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PROFESSIONAL PAPER 377 / April 1983

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, THE OUTLOOK FORMILITARY OPERATIONSRESEARCH

Thomas E. Anger

C>DTIC-.- I MAY 2 1 I1M8

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CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES

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s. PROFESSIONAL PAPER 377/ April 1983P'.r

THE OUTLOOK FORMILITARY OPERATIONSRESEARCH

Thomas E. Anger

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THE OUTLOOK FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS RESEARCH*

Thomas E. AngerDirector of Review, Center for Naval Analyses

* Before getting on with my topic, I want to distinguish between "operations

research" and "operations analysis."

To me, "operations research" (O.1.) is the broader term; it includes such

black arts as "system analysis" and "net assessment." In my lexicon, the

branch of operations research called "operations analysis" involves the

study of current forces, for the purpose of evaluating them and improving

their tactical employment. I make these distinctions now because I will

use both term a lot.

* What is the outlook for military operations research? I can only give you

a personal view, one that is fraught with biases which will become apparent

to you.

To lay the foundation for my views, I will begin where military operations

research began--with its genesis in World War II as operations analysis.

Net, I will survey subsequent developments in warfare and military

operations research, to see what lessons 4hey may hold for the future.

Specifically, -I will asese-two possibilities:

*This paper was given at a general session of the 50th Symposium of theMilitary Operations Research Society, which was held at the U.S. NavalAcadmy in March 1983. The paper reflects the author's personal views; itdoes not necessarily represent the opinion of the Center for Naval

," Analyses.i -1-

1) that we- need to reform military 0.R. to purge it ofaccumulated sins, and

2) that military 0.1. must be redirected, if it is to ridethe wave of the future.

After weighing these possibilities, in specific terms, I will end by

stating my vision of the future of military operations research.

THE PAST AS PROLOGUE

Genesis of Military O.R. in World War II

Turning to the genesis of military 0.E., we come inevitably to Morse and

Kimball, who were there at the creation. In Methods of Operations

Research, they describe the scope of O.1. in World War I1, by quoting Fleet

Admiral Ernest J. King. In urging the continuation of the Navy's45%

Operations Research Group (OR) into peacetime, Admiral King called out

these wartim activities:

(a) The evaluation of new equipment to meet militaryrequirements.

(b) The evaluation of specific phases of operations (e.g.,Su support, A& fire) from studies of action reports.

(c) The evaluation and analysis of tactical problems tomeasure the operational behavior of new material.

(d) The development of new tactical doctrine to meet

specific requirsments (e.g., antisubmarine screens andscreens for slow-moving damaged ships).*

*These are, of course, activities I would classify as operations analysis.

*From a letter to Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal, quoted byPhilip M. Morse and George E. Kimball in Methods of Operations Research(Washington, D.C.: Operattons Evaluation Group, 1946), p. 1.

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Why was this analysis considered successful? What characterized its

practice? Borrowing from a history of ORG's descendant, the Operations

Evaluation Group, I come up with five attributes.*

First, the members of ORG brought suitable academic disciplines to the

operational problems of the day. Those disciplines were, mainly, the

physical sciences and mathematics.

Second, as civilians, they operated outside the Naval hierarchy, and could

*bring a detached perspective to their study of the operational problems.

Third, the value of this perspective fostered a relationship of mutual

trust between the analysts and their Naval clients. The Navy divulged

whatever Inforation the analysts needed to get the job done. The

analysts, in turn, protected the information.

Fourth, in this atmosphere of mutual trust, the analysts could readily get

their findings and rec mndations to Navy decision-makers, who-in turn-

were quick to tell the analysts what problems were mst pressing. In other

words, there was open communication.

*Ksith R. Tidmen, The Operations Evaluation Group: A History of NavalOrations Analysis (scheduled for publication in 1983 by the U.S. NavalInstitute), manuscript pages 144-149, passim.

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Finally, reinforcing all of these characteristics of a successful venture, we

4 find the field program. A large fraction of the Operations Research Group's

analysts were assigned to operating bases where they could "more readily learn

/ of operational problems and pass along proposed solutions directly to those in

command." The practical knowledge gained in the field was essential to group

members in Washington, "who needed to know whether their suggestions

concerning tactics or equipment squared with the real world ...

The most important point about operations research in World War II seems

almost too obvious to mention--so it must be mentioned. As Morse and Kimball

said, it was "toughened by the repeated impact of hard operational facts and

* -. ( pressing day-to-day demands," and "repeatedly tested in the acid of use."*

In short, it was done in wartime, to do nothing less than help win an

actual war. I will return to this point in assessing the evolution of

military operations research since World War II, and its future.

E olution

flow has O.R. evolved since 1945? First, its scope has expanded widely

beyond operations analysis. Aspects of defense that were once embedded in

the routines of defense management, or ignored altogether, have developed

into formal, analytical enclaves--each with their own jargon, techniques,

* and mystique. These never branches of O.R. deal with such by now familiar

*-.. pursuits as:

*Morse and Kimball, op. cit., p. 10.

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o The assessment and projection of enemy strategies andforces

0 Formulation and evaluation of alternative U.S. militarystrategies

o Assessment of our ability to execute the approvedstrategy and its derivative missions

o Evaluation of alternative future forces and systems, for-specific missions and tasks

0 Development of efficient manpower policies and logisticsoperations, to support the forces

o Integration of all these elements into coherent, multi-year spending programs.

4The actual problems studied in these never branches of O.R.-and in

operations analysis, as well-have been shaped by changes in the

instruments of warfare. Without stretching things too far, I can say that

in naval warfare, for example, we have gone from guns and bombs to

missiles, from radios to satellites, from eyeballs to imaging radars, fromchaff and underwater ebeaters to a spectrum of electromagnetic tricks,

- and from the finger on the trigger to the onboard computer. (It is

interesting to note that among the constants of naval warfare are the

displacment hull and conventional carrier-based aircraft.)

'. Prevailing opinion seem to be that the new gadgets add up to this:

o Combat can take place over much longer ranges; there arefewer places to hide.

o Combat can be observed and controlled more directly byhigher authority.

N 0 o Success in combat depends more heavily on things than onpeople.

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I will come back to the role of things and people--analytical people, in

particular.

Now, I want to consider how the practice of operations research has

evolved. Are the practices of World War 11-for example, putting the

analysts where the operations were-still observed, and how?

The first practice I cited earlier was the application of appropriate

academic discplines. The physical scientists and mathematicians of World

War I have been joined by economists, psychologists, engineers, computer

analysts, political scientists, and so on. Though some may disagree, this

development is essentially neutral.

What about the detached perspective of 0o..? The techniques of GA. have

been adopted by advocates-the producers and military proponents of

systems. Thus the only unique value O.R. has left to offer may be

detachment. But a high proportion of its practicioners are part of the

organizations they are supposed to advise--holding civil or Naval rank--

rather than advising at arm's length.

With more analysts serving in the goveriment, the old client-lawyer

relationship has given way mainly to an employer-employee relationship.

Those in government, at least, hold a position of privilege-a position

that a lot of private contractors may not enjoy.

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With the burgeoning of military O.R., its findings and recommendations have

reached decision-makers by more and more rigidly-controlled routes. Why?

First, there is an absorption problem: The military establishment today is

smaller than it was in World War 11, yet the numbers of analysts who are

pouring out paper has increased by orders of magnitude. Then, there is no

-4! war, so it is harder to tell what problems are really urgent and what ideas

hold real promise.

The absence of war, of course, means that today's military operations

- research is removed from reality. There is no "acid test" for our views of

9the threat and our recommendations for strategy, forces, and tactics. Even

" our manpower, logistics, and management studies may point to policies that

-e are good for peacetime efficiency and disastrous for combat effectiveness.

Enough reminiscing and breast-beating. Where do we go from here? Must

military O.R. be reformed or redirected? Is the coming age of technological

wizardry going to render military O.A. useless, no matter what we do?

WEEIGHNG? THE FUTURE

Reform?

First, let us ask what problems military O.R. has today, and how they can

be fixed. I think all the fundamental problems can be traced to the lack

of urgency and feedback that I just mentioned. This leads to a lot of

uncertainty about the purpose of military power, about the proper selection

of forces and other resources, about the capabilities of current forces--

and even about the future of military O.R. The uncertainty manifests

q itself in what we do and how we do it.

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Activities like threat assessment.and campaign analysis, for example, take

a lot of beat for being pure guesswork. A closely related problem, which

affects most branches of military O.R., is that the lack of feedback allows

analysts' biases to creep in, unchecked. Thus, even in traditional

operations analysis, results often have to be taken with large doses of

salt. The "lessons learned" from peacetime exercises, for instance, must

always be-or should always be-preceded by warnings about exercise

artificialities.

The uncertainty also leads to problems in the way O.R. is done; for example:

o If problems are unclear, it is easy to let them bedefined by researchers' interests and techniques.

0 Inferior work is more difficult to spot, because resultsare harder to test. Thus bad O.R. can be "sold by theyard--vhich hurts the whole profession.

Are there solutions to these problems? Obviously, we don't want to relieve

the uncertainty that underlies them by-having a war. But there are some

thlngs that we in the O.R. profession can do to get more respect for our

endeavors from military leaders and operators. Basically, it means

-. accepting the limitations of our art and cutting out much of the window

dressing that lends the appearance of science to what is often no more than

guesswork. Here are a few maxims that I try to keep in mind when reviewing

CN& studies:

0 Our purpose is to help decision-makers find roughlyright courses of action; there may be many roughly rightoptions-there is seldom a "best" one.

0 Perhaps the proper way tc. help decision-makers is by anegative approach-use he ,bel thinking to weed out thenon-starters, and tell .ision-makers what specialconditions must prevai- if any option is to be clearlypreferred.

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0 Avoid Judgments--implicit or explicit--about whichconditions will prevail; leave the decisions todecision-makers.

When you think about it, these ideas apply to all types of O.R., not just

* the much abused cost-effectiveness branch.

Reorientation?

So much for what we can do to clean up our act. What about the new

challenges we may have to meet, as the range over which warfare takes place

is extended, even into space; as tactical decisions are made farther from

where the weapons explode; and as electronic gadgets do more of the

A"seeing," "hearing," and even "thinking"? Will the machinery of warfare so

dominate the outcome of war that its planning and conduct will become

primarily an engineering problem?

Let us consider the recent conflicts in the South Atlantic and Middle East,

which involved many weapons that were far-removed from those of World War II.

U. First, the Israeli experience in Lebanon--and in earlier wars--shows that

there is nothing like knowing who and where you're going to fight to make

it easier to decide bow, when, and with what.

According to a recent magazine article, for instance, the Israelis have

designed their main battle tank--the Merkava-according to the view that

- speed, range, and fire power should be sacrificed to tactical mobility and

crew protection.* This approach sews to have paid off.

S*Maj. Richard Gabriel, USAR, and Prof. John Moriarty, "Israel's Main BattleTank Pounds Its Message Home," Military Electronics, January 1983, pp. 124-32.

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Then, in the air war, the Israelis demonstrated tactical readiness, by

their coordinated use of RPVs, electronic countermeasures, chaff, and

missiles, to take out Syrian SAM sites. The Syrian air threat was

evidently defeated by jamming the Syrians' C3 and attacking their MIGs from

the "blind side."*

Such results suggest not only that the Israelis had excellent intelligence,

but also that they used analysis--whether they called it that, or not--to

develop nearly foolproof tactics. (It also helps, of course, to place a

lot of emphasis on training in these tactics, and to keep the enemy from

knowing what you know and knowing what you are going to do.)

In other words, the clearer your pre-war objectives, the more decisive pre-

war analysis may be.

On the other hand, the battle for the Falkland Islands--which also involved

modern weapons--showed clearly that war can still be an uncertain and messy

business. As the British undoubtedly learned, unless you have been

fighting the same enemy for a long time, and are sure to keep on fighting

him, the next war will never be the one you have planned for.

*These impressions are gleaned from two other articles in the January 1983issue of Militaru Electronics: "EW Won the Bekaa Valley Air Battle," (p.106) and "ELTA Plays a Decisive Role in the EOB Scenario" (pp. 135-7),both by Paul S. Cutler.

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The situation of the U.S., vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, is more like that of

the British than like that of the Israelis. In this situation, it is

critical that strategies, forces, and tactics be robust--not tailored to

specified planning scenarios. The need for analysis to explore the future

* uncertainty and compare the options for coping with it remains compelling.

The battle for the Falklands also showed that technological advances do not

lead necessarily to "walkovers." The British needed O.R. during their

conflict, to design and carry out vital logistics operations, to assess the-a

seriousness of the Argentine mine threat, and to develop tactics to deal

with the Exocet missile threat. (And I understand that the British would

-!not go do it again without some on-scene O.R. help.)

In the event of a major U.S.-Soviet conflict-involving, as it would,

rather evenly-matched opponents-this record of improvisation, aided by

analysis of actual operations, would likely be repeated.

CONCLUSION

As is obvious by now, I hvre taken two approaches to the future of military

operations research. One is prescriptive-how we must act to preserve and

enhance our profession. The other Is predictive.

First, the prescriptive part.

O.R. (by various names) has taken a lot of flak in recent years. A lot of

that is due to the relative peace in which we live.

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Take those who criticize U.S. strategy, forces, and tacics, and who blame

quantitative analysis for the supposed failings of our defense posture. I

would remind these critics--who usually have their own strategies, forces,

and tactics to promote-that they are free to be so critical and prescient

mainly because their own pet theories cannot be subjected to the acid test

of combat.

But neither can ours. Yet, we have invited much of the criticism by being

pseudo-scientific and comically precise in offering assessments of

strategies, forces, and tactics, on the basis of a priori models, brochure

values, exercise data, and plausible-sounding intuition.

We can help decision-makers weed out the unworkable courses of action and

understand the conditions under which one workable option or another may be

preferred. But the analyst who presumes to know the answer-or to have the---

technique that reveals answers--does his profession and his client a

disservice.

In the predictive vein, I submit that 0.1. analysts may have to know a lot

more about technical matters-but that technology will not do away with

O.R., no matter how "smart" and adaptive our weapons and their ancillary

systesm nay become.

The choices mong technologies will remain difficult, and fraught with

implications for strategy options, manpower policies, and so on. Even if

analysis cannot say which technologies are best, it can help to sort them* V.°

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out, according to which strategies they may serve. And, given a strategy--

if we're given a strategy-there will always be the need to strive for a

rough consistency between such things as manpower and logistics policies,

on the one hand, and the force structure, on the other hand.

Perhaps the idea of consistency--rather than optimality--will animate the

future-oriented branches of military operations research in the 1980s.

On the operational side, there will always be the need to test the

technology and see how well it actually peforms. The more dependent we

become on technology, the more important it is that we know its physical

limitations, and fix them or adapt to them.

Beyond that, however, technology actually opens new horizons for

analysis. The number of tactical possibilities increases with the

geographic range over which operations can be conducted and the speed with

which they can be controlled and carried out. The challenge for analysis

will be to sort out the possibilities and help operational commanders

develop a manageable repertoire of tactical tricks.

Finally--as Morse and Kimball observed in Methods of Operations Research-

there will be opportunities to exploit the predictability of technology.

For until the illenium of artificial intelligence arrives, machines will

always be more predictable than people.

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These opportunities may be the most promising and critical for the future

of operations research. For one thing, we may expect the enemy to become

more dependent on technology, too. Thus we can figure out, in advance,

more and better ways to thwart him-if we know enough about his technology.

We can also figure out more readily how the enemy may thwart us, through

our technology--and prepare for that event by developing tactics that do

not rely on the technology.

Perhaps the growth industry of military O.1. in the next few decades will

be the systeuatic evaluation of technological failure modes, and analysis

of their tactical implications.

Should a war come for this nation, there is no doubt that O.R.--of all

types, but especially operations analysis--will prove as valuable as it did

in World War II.

Whatever happens, I believe that military operations research-for all its

* faults-vill prove more valuable than over, for operations research can be

an instrument of guile, as well as an instrusment of brute force. And one

of the overlooked lessons of all wars is that guile is usually decisive.

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ClIaS meting an "Mal sttcal Probiems In Feynes's PathsPPD 212 intograis, Mrselile. France. May 22-26, 19761 (Publiasaed

4IMngel, Marc. Of singular co-srcteristic Initial Value In Springer Varlso; Lecture Nmte In Phiacs. 106, (1979).Probem withm Unique Soiwtlion," 20 pp.. Jun 1973, 234-253) AD AOSS 536AD AMS 535

PP 213 Mangel. Marc, "Stochastic Mechsanics of Mlecuielon MleculeMengl, Mac, *Fluctuatione In System wilth Obtipie Steady Ataactionse, 21 pp., Jun 1973. AD ROSE 227

Stutee. Ap9licatem fto Landmeseter Squations," 12 pp..Feb 13 (Prueened at thme First MAnal Workslmap an thme PP 224information Lilage Betwen pp9lied Mathmatics and Manger, Marc, *Agregation. Siturcatla', and Extinaction InIndustry. lati Poo Scooli. Feb 23-25, 1976), AD A071 472 Exploitad Animil Ppulatia's,. 48 pp., Mar 1973,

5.~A ADMOS 536PP 214 *Portions of this wrt ams started at tme institut of

Weiniated, 111bort 6. 9A Sommewht Different View of The Appiead Melamesti and Statistics, University of BritishOptimal Novel Posturs," 37 pp., Jun 1978 (Presented at tme olumbia. Vanover, N.C.. Canada1974 Carnatio of lime AMrIca Political Sclince Peocie-ties (APSAIUS Panel an "Omnn Strategic Rpuiremntu ad PP 225Mlilit"r 11061u'e"), Chicago, Ill.. Septmbr 2. 1974), MngUel, Mar'c. 00aclistlome, Fluctuations. and thme Mapf0 AM 223 11ifurcati..," 43 pp.. Jun 1973, AD AMl 537

4PC~an f tis erkwer ipatedatf@lttuofpp 219 Applied Mathmastics and Statistics, University of British.

Col I1% Rasse I C., "cnt Got Principles of Inforestlon Columbia, Vncouvr. Canada.11atriewal by Mafred Nadman, 10 pp., Nor' 70 (P,*ilaiman a

* Lette ft thme Wditor, Jairmal of Documentation. Vol. 31. PP 226ft. 4, pagise 290-301). Decmbr 1979). AD A654 424 RalIStan, J. N. end J. W. Main. * *rtpersture and Ow rret

Dapandenceat Deraation In Red-EmItting Oai LEDs," 34 pp.,PP9214 Jun 1973 (Pu*1 15sd In Journai of Appi led P"lea.s 90, 3M3,

Coil%, Olmseli C.. "Laise's Frequency Olatrilbttica of No 1979) 10 AOSS 536Scientific Pl'octIvIty.0 14 pp., Feb 1973 IP.*iislad In thme Oftii Telapmon Labratories, Inc.Javnai of flanme rica Societ for Informaetion Science,Vol. 21. ft. 6, pW 316-370. Mwm~e 19771, AD AM3 429 pp 227

Memsel, Mm-, "Wlifors Treatment of Fluctuations at 04ticaiPP 217 Points.' 50 pp., MRp 1976. 10 ROSS 539

Coee 11esueli C., "S11ilontric Studies at ScientificProultctivitly.0 17 pp., a 76 I nvelat at tme MAnal PP 220elatin of tIme Arce Society for Infor maion Science held Howgl. Marc, "Reaution at Critical Points DaterministicIn Sen Francisco, Californls, Octoaar 1976), AD AO54 442 and Stochatic maui" 54 pp.. Jun 1978, 00 ROSS 540

PP 216 - Ciaaeif led pp9229Moegel, Mac. "Diffusione Theory of Reaction ates, 1:

PP ',9219 Formuiation bull' Einstein-Smluhceell AIpprouimtiom,*Mnftlqn99 ft. LaVer, 'Imbsit Analysis with libtonei Impe- 50 pp.. Jan 1973. AD AMS 541tetions lmeery and IErtiton," 60 pp., Apr 76, 16 A04 422

pp9230S.p 9922 MeNgel Marc, "Diffusion 'Theory of paston Pates, ii

mmr, amined 16. "Diagoalizatio by Grup "iti~eft" Orfetin-OSiabeeb Ppo lnton, 34 pp., Feb 1978,W pp.. AW 7. 18ia% 3 AD 14 5012

% PP9221 PP9231* j,'"liiad. fbert Q.. *&*Smmpree Noei Olpimmoy In te wi le", Deenmn P., Jr.. ""Vol Projection Foes: The Case

ONONbe 1913 Ar-larmil Mr,* 76 pp., Jun I97 (P*iised for a fteponaI e 0411F." Avg 19711, tO RO4 543In sspmn In tme Maditeren Political Utilit1y andNil ilsery Om~toeints The Vubingte Papers "m 61. Sewlryi PP 232Mills, and Loadana Sep Pubication. 1979) VO A0S9 564 Jacobean, Lila, Two Policy ChmengeS Made Aceptable t

Labori" ANN I97 (SuMiatWe for puleiication In insetriaiand Labor ftlatlon Ilrloe), tO tOGl M2

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Ammae, M0 O9'l" Immeged IrWat, Aeno#Ie Virginia 22311. An Iia of Selecte Publicstions Is aiam avelieblo onreMst The 1ade inaeda a Listi of Professional PapeSI withs aftfractst Issued fron 96W fto June 1991l.

PP 233 PP 249IJambaoci. Louis. OAP Alte-nailve Explafetion at the6 Cyclical Glasser, Keneth S., *A Secretary problem f w is a ndoP tt. - 4 otuits,' 23 pp.. Sep 1978 Number of Choice%*' 23 pp., Mwr 1979

PP 234- flaess pp 2500 .o Jam ad .Levy , Robs A..Mos edra EVundI- Meng, more. 'Mdeling Fluctuations In Macroscopic Sys-

two Displae Stte. bad Local Expendituares The Come of tame., 26 pp., Jons 1979

pp 251pp 22 Trout, Robert P., " The Eat lust ion ond I nterpretat ion of

Nisaheb. ibla N.. OTMi Selmicscl Expansion of "al Several Selectivity Moduls," 37 pp., Jun 1979, AD A079 941Ai~m..Oul I tm'Propegtor.' 41 pp., Oct 1976 (Pub-

If~au to JowW of iblfiimllcui Physics 20 (1979) pp. 644- PP 25261). aC M61 938 Neon. Weltar R., 'Position Finding with Prior Knowledge of

Cowu'isnon Pwtes,' 5 pp.. Jun 1979 CPublished In IEEEpp 23 Transactions an Amrampmc & Electronic Systms. Vol. MES-IS,

Nere. Donald. OA Ntrix O'iterlion for Norell Integral W. 3, Wa' 1979*lss,.* 10 PP.. Jan 19M (Pubilabud In the Illinois Journalofliwitm Vol. 22 (1976). pp. 672-4141 PP 253

Gloer. Kenat SL, *The d-Choice Secret" Problem,'pp 236 32 pp., Jun 1979, AD A075 225

Utilef. Ka~ile.. Classes, Olinmloysmt lnsuraeseed ThEaotlepest

5 9Ct 20 pp.. ct t9le (Presented at te Con- PP 254

two me lunele indlouteraend Fuunoes mhe 0~ten Nungl Va Ner d quenbeft. Davl B ., * integration of a08 flie Pacingl %wr~n end gaminss. Leaders. piemadted by Illverlat Normal Over en Ofert Circle,* 14 pp., Jun 1979,laidlam University gradat bSol of Balnds). 10 AMOI 527 AC M96G 471

P2P P 259 - Clasified. A0 4651 441LTrost. R. P. end Mts, J. T., 01The Effects of@4 Ilt"tOampetleael Training on Civllen germlmi:An MIncom pp 256lil5tlvli AppOe, 39 pp.. New 1979k, 1 AM 631 Mnuurst Donald E.. "Ilulng Pu'sonnuI Olstribution Medate,*

27 pp.. Feb 1960, AC M62 216PP 240

Pever, Grow. "Gama of t Cowler for Mosat Alalyses.' PP 25713 pp., Ona 191711. 0AC M 759 Thaer.t R.. 00iaomwtlng ed Fiscal Constraintus Why Ols-

atig Is Atows Itio.*, 10 pp., Avg 1979, AD A079 224pp P241

"owngl. Hee 'Plntuetlen at Chemical In!lmiIittle%* PP 296*34 PP.. COn 191161 Iabilid In Isal of Chemcal Physica, VANWP wa's 6. VAd Thin,4 Leme A.. Jr., 'Maelyticul

Vol. do, ft. G, Cot i1,.1IOU). AD A93 767 Methode s Inlsuoteb Theory.0 ft pp., Now 1979, AC0 AC?? 632

pp P242pp2Stations. 111ll111 M.. .Me AnlysIs ot Ovaneloally inter- glass, David V.9 lMs. INllllgsNett N lrM., ed P'in,active or te (Alt 0~t b the NuftS 0S pp.. David A.. *A Clas of Conatetie Norwr Nettioa' 17 pp.,0m; 1976, A0Md 740 Now 1979, AD A077 M3

PP 243 pp 260Slapses. William N., 'A probblisutic Fotmlatton of No'phy Plagal. VA 6 end Cap. Owls 16. "efttem Mte endOpsenleoi as Applied ft time Analysis of Opesttonef Reseac Samg widles in a IeI ob,' 14 pp., Nov IM. AC AC?? 634Prlne,* 18 pp., On IM976 A M3 761

pp 244 Mie, Carlos Lsa ZviJae, Owvid J. end bus, John, 'UI'-sFSwMaa Allas end Her'wltz. Itanley A., OflntenW Cosls CDenh Theory at COndeal Oyos. V1. Angular Olstwlbw-of Comlem golpsunt,' 20 pp., .on8976 (betllubed or The tien of Reatles Prebeats, 14 pp., Mew I9t" famtntd

* ~MMOleN gl"et of NMIe EngIneers Nowel bnnfer from Journl bauleal Pls. M012). 19 Jun 19791.Jeu'nl10106. 91, ft.GO ft IVM 10 A7I 473 AD AM7626

pp 205 PP 262Shooase WOIMe ft., 'be AMlereter DbfileS of abtalningi Mau'en OWles C., "Iblrd Wrld INIlitary Elite In fovietAlvaft1 Pu'f'ee fms Flight Test Dats (flynee Per- Peas o ti ve, 90 pp.. Now 1976, AC AC? 639feenes l40ting, 40 pp-, Ju 1911110 AC AC?! 226

pp 263PP. 246 Meiaesn NOWh 6. 'Wing amunelel Tfers end Dealnow-

Oblau 8g. Pfadi, "LQWofS aend tM=Veyeunt lawmanes 3 ships for N"v Unturall bpleillsnt, 25 pp., Nor 1979.pp., to two6 (Resat at file Mine owfesee a n a AC AC?? 6INiee LaVber iweta, SlOWg, Jun 8976)1, ACl AM 6

pp 246Thees Jaes As. Jr., .me T'eampart Ftnts 4 lmofOfleft

toseI Applied Fields,' 103 pp., No 976,1 A N M4

1. *-*.we -%.-

PID264 PIR277"inlad. Pasert Q., Time U.S. beyIn thme Pacific: Post. Mangal, Marc. "Smi I Fluctuations in System viths iaitiple

0 Presen.t sad GIlopssesat tihe Future," 31 pp., Now 1979 Limit Cycles." 19 pp., ber 1990 (Pubtlished in Slp .5. Appi.W~ellsere at "~a International S~psIlm am thme Soa, ft"., Vol. 38. No. . Feb 11140) All A086 229

- sonsore by thme I nternetioa Institute for Strategic~" ~Studiea. The Brookings Institution and thme Yoeluri Smban, PP 278*'Tokyo, 16-20 Oct 1971) AD 8888 637 mizrubi, Maurice. *A Targeting Problems Enect vs. Eispctsd-

W Value Approah" 23 pp.. Apr 19N0, AC 88115 096

PP 283Walisad. Robert G., wdr ad oec n lme bern. Sam pp 279Political Iiletionss of lime Cmaging Military Situation In Walt, Stephen M.. Nusei inference and the Use at Forcs ANo tmer I Euriope," IS pp., fow 1979 (Prepared for Critique of Force Without War.- 90 pp.. Way 1990,prsaeattic t the Coaleseces of time Nordic Seesce In AD A0119 097PasrapctIves The Omeagig II tary and PotlitIcal Situation."Center for Strateg$c sod international Studies. Georgetown PP 280

Unv ty o 19-16, 1976) ADA077 83 PPolberg. Leerence. "Estlootlon ofthe Effeci ofA Shp'spp s tme f E t Anlyss.'25 pp.. Apr 11110, 1A M3

pp 2U7 Functioal Integras In Phmaae Spaeds, 2 pp.. ftv 18M.% , Treat. Robert P., end Vogel, movar C.. yemso"o publishmed! In P1hyalcal lreim DO, Vol. 22 (188M),

State Govarnmet Reoeipts ft Economic Flattaesad the AC A094 99Allocaticnato Comater-Oyalicei Mroaae Shariag Oreant.12 pp., Dao 1919 (Raprated free the flawles of lmcmlca and PP 283Statiatics. Vol. LXI, Ne. 3. Aipmet 1979) olookee, Brdford. "lERecte 06ad for thme U.S. ft", ft

Serve s An laatvucuat of U.S. foreign Pelicyr ThIalsiagpp288 About Pol itical ad MII tar Eaviromaetl Fectoa,". 30 Mp.

Thinsa Jaes U. * Saept Capsadeac sad inter-State Apr 1880. AD 8885 0119-P Coaperatioas The COwe at Sub-Saimersa Africa," 141 pp..

Je "GO0, AC 8881 193 WP28J5. Eel low,* V. leane, ad U. 1mms.4l ta e The Lsgmaerte Treas-

pp 28 form," 119 pp. M"y 1980, AC 8885 100Weiss. KOAmaS.. Wlme Soviet nlmeat. In tme OgdebTe Vadeeto seoal of toamanot. Usmlwaralty of RaheataWorse 42 W6. joss l88 (Presantd at thme S1outhern amsraace ad "eate o o tr Memel Anealyses-n Slavic Situdles go Ovctabur. 19M, 1 AM86 219 "Moa graduate Scool a o amet University of Roolmeter

PP 270pp 2119Flmish, Richard, "Sovie Policy to tme fta of Africat The RMsik. Richaerd 1. "Soopoma Security Iatereeta in thmeOnealis to Iter e, 0 2 pM. isms I9M (To be pallI~ In Iodin Gam Aree." 28 p6. Joe 1100. AD 8887 1131011he Soviet Union In t*A Third Wandi Suppose of Pal lure,"ad. IV 10mr-~t 016 Gemeldesa. Weatm Prees, ftulder, Go.. pp28Sumer, IM)l, 888 89I I" "I"I. ftunia "., "ft the we Appraumtsstc to thme

Propegrter for Arbitrary Wmii ioniana," 25 p6. Avg 100pp 271 .(Pubilaim In Journal at vsth. Phys,. 22() jsa 18).

Mc.nnell. Jem06 "gowiet sad Amer raic - I Oweetrle AC A091 307Onea e Tim,"si 43 pw. Jans ION, 1A 881912

PP 207pp 27 Cape. Olsois, 111ieit Wyce Solutions of Rt o "e.lffualo

e *. Wist. KNaetM 4. fthe MAtrml to Diloima" ad Stnatgy Iguatlcas 35 pp.. Joe 1990, AD A7 114188-1883, 46 pp.. Wars 1880, 0888M 088

pp 288pp 2M Soloosg, Walter. Oll.a't Let Your$ SIdea Flip You: A Palolaim

% ., ~ Nmda, Mecmel K., n~be Supply at Wivee with Wnaband guide to Visuas That Relly Aid," 28 pp. (revisedEmployed S1ti. FallI Tim or Part Tim." 38 pp.. War 1880. Aug 1102). AM89 732

%.AD APP 220

pp 299pp 275 Wtne JreackI. "dequate Clof Gaater Souitance in sAWIas,b~ . 11sA 11uitr Advo Terins vy Enr l it Souerana Prvlesst," I pp., Ag 1W.0 A 89 219 pp.. W4ipl, IM 80,A 88 2

PP 291pp 2M 1Meddle, 8. S.41 sad Truat, ft. P., "Sane Extension of tim

4, b*arg, Lineaee. Vayng an Ovrhou and Sbip's kequp- beiw Pree MW*de. 17 pp..' Oct 1880, AD 8081 844

=Ott* 40 pp6. VP 1188 $0 88890M "Uniaverolty of Florida

-i - . W. . -W -V - --v . - -;---w----.. ,.-w---.'-71.;--.-

P* NO29 PP 303Thin. Jesse A., Jr.. Ofthe Tranesot Proeties of GIsa" Nunnl, Learn W.. '-An introduction to The Literature of SearchOft Mlxfture In Applied mapeticl Fields.. 10 pp.. Sep 1IW0 Theory,' 32 pp., Jun 19111, AD A100 420(PualIslaed In Journal at Omesleel Physics 72010),19 "m 1901 pp 306

* u~sAnger, Thin. E.. "Mhet ood Are Warfare Imdelil?' 7 pp..pp 293 lay 1961. ACI ASOD 421

Thomas, Jaes A.. Jr.. 69valueitin at Kinetic Thseory (billi-V lS intMapela Using WINe Sanarellged Phase Shit Aproach.," PP 307

12 pp.. Sep 1990 (Printed In Journal of Chemical Phics Thonam Jens, Vopendence, Risk, and Vunerblity.-72(10). 15mo Item960 43 pp., Jun 1961. 10 A102 696

PP 294 pp 30difet. Stepsan S., 'A11em Nvel Policy Outside of Nigrohl, ".. 'Greepandan5 guise and Pag" Integrals, 17turope.0 30 pp.. Sep 1960 (Presented at tee Gonferenc at pp.. Jul 1961. (Pubi Ished In 03uav Cinto s'. vol. 61,

* **the Section as Miitsry Studies. ait eoel Studies 19111), AO A102 699Assoiation. Kidap Island. S.C.). AC A091 36

PP 300PP 2915 inland, Rabaet 0.. "An (The?) Explanation of te Soviet

~bmrftsSepe S.. *mn indictor of Informal Eires Invasion at Afghnistan.' 44 pp., Ifty 1961, AC AlSO 422Patterns of U.S. NOW are i lg an Oversees Stst ions, 1669-997,' 40 pp.. Sep 1960 (Presnte at Fourth Novel Mist"r PP 310

Syeesim, IS Novel Agedeep, 26 Oat 1910). AC A09I 316 Stanford, JaStt~e M.. end We, Tel T*,* -A Predictive 0mathodfor Determining Posslblo Thres-diumnaosl Foldinge of

PP 296 imaoglouilst Bacbones Around Antibody Coining Sitee,'liwks, Bedford. end Petersen, akris C., "Nrtims It pp.. June 111111 (Pubiished In J. Thewe. Siol.. 1961). W0,

Pesftr Affecting harlan Sesurty.' (Pstes maitime que AC A100 423Afeetan Is Sepidad Mberin) 14 pp. Ot 1960. AC AM9 733 Olortmeestern University

PP 2W? - Csified PP 311fases. ftriann. &recil m; Frank P. It.. and utgof ,

pp as iKafthim P. Classes, *An Evaiuation of Ui Fund.' 13 pp..11mrshl, 14wries W.. ORt lhrov Aptrosad ft Lgs 14issile lay i961 (PubliIshed In Iwtional Commssilon an UnempioyedntAttaskma,' 31 pp.. Jan1961, AC A0911.190 Goesation'es 'linaplamst oen aate: Studies and

PP 299 Ruserch,' Voiume 2, Jui 1960). AC A100 424

Jman'es, James It.. and Levy. Smart A.. WWg Laedrship in PP 312GOnsl =I In. It pp.. Jan 1961. AC 4066 797 Jondrow, James Oan. ariennes ad Levy. Fsbort, 'The

Opti..e Spued Limit.* 23 pp.. Jul 1963 (flsvlsed),pp 31111 AC AlSO 423

Jandres, jis, and Snowd, ftar,* afte "a tlitien ofTsbll nloolnep Is Vims Stmsetl Frontier produstion pp 31)Featlen 01de1.0 It pp.. Jan 1961, 0 A 49140 110ber"t, 111pi1en S.. *The U.S. Mwy In the 19M.0, 3d pp..slaolg Stat Unlversity Jul 1961. 16 A102 696

pp 301 PP 314* 40n0&m. Jae Nsj Lowy. RubtI A.; and Moe, iire, Jebe, Owl-tspberg ;Mroults, Stanley A.1 end Lson,

'TeabIesi Cang and lloyannt In Steel, Awtos. Aluisnuma uset F., '~mmining I" ore"t Doefate, 20 pp.. Jul 1961,ad Ires 0%e0 17 pp.. Owr 1961, 00 AM9 394 AC AS I92

ppN 111pp 313(4 ~Jdadre Jms K.. adLevy, Rulset A.. 'The Ef feet at @mok, WOOD~ V. (owt. US), 'La Gttr~vo by anyste

lepaen doaeal" Under National Eppeottlene, It ppl., nees...,' 4 pp.. Juilf1961 AC Ai02 697Apir w, to AM 0992

pp WI. Pawlrt, Stephen S.. Ofterno European an NTO maries,Thiland, ins, oft*e ANrest oty in iNs Canine 160'm 20 pp.. Aug1961. AC A104 W2Rmsera Mar, 3 pp., Avg 1961 (Ppill ishd In Ifs Val "eStaer. 13 Apr IWO), 0A16121 PP 317

4...- holdst. Stephe S.. Ofutenpaele NMI crisis 11gun inpp 30 tee Nbiteraeen 39 Pp., Aug 1961, AC1 A104 22

" .ty MousI Nj esuwmed Nioheel J.$4 end Ma011nel IJd a n "A Oe- etilModel of Apeael Inte emaj pp 318Nigrata ad 1"lawat *0tei lamernow eI Evidanse at tugs. Olan H.. 'tugmeleal and tee Soviet Policy of FaresStresfurs engs. 1996-1973, 31 pp., Apr 1961, AC A099 39 In Ias Materraes Sine 1961.- 167 pp., Aug 1961410lwlty o#f blareds"drlue Stt Unlversity

Pp P319 PP 333Sith, Michael W.. 'Atialr Werter. Osten"e of Ships at Los. LungFeai and Trost, Robert P., 'Estimation of SomeSam.- 46 pp., Sep 1901 (This talk wasn delivered at the Navel Uited Dependent Variable Hodefs with Application to

*Wrfere System and Tachnolog Conference af th" Amesrican Housing Demad,' 26 pp.. Jan 1962. (Published in Journal of4 Institute of Aronutcs and Astonautics In Washington on Eonometrics 8 (1978). AD A 112 536

Ie12 oc 190 In Boston on 20 Jan 1961; and In Los Angeles on 'UniversIty of Minnesotat2 Jun 1941.), AD AIDS 191

'.5PP 334PP 320 Keanny, Lawrence W.;* Lee. Lung.Fet;* Nadde Ia, G. S.;' and

Trost, ft. P.; Luria, PhIII p; end flarger. Edward. *A Note on Trost ft. P.. 'Returns to Dol leg* Education: An Invet IllationEstimating Continuous Time Decision Waels.' iS pp., of Seif-Selaction Slas Based on the Project Talent Oafs.- i5

4%Sa 961. AD A106 293 PP, oJan 2902. (Published In international Economic Rsview,Vol. 20. No. 3, Oct 1979), AD A112 460

PP 321 *liversity of FloridaDutffy, Michael K.. and Ladmin. Jarry R.,* -The Simultaneous "Uniaversity of Minnesoa

* Determination of Incoe end Employment In United Sttes--Nexico Border Region Econams,' 54 pp., Sap 1961, pp 335AD AIOG 540 Lee, Lung-Fei;* Maddeia, 0. 5 .;* and Trost, RJ. 'As~aptat*0A~eociats Prof eaao of Eco ias. Arizona State University ic overian. Matrices of Two-Stage Probit and Two-stage

Tabit Meth"d for Simultaneous Equations Models with Selec-_0 PP 322tivity,' 13 pp.. Jan 19112. (Published In Econometrics. Vol.

Meamr, John T.0 'asquaa In Navy manpower Reseac end 48, No. 2. Nor 1960) , AC Al112 463Policy* An Econelst's Persppetive,' 46 pp., oc 1901, Oniversity of MinnesotaAD AIIO 221 *'niversity of Florida

PP9323 PP 334@am*., Frederick M.. *Generation of Correlated Log-Mormi O'Neill. Thos, %bblifty Fuels for the Mavy,' 13 pp.,Sequences far thre Simulation of Clutte Echoe.- 33 pp., Do Jan 1902. (Accepted for publication In Neal Institute

N.196t Proceedings). D Alit Sit

PP9324 pp9337Hareit. Staly A., 'quantifying Saepsooe Readineis,' Werner, JohnT., and Goldberg, Matthew S.. -The Influence of6 pp., One 1961 (Published in Oaften"e Managemnt Journal, Noe-Pow Iiery Fact ors on Labor Suappl y The Ono of NavyVol. 10, MO. 2), AC AII10 220 Endlifelent Personnel," 23 pp., oc 1961, AC A113 094

P92 =pp 339Retwl Stephen S.. 'Weatern European end NATO Navis, Wilson, Desmond P.. * 'T Persian gult and the National1961.' 27 pp., Jul 1902. AC At I 703 Interet." 11 pp.. Feb 19412. AC A112 SOS

PP P327 pp9340Hanon Colts (Got.. UPOl, end Grahen, David ft., Luri*, Philip; Trost. ft. P.; end Berger, Edward, *A mathod'tlawti on and ftelysls of Navy shipbuilding Peogre for Analyzing Mltiple Spall Duration Onte,- 34 pp.. FebO araption Cos,'* 12 pp.. Nor 1960, AC At 12 514 li9it, AC At 12 504

pp93211 PP 341Wanami, Robert 0.. illortle Matere Their Strategic Trost, Robert P., end Vogel. Robert C.,* 'P1redictiont with

* Signifloene, 27 PP., Oen 1911, AC A112 N09 Pooled @ors-Sectfon en" TIme-6erle Data Two Oee

* Studies.' 6 pp., Feb 1902 AC Ati12 503PP 329 05outhorn Illinois University

Ifagal, ... , Appled mathematicians And Navel Opersars,'40 pp.. NaW 1902 4(Aried), AC AII6 96 PP 342

Lee, Lumi-Pel;* Modale. S. S.;*' and Trost. Rt. P., 'TestingPp 330 for Structural Change by D-Mrtirods In Switching Simultneous

L 0',ns Reher F., *Alteretve Appracheas to Attrition Equations Modela,' 5 pp., Feb 1962. AC Al 12 482innageeet,' 30 pp., Jant 1962. AC A112 510 'University of minnows

eq0niversity of Florida

ft I Sephinfen rmi, IS.p. 'The Tf1s (Publ~~ished in oldberg, Matthmew S.. 'Projetin the Navy Enlisted Force

MevyIntrnetml)Level.11 9 pp., Feb 1962. AC A112 4

P9352 pp934Jehn, Osristph, 'The 111 and Amphibious Wrfare.' 36 pp., Fletcher, Jean. U.. "Navy Quality of Life and Reelilent.'Nor 19612, AC A IS92 13 pg., Nay 1991, AC AilS 099

4I

.... .....- ~ . * * ?

Yw C ant ting.- 4? pp.. Nor 192 (Presented at "is 199 Sy - TheeTire Aprah" 1Ip, S 92

Toins. S-4 o.111) AD A 114 73244. Orneii ibivarslty PP 3

V. ~~quester * Ali"*a, Fletcher. Sam; and Nerass. Alan; 'Vaapp 3" Status a Scraening DOvicO: C nt,' 26 PP., Aug 1962,

leafter. Bernard. "eleactive Service and "as Al i-Voluntwe AD A123 694Force.' 23 pp.. Nr19112. AD A113 096

PP 361pp 34 UM6b00k, David B., PlthOd& for Generating Aircraft

McConnll. Jams. M.. "A Possible Omentarforce Role for "is Trjactorls. $1 pp.. Sap 1962. AD A122 36TypiOr. 24 pp.. Mr1962. Mb A116 601

PP 362pp 346 Moroitz. Stanlay A., 1s toa Military Budget Out of

Jewdrs, Jame., and Treat, NAbart, -An Fapirical Stud at Salomn?." 10 pp.. Sap 1962, AD A122 346Production leficane Is tils Praaane ato Errors-in-The-Variables,* 14 pp.. Fab IM6, 10 A113 591 pp 363

Moraea. A, S,v 0Parsoansi Substitution and NaOy AviationPP 349 sadlns.' 33 pp.. Oct 1962. AD A122 420

IasNrekmidgo. W. M..6 and Noles, 0. Kim, Ooalilanaiintrinitisis t Ilawtlon of Cd(SOS eP0 1 2 ) by Aikane PP 364

:1:' Nydraarbae., 7 pp.. Jul 1991. (Publilme t inJournal of Quester, Aline, and Meknsad. Michsael, *The Military'sChemial Phsysics, 76(4), 13 Fab 1962). )0 A113 093 Monopany Poar,." 29 pp., Oct 1962, AD A123 657GUNIVar81" of Ufth, Dapt. at OoWBafy

PP 365pp AD Groar. William L.. mnd Bartholoew. Jesse C.. cCdr.usmi.

Lewis. Ilwc. 'A MtWa far Incraasing te P.irapowar of Pacychological Aspacts of Mina Warfare,' i5 pp.. Oct 1902

Virginia Clas Oulmare.' 10 pp.. Apr 1962. (To be poliish"d AD A2a 244

PP 366pp 391 Spruill., Nancy L., and Gasvirth, Joaeph L.,* 'On te

Omutra S. E..* Stanford, J. N.. Movie, J. 6. Steven., Estiation af the Correlation Cofflclat Fron GroupadP. IS.;* and We. T. T..* "Possible Thras-Oimnaonoi Backbone Oats' 9 pp., Oct 1962. (Publishad In tha Journal at teFolding Armun ANtibadyt Combining Silts fins iouiin Amrican Statistical Association. Sap 1962. Voi. 77. No.

* ,"~MM 167.0 IS pp., Apr 962 (Publahatd In JOW704alto 379. Theory and methiods Saction), AD A122 362 .Thauwtlasi 11iology) 0111org ~hig" University. Dapet. at StalItistIes'leteto m Volvo 11V. Cafts, of Slodshsy 6 NolouierBleleog ON fginesing Scaaas A AppIlied Not lemnia PP 367

Patursa, Charles C.. 'Soviat Tactics for Warfae. at SasPP 392 (Two Dacaduat o UPIam-a1)," 37 pp., Nov 1922

Brlest, C. @sread, sAgaslaem ot Conditional AbsaorbingKoko Chains.' 7 pp., Jun I62 (Presentad fto ma Sixth pp 366

q.European Meeting on Cybarmatios mad Syam PAeaare. hlid Wesnand, Rbeart 6., 'Tme Evolution at Soviet Rquirementsat The Usiveraily of Viewed, Apr 196121, AD AIIG 603 for NaDVal ForCes-SolvIng the Problems of the Early igfta,'

41 pp., Dae 1962, AD A123 635PP 33

Saorfast, C. farnard. 'Sm No~masleal Methods for Modallng pp 369thes Parforance of a Dlatribetd Deat Baa $yet=.*' 1 pp., Quaster, Al ine. add Lockman. Robert, 'The Al i-VoluntaarJun 1102. (Prasened fto ta International Working Conf eraes Frces A Pea tivo Perspactive,' 29 pp.,* Nov 11962.On 0odal 111i94sa, hold at Bad MOnnah, Wast Gainay. Ap AD A12N M7196), AD A1l6 404

pp 370PP 334 Footluar, Bernard 0.. NusO~ Resource Nodalst An Ovary lam,'

"oil, Sohs V.. Miley Te Serf-War Scanalo Is Wrong fur 17 pp., Nov I962 AD A123 636Novel Planning,* 6 pp., Jun 1902., AD Ail* 70

PP 372PP 336 Itulay, WIllan J.. 'An Ovarview of Acoustic Anlysis,'

Cyike, Ssewa Goldberg. Motluso S.; Haga, Paul. and Mairs, 46 pp.. Jan IM6. AD A120 316Lasi 'Istleat "nom Personal oest Itate: Evidencefree military Reanlistmant Dacialonsa 19 Pp., Ap 1962, PP 37318 Ain 419 Jaoo1aon, Louis, "Rasearch to Quantity ma Etfaect of

Paraman Change of Station Novas on WI yes' wagesand LaboriiPP 3N? Supply.' 33 pp., Jan 1963. AD A128 300Goldbarg, Nottess S., flOiscrIainatlon, Mapois, and Lon-lun age DOiffasnlois, 13 pg., Sep IM6 (Pubillih" in pp 374tdartaiy Journal of bomoice, May 1962) COay-000ndaa. Dawoesft and fail$s, Sle, Balancing Accesion

and RtanlIon: Tha Olsaggra" Nodal," 27 pp., Aug 1962

fJS

PP 375 PP 392Feldn. Paul, -Privatiuing Airports In Washington. D.C.." Wrner, John T.. and Simn, Bruce, -An Empirical Analysis of

l 17 pp.. Peb. 1683. AD A129 236 Pay and Navy Enlisted Retention In the AVP: Preliminary

PP376Results.. 51 pp., Dec 1979

Weiss, Kownna" G., "Power Grow&. Out ot the Barrel at a pp 394Gunboat: The U.S. In Sino-Sovlef Crises," 136 pp., Dec 1992 Ncihney Donaid, Camrini, Upo; Roberts. Arthur; and

Winston, Rtoland. "Development of an Undarwater NighPP 377 Sensitivity Cherenkov Detector: Soo Urchin,* 20 pp._

Anger. Thomas E,0 "The Outiook for NI I itary Operations Aug 1983Reserch," 14 pp.. Apr 1163

pp 396PP 379 Jondron, Jae N.; irechiing, Prank; and Macus, Aiso;

Jandrow, Jsms N.; Chase, David E.. and Gambie. Christopher "Older Workers In the Market for Part-Time Eapioymt,-L., "The Price Differentiai Betwem Domestic and Imported 34 pp.. Aug 1983Stel," 17 pp.. May IM6

PP 360 Levy. Robert A.; Dow"e. Mari ann; and .iondrow, Jamin N.;Blls, Eiien. "Iiancing Accession and eratntion: Cost and "Technical Change end Eipoyment In the Steel. Auto.Productivity Tradeoffs," 36 1Pp.. War 1903 Aiuminum, Cooi, and Iron Ore Industries." 23 pp., Sep 1983

pp 361 PP 399Reeveas. John M. L., GalA's Conceptual Deesign and Cost Modeis Roberts, Stephen. "Western European end NATO Movies.* 23

'afor Nigh-Speedl Surface Craft," 23 pp.. Apr 1963. AD A128 245 pp.. Nov 1962

%' PP 362 PP 400

Levy, Robert A., and J.,drea, Jes N. wThe Adjustment of Laird. Rlobbin P., I smrech bciwo Foress In the 1906 and[Jyetto Technical Chanige Inthe SeladAuto 1900s.1 37 pp.Ag1983

Industries." 40 pp., My 1963pp 401

pp 36 (Rievised) Moloney. Arthur P., "The Berlin-Baghdad Railway as a Cause.4. Thins James A., Jr. mil Wngal, Marc. "Properis of Quick of World War 1,- 27 pp.. Jon 1914

'a Leak Pasive Loalization." 39 pp., Jul 1963pp 402

pp 384 Hart, Manry L., "A Parametric Analysis of Duals," 41 pp..@DIM",rg Mattham S.. end Mager. Michael P.. "A Capplarison War 1964of WAs Prophet and ACL. Fares Projection Models. 1 33 pp..

Jam I"Ipp 40

.~~~Is a. Pesen. Chws C.. "Aircraft Carriers In Soviet NovelPP 30 Theory Pree 1960 to the Psikiands Wr," 2D pp.. Jan 1964

~'. '~'.Angler. 64um; Driseoli, Krtj and Giegiry. David. 4%nper

ftinmq l t Dar ivation tair "ae Navy Comprehensilye Coopanee- pp 40ties and Somilly Study," 22 pp.. Sao low lam.s Heirlonne. "Prof It-Ma slahig vs. Optiali Behavior In

a Spatial Setting: Suany and Extensiams," 10 pp., Jan 1964

Angier. fri.. N.; Oriseeli. Itut A.1;n Capenter aty pp 401A., wCDemetrs of 'Treanang Cast Per gradate' ter theo Laird, Robbin P.. "The French Strategic Ollom," 41 pp..W" Nav Daprehaemiva Compensation and Sepaly Stdy." 67 pp.. 196IO

PP 446

pp 1 Ellen an tybdm aea."saefgAe ln Marcos. Alan, and Quester, Alma In, imamuring the Productiv-WIS.9140. A Clr~fedw 06". atioingAscesio It ofFirst Torm Navy Enl Istema, 30 pp.. Ap 119614

and Rtentiens The AMegmte INe0.8 20 pp., Jul 1962

' .Clay-lendes. Doliera. 4111das at0 Aumesln and Rtanilem."

% I I to.. Oat 194

Ciep4Ienadme, Beberall. *A 1amoinmRoerwaln Cost functien

far, Nic Ni9p 5~ Goa"e!e, aI p., Jan 15M

Claymmdas. aomler. VOIintien tar Ite Rooriting oaet10atlmfe Utiliaml IN ft" Nv Comrehensie Casaltienand supply SMOy, 30 00., up 116

Goldberg. Larr. allmmry ef Navy Inflates Supply Study,"11 pp., Jul 1961

-1-.

I. V4

4 /116r