Notes on the Evolution ofBrazilian Multilateral Diplomacy

�Gelson Fonseca Jr.

The article describes the evolution of Brazilian multilateralism since theFirst Pan American Conference in 1889. The impact of the domestic and in-ternational spheres are examined to understand the continuities andchanges in Brazil multilateral attitudes. In our days, the increasing influ-ence of Brazil international presence, especially in multilateral forums, isevident. The open question is how the emerging countries will influencethe new international order. KEYWORDS: Brazil, foreign policy, United Na-tions, multilateralism.

IT IS EVIDENT THAT, AS A RESULT OF THEIR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND POLITICAL

maturation, a number of countries once cast as merely “developing” haveemerged over the past two decades as consequential international actors.Among the most prominent are Brazil, India, China, Turkey, South Africa, andIndonesia. A restored Russia, emerging from the wreckage of the SovietUnion, is generally seen and sees itself as a member of this cohort. Collec-tively, they promise to play a progressively more important role in determin-ing the shape of global governance.

It is equally evident that effective and sustainable responses to the greattransnational challenges of our time, including climate change, armed conflict,terrorism, gross violations of human rights, and uneven and unstable economicglobalization, have to be universal in breadth and broadly perceived as legiti-mate. Multilateralism in some form is the natural and necessary means forconfronting these challenges.

The difficulties and precariousness of extant multilateral institutions arewell known. With their newly acquired influence, will the emerging powersmove the world order in a better direction? Can we reasonably hope forstronger multilateral institutions? These questions require long and necessar-ily speculative answers. To the end of throwing some light on present prob-lems and prospects for addressing them, this essay focuses on only one of themoving parts that is shaping the future; namely, Brazil. Specifically, I inquirehow the Brazilian attitude toward multilateralism has evolved in the face of itsown internal challenges and those that engage the entire world.

To cope with today’s complex realities, Brazil has participated in the cre-ation of new multilateral forums: Brazil, Russia, India, China (BRIC); India,

375

Global Governance 17 (2011), 375–397

Brazil, and South Africa Forum (IBSA); and Group of 20 (G-20). But inBrazil’s view of the world, regional and other limited number forums are not asubstitute for the universal forum that is the United Nations. It remains the pre-eminent multilateral institution. This view of the UN could be called the coreof Brazilian multilateral ideology. And while it may not be unique to Brazil, itis nevertheless a key to understanding Brazil’s multilateral diplomacy.

Seminal Moments in the Makingof Brazil’s Multilateral PrinciplesThe multilateral focus was a constant in Brazilian diplomacy even before thecreation of the UN’s predecessor, the League of Nations. To be precise, thatfocus first appeared in 1889 when Brazil attended a meeting of Western Hemi-sphere countries in Washington, DC, convened by President Grover Cleve-land. The meeting turned out to be the embryo of the Organization ofAmerican States (OAS). By participating in this meeting, Brazil implicitly ac-cepted multilateralism as a useful means for advancing its national interests.At the same time, however, it demonstrated its determination to resist multi-lateral commitments inconsistent with its perceived self-interest by joiningwith other Latin American countries in rejecting the US government’s pro-posal of a continental free-trade zone.1

While opposing that particular US initiative, Brazil regarded amiable re-lations with the United States as very much in the national interest. Consistentwith that view, in 1906 it consolidated what both sides perceived to be an “un-written alliance” with the United States. The essence of the understanding atthe heart of that alliance was that the United States would help Brazil defenditself from European threats and would also support Brazil in the event that itencountered diplomatic problems with its neighbors. In exchange, Brazilwould generally support the United States with respect to issues that arose be-tween it and other Latin American states. A case in point was the controversyover the so-called Drago Doctrine, which purported to bar the use of militarymeans by one state to force payment of its debts (normally to foreign bond-holders) by another, a doctrine strongly supported by most other Latin statesand particularly by Brazil’s principal neighbors.

Overall, while as noted above Brazil was not hostile to multilateral diplo-macy, it approached with great caution any proposals of a multilateral charac-ter; in particular, proposals that would commit Brazil indefinitely to a systemof obligatory arbitration of disputes and proposals for various disarmamentschemes. This caution reflected a still relatively weak state’s sense of risks toits national sovereignty, a sovereignty achieved a little later (in 1822) than inthe case of other Latin states after Brazil’s short period as part of the UnitedKingdom of Portugal and Algarves (1815–1822).

Throughout the twentieth century, Brazilian diplomacy was informed bya sense that it was not yet one of the major powers that at any given time could

376 Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy

define the rules constraining state behavior in a way to advance their interestsas they saw them, whether or not the rules coincidentally advance the generalinterest of the international community. Remaining aloof from the norm-mak-ing process was seen as a bad option. At the same time, however, Brazil’s for-eign policy elite believed that an optimal diplomacy meant participatingactively in the norm-making process while being careful to avoid potentiallydangerous constraints. Manifest even trumpeted sensitivity about threats to itssovereign discretion was seen as part of a strategy of participation in multilat-eral fora. The defense of sovereignty and its consequences for internationalorder, as equality of states, was one of the traits of that balancing act betweenmultilateral commitment and a permanent effort for preserving and strength-ening political autonomy.

Brazil’s behavior at the Hague Peace Conference of 1907 illustrates thisstrategic approach to multilateral diplomacy. Despite the overall alignment oftheir foreign policies, on certain key issues at the conference the Brazilian andUS positions diverged. The latter strongly supported the creation of the Inter-national Prize Court and the Court of Arbitral Justice.2 Brazil did not object tothe creation of the two institutions, but was concerned about the unbalancedmanner by which the major powers intended to define the composition of thecourts. The debate ended up going beyond the jurisdiction of the courts to thefundamental question for the international order: how to decide on who de-cides in international institutions. The choice was clear: the control of the de-cision process was based either on a country’s power or on international law,which dictates that every country is juridicially equal.

According to former foreign minister Celso Lafer, that Hague moment co-incided with the beginning of Brazil’s “questioning the exclusive managementof the world order by the major powers,” an attitude that became even morepronounced during the Versailles Conference of 1919. At the outset of the con-ference, Brazil successfully opposed a procedural rule that distinguished be-tween countries with general interests (the United States, France, GreatBritain, Italy, and Japan) and countries with limited interests, which wouldhave allowed the latter to participate only in sessions that dealt with their di-rect interests. Lafer posits, “The affirmation that Brazil has general interests,that is, a view of the world and how it should be organized and that this viewis important to preserve . . . the specific interests of the country, became adefining trait of the Brazilian identity in the 20th century.”3

A third seminal moment of Brazilian multilateralism occurred during thenegotiation on the creation of the Permanent Court of International Justice es-tablished by the League of Nations Covenant. One of the contentious issueswas the jurisdictional consequences of becoming a member of the court.Would adhesion imply an obligation for a state to submit all of its judicial dis-putes to the court? The issue was divisive and some countries rejected peremp-torily any possibility of accepting mandatory rulings by the court. Brazil’sproposed compromise, which in the end enabled the establishment of the new

Gelson Fonseca Jr. 377

court, was the so-called optional clause that allowed each state party to thetreaty creating the court to decide whether to accept compulsory jurisdictionto some greater or lesser degree, if at all. That clause is now embodied in theStatute of the Permanent Court’s successor, the International Court of Justice.As Lafer explains, “the principle of equality of States was preserved and theinterests of major or minor powers were safeguarded.”4 This episode began todelineate a possible role for Brazil in multilateral forums; namely, mediatingand creating bridges between highly contentious positions.

Another seminal moment took place in the 1920s, when Brazil tried to ob-tain a permanent seat on the council of the League of Nations, the UN’s pred-ecessor. In 1926, its effort was thwarted by a decision of the European powersto award the seat to Germany as part of the process of reintegrating Germanyinto the established order. So Brazil decided within the following year to with-draw entirely from the League. This episode evidences a point when Brazilwas still a young and relatively weak state with an aspiration to become an im-portant actor in the international arena and a readiness to pay significant diplo-matic costs in order to make that aspiration become a reality.5

Brazil in San FranciscoThe negotiations to create the United Nations were dominated by the victors ofWorld War II. The United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain becamethe de facto owners of the plans for the new organization since the other par-ticipants had only the barest of opportunities to influence the directives drawnup in Yalta. Nevertheless, Brazilian participation was not entirely marginal.President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull suggestedthat Brazil could occupy the “sixth permanent seat” in the Security Council.That move was a way to compensate Brazil for its early entry into World WarII on the Allied side and its substantial contribution of bases and troops.

For a moment, it appeared that Brazil would realize its aspiration evenwhile its economy was in a developmental stage. But aspiration remained justthat because both Britain and the Soviet Union objected to President Roo-sevelt’s proposal, the latter because it viewed Brazil as a likely US ally in theSecurity Council and the former on the grounds that the expansion of the num-ber of permanent members would dilute the Council’s decisionmaking capac-ity. Following Roosevelt’s death, the proposal was withdrawn.

The Evolution of Brazilian Attitudes at the United NationsIt is possible to distinguish four broad periods in the evolution of Brazilianmultilateral positions. The differences from one period to another could be at-tributed to internal changes in the political system (democracy vs. authoritar-ian regime and closed vs. open economy) and to the external transformation of

378 Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy

the international system (decolonization was decisive for the “modernization”of Brazil’s foreign policy).

Loyalty to the Western World and Institutional Criticism (1947–1960)After fifteen years of authoritarian rule (1930–1945), Brazil turned todemocratic governance following the end of World War II before submittingagain to authoritarian control in 1964 when a military coup, backed by theUnited States, ousted President João Goulart. During the democraticinterregnum Brazilian foreign policy was strongly influenced by its alliancewith the United States, in part because official and unofficial elites perceivedthe country’s identity as Western and Christian. As a consequence, Brazilgenerally endorsed US positions in the UN General Assembly and in theSecurity Council. In doing so it was often at odds, diplomatically, with itsLatin neighbors.6

As a member of the Western bloc, Brazil voted for the Uniting for Peaceresolution, which sanctioned the UN’s institutional participation in the KoreanWar of 1949–1953. This position did not amount to reflexive support for USpolicy. An equal motive behind the vote was Brazilian desire to strengthen theinfluence of the General Assembly in security matters. Brazil, did not, how-ever, send troops to Korea, despite strong appeals from the United States. Toengage Brazilian troops in foreign countries, even under a UN mandate, wasdeemed politically imprudent particularly for a government that at the timewas losing its political support.

While seeing itself as an influential actor in the General Assembly andtherefore being an advocate, as noted above, of maximizing the Assembly’sauthority, Brazil was elected to the Security Council three times during thisdemocratic era. One author characterizes Brazilian presence on the Council as“prestige multilateralism” because it was not linked to concrete and specificnational interests that could be secured through Council membership in thatera.7 While seeking to avoid antagonizing the United States, Brazil tried, as arule, to facilitate peaceful settlement by having the UN foster negotiation ofinflammatory international issues while upholding the principle of noninter-vention in domestic affairs, a principle that Brazil construed broadly.

The 1956 Middle East crisis stemming from the joint Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt precipitated strong Brazilian support for UN involve-ment in actively maintaining the peace. Specifically, it became a champion ofUN peacekeeping.8 More generally it could be said that, by virtue of beingelected multiple times to the Security Council, Brazil felt a greater interest inand responsibility for the success of the UN as the keystone institution ofglobal order. Unlike the UN’s authorization for military operations in Korea bythe United States and its allies, the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) establishedin the wake of the Middle East war to separate Israeli and Egyptian forces wasclearly identified with the office initiative of the Secretary General. It was,

Gelson Fonseca Jr. 379

moreover, an instantiation of the Uniting for Peace resolution and, hence, ofthe importance of the General Assembly. Moreover, the peacekeeping opera-tion appeared as a new door open to middle powers to contribute to the solu-tion of global security problems. Through that door came Brazil, whichassigned a battalion to UNEF that remained in Suez until, on the threshold ofa new Middle East war, the Secretary-General ordered the entire peacekeepingforce withdrawn. Subsequently Brazil provided troops for the UN Operationin the Congo and United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea–WestIrian (UNSF).9

Despite a shared hostility to the Soviet bloc and communism generally,during the years of democratic government, Brazil’s overall alliance with theUnited States experienced a process of gradual attrition. This was in part the re-sult of the disappointed expectations of the Brazilian elite about economic as-sistance from the United States. Aggravating that disappointment was a gradualintensification of Brazilian nationalism and determination to accelerate anddeepen economic growth and to be an important actor in world affairs.10 Thefoundations of the alliance remained, but the Brazilian attitude became moreambiguous and frictions with the United States began to multiply. Emblematicof a certain ambivalence was the coincidence in 1952 of a military assistancetreaty with the United States, which practically made the two armed forces part-ners, and the Brazilian Congress’s approval, despite opposition from US oilcompanies, of the nationalization of the country’s oil industry.

The unfulfilled potential from the Brazilian perspective of the alliancewith the United States and the need for economic development led to a sub-stantial adjustment of Brazilian foreign policy. Brazil needed greater auton-omy and strengthening multilateralism began to be seen clearly as a means tothat end.

An emphasis on institutional issues became a recurring theme of Brazil’sspeeches in the General Assembly’s annual general debate. The reason for thisemphasis is simple: except for the Security Council, UN institutions have beenbased on the equality of nations and, in theory, a middle power can signifi-cantly affect their decisions. Brazil’s speeches were mainly about the need fora more influential General Assembly or a more vigorous Economic and SocialCouncil (ECOSOC). They were also quite critical of the way that the perma-nent members were damaging the Security Council’s legitimacy by using theCouncil as an East-West battleground rather than as an instrument for promot-ing friendly relations among member states.

An independent line also characterized Brazil’s discourse about the struc-ture of the international economy. Brazil played a major role in the creation ofthe Economic Commission on Latin America (ECLA), which would become,under Raul Prebisch, a source of heterodox theories of international trade. Andat an early point in global trade negotiations, Brazil began to support the no-tion that a country’s underdevelopment should be taken into account in the

380 Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy

trade negotiations promoted by the United States to produce a progressivelymore open international trading system. Opposing the liberal orthodoxy cham-pioned by the United States, Brazil contended that absolute reciprocity shouldnot be required from poor countries. This position became sharper when, in themid-1950s, Brazil began to add “underdeveloped” to its hitherto establishedidentities as Western, Christian, and Latin American. This new status some-how universalized Brazilian identity, broadening the scope of its potentialdiplomatic linkages. The expansion of identity led to support for the idea of“collective economic security” and, later, to support for the establishment ofthe UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) which became ina sense the anti–GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade and the forum for andresearch arm of third world countries striving for increased economic growthand dubious about Washington, DC’s pursuit of free trade.

The mid-1950s, the period in which these policy inflections became pro-nounced, coincided with one of the most innovative moments in Brazilian his-tory. The inauguration of the country’s new capital: Brasilia; the emergence ofan extraordinary cultural dynamism (exemplified by the rhythms of bossanova); and the first stages of modern industrialization all happened in this pe-riod. The country became more aware of its potential and acted accordingly.In 1956, President Juscelino Kubitschek launched the Pan-American Opera-tion (OPA). It was the first time that Brazil tried to rally its neighbors to cre-ate instruments and goals in order to collectively negotiated economiccooperation with the United States. The core of Kubitschek’s position was asfollows: without growth, democracy itself would be threatened in the region,so that the anticommunist struggle could not be reduced to its strategic di-mension. The United States rejected the transformation of the OPA into an in-stitution that could organize hemispheric cooperation policies but not the ideabehind it, which became one of the tenets for theAlliance for Progress. But be-fore that, the creation of the Inter-American Development Bank in 1960 wascertainly motivated by the new concepts proposed by Kubitschek.

Another important theme that entered Brazilian discourse at the UN wasthe promotion of tolerance and the condemnation of racial discrimination. Butin terms of aligning Brazil with the growing ranks of the third world, there re-mained through the 1950s and 1960s an omission, an ambiguity with regard tocolonialism. This anomaly grew out of the country’s special relationship withPortugal and was not unrelated to the settlement in Brazil of a vocal andwealthy Portuguese community. Brazil would not join in a vote against its“mother country” until the years of the independent foreign policy. After thatintermission, the anomaly endured until Portugal’s 1973 revolution spelled theend of its colonial vocation and the imminent independence of the so-calledultramarine provinces.

During the Cold War, it was difficult for peripheral countries to takeunique positions collectively. Peppering the Security Council with vetoes, the

Gelson Fonseca Jr. 381

two superpowers generally constrained UN action in the majority of caseswhere concerns with peace and security seemed to demand it. They also lim-ited the authority and activity of the General Assembly to the best of their abil-ity. But in the case of decolonization, the developing world tried with somesuccess to make space in UN political discourse and even, occasionally, actionfor an issue deemed to be isolable from the East-West struggle.

A Universal and Independent Foreign Policy (1960–1964)The election of Janio Quadros in 1960 led to deep changes in Brazilian foreignpolicy—changes that were not entirely unexpected, to be sure, since Brazil’sdesire for greater autonomy was already apparent during the Kubitschek ad-ministration. The new president wanted to broaden Brazil’s international scopewhile maintaining its connection to the Western world. This meant deeper re-lationships with African and socialist countries, and also a more active role ineconomic and disarmament negotiations. This heightened global “activism”was naturally reflected in Brazil’s positions on issues at the UN. Quadros’sresignation a mere two-thirds of the way through his first year in office did nothalt the effort to mark out an independent foreign policy. His successor, JoãoGoulart (1961–1964), a president with a leftist and labor background, sharedQuadros’s general approach to foreign policy. In retrospect, one can say thatthis brief era before the coup d’état against the democratic regime augured thelong-term course of Brazilian diplomacy.

It should be noted that this period was rife with internal problems, startingwith Quadros’s resignation and followed almost immediately by the signs ofmilitary resistance to what most senior officers (and the United States) consid-ered Goulart’s lunge to the left. There followed in rapid and stunning successionof events: first, the political system was changed from a presidential democracyto a parliamentary system; then, after a referendum, it changed back to a presi-dential system; then came the military coup suspending democracy of any kind.

At the same time (and not unrelated to the military coup), relations with theUnited States became increasingly conflictive once President Goulart an-nounced in 1962 his opposition to the economic blockade of Cuba. Coinciden-tally, the decolonization process picked up speed and the developing countriescreated groups to increase their leverage in multilateral forums, groups such asthe Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Group of 77 (G-77). In this newworld where the rift between the North and the South became structural, theexpansion of the Brazilian diplomatic presence and the country’s readiness,according to Quadros, to act as a “bridge” between the rich and the poor con-tributed to the sense internally, and also to a considerable degree externally,that Brazil was charting for itself a position that was unique. On the one hand,it refrained from joining the NAM and thus waived an opportunity to becomean across-the-board leader of the developing world. But as one of the mainproponents of UNCTAD, it did assume a leadership role in the economicsphere. And even in the political sphere, Brazil was far from silent. The su-

382 Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy

perpower restraints on the UN were sharply criticized; and, at the General As-sembly, the Brazilian representatives began to speak against what many sawas “an invisible veto” on progress toward a more equitable economic order.The Western group, especially the United States, would systematically blockthe acceptance of international instruments that could promote growth for theunderdeveloped countries, as commodity agreements that could guarantee eq-uitable prices for their exports, increase in the levels of financial and technicalassistance, nonreciprocal tariff preferences, and so on. Brazilian criticism ofthe superpower nuclear arms race became more direct and vehement. AraujoCastro, the last of Goulart’s foreign ministers, summarized the goals of the in-dependent foreign policy era in terms of the prominence of the three Ds:development, disarmament, and decolonization.

The disarmament issue provided a convenient vehicle for Brazil to insertitself into global security discussions since it had a record on the issue that wasdifficult to assail. It had no nuclear weapons, was not involved in an arms race,was at peace with its neighbors, and it was a consistent supporter of an effec-tive UN. Because of these assets and its size and influence in Latin America,Brazil was invited as one of the eighteen neutral nations to serve on the UNDisarmament Committee in Geneva. In that forum, Brazil indicted closed de-cision processes, such as the one that characterized the treaty on the partialfreezing of nuclear tests—a treaty directly negotiated by the United States, theUSSR, and Great Britain—and then presented to the committee as a fait ac-compli. Years later, Brazil would voice a similar criticism of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The support for decolonization was stronger and, with respect to Por-tuguese colonies, a remarkable change occurred. Despite its close relationswith Portugal, Brazil changed its vote from negative to abstention on the Gen-eral Assembly resolutions dealing with Portuguese problems, and, in 1963,voted for two Security Council resolutions (Resolutions 180 and 183) declar-ing that keeping the colonies in Africa was a threat to peace and demandingthat Portugal accept self-determination.

This period marked, as mentioned above, the origins of Brazilian moderndiplomacy. The ideas of autonomy, universal diplomatic relations, and a strongmultilateral presence corresponded to a sort of ideal foreign policy for the coun-try, which continues somehow to serve as a guide for Brazilian foreign policy.

The Military Government: Alliance and ConflictWithin the Western Bloc (1964–1985)The authoritarian period was not uniform in terms of foreign policy, and evenless so in its multilateral positions. Broadly speaking, there were two distinctmoments. The first one, from 1964 to 1968, is characterized by the return toclose alliance with the United States and a clearly pro-Western position inColdWar matters (the 1964 coup was partly justified by the need to stop a “so-cialist republic” from being installed in Brazil). Two examples of this rap-

Gelson Fonseca Jr. 383

prochement include the break of diplomatic relations with Cuba and Brazilianparticipation in, indeed nominal leadership of, the Inter-American Force,which served as an after-the-fact veil over the US invasion of the DominicanRepublic in 1965. Replacing Goulart’s independent foreign policy was a de-clared commitment to a close alliance with the United States and the shareddefense of Western values. In an increasingly interdependent world divided by“ideological frontiers,” the notion of an “independent foreign policy” wassenseless in the military government view.

The military regime also drew back from any hint of criticism of Por-tuguese colonialism, diminished its presence in multilateral forums, and alignedits votes with those of the United States and the Western countries, except onsome economic North-South issues. The inevitable result was isolation from thethird world movement and, hence, a reluctance to compete for electoral posi-tions in the UN and termination altogether from the now obviously unattainablepursuit of a seat on the Security Council.11 Brazil’s twenty-year failure to par-ticipate in UN peacekeeping operations after the withdrawal from Sinai in 1967is another sign of the country’s retrenchment at the very outset of the militaryregime from any sort of prominent role in global multilateral diplomacy.

This attitude began to change by the end of the 1960s, when the countrybecame less dependent on the United States (due to the Brazilian economic“miracle”). A conceptual alternative to interdependence emerged in elite dis-course, especially the military elite, characterized by the traditional aspirationto become a significant power, but with new features as well. Multilateralismwas still a relevant option, but its potential was limited by Brazil’s isolationfrom third world countries. The course Brazil then took was to begin stakingout a place for itself as an autonomous power, a country consequential not forits bloc leadership but for its own capabilities. Some of the government’sdecisions—for example, extending Brazil’s territorial sea to 200 nautical milesand entering into a nuclear energy development pact with West Germany—ledto quarrels with the United States. They sharpened when the administration ofUS president Jimmy Carter criticized human rights practices in Brazil, and thegovernment decided to abrogate the 1952 military cooperation agreement be-tween the two countries. During the same period (specifically in 1969), Brazilrefused to sign the NPT, claiming that it unfairly perpetuated a division be-tween nuclear and non-nuclear countries.

In multilateral forums, the first and most important objective of the newmove in Brazilian foreign policy was limiting the creation of any formal ob-stacles to the expansion of Brazilian potential. Wayne A. Selcher mentions

the vigor and competitiveness with which the Foreign Ministry led the domes-tic and international attack against any emerging international consensusspawned by developed states and perceived as a contrived or arbitrary obstacleto full development of national potential, such as criticism of the development

384 Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy

of the Amazon, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the birth control issue, interna-tional pollution standards, an arbitrary twelve-mile limit on coastal sovereigntyand potential restrictions on use of water resources shared by many states.12

Autonomy was thus to be maintained by avoiding multilateral “restric-tive” engagement. While unilaterally warding off any perceived restraint onnational development and autonomy, the military government was more thanready to use multilateral diplomacy when it served what were perceived to beBrazil’s interests. The main interests it served were in the economic fieldwhere Brazil’s position coincided with those of other developing states of theGlobal South. Within UNCTAD the government opted for a very vocal, high-profile style. Relatedly, in 1968 Brazil presided over the G-77, and in 1976 itled the group’s meeting in Geneva. Brazil’s activism in commercial and eco-nomic issues is easily explainable. The country, in the view of its elite, neededall of the things that the Global South was demanding, including raw materialprice floors, nonreciprocity in commercial agreements, tariff concessions fromthe developed states, and capital investment on favorable terms. Then camethe 1973 oil crisis and the related emergence of the Organization of PetroleumExporting Countries (OPEC) cartel as a powerful actor on the internationalscene. At that point, Brazil concluded that an alliance with third world coun-tries was more than useful—it was necessary.

On the political front, however, Brazilian leadership in multilateral forumsremained constrained by the government’s timidity about Portuguese colonial-ism and also about Palestinian rights, which were rapidly becoming a majorissue on the third world agenda. This timidity became unsustainable when itfaced two problems that revealed how vulnerable the Brazilian position was inmultilateral forums. The first was a dispute with Argentina over the construc-tion of the Itaipu hydroelectric plant. The issue surfaced in the 1972 Conferenceon Human Environment in Stockholm, then called Principle 20, but it did notcome up for a vote; instead, it was brought up in the GeneralAssembly.13 Brazilfound it difficult to contain the pressure from Argentina. Its newly returnedpresident, Juan Peron, had immediately placed Argentina within the Non-Aligned Movement. Then, Argentina set about using its position in the move-ment to advance the principle of previous consultation for the construction ofdams in rivers that traverse several countries. In the 1973 and 1974 General As-semblies, Brazil failed to defeat resolutions calling for previous consultation.This was arguably the only occasion when Brazil had to adopt a multilateral de-fensive stand in order to deal with a specific bilateral issue.

The 1973 oil crisis induced Brazil, reliant as it was on oil imports, tostrengthen its relationship with the Arab countries and to adopt a pro-Palestineposition. However, even as it worked a rapprochement with the third world, itsought to maintain close ties with the West primarily through energetic bilat-eral relations. Though, as noted above, after President Carter’s election, the

Gelson Fonseca Jr. 385

country’s authoritarianism and its nuclear pact with Germany began to strainthe bilateral relationship with the United States.

The combination of the two crises (Argentina and energy) clearly effectedan adjustment in Brazilian strategy. The government accepted unreservedlythe proposition that a good relationship with the third world was essential forthe promotion of the country’s global interests. It was evident that any multi-lateral action could be compromised if it did not have the support particularlyof the African countries, which made up more than one-third of the GeneralAssembly.14 The greatest difficulty in executing this plan was conciliatingBrazil’s desire for deeper relationships with Africa and its tacit support forPortuguese colonialism. This contradiction was only resolved in 1975, whenBrazil became the first government to recognize the legitimacy of Angola’sMovimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) government.

In the Arab case, there were already signs in 1973 that Brazil was aban-doning its neutral stand on the Arab-Israeli conflict and was starting to supportPalestinian positions. The “dramatic” turning point happened when Brazilvoted in favor of the resolution that equated Zionism with racism in 1974. Itprobably was one of the most controversial and internally disputed decisions(as was the recognition of the MPLA government) of Brazilian diplomacy inthe 1970s.

Ambassador Araujo Castro’s writings best describe Brazil’s new aspira-tions for autonomy.15 Castro, Goulart’s last chancellor and permanent repre-sentative at the UN from 1968 to 1971, detailed the conceptual framework ofthe independent foreign policy. The starting point was the idea that Brazil is acountry “condemned to greatness” and, to fulfill its destiny, autonomy wascrucial. Castro realized that, to achieve it, the international order had to changesince it often acted as an obstacle to Brazil’s efforts. For Castro, the funda-mental working concept to understand the international order is the notion ofthe “freezing of global power.”16 After analyzing the consequences of détenteand using the NPT as a model, Castro showed how the major powers used themultilateral system to secure an advantaged power position, which constrainedBrazil’s possibilities for ascension and its maneuvering capability. Castro didnot propose that Brazil acquire nuclear weapons, but he pointed out how frag-ile were the disarmament commitments made by nuclear nations, in contrastwith the obligations of those states that had no weapons. Another problemmentioned by Castro was the association of power with “responsibility” in theinternational order. As chair of the Security Council during the invasion ofCzechoslovakia, he made the following remark:

In the precise moment non-nuclear nations are asked to blindly trust the ac-tions or moderation of the nuclear powers, one of them, the USSR, utilizesbrute force to achieve its political objective of domination. The curious po-litical assumption that power is synonymous with moderation, prudence, and

386 Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy

responsibility was disproved. By invading Czechoslovakia, one of the per-manent members of the Security Council ripped, in a single night, several ar-ticles of the UN Charter, and shockingly justified this violation by invokinga strange “limited sovereignty” theory, which, if accepted, would create adoctrine of spheres of influence, perhaps even spheres of domination.17

Following Castro’s ideas, the possibility that multilateral institutions were aninstrument for major powers to advance their own interests became again aconstant concern to Brazilian diplomacy.

With regard to human rights, Brazil’s attitude was extremely restrictiveand any hypothesis of international cooperation was overruled by sovereignty.There was no dialogue with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), viewedas an instrument of Western powers. In 1977, Brazil was elected to the HumanRights Commission, with a goal of self-defense to avoid, from the inside, anyinvestigations on human rights violations in Brazil. Despite that motivation,Brazil did not adopt an obstructionist stance while in the commission.18

In 1982, for the first time, a Brazilian head of state, General João Baptistade Oliveira Figueiredo, attended the opening of the general debate of the Gen-eral Assembly. The decision could be linked to the reshaping of the Brazilianimage abroad. The democratic opening was in motion and the country was re-gaining self-confidence.

Democratization and the New Tendenciesof Brazil’s Multilateral Behavior (1985–2011)Brazil once again became a democratic nation in 1985, through the indirectelection by Congress of the first civilian president since 1964. President Tan-credo Neves, however, became ill and died within a few months. His vice pres-ident Jose Sarney assumed the presidency and completed his mandate in 1990,initiating a period of institutional stability that lasts yet today. A new constitu-tion was approved in 1988, and one year later, direct presidential electionswere reestablished. Besides the return to institutional democracy (e.g., directelections, protection of rights and freedoms), there was a simultaneous de-mocratization of Brazilian society, with a growing number of NGOs and so-cial movements becoming participants in the political scene.

With democracy, the foundations of Brazil’s multilateral politics hasbeen clearly altered. It was not a sudden change, but a gradual one. It is curi-ous that, in the first years of democracy, continuity in foreign policy wasviewed as positive. President Neves used to say that the Itamaraty’s foreignpolicy is an area for consensus, and it should be preserved as such, as RubensRicupero observes.19

Not surprisingly, democracy first affected Brazil’s self-image. Its new andessential objective was to “recover its international status” and, to achieve thisgoal, an assertive multilateral attitude would be crucial.20 As early as 1985, Sar-

Gelson Fonseca Jr. 387

ney’s speech in the general debate delineates the aspiration that will guideBrazilian diplomacy: “I’m here to say that Brazil does not wish anymore to havea timid voice. We wish to be heard, but we have no desire to be hegemonic.”21

From the mid-1980s on, the country faced two distinct challenges. First,it had to transform its negative image, a legacy from the authoritarian years.Brazilians were viewed as enemies of the environment, human rights viola-tors, timid in commitment to multilateralism due to a reluctance to engage inpeace missions, and distant from the disarmament struggle because the gov-ernment did not sign the NPT. The “accusers” were mostly the NGOs (inter-national and Brazilian), but the way to respond to their concerns passedthrough multilateral forums—a place where the voice of the social movementswas being heard with increasing repercussion. Brazil began to simultaneouslychange its internal institutions and its international conduct, getting closer tothe principles of international legitimacy in environmental matters, humanrights, and disarmament. Additionally, with the newly gained margins for ma-neuvering. Brazilian diplomacy had possibilities to influence the new designin the pattern of international legitimacy, with an active role in the UN globalconferences of the 1990s.

The second challenge is more complex and remains today: how can Braziluse the political capital it gained from democratization—and later on, from eco-nomic stability—to explore new ways to project the country internationally?

The process to recover the international status began in the first phase ofdemocratization, during the Sarney administration (1985–1990). There was amovement of aggiornamento (updating), notably in the area of human rights.The adhesion to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Covenant onSocial and Economic Rights, the Convention on Torture (in 1985), and, in theinter-American arena, the signature of the San Jose Pact (in 1986) made Brazilcompliant with the new standards of international legitimacy. After the solu-tion of the Itaipu problem (1979), the relationship with Argentina was deep-ened through the establishment of a gradual process of economic integrationin 1988 (the origin of Mercosul), the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Ac-counting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) agreement betweenBrazil, Argentina, and the InternationalAtomic EnergyAgency (IAEA), whichestablished a mutual nuclear facility inspection process and, consequently, thedissolution of the two countries’ “strategic rivalry.” Brazil gave a concrete andtangible demonstration of a new disposition in disarmament matters.

In this context, it was natural that Brazil ran for a Security Council seatafter a twenty-year absence and, in 1989, it was elected to a nonpermanentseat. Brazil could again be innovative in the General Assembly, presenting in1986 a proposal for a South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone.

Brazilian officials began to mention democracy in their speeches, unusualas a matter of course for the military. In the general debate of 1985, PresidentSarney said that “war and democracy, war and liberty are incompatible . . .

388 Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy

when nations have freedom, democracy, permanent institutions, a functioninggovernment, and popular participation, pacific and consensual solutions willprevail.”22 Brazilian diplomacy had finally discovered Kant.

Another problem was the Brazilian attitude toward environmental issues.The style of development pursued by the military government (e.g., roads inthe middle of forests, giant hydroelectric dams) did not jibe with the new en-vironmental consciousness of Brazil and the world. The arguments against in-ternational cooperation did not work anymore. Brazil acknowledged this shiftand offered to host the UN Earth Summit in 1992. This was a way, on onehand, to reinforce through the UN a national awareness of environmentalproblems and, on the other, to show that the country was open to internationalcooperation in this area. It became clear, then, that autonomy could bestrengthened by integration in legitimacy mainstream, not by repudiating thesocial and international pressures to cooperation.

An important factor in molding Brazilian foreign policy was the new con-stitution, promulgated in 1988, which lists in Article 5, the principles thatshould guide the conduct of foreign policy, including traditional concepts likesovereignty and peaceful conflict resolution as well as new ones such as pro-tection of human rights and regional integration. It also forbids, in Article 21,the production of nuclear weapons.

Since 1990, the Brazilian preference for multilateralism became strongerdue to internal changes and the subsequent growing importance of the countryin the international order. Internally, the institutional democracy wasconsolidated when the country experienced a constitutional crisis that resultedin the impeachment of the first democratically (directly) elected president. Thegovernment followed the constitutional process and the crisis was resolvedaccording to the constitution. In 1992, inflation was reined in and the processof economic opening and privatization continued. Social indicators, thoughstill revealing dramatic social inequalities, started improving when inflation(which penalizes mainly the lower classes) was controlled. During the Sarneyadministration, the country’s first massive social assistance programs werelaunched and these were later improved under Presidents Fernando HenriqueCardoso (1995–2003) and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2010). Both, intheir own ways, had an important international presence. The sum of theconsolidation of democracy, economic stability, and social improvement hadpositive international repercussions. The stature of the country obviouslychanged.

The first sign of a greater international prestige (or soft power) is a moreactive multilateral presence. Brazil continued shifting its foreign policy closerto the mainstream of international legitimacy, especially in the areas ofhuman rights, disarmament, and the environment. The second was a moresignificant participation in peace missions and a deeper engagement ininternational security issues. Brazil’s participation in the 1990s global

Gelson Fonseca Jr. 389

conferences also brought about changes in the way foreign policy wasformulated. The Brazilian positions for these global conferences wereprepared by commissions composed of representatives from the governmentand NGOs (and NGO representatives also participated in the conferences asdelegates). Foreign policy became more democratic, more linked to thesociety aspirations.

The goal of this article was not to delve into all aspects of the evolutionof Brazilian diplomacy in the past few years, nor discuss the differences be-tween President Fernando Henrique and President Lula’s diplomacy, whichshare meaningful similarities in UN issues.23 It should be noted, however, thatLula was able to take advantage of the spaces created by the retreat of themajor powers (such as the United States, which had its legitimacy underminedafter the use of torture in the war on terror as well as the failures in Iraq andAfghanistan). The space for proposals broadened and, in this connection, Lulapromoted several multilateral initiatives: the BRIC grouping, IBAS, G-20,Union of South American Nations (UNASUL), and the South America–ArabCountries Summit, to mention a few.

Yet the continuities are also worth discussing. Take, for example, the caseof human rights. According to Jose Augusto Lindgren Alves, there are two dis-tinct periods: the adhesion to international procedures (1990–1994) and the val-orization of the system, which is still going on today, even though after 2006,Brazil manifested some apprehension about the way that the internationalhuman rights system was performing. After ratifying the covenants on civil andpolitical rights and economic and social rights, as well as the Convention on theRights of the Child, in 1998 Brazil signed the Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court. Following through with the treaties, Brazil opened its bordersto human rights inspectors, sent the reports required by the various covenants,created a national human rights plan, created a reparation mechanism for thosewho suffered violations, and approved a law dealing with the “disappeared.” Inthe Conference of Vienna, in 1993, the head of the Brazilian delegation, Am-bassador Gilberto Saboia, presided at the drafting committee and played a sig-nificant role in achieving consensus over the final text.

In the recent phase, the valorization continues, but to Lindgren Alves, itwas approached with a certain grain of caution. Brazilian diplomacy promotesthe human rights ideals and is an active participant in UN institutions, beingelected for the first composition of the Council of Human Rights. At the sametime, the need to improve the UN mechanisms became another aspect of theBrazilian attitude. Brazil is worried about the system’s greatest vice, politiciza-tion, which weakens its foundation and leads sometimes to inertia when facedwith the gross violations by major powers, as in the case of the Iraq War (e.g.,illegal imprisonment, and torture). To correct the selectivity problem, the Brazil-ian reaction has been twofold. First, Brazilian diplomacy defends the idea thatselectivity can be neutralized with the universalization of human rights review

390 Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy

systems and, second, insisting that specific violations be dealt with in a discreetfashion and that enforcement instruments be used only as a last resort.24

A similar movement toward mainstream legitimacy has occurred in disar-mament issues. A combination of national and international circumstances ul-timately sealed the decision to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1998.On one hand, NPTmembership was almost universal and Brazilian motivationnot to adhere became somehow dysfunctional. There were no political orstrategic reasons to remain in the company of the few countries (India, Pak-istan, Israel) that rejected the treaty. Brazilian nuclear policies were unre-servedly peaceful and so quite different from those of the nonsignatories.Additionally, the 1995 review conference had decided to extend the treaty’svalidity, strengthening its legitimacy. A clear provision in the 1988 constitu-tion prohibiting use of nuclear energy for nonmilitary purposes is another fac-tor to explain the decision taken by Brazil to sign the NPT.

In order to complete the reshaping of the disarmament policy, Brazilsigned the Comprehensive (Nuclear) Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and adhered toinformal mechanisms such as the Nuclear Supplier’s Group and the MissileTechnology Control Regime. Furthermore, Brazil participated actively in theconferences for the revision of the NPT, forming in 1998 a negotiating groupdubbed the Coalition for a New Agenda that brought together countries fromthe North and South (Brazil, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Sweden, Egypt,and Slovenia). Perhaps the coalition’s most important contribution was the in-troduction at the revision conference held in 2000 of the thirteen-step proposaloffering “an alternative to the maximalist disarmament proposals, insisting onthe adoption of realistic and practical measures.”25 This is a remarkable ex-ample of Brazil’s effort to serve as a bridge in multilateral forums.

At any rate, the Brazilian attitude did not come without a good measureof frustration due to the limited relevance of multilateral forums at the helm ofa process which, by definition, should be broad and global.26 Progress wasachieved, however mostly beyond the boundaries of UN multilateralism.

Also worthy of mention are two other developments within the realm of se-curity and peace. The first is with respect to participation in peacekeeping mis-sions and the second has to do with significant interventions as a nonpermanentmember in the UN Security Council (Brazil held a seat at the Council severaltimes: 1988–1989, 1993–1994, 1998–1999, 2004–2005, and 2010–2011).

Even before democratization in the 1990s, Brazil had a long-running tra-dition in peacekeeping missions that began in 1956 with the Suez. Recently,the most important contributions were in Angola (UN Angola VerificationMission ), East Timor, and, now, Haiti and Lebanon. Brazil’s role as head ofthe United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti has a special meaning, notonly due to the dimension of this engagement in material and human terms,but also because it signals a willingness to more incisively assume a positionof command in the solution of regional crises.

Gelson Fonseca Jr. 391

Brazil’s participation in the Security Council especially stands out when is-sues important to it, such as Angola, Mozambique, Haiti, or East Timor, are atstake. Nonetheless, these are not the only ones. In many of its votes, Brazil hadexplicit concerns with the institutional limits of Council’s action. In 1994,Brazil abstained in four of the thirteen resolutions adopted on the Haiti ques-tion and in one of them, Resolution 948, it acted alone. In Brazilian diplomacy,the Haitian situation was not characterized at that time as a threat to peace andso it was not deemed to be within the Council’s competence. In a similar vein,Brazil did not approve the demarcation of the frontiers between Kuwait andIraq by the Council or the attempts to extend the Council’s jurisdiction to dealwith issues such as drug trafficking or the environment.27 Another area for ex-panding the Council’s agenda had to do with the humanitarian agenda, as in thecase of the responsibility to protect. As Antonio Patriota indicated,28 Brazilianreactions were cautious for two main reasons: first, the conceptual difficultiesinvolved in defining new areas for the Council’s action, which sometimes can-not be characterized as “security problems”; and, second, the problem of effi-caciousness of interventions that tend to deal with domestic matters.

It is important to emphasize that, for Brazilian diplomacy, the nonperma-nent status does not imply any restriction as to how to act or vote. Brazil isthere to represent the international community and, insofar as it has opinionsand proposals, it must act with the incisiveness that is called for. Permanentmembers have the prerogative of the veto, but not necessarily a monopoly overpolitical wisdom. Evidently, opportunities for full-fledged action in the Coun-cil, in its current format, are limited but can be useful nonetheless. A notewor-thy example took place in the late 1990s when, following US missile strikes,Iraq prohibited the entry of nuclear inspectors. This impasse undermined theCouncil’s prestige and created doubts concerning the possession (or not) ofweapons of mass destruction by Saddam Hussein. At the time, January 1999,Brazilian permanent representative, Ambassador Celso Amorim, presided theSecurity Council. He was assigned the task of organizing panels aiming at as-sessing the manifold dimensions of the Iraqi situation (e.g., disarmament, hu-manitarian conditions, and indemnities). In addition to the impeccableassessment carried out (none of the contents of the final report were ever re-futed), the panel proposed a framework for the return of inspection that guidedthe negotiations that led to the resolution creating the UN Monitoring, Verifi-cation, and Inpsection Commission in 1999.29 At that point in time, Brazilfully exercised its ability to build bridges; in this case, bringing together per-manent members in a direction that restored the authority of the SecurityCouncil in one of the most controversial issues on the international agenda.

In 2010, after rotating back into the Council, Brazil, with Celso Amorimnow acting as minister of foreign relations, attempted a similar move in viewof the impasse holding back nuclear energy negotiations with Iran. It is beyondthe scope of this article to discuss why the Brazilian and Turkish formula for

392 Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy

enrichment of Iranian uranium in a third world country was not even broughtup in the Security Council, which days later imposed a new round of sanctionson Iran. Brazil and Turkey voted against that resolution. Differently than whatoccurred in 1999, there was no mandate to act on behalf of the Council and,hence, the initiative was ignored by the permanent members. On the otherhand, the Brazilian attitude was broadly discussed internally. The criticismconcentrated on the idea that Brazil does not have specific strategic interestsin Iran and so its capacity to influence events in the region is modest.

Another revealing sign of Brazil’s multilateral stance was the InitiativeAgainst Hunger proposal, launched in 2004 by the presidents of Brazil, Spain,France, and Chile. The stated goal consists of reducing in half the number ofpeople in the world suffering and dying as a result of poverty and hunger bythe year 2015.

A mention of Brazil’s aspiration to become a permanent member of theSecurity Council is in order. The Brazilian credentials are indisputable given,for instance, its commitment to the values and practices of the United Nations.Brazil has cultivated excellent relations in its region and a good reputation atthe global level. Its candidacy thus seems “natural” and, domestically, the ef-fort to become a permanent member of the Security Councial has achieved areasonable consensus. But some controversy remains regarding the “costs” ofthe candidacy and the strategy adopted in its pursuance. Is the hypothesis oneof causing harm to or enhancing Brazil’s regional presence? What is the ef-fective cost of garnering more votes? Is Brazil prepared for global diplomacy?Answers have been varied. But during President Lula’s term in office, the dis-position to pursue alongside Germany, India, and Japan, the Group of 4 (G4),a reform proposal establishing new permanent members, gained momentum.

Two important issues in which Brazil’s profile has been increasing mustbe summarily mentioned: trade and the environment. As I indicated above, thetraditional attitude in matters related to the environment was that sovereigntywas the sole factor defining Brazil’s choices. After the United Nations Con-ference on Environment and Development (Rio 92), this attitude evolved toadmit international cooperation. Brazil was a signatory of the Kyoto Protocol.Nowadays, one of the “emblematic” concerns consists of defining shares of re-sponsibility for global warming.30 This item is crucial since curbing globalwarming implies costs that affect economic potential. The ensuing clash be-tween rich countries (traditional polluters) and emerging countries (recent pol-luters) was more than expected. The Brazilian emphasis—and that of manyother developing countries—on “differentiated” responsibilities was germaneto the idea of “sharing” costs. They go hand in hand. The negotiating processesmust strike a balance between a careful (and painful) sharing of costs incur-ring on the short run and the need for a global environmental solidarity. Thegreatest risk is mutual demonizing of negotiating positions, which is always apossibility when issues that are at the same time highly technical and emo-

Gelson Fonseca Jr. 393

tional are at stake. The Brazilian attitude, if we look back at the United Na-tions Climate Change Conference meetings, have evolved to a willingness toaccept greater responsibilities for the costs of attenuating the effects of climatechange, without abandoning the need to find a balanced and just solution fordeveloping countries.

The Doha Round negotiations are advancing slowly; many believe thatthey are entering a terminal stage. This is not how Brazil sees it because thecountry is always motivated by a belief in universal solutions for trade, notleast because several issues in this realm (e.g., subsidies) are intrinsicallyglobal. The complexity of the Brazilian economy is crucial in understandingBrazil’s stance. In a nutshell, the demands of the developed countries are con-centrated in modernized sectors (e.g., greater access to industrialized productsand services markets) in which the developing countries are not always inter-nationally competitive and little is offered in sectors where they are competi-tive like agriculture. Often, developed countries are the ones with an illiberalattitude only to protect the more traditional sectors of their economies. Theyhave the economic and financial conditions to subsidize their agricultural sec-tors, but Brazil does not. The road ahead is not yet clear. But again, Brazil isa fair partner in the game. It has legitimate interests to protect, and its view ofthe future conforms to the tenets of its multilateral vision.

ConclusionMy examination of the evolution of Brazil’s multilateral attitude was naturallyquite selective. But I think it may be sufficient to demonstrate one simplepoint: Brazil has had a consistent and clear multilateral vocation, characterizedby a balanced view of the possibilities and limitations of the United Nations.A sort of utopian realism marks Brazil’s attitude. We need a stronger multilat-eralism because the multilateral forums are the ideal stage for the middle pow-ers to influence global questions. On the other hand, multilateralism is seldoma clear path. Ideals and principles define the goals of the institutions, but thehard game of politics is the necessary means to realize those goals. Vocationand caution go together.

Brazil has expended a large amount of political capital in the United Na-tions. This capital is translated, physically, into missions with considerablestaffs and, morally, into the acceptance of the legitimacy of the decisions madeby the organization. This constitutes a natural path for Brazil’s projection intothe decisionmaking arena of the international order. If it is to accept the notionthat universal forums, especially the UN, are ultimately becoming irrelevant,would it be worthwhile to maintain its engagement or would it be preferableto pursue partial solutions according to specific interests and selected partners;for example as in the Group of 8 (G8) model?31 Thus far, the diagnosis madeby Brazilian diplomacy is that partial movements are quite distant to under-

394 Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy

mine the need for a strong, legitimate, and universal forum. Brazilian diplo-macy firmly sustains the belief that the solutions to the problems Brazil facesin several fields, from disarmament to the environment, must be universal. Thechallenge is not to abandon the UN, but rather to strengthen it and to ensurethat partial movements converge toward the universal forum. More than ever,there is a need for countries that know how to build bridges in a world inwhich clear consensus and easily convergent interests are difficult to find.

Indeed, Brazil’s presence in the world is essentially diplomatic. It does notaspire to be a military power; it is not promoting an ideological agenda; and itis still a developing country. So Brazil has, perforce, been relating to the worldprimarily through diplomacy. And diplomacy should be the domain oftolerance—of the ability to deal with differences—which is a product that theworld needs with urgency. So, if Brazil were to become a member of the Secu-rity Council, its multilateral orientation would be an asset that could help togenerate more diverse ways of facing conflict resolution and the issues of se-curity than those that have tended to resonate with the present permanent mem-bers. Brazilian diplomats believe that the country’s settled commitment tomultilateralism is the trump card in its bid for a permanent seat. �

NotesGelson Fonseca Jr. served as permanent representative to the United Nations from 1999to 2003, as ambassador to Santiago from 2003 to 2006, and as consul general (Madrid)from 2006 to 2009. Presently, he is inspector general of the Foreign Service (since2009) and professor at Instituto Rio Branco, Brasilia, Brazil.

This article was translated by Jose Pedro Londres Fonseca. The author wishes tothank Tom Farer for his perceptive observations and his careful, intelligent, and sensi-tive editing of the text. He also thanks Celso Lafer, Rubens Ricupero, Breno Hermann,Benoni Belli, Luiz Felipe Seixas Correa, and Gisela Padovan for their rich comments.Alexandra Barahona reviewed the text with care and intelligence. While the author isa member of the Brazilian diplomatic service, this article reflects only his personalviews.

1. The motives behind Brazil’s approving the bureau can be found in the report onthe US invitation issued by the State Council on 7 November 1888, O Conselho de Es-tado e a política externa do Império, 1975–1889 (Brasilia: FUNAG, 2000).

2. Luiz Felipe Seixas Correa, O Brasil nas Nações Unidas (Brasilia: FUNAG,2007).

3. Celso Lafer, A Identidade Nacional do Brasil e a Política Externa Brasileira(São Paulo: Perspectiva, 2009), p. 73.

4. Ibid., p. 78.5. E. V. Garcia, O Brasil na Liga das Nações: Vencer ou Não Perder, 1919–1926

(Porto Alegre: Editora da UFRGS, 2000).6. See Wayne A. Selcher, Brazil’s Multilateral Relations (Boulder: Westview,

1978), p. 38.7. Eduardo Uziel, O Conselho de Segurança e a Inserção do Brasil no Mecanismo

de Segurança Coletiva das Nações Unidas (Brasília: FUNAG, 2010), p. 82.8. Ibid.

Gelson Fonseca Jr. 395

9. Ibid., p. 84.10. As Selcher (Brazil’s Multilateral Relations) explains, starting with Kubistchek,

“the chief national goal became industrialization. Foreign policy ceased being merelyexpressive (declarative of what Brazil represents in the world) and became instrumen-tal to concrete national programs,” p. 39.

11. Selcher (Brazil’s Multilateral Relations) correctly states that “Brazil has kept alow profile in not showing great interest in election to a Security Council seat at thepresent time, because that would tend to over-accentuate some political vulnerabilitiesin areas not immediately tied to the national interest,” p. 45.

12. Selcher, Brazil’s Multilateral Relations, p. 23.13. Andre A. Correa do Lago, Estocolmo, Rio, Joanesburgo: o Brasisl e as três

conferências ambientais das Nações Unidas (Brasília: FUNAG, 2007), p. 138.14. In a 1968 telegram, Ambassador Araujo Castro, permanent representative to the

UN, was explicit: “I see great difficulty ahead for any Brazilian aspiration to higher po-sitions in the UN, given how irritated and disappointed a number of African nations,who do not hide their hostility.” The telegram can be found in J. A. Costa Vargas, UmaEsplêndida Tradição: João Augusto Araujo Castro e a Política Exterior do Brasil(Brasilia: Instituto Rio Branco, 2008), p. 50

15. Rodrigo Amado, Araujo Castro (Brasilia: Editora Universidade de Brasilia,1982).

16. Ibid., p. 219.17. Vargas, Uma Esplêndida Tradição, p. 80.18. See J. A. Lindgren Alves, “Human Rights and the Role of Brazil,” in Alexan-

dre de Gusmão, ed., O Brasil e a ONU (Brasilia: FUNAG, 2008), p. 190.19. Rubens Ricupero, Diário de Bordo (São Paulo: Imprensa Oficial), p. 38.20. Seixas Correa, O Brasil nas Nações Unidas, p. 441.21. Ibid., p. 447.22. Ibid., p. 457.23. Some differences are meaningful. For instance, despite the same goals, the

campaign to obtain a permanent seat in the Security Council led to very different diplo-matic mobilization efforts, much more forceful during Lula’s government.

24. Brazilian president Dilma Roussef, whose mandate began 1 January 2011, sig-naled that some changes will be introduced in human rights policies. A different atti-tude in regard to the Iranian problems was the first movement, and Brazil voted in favorof a Council of Human Rights resolution that designated a special rapporteur for Iran.

25. See Carlos S. Duarte, “Por um mundo livre de armas de destruição em massa:desarmamento e não proliferação,” inO Brasil e a ONU (Brasilia: FUNAG, 2008), p. 75.

26. Ibid., p. 81.27. See Uziel, O Conselho de Segurança e a Inserção do Brasil no Mecanismo de

Segurança Coletiva das Nações Unidas, p. 164. The author mentions that, during his2004–2005 mandate, Brazil abstained only in three votes in the Security Council: Res-olution 1559 (Lebanon), because it disagreed with the characterization of the situationas a threat to peace; Resolution 1593 (Sudan), because it defended the notion that theSecurity Council could impose restrictions on the International Criminal Court; andResolution 1646 (Human Rights Council), because it opposed the existence of perma-nent seats for the P5 on the Council.

28. Ver Antonio Patriota, O Conselho de Segurança após a Guerra do Golfo, 2nded. (Brasília: FUNAG, 2010). Patriota is now the Brazilian foreign minister and, asmany of his predecessors, has a strong multilateral background.

29. See A. Patriota, G. Padovan, and L. Gorgulho, “Os Três Painèis sobre o Iraquenas Nações Unidas,” in Alexandre de Gusmão, ed., O Brasil na ONU (Brasilia:FUNAG, 2008), pp. 231–249.

396 Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy

30. There are several other issues, but global warming is perhaps the most reveal-ing of the interests being negotiated.

31. In trade matters, a similar criticism is also raised. It is said that Brazil shouldhave engaged more consistently in bilateral free-trade agreements instead of waitingfor the dubious possibility of success of the Doha Round. The government defense saysthat there are areas, such as intellectual property, agricultural subsidies, and others, thatnecessarily require a universal treatment or the results will be meaningless. Moreover,the diversified (in terms of products and international partners) Brazilian economytends to gain in absolute terms only with global negotiations. For a summary of the dis-cussion on trade policies, see Lia Valls Pereira, “A pauta do comércio exterior brasileiroe os acordos comerciais,” Conjuntura Econômica (June 2010); Pedro Motta Veiga andSandra Polonio Rios, “A Política Externa do Governo Lula: o fim do consenso deBrasília,” Breves Cindes (August 2010).

Gelson Fonseca Jr. 397