FIELD MANUALNO 34-2-1

*FM 34-2-1HEADQUARTERS

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMYWashington, DC, 19 June 1991

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Preface

This field manual providest a c t i c s , techniques, andprocedures (TTP) forreconnaissance and surveillance(R&S) planning, missionmanagement, and reporting.It provides TTP for thedevelopment of intelligence tosupport counterreconnaissance(CR) operat ions . I t descr ibesemployment considerations forR&S assets; and defines theroles of the collection managerand maneuver brigade andbattalion S2's in planningR&S operations. I t descr ibestheir roles in ident i fy ingintell igence requirements tosupport CR operations.

This manual addressesTTP for planning andconducting R&S and developingintelligence to support CRoperations at maneuver brigadeand below. It can also applyto armored cavalry regiment(ACR) and separate brigades.

This manual is intendedfor maneuver commanders andt h e i r s t a f f s ( e s p e c i a l l y S 2 s ) ;inte l l igence s taf fs and

collection managers; and otherpersonnel involved in planningand conducting R&S anddeveloping intell igence tosupport CR operations. I t i sintended for use by both activeand Reserve Components (RC) andUS Army Training and DoctrineCommand (TRADOC) schools.

The doctrine in thispublication conforms with andsupports the principlescontained in FM 34-1.

Unless this publicationstates otherwise, masculinenouns and pronouns do not referexclusively to men.

The proponent of thispublication is the UnitedStates Army IntelligenceCenter, Fort Huachuca, AZ.Send comments andrecommendations on DA Form 2028(Recommended Changes toPublications and Blank Forms)directly to Commander, US ArmyIntelligence Center and School,ATTN : ATSI-TDL-D, FortHuachuca, AZ 85613-7000.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Throughout history,military leaders haverecognized the importance ofR&S. Gaining and maintainingcontact with the enemy isessential to win the battle.Our own military historycontains many examples whereour knowledge of the enemy,or lack of knowledge, directlyled to victory or defeat.

The role of R&S has notchanged on the modernbat t le f ie ld ; i f anything,it has become even moreimportant. Battles at thecombat training centers provethat a good R&S effort iscr i t ica l to successfulat tacks . On the other hand,a poor R&S effort almostguarantees defeat for thecommander. Figure 1-1 showsattack outcome according toreconnaissance status (BlueForce [BLUFOR]). This chartwas developed by the RandCorporation in its October 1987

study, "Applying the NationalTraining Center Experience:Tactical Reconnaissance.”

The message is clear:Success on the battlefieldbegins with R&S and R&S beginswith the inte l l igence of f icer .As the S2, you play a big rolein the success or failure ofyour unit. But if being ableto find the enemy is criticalto the attack, what role doesthe S2 play in the defense?

Figure 1-2 shows the attackoutcome according to reconnais-sance status (Opposing Force[OPFOR]). This is anotherchart from the same Rand study.It clearly shows: If you blindthe enemy, they will mostl ike ly fa i l in the at tack .Therefore, a successful defensedepends on finding, targeting,destroying, or suppressingenemy reconnaissance assetsbefore they can report yourunit’s defensive positions.

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This implies an aggressiveCR effort that seeks out enemyreconnaissance units ratherthan pass ively screening. I talso implies the coordinationand active participation amongthe S2, S3, fire supportofficer (FSO), and theintell igence and electronicwarfare support element(IEWSE).

This manual describes theTTP you can use to develop andexecute successful R&S plans.Field Manual 34-2 and FM 34-80contain additional informationon collection management andR&S.

This is a "how to" manual.It describes how to--

o Plan R&S operations.

o Task R&S assets.

o Graphically depict R&Soperations.

o Execute R&S operations.

o Save time in the planningprocess.

o Plan for intelligencesupport to CR missions.

o Plan for division levela s s e t s , such as signalsintelligence (SIGINT)c o l l e c t o r s .

This manual will show youhow to succeed in yourreconnaissance and CR effort,

giving you and your commanderthe best chance for victory inb a t t l e .

The intent is for you touse this manual in the field asa g u i d e . This manual is alsodesigned to show commanders andS3s the R&S planning process.This manual is arrangedsequent ia l ly to ref lec t theorder of the R&S and collectionmanagement processes. I t w i l lhelp you understand R&S a stepat a time.

The better prepared youare as an S2, the better yourR&S plan will be. Therefore,you should have a solidappreciat ion for inte l l igencepreparation of the battlefield(IPB) and its contribution todeveloping an R&S plan. (SeeFM 34-130, IntelligencePreparation of the Battlefield,for a complete discussion ofIPB.) You need to know whatassets are available to you,as well as the capabilit iesand limitations of thosea s s e t s . This supportsplanning and executing R&Soperations.

Once you formulate yourplan, you must know how totask appropriate assets. Oneway to disseminate the R&Splan or taskings is to developan R&S overlay. FM 34-80,Appendix E, describes thepreparation of the R&Soverlay. As you execute theplan, you should know how tomonitor the R&S effort and

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modify the plan accordingly.To reinforce the steps in theR&S process, this manualincludes examples at brigadeand battalion levels of how toplan, prepare, execute, andmonitor the R&S effort.

COLLECTION MANAGEMENT PROCESS

To successfully plan andexecute the R&S effort, youshould understand the fivephases of the collectionmanagement process, and therelationship of R&S tocollection management.Regardless of the echelon, youwill go through the followingfive steps or phases to developa collection plan and,ultimately, an R&S plan:

o Receive and analyzerequirements.

o Determine resourceavailabil ity and capability.

requirements (PIR) orinformation requirements (IR).

PIR and IR are eitherstated by the commander orrecommended by you and approvedby the commander. They are thevery reason R&S plans (and allcol lect ion plans) exis t . Youmay also have requirements fromhigher or subordinate units;these you will prioritize andconsolidate with thecommander's PIR. Once you haveidentified all requirements,you will eventually convertthem into specific items tolook for.

DETERMINE RESOURCEAVAILABILITY AND CAPABILITY

In simplest terms,determining resourceavai labi l i ty and capabi l i tymeans assessing what means youhave to look for the specificitems you have developed in thef i r s t s t e p .

o Task resources.TASK RESOURCES

o Evaluate reporting.

o Update collectionplanning.

RECEIVE AND ANALYZEREQUIREMENTS

Receiving and analyzingrequirements means identifyingwhat the commander must knowabout the enemy, weather, andterrain to accomplish themission. Normally, thecommander’s concerns areexpressed as questions, termedp r i o r i t y i n t e l l i g e n c e

When tasking resources, youmust tell a specific resourcewhat it should look for, andhow it is to reportinformation.

At division and higher,several elements accomplishthese five steps. For example,the all-source productionsection (ASPS) aids thecollection management anddissemination (CM&D) section inanalyzing requirements. TheCM&D may simply task themilitary intell igence (MI)

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battalion to collect onspecific requirements; the MIbattalion S3 is the one whoactually tasks a specifica s s e t . In fact, very seldomdoes a division G2 directlytask a speci f ic asset .

At maneuver brigade andbattalion levels, however, yourS2 section will usually do allf ive steps of the collectionmanagement process. You willdevelop a collection plan whichaddresses how your unit willcollect information to satisfyall intell igence requirements.Unlike division, you willnormally task specific assetst o c o l l e c t s p e c i f i cinformation.

This essent ia l ly i s thedifference between a collectionplan and an R&S plan: acol lect ion plan ident i f ieswhich units or agencies willcollect information. An R&Splan identifies which specificassets will be tasked tocollect information, and howthey will do it. Therefore, asa general rule, R&S planningoccurs mostly at brigade andbelow.

EVALUATE REPORTING

Is the asset accuratelyreporting what it sees based oni t s c a p a b i l i t i e s ? And does thereport answer the originalquestion?

UPDATE COLLECTION PLANNING

Do you need moreinformation to answer the

question; or is i t t ime toshift focus and begin answeringanother question?

SOLUTIONS TO COMMONERRORS IN RECONNAISSANCE

AND SURVEILLANCE PLANNING

This manual focuses onR&S at brigade and battalionl e v e l s . It discusses waysto improve your R&S plans andto win the battle. Manycommon mistakes made by S2sin the planning stage resultin unproductive R&S operations.These mistakes were notedduring numerous observationsat the training centers andoccur regularly. To avoiderrors in R&S plans, usethe guidelines discussedbelow.

USE IPB PRODUCTS

Use enemy situationtemplates and event templatesto identify areas on thebattlefield where and whenyou expect significant eventsor targets to appear. TheseIPB products will save manyhours of analysis bypinpointing specific areason which to focus your R&Se f f o r t .

KNOW YOUR ASSETS

Know the capabilities andlimitations of the R&S assetsavailable to you. This shouldensure that assets are not senton missions they are notcapable of conducting nortrained to conduct.

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PROVIDE DETAILS

When you develop your R&Splan, provide deta i ls . Gener icR&S plans do not produce theamount of information requiredin the time allocated.

UNDERSTAND SCHEMEOF MANEUVER

It is imperative youunderstand your unit’s schemeof maneuver before you begin toformulate the R&S plan. A wellthought out R&S plan that doesnot support the scheme ofmaneuver is a useless effort.

PROVIDE GUIDANCE

Provide detailed guidanceto the company and teams asthey plan their patrolmissions; patrols also need tocoordinate with the battalionbefore, during, and after allmissions. This should precludeuseless missions and wastedl i v e s . You should also makesure patrols have enough timeto plan and execute theirmissions.

KNOW LOCATIONS OF ASSETS

You need to continuouslymonitor and disseminate thecurrent locations of friendlyR&S assets. This shouldminimize the incidents off r a t r i c i d e .

INTEGRATE FIRE SUPPORT

Involve the FSO in R&Splanning so that indirect fire

support is integrated into allphases of R&S operations.

STRESS THE IMPORTANCEOF R&S MISSIONS

Subordinate elements tendto ignore collection taskingsassigned by higher echelons;they sometimes consider thesenonessential taskings. Makesure these subordinate elementcommanders understand theimportance of their R&Smissions. You must get the S3or the commander involved toremedy this situation.

PARTICIPATE IN THEDEVELOPMENT OF

MISSION ESSENTIALTASK LISTS

The battalion S2 shouldtake an active role in thedevelopment of the scoutplatoon battle tasks. Figure1-3 is an example of scoutplatoon battle tasks. The onlyway to establish a properworking relationship to trainwith the scout platoon leaderin garrison as well as in thef i e l d . The result will be ascout platoon that understandswhat the S2 needs and an S2understanding the capabilit iesand limitations of the scoutplatoon.

POINT OUT NAI

During CR operations,point out areas throughoutthe battlefield where youexpect enemy reconnaissance.Do not limit these NAI to

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just along the forward edgeof the battle area (FEBA) orthe line of departure (LD)/line of contact (LC). Companyand team commanders and staffmust understand that CRoperations extend throughoutthe depth of the battlefield.Enemy reconnaissance assetsare trained to look deep andto conduct operations wellinto the rear area.

INCORPORATE FLEXIBILITY

Be sure to incorporateflexibility into your R&Splan. Be ready to makemodifications at any time,especially in a nuclear,b i o l o g i c a l , and chemical(NBC) environment. TheCombined Arms in a Nuclear/Chemical Environment (CANE)IIB Test explains thed i f f i c u l t y i n c o l l e c t i n gintelligence data in an NBCenvironment.

DO NOT KEEP THE SCOUTPLATOON LEADER WAITING

Do not keep the scoutplatoon leader at thetact ica l operat ions center(TOC) waiting for a completeoperations order (OPORD).Some results are--

o The scout platoon deploystoo la te to suf f ic ient lyreconnoiter its assigned NAI.

o Lack of time makes thescout platoon leader reluctantto exercise the initiative andflexibility necessary to ensurecomplete coverage. Forexample, scouts remain intheir vehicles instead ofdismounting.

o The scout platoon failsto follow standing operatingprocedures (SOPS).

DO NOT OVERLY RELY ONTHE SCOUT PLATOON

Commanders tend to rely toomuch on their scout platoons.An untrained scout platoon maydisplay weaknesses in landnavigation, selecting properR&S positions, reportinginformation, and calling fori n d i r e c t f i r e . When you do usescout platoons, try to confirmtheir reports with informationgathered from other assets.Also, do not fall into the trapof using the scout platoon asthe only R&S collection asset.When using the scout platoon,be sure the mission you givethem is one they are capable ofsuccessfully completing.

These solutions apply tocommon problems occurringthroughout the Army. Take noteof these solutions and try todevelop R&S plans reflectingthe solutions, not theproblems.

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CHAPTER 2

RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE AND INTELLIGENCEPREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

Think of developing an R&Splan as being similar tobuilding a house. A good houseneeds a solid foundation. Thepillars for the foundation ofR&S are the actual terms used.Before going on, let us discusssome important terms.

TERMS

Refer to the glossary forthe definitions ofreconnaissance, surveillance,and CR. Below is a discussionof these terms.

RECONNAISSANCE

Reconnaissance is concernedwith three components: enemy,weather, and terrain. Youshould understand thatreconnaissance is act ive ; i tseeks out enemy positions,obstac les , and routes. Sincemovement draws attention, goodreconnaissance uses stealth toavoid detection.

SURVEILLANCE

Surveillance is passive.Surveillance implies observinga specified area or areassystematically from a fixed,concealed position. A good R&Splan contains the best mix ofR&S based on requirements,assets available, and thet h r e a t .

COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE

Essentially, CR meansblinding the enemy's eyes sothey cannot detect our attack,or cannot locate our defensiveposi t ions . CR missions requireyou to--

o Know something about howthe enemy reconnoiters.

o Be able to locate,target, destroy, or suppressenemy reconnaissance assets.

Providing support to theCR mission means that youmust become an expert onthreat reconnaissance doctrine,tact ics , uni t organizat ions ,and equipment. You must knowhow the enemy plans to collectinformation; when they do it;and with what equipment,vehic les , and organizationsthey col lect .

Then plan how to findthe enemy's reconnaissanceassets before they are ableto find friendly forces. Youalso need to understand USmaneuver organizations,doctr ine , tact ics , andc a p a b i l i t i e s , since you maybe called on to provide arecommendation for organizingCR forces.

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Coordinate closely with theS3 and the FSO, since much oftheir planning relies on yourabi l i ty to predict , locate , andconfirm enemy reconnaissancea s s e t s . Your knowledge ofthreat reconnaissancecapabi l i t ies , l imitat ions , andvulnerabi l i t ies a ids the s taf fin developing high payofftargets (HPTs). I t a ids indetermining how best to destroyor suppress those targets,either by lethal or nonlethalmeans.

At brigade level, you mustget the IEWSE officer involvedin CR battle planning, becauseusing EW may be crucial to thesuccess of the mission.

Defining R&S and CR inisolation may suggest theyoccur in a vacuum. Nothingcould be further from thetruth . R&S is a crucial phaseof the inte l l igence cycle . Asyou will see, your R&S effortrequires direct ion i f i t i s toprovide the necessaryintelligence the commanderneeds to fight and win theb a t t l e .

You might have theimpression R&S has definitivestart and end points.Actually, R&S is part of alarger, continuing collectionprocess. That process gets itsdirection from two things:first, the mission; and second,by extension, the IPB process.

These two things tell you--

o What to collect.

o Where to collect.

o When to collect.

o Who should collect it foryou .

o Why you must collect it.

Your collection planenables you to direct andcontrol the collection ofinformation. That information,once recorded, evaluated, andinterpreted, becomesi n t e l l i g e n c e . Col lect inginformation gives commanderstargeting data so they candestroy enemy weapon systemsand units. Your analysis canprovide insight into the enemysituation to the extent thatyou can make an educatedestimate of possible futureenemy courses of action( COAs ) . At this point, informyour commander and the rest ofthe staff ; then begin todevelop friendly COAs forfuture operations.

The cycle continuesendlessly. However, within thecycle you may discover, basedon the picture you havedeveloped, that you must modifythe collection plan. Or, basedon what you have collected, youmust update the IPB terraindata base.

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There is an interrelation-ship between all aspects of theinte l l igence cycle . Yourcollection plan has a directeffect on how you--

o Process information anddisseminate intelligence duringthe present battle.

o Direct your intell igenceef forts for future bat t les .

The R&S plan marries theIPB with assets available fori n f o r m a t i o n c o l l e c t i o n . I torganizes and prioritizesinformation requirements. Thisresults in R&S taskings tounits through the S3.

RECONNAISSANCE ANDSURVEILLANCE PRINCIPLES

Now that we have definedthe terms, let us discuss thetwo principles of R&S. Theya r e - -

o Tell commanders what theyneed to know in time for themto act .

o Do as much as possibleahead of time.

TELL COMMANDERS WHATTHEY NEED TO KNOW

IN TIME FOR THEM TO ACT

This principle is ofparamount importance. You mustdevelop the R&S plan so that itdirectly addresses what thecommander wants to know. Inessence, the R&S effort (aswith the intell igence effort in

general) is commander-orientedand commander-directed.Therefore, you cannot developa successful R&S plan until youknow exactly what the commanderneeds to know.

The commander’s questionswhich positively must beanswered in order to accomplishthe mission are PIR. They arethe start point for the R&Splan. The clearer and moreprecise the commander’s PIR,the better you will be able todevelop the R&S plan to answerthem.

How do PIR come about? Aspart of the mission analysisprocess, you and your commanderstudy the mission given to youby higher headquarters. Youdevelop specified, implied, andessent ia l tasks . AS you dothis, you should also be ableto identify gaps in yourunderstanding of theb a t t l e f i e l d s i t u a t i o n .

The following are examplesof possible gaps:

o Which avenue of approach(AA) will the enemy use, andwhen?

o Which fixed- androtary-wing air AAs will theenemy use?

o How will the enemy deployin their attack?

o Where will the enemycommit their second echelonforces?

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o What are the enemyreconnaissance forces , tact ics ,and capabilit ies?

o Where is the enemy mainsupply route (MSR)?

o Under what circumstanceswill the enemy use NBCweapons? How will they beemployed?

o What are the enemysubsequent and fallbackposi t ions , and routes fromtheir main defensive positionsto the fallback positions?

o In what strength will theenemy counterattack, and whereare the armor counterattackforces?

o Where are the enemyobservation posts (OPs) andlistening posts (LPs)?

o Where are the enemyantitank (AT) helicopters?

o Where are the enemy TOCsand tactical command posts,relays, and communicationss i t e s ?

o Where are the enemylogistic and support areas?

o What effects of weatherprovide a key advantage ordisadvantage to you or theenemy?

o Where are the enemyobstacles and fire sacks?

o Where are the enemy maindefensive positions?

o Where and when will theenemy counterattack, and howwill they counterattack?

o Where are the enemy ATweapons?

o Where is the enemya r t i l l e r y ?

Essentially, you and yourcommander try to zero in onexactly what will determine theoutcome of the battle. Manytimes, the commander will tellyou what is of the mostconcern. I t i s t h eresponsibility of the commanderto state PIR. However, the S2and the S3 can assist in thisprocess by presenting their ownanalyses of the mission.

Remember, PIR drive yourR&S efforts; s o i t i s c r i t i c a lthat you understand justexactly what your commanderneeds to know in order tof i g h t .

Try to keep the commander'sPIR as specific as possible.The more general the question,the harder it is to answer.Instead of asking, “With whatforce will the 34th MotorizedRifle Regiment attack?", try todiscern exactly what it is yourcommander is looking for. Ifthe commander wants to know howthe 34th will initially deploy,it is better to ask, "Will the34th attack in column, with twobattalions leading, or withthree battalions on line?"

Similar ly , is the commanderconcerned with finding the

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enemy’s main defensive area;or is he really worried aboutlocating company and platoonpositions within the maindefensive area? How youphrase the PIR has a directbearing on how you answerthose PIR.

To better focus R&Sefforts, keep PIR down to amanageable number. Normally,you will only be able toconcentrate on three or fourat any one time. Of course,the mission and thecommander’s needs may sometimesdictate more. Having a largenumber of priorities defeatsthe purpose of having PIR inthe f i rs t p lace .

Other questions thecommander may have regardingthe enemy, weather, and terrainof a lesser priority than PIRare called IR. Examples of IRa r e - -

o Where or what is theenemy’s immediate objective?

o Will the enemy employsmoke?

o Where are the usableriver fording points?

Answers to these questionsmay not be critical to theimmediate success of themission, but they willcertainly help provide answersto those cr i t ica l quest ions .Keep in mind that IR may atsome point become PIR, and viceversa, depending on thes i tuat ion.

Once developed, PIR shouldbe disseminated to subordinate,adjacent, and higher units. Inthis way, you inform everyoneof the questions you needanswered. Remember, althoughyou may not be able to answera specific PIR at your level,your higher headquarters maybe able to. Disseminatingyour PIR also tells everyonewhat you are most interestedi n .

Use the intelligence annexand intelligence summaries todisseminate PIR. Your PIR andIR also determine your requestfor intelligence information(RII) . The RII is the best wayto let your higher headquartersknow your information needs.Your higher headquarters doesnot always know what specificinformation you may need.

Your commanders PIR giveyou a direction in which tostart your R&S planning.Subsequently, most of yourtime will be spent doingdetailed planning and analysis,all focused on answeringthose PIR. Essentially, youwill study the effects ofenemy, weather, and terrainon the battlefield and themission.

The best way to study theenemy, weather, and terrain isthrough the IPB process. IPB--

o Enables you to focusanalytical efforts on aspecific part of theb a t t l e f i e l d .

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o Gives you a way tosystematically examine theterrain and weather effects onenemy and friendly actions.

o Helps you determine theeffects on R&S activities.

o Gives you an in-depthview of how the enemy fight,how they reconnoiter, and wherethey may be most vulnerable.

Most importantly, IPB givesyou a way to synchronize yourR&S plan with the generalbat t le plan. Figure 2-1illustrates the commander’sdecision-making process(supported by IPB). If i t isdone right, IPB is people-intensive and time-consuming.This brings us to a second -

principle of R&S.

DO AS MUCH AS POSSIBLEAHEAD OF TIME

The first four functionsthe IPB process are homeworkfunctions. That means youbuild a data base on terrainand weather conditions, andenemy order of battle (OB)b e f o r e h o s t i l i t i e s . For

o f

example, your unit has receiveda new contingency mission forsome part of the world. Giventhis mission, begin collectinginformation on terrain featuresand conditions for the areayour unit is responsible for.You might get this informationfrom existing maps, areastudies, or special engineerproducts. Then build a database on the people, customs,cul ture , and other demographicsof the region.

Also, collect informationon historic weather patternsand conditions for your area.Develop a data base thatincludes how the weatherinfluences the terrain andthe people of that region.

Finally, learn as much asyou can about the potentialthreat in that region.Depending on how much time youhad and how much informationwere available, you would--

o Find out individual uniti d e n t i f i c a t i o n s , u n i torganization, and garrisonlocat ions .

o Determine the status ofunit training and overallcombat readiness.

o Study threat tactics,both doctrinally andh i s t o r i c a l l y .

o Build a data basecontaining a l l th isinformation.

o Update your data base asmore recent information becomesavai lable . (Don’t forget toask higher headquarters fordata base information alreadyobtained.)

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OFTHE BATTLEFIELD PROCESS

The majority of the IPBprocess needs to be done aheadof time. You simply will nothave time during combat toestablish any data base or toperform an in-depth analysis ofthe enemy, weather, or

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t e r r a i n . To successfully planand execute the R&S operation,you must have this detailedanalys is . The IPB process hasfive components:

o Battlefield areaevaluation (BAE).

o Terrain analysis.

o Weather analysis.

o Threat evaluation.

o Threat integrat ion.

Refer to FM 34-130,Intelligence Preparation of theB a t t l e f i e l d , for detailedinformation on IPB.

BATTLEFIELD AREA EVALUATION

BAE is the first step ofthe IPB process. Begin youranalysis by figuring out whatpart of the battlefield shouldbe of interest to you and yourcommander. The end result ofthis s tep is the ident i f icat ionof the area of interest (AI):That part of the battlefieldwhich contains significantterrain features or enemy unitsand weapon systems that mayaffect your unit’s near orfuture bat t le .

BAE is a crucial step inthe IPB process because itfocuses your analytical effortson a finite piece of theb a t t l e f i e l d . By extension, itwill also provide geographiclimits to your R&S andc o l l e c t i o n e f f o r t s .

The commander bases theunit’s AI on many things. Itis normally an expansion ofyour unit's area of operations(AO) . It should be largeenough to provide answers tothe commander’s PIR; yet smallenough to prevent youranalyt ica l e f forts f rombecoming unfocused.Determining the AI depends onthe unit mission and threatc a p a b i l i t i e s . For example, ifyour unit is to attack, your AIshould extend across your LD/LCup to and surrounding yourintermediate and subsequentob ject ives .

If the mission is todefend, the AI should extendfar enough to include anypossible units that mightreinforce against you. You canbase your AI considerations interms of time and on how fastyou or the enemy moves.Figure 2-2 l ists generaldistance guidelines in hoursand kilometers; use this todetermine your unit's AI.

Considerations for your AIshould be expressed in terms ofdistance, based on--

o How your u n i t at tacks .

o How the enemy attacks.

o What your commander needsto know.

For example, a battalioncommander fighting an attackingenemy using Soviet tactics isnormally interested in 1st- and

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2nd-echelon battalions of1st-echelon regiments.

Doctrinally, these unitswould normally be from 1 to 15kilometers from our FLOT.Therefore, the AI should extendforward at least 15 kilometers.

You must determine your AIduring mission analysis. Yourcommander and S3 play a bigpart in formulating the AI.They tell you what theirintelligence concerns are.Like PIR, your unit’s AI mustbe the commander s and must besent to higher headquarters.Figures 2-3 and 2-4 showexamples of AIs for defensiveand offensive missions.Figure 2-5 shows both defensiveand offensive. It will help indetermining your unit’s AI.

TERRAIN ANALYSIS ANDWEATHER ANALYSIS

The next two steps in theIPB process are terrain and

weather analyses. E s s e n t i a l l y ,these are detailed studies ofhow the terrain and weatherwill affect both friendly andenemy operations.Speci f ica l ly , terra in andweather will dictate howeffective R&S assets will be,and where they should go tobe most effective. Yourknowledge of terrain andweather will allow you toant ic ipate ef fects on fr iendlyand enemy R&S systems andoperations.

Terrain analysis andweather analysis shouldstart as soon as you havedetermined your AI. Do notwait until you deploy tostart your analysis! Themore prepared you are, thebetter the R&S plan will be.Figures 2-6 and 2-7 showspecific uses and effectsfor terrain and weatheranalyses.

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THREAT EVALUATION o Personal i t ies .

Once you have analyzed o Other miscellaneousterrain and weather, begin a f a c t o r s .thorough study of enemy--

This study results ino Composition. threat evaluation, the fourth

step in the IPB process.o Disposition. During this step--

o Tactics. o Develop a doctrinaltemplate f i le .

o Training.o Build up

o Combat readiness. base.

o Logistic support. o Evaluatec a p a b i l i t i e s .

o Electronic technicaldata.

your threat data

t h r e a t

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Doctrinal templates areimportant because they show howthe enemy doctrinally attacksor defends in variouss i tuat ions . Knowing how theenemy defends will tell youwhat you ought to look for inorder to confirm that they are,in fact, defending.

Knowing how the enemyemploys reconnaissance in theattack will help you targetthem, allowing you to destroyo r n e u t r a l i z e t h o s e a s s e t s . I talso helps you determine whichof those assets are mostimportant to the enemy’sreconnaissance effort.

Figures 2-8 and 2-9 areexamples of doctrinal templatesyou might use specifically forR&S planning. Whenever you usedoctrinal templates, you musttemper them with some reality.For example: a Sovietregimental attack template hasset doctrinal sector widths.It serves no purpose to placethis over a map where abattalion falls outside an AA.There is enough leeway even inSoviet doctrine to conform toterrain limitations; when usingthe template you must makethose same allowances.

A careful study of threatdoctrine tells how fast theywill attack in variouss i t u a t i o n s . This informationwill become very importantlater on. For right now,remember during threatevaluation that you determineenemy doctrinal rates ofadvance. Figure 2-10 is a

table of enemy rates of advancefor specific situations andt e r r a i n .

Finally, knowing how thethreat uses weapon systems andunits gives you an appreciationof which are most important tothe enemy commander in apart icular s i tuat ion. Theseimportant weapon systems andunits are called high valuetargets (HVTs). They are thestarting point for the targetvalue analysis process. Targetacquisition is an importantaspect of R&S and CR. Targetvalue analysis will play a bigrole in your R&S planning.

THREAT INTEGRATION

Remember, the four IPBsteps should be started beforedeployment. They ought to bepart of your day-by-dayinte l l igence operat ions . Youare now at the point where youcan pull together what you havedeveloped about the enemy,weather, and terrain and applyi t t o a s p e c i f i c b a t t l e f i e l ds i tuat ion.

This step is threatintegrat ion. You will discoveryou can also perform somethreat integration functionsahead of time. The first suchfunction is to develop a seriesof situation templatesdepicting how you think theenemy will deploy assets.

Situation Template

The situation templatetakes what is on the doctrinal

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template and integrates whatyou know about weather andt e r r a i n . The situationtemplates will show how anenemy unit might modify itsdoctrine and tactics because ofthe effects of weather andt e r r a i n .

Figure 2-11 is an exampleof one s i tuat ion template . I tis important to understand thatyou should develop as manysituation templates as thereare enemy COAs. This allowsyou to thoroughly examine whatoptions the enemy has for eachCOA.

For example, you maydiscover enemy forces have touse specific bridges, roadintersections, or mobilitycorridors (MCs) for a specificCOA. Or you may discover thatthe terrain offers the enemyseveral choices to at tack . Oryou may determine the terrainoffers a limited number ofsuitable enemy defensiveposi t ions . And you may learnthat the terrain only providesa limited number of concealedroutes for enemy reconnaissanceto enter your sector.

The bridges, roadintersections, and possibledefensive positions you haveidentified become NAI. Focusyour attention on these NAIbecause it is there you expectsomething to happen. What yousee or fail to see at your NAIwill confirm whether or not theenemy is doing what youexpected them to do, asprojected on the situation

template. NAI do severalthings for you. They--

o Focus the collectioneffort on specific points orareas of the bat t le f ie ld .

o Tell you what to look forand when you should expect tos e e i t , at those points orareas on the battlefield (basedon the situation templates) .

o Enable you to decidewhich of your R&S assets arebest suited to cover aparticular NAI. For example,a point NAI for a roadintersection where you expectto see a motorized riflecompany (MRC) might requireseismic-acoustic sensors. Onthe other hand, an area NAIdesignated for a dug-in BMPplatoon might require adismounted patrol.

Remember, one of the thingsyou did during threatevaluation was to determineenemy rates of advance. Younow put this knowledge to workby developing time phase lines(TPLs) . Think of TPLs assnapshots of an enemy or af r i e n d l y f r o n t l i n e t r a c e . Aseries of TPLs would portrayfriendly or enemy movement overa period of time.

Event Template

If you combine NAI withTPLs, you will be able to showapproximately when and whereyou would expect to see enemycri t ica l events occur . Thisis basically what the event

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template does. Figure 2-12 isa sample event template.

The event template allowsyou to--

o Confirm or deny yoursituation templates.

o Gauge enemy and friendlyrates of movement.

o Compare rates of movementbetween MCs and AAs.

o Cue other collectionassets based on friendly andenemy movement.

Of all IPB products, theevent template is the mostimportant product for the R&Se f f o r t . As you will see, theevent template is also thebasis for the decision supporttemplate (DST).

In many situations youmight find it helpful tocalculate how long an enemyunit would take to move fromone NAI to another. Normally,your calculations will be basedon opposition and doctrinalrates of advance. S i tuat ionalaspects such as weather,t e r r a i n , and your previoushindering actions are alsofactored in.

Comparing actual movementrates with your calculationswill tell you whether the enemyis moving slower or faster thanexpected. It will also helpyou predict how long it willactually take the enemy toreach a certain point (yourFEBA, for example).

Event Analysis Matrix

The event analysis matrixis a tool used along with theevent template to analyzespeci f ic events . Figure 2-13shows examples of eventanalysis matrixes.

Basically, you calculatethe not earlier than (NET) andthe not later than (NLT) timeslead elements of a unit willarrive at an NAI. Determinethe distance between NAI andmultiply the distance by theexpected rate of advance.

For example, suppose thedistance between NAI 1 and NAI2 is 2.5 kilometers. Supposea l s o , for the sake of thisexample, that the enemyexpected rate of advance is 6kilometers per hour, or 1kilometer every 10 minutes.Use this formula to calculatetime:

d i s t a n c e = t i m er a t e

2.5 km ÷ .1 km (1 km every10 minutes) = 25 minutes.Therefore, it takes the unit 25minutes to travel from NAI 1 toNAI 2.

Decision SupportTemplate

The final IPB product isthe DST. The purpose of theDST is to synchronize allbattlefield operating systems(BOS) to the commander’s bestadvantage. The DST consists oftarget areas of interest (TAI),decision points or lines, TPLs,

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and a synchronization matrix.Figure 2-14 shows a DST.

There are many importantthings you should know aboutthe DST. First , the DST isa total staff product, notsomething the S2 makes ini s o l a t i o n . Although you maybegin the process of developingthe DST, the S3 and thecommander drive thedevelopment.

Second, the DST is aproduct of war gaming.Together with the rest of thestaff, you develop friendlyCOAs which consider what youenvision the enemy doing. Asa result of this action,react ion, and counteractionwar game, you identify actionsand decisions that may occurduring the battle.

Third, the R&S plan mustsupport the DST.

Fourth, you can use theDST, as well as the generalbattle plan, to synchronizethe R&S effort.

As a result of thewar-gaming process, thestaff identifies HPTs--thoseenemy weapon systems andunits that must be acquiredand successfully attackedfor the success of thefriendly commander’s mission.The staff identifies HPTs fromthe list of HVTs you developedduring threat evaluation.(See FM 6-20-10, TTP forthe Targeting Process.)

Once the staff has decidedon HPTs, it begins to identifywhere on the battlefield it canbest interdict them. Theseinterdic t ing s i tes are label ledTAI . The next step is for thestaff to decide how best tointerdict the enemy at aparticular TAI. The method ofinterdiction will determine thelocation of decision points orl i n e s .

Decision points or linesare a time and a place on thebattlefield which represent thelast chance your commander hasto decide to use a specificsystem for a particular TAI.Once the enemy or friendlyforces pass the decision point,the ability to use that systemi s l o s t . Logically, you shouldmonitor decision points todetect if and when enemy unitsenter and to confirm enemyrates of movement.

This logical re lat ionshipshows that NAI (such as yourevent template) must supportyour decision points. There isa relationship between NAI andTAI as well. If battle damageassessment of a particular TAIis important, your eventtemplate (and your R&S plan)must support that TAI.

RECONNAISSANCE & SURVEILLANCEPLAN DEVELOPMENT

There are many things youmust consider when you developthe R&S plan. You willprobably have to think aboutfire support, maneuver,

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engineer augmentation, andcommand and control (C2).You will also want to make surethe R&S plan fits into yourcommander’s overall scheme ofmaneuver.

You will want to make surethe R&S plan is closely tied tofire support and maneuver forthe CR mission as well. Youcan synchronize these elementsby completing the synchroniza-tion matrix as a staff . Onceagain, completing the matrixcan only be done by war gaming.

We have discussed IPB andthe importance of doing as muchas you can ahead of time. Theprimary reason for this isbecause you will not have a lotof time for in-depth analysisin the f ie ld .

On one hand, your higherheadquarters normally gives youa deadline to develop andforward a copy of your R&Splans to them. You want to getyour assets out looking as soonas possible. On the otherhand, you may feel you have towait until your subordinatesgive you their R&S plans.

Do not wait! “Time isblood!” The faster your R&Sassets are out looking, themore time they will have tofind what you want.

Do not delay your planningbecause you do not have acomplete situation template, orbecause you do not have allyour subordinate units’ plans.If necessary, give your R&S

assets an initial mission andupdate the mission when youhave had the time to do moredetailed planning.

The technique that allowsyou, your subordinate units,and your higher headquartersto conduct R&S planningsimultaneously is the useof l imits of responsibi l i ty .A limit of responsibility isa boundary defining where aparticular unit shouldconcentrate its R&S efforts.

In essence, a l imit ofresponsibility is a “no furtherthan" l ine ; i t te l l s the uni t ,“your R&S responsibility stopsh e r e . " Figure 2-15 is anexample of limits ofresponsibi l i ty for bat ta l ions ,brigades, and divisions. Theymay be tied to a unit’s AI ormay depend entirely on mission,enemy, terrain, time, andtroops available (METT-T).

The key is that limits ofresponsibility allow eachechelon to formulate its R&Splan independently. I t i simportant to note that an R&Splan is never a finishedproduct. Because the situationand the operational plan willmost likely change, the R&Splan must change to fit them.

This chapter discussed R&Sand CR definitions, PIR, thecontributions of IPB to R&S,and limits of responsibility.If you understand theseconcepts, you have a solidfoundation on which to buildyour R&S plan. The next

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chapter talks about assets you you to actually build yourmay have available to you. plan.These will be the bricks for

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CHAPTER 3

ASSETS AND EQUIPMENT

Before you can develop anR&S plan you must know thecharacter is t ics of avai lableassets and equipment. Thischapter discusses the organicand supporting R&S assets andequipment available to you,the maneuver battalion, andthe brigade S2. This chapteralso discusses the basiccapabilit ies and limitationsof these assets.

Due to securityc l a s s i f i c a t i o n s , d e t a i l e dinformation on some assetsis not included. Refer to theappropriate field manuals forfurther deta i ls . Some assetsa r e s t a f f o f f i c e r s ; t h i schapter gives you the types ofinformation they can provideand equipment they might use.

ASSETS AND EQUIPMENT ORGANICTO THE MANEUVER BATTALION

At the battalion level thecommander is fighting close-inoperations. To support thecommander, focus the collectioneffort at the lst- and2d-echelon battalions oflst-echelon regiments (out to15 kilometers). The assetsavailable to conduct R&Smissions at the battalionare l imited. Since the assetsavailable to conduct R&Smissions at the battalion

are limited, the S2 faces achallenge when planning R&Soperations. Some of theavailable assets are scouts,patrols, OPs/LPs, soldiers,and equipment.

SCOUT PLATOON

The scout platoon's primarymissions in support of thebattalion are reconnaissanceand screening. FM 17-98contains a detailed discussionof scout platoons. Presentlyall scout platoons are beingreequipped with 10 highmobility multipurpose wheeledvehicles (HMMWVs).

Capabi l i t ies

The scout platoon canperform missions--

o Mounted or dismounted.

o In various terrainconditions.

o Under all weatherconditions.

o Day and night.

The primary mission of thescout platoon is reconnais-sance. The scout platoon, withfire support protection, canconduct reconnaissance missions

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10 to 15 kilometers beyond theFEBA. These distances varywith the type of scout platoonand METT-T.

The scout platoon is theonly asset found at themaneuver battalion specificallytrained to conduct reconnais-sance. Other missions thescout platoon conducts are--

o Quartering party duties.

o NBC reconnaissance,including chemical detectionand radiological surveying andmonitoring.

o Limited pioneer anddemolition.

o Security missions.

o Reconnoiter and establishOPs and LPs.

Limitations

The scout platoon conductsreconnaissance operations aspart of a larger combinedarms force. The scout platoondepends on its parent unitfor combat support and combatservice support to augmentand sustain its operations.Remember, the scout platoon'sdesign and training is toreconnoiter platoon sizeareas only.

In addition, a fullstrength platoon--

o Reconnoiters only asingle route during routereconnaissance; METT-T isthe determining factor.

o Reconnoiters a zone 3to 5 kilometers wide; METT-Tmay increase or decrease thezone.

o During screeningmissions, is extremely limitedin its ability to destroy orrepel enemy reconnaissanceuni ts .

NOTE : Airborne and lightinfantry scouts are notmounted; they reconnoiterareas out 500 to 1,000 metersduring most missions.

o During CR operations,can only acquire and maintainvisual contact with the enemy;can kill or repel enemyreconnaissance elements onlyif augmented or task organizedwith infantry, armor, or ATa s s e t s .

o Operates six OPs forlimited periods (under 12hours); or three OPs forextended periods (over 12hours ) . The light scoutplatoon usually operatesthree OPs.

o Is restricted in thedistance it can operatefrom the main body, due tocommunications range andrange of supporting elements.

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o Cannot operatecontinuously on all battalionnets (such as battalioncommand, operations andi n t e l l i g e n c e , rear operations,and mortar) while operating onthe platoon net. The platoonleader can monitor only twonets at the same time.

o Uses the HMMWV with onlya 30-inch fording capability;its reconnaissance,survei l lance , targetacquisition, and nightobservation equipment includesthe AN/UAS-11, Night VisionSight; AN/PVS-4, Night VisionSight, Individual Weapon;AN/PVS-5, Night Vision Goggles;and binoculars.

PATROLS (MANEUVER ELEMENTS)

There are two basiccategories of patrols:reconnaissance and combat. Apatrol is a detachment sent toconduct reconnaissance, combat,or both. I t consis ts of a tleast two people who may beaccompanied by speciallytrained personnel or augmentedwith equipment essential to themission. All maneuver elementsconduct patrols during combatoperations to providereconnaissance, CR, security,and small-scale combatoperations.

Reconnaissance patrolscollect information and confirmor disprove the accuracy ofpreviously gained information.The three types ofreconnaissance patrols areroute, area, and zone.

Combat patrols providesecurity and harass, destroy,or capture enemy personnel,equipment, and installations.The three types of combatpatrols are raid, ambush, andsecur i ty .

Capabi l i t ies

Patrols can conductmissions mounted or dismountedin various terrain and weatherconditions. Patrols can alsoconduct missions 10 to 15kilometers beyond the FEBA.Patrols sometimes pass throughthe scout platoon to conductmissions. Indirect f ire shouldsupport patrols at all t imes.The distance for patrolmissions varies with the typeof patrol and METT-T. Thecompany must always coordinatewith the battalion before thepatrons departure to eliminateredundancy and gaps.

Limitations

Patrols have many of thesame limitations as the scoutplatoon. Patrols normally donot provide surveillance forextended periods. Patrols canreconnoiter an area, establishOPs/LPs for a limited period,and then leave.

OBSERVATION POSTS/LISTENING POSTS

(MANEUVER ELEMENTS)

Units establish OPs/LPs toprovide security, surveillanceof NAI, and early warning ofenemy activities. They are inuse extensively during limited

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v i s i b i l i t y . Proper emplacementincludes concealment and unitsupport by fire.

Patrols di f fer in t ra iningand logistic support from scoutplatoons and normally do notestablish OPs/LPs for extendedperiods. If you use patrolsto conduct surveillance forextended periods, you aremismanaging your R&S assets.OPs/LPs are tasked to providesurveillance for extendedperiods as long as theythe requirements stated

Capabi l i t ies

Units can employ

meetabove.

practically an unlimitednumber of OPs/LPs. They canprovide 24-hour coverage ifthey have the proper day andnight observation devices,GSRs , or sensors. They canremain undetected due to lackof movement. Units can useOPs/LPs all over thebattlefield as long as they areprovided with fire support.

Limitations

OPs/LPs cannot operatefor 24 hours if they do nothave the proper equipment.A security element must benear the OP/LP to providesupport and security in atimely manner.

SOLDIERS

During combat, soldiersare scattered all over thebat t le f ie ld ; thus , they can

provide a large quantity ofreal-time information. Youmust get involved in thetraining to increase thetimeliness and accuracy ofinformation reported. Al lsoldiers, from private togeneral officer, must knowhow to properly sendinformation up the chain.

Capabi l i t ies

Soldiers can determine thetypes and numbers of enemyapproaching.

Limitations

Soldiers do not always havethe right equipment to sendinformation quickly.

EQUIPMENT

Night observation devices(NODS) are either active orpassive equipment designed topermit observation duringdarkness. Active equipmenttransmits infrared or whitelight to i l luminate thet a r g e t . Passive devices useeither ambient light (from thestars, moon, or otherlow-intensity i l lumination) oroperate by detecting thedifferences in heat (infraredenergy) radiated by differento b j e c t s . Heavy rain, snow,fog, or smoke degrade theeffectiveness of thesedevices. You should use NODSon night patrols and OPs/LPs.Figure 3-1 shows observationequipment associated with themaneuver battalion.

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ASSETS AND PERSONNELNORMALLY SUPPORTING

THE MANEUVER BATTALION

Assets and personnel thatnormally support the maneuverbattalion include GSR, REMBASS,f ie ld ar t i l lery , engineerplatoon, a ir defense ar t i l leryplatoon, Army aviation, andtact ica l Air Force .

GROUND SURVEILLANCE RADAR

GSR provides the tacticalcommander with timely combatinformation and targetacquisition data. The primarycapability of GSR is to search,detect , and locate moving

objects during limitedv i s i b i l i t y . GSR is capable ofaccurately locating targets forrapid engagement. It providesearly warning of enemy movementand assists friendly forces inmovement control.

Tasks

GSR is used to--

o Detect enemy movementduring l imited vis ib i l i ty .

o Monitor NAI.

o Monitor barriers andobstacles to detect enemybreaching.

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o Monitor flanks.

o Extend the capabilitiesof patrols and OPs/LPs.

o Vector patrols.

o During daylight, detectenemy obscured by haze, smoke,or fog.

o Monitor possible dropzones or landing zones.

Capabi l i t ies

GSRs can--

o Penetrate smoke, haze,fog, light rain and snow,l i g h t f o l i a g e .

o Operate in completedarkness.

and

o Detect moving personneland equipment.

o Be moved around onb a t t l e f i e l d .

o Provide adjustmenti n d i r e c t f i r e .

Limitations

the

o f

GSR limitations are--

o Emits active radar waveswhich are subject to enemydetection and electroniccountermeasures (ECM).

o Performance is degradedby heavy rain or snow and densef o l i a g e .

o Line of sight (LOS)operation only.

o Limited mobility of theAN/PPS-5.

o Limited range of theAN/PPS-15.

Character is t ics

GSR should be used withNODS as complementarysurveil lance devices, sinceeach device can be used toovercome the limitations of theother. Figure 3-2 shows GSRc h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . GSRs areorganic to the MI battalion,intell igence and surveillance(I&S) company. The MIBattalion provides GSRs indirect support (DS) of brigadeoperations. GSR teams that areDS to the brigade can beattached to maneuver battalionand company elements to supportthe commanders.

Radar Allocation

Radar is allocated asfollows:

o Heavy Division:

--Three squads of fourteams each.

--One PPS-5 per teamequals 12 PPS-5’s.

o Light Division:

--Four squads of threeteams each.

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--One PPS-15 per team of the team leader’s expertiseequals 12 PPS-15’s. and knowledge of the GSR. S i t e

o Airborne division and airassault division:

--Three squads of fourteams each.

--Three PPS-15's persquad equal nine PPS-15’s(two-person team).

--One PPS-5 per squadequals three PPS-5'S(three-person team).

Si te Select ion Factors

General site selectionshould be made in closecoordination with the GSR teamleader whenever possible;speci f ic s i te se lect ion shouldalways be left to the teamleader. This takes advantage

selection should provide--

o Protection by combatelements, as far forward aspossible to provide theearliest warning.

o LOS between radar andt a r g e t .

o Communication capability.

o Concealment and cover.

o Protection against ECM.

Remember, radars are anextreme electronic securityr i s k . Both the main and sidelobes emit sufficient energyfor the enemy to detect anduse radio ECM. GSRs, oncedetected, can give indicatorsto the enemy showing the size

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and disposition of friendlyelements. GSRs can bedestroyed or jammed. Thefollowing are common-senseOPSEC measures to be used withGSRs :

o Use terrain or vegetationto absorb or scatter sidelobes.

o Place radar site so thetarget is between the radar andthe hi l l s or forests to l imitthe detection range.

o Schedule random operatingperiods of short duration.

GSRs can be used in tandemwith two or more widelydispersed radars having thecapability to i l luminate thesame target area, alternatingoperation times. The GSR canalso be used with a nightvision device that may not havethe same range capability, butwill provide some coverage whenthe radar is turned off.

REMBASS

REMBASS is organic to theairborne, air assault , andlight division MI battalion,I&S company. REMBASS canremain under division, ingeneral support (GS); or thedivision can provide it in DSto maneuver brigades, divisionsupport command headquarters,armored cavalry squadron, ormaneuver battalion. REMBASSteams report directly to theG2 or S2 of the supporteduni t . The sensor monitoring

s e t , which functions as thesensor output display, providestarget identification andc l a s s i f i c a t i o n . In most cases,the sensor monitoring set isplaced at the supported unit'sTOC.

REMBASS teams hand deploythe sensors and repeaters; theyalso provide personnel tooperate a monitoring device.REMBASS allocations aredi f ferent for a l l d ivis ionsand are based on eachdivis ions part icular miss ion.It is important to rememberto include the REMBASS teamleader in planning REMBASSmissions.

Capabi l i t ies

REMBASS is an all-weather,day or night surveillancesystem, activated by magnetic,se ismic-acoust ic , or infraredchanges from moving targets.REMBASS transmits target databy FM radio link to themonitors. With this data theoperator can determine thet a r g e t ' s - -

o Direction of travel.

o Rate of speed.

o Length of column.

o Approximate number.

o Type (Personnel orwheeled or tracked vehicles).

REMBASS can operate inunusual climatic conditions and

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on varied terrain. REMBASShas transmission ranges of 15kilometers (ground-to-ground),and 100 kilometers (ground-t o - a i r ) . Because of theflexibility and wide rangeof REMBASS application,various sensor combinationscan be selected to suit anygiven mission.

Limitations

Hand emplacement of sensorsand repeaters in hostile areasincreases employment responsetime. The sensor requiresradio LOS to transmit data tothe monitor. The equipment'sweight and size limit theamount and distance personnelcan hand carry for emplacement.REMBASS receivers are highlysuscept ib le to e lectronicjamming; barrage jamming beingthe most effective. Operatorproficiency greatly affects theresults obtained.

Equipment

REMBASS teams normally usethree different types ofsensors: magnetic,seismic-acoustic, andinfrared-passive. The sensorsare arrayed in strings whichcomplement one another. Thesensors function automatically,transmitting information whenmovement, sound, or heatactivates them.

Each sensor has detectionand classification techniquessuited to the physical

disturbance (such as magnetic,se ismic-acoust ic , infrared-pass ive) . Each sensor has aself-disabling and anti-tampering feature built intoi t .

Experience during OperationDesert Shield indicates anincreased radius of detectionfor sensors emplaced in sand orsandy soil with a silica base,while sensors emplaced in looserocky soil degrades sensordetection radius. Therefore,it is very important to checkthe detection radius of eachsensor in the type soil of itsintended employment andannotate the results on theSensor Operator Data Record,if the situation permits.

Magnetic sensor. The magneticsensor uses a passive magnetictechnique to detect targetsand determine the directionof movement (left to rightand r ight to le f t ) . Thissensor detects moving objectsthat are a t least part ia l lymade of ferrous materials.The magnetic sensor will notc l a s s i f y t a r g e t s . The magneticsensor is most effectivelyused as a count indicatorfor vehic les .

Detection ranges of themagnetic sensor are--

o Armed personnel, 3meters.

o Wheeled vehicles, 15meters.

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o Tracked vehicles, 25meters.

Due to these detectionranges, REMBASS teams mustuse these sensors withinproximity of the expectedroutes of travel. The weightof this sensor and battery is 3kilograms.

Seismic-acoust ic sensor . Theseismic-acoustic sensor detectsand classifies personnel andwheeled or tracked vehicles byanalyzing target signature.It transmits a targetc lass i f icat ion report to themonitor. The weight of thesensor and its battery is 3kilograms.

Detection ranges for theseismic-acoustic sensor are--

o Personnel, 50 meters.

o Wheeled vehicles, 250meters.

o Tracked vehicles, 350meters.

I n f r a r e d - p a s s v e s e n s o r . Thissensor detects and responds toa temperature change of 1.5degrees Celsius within itsfield of view. It candetermine the direction ofmotion relative to the sensorposi t ion. The infrared-passivesensor is most effectively usedas a count indicator forpersonnel. The weight of thesensor and battery is 3kilograms.

Detection ranges of theinfrared-passive sensor are--

o Personnel, 3 to 20meters.

o Vehicles, 3 to 50 meters.

Radio repeater. The radiorepeater relays datatransmissions between thesensors and the monitorings i t e s . The radio repeaterintercepts the encoded radiomessage from either a REMBASSsensor or another likerepeater.

Ranges of the repeatera r e - -

o 15 kilometersground-to-ground.

o 100 kilometersground-to-air.

The repeater, l ike thesensors, has a self-disablingand antitampering feature builti n t o i t . The weight of therepeater and three batteriesis 15 kilograms.

Additional equipment.Additional equipment for thesensor includes--

o A code programmer forprogramming a sensor orrepeater to a desired operatingchannel.

o The antenna group forthe REMBASS sensor monitoringset receives transmissions fromextended ranges.

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o Sensor monitoring setsfor monitoring REMBASSradio-linked sensor andrepeater transmissions.

o A portable radiofrequency monitor to monitorsensors and repeaters . I tis used primarily duringemplacement of sensors totest operational status andradio LOS. It can also beused as a backup if the sensormonitoring set becomesinoperative.

Figure 3-3 shows sitesymbols . Adjacent brigadesor battalions can monitor thesame sensors if they exchangeradio frequency information.This lateral monitoringincreases the surveillanceof units and promotes theexchange of intell igence.For additional informationon REMBASS characteristics andemployment techniques, referto FM 34-10-1.

FIELD ARTILLERY

To properly integrate fieldartil lery assets into the R&Sand CR plans, you mustunderstand the capabilities andlimitations of this equipment.

A f ie ld ar t i l lery bat ta l ionis both a producer and aconsumer of combat information.Fie ld ar t i l lery bat ta l ions inDS of brigades provide eachmaneuver battalion headquartersa fire support element (FSE).This element is headed by anFSO. The FSE helps plan,d i r e c t , and coordinate fire

support operations. The FSEalso provides a fire supportteam (FIST) to each maneuvercompany.

Forward observers (FOs)from each FIST are deployedto platoons (except in armorbattalions) and may accompanyreconnaissance patrols or helpoperate OPs. FOs observe thebat t le f ie ld to detect ,ident i fy , locate , andlaser-designate targets forsuppression, neutralization,or destruction. They reportboth targeting data and combatinformation to the maneuverbattalion FSO and S2.

The FISTs and FOs arespecially equipped for theirmission. The laser rangefinder provides an accuratedistance measurement to at a r g e t . Using the ground orvehicular laser locatordesignator, the FO candetermine distance, direction,and vertical angle. The FOcan also laser-designatetargets for Army, Navy, andAir Force laser-guidedmunitions.

The capability of the FISTto provide real-time combatinformation cannot beoveremphasized. The FISTvehicle (FISTV) is capable ofaccurate target locationthrough the combination of amanual calculation laser rangefinder and a self-locationcapabi l i ty . It has a digitaland voice interface with thefire support system and athermal sight.

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The FISTV can locatetargets out to 10 kilometersand designate targets out to 5kilometers. However, itse lectro-opt ics capabi l i tycannot provide acquisitionbeyond direct fire range (5kilometers).

Maneuver company and troopFISTS and combat observationand laser teams use the FISTV.The FISTV has only LOStarget -acquis i t ion capabi l i ty .When on the move, it cannotdesignate targets. The thermalsight’s range l imitation iswithin 3 kilometers of itsf ie ld of v is ion. Being mountedon an M113 chassis, it lacksthe mobility and armorprotection of the maneuverforces it supports.

ENGINEER PLATOON

The maneuver battalionreceives engineer support fromthe engineer company normallyplaced in DS of the brigade.Usually an engineer platoonsupports a battalion. Themission of this engineerplatoon is to provide mobility,countermobility, survivability,and general engineeringsupport.

As the S2, you should learnto tap into this valuableresource for detailedinformation on natural andconstructed terrain features.The S3 and the engineer supportofficer need to coordinate witheach other to integrateengineer assets into the R&Sand CR plans. The engineer

support officer can provide keyinformation about the terrainwithout your having to send outa reconnaissance patrol . Insome cases it would provevaluable to have engineers goalong with reconnaissancep a t r o l s . Engineers can provideexpert terrain and obstacleanalys is .

AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERYPLATOON

Short-range air defenseelements normally support themaneuver battalion. These mayinclude Stinger teams orsections and Vulcan squads.The air defense artillery (ADA)platoon or section leaderfunctions as the battalion airdefense of f icer . The ADAleader works closely with thebattalion S2, S3-air, FSO, andair l iaison officer (ALO) toplan and coordinate air defensesupport.

Specifically, the ADAleader would coordinate withyou to pinpoint areas of enemyair and ground activity. Thebat ta l ion a ir defense of f icercan tap into resources thatlook through the battlefield todetermine areas of enemy airactivity, thus revealing enemyground activity.

The forward area alertingradar (FAAR) and target datadisplay set provide air alertwarning information to Vulcansquads and Stinger teams. Thiswarning includes tentativeidentification, approximaterange, and azimuth of

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approaching low-altitudeaircraft out to 20 kilometers.

ARMY AVIATION

Aviation units supportmaneuver brigade and battalioncommanders. They provide aresponsive, mobile, andextremely flexible means tofind, fix, disrupt, and destroyenemy forces and theirsupporting command, control,

3and communications (C )f a c i l i t i e s . Some aviationassets are capable ofperforming limitedreconnaissance missions;however, most will collectinformation only as part ofnormal aviation missions.

You can find out from thearmy aviation support officerinformation concerning enemyactivity in areas whereaviation assets f ly missions.Helicopters can resupply,i n s e r t , or extract OPs/LPsor patrols. Combat aviationcompanies provide airliftsupport for troops and evacuateequipment, casualties, andenemy prisoners of war (EPWs).

The OH-58D is found in theat tack hel icopter bat ta l ionsupporting maneuver brigadesand battalions. The crew ofthe OH-58D consists of a pilotand an artil lery fire supportcoordinator and observer. Thisaircraft performs twofunctions. First, when insupport of maneuver battalionswith FSEs, it is primarily atarget acquisition and targetattack system. Second, when in

support of units where no FSEexists, the OH-58D crewperforms a fire supportplanning and coordinationfunction.

The OH-58D has many of thesame capabilities as the FISTV.It has a thermal sight; a laserrange finder and designator; ase l f - locat ion capabi l i ty ; and adigital and voice inter acewith the fire support C 3system. It can locate anddesignate targets out to 10kilometers. Under less thanideal weather conditions it canonly detect and recognizetargets to within direct f i reranges.

This system provides--

o Digital interface withfire support C systems.

o Digital interface withArmy aviation aircraft equippedwith the airborne targethandover system (such as theAH-64 Apache).

o Interface with Air Forceassets so equipped.

These characteristics makethe OH-58D a primary member ofJoint Air Attack Team (JAAT)operations.

TACTICAL AIR FORCE

JAAT is a combination ofArmy attack and scouthelicopters and Air Force closeair support (CAS). It normallyoperates in support of maneuverbrigade or battalions. Al l

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s t a f f o f f i c e r s p a r t i c i p a t e i nplanning missions for Air Forcesupport, especially the S2, S3,S3-air, FSO, and ALO.Coordinate through the ALO toreceive real-time informationfrom these Air Force assets.

The ALO also provides themeans to forward immediatetact ica l a ir reconnaissancerequests up the chain. Airreconnaissance reports,in-flight combat informationreports, and air situationreports are all availablethrough the ALO. The ALOweighs this information againstinformation from the CR and theR&S plans. In this way the ALOcan confirm or deny theaccuracy of those plans.

ASSETS AND PERSONNELNORMALLY SUPPORTING

THE MANEUVER BRIGADE

At brigade level, thecommander is fighting thec l o s e - i n b a t t l e . You, as thebrigade S2, must support thecommander. To do this you mustfocus your collection effort atthe lst-echelon regiments andthe 2d-echelon regimentscapable of influencing yourcommanders battle (out to 30kilometers) . The brigade haslimited assets available toconduct the collection effort.Here are some assets andpersonnel you can use toenhance your R&S and CRoperations.

IEWSE

The IEWSE officer providesexpertise on the capabilit ies,

l imitat ions , and employment ofthe intell igence and electronicwarfare (IEW) equipmentsupporting the brigade. TheIEWSE--

o Coordinates IEW supportof the maneuver brigade.

o Is the link to the MIbattalion for support.

o Communicates with the MIbn to receive targeting andtasking information.

EPW INTERROGATORS

Interrogators screen andinterrogate EPW, detainees,and refugees. Their missionis to collect and report allinformation possible to satisfythe commander’s PIR and IR.FM 34-80 contains the typesof information interrogatorscan obtain and provide.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

The counterintell igence(CI) support team can evaluatethe vulnerability of friendlyR&S assets to detection bythreat R&S and targetacquis i t ion assets . CI membersof support teams can identifyand counter the specific enemytarget acquisition means whichpose a significant threat tobrigade operations. Theseinclude--

o Human intelligence(HUMINT).

o Imagery intelligence(IMINT).

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o SIGINT.

Based on enemy R&Sactivities, you could determinewhich operations security(OPSEC) and deceptionoperations would work againstthe enemy, after coordinationwith CI personnel. FM 34-80has detailed information on CIsupport.

GSR AND REMBASS

GSR and REMBASS can bekept under brigade control.See the above paragraphtitled "Assets and PersonnelNormally Supporting TheManeuver Battalion” forspecific information.

ELECTRONIC WARFARECOLLECTION SYSTEMS

These assets operate nearor within the brigade AO. Theyprovide intelligence fromintercepted enemy emitters.Ground-based systems includethe following:

o AN/TSQ-138 (TRAILBLAZER)is a ground-based HF and VHFcommunications intercept andVHF DF system. It is found inheavy divisions only.

o AN/MSQ-103C, HeavyDivisions, AN/MSQ-l03B,Airborne and Air AssaultDivisions, (TEAMPACK) is aground-based noncommunicationsintercept and line-of-bearing(LOB) system. It is found inall divisions except l ight.

o AN/TLQ-17A (TRAFFIC JAM)is a ground-based HF and VHFcommunications intercept andjamming system. It is foundin all divisions except l ight.

o AN/TRQ-32 (TEAMMATE) isa ground-based HF, VHF, and UHFcommunications intercept andLOB system. It is found in alldivis ions .

o The AN/PRD-10\ll/12 isa ground-based radio DF systemcapable of being carried by oneperson. It is found in airassaul t , airborne, and lightdivis ions , and some heavydivis ions .

o AN/ARQ-33A or AN/ALQ-151(QUICKFIX) is an airbornecommunications intercept,jamming, and DF system. Itis found in all divisions.

There are also numerouscommunications jammingresources that will beavailable to the commanderin or near your brigade AO.FM 34-80 has detailedinformation about electronicwarfare (EW) equipment.

DIVISION INTELLIGENCEOFFICER

The G2 can provide manykinds of detailed intell igence.The G2 has various assetsavai lable to col lec tinformation and can pass thisdown to you as intelligence.FM 34-10 has specificinformation concerning thesea s s e t s .

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FIELD ARTILLERY

Like the maneuverbattalion, the maneuver brigadehas an FSO to coordinate firesupport. The FSO cancommunicate with numerousweapon-locating radars.

Fire Finder Radar

The target acquisitionbat tery of divis ion ar t i l lery(DIVARTY) has three AN/TPQ-36mortar-locating radars and twoAN/TPQ-37 artillery-locatingradars.

The AN/TPQ-36 detectsmortars and artillery out to12 kilometers and detectsrockets out to 24 kilometers.

The AN/TPQ-37 detectsartillery and mortars out to30 kilometers and rockets outto 50 kilometers.

Moving Target LocatingRadars

The DIVARTY targetacquisition battery has eitherone AN/TPS-25A or oneAN/TPS-58B moving-target-locating radar. Thesebat t le f ie ld survei l lanceradars are similar to theGSR. They can detect,l o c a t e , and distinguishwheeled and tracked vehiclesand dismounted personnel.

The AN/TPS-25A detectsmoving vehicles out to 18kilometers and personnel outto 12 kilometers.

The AN/TPS-58B detectsmoving vehicles out to 20kilometers and personnel outto 10 kilometers.

F ie ld Art i l lery Bat ta l ionObservation Posts

Survey parties and othertrained personnel of the fieldart i l lery bat ta l ion operate thebattalion OPs. These personnelsurvey designated target areas,and record high-burst and meanpoint-of - impact regis trat ions .They send targeting data andcombat information to the firedirection center or the FSO atthe maneuver battalion orbrigade.

Aerial Fire SupportO f f i c e r

The DIVARTY support platoonof the heavy division’s combataviation brigade providesrotary wing aircraft forDIVARTY air observers. Theirmission is to call for oradjust f ires from the firesupport assets. A e r i a l f i r esupport of f icers- -

o Cover areas masked fromground observers.

o Cover thinly resourcedareas .

o Provide coverage whileground-based R&S and targetacquisition assets displace.

o Reinforce surveillance ofvulnerable areas.

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o Report targeting data andcombat information to the FSOat the maneuver battalion orbrigade, DIVARTY TOC, or thef i re direct ion center .

ENGINEER AND AIRDEFENSE ARTILLERY

Engineer and ADA supportofficers are located at themaneuver brigade. Types ofinformation these personnel canprovide is discussed in theabove paragraph titled “Assetsand Personnel NormallySupporting The ManeuverB a t t a l i o n . "

AIR AND ARMOREDCAVALRY SQUADRON

This squadron supports thedivision by conductingreconnaissance and securitymissions. There are four typesof air and armored cavalrysquadrons:

o The air and armoredcavalry squadron of the heavydivision consists of two groundcavalry troops (M3 equipped);and two air cavalry troops(OH-58s and attackh e l i c o p t e r s ) .

o The air cavalry squadronof the air assault divisionconsists of three air cavalrytroops; and one air assaulttroop.

o The air cavalry squadronof the airborne divisionconsists of three air cavalrytroops; one ground cavalrytroop (tube-launched, optically

tracked, wire guided [TOW]missile systems and scoutHMMWVs); and one air assaulttroop.

o The air cavalry squadronof the l ight division consistsof two air cavalry troops; andone ground cavalry troop (TOWand scout HMMWVs).

Headquarters andheadquarters troops andmaintenance troops are notincluded in the above list.

ARMY AVIATION

Attack HelicopterBat ta l ions

These battalions areprimari ly t ra ined to "ki l l "enemy tanks. They can also--

o Provide aerial escort andsuppressive fires to supportair assault operations.

o Destroy enemy C3 a n dl o g i s t i c a s s e t s .

o Conduct JAAT operations.

If these assets supportyour brigade, they can providedetailed information aboutenemy activity. The key toobtaining this information isto coordinate with the S3-airand the Army aviation supporto f f i c e r . Refer to the aboveparagraph titled “Assets andPersonnel Normally SupportingThe Maneuver Battalion" foradditional information. Figure3-4 shows an asset deploymentmatrix. This matrix may be

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If these assets supportyour brigade, they can providedetailed information aboutenemy activity. The key toobtaining this information isto coordinate with the S3-airand the Army aviation supporto f f i c e r . Refer to the aboveparagraph titled "Assets andPersonnel Normally SupportingThe Maneuver Battalion” foradditional information. Figure3-4 shows an asset deploymentmatrix. This matrix may beused by brigade and battalion

S2s to keep track of deployeda s s e t s .

MILITARY POLICE PLATOON

The military police (MP)platoon supports the maneuverbrigade during some missions.If you have an MP platoonsupporting your unit, youshould coordinate with the MPplatoon leader forinformation. The MP platooncan usually coordinate withother MPs who are normallyscattered all over the AO.

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CHAPTER 4

PLANNING EFFECTIVE RECONNAISSANCEAND SURVEILLANCE

This chapter presents theplanning steps for effectiveR&S operations. The S2 isresponsible for makingrecommendations in R&Soperations. At brigade orbattalion, you are the drivingforce in the R&S effort.(Refer to Chapter 1 for thecollection managementprocess.) These steps apply toboth brigade and battalionl e v e l s .

The first step begins withreceiving the unit’s mission.You must understand thecommander’s intent in thisparticular mission. You havealready completed most of theIPB process; but now you mustproduce some of the specificinformation pertaining to themission.

Once you understand themission, begin to analyze therequirements placed on you asthe S2. The commander shouldtell you the key pieces ofinformation needed before andduring the mission. This keyinformation, called PIR, iseither stated by the commanderor recommended by you for thecommander’s approval.

The PIR and IR provide theinitial focus of the R&S

e f f o r t . The R&S plan shouldanswer the PIR and IR. At thispoint you should have a roughdraft R&S plan, such as whenand what areas to begin R&Soperations. (This is part ofthe mission analysis phase ofthe planning process steps.)

You can now begin addingsome detail to the R&S plan.Integrate any requirements fromhigher headquarters into theplan. You have to translatethe initial PIR and IR intoindicators on which R&S assetscan col lect . Figure 4-1 showsexamples of the PIR, indicator,specific informationrequirements (SIR), andspecific orders and requests(SOR) process. Additionalexamples of indicators are inFM 34-3, Appendix C. Nowdetermine the SIR and SORneeded for the R&S plan. TheSIR and SOR ensure assets arecol lect ing speci f ic informat ionthat answers the PIR and IR.

The event template is aproduct of IPB showing when andwhere the enemy could go.Compare the SIR to the eventtemplate; this comparisonshould indicate when and whereto send friendly R&S assets.Those areas in which you expectenemy activity are labeled NAI.

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Once you have a picture ofthe coverage required for theR&S effort, you shouldprioritize the SIR. Those SIRthat, when answered, willprovide the greatest amount ofintell igence in the shortestamount of time should have ahigh priority. (This is partof the COA development phase ofthe planning process steps.)

By now you have set yourSIR pr ior i t ies , ident i f iedareas to send R&S assets, andknow when to begin the R&Smission. For the next step,you must be familiar with thecapabilit ies and limitations ofall R&S assets at yourpart icular level . Compare theSIR with available R&S assets.Close coordination between youand the other staff officersshould help ensure the assetsare properly deployed.Development of the R&S planshould involve all staffo f f i c e r s . Your concern isdeveloping IR and guidingassets to the proper areas.

STAFF OFFICERRESPONSIBILITIES

Other staff officers have arole in this process. Thefollowing is a l ist of theseoff icers and theirr e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s :

o The S3 makes sure theassets are available and canconduct the mission and the R&Splan supports the overallmission of the unit.

o The CI officer apprisesyou of the vulnerability of

your R&S assets to enemycollection and targetc a p a b i l i t i e s .

o The FSO coordinatesindirect f ires planned tosupport R&S assets andrecommends establishingappropriate restr ic t ive f i resupport coordination measuresto provide for troop safety.

o The R&S asset commanderis responsible for planningtargets and indirect f i res forthat element.

o The engineer officersupports the R&S effort bycollecting information on theterrain and obstacles.

o The IEWSE officersupports the R&S effort byguiding the MI battalion assetsto assist in answering the PIR.

o The ADA officer plans airdefense for the R&S assets andalso provides information onenemy air activity.

o The NBC officerintegrates NBC operations withR&S missions.

o The aviation officerprovides air movement for R&Sassets and also information onenemy activity while in flight.

o The ALO provides closeair support for R&S missions aswell as in-flight reports onenemy movement.

These s taf f of f icers arenot cast aside upon completionof the R&S plan. They should

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be kept updated on the currentR&S situation. These officersprovide recommendations duringR&S operations and ensure theirassets are operating asinstructed.

The DST is a tool used inthe IPB process that brings thestaff officers together to planthe mission. The DST alsoensures involvement among theS2, the S3, and the FSO inplanning R&S missions.

PLANNING

Once you know which R&Sassets are available to conductR&S operations, you have todecide how to satisfy the SIR.To collect the greatest amountof intelligence with the fewestassets, you must know how toplan missions using basiccollection management strategysuch as augmenting, taskorganizing, cueing, andredundancy.

AUGMENTING

Chapter 8discussion of

TASK

has an in-depthaugmenting.

ORGANIZING

To collect the mostinformation, with the fewestassets and in the quickest way,task organize assets. Thisincreases their overalleffectiveness in gatheringinformation and surviving ont h e b a t t l e f i e l d . The followingis an example of taskorganizing.

A scout platoon's missionis to conduct a 10-kilometer-wide by 10-kilometer-deep zonereconnaissance before amovement to contact. The scoutplatoon must accomplish thismission in one hour. You havedetermined the platoon needsaugmentation to cover this mucharea in the time allowed.After you coordinate with theS3, the S3 attaches twomechanized infantry squads tothe scout platoon. These twosquads are given the mission toprovide security and marki n f i l t r a t i o n r o u t e s .

In this example the scoutplatoon is able to concentrateon reconnoitering the terrainand locating enemy positions;while the two mechanized squadsprovide security for the scoutplatoon and mark infiltrationroutes. If you had expectedheavy enemy obstacles, the S3could have attached an engineersection to mark, breach, orprovide obstacle assessmentwhile the scouts and infantrydid their mission.

You should consider all theassets l isted in Chapter 3 foraugmentation or task organiza-t ion roles . See Chapter 8 forfurther discussion of taskorganization.

CUEING

Another collection strategyof R&S missions is cueing.Cueing is using limited assetsto identify or verify enemyactivity or using one asset to

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tip off or alert anothera s s e t . Use the event templateto pinpoint the times and areasto collect on the enemy.

Instead of the R&S assetstrying to cover large areas forextended periods of time, theassets are active only whencued. The cueing can be thetime you expect the enemy to beat a specific NAI, or thereaction to informationreported by another asset. Anexample of cueing follows:

You have identified threeNAI needing surveillance, whileusing only one asset. For thisexample the only assetavailable to cover the threeNAI is an OP. Due to thedistance between the NAI, theOP cannot cover all three NAIat the same time. Youdetermine a location central toall three NAI. From thislocation the OP can cover onlyone NAI with surveillance.

An aircraft reports enemyvehicles near one of theunsurveilled NAI. You informthe OP of the activity, thuscueing it; and the asset movestoward the NAI to verify thereport . You may use any of theassets listed in Chapter 3 ascues for other assets.

REDUNDANCY

Another collection strategyfor R&S operations isredundancy. As the S2, yourprimary effort is to provideR&S coverage for as many NAI asposs ible . Based on the

priority of the SIR and thenumber of NAI, you have todecide which areas you wantmore than one asset to cover.With more than one assetcovering the same NAI, a backupsystem is available in case oneasset breaks down. Redundancyguarantees continuous areacoverage. An example ofredundancy follows.

You have a GSR covering anNAI during limited visibility.Just in case the GSR breaksdown, you have assigned twoOPs/LPs with NODS to cover theNAI . The OPs also provide NAIcoverage during daylight whilethe GSR crew rests. If the GSRbreaks down, the OPs have NODSto pick up the responsibilityof surveilling the NAI. TheNODS can also specificallyidentify the moving intrudersdetected by the GSR.

Remember to include in theR&S planning effortscoordination with the CI teamsupporting your unit. Theroutes used by your scoutplatoon and the positionsoperated by your assets willbe potential NAI to enemycol lect ion assets . WhateverOPSEC and deception measuresyou incorporate into the R&Splan, they should be basedon CI evaluation of thevulnerability of your R&Sassets to enemy collectionand target acquisitionc a p a b i l i t i e s . As you expectto see the enemy at certaintimes and places on thebattlefield, so the enemywill expect to see you.

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Working with the S3, youare now ready to begin matchingassets with missions. I f t h ecommander and the S3 approvethe R&S plan, then give warningorders to the assets. Thewarning orders allow the assetsenough time to conduct troop-leading procedures.

Once you issue the warningorders and refined R&S plan,prepare your portion of the

mission briefing. The purposeof this briefing is to informthe col lect ion assets of theirmissions and to provide themwith as much information aspossible about it (such as IPBproducts). Use all availableinformation to provide as cleara picture as possible of whatyou expect of them on thebattlefield and what they canexpect to encounter.

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CHAPTER 5

METHODS OF TASKING RECONNAISSANCEAND SURVEILLANCE ASSETS

The S3 is responsible forand has tasking authority overmaneuver elements. The S2makes tasking recommendationsto the commander or S3. The S2is the primary user of thescouts and, many times, the S2actually tasks them. In someunits the S2 has taskingauthority over R&S assets afterthe commander and the S3approve the R&S plan. Everyunit has its own SOP regardingR&S responsibilit ies.

Normally, you can considerthe commanders approval of theR&S plan as granting taskingauthority. Many times the S3does not have time to prepareand publish separate R&Smissions, so the S2 does it.Once the S2, after coordinatingclosely with the S3, hascompleted writing the formalplan, it is sent to thecommander for approval. Oncethe commander signs thefragmentary order (FRAGO) orwarning order, the taskingswithin it become missionsordered by the commander,regardless of who actuallywrote it .

Another way to publish themissions and taskings of theR&S plan is to print it in thesubordinate unit instructionswithin the unit OPORD. While

not as timely as FRAGOs orwarning orders, unitinstruct ions s t i l l le t everyoneknow what you expect of themduring the R&S operations.

Figure 5-1 shows a sampleR&S tasking with subordinateuni t instruct ions . Maneuverbattalions can also use thismethod when it is tailored tot h e i r l e v e l .

Probably the quickest wayto issue R&S orders is to havethe S3 issue them when issuingthe warning order to the unit.This method ensures the taskedassets know it is a formaltasking coming from thecommander. Both the S2 and S3plan the R&S operation;however, the S3 continues tohave the responsibility ofactually tasking assets.

A formal method of taskingassets for R&S operations is anintelligence annex to theOPORD. The intelligence annexis a formal intell igencetasking document accompanyingan OPORD or an operations plan(OPLAN). Paragraph 2, PriorityIntelligence Requirements, andparagraph 3, IntelligenceAcquisition Tasks, inform allassets what the focus of theR&S plan is and what missioneach asset is to conduct. The

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S2 is responsible for theintell igence annex. Again,before distribution, the S2coordinates the intell igenceannex with the commander and S3for their approval.

Figure 5-2 is a sample R&Stasking. Maneuver battalionscan also use this method, butwould tailor it to their level.

The R&S tasking matrix isanother method of tasking R&Sa s s e t s . (See Appendix A.)Distribution can be--

o Directly to the taskeda s s e t .

o Attached to thesubordinate unit instructionsof the OPORD.

o Attached to theintell igence annex.

Once tasked, the assetsmust understand their mission.During the mission briefing forthe assets , use as many of theIPB products as possible. Eachproduct serves a particularpurpose:

o The modified combinedobstacles overlay (MCOO)reveals terra in constra ints .

o Photographs show terrainfeatures .

o Enemy situation templatesprovide a picture of theenemy’s location and probableCOA.

o Event templates indicatewhere and when the enemy can

maneuver.

o NAI on the event templateshow target locations.

o The DST provides apicture of the overall friendlyscheme of maneuver and warnsthe R&S assets of any friendlyf i r e s i n t h e i r v i c i n i t y .

Once the assets have anunderstanding of the enemy andt e r r a i n , they can receivedetailed mission instructions.It does not matter if you orthe S3 give this briefing, justas long as the assetsunderstand their mission. Ifpossible, the S2, S3, and FSOshould be involved in thisb r i e f i n g .

Each asset shouldunderstand what the commanderwants it to accomplish. Givethe assets the big picture,then direct them to theirspecific roles and how they areto support the overall mission.

You can see the extensivetime required to plan R&Soperations. In most unitsthere is not enough time to gointo a lot of mission-specificdetailed planning before theassets are deployed. R&Soperations must begin as soonas possible after the unitreceives the warning order orOPORD . I f th is i s the case ,assets can be sent out afteryou and the S3 have developedthe rough draft R&S plan.Later, as you and the otherstaff officers refine the R&Splan, you can adjust the assetsand their instructions.

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CHAPTER 6

THE RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE OVERLAY

The R&S overlay is the R&Splan in graphic form. Thepurpose of the R&S overlay isto show the assets and the keystaff officers exactly wherethe R&S assets are operating.You will extract most of theoverlay’s graphics and symbolsfrom FM 101-5-1. Additionally,due to the various R&Soperational techniques, youwill need to construct some"homemade” graphics and explainthem in the legend.

There are two parts to theR&S overlay. The f i rs t part i sthe graphic display of deployedor planned deployment of R&Sa s s e t s . The second part is themarginal data consisting of thelegend, administrative data,specific instructions to eacha s s e t , and the distributionl i s t .

The marginal informationfound on the overlay consistsof the standard wording foundon all overlays. Theadministrative data iscomprised of the following:

o Class i f icat ion.

o Overlay tit le.

o Registration marks.

o Map sheet name.

o Map sheet scale.

o Map sheet number.

o Map sheet series.

o The “prepared by” line.

Another portion of theadministrative data is thelegend. The legend containsany nonstandard FM 101-5-1graphics used. I t a l s ocontains detailed writteninstructions to each R&Sa s s e t . These detailedinstructions should focus on--

o The required operationaltimes. You should give eachasset both a start and a finishtime for each mission, asapplicable.

o The target. To answerthe PIR, you need to look forspeci f ic indicators . Eachasset should be told exactlywhat to look for (such as typeuni ts , equipment, and specifica c t i v i t y ) . Never givebroad-based generic missions to“go out and look for and reporton anything that moves.”Specific guidance will promotespecific answers.

o Coordinatinginstruct ions . Al l assets wi l l ,at one time or another, move

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through or near another unit'sAO . To keep units fromshooting friendly R&S assets,assets and units mustcoordinate with each other.It is also important thatR&S assets coordinate amongthemselves.

o Reporting requirements.All assets should know when,how often, and what formatto use when reporting. Youshould provide frequencies,alternate frequencies, andreaction during jamming. Youmust also provide the NLTtime for specific informationto be reported.

I n i t i a l l y , the locationsfor assets are areas in whichyou recommend they deploy.After the assets have goneto these areas (NAI), theyreport to you or the S3 theactual locations in whichthey can conduct theirmissions. You or the S3updates the graphics toshow actual locations.

Control measures are asfollows:

o Friendly boundaries, R&Slimit of responsibility, NAI,s tar t points (SP) , re leasepoints (RP), and checkpoints.

o Graphics depicting route,area, and zone reconnaissance.

o Primary, alternate, andsupplementary positions.

o Sectors of scan forsensors.

All of these controlmeasures, except R&S limit ofresponsibility, are found inFM 101-5-1. The R&S limit ofresponsibility comes down fromhigher headquarters along withother R&S guidance. This l imitis a control measure thatinforms subordinate units ofthe limits of their R&Soperations. It can berepresented by a dashed line(- - - - ).

Remember, it is importantto include detailedinstructions for each R&S asseton the overlay. This method isknown as the overlay method fordistributing writteninstruct ions . Another methodis known as the matrix method.The R&S tasking matrix is thematrix used for this method.(See Appendix A.) Figure 6-1shows an R&S tasking matrix.

Figure 6-2 is an example ofthe R&S plan graphicallyportrayed on an overlay withdetailed instructions to eachasset written on the bottom ofthe overlay. Attach the R&Stasking matrix to the bottomof the R&S overlay. The matrixprovides the followinginformation:

o The first column showsthe priority of each mission.This number should correspondwith the PIR number.

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o The next column providesthe asset with the NAI numberand grid coordinate.

o The start/stop columninforms the asset the timesfor this mission.

o The SIR column explainsto the assets exactly whatthey are looking for (target).

o The next set of columnslists the actual assets taskedto conduct each mission. An“X" placed under each assetidentifies the tasking.

o The coordination columntells the assets which unitsto coordinate with for thismission.

o The last column providesthe assets with reportingrequirements.

We have discussed twoways to distributeinstructions; however, themethod is not important.What is important is for

assets to receive clear,speci f ic instruct ions .

Disseminating the R&Splan to all the assets canbe a problem. When the R&Splan reaches the disseminationphase, the assets are usuallyscattered great distanceso v e r t h e b a t t l e f i e l d . I nsome instances the R&S planis disseminated by courier.To ensure all assets receivetheir copy, write each asset’st i t le direct ly on thed i s t r i b u t i o n l i s t , p l a n ,or overlay. Exchangingbrigade or battalion R&Splans with adjacent unitsensures proper coordination,minimizes the risk ofshooting friendly soldiers,and cuts out unnecessaryredundancy.

Chapter 5 providesadditional methods fordisseminating R&Srequirements. See FM 34-80,Appendix E, for another sampleR&S overlay.

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CHAPTER 7

MONITORING THE RECONNAISSANCEAND SURVEILLANCE EFFORT

During the battle, yourcommander will probably haveseveral PIR that need to beanswered. As the S2, you willweigh those PIR in some way toorganize your collectione f f o r t . Remember the firstprinciple of R&S: t e l lcommanders what they need toknow in time for them to act.

This principle impliesthat, as the S2, you mustmonitor your collection effortat all times so you can makesure you answer yourcommander’s PIR.

If your commander developsnew PIR during the battle, youmay have to modify your R&Splan to address the new PIR.Suppose a PIR becomes obsolete.For example, let's say yourcommander was very concernedabout enemy reconnaissancelocat ions . This PIR would bevalid as your unit prepared tocross the LD/LC. However, onceyour unit consolidates on itsob ject ive , th is part icular PIRwould be less important. Thepoint is, you should constantlymonitor the status of your R&Seffort so you will know when toupdate PIR or to modify yourR&S plan.

TRACKING TARGETSAND ASSETS

There are other reasons youmust monitor your R&S orcol lect ion plan. Remember the

term "high payoff target," orHPT? These are specific enemyweapon systems or specificenemy units that are identifiedwhich must be destroyed,degraded, or suppressed foryour unit to succeed in itsmission. Many times, locatingan HPT may be one of yourcommander’s PIR. Other times,it might be an IR. In e i thercase, your R&S plan mustaccount for HPTs. During theexecution of your R&S plan, youmust be able to identify HPTsand quickly forward theirlocation to the S3 and FSO foract ion. This i s especia l lycritical for CR operations.

Another reason formonitoring your R&S operationis to keep track of your assetstatus and location. You willneed to know which of yourassets are s t i l l miss ioncapable and which areinoperative, so you will notwaste time retasking inoperableassets. Obviously, if you needto retask assets from onelocation to another, you needto know where those assets are.

One technique to keep trackof your assets is to have themreport in at predeterminedintervals based on METT-T,criticality of the area coveredby the asset, or communicationsavai lable . You can even showthis graphically by using TPLsfor moving assets.

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For example, let us say youhave given your scouts themission of routereconnaissance. On your eventtemplate, you have developed aseries of TPLs depicting15-minute increments. As yourscouts cross a TPL, they reportin to you. In this way, youcan easily monitor where yourscouts are on the battlefield.(Instead of TPLs, you can useexisting friendly controlgraphics as well.)

If you lose contact withyour scouts, you at least havean approximate idea of wherethey last were. When you useTPLs, try to have recognizablefeatures represent them.Figure 7-1 is an example ofthis technique.

EVALUATING HOW YOURASSETS REPORT

You should monitor yourR&S plan to evaluate how wellyour assets are reportinginformation back to you. Ifyour assets are not reportingquickly enough, accuratelyenough, or reporting the wronginformation, you will need tomake corrections.

At the brigade andbattalion levels, many timesyou will find your assets maynot always provide you withtimely or complete information.There are many reasons fort h i s . Most of the time it isdifficult to discern what is

happening on the battlefield.The company commander orplatoon leader is preoccupiedwith fighting and winning theb a t t l e .

Nevertheless, do not acceptincomplete information! I f aspot report lacks the type ofvehic le , number of vehicles, ordirection of movement, get backon the radio and ask for it.If your scouts send back areport that does not make senseto you, ask for c lar i f icat ion.If you have not heard from yourground surveillance radars foran unusually long time, callthem and ask for a situationreport .

You should enforce negatives i tuat ion reports a tpredetermined intervals. Toomany times in the past, S2sthought no news was good news.They were content to sit int h e i r v e h i c l e s i n s i l e n c e . B eaggressive ! Remember, you aretrying to answer yourcommander’s questions. Youcannot, and commanders cannotdo their jobs, unless incominginformation is timely,accurate, and complete.Nevertheless, you must ber e a l i s t i c .

There is much confusion inbattle, and some informationwill not be attainable. Youcannot tie up the radio netstrying to get "perfect"reports . Some information youwill have to live without.

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The reporting criteria youhave specified in yourintelligence annex or on yourR&S overlay will tell yourassets how and when they are toreport. As you monitor yourR&S operation, you shouldevaluate two things:

o Are my R&S assetsreporting per my publishedreport ing cr i ter ia?

o Are my publishedreporting criteria adequate toprovide the specificinformation used to answer mycommanders PIR?

NOTE : Sometimes reports usingonly s ize , ac t iv i ty , locat ion,and time (SALT) will be morefeasible and timely than thef u l l s i z e , a c t i v i t y , l o c a t i o n ,unit , t ime, equipment (SALUTE)report .

If your assets are notreporting per your criteria,it is simple to correct theasset; your S3 can help witht h i s . However, you shouldcontinually assess whether ornot your reporting criteriaare sufficient to give youanswers to your commander’squestions.

If your assets arereporting per your criteriaand you are not getting thedetailed information you need,you should consider modifyingyour reporting criteria.

For example, let us supposeyou wanted A Company to reportenemy motorized rifle units bynumber and type of vehicles

and their location. Later,however, you discover thatin order to answer yourcommander’s PIR, you mustcalculate the enemy rate ofadvance. You should modifyA Company's reporting criteriato include speed and directionof movement.

Remember a good R&Scol lect ion plan te l ls thecommander what he or she needsto know in time for thecommander to act. Therefore,assets must report informationto you quickly so you canprocess and relay it to thecommander, S3, or FSO. Itdoes no good to report an enemycounterattack 30 minutes afterthe fact . As the S2, you needto enforce timely reporting ofinformation.

Here again, the commanderand/or the S3 can help.Remember, be aggressive! TheS2 must also inform thecommander when information onthe PIR cannot be collected orif the R&S assets have beendestroyed.

MANAGING PRIORITYINTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

Now that you have evaluatedreporting, assume that you havebeen able to answer yourcommander’s first PIR. Thenext logical step is for youto focus your R&S effort onanswering the commander’ssecond highest PIR, then thethird, fourth, and so on.Realistically, your R&S planwill probably address morethan one PIR simultaneously.

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The point for you to rememberis that R&S does not stop.Once you have satisfied arequirement, shift yourattention to the nexthighest pr ior i ty .

Many times you may haveanswered a PIR out ofsequence. For example, youmay be able to answer PIR 2and 3 although you stillhave not been able to collectenough information to answerPIR 1. Or you may find thebat t le f ie ld s i tuat ion haschanged so drastically yourPIR 1 is no longer a validconcern.

These cases prove you mustcontinually reevaluate thepriority of your commanders

PIR. If you have answered PIR2 and 3, does PIR 4 become yoursecond priority? If PIR 1 isno longer a valid concern, doesPIR 2 become your top priority?You must support yourcommander. Knowing andunderstanding your commander’sintent will help you reevaluateprior i t ies and ant ic ipatepossible changes, as will asolid relationship with yourcommander and S3.

One useful technique thatwill aid you in managing PIRpriorities is to "time phase"your commander's PIR based onhow you anticipate events ont h e b a t t l e f i e l d . Essent ia l ly ,you tie each PIR to a phase inthe battle through use of theDST.

Normally, each PIR has atime relative to a point in thebattle when answering it will

be important, and another timewhen the PIR will no longer bea valid concern. For example,let us suppose your unit'smission is to attack.Initially, the most importantthing your commander might needto know is the location ofenemy reconnaissance andsecurity zone units.

However, af ter a cer ta inpoint in the attack (after youhave penetrated the securityzone) , this question becomesmeaningless. Now, the mostimportant thing might be tolocate the enemy's maindefensive area. Once you haveconsolidated on the objective,the most important thing mightbe locating any possible enemycounterattack. Therefore,before the attack, yourcommander’s PIR might lookl i k e t h i s :

o PIR 1: What are thelocations of the 34th motorizedrifle regiment (MRR)reconnaissance and platoonstrong points in the securityzone?

o PIR 2: What are thelocations of the 34th MRR’sMRC and AT positions withinthe main defensive area?

o PIR 3: What is thelocation of the 4th TankBattalion (TB) (-) of the34th MRR?

Once you have reached yourintermediate objective, youmight change your commander’sPIR priorities to look liket h i s :

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° PIR 1: What are thelocations of the 34th MRR'sMRC and AT positions withinthe main defensive area?

o PIR 2: What is thelocation of the 4th TB (-)of the 34th MRR?

o PIR 3: What are thelocations of the 34th MRR'sreconnaissance and platoonstrong points in the securityzone?

In fact, you might deletePIR 3 altogether. Later, asyou consolidate on yoursubsequent objective, you mayr e p r i o r i t i z e l i k e t h i s :

o PIR 1: What is thelocation of the 4th TB (-)of the 34th MRR?

o PIR 2: What are thelocations of the 34th MRR'sMRC and AT positions withinthe main defensive area?

Since PIR relate to eventson the battlefield, you cananticipate them by war gaming;and enter these changes ontothe intelligence BOS of yourunit's DST. Figure 7-2 showsthe process of time phasingPIR .

MODIFYING THE RECONNAISSANCEAND SURVEILLANCE PLAN

Whether modifying reportingrequirements because of newreporting criteria or becauseof new or modified PIR, youmust be ready to change yourR&S plan to fit the commandersneeds. Basically, you willhave to decide--

0 Where you want yourR&S assets to shift theirat tent ion.

o Where you want thoseassets to actually move.

o What you want your assetsto look for.

o How you want your assetsto report.

Here is where doing yourhomework (IPB) ahead of timecomes in handy. If most orall of your IPB products wereprepared ahead of time, allyou need do is review andupdate those products asnecessary.

Looking at your updatedsituation templates and eventtemplates will give you a goodidea of where to shift your R&Sfocus , and what you shouldexpect to see. Your updatedterrain and weather productswill tell you where to placeyour assets.

However, if you have notbeen able to update or producesituation and event templates,or you have advanced past yourAI, you still need to mentallyenvision what you think theenemy will look like on thet e r r a i n , applying the effectsof weather. Your mentalpicture will help you quicklycome up with NAI and TPLs.

The next step is to retaskyour R&S assets. Remember,when you shift your R&S assets,their vulnerability to enemycollection and target

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acquisition capabilit ies maychange.

TASKING ASSETS

Chapter 5 described manyways of tasking assets,including using a matrixformat. A matrix is easy touse and can be quicklymodified. Figure 7-3 is anexample of a modified matrix.

Each column has a letterdesignator. For example, thePriority column is "A," the NAIcolumn is “B,” and so on. Thelettering makes it easy toquickly assign a new R&Smission, or modify an existingmission. All you need do istransmit pertinent informationwithin each column. Forexample:

o Column B - 4.

o Column C - 1800 to 2000.

o Column D - BRDM, BMP,platoon-size (three vehicles)with possible tanks.

o Column L - Action.

o Column N - Coordinatewith ECHO.

o Column O - Report by type(light and heavy wheeled andtracked), number of vehicles,locat ion, speed, and directionof movement.

You have told the attachedGSR team to monitor NAI 4 from1800 to 2000. They shouldexpect to see BRDM or BMP

vehicles (possibly reinforcedwith tanks) up to platoon size(three vehicles). You havealso told the GSR team theymust coordinate with A Company,and should report targets bytype (light or heavy wheeledand light or heavy tracked) andnumber of vehicles, location,speed, and direction ofmovement.

Figure 7-4 shows a similarR&S tasking matrix with itshorizontal lines numbered andits vertical columns identifiedby le t ters . Use this system ifyou wish to modify only onespecific asset tasking on thematrix. For example:

o Line 3C - 8.

o Line 3D - AB434160.

o Line 3E - Refer to 7E.

In this example, you havejust told Task Force 1-10 toestablish an OP at an NAI.The OP is to observe analternate position for anMRC at NAI 8. You updatedthe mission of one asset

without reconstructing theentire matrix.

These are just two examplesof a technique you can use toquickly retask your deployedR&S assets. There are manymore. The key is to establisha standard to quickly andeasily modify your R&S planbased on your commanderschanging needs.

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CHAPTER 8

AUGMENTING OR TASK ORGANIZINGRECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE MISSIONS

Data gathered fromdif ferent t ra ining exerc isesand the training centersindicate maneuver battalionstypically overuse the scouts.Very often the scout platoon isthe only R&S asset activelycol lect ing on the bat t le f ie ld .This usually results in a deadscout platoon, and manyunanswered PIR. To increasethe effectiveness of the scoutplatoon, other R&S assets, andthe overal l col lect ioncapability, you should augmentor task organize as many R&Smissions as possible.

Augmenting and taskorganizing are two differentconcepts that strive for thesame end result. In this f ie ldmanual, the term “augmenting”is used to describe usingnumerous assets at the sametime to support the R&S plan.You task with independent ordual R&S missions to augmentthe R&S effort; units are notaugmented.

There are circumstances inwhich you do not want to placeR&S assets under C2 of someof your subordinate units; youor the S3 want to maintaincontrol of these assets to taskor move them quickly withoutdisrupting the other units.

There may be times whenyou or the S3 want R&S assets

under the C2 of subordinateuni ts . Both of theseconcepts --augmenting and taskorganizing --can be used toimplement productive R&S plans.The following examples provideaugmented or task organized R&Smissions and what eachaccomplishes.

TASK ORGANIZED WITH ENGINEERSAND ARTILLERY FORWARDOBSERVERS ATTACHED TORECONNAISSANCE PATROL

In this example you want todeny or confirm enemy activityat NAI 1 and to check onobstacles and booby traps alongthe road. You also want to seeif the enemy has begun toprepare a possible fording siteat NAI 2. Based on keyintelligence you have provided,the S3 decides to send amounted patrol for thismission. To increase missioneffectiveness, the S3 alsoattaches some engineers andart i l lery FOs. Figure 8-1 is asample R&S task organizationwith engineers and artilleryFOs attached to reconnaissancep a t r o l .

The engineers will be ableto inform you of tampered-withobstacles and adjusted roadsidebooby traps. The FOs will beable to ca l l for indirect f i reif the patrol finds anyprepared fording or bridging

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sites along the river. In thisexample you have threeelements, each complementingthe overall effectiveness ofthe reconnaissance mission.The reconnaissance element mustreceive instructions to clear,mark, breach, and/or bypassinstructions before missionexecution.

TASK ORGANIZED WITH SIGNALASSETS, OBSERVATION POST,

AND FORWARD OBSERVERSATTACHED TO EXTENDED

RECONNAISSANCE PATROL

Figure 8-2 is a sample taskorganization with signalassets, OPs, and FOs attached

to extended reconnaissancepatrol . In this example youhave a reconnaissance patrolconducting a zonereconnaissance in Zone Buck.Due to the extended range ofthe patrol and the terrain,radio communications will notreach from Zone Buck to theTOC . You also have two NAI, 4and 7, needing surveillanceduring a particular timewindow. NAI 4 is a high speedavenue of approach exiting thebattalion to the north. AI andNAI 7 is a road intersection.To augment this patrol you havea signal retransmissionelement, OP, and artillery FOsattached to the patrol.

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The retransmission elementenables the reconnaissancepatrol to report what is inZone Buck; the OP and FO enableyou to have surveillance of theNAI; and the FO allows you tointerdict any targets movingalong the NAI or the roads.

SCOUTS WITH INFANTRY

In this example yourbattalion is preparing toconduct a raid on ObjectiveBear. The terrain along ther iver consis ts of thickf o r e s t s . You only have twohours to reconnoiter from theLD to the objective and to marki n f i l t r a t i o n r o u t e s . You andthe S3 decide to task organizethis mission with the scoutplatoon and two infantry

platoons. Figure 8-3 is asample of R&S task organiza-tion with scout and infantryplatoons.

The scout platoon leaderis the reconnaissance commanderfor this particular mission.The battalion has cross-trained

one of the infantry platoons asthe backup scout platoon. Thescout platoon and the backupplatoon mark crossing sites andinf i l t rat ion routes whi le theother infantry platoon providessecur i ty . Once the scoutplatoon has marked the routes,they dismount and reconnoiterObjective Bear while the twoinfantry platoons providesecur i ty .

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D COMPANY, SCOUT PLATOON,AND GROUND SURVEILLANCERADAR EFFORT AUGMENTED

Figure 8-4 is a sampleof an augmented R&S platoonmission. In this example yourbattalion is in the defense andhas tasked Company D to conducta route reconnaissance andprovide surveillance of NAI 3for four hours. The scout

platoon is conducting a screenin the north. Two GSRs areproviding surveillance of thef lanks . Each asset isconducting an independent R&Se f f o r t . This part icularmission concept allows you orthe S3 to move or assignadditional missions to theseassets with minimal disruptionto the entire battalion.

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CHAPTER 9

RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCEIN OFFENSIVE

Planning R&S missions inoffensive operations requiresclose coordination between theS2 , S3, FSO, and ALO. Thechance of fratricide multipliesduring these operations. Thereason is R&S assets areusually conducting missions asthe friendly units maneuverthrough these areas and engagepossible enemy targets withdirect or indirect f i res .

Detailed reconnaissanceis the initial requirementfor offensive operations.Due to the limited timeavailable to conduct detailedreconnaissance , i t i simperative you use, withaugmentation, a l l avai lablereconnaissance assets.Recent training exercisesreveal that many times S2sdo not construct completeR&S plans for offensiveoperations. To make sureyou construct complete R&Splans, consider three generalareas when planning foroffensive operations:

o Detailed reconnaissance.

o Surveillance of theobject ive .

o Ongoing R&S planning.

DETAILED RECONNAISSANCE

The first area of planningconsideration stresses a

OPERATIONS

detailed reconnaissance fromthe LD/LC to beyond theobject ive . During this phaseyou need to plan missions whichanswer the PIR and provide thecommander and S3 with detailedinformation about the terrainand enemy that lie between themand the objective.

You should have assetsfirst complete those missionsdesigned to provide specificinformation that will answerPIR, so gathered informationcan reach the TOC in time forthe commander and the S3 tomake any changes to COAs or tofinalize the OPORD. There arebasically two areas in which toconduct this detailedreconnaissance: along thefriendly AAs and at theobject ive .

RECONNAISSANCE ALONG THEAVENUES OF APPROACH

Typical reconnaissancemissions along the AA are to--

o Detect, pinpoint,classify, and report location,dimension, and type of allobstacles (constructed ornatural ) .

o Detect gaps or bypassesof obstac les .

o Provide surveillanceand security of marks, gaps,breaches, and bypasses ofobstac les .

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o Report t raf f icabi l i tyalong AA.

o Establish OPs overlookingAA.

o Reconnoiter terrain andsuspected enemy locationscapable of overmatching andplacing effective fire on theAA.

o Detect locations andstrength of enemy R&S assetsalong the AA.

RECONNAISSANCE OF THEOBJECTIVE

Typical reconnaissancemissions in the area of theobject ive are- -

o Pinpoint fightingposi t ions . Provide strength,weapon orientations, anddescription of fightingposi t ions .

o Detect obstaclesand prepare to mark.Detect breaches, gaps,and bypasses.

o Reconnoiter area aroundthe objective (area dependson METT-T) to detect possiblereinforcements or counterattackelements.

o Establish OPs to maintainsurveillance of the objective.

As reconnaissance assetsconduct these missions, youmust ensure security,survei l lance , and CR assets

are providing coverage to themaneuver elements while theyare preparing for thiso f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n . I tappears to be two distinctR&S missions taking place atthe same time. The f i rs tmission is providing supportto the units that are preparingfor the offensive OPORD. Thesecond mission conducts R&Sto answer PIR concerning theactual offensive operation.

SURVEILLANCE OF THEOBJECTIVE

Now it is time to focuson the second area of planningconsideration which stressessurvei l lance . Surveillancefocuses on--

o The objective.

o Terrain along thefriendly avenue of approach(AA) .

o Possible enemyreinforcement routes.

During this phase, youmust make sure the S3 andall maneuver elements knowthe locations of surveillancea s s e t s .

Surveillance of theobjective should detect anychanges while the friendlyelements are maneuveringforward. The surveillanceassets report any enemyleaving or entering theobjective area.

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Any terrain that cancontrol the friendly AAshould be covered withsurvei l lance or controlledby one of the seven BOSlisted at the bottom of theDST.

Any routes leading intothe friendly AA or theobjective should be coveredwith surveillance to provideearly warning of an enemycounterattack or reinforcementsapproaching. Again, thesesurveillance operations occurwhile the friendly elementsare maneuvering toward theobject ive .

ONGOING RECONNAISSANCE ANDSURVEILLANCE PLANNING

The third area of planningconsideration focuses on bothR&S missions. This areaconcerns planning R&S missionsonce your unit takes theobject ive . The S3 can now tasksubsequent R&S missions tothose assets which providedsurveillance to the maneuverelements. These R&S missionsdepend on the type of follow-onmissions planned.

If the unit 's mission isto reconsolidate and prepareto continue the attack to asubsequent objective, youshould have a plan to continueR&S activities forward to thenext objective. Remember,planning is continuous. Afteryou accomplish this, your unitcan implement missionsdiscussed in supporting the

second and third areas ofplanning considerations. Akey scout mission ismaintaining visual contactwith the enemy.

If the unit 's mission isto occupy and defend theobjective, you should recommendan R&S plan stressing earlywarning and CR operations.

If the unit 's mission is topursue the fleeing enemy, youcould recommend that scoutelements provide flank securityas other maneuver elementsconduct guard operations.

The most important aspectof the final planningconsideration is that it beplanned out well in advance.This ensures the assets areprepared to execute themission, not reorganizing theobject ive .

The three areas of planningconsiderations previouslystated work particularly wellin a deliberate attack. Youcan apply these same principlesfor a movement to contact.

Do not be misled into thinkingthese three areas of planningconsiderations take placeindependent of each otherat different t imes. On thecontrary, many times thesemissions overlap.

We have shown you atechnique for constructingcomplete R&S plans inoffensive operations. Referto Chapter 12 for examples.

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CHAPTER 10

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORTTO COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE

The S3 is in charge ofthe CR mission. However,the S2 plays a critical rolein developing the battlefieldsituation in enough detailto allow the S3 to target,destroy, or suppress theenemy’s R&S assets.

STAFF OFFICERS

A number of staff officersparticipate in CR planning andexecution. Essentially, youmust find the enemy’sreconnaissance units beforethey can find and report backon friendly unit locations.You must process informationquickly and pass targetingdata to the S3 and the FSO.Those staff officers involvedin CR planning and executionare discussed below.

INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

The S2 must beknowledgeable about the enemy,weather, and terrain. Usingthis knowledge, the S2--

o Identifies enemyreconnaissance HVTs.

o Recommends engagementareas and ambush sites(TAI).

o Recommends HPTs.

o Makes sure electronicwarfare support measures (ESM)support any planned use of EWagainst enemy reconnaissanceelements.

o Develops an R&S plan tofind enemy reconnaissance wellforward.

o Evaluates vulnerabilityof R&S assets to enemy R&Sand target acquisitionc a p a b i l i t i e s .

OPERATIONS AND TRAININGOFFICER

The S3--

o Integrates f i re ,maneuver, obscurants, and EWto destroy or suppress enemyreconnaissance.

o Task-organizes the unitto defeat enemy reconnaissancewell forward.

o Plans use of EW tosuppress enemy reconnaissance.

o Determines and plans foruse of engagement areas andambush sites (TAI).

o Determines HPT basedon the commander’s intentand input from the S2 andthe FSO.

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o Develops deceptionplans to deceive enemyreconnaissance.

o Develops, executes,and monitors the unit OPSECprogram.

o Uses targeting datafrom the S2.

FIRE SUPPORT OFFICER

The FSO--

o Plans and coordinates allindirect lethal and nonlethalmeans to destroy or suppressenemy reconnaissance.

o Provides appropriate firesupport coordination measuresto protect the R&S participants(such as no fire areas orr e s t r i c t e d f i r e a r e a s ) .

o Uses targeting databased on FOS and organic orsupporting target acquisitionradars.

o With the S2, recommendsHPTs and TAI.

o Needs targeting data fromthe S2 and also specificweather and terrain datafor targeting and weaponemplacement.

IEWSE OFFICER

The IEWSE officer--

o Recommends the use of MIbat ta l ion assets , i f a t tachedor in DS.

o Informs the commander,S2, and S3 of the status andlocation of MI battalion assetswithin the unit's AO.

o Acts as liaison betweenthe maneuver unit and the MIbattalion S3.

o Provides expertise on EWplanning and use.

o Receives priorities fromthe S3 and ESM priorities fromthe S2.

AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERYOFFICER

The ADA officer--

o Provides early warningof enemy fixed-wing attackaircraft and rotary-winga i r c r a f t .

o Plans for and providesair defense coverage offriendly units well forward.

o Recommends the use of ADAa s s e t s .

o Needs information on theterrain and weather from the S2to place assets.

o Receives information onthe air threat from the S2.

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o Needs ADA priorities andweapons status from the S3.

ENGINEER OFFICER

The engineer officer--

o Recommends the placementand types of obstacles to stopor slow down enemyreconnaissance.

o Provides the S2 withinformation on the state ofthe terrain and enemy specialreconnaissance act iv i t ies .

o Receives information onthe terrain, weather, and enemyfrom the S2.

o Needs engineer prioritiesand the unit scheme of maneuverfrom the S3.

CHEMICAL OFFICER

The chemical officer--

o Monitors contaminatedareas .

o Plans the use ofobscurants to suppress enemyreconnaissance.

o Provides expertise onareas of likely enemy NBC use.

o Receives precise weatherdata.

Several primary and specialstaff officers can provide youwith information; however, theyalso require information fromyou . Remember, you are anintegral part of the targetingprocess. You recommend where

to best engage enemyreconnaissance units. Youalso recommend which enemyreconnaissance elements arethe most important for yourunit to destroy or suppress(such as HPTs). This impliesclose coordination andsynchronization among the S2,IEWSE, S3, FSO, and the restof the s taf f .

MISSION PLANNING

To plan the CR mission, youshould know something abouthow terrain and weather willaffect reconnaissanceoperations. You should alsoknow threat reconnaissanceoperations, equipment,doctrine, and tactics.Remember, seek the assistanceof your CI team when evaluatingenemy capabilities.

Each threat division andregiment has organic groundreconnaissance units. Theseunits either confirminformation from other systemsor develop their owninformation. They gatherinformation primarily bypatrolling and avoidingcontact . Reconnaissance unitsmay conduct raids or ambushesto gather information.Figure 10-1 shows divisionreconnaissance assets.Figure 10-2 shows regimentalreconnaissance assets.

Reconnaissance patrols willusually be reinforced withtanks or additional armoredpersonnel carriers (APCs) fromthe lead units. In addition,the lead battalions may use

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reinforced platoons as combat regimental main body, but mayreconnaissance patrols. operate a maximum of 50

kilometers forward.REGIMENT

A reconnaissance companywith two reconnaissanceplatoons provides regimentalreconnaissance. These normallymounted platoons performreconnaissance across theregimental front. Thereconnaissance company willnormally operate 25 to 30kilometers forward of the

These platoons, broken downinto patrols , are the eyes andears of the commander. Theynormally consist of one tothree vehicles. Their purposeis to provide information aboutenemy location, composition,and formations. These patrolsstress reconnaissance and willavoid detection and engagementby the enemy.

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Patrols, however, canf i g h t . Personnel and vehiclearmament provide sufficientfirepower for thesereconnaissance elements toprotect and disengagethemselves if necessary.

DIVISION

Division reconnaissanceassets provide the commanderground, air defense, chemical,engineer, electronic, andsignal reconnaissance, as wellas target acquisition. Theseassets are located throughoutthe divis ion, especia l lyartil lery and rocket units.

For troop reconnaissance,the division has an organicreconnaissance battalion thatincludes two reconnaissancecompanies, a reconnaissanceassault company (RAC) , andother technical reconnaissancea s s e t s . Due to theunclassified nature of thismanual, technicalreconnaissance assets are notpresented here. For additionalinformation on the technicalreconnaissance assets, refer tothe Defense Intelligence Agency(DIA) Study, "Reconnaissanceand Surveillance and TargetAcquisition of the USSR."

The two divisionreconnaissance companies willnormally provide coverageacross the division front,operating between theregimental reconnaissancecompany and RAC. Thesecompanies typically performclose reconnaissance missions

for the division commander,with a primary mission ofreconnaissance rather thancombat.

Ideally, these companieswill locate high prioritytargets, such as headquartersand C³ facil it ies, as wellas unit deployments andmovements. Normally, theseunits will operate as smallpatrols of two to threevehicles with troops mounted.Troops will dismount to performfoot patrols or ambushes togather information. However,their vehicles will not be faraway.

The RAC (also calledlong-range reconnaissancecompany) performs divisionlong-range reconnaissance.It also provides the divisioncommander with a look-deepcapability out to 100kilometers. Small teams offive or six soldiers fromthis company can be insertedby parachute, helicopter,vehic le , or on foot to collectinformation within the enemyrear area. These teams willmove primarily on foot,avoiding engagements withenemy forces, and will locatehigh priority targets withinthe enemy's division rear andcorps forward area.

While the primarymission of these troops isreconnaissance, they mayalso have secondary missionsto conduct disruptiveoperations in the rear area,such as--

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o Ambushes. RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS

o Prisoner snatches.

o Traffic diversions.

o Disruption of lines ofcommunication (LOC).

o Limited attacks againstimportant targets ofopportunity.

When not operating in theenemy area, this company iscapable of providing additionalreconnaissance patrols mountedin their organic vehicleswithin the division area.

RECONNAISSANCE FUNDAMENTALS

Reconnaissance plays animportant part in the overallintell igence-gathering system.It can provide confirmationof other collection assets.I t of ten provides in i t ia linformation that can beconfirmed by other means,such as electronic or signalreconnaissance.

TROOP RECONNAISSANCE

Troop reconnaissance isresponsive to the commander’sneeds and can provide timelyinformation on which to basecommand decisions.

Division and regimentalreconnaissance efforts arecarefully planned, coordinated,and supervised by the chief ofreconnaissance; while battalionand lower commanders mustaccomplish the task themselves.

Reconnaissance patrolswill gain information byobservation; they will bypassdefenders. However, they willf ight i f required. Normallythe tanks and BMPs willoverwatch the BRDMs. BMPs andBRDMs will make a detailedreconnaissance of all l ikelyenemy positions, with the tanksproviding cover.

CHEMICAL-ENGINEERRECONNAISSANCE

Chemical-engineerreconnaissance teams will movebehind the lead reconnaissanceelements. When obstacles orcontaminated areas are located,they will be marked and theirlocations reported to theregimental commander.Reconnaissance elements willuse bounding overwatchtechniques. Figure 10-3 showsthe Soviet reconnaissanceoverwatch. Figure 10-4 showsSoviet reconnaissance overwatchwith patrols. Figure 10-5shows Soviet technique patrolswith overwatch.

USING INTELLIGENCEPREPARATION OF THE

BATTLEFIELD TO SUPPORTYOUR COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE

EFFORT

Once again, the IPB processcan help in your planning. Thetwo most important products youwill develop in CR aresituation templates and eventtemplates. It will be helpfulto develop a series of

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situation templates which reconnaissance will use routesdepict enemy reconnaissancemovement. Such templates allowyou to develop your eventtemplate; and let your S3visualize how you expect theenemy to conduct theirreconnaissance battle.Figure 10-6 is a sample ofone such situation template.

SITUATION TEMPLATE

Do not make the mistakeof thinking the enemy'sreconnaissance will use thesame AAs as the enemy mainforce . Remember, enemyreconnaissance elements willmost likely operate as two orthree vehicles. Such smallelements can traverse almostany kind of terrain. Keepin mind, the mission ofreconnaissance is to seekand report information, nott o f i g h t . Therefore, enemy

that have plenty of concealmentand cover.

Also remember, enemyreconnaissance is looking forthe best route of attack; theenemy may decide that attackingover rough terrain ispreferable to attacking open,but heavily defended, country.For this reason, be sure toconsider your entire AI whenyou develop your situationtemplates. Do not get "tunnelvision” and consider onlyobvious AAs or MCs.

Look at all ways the enemycan enter your sector,including using No-Go terrain!As a general rule, the moreconcealment or protection aroute provides, the more likelyit will be used byreconnaissance elements. Theoutcome of well prepared

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situation templates is acommander and staff that havea good indication of what theenemy will look like on theb a t t l e f i e l d . T h i s e v e n t u a l l ywill save your R&S assets manyhours of unnecessaryreconnaissance or surveillance.

EVENT TEMPLATE

Based on your situationtemplates, develop your eventtemplate. Your event templatewill show where on the

battlefield you expect to seeenemy reconnaissance elements.Then concentrate your R&Sattention on those areas (NAI)to detect enemy reconnaissancea c t i v i t y .

Remember, the key to CRintelligence support is f indingthose enemy reconnaissanceunits before they can discoverfriendly positions and reportback. Therefore, you mustcarefully study the effects ofweather and terrain on enemy

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reconnaissance to determine atwhat point the enemy canobserve friendly positions.Usually, this is a functionof observation (LOS) andvisibil ity in your unit’s AI.

Compare these limits withthe enemy's knownreconnaissance observationcapabilit ies (such as infrared,thermal, light enhancement, andt e l e s c o p i c ) . As you do this,you will begin to identify alimit of enemy advance (LOEA).Essentially, you must preventthe enemy from going beyondthis l imit ; because past thatlimit, the enemy can observefriendly positions.

Figure 10-7 shows anexample of an LOEA, or you canrecommend a phase line (PL)that represents the LOEA.

R&S PLAN

You should focus your R&Sassets forward of the LOEA toidentify enemy reconnaissancebefore they can spot yourunit ’s posi t ions .Additionally, your analysis ofthe terrain may indicate thereare isolated terrain featuresforward of the LOEA you mustcontrol to prevent enemyobservation of your unit’sposi t ion.

For example, you may havedetermined, based on generalterrain and weather conditions,that your LOEA is 5 kilometersin front of your FEBA.However, you discover there aretwo hills approximately 7 to 8

kilometers in front of yourFEBA which allow observation ofyour unit’s positions.Essent ia l ly , those three hi l l sbecome key terrain for the CRb a t t l e . You must prevent theenemy from occupying thoseh i l l s . Figure 10-8 shows youan example of this.

By integrating your LOEAand key terrain with your eventtemplate, you have narrowed thebat t le f ie ld to speci f ic pointsor areas where you can focusyour R&S assets. You can nowgo through the process ofdetermining SIR, matching R&Sassets with SIR and NAI, anddeveloping detailed R&Sinstruct ions .

COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE

Remember, normally your S3will actually task units forthe CR mission based on yourinput. (Of course. this maydiffer depending on unit SOP.)Because of the importance ofwinning the CR battle, manyunits use a large CR force.(Sometimes this force may be upto one-third of the entireu n i t . )

FINDING THE ENEMY

Your S3 will task-organizethe CR force based on thecommander’s guidance, your R&Srequirements, and your estimateof the enemy reconnaissanceforce .

You have a big role to playin forming the CR force. Thisimplies, however, you know

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something about friendly R&Scapabilities, maneuvercapabi l i t ies , organizat ion,tactics, and equipment.Therefore, you cannot affordto concentrate solely onthreat forces .

TARGETING

So far this chapterdiscussed finding enemyreconnaissance elements. Theother side of the CR missionis to target and destroy orsuppress those reconnaissanceelements so they cannot reportyour unit’s position. You havea role to play in this aspectof the CR mission as well.

Remember, during thewar-gaming process, thecommander and the S3 identifiedfriendly COAs. Part of thatprocess was--

o Developing TAI.

o Deciding how best toengage enemy units at TAI.

o Formulating decisionpoints or l ines.

As the S2, you are theexpert on the enemy, weather,and terrain. Based on yoursituation templates, youhave a good idea which enemyreconnaissance units willgo where. Based on your IPBterrain and weather analyses,you have a good idea whereon the battlefield your unitcan best engage those enemyreconnaissance units.Therefore, you are in aposition to recommend to

your S3 various engagementareas or ambush sites (TAI)in which to catch enemyreconnaissance elements.

Once again, remember, youmust destroy or suppressenemy reconnaissance beforethey can discover your unit'spositions and report back.Therefore, any TAI yourecommend should be forwardof the LOEA. You will alsowant to point out any keyterrain you have discoveredto your S3. Key terrain arenatural TAI, since the enemyrecognizes their importanceas much as you do. Do notforget the role EW can playin suppressing enemyreconnaissance units.

Although your S3 isresponsible for planning theuse of EW, you and the IEWSEcan recommend its employment.Both of you should plan anESM program that will supportany EW use. Remember, enemyreconnaissance elements arepriority targets of jammingand/or DF. You can alsointegrate smoke and obscurantsto multiply the effectivenessof your EW effort.

USING R&S MISSIONSTO SUPPORT CR

As explained before, CRessent ia l ly consis ts of f indingthe enemy reconnaissance; thendestroying or suppressing thoseelements before they can reportfriendly unit positions. Thisimplies some friendly elementswill act as finders and somewill act as shooters.

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Normally, the scout platoonshould be finders, notshooters. They do not havethe organic firepower todecisively engage enemy units.However, your scouts must belinked to the shooters, toinclude aviation, maneuver,and art i l lery . You mayposition your scouts along ascreen line so they canobserve NAI or concealedroutes into your sector. Thescouts then report detectionof enemy reconnaissance andprovide targeting data to theshooters.

You may also augment yourscouts or R&S mission witharmor, mechanized infantry,light infantry, or ATelements. In this s i tuat ion,you might employ your scoutsas roving teams. The scoutelement finds the enemyreconnaissance, informs theS3, who then calls in thearmor, infantry , aviat ion, orindirect f ire assets to destroyit . Figure 10-9 is an example

of scout employment to screenconcealed routes. Figure10-10, is an example of theuse of mechanized infantry withscouts under operationalcontrol .

To effectively plan yourportion of the CR mission,you need to know how threatreconnaissance operates. Foradditional information onthreat smoke and obscurantemployment, refer to theJoint Test Command Groupmanual, 61 JTCG/ME-87-10,Handbook for OperationalTest ing of Electro-opt icalSystems in BattlefieldObscurants.

This chapter discussedvarious staff roles in theCR mission, how you cancontribute, and how the threatperforms reconnaissance atregimental and divisionl e v e l s . It is also importantfor you to do your "homework"to find out how the variousthreat forces conductdismounted reconnaissance.

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CHAPTER 11

RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCEIN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

During LIC operations, R&Smust provide your commander awide range of information in acomplex environment.

FACTORS

Factors to consider whenplanning R&S in an LICenvironment include--

o US forces mission--counterinsurgency, combattingterrorism, peacekeepingoperation, or peacetimecontingency operations.

o Threat--conventionalforces , insurgent forces,terror is ts , demonstrators , ora combination of two or more.

o Environment-- s o c i a l ,psychological , pol i t ica l , andeconomic factors. Terrain andweather are also importantconsiderations.

o Host nation government--support, information sharing,security forces, and militaryforces .

The US force's mission,environment, and host-nationgovernment are influences thathave an affect on what we dooffensively or defensively.However, the LIC threat willrequire you to spend the mosttime learning how to predictthe enemy's next move.

THREAT

The LIC threat can rangefrom demonstrations, terrorista c t s , insurgent or guerril laactivity to confrontations withconventional forces. Thecharacter is t ics of a threatforce depend on the level ofinsurgency. US maneuver forceswill most likely face insurgentforces or a hostile countryconventional military force.Your unit may facedemonstrators or terroristt h r e a t s . But primary popula-t ion control responsibi l i ty iswith the host nation.

Insurgent or guerril laforces usually fight in smallc e l l s . They carry lightweapons and can concentrateforces against majorf a c i l i t i e s , t h e n d i s p e r s e a f t e rthe operation. Insurgentforces can operate in urbanareas but prefer remote areasfor better concealment andsecur i ty . You can expect tofight squad- to platoon-sizeforces when facing insurgentforces . They will rely on--

o Well-planned ambushes.

o Attacks on soft targets.

o Sniper and mortarat tacks .

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The objective is todemoralize and frustrate theiropponent by attacking a varietyof targets in a wide AO.Segments of the populace canplay a key role in theinsurgent intell igence net; inwhich case, they would becomea primary target of friendlyCI ef forts .

Guerrilla forces needsupport from politicalsympathizers or foreignpowers. They need an effectivesystem of obtaining food,ammunition, weapons, equipment,and training. In some casesinsurgents conduct raids forequipment. By eliminatinginsurgent supply nets andsources they lose combatef fect iveness .

See DA Pam 381-3, How LatinAmerican Insurgents Fight, fordetailed information.

CONVENTIONAL THREATFORCES IN LIC

Conventional threat forcesin an LIC environment conduct avariety of missions. Thesemissions involve advising andassisting insurgent forces onhow to fight. Conventionalthreat forces train insurgentson the use of sophisticatedweapons or act as leaders forinsurgent units. Thisinvolvement depends on supportprovided by the hostilegovernment.

roles attacking and defendingto support insurgents. Theseforces are infantry, ormechanized infantry supportedby arti l lery, mortars, andarmored vehicles. Along withlimited CAS, they could haveNBC weapons.

Their equipment is a mixfrom several major weapons-producing countries (forexample, United States,Belgium, Soviet Union, China,and West Germany) . Usuallythis equipment is a generationor two older than that foundin modern armies. However,this trend is slowly changing.The type of weapons used inan LIC environment variesfrom homemade weapons (minesor shotguns) to sophisticatedweapons (SA-7'S) .Understanding the capabilitiesof guerrilla/insurgent weaponsand collection and targetacquisition systems helps youin R&S planning.

GUERRILLA/INSURGENTOPERATIONS

Guerrilla operations arethose military actions executedwith selected commands andcombatants. For this reason,it is necessary to obtainspecific enemy information,and to know the enemy’ssituation by observation.In guerrilla operations,attacking by surprise andhaving control of key terrainare essent ia l .

Conventional threat forcescan operate in traditional

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Everyone who engages inguerril la operations, besidesbeing elusive, must have hadexcellent training andpreparation. The followingare general prerequisites orpriorities for the preparationof an individual guerril laf i g h t e r .

o Physical conditioning.

o High morale.

o Individual combattra ining.

o Land navigation andknowledge of the terrain.

o Complete understandingof the mission.

o Clear understandingof his or her role in themission.

o Discipline.

o Esprit de corps.

o Aggressiveness,dexter i ty , se l f -conf idence ,valor , and courage.

o Decisiveness andpatience.

Guerrilla operationsi n c l u d e - -

o The ambush.

o The incursion.

o The surprise attack.

o Sabotage (machinery,electrical energy, andtelephone).

o Inf i l t rat ion (captureof personnel, weapons, anddocuments).

In every guerril laoperation, the execution ofthe mission must be guaranteed.

Current and accurate enemyinformation, including terrainand weather knowledge, are keyto prepare, plan, and executethe mission. Every smalldetail must be covered in theplan, and nothing should beoverlooked.

For each guerrillaoperation, training orsimulated attack must beconducted and verified; thesemust be in terrain whichclosely resembles the sitecharacteristics where theoperation will be carried out.

Individual guerril latraining must be continuous;it must always strive forsuperiority in all aspects oftra ining. Training must focuson the prerequisites mentionedabove.

Coordination is a highpriority during each guerril laoperation. Coordinationensures teamwork and helps toguarantee the success of theoperation.

Selected commands andcombatants, as well asweaponry, are key ingredientsfor the operation. Eachquerrilla fighter must makefull use of weapons and mustnot fire continuously. I t i svery important that strict f irediscipline be followed.

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Terrain knowledge,appropriate camouflage, andsurprise are essentialelements during the executionof a guerrilla operation.

Surprise , secur i ty ,rational use of resources,and economy of force are thekey principles of guerril lawarfare tact ics . These mustbe followed in every guerrillaoperation.

Guerrillas around theworld typically fight thesame way. They use surprise,night operations, carefulplanning and selection oftargets, and timing toinflict the greatest damage.They are particularly sensitiveto the propaganda value ofthe psychological impact ofevery action they take, froma s ingle terror is t act(bombing or politicalassassination) to a majorassaul t on a cr i t ica li n s t a l l a t i o n .

Guerrillas can best bedescribed as capable, all-weather soldiers who liveoff the land, thus reducingthe amount of rations theyneed to carry. They operatein their own domain and,because of their familiaritywith it , can negotiate themost di f f icul t terra in inany kind of weather, at anytime of the day. They usuallyattack at night to ensure theelement of surprise. Theoverall combat effectivenessof these fighters is usuallygood .

UPPER ECHELON ORGANIZATION

The guerr i l la ’s mi l i taryorganization is a network ofinsurgent groups placed indifferent parts of a country.It has a definite commandstructure based on geographicallocat ion. Thus, a "NorthernCommand," an "Eastern Command,"a "Central Command," and a"Northwest Command" wouldcorrespond to the area of thecountry in which each commandoperates. Figure 11-1 shows atypical insurgent organization.

The guerril la militaryorganization is headed by ageneral s taf f with s taf fdepartments organized tof u l f i l l t r a i n i n g , l o g i s t i c ,t roop, inte l l igence , andoperational functions.Figure 11-2 shows the generals t a f f . Figure 11-3 shows thel o g i s t i c s t a f f . Figure 11-4shows the troop staff.

The guerril la militaryforces have an infrastructureranging from a brigade ofseveral thousand down to acell of three to five people.Falling in between arebattalions or columns with500; detachments, 100;platoons, 20 plus; andsquads, 10.

The largest insurgent forcenormally encountered duringcombat is the platoon. Theplatoon consists of theplatoon leader and two orthree squads. Each squad has7 to 11 soldiers, a squadleader, an information or

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pol i t ica l of f icer , and amessenger. Squads aresometimes subdivided intosmaller units of three tofive men (including a leader);these are also referred toas subsquads.

SUBSQUADS

These smaller units, calledsubsquads, have the followingmissions:

o Combat subsquads maintainsecurity for the remainder ofthe squad during movement.

o Sabotage subsquadsconsist of a demolition sectionand a security section. Thesecurity section providessecurity to the demolitionsection during sabotageoperations.

o Reconnaissance subsquadsconsist of a reconnaissancesection and a security section.

PLATOON

The guerrilla platoon isthe bas ic ( tact ica l ) uni t ofthe guerr i l las . It is made upo f - -

o One platoon leader.

o Two squads (of 7 to 11guerr i l las each) . Each squadalso has one leader.

o Each squad can besubdivided into two subgroups,depending on the mission.

Platoon organizations are--

o Combat platoons have twosquads: one assault squad andone security squad.

o Reconnaissance platoonshave two squads: onereconnaissance squad and onesecurity squad.

o Other platoons providelogistic support (storehousesfor arms), withdrawal sites,communications system,transport , firing ranges andmaneuver sites, underwaterdemolition, sabotage, andpropaganda.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The insurgent organizationand chain of command simplyconsists of leaders andfollowers. Insurgentcommanders exercise controlover their forces by delegatingcommand authority down to theplatoon and squad levels.Although several platoons maybe committed in combat, allmissions are assigned andconducted at the squad level.

Insurgent combat units mayoperate alone when seizingterra in , but a l l uni tcommanders must ensure that thehigh command provides detailedinstruct ions for their uni t .The leader of a combat unit isexpected to exercise effectivecontrol of all combatants, toassign specific functions, andto see that they are strictlycomplied with.

Insurgents are also trainedto use their own initiative

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when faced with unforeseensi tuat ions . The unit must beflexible and capable of solvingproblems associated withmissions assigned by thesupreme command in such areasa s - -

o Communications.

o Chain of command.

o Mobilization of forces.

o The use of equipment andfirepower.

EQUIPMENT

Insurgents require the samecombatant gear to perform theirmission as the friendly forces;however, insurgents do notusually have the sameequipment. Theirs is obtainedfrom a variety of sourcesthrough a complex logisticsystem. Weapons, food,medicine, and other suppliesare obtained by one of thefollowing methods: blackmarket, captured, stolen, orprovided by second-partysources.

Much of the equipment isobtained from government forcesthrough raids on isolatedoutposts or ambushes onmilitary units and convoys;additional guerril la suppliesand arms come from othercountries. Some equipment ispurchased abroad with moneyobtained through terroristactivities (kidnapping androbbery) .

A more popular andpractical means of obtaining

military supplies is bycapturing government weapons;this ensures an abundant supplyof ammunition and repair partsis avai lable . The threeessential requirements ofinsurgent weapons areavai labi l i ty , s impl ic i ty , ande f f i c i e n c y .

Usually, each combatant hasthe following equipment:

o Ri f le : Belgian FAL;Israeli Galil; German G-3;Soviet AK-47 or AKM; CzechM-25; and United States M-2,M-14, or M-16.

o Pack or knapsack.

o Web belt.

o Canteen.

o Beret, cap, or hat.

o Protective combatclothing that blends with thet e r r a i n .

o Combat boots.

o Knife and steel blade.

o Weapon cleaningequipment.

o Nylon cord, approximately2 meters long.

o Square of plastic, 2 by 2meters (to protect weapon fromrain) .

o Medication kit (such asaspirin, bandages) .

Each unit has a radio(probably commercial type, AM

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or FM) to keep the insurgentsinformed of the news.

An insurgent unit may haveone or more of the followingweapons:

o Hand grenades(fragmentation, concussion, andincendiary).

o Grenade launchers.

o Mortars.

o Mines of the claymoretype.

o An assortment of AT andair defense weapons.

ARTILLERY

Art i l lery is the pr incipalfire power for some insurgentforces . Insurgents use itbecause of its range, volume off i r e , and accuracy. Theprincipal mission for anart i l lery uni t i s to neutra l izeor destroy the enemy and theirmeans of combat. Mortars andrecoilless weapons are usuallythe preferred artil lery piecesused by the guerrilla, probablydue to their mobility andp o r t a b i l i t y .

Guerrillas can and will usecaptured heavier weapons. Theywill transport them bycommercial vehicles into thebattle area; or abandon them,if necessary, if they impedetheir withdrawal from thearea. A r t i l l e r y i s c l a s s i f i e daccording to--

o Recoil construction andtype of tube.

o Caliber: small caliber,20 to 57 mm; medium caliber, 58to 152 mm; large caliber, over152

the

mm.

o Bore: smooth (mortar),205 mm has grooves.

o Firing: high angle orf l a t t r a j e c t o r y .

o Means of transport:mechanical traction orsel f -propel led.

o I n i t i a l v e l o c i t yclassified as follows: mortarsfrom 150 to 400 meters persecond; a howitzer from 300to 600 meters per second;and cannons from 900 to1,500 meters per second.

It is important to notethat some of this equipmentis homemade, such as uniforms,p i s t o l b e l t s , and harnesses.Insurgent camps sometimescontain factories where Molotovcocktails; booby traps;claymore type mines; grenades;and ammunition, includingmortars, can be produced atlitt le cost in a short t ime.

TYPES AND SOURCES OF SUPPLIES

The guerril la, bynecessity, uses a wide varietyof weapons, some self-manufactured, some captured,and some supplied from outsidesources. In the earlier stagesof a war, the weapons areusually primitive, homemader i f l e s , hand grenades, andclaymore type mines; trailsare crudely booby-trapped withPunji stakes and shallow pitslined with nail boards.

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Nearly every guerrilla warhas produced ingeniousimprovisations, both fromnecessity and to avoid acumbersome logistic supplysystem. Nothing can be simplerto construct and use than aMolotov cocktail or a plastiquebomb; and under certainconditions, nothing can be moree f f e c t i v e .

Arms and Ammunition

All types of arms areneeded for a guerrillamovement. However, there arethree important factors whichinsurgents have to keep in mindwhen arms are selected:weight, range, and rate off i r e . Guerr i l las carry theirweapons for long periods oftime, thus the weapon must beas l ight as possible. Theweapons must be effective bothat short and long range.Maximum rate of fire isc r i t i c a l s i n c e g u e r r i l l a sneed to place a large amountof fire in a short amount oftime. With a variety ofweapons comes the need fordifferent types of ammunition.Individuals responsible foracquiring ammunition must beable to distinguish between thedifferent types and caliberrounds needed.

Food

Just as with arms andammunition, food is a basicnecessity for a guerril lamovement. It must be easy tocarry, nutritious, and notperishable (such as chocolate,condensed milk, dried fish or

meat, r ice , beans , cereals ,sugar, coffee) . The mainsources for food are localvil lages, supplies left behindby government troops,warehouses, stores, and thel a n d i t s e l f .

Explosives

Explosives are the key toguerrilla operations due totheir destructive power. Theyare used to destroy bridges,ra i l road l ines , a irports ofmilitary value, communicationl i n e s , and electrical towers.To acquire explosives,clandestine groups are formedwhich operate in areas whereexplosives are used. Byattacking vehicles whichtransport the explosives,they are able to obtain theexplosives needed.

Hand Grenades

These can be industriallyor domestically manufactured.There are two types of handgrenades:

o Defensive--A metalliccontainer that splinters; hasan effective range of morethan 30 m; and is used mostlyto break out of a siege bydisorganizing the enemy.

o Offensive--A containerfilled with an explosivecharge, which when ignited,creates a proliferous blastof f i re or pel le ts . This typeis used mostly for ambushesand in attacks on garrisons.It also serves to disorganizethe enemy, as well as causec a s u a l t i e s .

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External Supplies

Nicaragua has been themain source of externalsupplies since the start ofinsurgences in CentralAmerica. While in SouthAmerica, Cuba has been theprimary source guaranteeingthe guerril las a sustainedrate of supply and resupply.Supplies are carried bya i r c r a f t , small boats, truckswith false bottoms, stolenbuses, or pack animals . I tdepends on the terrain and onthe control exercised by theguerrillas in the area in whichthey are operating.

Internal Supplies

On the local level, i f theguerrillas have funds, theypurchase food and medicine.However, this is rare; andthese are primarily acquired bystealing and pillaging fromvillages and towns temporarilyoccupied by guerrilla groups.Known as “war taxes," farmersand merchants are threatenedwith death if they fail to pay(comply).

In the cities, safe housesserve as storage anddistribution points for theguerrilla’s supply network.Large caches of weapons andammunition are kept atconvenient, centra l ly located,and relatively safe geographiclocat ions .

In regions controlled bythe guerr i l las , thenoncombatant camp followers arerequired to cultivate the land

for cereals and basic foodgrains, with the guerril lastaking half of the harvest.In some areas, sugar mills andslaughter houses are operatedby collaborators of theg u e r r i l l a s . Basic food stuffssuch as beans, rice, cookingo i l , s a l t , sugar, and corn arecollected and stored before aninsurgent offensive. When notin combat, guerrillas are ableto obtain supplies with moneyalmost anytime, anywhere.

COMMUNICATIONS

It is impossible to directa war without communications.Among the most important formsof communication for theguerr i l las i s the radio . Thereare two types of radiocommunications: tact ica l andoperative communications andstrategic communications.

Tactical and Operative

These are the radio signalsused by leaders to commandtheir units in operations,marches, and encampments. Dueto the need for maneuverabilityand agility, radios usedinclude walkie- ta lk ies , c i t izenband, and PRC-77.

S t r a t e g i c

These are radio signalsused by strategic commands inorder to have an overall visionof all the fronts of the warand to direct the war. In longdistance communications, avariable selection of hamradios are used.

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When setting up a basecamp, the radio operator seeksa high location to establisheffective communications.Radio waves require LOS; soit is important that the radiooperators set up operations atthe highest point to avoidn a t u r a l o r a r t i f i c i a l o b j e c t s .The radio is always set uprightwith the antenna in a verticalposition directed towards thereceiver with whom theinsurgent wishes tocommunicate. Messages areb r i e f .

Relay stations bridgestations that do not havedirect communication becauseof topographic obstacles ortoo long a distance. Thereare two types of relays t a t i o n : manual (operated byan individual) and automatic(signal is sent outautomatically when received) .

FORMS OF GUERRILLA COMBAT

To prepare for combat, theguerril las must train inisolated locat ions . Figure11-5 shows a typical guerrillatraining complex. Before theguerr i l las t ra in on hi t t ingtargets they are indoctrinatedon the typical targets theyshould hit. Figure 11-6 showstypical guerr i l la targets .

RAID

This i s a fas t , surpr iseaction carried out against anenemy position or force. I t spurpose is related directlyto current needs in thedevelopment of the guerrilla’s

campaign (arms, food,propaganda). Generally, raidsare well planned and carriedout in small units composed ofthree to twelve individuals.They occur more frequentlyin the initial stages of aninsurgency when few individualsand arms are available. Oncetheir goal is achieved, theforce withdraws quickly anddisperses.

ASSAULT

This is a moresophisticated, complex attackdesigned to annihilate a targetand its defenders. As assaultis of a larger scale andpurpose, it requires theoccupation of positions andstrategic locat ions s ince theguerril las are fighting againstprepared defensive positions ofthe enemy. At a certain phaseof a local insurgency, theprime goal becomes that ofeliminating enemy units, thuschanging the correlation offorces in the region.

AMBUSH

This is an action carriedout by small units against amoving enemy with greatsuperiority in soldiers andarms. Factors that influencethe outcome of an ambush arelocat ion, terrain , posi t ion,camouflage, signals, andr e t r e a t . There are three typesof ambushes:

o Annihilation--enemytroops sustain the maximumnumber of casualties to reduceor destroy the combat

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effectiveness of the governmentforces . Figure 11-7 shows atypical annihilation ambush.

o Harassment-- enemy troopsare harassed by engagement insmall skirmishes to destroytheir will or to distract andtire them, thus causingdeterioration of morale.Figure 11-8 shows a typicalharassment ambush.

o Containment-- enemy forcesare surrounded by mines,obstac les , and small arms fireto halt movement to and from aspecific area; usually to keepthem from reinforcing agovernment unit in contact withinsurgents. Figure 11-9 showsa typical containment ambush.

INSURGENT MAP SYMBOLS

These are the symbols usedby known insurgent groups.Figure 11-10 shows the militarymapping symbols. The listingincludes many military mappingsymbols used by the Sovietarmed forces; however,different meanings have beenapplied.

Insurgents normally use thesymbols that are taught to themby the country that isproviding training andequipment. Also refer to DAPam 381-3 for insurgentmilitary map symbols.

MOVEMENT FORMATIONS

Movement formationsinclude--

o Single firing or lineformation.

o Diamond formation.

o Wedge formation.

o “L” formation.

o Two-echelon formation.

o Fan formation.

COLUMN FORMATION

Column formations are usedfor deploying from one area toanother when government forcesare not present. When thismove is performed by a squad,all members know their placesin the formation. Posi t ionsare numbered in advance by thesquad leader, and each numberedposition is assigned a mission.Odd numbers are used for theleft file of the column; andeven numbers for the rightf i l e . The squad leaderdetermines the spacing betweenpersonnel based on the terrainand vis ib i l i ty .

When required by terrainand operational needs, thesquad leader divides the squadinto two groups. The assistantsquad leader takes the secondgroup. This formation isnormally used for movementover terrain where there isno probability of attack.The squad's fire power isconcentrated on the flanks;therefore, the point and rearare very weak. Figure 11-11shows the column formation.

o Column formation.

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are not present. When thismove is performed by a squad,all members know their placesin the formation. Positionsare numbered in advance by thesquad leader, and each numberedposition is assigned a mission.Odd numbers are used for theleft file of the column; andeven numbers for the rightf i l e . The squad leaderdetermines the spacing betweenpersonnel based on the terraina n d v i s i b i l i t y .

When required by terrainand operational needs, thesquad leader divides the squadinto two groups. The assistantsquad leader takes the second

group. This formation isnormally used for movementover terrain where there isno probability of attack.The squad’s fire power isconcentrated on the flanks;therefore, the point and rearare very weak. Figure 11-11shows the column formation.

SINGLE FILE ORFIRING LINE FORMATION

This type of formationis used when necessary tocover a 100- to a 300-meterarea. Figure 11-12 showsthe s ingle f i le or f i r ingline formation. It is usedwhen--

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WEDGE FORMATION

A wedge formation is usedfor advancing or performingreconnaissance over opent e r r a i n . This formation coversthe front, as well as bothflanks; however, the rear isundefended. This type offormation is used mainly tomove where there is apossibil ity of being attacked.It can also be used to breakor penetrate an enemy barrier.Figure 11-14 shows the wedgeformation.

"L" FORMATION

The “L” formation is anattack formation used in twoflanks. Figure 11-15 shows the"L" formation. It can be usedbefore the assault by deployingone squad to gain a shock whilethe remaining squad providessecur i ty . From the formationof a single to a double column,it can quickly change to adiamond formation. Thesechanges take place on commandand are performed as discussedbelow.

Double Column

Upon command, odd numbersextend to the left, while evennumbers extend to the right.One combatant leads theformation at the front whilethe one at the rear providesrear securi ty . Figure 11-16shows a double columnformation.

Changing Double Column toa Diamond Formation

In order to change a doublecolumn to a diamond formation,

the insurgents change theabove-mentioned formation. Atthis time, the insurgents onthe right extend to that side,while those on the left extendto the right. (See Figure11-16 . ) The combatant from therear guard at the right flankmaneuvers, while providing rearsecur i ty . The group on theleft that heads the teamsecures the front.

TWO-ECHELON FORMATION

This type of formation isused for a deliberate attack ora movement to contact. While asquad advances, the other onesupports it; and upon occupyinga new position, the oneadvancing stops and providessupport while the other unitadvances. Figure 11-17 showstwo-echelon formation.

FAN FORMATION

This formation is used whenthe commander calls the unit toassemble to assign a mission orissue other directives. Thevoice of command is: “SQUADASSEMBLE.” Figure 11-18 showsthe fan formation.

TACTICAL COMMAND BASICORGANIZATION

Basic organizations for thetactical command are the basicunit operations, basic platoonoperations, and breakingcontact . Figure 11-19 showsthe basic organization.

A basic unit operation iswhen one squad conductsreconnaissance for about anhour before the rest of the

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unit follows. Thisreconnaissance squad thenoccupies key positions forobservation to preventgovernment forces fromsurprising the unit .

A basic platoon operationis when the first squadprovides frontal security, thesecond squad covers the flanks,and the third assumes the rearguard role.

When breaking contact withthe enemy, the first platoonacts as a delaying force untilthe second platoon withdraws;after which, the first platoonwithdraws by squads. Figure11-20 lists the sounds producedduring basic operations.Figure 11-21 shows a typicalbase camp which is the hub ofal l operat ions .

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATIONOF THE BATTLEFIELD

CONSIDERATIONS

The doctrine that threatforces use to operate in LICmay not be well known. Yourini t ia l IPB ef for t wi l lprobably require you to modifysome IPB products to accountfor the LIC environment. Theseproducts can help you planR&S . Factors not graphicallyportrayed during the normal IPBprocess which come into playduring LIC include social,pol i t ica l , psychological , andeconomic factors.

CIVILIAN POPULATION

During LIC operations thecivilian population plays a key

r o l e . You enhance your R&Splan and the informationobtained by gaining the supportof the civilian population.You also become familiar withthe c ivi l ian populat ionsattitude toward their owngovernment and the US forces.In most cases, your R&S assetwill observe or monitor groupsof civil ians to determine ifthey pose a threat.

The understanding andanalys is of the c iv i l ianpopulation during the IPBprocess impacts greatly on theR&S effort. A lesson learnedfrom Operation Just Cause isthat "the population cannotread maps nor give gridcoordinates . " Therefore, whenproviding the intell igenceinformation part of IPB duringprehost i l i t ies , bui ld a s t reetmap, showing city landmarks;use this with civil ianinformants.

IPB PRODUCTS

Products produced duringthe IPB process impacting onthe R&S effort vary dependingon the threat. The missionrequirement influences the typeof overlays and subjectcategories needed. Thefollowing paragraphs cover someLIC IPB products and how theyrelate to the R&S effort.

Incident Overlay

The incident overlayprovides the historical dataneeded to look for trends andto conduct pattern analysis onthe threat. Figure 11-22 shows

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an incident overlay. You canidentify the types of missionsthe insurgents tend to favorand determine the insurgentAO. This map will showinsurgent control or lack ofcontrol in specific areas.

Based on this overlay,considerations on where tofocus R&S assets are made.Figure 11-23 shows an incidentmatrix. By constructing anincident matrix, the analystcan determine the times, days,or methods when insurgents willattack targets and candetermine their operationaltrends. The incident overlaywill require coordination withthe host nation to ensurecomplete and accurateinformation.

Situation Map

The insurgent situation map(SITMAP) is built from theincident overlay. Figure 11-24shows an LIC SITMAP. TheSITMAP adds currentinte l l igence and act iv i t ieswhich indicate insurgentmovement, resupply operations,or attacks. You will confirmor deny information on theSITMAP using R&S assets. Thesea s s e t s - -

o Monitor insurgent supplyroutes.

o Monitor radiotransmissions.

o Vis i t c iv i l iancommunities.

o Patrol LOC.

o P a t r o l c r i t i c a l s i t e s .

o Provide coordinationbetween local law enforcementand host nation military units.

o Provide sketches ofinsurgent bases.

When briefing patrols, theSITMAP warns of danger areassuch as mines or insurgentcontrolled areas.

Trap Map

The trap map identifiestargets the insurgents willattempt to sabotage or attack.Figure 11-25 shows an LIC trapmap. These targets mayinclude--

o Hydroelectric plants.

o Weapon storage sites.

o Airports.

o Banks.

o Government offices.

o Terrain favoringambushes.

Analyze these areas forinsurgent access and escaperoutes. Preplan use of R&Sassets to support trap mapareas in case indicators showinsurgent intent to attack.Photographs or sketches of theareas can help the analysis andplanning process.

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Population Status Overlay

Figure 11-26 shows apopulation status overlay.This overlay portrays theattitude of the population inyour AO and AI. It shows whosupports the government, who isneutra l , and who supports theinsurgents. This overlay canfurther classify populationi n t o t r i b a l , re l ig ious , e thnic ,p o l i t i c a l , or economic groups.The detail of information onthis overlay depends oninsurgent strategy andavailability of information.

Focusing R&S assets towarda particular group may providevital information on insurgenta c t i v i t y . Knowing pro-Government areas andproinsurgent areas will alsohelp protect your limited R&Sa s s e t s .

ASSETS

R&S assets available duringLIC operations depend onmission and host-nationsupport. Peacetime contingencyoperations will require lessR&S assets than counter-insurgency operations. Closecoordination with the hostnation will be vital .Information received from localagencies will supplement theR&S plan.

Typical collection assetsavailable to brigade andbattalion S2s during LICoperations include--

o Patrols.

o Scouts.

o GSRs.

o REMBASS.

o OPs.

o Radio interceptand DF.

Additional assets depend onforce package and may include--

o AN/TPQ-36 countermortarradar.

o AN/MPQ-49 FAAR.

o Army aviation.

o QUICKFIX and CI andinterrogation of prisoner ofwar teams, supporting MPs,and host-nation law enforcementand intell igence units.

PATROLS

In LIC operations,patrolling is one of theprimary ways to obtain anddevelop information. Patrolscollect data on population,insurgent activity, and terrainby using a combination ofroute, zone, and areareconnaissance.

Ef fect ive patrol l ingprovides the location,strength, and disposition ofinsurgent forces. Patrols canconfirm insurgent weapons andthe presence of foreignmilitary advisors. Areasrequiring special attentionwhile planning patrols include

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r i v e r s , streams, andagricul tural areas . Patrolsconducted around keyinsta l la t ions g ive ear lywarning and prove effectiveduring CR or security missions.

Limitations to considerinclude communication andsecur i ty . The primary meansof communication for dismountedpatrols is the FM battery-powered AN/PRC-77. Also,the patrol 's small size leavesit vulnerable to ambush orat tack .

The scout platoon gathersinformation on insurgent forceswhile conducting patrols or byestablished OPs in assignedareas . They conduct much thesame missions as patrols fromthe line companies; but scoutsusually extend out farther thancompany patrols. Examples ofmissions that scouts conductinc lude--

o Locating and providingdetailed information oninsurgent bases.

o Establishing OPs tomonitor these bases whilefriendly forces move forwardto at tack .

o Reporting possible supplyroutes used by insurgentforces .

Augmenting patrols withattached interrogation assetscan add to the patrol 's abilityto gather intell igence byinterrogation or questioningof the local populace.

Augmentation of native scoutsfamiliar with the area providean advantage. Again,communications and security areprimary limitations to scoutoperations.

GSR

GSR missions in an LICenvironment may includecontinued search of openareas or surveillance ofpoint targets . GSRs arevery effective when integratedinto R&S plans forinsta l la t ions , bases , anda i r f i e l d s e c u r i t y . They canverify activity detected byother sources (such as OPs,REMBASS, NODs) or vectorfr iendly patrols .

The AN/PPS-5 and AN/PPS-15are currently found in MIbattalions supporting airborneand air assault divisions.The AN/PPS-15 is found inlight infantry division MIb a t t a l i o n s . System use dependson the AO and the mission.

GSR limitations include LOSto target . This is a keyfactor when insurgent activityoccurs in forested or urbanareas .

Extremes in weather such asrain, wind, or snow willdegrade their operations.

AN/PPS-5 users mustconsider the system’s weightif the mission is in roughterrain or requires quickmovement. It weighs inexcess of 110 pounds without

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b a t t e r i e s , which are 12pounds each.

REMBASS

REMBASS is a valuable assetin the LIC environment.REMBASS gives indications onthe amount of traffic alongsuspected insurgent trails; andit provides early warning whenused along routes leading topossible insurgent targets orfriendly base camps.

Sensors have a 24-hour,near all-weather capability.The information obtained cuesthe use of patrols, GSR, or OPsto confirm activity.Considerations when usingremote sensors include radioLOS to the relay or monitorings t a t i o n . The transmittingrange is about 15 kilometersfor sensors and repeaters, andup to 100 kilometers forairborne repeaters.

VOICE COLLECTION TEAMS

The MI battalionsubordinate to heavy, light,a i r assaul t , and airbornedivisions have voice collectionteams capable of supporting theR&S effort. The AN/TRQ-32TEAMMATE and the AN/PRD-10provide IEW support. TheQUICKFIX and GUARDRAIL (a corpsMI brigade asset) can assist inthe EW collection effort basedon avai labi l i ty .

The AN/TRQ-32(V)(I)(TEAMMATE) will intercept HF,VHF, and UHF communications.

It provides VHF LOB data. Thepower of the intercepted signaland LOS determine rangecapabi l i ty . Limitations to beconsidered include mobility ofthe prime mover and securityfor systems when operatingoutside a security base.

The AN/PRD-10/11/12 is amobile radio DF system. It canoperate as a single stationproviding intercept and LOBdata. When operating in thenet mode with three otherstations, the AN/PRD-10provides intercept and manuallycomputed radio DF fix locationsof enemy transmissions. TheAN/PRD-10 weighs approximately80 pounds; its range depends onLOS and the power of theintercepted signal.

When available, theQUICKFIX or GUARDRAIL canconduct airborne DF. Thesesystems have extensive rangeand can provide locations onenemy transmitters.

Evaluate all availableassets within the brigade orbattalion capable of supportingthe R&S effort. Some assetsand their capabilit ies follow:

o Helicopters resupply,i n s e r t , or extract patrols ;they also conduct limitedroute and area reconnaissance.

o The countermortarradar AN/TPQ-36 (DS to theart i l lery bat ta l ion) providesinformation on insurgent mortarlocat ions .

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o Patrols search suspectareas for mortar tubes andammunition cache sites.

o CI teams provideinformation on insurgentact iv i t ies and theiri n t e l l i g e n c e c a p a b i l i t i e s .

Consider all human sourcessuch as convoy truck drivers,FOs , and personnel fromhost-nation agencies or units(such as refugee camps, civilaf fa irs checkpoints , local

law enforcement, andi n t e l l i g e n c e . )

Fighting in an LICenvironment requires acontinuous R&S effort. Thisef fort s tresses report inginformation to the S2 anddisseminating that informationno matter how insignificant.It also involves the totalforce . Figure 11-27 is anexample of how these assets areemployed in a battalion R&Splan.

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CHAPTER 12

ELECTRONIC WARFARE ASSET EMPLOYMENT

Normally, divis ion s taf fsand higher echelons plan forthe use of IEW assets.However, you may be in asituation where you have MIunit assets either attached orin DS of your unit. In e i thercase, you must be able toproperly direct those assetsin support of your R&S plan,as well as your unit’s CRplan. To do that, you shouldunderstand--

o The fundamentals of EW.

o Who plays what role inEW planning.

o What IEW assets areneeded to help you answer yourcommander’s PIR and IR andsupport the unit CR plan.

FUNDAMENTALS

IEW assets belonging to MIunits do three things: theyprovide combat information;they provide data whichcontributes to production ofintelligence; and they giveyour unit an EW capability.EW should be a vital elementof your unit’s command,control , and communicationscountermeasures (C³CM)program. EW is one waycommanders protect theirelectronic systems whileattacking the enemy’s

electronic systems. Yourstaff should plan for useof EW within three broadmission areas:

o Defend.

o Degrade or disrupt.

o Deceive.

DEFEND

The defend mission includesyour use of electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) toprotect your unit’s electronicsystems. ECCM includes properuse of signal operationi n s t r u c t i o n s ( S 0 I ) , t e r r a i nmasking, and proper radio andtelevision operator procedures.FM 24-33 contains detailedinformation on ECCM. Thedefend mission also includesESM to find and target enemyjammers and ECM to screenfriendly communications fromthe enemy.

DEGRADE OR DISRUPT

You degrade or disruptenemy electronic systems bytarget ing e lectronic emit tersor jamming electronicreceivers . Normally, the smallnumber of jammers available toyou forces you to be highlyselective about which targetsto disrupt.

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The S3 is in charge of thedegrade or disrupt mission.You must support this missionthrough intelligence and ESMwhich intercept, identify, andlocate potent ia l targets .

DECEIVE

Electronic deception isnormally controlled by divisionor corps. Deceiving, orelectronic deception, providesfalse information to the enemythrough electronic devices.It is intended to induce theenemy into acting againsttheir best interests .Deception is achieved byfeeding false or misleadinginformation to enemy electronicsensors; or by transmittingit directly into operationalchannels. (Normally, thisis part of an overall deceptionplan.) Make sure that whatthe enemy collectselectronically agrees with,or at least does not refute,the overall deceptionscheme.

IEW systems collect combatinformation through ESM.Essent ia l ly , consider yourIEW assets as one more sourceyou can use to help answeryour commander's PIR. However,you do not directly task thissource, specify which assetsdo what, nor emplace thesea s s e t s . You do specify whatyou want to know, andcoordinate with your IEWSE and

S3 to make sure your IEW assetsdo not interfere with yourunit’s scheme of maneuver. Wewill address this later in thischapter.

More than likely, your IEWassets will spend significanttime supporting or executingthe EW degrade or disruptmission. Look at this missionas consisting of twocomponents: passive anda c t i v e . ESM is the passivepart . That is, your IEW assetswork to collect informationthat will support the ECM, orthe active part, of themission.

ECM consists of jamming anddeception. E s s e n t i a l l y ,jamming delivers a high levelof power to an enemy receiver,preventing that receiver fromreceiving its intendedtransmission. Your IEW assetsmust radiate energy to dot h i s . Therefore, they aresusceptible to enemycountermeasures.

Deception causes the enemyto misinterpret what isreceived by electronicsystems. Once again, yourIEW assets (and any otherassets you choose to use)must transmit to deceive.Therefore, deception isactive as well . Moredetailed descriptions of EWare in FM 34-1, Chapter 5.

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PLANNING

Your S3 is in charge ofplanning and using EW. The S3is responsible for integratingEW into your unit’s scheme ofmaneuver. However, i t i s t h eFSO who must intergrate EWinto the overal l f i re supportplan. This becomes especiallyimportant for suppression ofenemy air defense operations.You must support your S3's EWplan by carefully selecting ESMp r i o r i t i e s . (The S2 shouldassist the S3 with EWplanning.) Figure 12-1 is abreakdown of who does what inEW planning.

Finally, the IEWSE officeris the resident expert on yourMI unit IEW assets. The IEWSEo f f i c e r - -

o Recommends use.

o Coordinates physicalplacement.

o Acts as liaison betweenyou and the assets.

o Coordinates EW planning.

o Recommends EW support forfire and maneuver.

Your unit has fourelectronic options to attackenemy electronic systems:

o Intercept.

o Locate.

o Jam.

o Deceive.

Intercepting providescombat information andtechnical data on the enemy’selectronic systems as well asraw data for processing intoi n t e l l i g e n c e . Technical datasupports jamming and electronicdeception.

The locating optionprovides approximate locationsof enemy radio and radarantennas. This aids in theuse of directional antennasfor jamming, and may be usedwith other information toprovide targeting-qualitydata.

Jamming disrupts thereceipt or exchange of ordersand battlefield information.It can delay the enemy longenough for the commander toexploit a situation thatotherwise would have beencorrected. Jamming providesa nonlethal alternative orsupplement to attack by fireand maneuver. I t i s w e l l --suited for targets that cannotbe located with targetingaccuracy, or that only requiretemporary disruption.

As a general rule, youwill want to destroy or jamenemy electronic systemslocated near your FLOT.Enemy communications systemslocated farther back willnormally be used by enemyplanning elements. Therefore,they may be more valuable asa source of information.Figure 12-2 is a l ist ofelectronic options l isted byenemy echelon and distance fromthe FLOT.

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EW planning follows thenormal staff planning process.It begins with the mission andcommander’s guidance. Duringthe planning process, yourstaff determines electronicHPTs . You then divide yourelectronic HPTs into fourcategories :

o Targets located fordestruct ion ( target ing) .

o Targets to be jammed.

o Targets to be interceptedfor combat information ori n t e l l i g e n c e .

o Targets to be deceived.

WHAT TYPE OF INTELLIGENCEAND ELECTRONIC WARFARE

ASSETS ARE NEEDED?

Once you have categorizedyour electronic HPTs, you needto have a way to tell your IEWassets what you want them todo. Do this by providing yourIEW assets a l ist of prioritieson a target list worksheet.Remember to include both ESM(passive) and ECM (active)p r i o r i t i e s .

STAFF ACTIONS

You and other staffofficers determine ESM andECM priorities by war gaming.Remember that ESM must supportECM. ESM may also help youanswer the commander’s PIR.

Your S3 ultimatelydetermines ECM priorities(based on staf f input) .The S2 determines--

o ESM priorities based onyour commander's PIR and IR.

o The S3’s ECM priorities.

o When and where on thebattlefield the PIR, IR, andECM become most important.

The IEWSE officer relaysyour unit's ESM and ECMpriorities to your attachedor supporting IEW assets.Figure 12-3 is an example ofa completed EW target list worksheet. It shows how you cansynchronize those prioritiesto support the DST. In thisexample, identifying andlocating enemy reconnaissanceunits of the 141st MRR is thenumber one ESM priority becausethe commander's top PIRinitially is to locate enemyreconnaissance units.

The second and third ESMpriorities are to identify andlocate divisional andregimental air defense assets.Note that the first ECMpriority is to jam divisionalair defense nets. In thiscase, the third ESM prioritysupports the first ECMp r i o r i t y . Your EW assetscannot jam those nets withoutfirst f inding them.

Obviously, the first ECMpriority reflects that CAS isimportant to the success ofthe mission; and jamming enemydivisional air defense netssupports the planned CASmission. If you compare thetarget l ist work sheet to theDST, you will see therelationship between ESM and

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ECM priorities and how the unitintends to fight the battle intime.

ELECTRONIC WARFARE TARGETLIST WORKSHEET

Specifics of the EW targetlist worksheet follow:

o Time window is the timeyou want your assets to spendlooking for the target; or thestart/stop times you want yourassets to jam the target.

o Target unit is thespecific unit or target you arelooking for. The more specificyou are, the easier it is foryour IEW assets to find it.

o Target location is whereyou expect the target to be.Location can be based on actualinformation or on situationtemplates.

o Target activity is thespecific type of communicationsyou want collected or jammed.

o Control mechanism is howyou want the target unit to bejammed (such as spot jamming,barrage jamming). Your IEWSEcan tell you more about theadvantages and disadvantages ofeach type of jamming; and canrecommend which kind will bestsupport your mission.

o Feedback and coordinationis exactly what you are lookingfor; for example, location andident i f icat ion of the targetand effectiveness of jamming.Check with your S3 to see whatkind of feedback is required.

Again, your IEWSE can help inthis area .

TARGET LIST WORKSHEET:RECONNAISSANCE

AND SURVEILLANCE PLAN

An EW target list worksheetis the equivalent of an R&Splan for your IEW assets. Ittells your assets what theyshould look for, when theyshould look for it, and whatand when to jam. The EW targetlist worksheet should be atotal staff effort among you,the S3, the FSO, and the IEWSE.

Remember, you should not beconcerned with the details ofhow to collect the information,such as which specific assetshould do what, and where eachasset should go. Those detailsare left to the attached orsupporting MI unit and yourIEWSE . Simply tell them whatyou want, and let them figureout how best to do it.

You must, however, makecertain that the emplacementof your IEW assets does notinterfere with your unit’smission. Therefore, make sureyour IEWSE coordinates all IEWpositions with your S3. Also,remember to continually monitorthose IEW positions so thatthey do not get overrun oroutdistanced by maneuver units.

Keep your IEWSE updated onthe enemy frontline trace; andinsist on frequent statusreports on your IEW assets.Figure 12-4 is a l ist oforganic or supporting MI unitsby echelon. Figure 12-5 is

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an electronic attack options FM 34-40 provides a detailedchart . Figure 12-6 shows discussion of EW operations.IEWSE officer responsibilit ies.

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APPENDIX A

MANAGEMENT TOOLS FORRECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS

This appendix contains thefollowing checklists, formats,and reports used in planningand supervising R&S missions.NOTE : This appendix can bereproduced and used in thefield as a pocket guide.

o Figure A-1. Exampleof an intell igence estimatein matrix format.

o Figure A-2. R&S taskingmatrix.

o Figure A-3. Dif ferentversions of the R&S taskingmatrix.

o Figure A-4. R&Sc h e c k l i s t .

NOTE : The purpose of theR&S checklist is to makesure complete coordinationis conducted for all R&Soperations.

o Figure A-5. Col lect ionplan format.

o Figure A-6. IEW Assetredeployment matrix.

o Figure A-7. Reconnais-sance asset util ization matrix.

o Figure A-8. A patrolplan.

o Figure A-9. Patrolreport format.

o Figure A-10. Hintson debriefing patrols.

o Figure A-11. GSRor REMBASS plan format.

o Figure A-12. GSRor REMBASS briefingc h e c k l i s t .

o Figure A-13. Standardcol lect ion asset requestformat (SCARF) basic format.

o Figure A-14. Missionreport format.

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STANDARD COLLECTION ASSETREQUEST FORMAT

Asset managers use thestandard collection assetrequest format (SCARF) forintell igence requirementstasking and for requestinginformation from higher oradjacent headquarters. Atcorps and division,intell igence requirementstasking is directed toward MIcommanders and commanders ofother elements of the combatforce capable of collecting theinformation.

Intelligence requirementstasking provides the selected

unit with a specificrequirement, but not withspeci f ic instruct ions forcarrying out the mission. TheSCARF tells you--

o What information isneeded.

o Where to look for themovers, shooters, sitters, andemit ters .

o When to look.

o When the information isneeded.

o What to look with (insome cases).

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JOINT TACTICAL AIRRECONNAISSANCE AND

SURVEILLANCE REQUESTFORM (DD Form 1975)

This form is used torequest a jo int tac t ica l a i rreconnaissance or surveillancemission. The form statesrequirements, identifies needs,and, occas ional ly , speci f iesthe actual air asset to performthe mission.

Any echelon initiates therequest. It is used for bothimmediate and preplannedmission requirements. Therequestor completes section1 of the request for eachspecific mission. Normally,these requests are transmittedby electrical means. Theheadquarters receiving therequest adds informationrequired to validate orcomplete the request.Obtain DD Form 1975 throughyour S1.

MISSION REPORT

Air units include strike orattack, reconnaissance ors u r v e i l l a n c e , a i r l i f t ,observation, and helicopter.Air units use the missionreport to report the results ofall missions and significantsightings along the route oft h e f l i g h t .

The mission reportamplifies the inflight reportand is normally submittedwithin 30 minutes afteraircraf t landing to- -

o The tasking agency.

o The requesting unit oragency.

o Other interestedorganizations.

When the EW air task ormission is completed,intelligence personnel conducta briefing and submit a missionreport .

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APPENDIX B

EXAMPLE OF THE RECONNAISSANCEAND SURVEILLANCE PROCESS

The objective of R&Splanning is the collection ofinformation the commander needsin order to fight and win theb a t t l e . Planning results inthe coordinated efforts of allintell igence resourcesintegrated into one collectione f f o r t .

PLANNING PROCESS

The planning processinc ludes- -

o Determining requirements.

o Assigning priorities.

o Allocating the resourcesto satisfy each requirement.

This appendix will assistcommanders and staffs inunderstanding the process usedto develop, implement, andexecute an R&S operation.

The process described inthis appendix is a deliberateone which can be used whensuff ic ient t ime is avai lable .In a hasty planning process,the procedures can bemodified. Most of the productsdescribed here will not be doneformally; but the stepsinvolved should still beapplied mentally.

MANEUVER BRIGADE SCENARIO

The following is thescenario for a maneuver brigadein a high- intensi ty conf l ic t .

COL Link Gayagas,Commander, 1st Brigade, 52dInfantry Division (Mech), hadjust rece ived the divis ionsOPORD. Based on the divisioncommanders concept ofoperations and intent, COLGayagas knew his brigade was infor a hard time inaccomplishing the mission. Thebrigadets mission is to conducta supporting attack in thesouthern zone of the division’sAO .

The brigade is to seizedefensible terra in . This willallow the division to preparefor a defense and destroy areinforcing combined arms Armysoon to be committed. Tosupport the division’s mainattack, the division commanderwants the brigade to draw thecommitment of the 41st guardsmotorized rifle division’s(GMRD) reserve, the 35th tankregiment (TR), into thebrigadets zone. The 35th TR isthe only threat to any majordrive by the 52d InfantryDivision to the north.

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While sti l l at the divisionOPORD briefing, COL Gayagastook advantage of a short breakto instruct the brigade S3, MAJBooth, to call the brigade TOCand give them a warning orderfor the upcoming mission. MAJBooth provided the brigade TOCwith the type mission,boundaries, and the brigade’sobjective, as assigned byhigher headquarters. This wasto allow the staff to beginwork on the mission,particularly the S2 who neededthe additional time to developthe intell igence products tosupport the brigade’s IPBprocess.

MAJ Baker, the brigade'sS2, immediately began toorchestrate the inte l l igencesystem to support the upcomingmission. He directed SGTHockins, the sectioninte l l igence analyst , todevelop an MCOO of the AO; and,for initial planning purpose,to include in the MCOO theanalysis of the AI extending 5kilometers to the flanks and 10kilometers forward of the AO.MAJ Baker also directed hisassistant, CPT Roberts, to callthe G2 shop or divisionoperations and intelligence(O&I) and get as muchinformation as possible on theenemy situation.

By the time the brigadecommander returned from thedivision OPORD meeting, MAJ

Baker had developed a good ideaof the enemy situation; andsince he understood theinformational requirementsassociated with the typemission assigned, he was readyto support the brigadetsdecision-making process.

BRIGADE PLANNING

The brigadets planningstaff was assembled quicklyupon the return of thecommander. COL Gayagasprovided all the information hehad that was not published inthe OPORD. He also providedthe higher commander’s intentand guidance, insights, andconcerns, along with someavailable options.

COL Gayagas wasparticularly concerned aboutthe brigade’s ability to createa situation which would forcethe enemy motorized rifledivision s (MRD) commander tocommit his reserve into hisbrigade sector. He knew he hadto find an enemy weakness andexploit i t quickly; to do that,he needed detailed informationon the enemy disposition. COLGayagas gave MAJ Baker the PIR:

1. What is the 15th guardsmotorized rifle regiment (GMRR)defensive disposition?

2 . Is there a weakness inthe 15th GMRR defensivedisposition? If so, where?

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3. Where are the artillerybattalions comprising the 15thGMRR regimental artillerygroup?

4. Will the 41st GMRDcommander direct any of hisgunships against 1st Brigade?If so, when?

5. Where and when will the35th TR be committed?

6. Will the enemy employchemical munitions against 1stBrigade? If so, when andwhere?

COL Gayagas provided hisplanning guidance, stressinghis PIR. He left his secondin command, LTC Larcom, toinitiate the planning processand coordinate those staffactions requiring operatingsystem integration. LTC Larcomprovided each staff elementwith its corresponding portionof the division OPORD.

He informed the staff theyhad two hours to go throughthe mission analysis processin their respective area ofresponsibility and to be backat the end of those two hoursto review the results of theiranalys is .

S2 ANALYSIS PROCESS

With the commanders PIRin hand, MAJ Baker began todevelop the products neededto support the accomplishmentof the mission. When MAJ Bakerarrived at his 577, CPT Robertsand SGT Hockings were refiningt h e i n i t i a l s i t u a t i o n a l

template. They were comparingtheir product to the OBholdings on the enemy unitfacing 1st Brigade. MAJ Bakerinformed CPT Roberts he hadreceived the division’sintelligence products andcommander’s PIR and needed himto assist in the missionanalysis process.

They both understood thehigher commanders intent andknew the informationalrequirements associated withthe offensive operation beingconducted by the brigade. Theycompleted the mission analysisprocess as it pertained to theintell igence system. MAJ Bakerwas about to leave to meet withthe orders group to present theresul t of h is analys is . Hetook with him the MCOO and theenemy situation template.Figure B-1 shows an MRRsituation template (based on aprepared defense). Heinstructed CPT Roberts to startdeveloping the brigade R&Splan.

CPT Roberts began hisefforts by analyzing thecommander’s PIR. Using theenemy situation template, CPTRoberts took the PIR and beganto associate them withindicators of enemy COAs. Atthe same time, he identifiedthose PIR which could besatisfied with organic,assigned, or attachedcollection assets; and thosePIR for which he would have tosubmit an RII to higherheadquarters. The PIR analysisconducted by CPT Robertsr e f l e c t e d :

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PIR : What is the 15th GMRRdefensive disposition?

INDICATOR:

3 x MRCs with a totalof 8 to 10 BMP-2's, and2 to 3 T-64B'S per MRC,all in preparedfighting position or inassembly area.

Main obstacle arrayfrom 800 meters to1,000 meters forward ofthe MRC preparedfighting positions.

8 to 12 T-64B's in anassembly area.

2 to 3 BMP-2's forward1 to 3 kilometers ofmain defensive positionwith possibleprotective typeobstac le .

1 BMP-2 or BMP-1 BRDMforward and isolatedfrom any additionalf o r c e s .

5 to 7 BRDM-2's,mounting 5 AT-5Spandrel AT guidedmissiles in assemblyarea, possible minelayer with 1 BTRincluded.

PIR : Is there a weaknessin the 15th GMRR defensivedisposi t ion? If SO, where?

INDICATOR:

- Distance between MRCsgreater than 2,000 meters.

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- No impeding typeobstacle within the main AA.

- Location of tankswithin MRC positions.

- No tanks with secondechelon forces.

reserve.

PIR:a r t i l l e r y

Location of MRR

Where are thebattalions comprising

the 15th GMRR regimentalartil lery group? This PIR willalso serve as an RII to higherheadquarters and willfac i l i ta te the integrat ion ofECM support by the IEWSEofficer to support the schemeof maneuver.

INDICATOR: 3 x 5 t o 82S1’s or 2S3’s on line, locatedoff a major AA or MC.

PIR: Will the 41st GMRDcommander direct any of theirgunships against 1st brigade?If so, where? This PIR willserve as an RII to higherheadquarters.

PIR : Where and when willthe 35th TR be committedagainst 1st brigade? This PIRwill also serve as an RII tohigher headquarters for initialacquisition and tracking.

INDICATOR: 60 to 70T-64B's moving southeast fromNAI 90 to NAI 16 and NAI 18.

PIR : Will the enemy usechemical munitions against 1stbrigade? If so, when? ThisPIR will serve as an RII to

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higher headquarters for initialindication of intent to employ.

INDICATOR:

- Break of f ac t iv i t iesof enemy forces in contact.

- Enemy troops wearingprotective overgarment.

DEVELOPMENT OF SITUATIONTEMPLATE AND EVENT TEMPLATE

Concurrently with thedevelopment of the indicators,CPT Roberts began to identifyNAI that, when defined by theindicators , would form thebasis and focus of the brigadeR&S efforts. CPT Roberts'event analysis process wasdeveloped to ascertain thedefensive COA as it relates tothe reconnaissance and securityechelon and the 2d echelonmotorized rifle battalion (MRB)and MRR reserve. This i soutlined in the brigade SOP.The first echelon MRBsdefensive COA was given to thetask forces to develop, asassisted by the brigade S2’senemy situation template andevent template. Figure B-2shows an event template.Figure B-3 is a combinedsituation template and eventtemplate.

SPECIFIC R&S GUIDANCE

When MAJ Baker returnedfrom the meeting he had thetentative brigade plan toaccomplish the mission. Heinformed CPT Roberts of thebrigade's scheme of maneuverand provided him additional R&Sinstructions based on the

commander’s concept ofoperations. COL Gayagas wanteda good reconnaissance of AxisSpeed and Axis Kill (Annex A ofthe OPORD); and he wanted twoOPs established: oneovermatching OBJECTIVE CAT andthe other OBJECTIVE DOG.

MAJ Baker told CPT Robertsthat since he now knew thebrigadets scheme of maneuver,he had sufficient informationto ass ign speci f icinformational requirements tosubordinates and attached unitsand complete the brigade R&Splan. CPT Roberts was also todevelop the R&S tasking matrix,which is the tool used todisseminate R&S taskings tosubordinate and attachedunits . He is to have thematrix ready within the hour soMAJ Baker could pass it throughCOL Gayagas for his approvaland MAJ Booth for coordination.

The following samples arethe results of the brigade'smission analysis anddecision-making process todevelop the R&S plan. Thesample is given along with thefigure number assigned to it.

o Figure B-4. Samplewarning order.

o Figure B-5. SampleOPORD.

o Figure B-6. Sample AnnexA to OPORD l-XX.

o Figure B-7. Sample AnnexB to OPORD l-XX.

o Figure B-8. A sampleAppendix 3 to Annex B to OPORDl-XX .

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B-8

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B-10

F M 3 4 - 2 1

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F M 3 4 - 2 - 1

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GLOSSARY

AAAAA

ACRACRVADAAEAFAIALOAMammoAOAPCapproxartyASCASPSATa t t nAVLBavnAZ

BAEbdeBEbldgBLUFORBMNTBMPbnBOSBRDMBRMBTR

CAAc ²C ³C3CM

C&JCANE

CAScdrC-E

avenue of approacha n t i a i r c r a f t a r t i l l e r yarmored cavalry regimenta type Soviet equipmentair defense ar t i l leryaer ia l exploi tat ionAir Forcearea of interesta i r l i a i s o n o f f i c e ramplitude modulatedammunitionarea of operationsarmored personnel carrierapproximatelya r t i l l e r yarmored scout carall-source production sectionantitankat tent ionarmored vehicle launched bridgeaviationArizona

battlefield area evaluationbrigadebasic encyclopediabuildingBlue Force (US)beginning of morning nautical twilighta type of Soviet personnel carrierb a t t a l i o nbattlefield operating systemsa type of Soviet equipmenta type of Soviet equipmenta type of Soviet equipment

combined arms armycommand and controlcommand, control, and communicationscommand, control, and communicationscountermeasurescollection and jammingCombined Arms in a Nuclear/Chemical

Environmentclose air supportcommanderCommunications-Electronics

Glossary-1

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co

CESOthemCICM&DC/MOB

COACoilCommCOMSECconcounter-reconnaissance--

CPCPTCRCSSCUCV

DADAGDCDDdecondefdetDFDIAd i s tdivDIVARTYDSDSTDTGDZ

EECCMECMEENTELINTengrEPBEPWESMEW

communications-electronic staff officerchemicalcounter inte l l igencecollection management and disseminationcountermobilitycompanycourse of actionc o l l e c t i o ncommunicationcommunications securitycontact

all measures taken to prevent hostileobservation of a force, area, or place (DOD)command post

captaincounterreconnaissancecombat service supportcommercial utility cargo vehicle

Department of the Armydivision artil lery group (Soviet)District of ColumbiaDepartment of Defensedecontaminationdefense/defensivedetachmentdirection findingDefense Intelligence Agencydis tr ibut iondivis iond i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r ydirect supportdecision support templatedate-time groupdrop zone

e a s telectronic counter-countermeasureselectronic countermeasuresend of evening nautical twilighte lectronic inte l l igenceengineerelectronic preparation of the battlefieldenemy prisoner of warelectronic warfare support measureselectronic warfare

Glossary-2

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FAARFASCAMFEBAFISTFISTV577FLOTf l tFMFMFOFRAGOFSEFSOfwd

G2GMRDGMRRgpGSGSR

HHFHHOC

HMMWVHPThqhrHUMINTHVT

I&SIDIEWIEWSE

IFFillumIMINTintcpi n t e lIPBIRITBITR

forward area alerting radarfamily of scatterable minesforward edge of the battle areafire support teamFIST vehicletracked operations vehicle (heavy division)forward line of own troopsf l i g h t(with number) field manualfrequency modulatedforward observerfragmentary orderfire support elementf i re support of f icerforward

Assistant Chief of Staff (Intell igence)guards motorized rifle divisionguards motorized rifle regimentgroupgeneral supportground surveillance radar

the time hostilities commencehigh frequencyHeadquarters, headquarters and operationscompanyhigh mobility multipurpose wheeled vehiclehigh payoff targetheadquartershourhuman intelligencehigh value targets

intell igence and surveillanceinfantry divis ion/ident i f icat ionintelligence and electronic warfareintelligence and electronic warfare supportelementidentification, friend or foe (radar)i l luminationimagery intelligenceintercepti n t e l l i g e n c eintell igence preparation of the battlefieldinformation requirementsindependent tank battalionindependent tank regiment

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JAATJTCG

kmkm/h

l b sLCLDLICLOALOCLOEALOSLPLOB

MAJ

mmmag

MCM/CM/SMCOOmechMEDEVACMETLMETT-T

MIMIJI

minMOPPMPMRMRBMRCMRDMRPMRRMSRMTLB

NNAINATONBCNET

Joint Air Attack TeamJoint Test Command Group

kilometerkilometers per hour

poundsline of contactline of departurelow-intensi ty conf l ic tlimit of advancelines of communicationslimit of enemy advancel ine of s ightlistening postline of bearing

mechanizedmetermagneticmajormobility corridormobility, countermobility, and survivabilitymodified combined obstacles overlaymechanizedmedical evacuationmiss ion essent ia l task l i s tmission, enemy, terrain, troops, and timeavai lableMil i tary Inte l l igencemeaconing, intrusion, jamming, andinterferenceminutemission-oriented protection postureMilitary Policemotorized riflemotorized rifle battalionmotorized rifle companymotorized rifle divisionmotorized rifle platoonmotorized rifle regimentmain supply routea type Soviet equipment

northnamed areas of interestNorth Atlantic Treaty Organizationnuclear, biological, and chemicalnot earlier than

Glossary-4

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no NLT not later than

numberNOD night observation devicenoncomm noncommunicationsNV night visionNVG night vision goggles

OBobjO&IOMGOPOPCONOPFOROPLANOPORDOPSEC

PIRPLp l tPMCSPMIPOLpossPOVprepprob

r e g tretransRIIRISTA

Rkh

order of battleob jec t iveoperations and intelligenceoperational maneuver groupobservation postoperational controlopposing forceoperations planoperations orderoperations security

priority intell igence requirementsphase lineplatoonpreventive maintenance checks and servicespreventive maintenance inspectionspetroleum, oils, and lubricantspossibleprivately owned vehicleprepareprobable

R&S reconnaissance and surveillanceRAC reconnaissance assault companyRC Reserve ComponentsREC radio electronic combatrecon reconnaissanceREMBASS Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor Systemreconnaissance-- A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual

observation or other detection methods,information about the activities andresources of an enemy or potential enemy;or to secure data concerning themeteorological, hydrographic, or geographiccharacter is t ics of a part icular area . ( DOD,NATO )

regimentretransmissionrequest for intell igence informationreconnaissance , inte l l igence , survei l lanceand target acquisitiona type of Soviet equipment

Glossary-5

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Rkh/mRP

sS2S3S 3 - a i rS-ASASALTSALUTE

SAMSCARFs c t ySEADSIGINTSIRSITMAPSMSSOISOPSORSPSSMSurvlsurvei l lance- -

TATAATACFIRETAITBTCTEtempTFt kTNTTOCTOTTOWTPLTR

a type of Soviet equipmentrelease point

southIntelligence Officer (US Army)Operations and Training Officer (US Army)Air Operations and Training Officer (US Army)seismic-acousticsurface to airsize, activity, location, and timesize , ac t iv i ty , locat ion , uni t , t ime,equipment (spot report format)surface to air missilestandard collection asset request formatsecur i tysuppression of enemy air defenses ignals inte l l igencespecific information requirementssituation mapsimultaneous monitoring systemsignal operation instructionsstanding operating procedurespecific orders and requestsstart pointsurface- to-surface miss i lesurveillance

The systematic observation of aerospace,surface or subsurface areas, places, persons,or things by visual, aural, electronic,photographic, or other means. (DOD,NATO)

theater armytactical air armytactical f ire direction computer systemtarget areas of interesttank battaliontra ining c irculart a c t i c a l e x p l o i t a t i o ntemperaturetask forcetanktr ini trotoluenetact ica l operat ions centertime over targettube-launched, optically tracked, wire guidedtime phase linetank regiment

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TRADOC

TTP

UHFusUSAFUSAICSUSSR

VHFv i c

w

United States Army Training and DoctrineCommandtactics, techniques, and procedures

ultra high frequencyUnited StatesUnited States Air ForceUS Army Intelligence Center and SchoolUnion of Soviet Socialist Republics

very high frequencyv i c i n i t y

west

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REFERENCES

REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS

Required publications are sources that users must read inorder to understand or to comply with this field manual.

Field Manuals (FMs)

FM 17-98FM 34-1

FM 34-2FM 34-3FM 34-10-1

FM 34-80

FM 34-130

FM 101-5

FM 101-5-1

61 JTCG/ME-87-10

Scout Platoon. October 1987.Intelligence and Electronic Warfare

Operations. July 1987.Collection Management. 22 October 1990.Intell igence Analysis. 15 March 1990.T a c t i c s , Techniques, and Procedures for the

Remotely Monitored Battlefield SensorSystems (REMBASS). November 1990.

Brigade and Battalion Intelligence andElectronic Warfare Operations.April 1986.

Intelligence Preparation of theB a t t l e f i e l d . May 1989.

Staff Organization and Operations.May 1984.

Operational Terms and Symbols.October 1985.

Handbook for Operational Testing ofElectro-Optical Systems in BattlefieldObscurants. October 1987.

Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA Pam)

DA Pam 381-3 How Latin America Insurgents Fight.June 1986.

DD Form 1975 Joint Tactical Air Reconnaissance andSurveillance Request Form.

Rand Study. Applying the National Training Center Experience:Tactical Reconnaissance. October 1987.

References-1

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RELATED PUBLICATIONS

Related publications are sources of additional information.They are not required in order to understand this publication.

Field Manuals (FMs)

FM 6-20-10 TTP for the Targeting Process, Mar 90FM 24-33 Communications Techniques: Electronic

Counter-Countermeasures. 22 Mar 85FM 34-10 Division IEW Operations. November 1986.(U) FM 34-1OA Division Intell igence and Electronic

Warfare Operations, Secret.December 1986.

FM 100-5 Operations. May 1986.FM 101-5 Staff Organization and Preparation.

May 1984.

(U) DIA Study. Reconnaissance and Surveillance and TargetAcquisition in the USSR, Secret/NOFORN. June 1988.

References-2

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Index-1

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Index-2

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Index-3

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19 JUNE 1991

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

CARL E. VUONOGeneral, United States Army

Chief of Staff

O f f i c i a l :

PATRICIA P. HICKERSONColonel, United States Army

The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION : Active Army, USAR, and ARNG: To be distributedin accordance with DA Form 12-llE, requirements for FM 34-2-1,T a c t i c s , Techniques, and Procedures for Reconnaissance andSurveillance and Intelligence Support to Counterreconnaissance(Qty rqr block no. 4873).

*U.S. Government Printing Office 1994—300-421/82314