all Sony’s struggles, even industry-leader Samsung lost money in televisions in 2011, despite strong growth, and was reportedly considering exit from production of LCD panels so as to focus on OLED panels.48
41 “Sony Profit Is Hit by Phone, Camera Sales --- Earnings Decline 47%, But TVs, Videogames Were Strong
in Quarter”, by Yukari Iwatani Kane, The Wall Street Journal, 30 July 2008 42 “Sony to Cut 8,000 Jobs, Close Factories --- Electronics Giant's Turnaround Effort Undermined by
Slumping Demand, Holiday Discounts”, by Daisuke Wakabayashi , The Wall Street Journal, 10 December 2008
43 “China Takes Leading Role in TVs” by Lorraine Luk, The Wall Street Journal, 10 June 2010 44 “Sony warns of grim picture for TVs”, by Jonathan Soble, Financial Times, 21 December 2010 45 “Samsung Electronics Ends LCD Venture With Sony”, by Evan Ramstad, The Wall Street Journal, 27
December 2011 46 Japanese pioneers turn down the volume”, by Jonathan Soble , Financial Times, 3 November 2011 47 “Sony Taps New Type of Screen for TV Sets”, by Daisuke Wakabayashi, The Wall Street Journal, 10
January 2012; “Sony crowns Kaz the converger” by Jonathan Soble in Tokyo, Financial Times, 4 February 2012
48 “Samsung Profit Rises”, by Evan Ramstad, The Wall Street Journal, 28 January 2011; “Samsung could spin off LCD business”, by Song Jung-a, Financial Times, 15 February 2012
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VIZIO, Inc. was founded in 2002 by William Wang with the idea that everyone deserves to own the latest technology. Mr. Wang's first two employees, Laynie Newsome and Ken Lowe, were honoured as co-founders, and eight years later are still hard at work taking entertainment freedom by storm. 2002 * Founded in October of 2002 under the name V, Inc. * With a total of 3 employees, they provided consulting services to Gateway, Inc. 2003 * Launched the VIZIO brand * Launched Plasma monitor and DVD up-convert line at CES * VIZIO signed on with Costco Wholesale to sell VIZIO products * Total of 5 employees 2004 * VIZIO expanded their product offerings to include LCDs, Plasmas, DVD and DLP * Total of 25 employees 2005 * VIZIO’s 50” Plasma was ranked CNETs Top Holiday Tech gift * VIZIO signed on with Sam’s Club to sell VIZIO products * Grew to 41 employees 2006 * VIZIO’s 32”LCD and 42” Plasma HDTVs are ranked Best of CES * Expanded distribution to Circuit City, Sears, BJs and Kmart * VIZIO launched its first TV advertising campaign * Total of 62 employees * Shipped a total of 750,000 HDTVs 2007 * VIZIO 60” Plasma HDTV ranked BEST of CES * Q2 VIZIO achieved the rank of being the #1 shipper of HDTVs in North America * Throughout the year, VIZIO continued to remain among the Top 3 HDTV manufacturers in North America * Recognized by INC Magazine (INC 500) as one of the fastest growing privately held companies * VIZIO signed on with Walmart * Grew to 85 employees * Shipped a total of 2,900,000 HDTVs 2008 * Launches 30 HDTV models, several of which include 120Hz, and adds a 50” Plasma with HQV Technology to the mix * VIZIO expands its portfolio of products to include HDTV accessories (HDMI) and LCD computer monitors * Launches the High Performance XVT Series (Extreme VIZIO Technology) * Maintain its position as being one of the Top 3 shippers of HDTVs in N. America * Recognized as the #1 Fastest Growing CE Company by Inc. Magazine * VIZIO becomes the official sponsor of NBC’s broadcast of the Olympic Games * Receives Wal-Mart Supplier of the Year Award * Expanded distribution in to Canada * Total of 100 employees * Shipped a total of 3,500,000 HDTVs * Total revenue exceeds 2 Billion Dollars 2009 * VIZIO continues to add new innovative products to their portfolio such as Blu-ray® players, Home Theater Sound Bars with Wireless Sub, Motorized Wall Mounts and more. * VIZIO launches 40 new HDTV models with sizes ranging from 19” to 55” and including the top technologies such as VIZIO Internet Apps their version of the internet connected TV, 240Hz LCD models and the latest TruLED technology which delivers the ultimate HD experience with less impact on our planet. * #1 Shipper of LCD HDTVs in N. America Q1 * #1 Shipper of LCD HDTVs in United States Q2 * VIZIO is the official Sponsor of Super Bowl XLIII * VIZIO HDTVs can be found on more store shelves than SONY in July 2009 * Over 160 employees 2010 *As CEA member, VIZIO¹s first CES booth promoted their VIZIO Internet Apps™ connected HDTVs and key platform partners Yahoo!, Twitter, vudu, & Facebook *2010 CES announcements included eleven categories in addition to TVs including High Definition Blu-ray DVD Players™,
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wireless HD Internet routers and VIZIO Internet Apps™ enabled entertainment systems, HD home theater sound, HD Personal Home Theater headphones, and portable razor thin LED LCD HDTVs. *With 50 TVs including XVT, M and E lines of TVs, VIZIO offers models for every room in the house and every type of buyer. 35 of these 50 new TVs utilize LED backlighting. *Signs 3-year endorsement deal with music and film star Beyonce´ Knowles-Carter days before she wins a record setting 6 Grammy Awards *”Forge” Super Bowl Spot featuring Beyonce´ and integrated communications yield nearly 1 billion impressions * Tier one Donor to Greensburg GreenTown charity to help rebuild the Kansas town after a devastating tornado *Supports Hoag Hospital Irvine Grand Opening with LCD HDTVs throughout the hospital *VIZIO Operation Freedom gathers over $13,500 with 2,750 pounds of essential goods for U. S. Troops overseas *Wins Inc. 500/5000 award for 4th consecutive year *Deloitte Fast 500 award winner *OCBJ Best Private Companies award winner *OC Metro "10 Most Trusted Brands" *Home Theater Magazine Top Picks Award *Moves VIZIO tech support and direct sales expands to new offices in Dakota Dunes, SD *Wins ThePerfectVision Recommended 2010 - XVT473SV *XVT553SV named Editors' Choice by CNET and was Highly Recommended by HDTVSolutions.com *196 employees total (includes 76 South Dakota and 3 international) Beyond 2010 and well into the future: VIZIO has made great strides in providing Entertainment Freedom For All™ and will continue to build this principle through 2011. With the explosion of 3D TV, we currently have many exciting new developments to reveal at the Consumer Electronics Show and throughout the upcoming year. While staying true to our roots in vision and value, VIZIO is excited to continue and grow our brand within the U.S. and beyond. VIZIO: Taking entertainment freedom by storm!
Source: Company documents from www.vizio.com accessed 10/02/2012
Exhibit 12 Vizio: Vision, Mission and Core Values
VISION VIZIO’s® vision is to be the industry leader in consumer electronics by consistently delivering the latest technologies at the most affordable price.
MISSION Where vision meets value™ Visionary Products – VIZIO® understands the consumer electronics market and designs products customers’ desire. Visionary Technologies – VIZIO® selects the right technologies, brings the best to market, and delivers them at a price everyone can afford. Visionary Business Model – VIZIO® lowers cost and increase efficiency by creating and orchestrating mutually desirable global partnerships.
CORE VALUES Believe in the Vision. VIZIO® was founded on Faith, a belief that it can become the leader in consumer electronics. The VIZIO® team embodies the Vision and the Passion necessary to consistently deliver the latest technology at the most affordable prices. Create Value for our Customers. Success is dependent on VIZIO’s® ability to do things faster and more efficiently with fewer people than the competition. VIZIO’s® team achieves Success by giving All they have each and every day! Show Respect toward our Partners. VIZIO® achieves its goals by creating synergistic partnerships with its suppliers and customers. VIZIO® Honors and Respects its partnerships daily and continually seeks new ways to Collaborate. Lead through Teamwork. Being the industry leader requires both individual leadership and collaborative teamwork. VIZIO® team members lead by example and work together as a team to achieve the company’s goals.
Source: Company documents from www.vizio.com accessed 10/02/2012
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