Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 7288 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT PAKISTAN PUNJAB EXTENSION AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT SIND AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION AND ADAPTIVE RESEARCH PROJECT (CREDITS 813- AND 922-PAK) June 13, 1988 Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official dutier.. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized
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Document of
The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Report No. 7288
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
PAKISTAN
PUNJAB EXTENSION AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTSIND AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION AND ADAPTIVE RESEARCH PROJECT
(CREDITS 813- AND 922-PAK)
June 13, 1988
Operations Evaluation Department
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance oftheir official dutier.. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.
ADA Assistant Director of AgricultureAO Agricultural OfficerARF Adaptive Research FarmCF Contact FarmerDA Director of AgricultureDAE 0epartment of Agricultural ExtensionDDA Deputy Director of AgricultureDG Director-GeneralDOA Department of AgricultureECNEC Executive Committee of the National Economic
CouncilFA Field AssistantGOP Government of PakistanGOPunjab Government of PunjabGOSind Government of SindIDA International Development AssociationIPB Impact Production BlocksM&E Monitoring and EvaluationMEC Monitoring and Evaluation CellNCF Non-Contact FarmerNPS National Pay ScalePC1 Planning Commission Document 1PERI Punjab Economic Research InstituteSMS Subject Matter SpecialistSSMS Senior Subject Matter SpecialistTA Technical AssistanceT&V Training and Visit system of extensionUNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeWB World Bank
FISCAL YEAR OF BORROWER
July 1 to June 30
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYTHE WORLD BANK
Washington. D.C. 20433U.S.A.
Office of DeCtor-GOeOpeatmns Ivakiatmin
June 13, 1988
MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Project Performance Audit Report on PakistanPunjab Extension and Agricultural Development Project andSind Agricultural Extension and Adaptive Research Project(Credits 813-PAK and 922-PAK)
Attached, for information, is a copy of P report entitled "ProjectPerformance Audit Report: Pakistan - Punjab Extension and AgriculturalDevelopment Project and Sind Agricultural Extension and Adaptive ResearchProject (Credits 813-PAK and 922-PAK)" prepared by the OperationsEvaluation Department. The PCR9 were prepared by the FAO/CP.
Yves Rovani
by Ram K. Chopra
This documen, has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performanceof their c'.;z! duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.
MO OFMAL USE ONLY
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
PAKISTAN
PUNJAB EXTENSION AND AGRICULTUAL DEVELOW NT AJCTSIND AGRICULTURAI E)TENSION AND ADAPTIVE RESSARCH PROJACT
I. BACKGROUND ..................................... 1
II. PROJECT ....................................... 3
A. Punjab Extension and Agricultural DevelopmentProject ..... ******** * **..............*** 3
B. Sind Agricultural Extension and Adaptive ResearchProject .. ... ....................**.....*....... 5
III. MAIN FINDINGS ................ ............ .... 6
A* General ................................. .........B. Need for Flexibility ....... ............. 6C. Staff Housing ........................... . 9D. Scope for Improvement ............................ 10
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORTS
I. PUNJAB EXTENSION AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMEN PROJECT(Credit 813-PAK)
A. Introduction...................................... 15B. Project Formulation.................... 16C. Project Implementation............................. 19D. Institutional Performance and Develpmet.......... 29E. Project Impact................................ .... 33F. Bank Performance......... ............ ....... ..... 37G. Conclusions and Lessons Learned.................... 38
TablesAttachment
This document has a restricted distribution and may be aud by seeipi eaty is the pfg,mai-of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwie be disclod withoW Wash 0B ak891101110d
Page No.
II. SIND AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION AND ADAPTIVE RESEARCHPROJECT (Credit 922-PAK)
A. Introduction... *****.*.......- ............. 73B. Project Formulation..................... o ......... 74C. Implementation...... ................... . . . ..... 77D. Institutional Performance and Development...#...... 84E. Project Impact.................................... 90F. Bank Performance ...... . ....... . ..... . .............. 94G. Conclusions and Lessons Learned.................... 96
TablesAttachmentMaps: IBRD No. 12916R
14187R
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
PA-ISTAN
PUNJAB EXTENSION AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTSIND AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION AND ADAPTIVE RESEARCH PROJECT
(CREDITS 813- AND 922-PAK)
PREFACE
This is a performance audit of two agricultural extension proj-ects in Pakistan: the Punjab Extension and Agricultural DevelopmentProject, for which Credit 813-PAK was approved in May 1978 for the sum ofUS$12.5 million and closed on June 30, 1985 after cancellation of US$3.71million; and the Sind Agricultural Extension and Adaptive Research Proj-ect, for which Credit 922-PAK was approved in May 1979 for the sum ofUS$9.0 million and closed on June 30, 1985 after cancellation of US$3.17million.
The projects are almost identical in design and objectives andhave been covered in a single audit, consisting of an audit memorandum(PPAM) prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED), and thecompletion reports (PCRs) prepared by FAOICP dated March 12, 1986. ThePPAM is based on a review of the two Staff Appraisal Reports (SARs) Nos.1909a-PAK dated May 12, 1978 and 2387a-PAK dated May 7, 1979; the Presi-dent's Reports; the Credit Agreements; and the PCRs. Correspondence withthe Borrower and internal memoranda on project issues contained in rele-vant Bank files have been consulted and Bank staff associated with theprojects have been interviewed.
An OED mission visited Pakistan in January 1988. Discussionswere held with officials of the Ministry of Finance and Agriculture inIslamabad as well as with the Ministries of Agriculture in Punjab andSind. Field trips to project areas and installations were undertaken andthe information obtained during the mission was used to test the validityof the conclusions of the PCRs. The audit considers that the PCRs coveradequately the projects' salient features and the PPAM generally agreeswith the conclusions. The draft audit report was sent to the Borrower onMarch 4, 1988 for comments; however, none were received.
The valuable assistance provided by the Governments of Pakistan,Punjab and Sind and the project staff as well as the farmers met duringthe preparation of this report is gratefully acknowledged.
PUNJAB EXTENSION AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(CREDIT 813-PAK)
BASIC DATA SHEET
KEY P110JECT MTA
Actual orAa ia SKKAU Colum 2 as 2 ofiLaS58A Einstas
Supervision 1 IM 10-11/78 2 66 4e 1 2 Usuprvisios 2 IDA 3/79 1 28 a 1 2 NSupervicion 3 IM 6/79 1 10 a 1 2 wPsuperviios 4 IM 10/79 1 7 a 1 2 nrsupervisio 3/ IM 1-2/80 4 40 aabb 2 1 mosuperviaiot6 IM 1-2/81 6 60 asabb 2 1 nsupervisiom 7 IM 5/81 2 18 ea 2 1 Usuperisios a IM 9/81 1 4 I 2 2 msupervision 9 ta 1/82 2 10 as 3 2 rsuper:-ioa 10 IM 2/83 0 alämt 2 1 wSupervision 11 IM 10/83 6 60 Gaabter 2 1 vsupervisio 12 IM 5/84 2 12 ab 2 1 Usupervisiou 13 imA 10/84 2 20 ab 2 1 nsupervision 14 tM $/85 2 ab 2 1 U
subtotal 414
lTa 1,029
01MIE PROJECT DTA
sorower Is ie aepublic of Pakietapiacal Tear . 1 July to 30 JuncNae o Curracey Rupe (fa)Currecy &Nebase Sate:
21 a - .griculture; b - mit- a- easag specialist; 9 - tralnias specialist;r - rural developmnt specialigt.
j 1 - problem fra.; 2 - oderate problms; 3 - =ajor problems.,/ 1 - improving; 2 - statiouary; 3 - deteriorating.. / P - finafcial; N - manaterial; T - techical; P - political; 0 - other.3/ Also status revion.!U Also raviem of project by IM/COP.21 Supervision rdport not seen. tformaios based oG the subsquant report.
SIND AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION AND ADAPTIVE RESEARCY PROJECT
Date Physical Components Completed 6/30/83 6/30/85Institutional Performance Adequate InadequateAgro-economic Performance Adequate PoorNo. of Direct Beaeficiaries 4.9 million 1/ 2.6 million 11
1/ At appraisal the whole province vas covered by the project; fivedistricts with a higher level of invesaments and the seves remainingdistricts with a lower intensity. From early 1961, the project wasrevised to concentrate on only the five high intenasity districts with395,000 farm families.
teet mmcta No. of Naudaya Specialisati9s performance Typ
a - agriculturalist; b - econ~nst; e - etetsiow specialist; 4 - mchazisatiom specialist; a - irrigation engine*f - civil engifemr; 8 - managne cpecialigt; b - training specialist.
2I 1 - problm free; 2 - moderate problmas; 3 - detoriorating./ 1 - improving; 2 - statiogary; 3 - deterioratisg./ V - financiaa; N - maagerial; t - tocheical; P - political- 0 - ct-,
2/ Lack of ZCOECC approval prmventig credi effectiveues.t/ Non-adbre«ce to credit agtemt covemtss.
PRJJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
PAKISTAN
PUNJAB EXTENSION AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTSIND AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION AND ADAPTIVE RESEARCH PROJECT
(CREDITS 813- AND 922-PAK)
EVALUATION SUMMARY
The two projects were the nineteenth and twenticth Bank Grouploans and credits for the agricultural sector in Pakistan. They were inline with Government's objectives to improve the efficiency of the agri-cultural supporting services and to increase the country's agriculturalproduction.
Obiectives
Following the findings of a Bank Special Agricultural SectorReview in 1975/76 which concluded that significant production increasescould be expected from improving farmers' husbandry practices, the Gov-ernment of Pakistan (GOP) decided to improve the effectiveness of itsextension service. The main objective accepted was to raise yields bythe extension of improved husbandry practices to farmers. The introduc-tion of the Training and Visit (T&V) system to five districts each inPunjab and Sind was expected to contribute to the strengthaning of agri-cultural extension and adaptive research in the selected pilot districts,permitting at a later stage and if found successful, the introduction ofthe T&V system on a State-wide basis.
Implementation Experience
The objective of strengthening the extension service throughintroduction of the T&V system has been accomplished although at a muchslower pace than anticipated at appraisal. Implementation delays weremainly due to GOP's initial reluctance to accept the new concept of T&Vfor the extension approach, but by now has full government backing.Difficulties w-re encountered in getting government approvals to increasethe number of a -ension staff and the required salary increases deemednecessary to pr,_ ide incentives for improved extension staff performance.Difficulties in establishing and staffing of adaptive research farms haveled to extension messages being in short supply rendering the extensionservice less effective than hoped for at the time of appraisal. The twoprojects experienced a 50% time overrun, but a significant (about 20% inUS$ terms) underrun due to savings in equipment, consultant services andtraining.
Results
It is still too early to measure the project impact on agricul-
tural production as the main project emphasis was on institution buildingand recruitment of ataff. At project completion, an increase in use ofinputs had been noted in both projects, but the average yields of themain crops have not significantly increased so far. No rate of return
was calculated at project appraisal or completion.
Findins and Lessons Learned
The need for housing for field staff needs to be carefully eval-uated. Under certain circumstances, like in this project, housing mayeven act as a disinzentive and considerable savings can be made by not
providing it (PPAM paras. 36-39, PCR 3.16-3.19 Punjab, and 3.11-3.13Sind).
Provision must be made for the eventual replacement of staff
transport (PCR 7.5 Punjab, 7.6 Sind).
Special efforts are required to formulate adaptive researchprograms to deal with location-specific problems (PPAM paras. 30-31; PCRparas. 3.24-3.27 Punjab).
Flexibility in visiting schedules is needed to avoid repetitive-ness of extension messages and in view of possible cost savings (PPAM
paras. 30-35). Planning of extension activities with focus on few impactpoints will be essential to maintain farmers' interest and to promote
feedback (PPAM paras. 40-45).
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PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM
PAKISTAN
PUNJAB EXTENSION AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTSIND AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION AND ADAPTIVE RESEARCH PROJECT
(CREDITS 813- AND 922-PAK)
I. BACKGROUND
1. Pakistan extends over about 197 million acres of which onlyabout 47 million acres or 24% are cultivable. About 33 million acres isirrigated from the Indus River system, the biggest single irrigationsystem in the world. Since rainfall over most of the Indus Plain isinadequate for crop production, and is barely sufficient even in thewettest northern agricultural areas, irrigation and prosperous agricul-ture have gone hand-in-hand since about 2500 BC. Investment in control-led surface irrigation started about 100 years ago. Recent major invest-ments include the World Bank-supported Indus Basin and Tarbela projects,consisting of a system of canals interconnecting the major rivers and theconstruction of two of the world's largest rockfill storage dams at Man-gla and Tarbela. Some 150,000 private and 10,000 public tubewells aug-ment surface irrigation supplies and some also partially control thewater table and spread of soil salinization that would interfere withcrop production.
2. In 1987, agriculture continued to be the single largest sectorin Pakistan's economy, although its relative share is declining, from 32%of gross domestic product in FY76 to 24% in FY85, employing about half ofthe total labor force and providing about two-thirds of export earnings.The agriculture sector's growth rate decreased from an annual average of6% in the 1960s to 2% in the 1970s. A significant upturn to 4.4% occur-red between FY79 and FY83, when record output levels for most major cropswere attained and Pakistan achieved self-sufficiency in wheat and sugar.However, in FY84, agricultural value-added declined by 6.1% partly due tountimely rains affecting the wheat crop and serious infestation of thecotton crop. In FY85, rapid growth of 12% was achieved. While lowerthan the previous year, a high growth rate of 6.5% was achieved in FY86.
3. Punjab Province, with a total land area of 17 million hectares(ha) represents 30% of Pakistan's total land. Seventy-two percent of theprovince's population of 54 million is rural. The labor force consti-tutes 28% of the population, of which more than half is directly depen-dent on agriculture. There are about 2.5 million farms in the provincewith an average size of 4.7 ha and 36% of the farms have 2 ha of land orless. The predominant tenure pattern is owner-operated (54%), withowner-tenant and tenant- operated farms accounting for 25% and 21%,respectively.
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4. Sind Province, with a total land area of 12.5 million ha repre-sents 22% of the country's total. Fifty-seven percent of Sind's popula-tion of 22 million is rural. The majority of the labor force (28% oftotal population) derives a livelihood from agriculture. The provincehas about 800,000 farms with an average size of 4.7 ha of which 26% are 2ha or smaller. About half (49%) of the farms are tenant-operated, 41%owner-operated and the remaining 10% owner-tenant operated.
5. Pakistan's Sixth Five-Year Plan (FY83-68) places emphasis on theagriculture sector on the need to increase yields with a view to movingfrom self-sufficiency towards exports, especially of high-value crops.The Government's agricultural reform program has begun to address many ofthe issues constraining rapid agricultural growth. It emphasizes: (a)progressive price adjustments of key agricultural inputs and outputs,thereby phasing out input subsidies while providing adequate incentivesto farmers; (b) gradual transfer to the private sector of activities suchas the distribution of key agricultural inputs and the exploitation ofgroundwat-rs; and (c) reorienting public investment to emphasize quickreturns and complementing the existing irrigation system. Priorityinvestments planned include extension services, research, seed certifica-tion, water management, canal rehabilitation, water course improvementand essential drainage. To ensure that the increased provision of publicservices and infrastructure leads to an efficient utilization of resour-ces, input and output pricir; policies and producer incentives are beingreviewed with Bank Group support. The Government has taken action toimplement its agricultural reform program through new policies includingraising procurement prices to border parity and shifting investmentexpenditures towards rehabilitation, and improved efficiency and manage-ment of existing assets. However, much remains to be done particularlywith regard to investment priorities and improvements in physical andinstitutional infrastructure.
6. The Government and Bank are in general agreement that sustainingagricultural growth and realizing the potential of the sector willrequire continued action to implement sectoral policy reforms initiatedby Government. The Bank Group assistance strategy in agriculture com-prises two complementary approaches. First, the Bank's ongoing sectorwork and dialogue focuses on achievement of a satisfactory policy frame-work and priority investment program to be supported with a proposedagricultural sector loan. Second, project loans would assist in imple-mentation of the investment program with special emphasis on institutionbuilding at the federal and provincial levels. Projects underway andplanned address water management, irrigation systems rehabilitation,input supply and provision of credit and agricultural services.
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II. PROJECT
A. Punlab Extension and Agricultural Development Proiect
7. The project originated from a Bank Special Agricultural SectorReview which was completed in January 1976. This review indicated that asignificant increase in production could be made by improving farmers'agricultural practices through extens-on. As a result, two projects wereprepared, one for Punjab and another for Sind. The two projects wereimplemented In parallel and showed many similarities in terms of achieve-ments and problems during implementation.
8. The Punjab project was prepared by the Government of Punjab(GOPunjab) with t-.e assistance of the FAO/World Bank Cooperative Pro-gramme (FAO/CP) in 1976 and 1977 and appraised by IDA in September 1977.The Credit was signed on June 8, 1978, and became effective on September12, 1978. The Credit closed after one year's extension on June 30, 1985,but disbursements continued until December 1985 when the undisbursedbalance (US$3.7 million) of the US$12.5 million credit was cancelled.
9. Like for the Sind project, during appraisal the project as pre-pared was modified and proposals for access roads and watercourse reha-bilitation were dropped, all credit aspects (80% of costs) were referredto the Fourth Agricultural Credit Loan and the components for water andsoil conservation were reduced in size. Instead, the area covered by theproject was extended from eight blocks of 40,000 acres to include fivewhole districts. The objective of the final project was to provide farm-ers an extension service which would give them relevant and timely tech-nical advice, based on research findings applicable to the farmers' con-ditions. To this end, the project supported the reorganization andstrengthening of the extension service in five of the 21 districts ofPunjab according to the Training and Visit (T&V) system of agriculturalextension. It provided additicnal staff; buildings and equipment forfive adaptive research farms; staff officeq, housing and transport; andtechnical assistance. Total project costs we. US$20.8 million.
10. The project b--ease effective virtually on time but made a slowstart mainly due to a delay until February 10, 1981 in the approval ofthe project by the Executive Committee of the National Economic Council(ECNEC). Only then was the project provided the necessary governmentendorsement and commitment to permit appropriate implementation although"anticipatory approval" granted earlier allowed some limited progress.Some significant changes compared to the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR)were made in the GOPunjab project document (PC-1) finally approved byECNEC. Notably, the number of field assistants (FAs) was reduced byalmost 20%, and as a consequence also their housing. The consultancyservices under the IDA credit were almost halved from 122 to 64 man-months. However, an additional 39 man-months of technical assistance wasmade available under a UNDP grant.
11. Staff recruitment was a problem and vacancies remained numerousthroughout the project period. Failure to provide adequate salaries andallowances to field staff made recruitment difficult, especially of FAs.Other posts, e.g., Senior Training Officer and (Senior) Subject MatterSpecialists (SSMSs) did not exist in the cadre of Pakistan's agriculturalservice and therefore had to be created, thus delaying recruitment. Theproject also faced many other problems including: (a) staff mobility,due to failure to provide transport to all field staff, insufficienttravel allowances and lack of vehicle maintenance; (b) rapid price esca-lation of civil works, prompting a reduction in the size of staff houseswhich in addition to loss of the 20% housing allowance and often isolatedlocations made FAs reluctant to use them until instructed to do so; (c)failure to contract most technical assistance services provided under theproject and those which were obtained came late during project implemen-tation; and (d) shortage of budget funding which affected the implementa-tion rate of all components.
12. At project completion, 94% of agreed staffing positions werefilled, but 21 (68%) of the 31 SMS positions went vacant. Transportvehicle purchases were much less than proposed in the SAR; only 38% ofbicycles, 58% of moped/motorcycles and 67% of other vehicles were pro-cured. The building component was over 90% complete.
13. Five Adaptive Research Farms (ARFs) were established but lateappointment of SSMSs was a severe constraint. Although ARFs are wellmanaged now, research needs to focus more on farmers' real problems andinclude more economics, rather than just repeating basic research trials.
14. Fortnightly training of FAs was carried out regularly despitelarge numbers of SMS vacancies, but was rather theoretical and lackedpractical skill development. Other staff training started late in theproject, when consultants held successful series of workshops for train-ers and other staff. Funds for overseas study tours and seminars werehardly used at all, much to the detriment of the project.
15. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) reports provide useful data, butcould be improved much further. Only one M&E staff member benefittedfrom the overseas training under the project.
16. Technical assistance suffered from apparent GOPunjab reluctanceto hire consultants which expressed itself in aborted negotiations andlengthy clearing procedures. The absence of technical assistance seri-ously affected the project. In the event, only about eight man-months ofconsultancy were used under the IDA credit; however, the project alsobenefitted from the use of 34 man-months of consultancy under the UNDPproject.
17. Project reporting (not covenanted) was satisfactory but auditswere received late and were of poor quality. Other covenants covered a
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wide range of aspects of project implementation and were often late inbeing met, being adhered to intermittently, or sometimes not met at all.
B. Sind Atricultural Extension and Adaptive Research Project
18. Like for the Punjab project, during appraisal the project asprepared was modified and all credit aspects (60% of costs) were referredto the Fourth Agricultural Credit Loan and proposals for improvements ofwatercourses, access roads and markets were dropped (20%). Instead, theproject area coverage was increased from one district to cover the entireprovince. The objective of the final project was to raise yields by tkeextension of proven improved cultivation practices to the farmers. Tothis end, the project provided for full investments to achieve optimaloperating conditions in five districts of Sind and a lower investmentlevel to provide some support to operations with existing staff in theremaining seven districts. For the five districts the project providedadditional staff, staff housing, offices and transport. For the wholeprovince the project provided a cadre of SMSs, four adaptive researchfarms with buildings, equipment and staff, and technical assistance andtraining. Total project costs were US$13.8 million.
19. The Credit was approved by the Board on May 28, and signed onJune 12, 1979. However, credit effectiveness was dependent on projectapproval by the Executive Committee of the National Economic Council(ECNEC) which was not granted until February 10, 1981. The Credit becameeffective on June 12, 1981, two years after credit signing and aftereight extensions of the effectiveness deadline.
20. Two major changes relating to project scope and technical assis-tance were made in the project during implementation. Due to the poorprogress it was decided after the February 1981 Supervision to concen-trate all project investments and activities in the five intensivedistricts. The UNDP-financed technical assistance component finallyagreed on in the SAR was cut from 55 to 38 man-months.
21. For two years there was little progress in project implementa-tion, but once ECNEC had approved the project--allowing staff recruitmentand project expenditures--the general rate of progress was quite satis-factory and no extension of the credit was necessary.
22. Project staffing proceeded at a reasonable rate. However,recruitment of SSMSs was delayed due to the non-existence of these postsin the Pakistan civil service. Some other senior staff positions alsoremained vacant for long periods of time, including those of DirectorGeneral, Director Adaptive Research and Additional Director Monitoringand Evaluation (M&E). Also, senior field staff (Deputy Directors (DDA)and Assistant Directors (ADA)] were mostly appointed on an ad hoc basisand not given their supervisory allowances which resulted in low morale.
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23. The project faced many other problems during implementation,including: (a) inadequate staff mobility, due to failure to providetransport to all field staff, insufficient travel allowances and lack ofvehicle maintenance; (b) rapid price escalation of civil works, promptinga reduction in the size or staff houses which, in addition to loss of the20% housing allowance and often isolated )ocations, made FAs reluctant touse them until instructed to do so; (c) late technical assistance input;(4) shortage c4 budget funds for operating and maintenance costs andstaff travel allowances which negatively affected staff morale; and (e)civil disturbances in Sind stopped staff from working in the field for upto six months at a time.
24. At project completion, 98% of staffing positions were filled,100% of transport vehicles, including motorcycles and bicycles, had beenprocured and the building program was 100% implemented.
III. MAIN FINDINGS
A. General
25. Both projects have been successful in rendering the extensionservices in the project areas more efficient by introducing an element ofdiscipline to the extension organization and staff. While in the past noproper government control existed of extension activities, especiallyover frequency and intensity of farmer contacts, the T&V system intro-duced by the projects contributed to supervised regular farm visits andconvinced the Governments concerned, i.e., Pakistan, Punjab, and Sind,that investing in extension was money well spent.
26. The projects also succeeded in providing advice to small andmedium-sized farmers in the project areas, changing the past practice ofclose extension association with large landowners, for whom extensionagents had practically acted as farm managers.
27. During project implementation it became apparent to the Bank andthe Governments that the projects had some conceptual flaws. Lessonslearned have been introduced to the follow-on projects. However, someaspects will be elaborated in the following paragraphs and scope forfurther improvements highlighted.
B. Need for Flexibility
28. Despite the fact that the T&V system was to be introduced forthe first time in Pakistan, proper project preparation and consequentlyproject appraisal was disappointing. Following the Bank's 1975 Agricul-tural Sector Review, missions from the FAO/CP visited the country severaltimes from 1975 to 1977 to assist the Government in project preparation.According to Bank files, reflected in the Basic Data Sheets, a total of
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262 man-days were spent on preparation of the Punjab project but none onthe Sind project. Preappraisal activities in the Sind were limited tothree identification missions. The at-first-sight impressive manpowerinput in project preparation, however, has to be seen in perspective tothe appraisal input of 177 man-days which indicates the insufficient timespent on preparation. In Punjab, the longest, a tbee--man missior,lasted less than 6 weeks. None of the preparation or appiaisal mis.Iorsincluded an extension expert.
29. Considering the complex Pakistani farming systems, the timerequired to assess available research messages, extension staff qualifi-cations, and extension organization was not sufficiently recognized. Inthe absence of an extension expert during preparation and appraisal,extension planning was not included and instead a blueprint of a success-ful project, proven in a different country, was introduced. Appraisalwas restricted mainly to the projects' hardware and did not adjust to theregions' and country's specific needs. One of the indications that noproper analysis of available technical messages and consequently exten-sion planning was done is the fact that firm extension worker:farmerratios were assumed for the life of the project: one field assistant to530 farmers in Punjab and one to 660 in Sind. The question is why werethere differences in staff intensity. Messages to be transmitted were inscarce supply. This was mentioned in Central Projects/Operation Policystaff memos which indicated the likely difficulties to be encountered bythe extension service: "Technical packages available are very limited ornon-existent". Aiother memo expresses similar concerns: "My principalconcern with the system is the scanty treatment given research, on theassumption that sufficient information exists which only needs verifica-tion and adaption".
30. Under these circumstances, more flexibility would have beenbeneficial. Cost savings would have been possible by starting the proj-ects with less staff density, but the implementation went ahead asplanned. Immediately after startup all efforts were made to assure theappraisal-required extension density although (i) there were only limitedmessages to be extended, and (ii) establishment of adaptive researchfarms would take some time. While the idea of including adaptiveresearch farms was sound--it was expected that these farms would adapt tolocal conditions all research results disseminated by national researchinstitutes--the time lag of obtaining adapted, ecological region-specificrecommendations was never taken into consideration by the appraisal.
31. As it turned out, substantial delays occurred in making thesefarms operational and relatively few messages have emerged from thefarms, a problem exacerbated during project implementation by a croporiented instead of a farming system-oriented research/adaption program.1/
1/ The "farming system" approach in adaptive research is now to beintroduced under the Phase II projects.
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The lack of recommendations originating from the farms forced extensionworkers not only to repeat the few available message3 year after year buteven during consecutive farmer visits. It is obvious that farmers willget tired listening to the same cracked record continuously, especiallywhen conveying Euch exciting messages as "you must weed your fields now".Farmers have been fighting weeds since biblical ages and if they are notdoing it in a timely and proper fashion the main reason is usually alabor bottleneck.
32. ,But the Bank went even further in cementing the situationinstead of r-r-nitting flexibility through pushing the housing program forextension wo-ker; (see following sub-chapter). Only now in the follow-onprojects ias the desirable flexibility been introduced--at least to acertain degree. The number of farmers per individual extension workervaries according to village size and administrative units.
33. How flexible could the projects have been? First, it shouldhave been recognized that extension workerifarmer densities over theyears should not be linear but follow a curve. Densities should bedetermined by messages available and transmittable during the croppingseason. Due to the paucity of messages available, a lower staff inputwould have been better initially. With more information becoming avail-able from adaptive research farms, more frequent farmer visits wouldbecome necessary and consequently the extension worker:farmer ratio wouldhave narrowed and kept at this level for several years. Following thisphase, a gradual reduction in extension density could take plaf.e, underthe assumption that the majority of farmers would by then have picked upbasic agronomic practices, improved husbandry, use of certified seeds,fertilizer application, etc. At that stage farmers would require advicemainly for countering pest/disease problems or information on refiningadopted techniques and new seed varieties. Considering that agriculturalsciences are dynamic, extension staffing would always be required albeitat reduced levels. Also the focus of extension effort needs to beshifted from the established farmers to the younger generation toinstruct them in the basics of agriculture known by their parents.
34. Determination of extension density also would have requiredextension planning. There are two aspects in the prcjects under reviewwhich would have required special attention. First, the lack of messageswhich could have been translated into packages such as the rice/wheathigh-yielding (HYV) seed varieties cum fertilizer packages, and second,planning the farmer meetings t3 avoid monotonous repetitiveness. Plan-ning should have introduced the flexibility in visit schedules takinginto consideration the seasonality of available messages and the need tokeep extension workers busy all year round.
35. As mentioned above, a reduction in extension density has to beenvisaged after a given time. It should be recognized that a 100% accep-tance rate by farmers, i.e., all farmers adopting all advice, is never tobe attained and that maintaining the high extension density would be
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uneconomic. Bearing in mind the Governments' concerns about recurrentcosts after project completion, extension planning with density recommen-dations following a low-high-low pattern would have given them clearerindications on future staff needs and costs.
C. Staff Housing
36. The PCRs (Punjab, paras. 3.16-3.19 and Sind, paras. 3.11-3.13)give some good indications why an extension staff housing component in aproject could become counterproductive: (i) new accommodation might have
been less comfortable and spacious than lodging already available to
staff; (ii) staff were required to pay for what they found to be inferiorquarters; (iii) at the same time they lost their previous housing allow-ances; (iv) low-cost, sub-government housing standards prevented thetake-over of maintenance responsibilities by the Public Works Department.
37. But there are some additional aspects of staff housing whichneed to be considered. First, project preparation/appraisal under-estimated the time required to obtain land titles prior to starting hous-ing construction. It should be recognized that in countries sufferingfrom overpopulation, land is one of the scarcest commodities with lowturnovers. In the mission's view it would be advisable for any projectpreparation/appraisal mission envisaging land acquisitions under proposedprojects to contact local lawyers or courts to get a feel for timerequired in land transactions, including fair assessments of likelyappeals procedures.
38. Second, since extension workers usually have already benefittedfrom higher education than their farmer clientele, they have a differentoutlook on the education needs of their children. Access to schoolsbecomes an important factor in their lives and makes them reluctant tomove their families to remote villages where they would find at best somerudimentary primary education facilities. It convinces them that highereducation of their children would become impossible and their aspirationsfor better lives for their offspring would never materialize. Conse-quently, they prefer a more urban environment for their families.Lessons from the Pakistani experience show that provision of villageoffices where they could stay overnight, away from their families remain-ing in the towns, would be a solution.
39. While the projects sought to increase the salary levels ofextension workers, to provide incentives, to motivate extension workersin the field, the housing component--not clearly thought through at prep-aration/appraisal--has in fact acted as a disincentive. The Governmentsand the Bank have learned from this negative experience and the follow-onprojects have substantially reduced and modified housing components.
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D. Scope for Improvement
40. Cropping patterns on average Pakistani farms in the two states
are most diverse. They may include rice, wheat, maize, cotton, sugar-
cane, several pulses and oilseeds, fodder crops, vege'.ables, spices,fruits, etc. Due .o this diversified cropping pattern extension is try-
ing to provide farmers with advice on all crops, neglecting the extension
experience that "those who try to cover everything aren't covering any-
thing".
41. The audit mission reviewed sore monthly extension programsissued to the Field Assistants (FAs). By comparing the January 1988
program with the January 1987 program for tle same District, it was found
that, with one exception 2/ both were identical. The programs
recommended messages on wheat irrigation, fertilization, and weeding;rice stubble removal; sugarcane cutting; fodder cutting intervals; pulse
cultivation/ irrigation; and recommendations on vegetable/fruit
cultivation. These topics were not only discussed in January 1987 and
repeated in 1988 but also twice during each month.
42. It is obvious that farmers' interest is likely to diminish in
meeting with extension workers if extension messages become too repeti-
tive. A selection of most important messages would be imperative. Theabsence of any allowances for demonstration plots at village level had
not only hampered extension impact but also contributed to the multitude
of discussion topics, topics which in most instances could not be trans-lated into extension packages. On the other hand, almost no feedbackfrom farmers to extension-research is forthcoming. The mission inter-viewed an FA who could only recall one problem brought to his attentionduring his five-year assignmeat to one and the same village, i.e., farm-ers wanted to know how to control a specific fruit fly attacking theirmangoes. Since the T&V system relies on feedback from farmers, actionhas to be taken to correct the present situation. FAs need to be trainedto better promote dialogues with farmeri. Most FAs seem to be tooenthralled with the idea of being government officers, lecturing but notlistening to farmers. Without exception, all FAs interviewed by themission were unable to indicate which of their messages were taken upeasily and which had encountered difficulties in uptake by farmers. They
only knew that application of agro-chemicals was slow because frmers had
limited access to agricultural credit or difficulties in obtaining themin remote areas.
43. The apparent lack of a dialogue was explained to the audit mis-sion as a consequence of the farmers' shyness, wh'ch inhibits them fromasking questions. If this should be true, then farmers need to be pro-
2/ Due to drought conditions in Punjab, seeding of wheat has beendelayed. Extension has been informing farmers until when the 1987/88wheat can be seeded.
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voked into asking questions. There is scope for improvement and a modi-fied mesaage transmittal could accomplish that. Since proven messagesare still in short supply, extension efforts should focus on the mostimportant crops in a given village for which meaningful recommendationscan be made. Discussiors during extension meetings should focus on notmore than two or three crops and one or two messages per crop. Meetingsmust not be repetitive and the attention time span of farmers has to betaken into consideration. During these reduced topic meetings, FAsshould point out that information is also available on other crcps orcould be obtained through the SMS. This approach would get better farmerparticipation and feedback required for research and extension planning.3/
44. There is also scope for improving extension planning. While ithas been recognized that a shift from a crop to a farming system approachis necessary--the adaptive research farms are already changing theirprograms to this approach under the Phase II projects--the extensionprograms have not been adjusted accordingly. Extension planning, espe-cially the determination of impact points, becomes imperative. Followingstock-taking of messages presently available or becoming available in thenear future, sequences of message transmittal should be established. Itshould be remembered that the roots of the T&V system can be found inWest African cotton extension introduced by CFDT. The successful imple-mentation of the predecessor of T&V was based on introducing farmersfirst with improved husbandry methods requiring no financial investments.Impact points were convincing farmers to seed in lines, at optimum times,timely weed control, etc. During the following phase, once these basicrecomi idations had been accepted to a large extent, agro-chemicals wereintroduced. Finally in the third p.ase, production ex,ansion throughdraft animal mechanization was recommended.
45. Extension planning for the ongoing Phase II could follow a simi-lar approach. Impact points costing relatively little if anything fromthe farmers' point of view should be introduced for the startup. Itwould also be advisable to undertake socio-economic surveys to determinefarmers' attitudes to recommendations prior to their dissemination whichwould permit introduction of modifications if the recipients have goodreasons (risk avoidance, labor bottlenecks, etc.) to reject them.
46. The four Adaptive Research Farms (ARFs), due to the initialdelays, were only completed toward the end of the project. This togetherwith delays in the appointment of SSMSs and the frequent vacancy in thedirector's position negatively affected the adaptive research component.However, as a result of a good technical assistance input, adaptiveresearch had some impact during the project period. A consolidation ofthe effort is now needed with more focus on farmers' real problems and
3/ See also PPAR on Malaysia National Extension Project, Report No.7287, dated June 13, 1988.
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including more economic analysis rather than just repeating basicresearch trials.
47. Fortnightly training of FAs was carried out regularly but wasrather theoretical and leked practical skill development. Other stafftraining started o,nly in 1984 when consultants held successful series ofworkshops for trainers, management and other staff.
48. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) of the project was seriouslyhampered by delays in staff recruitment and the long vacancy in theDirector position, as well as by the late technical assistance input. Bythe end of the project, however, with the help of the M&E consultant theunit became fully operational and between 1984 and 1986 it carried outtwo M&E surveys, one for each cropping season, and a baseline survey forthe follow-on project.
49. Technical assistance, which was to be provided under a UNDPgrant, suffered from delays in concluding the financing arrangements andfrom bureaucratic delays in the appointment of consultants. This, inturn, seriously delayed qualitative aspects of project implementation.The first consultancy input was in 1984 but it continued after the IDAcredit closing and by December 1986 the full 38 man-months under two UNDPgrants had been utilized. Belatedly, this input was highly beneficial tothe project.
50. No periodic project reporting was agreed at apprsisal and laterIDA requests for quarterly progress reports were never met. Althoughdelayed, all project audits have been received. Other covenants whichcovered a wide range of aspects of project implementation, were oftenlate in being met.
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PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
PAKISTAN
PUNJAB EXTENSION AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT(CREDIT 813-PAK)
March 12, 1986
South Asia Projects DepartmentGeneral Agriculture I Division
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PAKISTAN
PUNJAB EXTENSION AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Cr.813-PAK)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
A. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Agriculture in Pakistan accounted fr. an estimated 25% of thecountry's total GOP in 1984/85. Over tie Fifth Plan period (FY'78-83)agricultural production expanded at an average annual rate of 4.2%.Improvements in availability of irrigation water and input supplies helpedto acheive record levels of output and self-sufficiency in wheat and sugarand improvements in availability of irrigation water and crop inputs.Subsequently, due mainly to adverse weather and pest attacks, agriculturevalue added declined by 6.1% in FY 1984 but increased again by an estimated9.9% in FY 1985. largely because of a record cotton crop, and 6.50 in FY1986.
1.2 The province of Punjab has a total area of 42 million acres (17million ha) and occupies about a quarter of Pakistan. It has about 56% ofthe population (47.3 million of 84.3 million in 1981). About two-thirds ofits area is cultivated, of which 85% is irrigated. Rainfall varies fromabout four inches in the south of the province to over sixty inches in thehighland areas of the north. Most rainfall occurs during the monsoon fromJune to August, with a second, less marked, 4et season from January to Marchin the north. In most of the province the climate is suitable for year roundcropping. Soils vary widely with silt and sandy loams predominating in theflood plains. Waterlogging and soil salinity are widespread and irrigationwater availability is frequently less than adequate, particularly forfarmers at the tail end of canals.
1.3 There are two principal cropping seasons: kharif from mid-April tomid-October; and rabi from mid-October to mid-April."In kharif the maincrops are cotton, rce and millet and in rabi wheat and grams. About 60% offarms are from 7.5-25 ac (3-10 ha), predominantly under owner occupation.
1.4 Over a long period the province's agriculture has been developed byexpansion of irrigated area. Projects in the 1970s included those supportedby USAID for on-farm water management in irrigated areas and increasedproduction in rainfed areas. Assistance from the World Bank Group (WB)included credits for Salinity Control and Soil Reclamation Projects (SCARP),for Agricultural Credit, Livestock and Seed Development.
1.5 The Punjah E-tension and Agricultural Development Project (PEA0P)was intended to be -i suppcrt of past and on-going projects with theobjective of strengthening agricultural extension and adaptivb research infive districts of the twenty-one districts of the province. The projectwhich started in 1978 was estimated to cost US$20.8 million over a five-yearperiod, of which US$12.5 million would be as IDA Credit.
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1.6 Information sources for the PCR include: The PEADP Appraisa) Report
(No. 1909a-PAK of May 7, 1979); The Project and Development Credit
Agreements of June 8, 1978; supervision reports; PEADP Identification Reoort
by the FAO/CP (No.19/76 PAK.12 of 30 June, 1976); all the monitoring and
evaluation (M and E) reports produced by the Planning and Evaluation Cell
(PEC) of the Agriculture Department, Government of Punjab (GOPUNJAB); the M
and E report of the Punjab Economic Research Institute (PERI) of November
1984; the Special Review of the Agricultural Extension and Adaptive Research
Programme (T & V) in the Punjab and Sind, produced by GOP Planning and
Development Division in March 1985 and the project files of the WB in
Washington. In additlon, during its visit in December 1985 the PCR mission
received a PEADP Completion Report, produced by the Director 'eneral
(Extension and Adaptive Research) of the Deoartment of Agriculture,GOPUNJAB, which formed the basis for this report. The PCR mission also had
the opportunity, during its field visits, of discussions with farmers,
project staff and staff of the WS Resident Mission in Pakistan (RMP).
B. PROJECT FORMULATION
Origin
2.1 The project originated from a World Bank Special AgricultLjre Sector
Review <1> which visited Pakistan in March/April 1975. This review Indicated
that a significant increase in production could be made Dy improving
farmers' agricultural practices and that this could be achieved ty promoting
proven techniques through extension. Following the conclusion of the review,
the Government of Pakistan requested the Bank's assistance in the
preparation and financing of a project to improve agricultural extension and
research in Punjab. Accordingly, an FAQ/World Bank Cooperative Programme
(CP) mission visited Punjab in 1976 to assist in the identification and
preparation of an extension and research project.
Identification and Preparation
2.2 The CP identification mission which visited Pakistan in March 1976
proposed a first phase project that would concentrate on eight blocks, each
of around 40,000 ac (16,200 ha), six in irrigated and two in rainfed areas
and benefitting around 30,000 families. Project proposals included the
provision of short and medium-term credit; reorganisation and strengthening
of the extension service; improvements to access roads, soil conservation
works, consultancies and studies. Total costs over a four-year period were
estimated at around USS10 million, 80% of which was for short and medium
term credit and the balance for reorganisation and strengthening of the
extension service, improvements to access roads, soil conservation works,
consultancies and studies.
<Rpt2P-aa 2 17 olB-----------------------<1> Report 922a-PAK, January 28, 1976, World Bank.
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2.3 The provincial government (GOPUNJAB) sanctioned a Policy andProgramme Framing Cell (PPFC) in 1976, which, in addition to other duties,was given responsibility for preparation of the project. Preparationassistance continued to be provided through a joint WS and CP follow-upmission in September/October 1976; and further W8 and CP missions up toAugust 1977.
2.4 As prepared, the project aimed at bringing improved practices,already known but not widely disseminated, to the majority of farmers infive districts and comprised:
- reorganization and strengthening of agricultural extension and itslink with agricultural research;
- watercourse rehabilitation in irrigated districts;
- on-farm water harvesting and soil conservation work in rainfedareas;
- pre-service and in-service training for extension workers at alllevels;
- an adaptive research programme;
- provision of associated housing, office accommodation andtransportation;
- provision of agricultural credit officers to participating banks,with associated training and transportation, to facilitate creditsupply, particularly to small farmers;
- supply, at village level, of farm machinery including sprayers,threshers, improved bullock-drawn implements and simple hand-operated seed cleaners/dressers;
- specialised consultancies; and
- monitoring and evaluation.
2.5 Total project costs, with contingencies, were estimated at US$37million.
Project Appraisal
2.6 The project was appraised by WO In September 1977 as set out inAppraisal Report 1909a-PAK, dated May 12, 1978. Between identification andfinal preparation and appraisal the project had been much expanded to coverfive whole districts (out of 21 districts in the province) respectivelyRahimyar Khan, Vehari, Sheikhupura, Sarghoda and Jhelum with a cultivatedarea of around 6.5 million ac (2.6 million ha) and vith around 500,000 farmfamilies. During the process of project preparation and appraisal there hadbeen a steady increase in emphasis on extension and research components andreduction in size or deletion of other components. Most. notaoly it wasdecided by W8 that all credit aspects would be included in the FourthAgricultural Credit Loan. Proposals for access roads and! watercourserehabilitation were dropped and the component for water and soilconservation reduced in size.
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2.7 As appraised, the project aimed at closing the gap between theagricultural practices used by the relatively few innovative farmers and the
majority of traditional farmers. Earlier production increases had comelargely from investment in irrigation and introduction of high yieldingvarieties. Less emphasis had been given to better cultural and managementpractices, stch as better land preparation, optimal plant population, betterweeding and disease control. The objective was therefore to enable a massivetransfer of technology regarding already proven, simple improvements to takeplace. This was to be achieved by reorganization and structuring of theextension service in the five districts and introduction of the T & Vextension system over a five year project period. Initially, the extensionmessages were derived from agricultural research stations findings. The mainrecommendations on use of seed, fertilisers and pesticides were summarisedin the appraisal report (Report 1909a-PAK, Table 5.1). These messages wereto be further refined and new messages generated by Adaptive Research Farms(ARF) established in each district as a part of the proiect.
2.8 Project proposals included:
- Increasing the number of Field Assistants (FA) from 560 to 980 togive a ratio of one FA per 530 farm families and recruitment of 50additional Agricultural Officers (AO), 7 Assistant Directors ofAgriculture (ADA), 3 Deputy Directors of Agriculture (ODA), 42Subject Matter Specialists (VMS), 21 Senior Subject MatterSpecialists (SSMS) and 5 Senior Training Officers (STO).
- Construction of 1,240 houses for the staff, farm buildings andoffices for the ARF and 75 offices, stores and training centres.
- Equipping the five ARF with three 80 hp, four 45 hp and four 10 hptractors and associated implements as well as draught animals,sprayers, office and laboratory equipment.
- Provision of transport consisting of 700 bicycles, 244 motorscooters, 208 motorcycles, 38 four-wheel drive vehicles, 27 pick-ups, 16 cars and 5 trucks (1.5 ton).
- Provision of 22,000 hand sprayers to support the use of pesticidesparticularly on cotton.
- Establishment of a tractor unit in Jhelum District and equipping itwith thirty 80 hp wheeled tractors and implements to undertake deepploughing, ripping and ridging on the contour and other shallowercultivations on farmers fields under contract.
- Provision of in-service training for extension staff at differentlevels and overseas study tours.
- Provision of 122 man-months of consultancy services.
2.9 Overall responsibility for the project implementation was to restwith the Department of Agriculture. The Director-General (0G) Extension was
to have specific responsibility for extension components and the OG Researchfor the ARF. To ensure the necessary close coordination of extension and
research activities, linkages were expected to be maintained at all levelsof the two directorates and the work programme of the ARF was to be
supervised by DBA at the district level.
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2.10 The project proposed to disengage the FA from undertaking the saleand application of pesticides as this was considered incompatible with thephilosophy of the T & V system. A separate organization was thereforeexpected to operate stores for the sale of pesticides. The FA were to workthrough 10-15 contact farmers as their principal channel for conveyingextension messages to the farmers. They were also made responsible forestablishing demonstration plots. Their work was to be supervised by an AO.The latter, who were degree holders, were to become responsible for abouteight FA's supervision and fortnightly training. At the Tehsil level, theADA would be responsible for all extension activities in the Tehsil and wereto report to the ODA. Training was to be imparted by SMS and each Tehsilwould have three SMS specialised in plant protection, agronomy and training.At the district level, an STO was entrusted to supervise the training in thedistrict. SSMS were to be appointed for each district ARF to be responsiblefor adaptive research and for providing technical support to the SMS. Theproject also made provision for monitoring and evaluation of projectactivities and impact. This was entrusted to the Planning and Policy FramingCell (PPFC), whose Chief reported directly to the Secretary of Agriculture.
2.11 Total project costs including contingencies were estimated atUSS20.8 million or Rs205.96 million over five years. The foreign exchangecomponent amounted to USS8.1 million. The credit, which was signed on 8June, 1978, amounted to USS12.5 million.
C. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
Start-Up
3.1 The credit was approved by the Board on 25 May, 1978 and signed on8 June, 1978. The credit became effective on 12 September, 1978. The projectmade a slow start. The project Action Plan was finalised and adopted byGOPUNJAB only in early 1979 and reviewed and agreed by WB in March 1979. Themost significant problem was in the recruiting and posting of additionalstaff. There were also problems regarding the building programme,procurement of vehicles and equipment and implementation of the consultancyand training component. The building programme only started in the 1979/80year. Significant expenditure on vehicles and equipment also only started in1979/80. While some progress was achieved in the first two years it was onlyfollowing the approval of the project by the Executive Committee of theNational Economic Council (ECNEC) on 10 February, 1981, that the project hadthe necessary endorsement and commitment for implementation to proceed asplanned.
3.2 Lack of approval was largely due to discussions within governmentover national extension policies and concern over the likely increases inrecurrent costs, particularly salaries and allowances which the projectwould cause. Only projects approved by ECNEC were able to draw on thedevelopment budget and post additional staff on a regular basis. Thesituation was made a little easier by ECNEC giving the PEADP "anticipatoryapproval" status but IDA had to push for complete approval during the firsttwo years of the project's life.
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Project Changes After Appraisal
3.3- Some significant changes were made to the project components in theGOPUNJAS project document (PC-I). In particular the target FA: farm familyratio was chanqed to 1:635 rather than 1:530 proposed at appraisal. Thiswas justified on the grounds that the larger farmers, whose level ofknowledge was above that of the FA, were "self-starters", able to seek outand use new technology. This they would be helped in doing by senior staffsuch as SMS and ADA. The number of SSMS was reduced from 21 to 18. Thereduction in number of FA from 984 to 820 reduced project cost as thenumber of FA houses to be constructed was also reduced from 984 to 820.The number of tractors to be provided at Jhelum also was reduced from 30,each of 80 hp to ten 65 hp tractors, also resulting in a cost saving.The amount of consultancy to be provided was also halved from 122 man-monthsproposed at appraisal to 64 man-months, extendable, if required, to 86man-months. All of these changes were agreed to by DA.
Physical Implementation
3.4 Details of increase in staff numbers as a result of the project arepresented in Table 2.
3.5 Extension staff. Increase in numbers of FA in line with the PC-I
to give a ratio of FA:farmer of 1:635 proceeded at a reasonable rate, ifsomewhat slower than the original phasing. Difficulties arose in recruitmentof suitable staff to fill the FA posts since it was originally anticipatedthat Crop Recording FA would be available, whereas in fact most of them were
retained by the Crop Recording Directorate. Also FA were expected at
appraisal to be recruited from the Sarghoda and Rahimyar Khan institutes.However, in the event the FA posts were not attractive to graduates of these
institutes and posts were filled by transfer from non-project districts or
by recruitment/promotion on an ad hoc basis. At the time a number of FA were
leaving the service for teaching and other, better paid positions. As themission noted during its visits, the average age of FA is high, the majorityhaving from. 10 to more than 20 years of service.
3.6 At appraisal it was anticipated that FA wages would be increased
from National Pay Scale (NPS) 5 to 9. This has never been achieved althoughin 1984 the National Pay Comlssion increased FA salary from NPS grade 5 to6 and one-third of all FA was upgraded to MPS grade 9. The provincial
government would be prepared to increase FA to NPS 8, but this proposal hasnever been agreed with GOP. Similarly at appraisal it was proposed that FAreceive a travel and daily allowance. It was finally agreed that this would
be paid to FA at the rate of Rs7O per month. However, due to budget
stringency no payments have been made since February 1985 / and AgriculturalInspectors (A!, who perform the same duties as FA are not entitled to thisallowance.3.7 At project completion virtdally all A were in post and the
objective of reducing the ratio of field level staff from one FA per 1,000farmers to 1:500/600 was achieved.
3.8 Also the recruitment of Agricultural Officers (AO) and SubjectMatter Specialists (SMS) was delayed as candidates for AO posts amongstUniversity graduates preferred to join research institutions and parastatal
organisations who offered better pay and generally less isolated livingconditions. In addition, SS14S and SMS staff recruitment was delayed due tothe non-existence of these posts in the Pakistan Civil Service. The
establishment of these posts took a long time and when completed the projectmanageet found.it.still difficult to recruit, as qualified staff.preferred
/ DAE claims that payments have been made now, but at any rate the delay anduncertainty wit% regard to this allowance did- not imorove PAs incentives.
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to remain in the research institutions. In December 1985, 3 out of 18 SSMSsanctioned posts and 25 out of 31 SMS posts were still unfilled.
3.9 The appointments of the Director General (Extension) and othersenior posts such as Director of Agriculture, Assistant Directors ofAgriculture (ADA) and Senior Training Officers have been made as scheduledin the first year of implementation.
3.10 At project completion the staff position was as per Table 2indicating that vacancies existed as follows:-
Post No. of Vacancies % of Total(as per PC-I)
ODA 1 20SSMS 3 17SMS 25 81
Junior Scientists/Asst. Research Officers 4 22.
AO 25 20FA Extension 15 2
3.11 Project implementation was further delayed because of transportproblems. Purchasing of transport was delayed initially and the proposals atappraisal that staff would purchase their transport through an advance soonled to complications. Travel and mileage allowances were often delayedcausing discontent while in other cases staff would be transferred to a non-project area and, naturally, take the transport with them.
3.12 Towards the latter part of project implementation recurrent budgetproblems caused difficulties in the maintenance and upkeep of transportresulting in a deterioration of transport at all levels (Table 7).
3.13 The transformation from the traditional extension service to the T& V system was frequently marred by calls to special duties for FA such aspest control campaigns, selling of improved seed varieties, etc. Shortage ofstaff, delays in training, lack of mobility, apparent non-adoption of thepackages proposed in the appraisal report and the absence of a clearlydefined package from the ARF made an early implementation of T & Vdifficult.
3.14 In addition to the pre-project *campaign activities", FA in thepast used to spend a considerable amount of time in selling fertilizer, seedand pesticides to farmers in their area. This practice was consideredincompatible with duties under the T & V system. The transfer from the dualresponsibility to Pure extension work took a, much longer time thananticipated but at project completion FA were working as pure extensionagents.
3.15 The above changeover was not welcomed by all farmers and on severaloccasions it wss stated oy farmers that due to this change greatinconveniences were experienced in getting input supplies in time. Althoughinput availability has improved, farmers in remote areas still experiencedifficulties and ways of improving the supply of inputs should beconsidered.
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3.16 Staff auarters and other buildings. The Building Department wasresponsible fo; all construction. Work started in 1979/80 but it was notuntil the following year that any significant number of buildings werecompleted and ready to be taken over by the Department of AgriculturalExtension (DAE). With WB's encouragement GOPUNJAB sought to reduce the costof housing, both by reducing the area (plinth size) and the standards ofconstruction. For example, the appraisal report suggested (Annex 3.1, para9) that satisfactory housing could be built for Rs55 per square foot,compared to the then current Building Department rate 0: Rs88 per square ft.Since the housing was below the standards set by the Building Departmentthey were not permitted to be responsible for maintenance, which devolved onDAE. It was suggested in the appraisal report (Annex 3.1, para. 19) that DAEshould therefore appoint an Executive Engineer with Assistant Engineers ineach of the five districts to be responsible for maintenance. However, thishas not happened and apparently no maintenance has been carried out. Thisunsatisfactory situation is mitigated to some extent by the fact that sincethe building programme was delayed the average age of housing and subsequentneed for maintenance has, so far, been less than originally estimated.
3.17 The programme is now substantially complete as Table 3 shows. About75% of the number of buildings proposed at appraisal, or 89% of thoseproposed in the PC-I have been constructed and accepted by DAE. Includingbuildings under construction the achievement is 81% and 95% respectively,the main shortfall being in FA and AO housing.
3.18 Location of staff housing proved a major problem in the buildingprogramme. Although nearly Rs7 million (US$700,000) was allocated for landpurchase at appraisal, only Rs272,000 (US$27,000) was used, in general sitesbeing donated to DAE. This has resulted in staff quarters being located onremote and poor sites. Since there was no effective supervision andinspection of construction by DAE, the specification and finish of thebuildings, particularly those in remote areas was not satisfactory. Also,since the houses were substandard in terms of area, the mission understoodthat they were not favourably regarded by the staff expected to live inthem.
3.19 A further and more significant reason for the field staff's generaldislike of the housing arrangements was that in contrast with the appraisalreport expectation that they would be better off (Appraisal Report Annex3.1, paras. 2 - 5), in the event they lost. Not only did they cease toreceive a housing allowance, equivalent to about 20% of salary, but inaddition had to pay a rental deduction equivalent to about 5% of salary.Consequently in a number of cases houses were left unoccupied until thestaff were instructed to live in them.
3.20 Staff transport. Transport purchases made during the project weremuch less than proposed at appraisal. As is shown in Table 5 on! 38% ofbicycles, 61% of mopeds, 55% of motorcycles, 41% of pick-ups and 13% of carswere in fact procured. The only exception were 4-wheel drive vehicles wherepurchases slightly exceeded the original proposals. In general the qualityof vehicles was higher than originally proposed, one reason being that themain Government supplier, the Pakistan Motor Corporation, could only supply4-Wheel drive vehicles.
3.21 Bicycles, mopeds and motorcycles were intended to be provided tostaff on a hire purchase basis. However, this was not generally adhered toand, in a number of cases, they remained as government owned items.Distribution presented some problems with cycles/mopeds/motorcyclesremaining in store undistributed, or distributed but not repaid. Allocation
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of vehicles was also made difficult in cases where staff were posted on anad hoc and unconfirmcd basis.
3.22 With the larger vehicles the main, and perhaps inevitable problem,was that of allocation, since senior staff both within and outside theproject on occasions monopolised the transport to the detriment of the fieldstaff for whom it was procured. Another general problem was lack of adequAtemaintenance and servicing of vehicles.
Research
3.23 Under the project research work has been stepped up through thedevelopment of the five Adaptive Research Farms (ARF). As in the case of theextension service, staffing was a severe constraint. SSMS who were to be incharge of experimental work were appointed late mainly due to a reluctanceon the part of SSMS to move from basic research to adaptive research work.Now most of these problems have been overcome and the ARF are well managed.
3.24 K.oever, despite the above, the tendency exists for ARF to carryout basic research. So far few activities are really related to solvingexisting farmers problems or developing new production technology packagesfor a given set of conditions prevailing in the ARF area of responsibility.Specifically there-seems to be more room for economic evaluation of specificrecommendations, not only in terms of cost benefit ratio basis but also, andmaybe even more important, on the basis of return per man-day.
3.25 In addition, adaptive research should evaluate low cost technologyinput packages and studies on why farmers may not be willing to adootrecommended packages. As a way of improving extension messages, research onfarming systems and cropping patterns should be iitroduced, to ensure thatadvice is tailored to individual farm/farmer charac';eristics.
3.26 A considerable number of on-farm trials have been laid out, oftenrepeating the ARF experiments. Inputs are provided by the ARF while farmersprovide labour and retain the crop after the required statistical data havebeen collected by the ARF staff. The trials could be improved by similarchanges to those recommended for the ARF*themselves.
3.27 Parallel to the on-farm trials programme, the extension serviceestablishes demonstration plots. These demonstrate the value of arecommended package for a specific crop in relation to normal farmer'spractice. These demonstrations are useful. Farmers only get technical advicefrom extension staff while all inputs and variable costs are sole'y thefarmer's responsibility. DAE staff report that this sometimes results in alack of interest by farmers in becoming a participant.
Trainin*
3.28 Provisions for training were not executed until the very finalstages of the project period. Training was to consist of two components:training of trainers; and training of extension staff. In addition to theabove a special workshop on Project Management was given.
3.29 Senior staff were trained by consultants ovc., two periods of aroundeight weeks in 1985. During the final period two Trainer Workshops were heldof two weeks each for staff such as SSMS, SMS, directors and instructors ofAgricultural Institutes. A special two week workshop on Extension was heldsolely for the benefit of AO, while the two week workshop on Extension
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Organisation was attended by ODA and ADA. The basic courses of the firstperiod were followed by a series of three workshops in the latter part of1985 when more detailed training was given in regard to ExtensionOrganisation, Media, Farm Management. and Advance Training Methodology.
3.30 The purpose of the workshop was to improve skills, capabilities andunderstanling of the staff and thus the effectiveness of the project. Majorsubjects of these courses are specified in Table 13 while the methodologyconsisted, amongst others, 9f group exercises, field trips, demonstrations,discussions, lectures, practical experience and case studies.
3.31 Total participation was around 100 staff members from theDepartment of Agriculture and the Agricultural Training Institutes who allattended first the basic course most related to their work and later theadvanced course. The consultants conducted in addition to these courses aspecial Project Management workshop of one week which was attended by theDirector General, the Directors of Agriculture as well as the Deputylrectors of Agriculture.
3.32 Courses have been very well conducted and certainly had an impacton the staff attending them. It is important that the momentum these courseshave created shculd be maintained and that Training Officers continue togive similar workshops.
3.33 Routine training required by the T & V system has been followed,i.e. fortnightly training of FA by AO and SMS and monthly d'scussion groupsat district level, which are attended by AO, SSMS and SMS. It appears thatas yet these training sessions are at a rather theoretical level. Very fewtopical points and specific farmers' problems are really identified andelaborated upon or followed through; also practical skill training has beenabsent.
3.34 Delays in the completion of the training component were caused bythe late agreement that COPUNJAB reached with the Consultants and therecruitment of qualified staff.
Monitoring and Evaluation
3.35 The appraisal report considered monitoring and evaluation (M & E)as an essential component. N & E was to be conducted by the Planning andEvaluation Cell of the Department of Agriculture GOPUNJAB to monitor thenumber of farmers exposed to the advice of the extension service and toevaluate the effect the extension service has had on yields achieved byfarmers. A baseline survey was conducted by the Faculty of AgriculturalEconomics of the Faisalabad Agricultural Universicy in 1980 and published in1984. <1>
3.36 During the lifetime of the project a number of monitoring surveys<2> and one eval%,ation <3> survey have been carried out by the Planning and
<1> Bench Mark Survey of Punjab Extension and Agricultural DevelopmentProject - University of Agriculture, Faisalabad, Division ofEducation and Extension.
<2> Moni-!ring of Punjab Extension and Agricultural DevelopmentProject. Reports Nos. 1 t3 7 inclusive, Planning and EvaluationCell, Agricultural Department of Punjab, Lahore.
<3>- Report No. 8 of the above series.
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Evaluation Cell of the Department of Agriculture GOPUNJAB. A full list of M& E stadies and others carried out during the project is shown in Table 16.
Information Unit
3.37 The unit appears to have performed satisfactorily. The Monitoringand Evaluation Report No. 8 states that 37% of all CF considered wallslogans as the most Important extension method used (40% for NCF) while thesupply of pamphlets was quoted by 12% of CF (6% for NCF). These figuresclearly indicate the important role the Information Unit plays. Besides theabove, farmers are also provided with information through Newsletters(fortnightly), press information, radio programmes (through 5 radiostations), with around 55 minutes of programmes on a daily basis, televisionprogrammes and video films. Extension staff in the districts are providedwith cassettes which are used in the fortnightly training sessions with CF.
3.38 As wall slogans are a major source of information to farmers,attention must be given to the correctness of the message advertised. It wasquoted to the mission that in some areas messages were outdated and had notbeen changed. Many farmers are illiterate and consequently wall slogans areonly effective for a fraction of the target group.
3.39 The Unit is increasing its services to farmers through the twocinema vans which are stationed at Jhelum and Vehari.
I
Technical Assistance
3.40 The Appraisal Report provided Rsl2.56 million (US$1.28 million) forthe technical assistance component which consisted of 114 man-months longterm consultancies and 8 man-montLs of short-term consultancies. At a laterstage (June 1981) this component was revised and was to be executed partlyunder the loan agreement and partly through UNOP financing as follows:-
Credit Financed
(a) Extension and Training Consultant : 30 m/m (extendable to 48 m/m)(b) Dry Farming and Soil Conservation : 20 m/m (extendable to 24 m/m)tc) Monitoring and Evaluation Consultant : 6 m/m (intermit.tent)(d) Short-term Consultancies (Unspecified) : 8 mm
(f) Extension Plannig (Extension andTraining Speci ali st) : 24 i/i (extendable to 36 m/m)
39 m/u (extendable to 51 m/m)
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3.41 Recruitment was a problem. Clearance of CVs from candidates took along time and differences of opinion regarding costs, reluctancy to useproject credit for funding and the responsibility of sctual selection ofcandidates caused more delays. Eventually the only consultants that wererecruited under the project credit were the short term consultants (8.4 man-months) who conducted the Training Workshops.
3.42 Under UNOP financing (Project PAK/78/044) only the consultant,Extension and Training Specialist was recruited and was in post for a totalof 34 months.
3.43 Lack of consultants harmed the project and in the case of the soiland water conservation activities prevented any significant implementationof the proposals made at appraisal.
3.44 The project's success was also damaged by lack of use of fundsprovided for DAE staff to make overseas visits to see T and V systems inother countries. Eventually only about 15% of the total allocation in USSterms was used and then only in the last two years. The main problem appearsto have been clearances required for government staff to make overseasvisits.
Project :osts
3.45 Total project costs including contingencies were estimated atappraisal at Rs205.96 million (US$20.80 million) compared to actualexpenditures of Rsl85.57 million (US$16.58 million), as set out in Table 1.However, the apparent similarity in the above totals conceals considerableover and under expenditure in each category, as summarised below:
Incremental Operating Costs 89.50 62.60 70Consultants and Training 15.05 1.47 10
total 205.14 185.57 90
3.46 The greatest cost increases were in civil works (+ 80%),particularly for construction of ARF and service buildings. Detailed annualexpenditures are shown in Table 4. This was offset by savings in equipmentcnd transport (- 31%), incremental operating costs (- 30%) and inconsultants and training (- 90%). Table 9 gives annual expenditures onvehicles and equipment.
3.47 The main saving in equipment and transport was in vehicles, wherefor all categories except four-wheel drive vehicles, in general only abouthalf the numbers originallj proposed were in fact procured (Table 5).Despite the eventual cost savings on vehicles, initial purchases tended tobe of higher specifications and more expensive than those considered atappraisal.
3.48 The savings in recurrent costs were due to the reduction in numberand delay in procurement -f vehicles and equipment, slow recruitment ofstaff and restricted payment of allowances and to the complete saving of anyexpenditure on building maintenance.
Project Financing
3.49 Appraisal proposals and actual disbursements by IDA (Tables 10 and11) were as follows:-
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Appraisal Actual
....(US$_million)...
buildings 2.4 3.53Equipment and Transport 3.0 1.99Incremental Operating Costs 3.7 3.17Consultant and Training Costs 1.5 0.10
Sub-Total * 10.7 8.79Unallocated 1.9 -
Total 12.5 8.79
3.50 Disbursement started slowly, the first claim being made inSeptember 1979, and up to end December 1983 (the original project completiondate) cumulative disbursements had never significantly exceeded about halfthe estimates made at appraisal. At the final closing of accounts at the endof December 1985, USS8.79 million or 70% of the credit had been disbursed,the balance of US$3.71 million being cancelled, effective 23 January, 1986.
3.51 Subsequent to the credit becoming effective (11 September, 1978)GOP signed an agreement with UNOP for provision of technical assistance(project UNDP/PAK/78/044) in addition ta that already included in theproject. The cost of this project was to be financed as follows:-
US$ million
UNOP contribution 0.698GOP contribution 0.014
Total 0.712
Total disbursement by UNOP up to end FY185 was USS626,200, or 90% of theoriginal proposals.
Financial Management
3.52 As specified in the appraisal report and the project and creditagreements, GOPUNJAB established at the commencement of the project in 1978,a Project Revolving Fund with an initial capital*equivalent to USS100,000.This was to be administered by the Director General (Extension) and usedexclusively for payments for goods and services for the project. However,probably as a result of the uncertainty caused by the project only having"anticipatoryu approval from ECNEC, by early 1980 the revolving fund hadstill not been used. One criticism of financial management in general wasthe tendency, when the budget was restricted, 'to favour fresh capitalinvestment rather than making necessary recurrent expenditures. Lack ofbuilding maintenance is just one example.
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Procurement and Contractors
3.53 Apart from some delays, There were no major difficulties inprocurement of vehicles and equipment. Annual procurement of vehicles,tractors and other equipment is shown in Tables 5, 6 and 8. However, therewere problems of quality of building construction, undertaken by privatecontractors, particularly where extension field staff housing was built inremote areas. This was due to the lack of.adequate supervision.
D. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT
General
4.1 In the execution of the project, the Punjab Department ofAgriculture (0OA), and within 0OA, the Directorate of Agricultural .Extension(DAE) encountered considerably more difficulties than had been anticipatedat appraisal. This was partly due to external factors, in particular thelong delay in project approval by the ECNEC and difficulties in recruitingadditional staff. The failure to upgrade FA from NPS 5 and the lack oftechnical ossistance also damaged the project. The low salaries of FA maderecruitment and keeping of suitably qualified staff difficult and loweredmotivation and morale. The great reduction in technical assistance meantthat there was insufficient support in the start-up phase of T and V byexternal consultants, and staff were unable to go and see T and V systems inoperation outside Pakistan. At appraisal the provision of TA had been acrucial component in the whole project design. Without the full support ofexperience which TA would have provided, the project's management and staffhad to find their own way and the project's progress was slowed.
4.2 It is arguable whether appointment of staff could have beenachieved faster. Certainly the difficulty and delay in appointing seniorstaff such as SSMS and SMS, were major constraints in getting the extensionservice and the ARF established and operating. Even when staff were finallyposted it was often on an ad hoc basis and there were delays before theappointments were confirmed. In-laWfion the staff structure proposals whichwere evolved during project preparation and appraisal did not work smoothly,as discussed in para. 7.1 below.
4.3 Despite these difficulties the extension service's performance hassteadily improved over the project period. Evidence of this is provided bythe monitoring surveys carried out by the Planning and Evaluation Cell (PEC)GOPUNJAB. The surveys clearly indicated an increase in contact that rieldAssistants (FA) had with Contact Farmers (CF) through regular visits (33.6%in 1981, 80.6% in 1984 but 72.2% in 1985). The report further indicated thata large majority (83%) of CF was satisfied with the advice they receivedfrom FA but at the same time only 52% of the CF expressed satisfactionregarding advice they obtained from the Agricultural Officers. During themission's visit several CF were interviewed and it was quite apparent thatthe above statistical data are still valid and that while CF have goodcombunications with FA the CF knowledge of other extension staff declines astheir seniority in the Department, even at district level, increases.
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4.4 Institutional performance in carrying out the building programmewas poor. Finance for purchase of sites was never used, t1e land beingdonated to 0AE. Consequently locations were often poor and remote. Reductionof plinth size while reducing cost also stigmatised the-houses as "sub-standard" and hence "too small". In addition to poor location and size ofhousing the itandard of construction, particularly in the remoter areas, wasnot satisfactory. These three factors have together impaired the benefit ofthe whole housing programe for lower grade staff.
4.5 The institutional performance of adaptive research has been mixed.As a result of the delays in project start-up and recruitment of staff lessprogress has been made than was foreseen at appraisal. Now the five ARF areestablished and well managed. However, as yet there is still a tendency forthe ARF to repeat basic.research work and there is little evaluation of theeffect of recommended prattices on farm incomes and return per labour day,as discussed in para. 3.24.
4.6 Institutional performance in training has been fair. Fortnightlytraining of field staff takes place regularly, but as discussed in para.3.31, tends to be theoretical and does not include skill training.Performance of the training consultants has been good (para. 3.32).
4.7 Institutional performance over recruitment of consultants was verydisappointing. A number of factors (discussed in para. 7.7) led to a lack ofcommitment to the component, which was consequently only implemented in amuch reduced form.
4.8 Arrangements for project monitoring and evaluation worked well(paras. 3.35 - 3.36). A benchmark survey was conducted by IslamabadUniversity in 1980 - about two years after the project's official startingdate. Annual monitoring reports have been produced by the Planning andEvaluation Cell (PEC) of the Agriculture Department (GOPUNJAB) and amonitoring and evaluation study of the project carried out in 1984 by thePunjab Economic Research Institute (PERI). Both the PEC and PERI studiesare good sources of information on the project's progress and institutionalperformance. However, data collected by PEC needs further improvement andthe PERI report conclusions were not always validated by the suDporting data.4.9 The PERI study provides a detailed description of Conclusions andSuggestions dealing with subjects such as: Selection of Contact Farmers,Manpower Planning, Improving the Capability of Field Assistants, StaffTraining, Training, Strengthening the Linkage Between Research, Extension,Farmers and Adaptive Research, Supervision of Staff and a Review of InputSupply and Credit Arrangements. In conclusion the Study states:-
"In a nutshell, the T & V system, the way it has been implementedin Punjab, has resulted in very little change or improvement in the qualityof agricultural extension. Consequently, the T & V system did notnecessarily succeed in bringing abOut the desired change in productionpractices, input use level and crop yields. The weaknesses of the oldtraditional extension system were supposed to be eliminated with theimplementation of the T & V system. However, most of them still exist underthe new extension system. Efforts should be made to improve theeffectiveness of agricultural extension staff as they have a significantrole to play in increasing productivity at farm level.u
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4.10 In March 1985 GOP undertook a special review of the projecttogether with the similar project in Sind (Credit 922-PAK). The review wascarried out by a team of five senior GOP officials consisting of the JointSecretary, Planning and Development Division (P00); the Cotton Commissioner,Ministry of.Food and Agriculture (MFA); Deputy Agricultural DevelopmentCommissioner (MFA), Deputy Director (PO0); and the Assistant Chief,Agricultur! and Food Section (PO). The review team examined the project'sprogress and made a number of recommendations for future development.(Attachment 1).
4.11 The PO0 Review observed that most of the objectives of the projectwere achieved and that:
"The impact of the T & V system was apparently positive in somemajor crops in some districts but in others, yield response was, however,erratic. With the creation of all these infrastructures, benefits in theform of better crop yields are expected to start accruing in the coming
years. In view of this, the team recommends to consolidate work in theexisting T & V districts of the Punjab and further extension in the scope ofproject may be considered when its impact becomes sign ;icantly visible.6
4.12 The mission's view is that the project has not made the impactanticipated at appraisal. It has, however, established an extension serviceoperating on the T & V principle. The accountability of staff has certainlybenefitted from this. The project has not reached "full development" and afurther increase in benefits may be anticipated.
Accounting and Reporting
4.13 As a covenant of the Project Agreement (Section 3.02) the projectwas to submit independently audited accounts each year within six months of
the year and date. This arranqement was very slow to start functioning, the
.first audit, covering FY79-81 being sent to IDA in April 1982. Subsequentlythe audited accounts were received by IDA four to seven months late.Auditing was of poor quality.4.14 Quarterly progress reports were instituted, although this was notthe subject of a covenant. However, in November 1984 IDA indicated that suchreporting was required. The first quarterly report received was for thequarter up to end March 1981, produced by the project staff in June 1981.Details of reporting are given in Table 12.
Compliance with Covenants
4.15 The Project Agreement included 15 main covenants and theDevelopment Credit Agreement 7 covenants, covering,a wide range of aspectsof project implementation including' procurement, staff appointment, landacquisition, provision of budget, remuneration of staff, duties of staff,vehicle supply and maintenance, building maintenance, project monitoring andevaluation, reporting and accounting, overall management, programmepreparation and date of commencement of activities. With such a wide rangeof covenants problems of non-compliance could have been anticipated and inthe event many were not adhered to, often for long periods of time, or onlyadhered to intermittently. Progress in compliance with some of the maincovenants is summarised below:-
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Section No. SubJect Performance
Developmnat CreditAgreement
3.02 Consultant employment. Complied with in late 1985.
3.03 Project equipment solely for Numerous instances of vehicle requisitionuse In project. during the project.
3.04 Land acquisition. Not complied with.
3.05 Field staff released from Complied with by 1963.other non-extension duties.
promecAgreement
2.02 Adequate budget provision. Complied with in 1979.
2.03 (a) vehicle provision. Vehicles provided but no replacement.(b) Payment of travel allowances. Complied with but payments erratic
and often seriously in arrears.
2.04 (a) Approval of staff positions Complied with in 1979.as per schedule.
(b) Appointaent of staff. Complied with, but appointmentscconsidqrably delayed.
2.05 Plans and reports. Complied with in 1979. However,reports and accounts presented late.
2.06 Field staff released trow Complied with by 1983.other uOextension duties.
2.07 Project N and E. Complied with in 1983.
2.06 Coordination and advisory Complied with in 1979.arrangemets.
2.09 Extension methodology. Complied with in 1981.
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E. PROJECT IMPACT
Impact on Production
5.1 For the assessment of production growth during the project periodboth levels of inputs and clioatic conditions play an important role.Estimated total input supplies according to information provided to themission shows an increase as follows:-
input 1978/79 1984/85 % Increase
Fertiliser (tons) 184,000 231,000 25
Pesticide (litres) 186,000 306,000 64
Credit (Rs million) 80 1,007 1,158
Improved Seed (tons) 2,900 15,000 517
5.2 There is, however, no indication if the increased use of inputs isdue to T & V or natural growth. Considering the Evaluation Survey on wheatin 1985 and the adoption rates quoted there, one may assume that the projecthas had an impact on the use of improved seed. Fertiliser increases havebeen too small (25% in 7 years) to attribute them to T & V. Increase in theuse of credit may partly be due to the project but certainly also due toeasier access.
5.3 Adverse climatic condiions have certainly played a role during theproject period and especially the 1983/84 cropping season was very poorindeed.
5.4 In addition to the above, crop production increases are affected byan ever increasing soil salinity problem and the rationing of irrigationwater to farmers.
5.5 It is still too early to expect a reasonable impact as in the firstfour years of the project period the main emphasis was on institutionbuilding and recruitment of staff. Table 18 (referring to the project area)and Table 19 (non-project area) provides details on area of production,total production and yields per hectare by district. From these tables theindex figures for six years' yield averages and area of production for themajor crops with 1978/79 as the base for both project and non-project areaswere as follows:-
/ 3 districts.2} 4 districts.)/ Caused by 905 drop in production in onp district.
Q quoted to be vast production increased.& 2 districts.
1 district.
N.8: Unless otherwise stated data refer to all 5 distrIcts, both Project and Non-Project.
36 -
5.6 - The average yield trends do not indicate a significant impact andin some crops they show a distinct decline (Basmati rice, sugarcane andchickpeas). The index figures also show that for some crops the non-projectareas have performed better than the project area.
5.7 A more definite trend exists with regard to areas of production.The cropped areas fluctuate from year to year but there are trends whichindicate increased areas under cotton, Barani wheat and coarse rice in thenon-project area. On the other hand, the project apparently led tosignificant increases in the cultivation of irrigated wheat, groundnuts andBasmati rice. The reasons are better prices for Basmati and availability ofshort duration wheat varieties.
5.8 There was a considerable change in the cultivation of rice. Thearea under coarse varieties dropped by 26% in the project areas (52% in non-project areas), and this was compensated for by an increase in basmati ricegrowing of 25% (57% for non-project areas). This trend probably reflectsfarmers' interest in earnings (basmati has a preferential price but yieldsare lower) rather than production per unit of land.
5.9 Other evidence in judging the project's impact is provided by a PECsurvey <1> of wheat in the 1984/85 vinter season (Table 14). The reportevaluates farmers adoption of reccmended practices. Results of this surveyindicate that adoption by CF is higier than by Non-Contact Farmers (NCF).Major problems appear to exist in tne adoption of fertilizer recommendations,pecifically at sowing time, the method of sowing and seed treatwent. Thetable also clearly indicates that farmers awareness of the recommendationsis high in general, but even higher among.t CF. A third interesting pointthat came out of the Evaluation was that FA were the main source ofinformation for CF followed by neighbouring farmers while amongst non-CFthis pattern was reversed. (See Table 15). Other sources through whichinformation is obtained are radio, TV and the press. However, the CFindication that only between 50-70% quote the FA as the source ofinformation indicates that a considerable improvement still remains possiblein the effectiveness of FA visits.
5.10 Other tables in the evaluation (as summarized in Table 17) indicatethat seed availability is a constraint for 31% of CF and that a quarter ofthe farmers prefer non-recommended wheat seed varieties. In the case of non-adoption of fertilizer recommendations, at sowing and after sowing, costsare the major factor (58% and 52%) while a number of farmers considersmal-eo doses of fertiliser sufficient, i.e. 25% of CF at sowing and 6% ofCF aft.r sowing. The above information could be used by ARF staff. to adjustdemonstration trials to evaluate farmers' ideas both in terms of realprofits and yields.
5.11 It is unfortunate that neartr to project completion no evaluationwas carried out using the same criteria as the Bench Mark survey of 1980.Such an evaluation would have produced objective information on the presentsituation which now is missing.
<1l> Monitoring of Punjab Extension and Agricultural Development Project(adoption of recomndations of Wheat Crop) Report No. 8 byPlanning and Evaluation Cell of Agr-Dep. Government of Punjab,Lahore.
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Factors Reducing Impact
5.12 Input supplies in the past were mainly provided through FA whoacted as selling agents. The Appraisal Report specifically stated that FAwould be released from all non-extension activities including the sales ofinputs. The GOP has complied with this stipulation since the introduction ofthe T & V system, although considerably later than was anticipated.
5.13 The adoption rate of recommended fertiliser practices has remainedlow. Fertilizers and pesticides are now available through commercialorganizations (both private and semi-private), although it appears thataccess to these inputs is not optimal, especially for the smaller farmers.Cost is a main constraint but it was clear that farmers found it alsodifficult to secure and transport their fertilizer requirements.
5.14 Pesticide supplies, which are far less bulky, are easier forfarmers to take to their fields. Intensive advertising campaigns bycommercial firms may lead to an overuse of pesticides which needs carefulfollow-up by extension staff.
5.15 Farmers are clearly Jisappointed that inputs are no longeravailable through FA and although the mission agrees that FA should not besalesmen, it is apparent that the present situation is not entirelysatisfactory. Input supply sales centres are now established at economicallyprofitable points. This automatically excludes remote farmers from easyaccess. There appears to be justification for the FA to function as aliaison between input supplier and farmers.
5.16 Credit is quoted as being adequately available for farmers. Fivedifferent institutions are providing credit in the province. Credit recoveryappears to be very good. It is reported, however, that credit officers paymore attention to large farmers and that small farmers' access to credit islimited due to difficulties in completing-application forms, etc. Here also,*FA could play a very positive role as a linkage between credit institutionsand farmers.
F. BANK PERFORMANCE
ProJect Design and Appraisal
6.1 The W6 appraisal mission produced a thorough and well preparedreport. While, particularly by the standards of the time, the appraisal waswell carried out in a professional manner, it is not surprising that now,eight years later, criticism can be made of a number of aspects.
6.2 It appears that it was the appraisal mission, as much as thegovernment, who favoured reduction of housing standards, particularlyreduction of plinth size and low cost construction methods. It was also theappraisal mission's view that by providing a house the field staff would bebetter off. Subsequent experience has shown that both these were falseassumptions.
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6.3 As with many projects of that period, successful implementation wasto be encouraged by staff motivation * through upgrading FA and payingallowances - and by the provision of 122 man-months of consultant time.Difficulties in getting staff grades changed and such a large quantity of TAaccepted might have been anticipated during appraisal. Similarly thedifficulty of posting staff of new types such as SSMS and SMS into theexisting, highly structured and inflexible Department of Agricultureestablishment might also have been recognised and remedies found. Thesecould have included giving thm positions to senior AO and giving themappropriate terms of reference rather than new post descriptions.Furthermore, perhaps WO could have taken more effective action to ensureearly approval of the project by the ECNEC, which proved to be essential forits success.
6.4 Numerous covenants were included in both the Development CreditAgreement (7) and the Project Agreement (15). These covered and sought tocontrol a wide range of pre-conditions for successful projectimplementation. In the event they had little beneficial effect on projectsuccess. OA and DAE as the implementing agency, faced with the realities ofbudget stringency, lack of qualified staff and instructions to take part invarious agricultural production campaigns were often powerless, despite thebest of intentions, to comply with the covenants agreed. A better formulawould have been to have a -uch reduced list of covenants, vigorouslyapplied. This could, for example, have prevented the continuous problem ofproject vehicles being requisitioned.
Supervision
6.5 Subsequent WB support to the project through fourteen supervisionmissions, involvement of staff from RMP and other W8 staff visits wasgenerally well timed and had a positive effect in maintaining the project'smomentum. For the vast majority of items considered and discussed by thesupervision mission their impact was positive and helpful. Perhaps onoccasions missions could have been still more imaginative in findingsolutions to particular problems. For example pressing for more senior AO tobe posted as SMS.
6.6 The mission formed the impression that there were twomisunderstandings over the role of the W8 - which although not WB's faultshould have bee6 clarified. The first was that Government expected moreassistance from WB in finding and selecting consultants. The WB did helpidentify suitable consultants, but held to the view that this was aGOP/GOPUNJAB responsibility. This position should have been made clear by Weto GOP/GOPUNJA8. The second case was with regard to building inspectionwhere it appears that the project felt that more inspection would beundertaken by the supervision missions.
G. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED
7i1 Overall, the project has been moderately successful in meeting itsbroad goals in spite of the numerous difficulties it has faced during itsimplementation including the delayed start. Staff problems were the mostsignificant constraint. The difficulties were in terms of availability,recruitment and staffing structure. Availability was a problem for most
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grades from AO upwards. For the FA, salary was too low. Other recruitmentinvolved establishing posts for categories of staff not previouslyspec4fied, such as SMS and SSMS.* The staff structure that has been developeddoes not work well. In many cases staff may be of similar grades andseniority but at varying levels of reshonsibility. For example ODA, SSMS andSTO all have the same grade. However, while the OA is the senior officer inthe district both SSMS and STO have technical responsiblities and in thecase of the SSMS also a line of command from the DA (Adaptive Research).This blurred situation, which appears symptomatic of the newness of theorganisation, is in marked contrast to older staff structures where eachposition in the hierarchy is clearly known and without any ambiguity. Theproblems are further compounded by payment or otherwise of field allowances.
7.2 Many of these problems were probably inevitable. However, thedifficulties could have been reduced by:
- minimising the extent of changes to staff structure, and tailoringthe project to the existing bureaucratic arrangements, imperfectthough these may have been;
- greater awareness and forewarning of likely difficulties bygovernment staff involved in project design during preparation andappraisal; or better still, preparation of staff structureproposals by government staff based on discussions with all thedepartments with an interest in the structure proposed.
7.3 Proposals for staff housing also caused problems. First there isthe whole question of need for houses. While government housing may benecessary and well accepted by more senior staff working at the tehsil ordistrict headquarters, in general it does not seem to be well received byFA. The main repsons for this are that FA may already have a house or livewith relations, or in accommodation provided by a landlord. Providing themwith government housing means that they lose their housing allowance, haveto pay rent and often find that the house is too small for their family,remote, poorly sited and constructed.
7.4 These difficalties could have been largely overcome by:
- not trying to provide housing for all but planning the housingprogramme on a district, tehsil or even on a case by case basis.For FA housing would generally not be required;
- where housing was required, buildings on good sites and groupingquarters into small colonies;
- where, in particular and in frequent instances, in remotesituations there was no possibility of an.FA finding accommodationproviding a small buildihg to be used as office/overnightaccommodation. No rental deduction would be made from the FA'ssalary for this "office";
- where full housing could be justified for any staff category foroperational reasons, constructing quarters to meet the governmentspecifications for each staff category;
- including in project staffing engineers and assistants to inspectthe construction work and organise subsequent building maintenancewhere the latter was not handled by the building department.
- 40 -
7.5 Although pr.ject experience with vehicles and equipment appears tohavi posed least problems, vehicles did not always fall into the hands thatthey were intended for and maintenance was largely neglected. With theexception of four wheel drive vehicles only about half the numbers of othertransport means were in fact procured. The project as prepared and appraisalappears to have been rather more liberal* than wa! really necessary onvehicles and sometimes also in specifications, as for example the 80 hptractors for Jhelum, where 65 hp tractors were procured. It was unfortunatethat the vehicles were procured early, adhering more closely to theappraisal schedule. As a result by the time that the project was starting towork more or less as designed, much of the transport had become worn out orbroken down. It would have been helpful if the project budget had made alarger provision for replacing transport, particularly bicycles, mopeds andmotorcycles in the final project year.
7.6 Both consultancies and training were highly problemat4c. To a largeextent the project which involved much innovation was implemented in asituation where nobody went to see other similar projects elsewhere, nor,with the exception of one extension and training specialist, was anyoneimported from outside.
7.7 The reasons for this included the following:
- reductions in the project as approved by the ECNEC;
- concern, particularly where consultants were to be financed out ofthe credit, as to whether it was cost effective;
- reluctance to recruit consultants until project staff were inplace;
- difficulties in recruitment, including identification of suitablecandidates and government clearance procedures both on technicalacceptability and cost;
- difficulties for government staff to obtain clearances for foreigntravel.
7.8 The problems might have been reduced by making the whole componenta UNDP project, which could have reduced the problems of governmentacceptance. Otherwise it is difficult to make any ;uggestions for additionalmeasures that could have been taken to'ensure the component's implementationas conceived at appraisal. During the last year the project has hadsuccessful experience with consultants for training and a series of staffvisits to countries with T & V systems are planned for early 1986.
7.9 Monitoring of the project by the Planning and Evaluation Call ofthe Agriculture Department (GOPULJAB) and evaluation by the Punjab EcononcResearch Institute hmr btbeen reasonably satisfactory to that it producedsome interesting data. Further improvement is however, nessary to developME into a useful management tool.
- 41 -
7.10 As discussed above the main constraints to project implementation(more or less in order of importance) were as follows:-
1) Staff recruitment and posting.
ii) Delay in complete project approval by ECNEC.
1ii) Difficulties with the staff housing programme.
iv) Virtual lack of implementation of the consultancy and trainingcomponent.
7.11 In converting the previously existing extension service from acampaign approach to a T & V system the aim was to improve the coverage andeffectiveness of the service and the accountability of its staff. Thisimprovement has occurred much more slowly than was originally anticipated.However, now that the new extension service anticipated at appraisal islargely both in place and functioning, its success wil' depend entirely onthe quality of messages for farmers. Whereas previously the FA and otheragricultural staff had several items to offer the farmer - advice, seeds,crop chemicals and assistance in operations such as spraying - now, underthe T & V system there is only the message. It is therefore vitallyimportant if the project is to achieve its final objectives for appropriatemessages to be given to the field staff. Moreover it is crucial that thesemessages should be based on an analysis, not of their impact -on production,but of their worth to the farmer in terms of income and return per farmfamily labour day.
7.12 Unless this can be achieved there will be. little merit inconversion from the campaign to the T & V extension system.
7.13 Improvement in extension messages must be the first priority.However, this will not be achieved overnight. At present the role of thefield staff could perhaps be, with advantage, slightly more flexiblyinterpreted to include more involvement in availability of inputr, creditand irrigation water. Assistance could be provided in coordinating likelyrequirements and availability of inputs, assisting farmers in obtainingcredit and resolving problems of irrigation water availability. Thisassistance would not detract to a significant extent from the T & V systemof operation. Much of any additional responsibility would devolve on the AO,who at the present time appears to be less than fully extended in his roleof supervising and supporting the FA.
- 42 - Attachment 1
Page 1
Extract from the SpeciaL Review of the AgriculturaLExtension and Adaptive Research Programme (T & V) inthe Punjab and Sind, Government of Pakistan, Planningand DeveLo .ment Division, Islamabad, March 1985,page 13 (The Punjab Project)
F. POINTS FOR CONSIDERATIONIRECOMMENDATIONS
44. Following points are worth considerationlrecommendation:
(i) Field Assistant is the focal point of the whole pro-gramme. He is a front line worker. In order to moti-vate him, it is essential that he may be granted a higherpay scale commensurate with his qualifications and ex-perience. The team recommends BPS-8 which has alsobeen recommended by the various committees in thepast. Alternatively, the ratio of grant of BPS-9 to one-third of the sanctioned strength of Field Assistants maybe enhanced to 50 per cent of the posts to provide betterservice prospects to them.
(ii) Suitable extension in the existing accommodation ofField AssistantlAgricultural Officer may be made sothat they are in a position to accommodate their familiescomfortably. In the meantime, standard rent based onthe accommodation under actual occupation of LheField Assistant may be determined and realised fromhim every month so that in lieu thereof he gets his fullhouse rent allowance.
(iii) In order to make the Field Assistant efficient and dedi-cated to his job, the team recommends creation of an-other cadre between Field Assistant and AgriculturalOfficer. This proposal will improve their career pros-pects and consequently their efficiency.
(iv) Presently. transport is provided.to the extension staff onhire purchase basis which, as stated earlier, does not
- 43 - Attachment IPage 2
14
involve any element ol compulsion. I he team recom-mends that motor cycles,cycles im iy be provided to ex-tension staff by the Government.
(v) Genuine T.A. may be paid to ext-ension statT for toursundertaken by them and fur this purpose, adequatefunds may be provided.
(vi) Inputs for demonstration plots may be provided to ex-tension staff by the Government.
(vii) Suitable awards may be paid to ellicient extension staffbased on their performance.
(viii) Frequent trans.ers ol extensiion stalt may be axi odedspecially of FA:AO in the interest of efficiency.
(ix) Certain quantity of seed of newly evolved varieties maybe distributed to the farmers through FA:AO alonewithpackage of technology.
(x) A suitable revolving fund may be placed at the disposalof responsible officers of Agriculture Department foradvancing credits in kind to the farmers in times ofemergency to be realised from them after crop har%cst.
(xi) Thc cssential inputs like seed, fcrtilizer, pesticides maybe made available at suitable sale points like LnionCouncil level and AO,FA should be given a,'thorityto ensure their quality. quantity and prices. Similarly,sprayers and other agricultural equipments may bemade available at such points.
(xii) Multi-dimensional approach for teaching the farmers isrequired. Farming community has different levels ofeducation, mostly farmers are illiterate, some are semi-literate and others are 'highly literate. The teachingshould cater to the requirements of all categories offarmers. The teachings should, therefore, include %%ideranging methods such as oral, visual and mobile exhi-bitions of agricultural products. The possibility of re-viving cinema vans for this purpose may also be con-sidered.
am WVE Om i~- 04A 2%....................... .................................... M .3 .............................................................
39
154
47 47 24 914 55
gul al 4
Ie 3340 995
cwi 313
1.5 be2 1 3
C~~
v
cr
PAKISTAN
PUNJAB EXTENSION AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(Credit 613-PAK)
Tractor Procurement 1/
Tvae at Provison as or the Provision as ner Actual ................... Phasing .................TracoI Anorasal RAnort E 1 Procured .
ea No.a foi EnL Ma.. On fara. .............. ARF ..............Contractina REL uharvesting
unit Jhel l um y Ag ggg g TalI
Ln80 hp (1978/79)) I - - - - - - 0wheeted )tractors 1979/80 ) - 2 to to - - o
1980/81 ) 30 - - - - - - - - -
1981/82 - - - - - - - - -
1962/83 - - 2 2 - - - - - 2
1983/84 - - 1 I - - - - .
1984/85 - - 1 t - - - a - -
30 3 14 14 10 1 I I - - 14
I/ In addition the Appraisal Report Included proposals for purchase of four 45 hp tractors in 1979. five 10 hp tractors.one in 1970/79 and four in 1979/80. These were dropped in the PC-I and were never,procured.
C-r
PAKISTAN
PUNJA8 EXTENSION AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(Credit 813-PAK)
Location and Condition of Transoort Vehicles and Tractor. in November 198M Jt 1
PUNJAB'EXTENSION AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(Credit-813-PAK)
Allocation of Credit Disbursements
Credit disbursements were proposed at appraisal as follows <1>
a) 50% of expenditures for the construction of housing, stores andtraining and research facilities;
b) 100% of foreign expenditures for directly imported vehicles andequipment; or 100% of local expenditures (ex-factory) for locallymanufactured vehicles and equipment procured through ICB; or 70% oflocal expenditures for vehicles and equipment procured locallyother than through ICB;
c) 30% of total salaries and travel allowances for all staff involvedin the project; and
d) 100% of expenditures for consultants services and overseastraining.
Proposed and actual credit disbursements are as follows:-
Appraisal_Report Proposals 2/ Actual.............. 0 M Mittimi_ .............
Buildings 2.4 3.53Equipment and Transport 3.0 1.99Incremental Operating Costs 3.7 3.17Consultant and Training Costs 1.5 0.10
/ The accounts were kept open for disbursements until 31 December, 1985.
- 56 -
Table 12
PAKISTAN
PUNJAB EXTENSION AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(Credit 813-PAK)
Project Reporting Record 1/
Reports Required
Type Frequency Entity Reporting Format Agreed
1. Progress Quarterly DOA No2. Audit Yearly 0OA No
Reports Received
Progress ......... * ....... Audited Accounts
Date Required Date Received 2/ Date Required Date Submitted
03.31.81 x 12.31.81 04.18.3206.30.81 x 12.31.82 07.19.8309.30.81 x 12.31.83 05.13.8412.31.81 x 12.31.84 04.29.8503.31.82 11.30.84 12.31.85 SDrinq 8606.30.82 11.30.8409.30.82 11.30.8412.31.82 11.30.8403.31.81 11.30.8406.30.83 11.30.8409.30.83 11.30.8412.31.83 11.30.8403.31.84 11.30.8406.30.84 N.A.09.30.84 April 8512.31.84 April 8503.31.85 /06.30.85 -
j/ This table follows the American convention for month/day/year andis based on information provided by supervision missions inOctober 1984 and May 1985 and by DOE in their comments an'the draft PCR.Project accounts were never sent to IDA orior to a dit.
/ Since this reporting requirement started in Noveer 1984. thereis no exact record of date received previous in 1984.
-/ Under preparation in-May 1985.
Table 13Page 1
PAKISTAN
PUNJAB EXTENSION AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(Credit 813-PAK)
Details on Training Programe
A. Courses
1. W C g
Dates - 195 Duration Type of Warkshop ParticipantsWeeks)
12 - 24 January 2 Trainer SSMS, SMS, Directors26 January -7 February and Instructors, ATI
9 - 21 February 2 Extension AD
4- 17 Narch 2 Extension Organisation DDA. ADA
2. Advanced Courses
12 - 25 October 2 Extension Organisation DDA, ADA
26 October - 8 November 2 Media Information Staff + 1 AO ofeach District
9 - 22 Noveer 2 Fare Nanage met Farm Managers of ARFs andGovernment Fars and FareSupervisors.
M §*Mel t* 64.1 CA 21.6 3.4 132 39.4 1.5 47.8 12.1
7.1 23.4 9.5 149 31.3 2.5 47.7 19.2
Table 16
PAKISTAN
PUNJAB EXTENSION AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(Credit 813-PAK)
List of Publications of Planning and Evaluation Cell
Monitoring Surveys of the Extension Service
Date
1. Report No. 1 1st June 1981 Published2. Report No. 4 2nd June 1982 Published3. Report No. 5 3rd June 1983 Published4. Report No. 6 4th June 1984 Published5. Report No. 7 5th June 1985 Published
Monitoring Surveys of Adaptive Research
1. Report No. 2 May 1982 Published
Monitoring of Training Programme
1. Report No. 3 May 1982 Published
Evaluation Survey on Adoption of Recommendations of Wheat Crop
1. Report No. 8 June 1985 Published
Independent Studies
1. Bench Mark Survey of Punjab Extension and Agricultural DevelopmentProject (1980); Division of Education and Extension University of
Agriculture, Faisalabad. Published 1984.
2. Monitoring and Evaluation of Training and Visit System ofAgricultural Extension in Punjab. Published by Punjab EconomicResearch Council, November 1984.
3. Special Review of the Agricultural Extension and Adaptive ResearchProgramme (T & V) in the Punjab and Sind; Government of Pakistan,Planning and Development Division, Islamabad. Published 1985.
sugarcane Area *000 ba 09 19 24 27 25 25 23ProcO'n '000 ton 685 768 986 3.084 695 1.035 839Vloed ton/bm 36 41.47 41.00 40.00 27.80 44.40 36.49
ýlutth11211~
Area *000 ba 100 75 29 42 45 57 74be) Prod'sh *000 ton 174 120 48 75 83 los %42
vleid t~ hv. 1.74 1.60 1.69 1.78 1.84 1.04 1.92
0bce Area '000 ba 92 116 354 349 138 031 Is(nazinatil Prod'n '000 ton 125 136 191 eee 169 14% $42
vield ton/ba 1.36 1.%7 1.24 1.26 b.21 1.07 b.23
As tod '009) 40.3 221 229 224 240 5144 2'11 2.44Ps ud , ob 009) too 329 397 430 442 4,341 0 J(AlV t e 1 cl toelblib.* 9.49 4.73 1 .132 1.64 1 fit§ .!§.* % . sta
10
Main Crop Production by Ostricts in Protect AreA
..ibtrict and Croo UniL 1978/79 1979/g AQ 980/1981 198/82 1982/83 19a3/84 1984/85
SIND AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION AND ADAPTIVE RESEARCH PROJECT(CREDIT 922-PAK)
March 12, 1986
South Asia Projects DepartmentGeneral Agriculture I Division
PAKISTAN
SIND AGRICULTURAL AND ADAPTIVE RESEARCH PROJECT (Cr.922-PAK)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
A. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The province of Sind occupies about a fifth of Pakistan. It hasabout 23% of the country's population (19.0 million out of 84.3 million in1981) and, after the Punjab, is the second most productive provinceagriculturally. Over a very long period the province's agriculture has beendeveloped, particularly by expansion of irrigated area. Projects in the1970s included those supported by USAID for watercourse improvement inirrigated areas and by the World Bank (WB) for salinity control, tile
drainage, seed improvement, and agricultural credit.
1.2 Agriculture in Pakistan accounted for an estimated 25% of theCountry's total GOP in 1984/85. Annual growth over the Fifth Plan period (FY1978-83) expanded at an average annual rate of 4.2%, that led to self-sufficiency in wheat and sugar. Improvements were also effected inavailability of irrigation water and crop inputs. Subsequently, in FY 1984mainly due to adverse weather and pest attacks, agriculture value addeddeclined by 6.1% in FY 1984 but increased again by an estimated 9.9% in FY1985, largely because of a record cotton crop, and by 6.5% in FY86.
1.3 Sind has a total area of almost 35 million acres (14 million ha),about 40% is classified as cultivable of which around 57%, or almost 8million acres (3.2 million ha), is irrigated. The climate is very dry with arainfall of 2 - 3 inches in the north to 6 - 7 inches in the south, mostlyoccurring between June and September and almost all crops are grown withirrigation. Most of the irrigated land lies in the Indus Msin where soilsare alluvial and of generally high pH (8.0-8.5) and very often suffer fromwaterlogging .and salinity problems. Irrigation water availability isfrequently less than adequate, particularly for farmers at the tail end ofcanals.
1.4 There are two principal cropping seasons; kharif from mid-April to
mid-October; and rabi from mid-October to mid-April.77 kharif the maincrops are cotton, rice, sugarcane and millet and in rabi wheat, andoilseeds. About 50% of farms are from 5-12.5 ac (2.5 ha) and a further 17%
from 12.5-25 ac, (5-10 ha). About half the farms are operated by tenants asshare croppers.
1.5 The Simd Agricultural Extension and Adaptive Research Project(SAEARP) was 'intended to support past and on-going projects through
strengthened agricultural extension and adaptive research in five districts,
and through lower investment support operations in the remaining seven
districts. Estimated cost was US$13.8 million, of which US$9.0 million would
be as IDA Credit.
- /4 -
Tnforimation sources for the PCR include: The Sind AgriculturalExtemion and Adaptive Research Project (SAEARF) Identification Report bythe FAO/CP (No.14/76 PAK.11 of 28 May, 1976); The SAERP Appraisal Report(No. 2387a-PAK of May 7, 1979); The Project and Development CreditAgreements of June 12, 1979; SAEARP supervision reports; FAO/CP ProjectBrief on SAEARP second phase (No. 17/85 CP-PAK.24 PB of 11 February, 1985);the Government of Sind (GOSIN0) PCI and draft PCIV documents of the SAEARPof 1980 and 1985; and the project files of the WB in Washington. Iraddition, during its visit in December 1985 the P:R mission received i.SAEARP Completion Report produced by the Directcr aeneral (Extension andAdaptive Research) of the Department of Agriculture, GOSINO, which formeothe basis for this report. The PCR mission also had discussions withfarmers, project staff and staff of the WB Resident Mission in Pakistan(RMP).
s. PROJECT FORMULATION
Oricin
2.1 Following the World Bank (W8) March/April 1975 Special AgricultureSector Review <1> the Government of Pakistan requested the Bank's assistancein the preparation and financing of a project to improve agriculturalcxtension and research in Sind. Accordingly, FAO/World Bank CooperativeProgrmRm (CP) missions visited Sind in October/November 1975 andFebruary/March 1976 and prepared an identification report. <2> It wasproposed that as. a first phase, the project would be concentrated inNawabshah district and benefit around 50,000 families. Project costs over afour year period were estimated at around US$8.4 million, about 60% of whichwas for production credit, 20% for watercourse and access road and marketimprovements and around 20% for strengthening agricultural extension andresearch ana for technical assistance. Subsequent project preparation wasundertaken by GOP/GOSIND without external assistance. The GOSINb proposalswere generally in line with those made at identification but were furtherrefined and elaborated.
Project Appraisal
2.2 The project was appraised by W in November 1978. At appraisal theproject had been much expanded to provide for complete reorganisation of theagricultural extension service in the five districts of Hyderabad, Sanghar,Nawabshah, Sukkur and Larkana with a lower level of investment in theremaining seven districts of the province. During the process of projectpreparation and appraisal there had been a steady'increase in emphasis onextension and research components and reduction in size or deletion of othercomponents. Most notably it was decided by WB that all credit aspects wouldbe included in the Fourth Agricultural Credit Loan and that proposals for
<1> Report 922a-PAK, January 28, 1976, World Bank<2> Report 14/76 PAK 11 May 28, 1976. FA0/World Bank Cooperative
Programme (CP)..
access roads and watercourse rehabilitation would be dropped.
2.3 The project concept was to close the gap between the agriculturalpractices used by the relatively few innovative farmers and the majority oftraditional farmers. Earlier production increases had come 'argely frominvestment in irrigation and introduction of high yielding varieties. Lessemphasis had been given to better cultural and management practices. rhe aimwas therefore to enable a massive transfer of technology regarding alreadyproven, simple improvements to take place.
2.4 The project was to enable an increase in extension staff,separation of extension and non-extension activities, reorganisation andstrengthening of supervision, provision of housing and vehicles and theestablishment of four Adaptive Research Farms (ARF) to provide carefullyfocussed and well tested extension messages. Initially, the extensionmessages were derived from agricultural research stations findings. The mainrecommendations on use of seed, fertilisers and pesticides were summarisedin the appraisal report (Report No. 2387a-PAK Table 5.1). These messageswere to be further refined and new messages generated by the ARF.
2.5 Extension Staff. In the five districts the number of FieldAssistants (FA) was to be increased to give a ratio of one FA per 660 farmfamilies and the number of Agricultural Officers (AO) was to increase toenable each AO to supervise 6 FA. Each district administrative sub-division(tehsil) was to be the responsibility of an Assistant Director ofAgriculture (ADA). Fifteen ADA were to be appointed allowing one ADA per 6or 7 AO and they would report in turn to Deputy Directors of Agriculture(ODA) one in charge of each District. In addition to one already existingDirector of Agriculture (DA), responsible for Extension Operations a furtherthree were to be appointed as Project Executive Officer, Director ofAdaptive Research and Information Officer. The four DA were to report to anewly appointed Director General (Extension) (DG).
2.6 Extension Training Staff. Each district was to have three SubjectMatter Specialists (SMS) for plant protection, agronomy and training. Theywere to assist the AO and FA in their work and carry out the fortnightlytraining of the FA, under the general guidance of a Senior Training Officer(STO).
2.7 Adaptive Research Farms (ARF). Four farms would be established tocarry out trials and develop extension messages. These farms were to bestaffed by 14 Senior Subject Matter Specialists (SSMS) of similar grade toODA and STO and equivalent in training and qualifications to Senior ResearchOfficers working at the Agricultural Research Institute (ARI) and the RiceResearch Institute (RRI). Each ARF was to have three SSMS, namely anagronomist, a crop specialist and a plant protection specialist. Inaddition, two of the ARF were to have farm. planning and managementspecialists. The SSMS were to divide tHeir time equally between the ARF andsupporting the SMS and AO. On each farm there were also to be two ResearchAssistants, three FA and non-technical staff. An AD, acting as farm manager,would be in charge of equipment and ,ay to day farm operations.Responsibility for research activities was to be given to a speciallyappointed Director of Agriculture (DA) (Adaptive Research). Two of the ARFwere also to have laboratories and staff for soil analysis. Each farm was tobe provided with a 55 hp and a 10 hp tractor with draught animals and avariety of implements.
2.8 Other Services. The project was also to establish a TechnicalInformation Unit and appoint four agricultural graduates as pest scouts inNawabshah District.
2.9 Extension Services in Remaining Districts. Staffing proposals forthe rema;ining seven districts were as follows:
1) The ratio of AO to FA was to be 1:6 - the same as in the fivedistricts.
ii) Three SMS were to be posted in each of the seven districts withsimilar duties to those in the five districts and similarlysupported by the ARF and SSMS.
The redeployment of staff proposed implied increasing staff in the fivedistricts and a decrease in staff in the seven districts.
2.10 Staff Quarters and Other 8uildings. The proposed building programmewas to be confined to the five districts and was to include construction of669 houses for allF A, AO and ARF staff, of farm buildings and offices forthe four ARF, of two soil testing laboratories and 15 ADA office complexeswith training centres.
2.11 Staff Transport. The project would provide FA with bicycles; AO andSMS with motorcycles, except the SMS for training, who was to have a half-ton pick-up truck. Bicycles and motorcycles were to be purchased on creditterms by the users, who would be eligible for travel allowances. -
2.12 Officers above AO rank were to be provided with suitable inspectionvehicles and each district provided with a pick-up truck. for transport ofmaterials. In addition, four 4-wheel drive vehicles were to be provided forthe pest scouts and eight 4-wheel drive vehicles, 10 motorcycles and 30bicycles were to be provided for construction supervision.
2.13 The total number number of cycles and motorcycles required wasreduced at appraisal to take account of distributions made in 1978. Totaltransport to be purchased was as follows:
2.14 Technical Assistance. A substantial programme of technicalassistance was proposed to help start up the T and V system, to provideexpertise on matters not previously covered by the Department, for stafftraining, organization of the soils laboratories, and to initiate aprogramme of project monitoring and evaluation. In total, 55 man-months ofconsultancy were proposed. Two vehicles, cameras, projectors, officemachines and equipment were to be provided for use by the consultants. Tofinance study tours for government staff involved in the project, anallocation of USS50,CO was included in project costs, and the same amountprovided for an anro.al monitoring survey to be conducted by the Tando JamAgricultura.1 university.
- 77 -
2.15 Overall implementation responsibility was to rest with the
Department of Agriculture and, within it, primarily with the AgriculturalExtension Directorate. The Director of Adaptive Research was to report to
the Director General (Extension) but was to maintain close contact with ARIand RRI.
2.16 Total project costs, including contingencies, were estimated atRs141,26 million, or USS14.27 million, with a foreign exchange component of
about 30%.
C. IMPLEMENTATION
Start-Un
3.1 The credit (US$9 million) was approved by the Board on 29 May, 1979
and signed on 12 June, 1979. However credit effectiveness was dependent on
approval of the project by the Executive Committee of the National Economic
Council (ECNEC). The government project document (PCI) was finally approvedon 10 February, 1981,.and the credit became effective on*12 June, 1981, twoyears after being signed, and after eight extensions of the effectivenessdeadline. One of the main factors which prevented approval of the PCI werediscussions within government over national extension policies and concernover the increase in recurrent costs, particularly salaries and allowanceswhich the project would cause.
3.2 A consequence of the lack of approval was very slow start up of theproject. Since the Department of Agriculture had already changed to a T andV extension in mid 1978, there was a slow but steady development in respectof method of operation, preparation of manuals, definition of duties, andsystems of reporting as well as some redeployment and recruitment of staff.However no capital expenditure was incurred until the 1981/82 year. Once
approved by the ECNEC, the project made better progress, but the poorsecurity situation existing in the early years hindered effectiveimplementation, and it was declared a problem project by the February 1982supervision mission.
Changes in Project Design
3.3 The main changes in project design during implementation were toproject scope and technical assistance. The project as appraised was to
operate at two levels of intensity, a higher level of investment in five
districts and a much lower level in the remaining seven districts. Followingthe February 1981 supervision and eeview mission, it was decided that inview of the poor progress at that time, project investments and activitiesshould be exclusively in the five districts.
3.4 The technical assistance component was greatly modified, asdetailed in paras.3.29 - 3.32, total man-months falling from 55 at appraisal
to 38 in the final UNOP project documents.
3.5 At apcraisal, it had been agreed between GOSIND and the WB thatplinth size of housing would be reduced. Area for staff of National PayScale (NPS) 17 (A0/SMS/ADA) would decline from 1,500 to 900 sq ft and forNPS 5-9 (FA) from 606 to 560 sq ft. Despite this agreement, initial buildingareas were more or less in line with government standards, until the SindPlanning and Development Department decided in late 1981 to reduce plinthareas on cost considerations as follows:
Specified Area per Unit %Up to late 1981 SUbsequently reduTtion
. ... . . (sq ft) ..........
FA house 610 550 10AO house 1,000 850 15ADA office and training centre 1,200 1,000 17Vehicle and cattle shed 1,050 800 24Adaptive research farm complex 3,000 2,000 33
3.6 In October 1983, GOP/GOSINO and IDA agreed that the proposed ARF atKumb in Hyderabad District should be resited in Larkana District.
Imolementation Experience
3.7 Staffing. Once the project had received ECNEC approval,redeployment of existing field staff and recruitment of additional staffproceeded at a reasonable rate. As set out in both the appraisal report andthe PCI, to achieve a ratio of 1 FA per 660 farm families required 594 FAwithin the five districts, or creation of 219 new FA positions. Supervisionby AO with one per 6 FA required a total of 99 AO, including 8 newpositions. These staffing levels were achieved for FA from 1982/83 onwardsand for AO for the whole period, starting 1979/80 (Table 2). At appraisal,FA were expected to be recruited from the Sakrand Agriculture TrainingInstitute and by promotion of a number of skilled labourers (beldars) towork as FA. However, initially the FA posts were not attractive tograduates of the Institute and posts were filled by transfer from non-project districts or by recruitment/promotion on an ad hoc basis.
3.8 At appraisal it was anticipated that FA wages would be increasedfrom NPS 5 to 9. This has never been achieved although"in 1984 the NationalPay Commission increased FAs salary from NPS grade 5 to 6 and one-third ofall FAs was upgraded to NPS grade 9. The provincial government would beprepared to increase FA to NPS 8, but this proposal has never been agreedwith GOP. Similarly at appraisal it was proposed that FA receive a traveland daily allowance. It was finally agreed that this would be paid to FA atthe rate of Rs70 per month. However, due to budget stringency payment ofallowances has been erratic. SSMS and'SMS staff recruitment was delayed dueto the non-existence of these posts in the Pakistan Civil Service. Theestablishment of these posts took a long time and when completed the projectmanagement still found it difficult to recruit, as qualified staff preferredto remain in the research institutions. At project completion 4 out of 14SSMS sanctioned posts remained unfilled.
3.9 The appointments of some senior staff have been seriously delayed.The replacement of the Director-General (Extension), who was transferred onpromotion took a considerable time (from February.1983 to early 1984). Thepost of Director of Agriculture (Adaptive Research) was only filled on an ad
.hoc, and-uconLimaed..basis..untL recantl.. but .the. .Dixctor...appointed .wiTT
- 79 -soon be retiring from the service. Also senior field staff (Deputy Directors andAssistant Directors) were mostly appointed on an a h.cSbasis, resulting in lowmorale.
3.10 The proposals -at appraisal that staff would purchase theirtransport on credit has not worked well. Staff receive salary slips from theOffice of the Accountant General, Sind. These are presented to the TreasuryOfficer in each District and payment made. There is no mechanism fordeductions to be made from salary for repayment of vehicle purchase and forthe amounts deducted to be repaid to the project. The project has tried toadopt the principle of staff ownership of cycles and motorcycles byproviding these to staff and accepting repayments. However, repaymentperformance has not been satisfactory and the arrangements have been furthercomplicated by posts being filled on an ad hoc basis and by staff transfersand staff leaving the service, where in both cases, staff take theirtransport with them. Repayment performance has also clearly suffered fromnon-payment of travel allowances.
3.11 Staff Quarters and Other Buildings. The Building Section of theGOSIND Communication and Works Department was responsible for allconstruction. Work started in 1981/82 but it was not until the subsequentyear that the programme really got into its stride. With WB's encouragement,GOSIND sought to reduce the cost of housing, both by reducing the area andthe standards of construction (para. 3.5). Since the housing was below thestandards set by the Sind Communications and Works Department (SCWO), theywere not permitted to be responsible for maintenance, which devolved on UAE.The importance of adequate building maintenance was recognised in theProject Agreement when it was made a covenant (Section 3.03). However, todate apparently little or no maintenance has been carried out. Thisunsatisfactory situation is mitigated to some extent by the fact that sincethe building programme was delayed the average age of housing and subsequentneed for maintenance has, so far, been less than originally estimated.
3.12 The building programme 'is now complete as Table 3 shows. Inaddition to reaching the targets set in the appraisal report, the projecthas provided ADA houses, offices and training centres in line with theincreased proposals set out in the PC1.
3.13 Location of staff housing proved a major problem in the buildingprogramme. Although nearly RsO.9 million (US$88,000) was allocated for landpurchase at appraisal, none of this was spent, in general sites beingdonated to DAE. Largely as a result, many of the staff quarters were locatedon remote and poor sites. In general, construction standards appear to meetthe specifications and the finish of the buildings is good. Adequatesupervision and management of construction was made difficult, because thevehicles proposed at appraisal and financE4 by the project, were in factused for other purposes and were never handed over to the supervisoryengineers as originally intended. Since the houses were substandard in termsof area, the mission understood that they were not favourably regarded bythe staff expected to live in them. A further and *more significant reasonfor the field staff's general dislike*of the housing arrangements was that,in contrast with the appraisal report expectation that they would be betteroff (see para. 2.10), in the event they lost. Not only did they cease toreceive a housing allowance, equivalent to about 20% of salary, but inaddition had to pay a rental deduction equivalent to about 5% of salary.Consequently in a number of cases FA houses remained unoccupied.
3.14 Staff Transoort. Numbers of vehicles purchased were as proposed atappraisal, although the project's late start resulted in a totally differentphasing (Table 5). At government request IDA retroactively financed 22 four-wheel drive vehicles which.had been purchased in FY 1978/79.
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3.15 Bicycles and motorcycles were intended to be provided to staff on ahire purchase basis. However, in many cases they were not and remainedgovernment owned. Problems included non-repayment and difficulty in caseswhere staff were posted on an ad hoc And unconfirmed basis.
3.16 With the larger vehicles the main, and perhaps inevitable problem,was that of allocation, since senior staff both witHin and outside theproject on occasions monopolised the transport to the detriment of the fieldstaff for whom it was procured. The poor security situation in the earlyproject period helped this tendency and Also provided the excuse forrequisitioning of vehicles by army/police 4thorities. Another generalproblem has been lack of adequate maintenatee and servicing of vehicles,mainly as a result of budget limitations.
3.17 Equipment. There appear to have been no major problems inequipping the ARF; procurement of audio-visual and other information andtraining equipment and equipment of the soils laboratories. The latter wasboth ordered and-arrived late.
3.18 Adaptive Research Farms. Under the project, research work has beenstepped up through the development of four Adaptive Research Farms (ARF) onexisting government farms at Oderolal, Ghotki, Padidan and Larkana.Oevelipment of the farms was considerably delayed and only towards the endof the project period were buildings completed, farm machinery and equipmentreceived and a programme developed. This poor performance reflected the latestart of project activities in general, constraints in recruitment of s#affand appointment of a permanent and full time Director Adaptive Research,slow implementation of the technical assistance component and delays inarrival of equipment.
3.19 The post of Director Adaptive Research was to be filled in thesecond year of project activities. Theoretically this was done but theencumbent carried out dual duties. It was not until well into the final yearof project activities that a separate director was appointed who is only sixmonths away from retirement.
3.20 The soil laboratories in the two ARF were expected to startoperating in year two and three of the project. At project completion civilworks were completed but water and electricity were not connected and nofurniture was installed. Most of the equipment was still in its packingcases while some had not yet been delivered to the site.
3.21 The above mentioned delays in making the soil laboratoriesoperational have caused delays on 3 ARFs for a reclamation programme that isneeded on saline soils on these farms.
Training
3.22 Provision for training was made under the project through atechnical assistance component, but was not executed until the very finalstages of the project period. Training was to consist of training oftrainers, and training of extension staff.
3.23 Staff training was conducted through the assistance of consultantsover two periods, each in the early and latter part of 1984. In the firstperiod a special workshop was organised for SMS staff and one ExtensionOrganisation Workshop for ADA staff. In addition two Extension Workshooswere given for AOs. All worksbos. were of a duration of two weeks. The basic
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courses of the first period were followed by a series of th.-ee workshops inthe latter part of 1985 when more detailed training was given in ExtensionOrganisation; Media; Farm Management; and Advance Training Methodology.
3.24 The purpose of the workshop was to improve skills, capabilities andunderstanding of the staff and thus the effectiveness of the project. Majorsubjects of these courses are specified in Table 10 while the methodologyconsisted, amongst others, of group exercises, field trips, demonstrations,discussions, lectures, practical experience and case studies.
3.25 Total participation was around 100 staff members from theDepartment of Agriculture and the Agricultural Training Institute who allattended first the basic course most related to their work and later theadvanced course. The consultants conducted in addition to these courses aspecial Project Management workshop of one week which was attended by theDirector General, the Directors of Agriculture as well as the DeputyDirectors of Agriculture.
3.26 In addition to the Training Workshops one workshop of two weekseach was given especially on Adaptive Research and one workshop, also of'twoweeks, on Monitoring and Evaluation. While the first workshop was attendedby 23 staff members, the latter one was conducted for the members of staffof the Monitoring and Evaluation Cell (MEC).
3.27 Inlormation Unit. The Unit has been established although withdelays and has started to operate. A series of pamphlets has been preparedon major topics but so far little has been done on preparation of cassettesand audio-visual aid materials, as equipment was received only at projectcompletion.
3.28 Cotton Pest Scouting. Althougp four pest scouts were to be postedin Nawabshan in the first year of the project (1979/80), only two wereappointed in 1982/83 and the remaining two in 1984/85. The performance ofthis component remained therefore much below appraisal expectation.
Technical Assistance
3.29 As provided in the appraisal report, the project included atechnical assistance component consisting of US$0.5 million for 55 man-months of consultancy and an additional US$0.2 million for equipment. Thetechnical assistance was to be provided by UNOP as a grant and executed bythe World Bank.
3.30 Accordingly, in mid-1979 proposals for technical assistance weredrafted as envisaged in the appraisal report and including 55 man-months ofconsultant time. The project document PAK/79/011 was subsequently altered toreflect need for particular specialists and the UNOP project document of8 April 1981 provides for 67 man-monthd as follows:-
Man-months
Extension and Training 24Farm Planning 18Monitoring and Management Info--mation 10Evaluation 12Short-Term Consultants 3
Total 67
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Besides the above specialists the document made provision for supportingstaff, training and equipment with a total project cost 3f USS705,200.
3.31 The document was signed by WB.as executing agency on 4 August 1981.Due to bureaucratic delays, appointment of consultants was not finalised byGOP/GOSINO until February 1982. In the meantime, UNOP expressed concernabout the lack of progress of the project which IDA had listed as a problemproject in February 1982. Therefore, the project agreement was not signed byUNOP or GOP, although the prospect of technical assistance was kept aliveuntil the project was reviewed in February 1983. The latter review suggesteda reduction to 38 man-months. The PAK/79/011 project which had never beensigned by either UNOP or GOP had in the meantime been cancelled and theFebruary review suggested that of the 38 man-months, 18 man-months in FY1983 and FY 1984 would be funded from the UNOP project PAK/78/044, which was alrea(providing technical assistance for Punjab, and the balance of 20 man-months financtby a new project. However, agreement between GOP and UNOP on these proposals werealso delayed. In order to provide some technical assistance for adaptive.researchand training programmes, IDA provided funding from its own budgef for 2.5 man-montin May 1983.
3.32 Finally, it was agreed to apply funds remaining under the UNDP projectPAK/78/044, "Agricultural Extension in Punjab/Sind", about US$189,000 to cover 18man-months of technical assistance for Sind. Also, a new UNOP project documentPAK/83/016 was signed in early November 1983. 'In addition to funds for 20 man-months of consultancy, the project included finance for staff training abroad. Thetotal UNOP contribution amounted to US$273,000 and GOP/GOSind provided Rs 160,000in kind.3.33 The UNDP PAK/78/044 project was fully disbursed in 1985 but due to thelate start PAK/83/016 had -.o be extended to 1986 during which year also funds undithat project were fully committed but not fully disbursed as shown in Table 9.
3.34 The technical assistance provided under the UNDP projects was very successful. With this assistance the adaptive research activities were launched and theM&E unit was made operational. The training consultants also held some veryappreciated workshops and, although less than planned, some staff were sent abroadfor training under these projects.
3.35 Monitoring and Evaluation. The appraisal report consideredMonitoring and Evaluation (M & E) as an essential component and it wasagreed that a base survey would be conducted by the Sind Regional PlanningOrganisation (RPO). Delays in project implementation, in particular lack ofappointment of consultants under the technical assistance component, causedserious delays. It had been anticipated that during implementation 2-3surveys would be carried out as a follow-up on the base survey, to becarried out at the start of the project. However, no base survey has beendone and the only M & E survey conducted was completed in October 1985. Thedata then collected had not beeen analysed at the time of the mission'svisit and only some impressions were given by the RPO staff involved.
3.36 Periodic project M & E was supposed to be carried out by the MECwhich was to have been established at the start of the project. However,staff recruitment was seriously delayed and the Director of MEC onlyappointed during the last project year. The MEC has carried out two surveysof the rabi crop (1984/85) and the kmarif crop (1985).
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Project Costs*
3.37 Total project costs including contingencies were estimated atappraisal at Rsl41.26 million (03$14.27 million) compared to an actualexpenditure of Rsl4-7.14 million (USS11.21 million), as set c-it in Table 1and summarised below:
Appraisal Actual Actual as %o? Appraisal
Rs million .... .... % ....
Land acquisition 0.87 0.0 0Civil works 77.12 73.19 95Equipment and Transport: Vehicles 16.08 14.01 87Incremental Operating Costs 37.82 53.14 141Consultants and Training 9.36 6.80 73
Total 141.26 147.14 104
3.38 No expenditure was incurred for land purchase. Cost savings forcivil works were due to*lower than projected spending on engineering andadministration (-63%) and for construction of training centres, ARF andsoils laboratories (-5%), less than fully offset by increased cost of staffhousing (+3%).
3.39 Expenditure on equipment and transport was less than originallyprojected (-13%), while incremental operating costs were significantlyhigher (+ 41%) and expenditure on consultants and training was .considerablyless (-27%) than SAR although available UNOP grants were fully utilized.
Disbursement
3.40 Appraisal proposals and actual disbursements by I0A (Tables 7 and8) were as follows:
Appraisalroposals Actual .
... UTmillion) ..
Civil works 7.50 4.87Equipment and transport 1.00 0.96
Sub-total 8.50 5.83
Unallocated 0.50
Total 9.00 5.83
3.41 Credit disbursement proceeded very slowly. Disbursement onlystarted in the second half of FY 1983, by which time it had been estimated,at appraisal, that the credit wculd be 97% disbursed. Rate of disbursementsubsequently improved so that at the anticipated completion of disbursementat the end of FY 1984 in fact 29% of the credit had been used. At the finalclosing of accounts at the end of December 1985, US$5.83 million or 65% ofthe credit had been disbursed, the balance of US$3.17 being cancelled,
ff -- 1- '31 1- 1 -t
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3.42 Financing by UNOP in 1984 and 1985 totalled US$324,000 (Table9) compared with USS690,000 at appraisal.
Procurement
3.43 There were no major difficulties in procurement of projectrequisites. Building construction was the responsiblity of the SindCommunications and Works Department. They in turn employed a number ofcontractors to construct the buildings. These arrangements worked well asfar as building specifications were concerned but led to difficulties overreceiving and processing of invoices and Consequent delays in submittingreimbursement applications to IDA.
3.44 No major difficulties were reported in vehicle procurement.Equipment for the soils laboratories was both ordered and delivered late.
D. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT
General
4.1 More difficulties were encountered by the Sind Department ofAgriculture (0OA), and within OA, cAe Directorate of Agricultural Extension(DAE) in the exacution of the agreed project, than had been anticipated atappraisal. This was partly due to external factors, in particular thesecurity problems during the early project yeas, lack of project approvalby the ECNEC and difficulties in recruiting additional staff. The failure toupgrade FA from NPS 5 to 9 and the lack of technical assistance also damagedthe project. <1>- The low salaries of FA made recruitment of suitablyqualified staff initially ' very difficult and lowered motivation and morale.The lack of technical assistance meant that until mid 19 " there was not theinjection of experience of T and V by external consult&arts, nor were staffable to go and see T and V systems in operation outside Pakistan. Withoutthe experience which TA would have provided the project's management andstaff had to find their own way and consequently moved slowly.
4.2 It is arguable whether appointment of staff could have beenachieved faster. Certainly the difficulty in appointing a full time regularDirector Adaptive Research and SSMS were major constraints in getting theARF established and operating. Lack of a full time Director General*forabout a year in 1983/84 also slowed the project's progress. Even when staffwere finally posted it was often on an ad hoc basis and there was a longdelay before the appointments were con?Tme.. In addition the staffstructure proposals which were evolved during project preparation andappraisal did not work smoothly, as discussed in para. 7.2 below.
<1> All FA were eventually upgraded from NPS 5 to 6 while in addition30% were promoted to NPS 9.
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4.3 Observations by the RPO staff responsible for the 1985 survey(para. 3.35) indicate that many farmers have more experience than theaverage AO employed; let alone FA. Alco the selection of Contact Farmers(CF) was beset with difficulties. There is a high percentage of absenteefarmers, and the routine visits of FA and AO still lacked sufficientregularity. As a result, therefore, the extensidn system is losing itseffectiveness. The RPO also found that there was serious dissatisfactionover housing location and design, and that FA and AO had not been paid theirallowances, often did not have transport and believed they are underpaid.
4.4 These views were supported by the findings of the surveys carriedout by the Monitoring and Evaluatior Cell (MEC) covering the rabi crop1984/85 and the kharif crop 1985. These found that over 20% of the ContactFarmers (CF) did not farm themselves, a clear indication that more attentionshould have been given to the choice of CF. Of the active CF, only 43% hadever seen a FA and only 25% of CF had two visits in the four weeks prior tothe day the survey was done, while only 30% of CF reported- that FA alwaysvisited on the same day.
4.5 In addition to the MEC survey the GOP, Planning Division, Islamabadcarried out a review in March 1985. The review team were particularlycritical of the adaptive research programme and the lack of supervision offield staff. The main observations and suggestions are in Attachment 1 ofthis report.
4.6 Institutional performance in carrying out the building programmewas mixed. Finance for purchase of sites was not used, the land beingdonated to DAE. Consequently locations were often poor and remote. Reductionof plinth size while reducing cost also stigmatised the houses as "sub-standard" and hence "too small". Both poor location and size of housingimpaired the benefit of the whole housing programme for lower grade staff.However, once budget for construction was released, the performance of theSind Communications and Works Department (SCWD) in appointing contractorsand supervising the work was very good and as a result the standard ofconstruction was also good. Virtually the only failing of SCWD was the delayin collecting and 'processing invoices for construction from the contractors,with consequent delays in reimbursement.
Adaptive Research
4.7 The performance of adaptive research work has been well belowexpectations. At completion the four ARF had been operational for a year butthe activities clearly show the need for improvement. Experimental work ismainly a continuation of basic research. Few activities are really relatedto solving farmers problems on developing production technology packages fora given set of conditions prevailing in the ARF area of responsibility.Cooperation between extension and research also needs to be improved to meetthe cQmmon task of increasing agricultural productivity.
4.8 To date there has been virtually no economic evaluation ofrecommendations. Such evaluation will be essential for the researchprogramme's future success, including analysis not only of total return butalso returns per man-day, the evaluation of low cost technology inputpackages, and research on farming systems and cropping patterns tailored toindividual farm/farmer characteristics.
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Contact with Farmers
4.9 A small programme of demonstrations and on farm trials has beenstarted, but so far these play only a minor role in the extension messagedevelopment in Sind province, much more emphasis being given to the ImpactBlock programme (para.4.12 below). Although the demonstrations are useful,the arrangements that farmers only get technical advice from extensionstaff, while all inputs and variable costs are solely the farmer'sresponsibility, is reported to diminish interest in becoming a participant.
4.10 The idea of increased production and improved contact with farmersthrough Impact Production Blocks (IPS) was developed by the consultants forAdaptive Research. An IPS is a contiguous block of land involving severalfarmers. The first blocks were based on rice but later IP9 were establishedalso for wheat and sugarcane. The objective was to improve crop managementand subsequent production through extensive field demonstrations, expandingin size each year. This has certainly been achieved. There were 27 IPS inkharif 1984 covering 1,700 ac (700 ha), increasing to 70 blocks in rabi1984/85 covering 3,810 ac (1,540 ha) and at project completion 117 blockscovering 8,200 ac (3,320 ha) was planted. Average size is now around 70 ac(28 ha).
4.11 The blocks are developed by implementing all recommendationsadvocated by the T & V system. Farmers are clearly cooperative in cheseblocks and benefits are quoted but h&ve not yet been statisticallyquantified.
4.12 The mission was under the impression that while the IPS is asuccess, greater involvement of. FA's would be beneficial (at present IPS aremainly the responsibility of AOs). The project should also Capitalise on theIPS success by making more use of them as focal points for farmers days andFAs training sessions.
Staff Training
4.13 Routine training required by the T & V system has been followed,i.e. fortnightly training of FAs by AOs and SMSs and monthly discussiongroups at district level, which are attended by A0s, SSMSs and SMSs. Itappears that as yet these training sessions are at a very theoretical level.Very few topical points and specific farmers problems are identified andelaborated upon or followed through; also practical skill training isneglected.
4.14 In mid 1984, training officers of the 0OA GOSIND organised a seriesof five courses of one week each for in-service training of both AOs andFAs. For the trainers these courses were a useful exercise to put intopractice what they were trained in the basic course. The experience gainedand the problems encountered formed the basis for the second round ofworkshops later in 1984. A total of 11 AOs and 122 FAs attended thesecourses.
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Consultants
4.15 Institutional performance over recruitment of consultants was verydisappointing. A number of factors (discussed in para.7.7) led to a lack ofcommitment to the component, which was consequently only implemented in areduced form in the final two years of the project.
Project Sustainability
4.16 As a result of the project DAE has been strengthened as aninstitution and is therefore better able to carry on its extensionprogrammes in the future. One particular weakness still exists in adaptiveresearch. This presents a major danger for the whole future DAE operation,since the usefulness of T and V extension service depends entirely on thequality of messages relayed to the farmer.
Accounting and Reporting
4.17 No periodic project reporting was agreed at appraisal but, althoughrequested later during implementation, no progress reports have been produced.4.18 Failing to get project accounts audited in a timely manner by theAuditor General's office, the project appointed private auditors in December1983 after Bank intervention to finalize the contract. After the backloghad been worked off, current audits were prepared and submitted to IDA,albeit still with considerable delay as shown below:
Accounts and Audit
Date Required Received
FY 1979/1981January 1982 July 1984
FY 1981/1982January 1983 December 1984
FY 1982/19a3January 1984 December 1984
FY 1983/1984January 1985 August 1986FY 1984/1985January 1986 August 1986
Compliance with Covenants
4.19 The Project A(reement included 14 main covenants and theDevelopment Credit Agreement 8 covenants, covering a wide range of aspects,including procurement, staff appointment, land acquisition, provision ofbudget, remuneration .of staff, duties of staff, vehicle supply andmaintenance, building maintenance, project monitoring and evaluation,reporting and accounting, overall management, programme preparation and dateof commencement of activities. .With such a wide range of covenants problems
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of non-compliance could have been anticipated and in the event many were notadhered to, often for long periods of time, or only adhered tointermittently.
4.20 The problems started in late 1979 when the first extension ofcredit effectiveness from 12 September, 1979 to 12 December, 1979,automtically turned some of the dated covenants into conditions foreffectiveness. Progress in compliance with some of the main covenants issummarised below:-
Section, Mo. SjgtPerformance
Develpmet Credit
3.02 Cmultant avloy t. Started aid-1983.
3.03 Project equip t solely for knum~s lnstanes of vehicle requisitionuso In project. during the project life.
3.04 Land acquisition. C~lied with starting FY 19M/S.
2.2 Aesate bdget provislon. Generlly cpliod, bt ~otimilng Intemittentprblws and not always ad~hato.
2.03 a) Vehicle prmisi<m. Vøhicles phvided bt no rplm.nt,
b) P nt oftravel allouens Start~d 19^3. ht doe to bdget shortage payenthas been erratic and often seriously in arrears.
2.04 Staff appoite . Attted to cmly bt still at projectc~letion en ,und 195 sme seniorposltions vere still vacat.
2.05 Plam and ~ports. Initial docu s presmted, but no reporting.
2.0 . Field staff releas d ffrm mainly cmølied with by emd 1985.other non-etnsion dutis.
2.07 Projegt N & E. Funds reles~d early 1985.
2.06 Cordination and advisory Cpliod 191.aranGa7
2.09 Extension methodology *Colmpid late 1979.
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E. PROJECT IMPACT
Impact on Production
5.1 For the assessment of production growth during the project periodboth levels of inputs and availability of irrigation water play an importantrole. Estimated total input supplies according to information provided tothe mission shows an increase as follows:-
5.2 It is difficult to distinguish which proportions of the increaseduse of inputs has been due to T & V and which to natural growth. It islikely that T & V has had an impact on the use of improved seed. Fertiliserincreases have been too small (26% in 6 years) to be contributed to T & V.An increase of 188% in the use of pesticides may partly be attributed to T &V activities but more active private salts agents ard advertisementcampaigns have certainly had an even greater effect.
5.3 It is still too early to expect a clearly visible impact of theproject on the performance of agriculture, as in the first four years of theproject period the main emphasis was on institution building and recruitmentof staff. However, Tables 12 to 14 were compiled to provide information onarea of production, total production and yields per hectare by district andto detect existing trends. From these tables the index figures for six yearsyield averages and area of productidn for the major crops with 1979/80 asthe base for both project and non-project areas,were as follows:-
PAKISTAN
SIND AGAICULTURAL EXTENSION AND ADAPTIVE RESEARCH PROJECT
& 2 districts only.4 This increase is mainly due to GOSIND promting sugarcame
prdgetion in two districts (Badin. Thatta).
N.B Unless otherwise stated project area includes all 5 districts and non-project area all 7 district
5.4 Irrigation water availability played a role during the projectperiod and especially the 1983/84 cropping season was very poor indeed. Inaddition to the above, crop production increases are affected by an everincreasing soil salinity problem and the rationing of irrigation water tofarmers.
5.5 The average yield trends do not indicate a significant Impact(except rice) and in some crops they show even a decline (cotton, oilseeds).For some crops (vheat and sugarcane) the non-project areas have performedbetter than the project area, probably due to the soils in these areas beingbetter for the specific crops.
5.6 Areas of production in 1984/85 show significant increases only forcotton (20%) and sugarcane (32%) and a nominal increase for wheat (8%).However, a serious production decline is noted in rice (27%) and oilseed(19%). In the non-project area sugarcane shows a 52% increase (20% higherthan in the project area), but all other crops have declined below the basefigure of 1979/80 (oilseeds by as much as 31%), as prices for these cropswere low.
5.7 The tvstem of data collection needs improvement if significantchanges in agriculture are to be detected. This will also require a muchlonger period of observations on agricultural performance in the with andwithout project areas in order to normalise inter-year variations.
Farmer Response
5.8 ;urther informvtion on farmers' adoption of suggested practices isprovided by two surveys carried out by the Sind Monitoring and EvaluationCell (MEC).
5.9 The first survey was undertaken in early 1985 and related to therabi crop 1984/85. A second one was carried out during the kharif crop in1985. The internal report <1> on the final survey showed little differencebetween the adoption rate of project recommendations for irrigated wheat orsugarcane by CF and NCF. There was, however, a wide variation in adoptionrates of various recommended practices (Table 11). There was, furthermore,no evidence that adoption rates were linked to farm size or tenure classes.
5.10 The most important sources of information for wheat production werelandlords and their agints (36% of CF). The ixtension service followed with29%. It appears that far all tenure classes the prime source of advice wasthe landowner.
5.11 The survey showed that wheat yields for CF were 11igher (0.7btons/ac or 1.9 tons/ha) than for NCF (0.68 tons/ac.or 1.7 tons/ha). Tenantshad higher average yields than owner-dperators, while the highest yield wasobtained in the farm size 25 to 50 acres. It is encouraging, but notnecessarily significant to note that farms with a higher frequency of FAvisits also tended to have better yields.
-- -----------------------------------<1> Monitoring cum Evaluation Survey, Rabi 1984/85, By Monitoring and
Evaluation Cell of Sind Agricultural Extension and AdaptiveResearch Project..
5.12 The adoption rate of recommended fertilizer application remainslow. Fertilizers and pesticides are now available through commercialorganizations (both private and semi-private), although it appears thataccess to these inputs is not optimal, especially for fertilizers. Pesticidesupplies, which are far less bulky, are easier for farmers to take to theirfields.
5.13 Farmers are clearly disappointed *hat inpucs are no longeravailable through the FA, who sold inputs at subsidized prices, and althoughthe mission agrees that the FA should not be salesmen it is apparent thatthe present situation is not entirely satisfactory. Input supply salescentres are now established at economically profitable points automaticallyexcluding remote farmers from easy access. There appears to be justificationfor the FA to function as a liaison between input supplier and farmers.
5.14 Production cost has become a more critical constraint sincesubsidies have been eliminated. Credit iz quoted as being adequatelyavailable for farmers. Five different institutions are providing credit inthe irovince. Credit recovery appears to be very good. It is reported,however, that credit officers give more importance to large farmers and thatsmall farmers access to Tredit is limited due to difficulties in completingapplication forms, etc. FA could play a very positive role as a linkagebetween credit officers and farmers.
F. BANK PERFORMANCE
Project Design and Appraisal
6.1 With the benefit of hindsight the project as described in theappraisal report seems to have been too ambitious in scale. Covering thewhole of Sind, at two levels of investment intensity, it was intended tobenefit around 700,000 farm families or a farm family population close to 5million persons. This needs to be compared with the proposals atidentification which includea much more than just extension and adaptiveresearch, but would have concentrated on Nawabshah District, with around50,000 farm families or about 325,000 people. Performance would undoubtedlyhave been higher if the security situation had been better and the projecthad received earlier approval from ECNEC. However, it is clear that thedecision taken following the February 1981 supervision and review mission toconcentrate exclusively on five districts was correct in easing the problemsof implementation.
6.2 Another weakness in the project formulation was in regard to thestaff housing programme. It appears that it was the appraisal mission, asmuch as the government, who favoured reduction of housing standards,particularly reduction of plinth size and low cost construction methods. Itwas also the appraisal mission's view that by providing a house the fieldstaff would be better off. Subsequent experience has shown that both thesewere false assumptions.
6.3 As with many projects of that period, successful implementation wasto be encouraged by staff motivation - through upgrading FA and payingallowances. Oifficulti.es in getting staff grades changed might have beennticipated. duriog..appraisal. Similarly.tbe.difficulty of. posting staff of
new types such as SSMS and SMS into the existing, apparently highly
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structured and .inflexible Department of Agriculture establishment might alsohave been recognised and remedies found. These could have included givingthe positions to senior AO and giving them appropriate terms of referencerather than new post descriptions. Furthermore, pernaos W8 could have takenmore effective action to ensure ea-ly approval of the project by the ECNEC,which proved to be essential for its success.
6.4 One point of central interest in the whole concept of thSe projectwas the appropriateness of a T and V system in a situation dominated bylandlords with tenant sharecroppers. This has been a theme repeatedlydicussed during the project's life. The tet.ants/sharecroppers do what thelandlord tells them and apply whatever he supplies them with by way ofinputs. This situation was fully recognized during the project period andmeasures taken with IDA's agreement and encouragement through the ADA, AOand the Impact Block Programme (ISP) to involve the landlord.
6.5 Numerous covenants were included in both the Development CreditAgreement (8) and the Project Agreement (14). These covered and sought tocontrol a wide range of pre-conditions for successful projectimplementation. In the event they had little beneficial effect on projectsuccess. DA and DAE as the implementing agency, faced with the realities ofbudget stringency, lack of qualified staff and instructions to take part invarious agricultural production campaigns were often powerless, despite thebest of intentions, to comply with the covenants agreed. A better formulawould have been to have a much reduced list of covenants, vigorouslyapplied. This could, for example, have prevented the continuous problem ofproject vehicles being requisitioned.
Supervision
6.6 Subsequent WB support to the project through eleven supervisionmissions, involvement of staff from PMP and other WS staff visits wasgenerally well timed and had a positive effect in getting the projectstarted. However, earlier pressure on ECNEC could have decreased the twoyears delay in the initiation of the project. For the vast majority of itemsconsidered and discussed by the supervision missions, their impact waspositive and helpful. Perhaps on occasitns missions could have been stillmore imaginative in finding solQtions to particular problems, for examplepressing for more senior AO to be posted as SMS, and recognizing earlier theneed to modify the approach to one fitting more closely the landlord/tenantsituation.
6.7 The mission formed the impression that there was a misunderstandingover the role of the WB - which although not WB's fault should have beenclarified - regarding the finding and selection of consultants. The We didhelp identify _ultable consultants, but held to the view that theirselection and appointment was a GOP/GOSINO -espoi7sibility. This positionshould have been made clear by WB to GOP/GOSIN.
G. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED
7.1 Comments on the individual components and the project as a wholeare as set out below.
7.2 Staffing. Staff problems were a significant constraint to projectimplementation and effectiveness. The difficulties were in terms ofavailability; recruitment (including estabTishment of posts); and staffingstructure. Availability was a problem for most grades from AD upwards. ForFA, although the training institute at Sakrand was producing suitablecandidates, the FA salary was too low to be attractive. Other recruitmentproblems involved establishing posts for zategories of staff not previouslyspecified, such as SMS and SSMS. The staff structure that has been developeddoes not work well. In many cases staff may be of similar grades andseniority but at varying levels of responsibility. For example 0OA, SSMS andSTO all have the same grade. However, while the OA is the senior officer inthe district both SSMS and STO have technical responsibilities and in thecase of the SSMS also a line of command from the QA (Adaptive Research).This blurred situation, which appears symptomatic of the newness of theorganisation, is in marked contrast to older staff structures where eachposition in the hierarchy is clearly known and without any ambiguity.
7.3 Many of these problems were probably inevitable. Howeve-, thedifficulties could have been reduced by;
- minimising the extent of changes to staff structure, and tailoringthe project to the existing bureaucratic arrangements, imperfectthough these may have been;
- greater awareness and forewarning of likely, difficulties bygovernment staff- involved in project design during preparation.andappraisal; or better still, preparation of staff structureproposals by government staff based on discussions with all thedepartments with an interest in the structure proposed.
7.4 Buildings. Staff housing also caused problems. First there isthe whole question of need for houses. While government housing may benecessary and well accepted by more senior staff working at the tehsil ordistrict headquarters, in general it does not seem.to be well received byFA. The main reasons for this are thtt FA may already have a house or livewith relations, or in accommodation provided by a landlord. Providing themwith government housing means that they lise their housing allowance, haveto pay rent to the Government and often find that the house is too small fortheir family, remote, and poorly sited.
7.5 These difficulties could have been largely overcome by:
- not trying to provide housing for all but planning the housingprogramme on a district, tehsil or even on a case by case basis.For FA housing would generally not be required;
- 97 -
- wiiere housing was required, building on good sites and groupingquarters Into small col6nies;
- where, in particular and infrequent instances, in remote situationsthere was no possibility of an FA finding accommodation, providinga small building to be used as office/overnight accommodation. Norental deduction would be made from the FA's salary for this"office";
- where full housing could be justified for ary staff category foroperational reasons, and where construction was favoured by thestaff themselves (in the firm knowledge that rental deductionswould be made), constructing quarters to meet th governmentspecifications for each staff category.
7.6 Vehicles and Equipment. Project experience with vehicles andequipment appears normal and there are few significant lessons to be learnt.Vehicles did not always fall into the hands that they were intended for andmaintenance was largely neglected. 22 of the 54 four-wheel drive vehicleswere purchased in 1978/79 and retroactively financed and much of thetransport needs of field staff relied on motorcycles and bicycles procureoin the same year. As a result, by the time that the project was starting towork more or less as designed, Much of the transport had become worn out orbroken down and had not been replaced. It would have been helpful if theproject budget had made a larger provision for replacing transport,particularly bicycles and motorcycles in the final project year.
7.7 Technical Assistance. Both consultancy and training were highlyproblematic. To a large extent the project which involved much innovationwas implemented in a situation where no-one went to see other similarprojects elsewhere, or at least not until after mid-1983, and then only on areduced scale. The reasons for this included the foliewinq:
- delay in approval of the project by the ECNEC;
- concern as to whether consultants would be cost effective;
- delay in recruitment of consultants;
- difficulties in recruitment, including identification of suitablecandidates and government clearance procedures both on technicalacceptability and cost;
- difficulties for government staff to obtain clearances for foreigntravel.
7.8 It is difficult to make any suggestions fcr aditional measuresthat could have been taken to ensure the co=,..2ent's implementation asconceived at appraisal. During the last two years the project has hadsuccessful experience with consultants for adaptive research and training.
7.9 Monitoring and Evaluation. Monitoring of the project by theMonitoring and Evaluation Cell (MEC) and by the Sind Regional PlanningOrganisation (RPO) both started only at the end a the project period, andwithout any baseline survey having been conducted. M and E suffered badlyfrom the non-recruitment. of consultants who were supposed to assist insetting up the unit. However, it is now fully operptional.
- 98 -
7.10 The Whole Project. As discussed above the main constraints toproject implementation (more or less in order of importance) were asfollows:-
i) Delay in project approval by ECNEC.
ii) Staff recruitment and posting.
ill) Poor security situation in the first half of the project period.
iv) Difficulties with the staff housing programme.
v) Late and partial implementation of the consultancy and trainingcomponent.
7.11 The project objective was to improve the extension service and soto enable increased production and farm incomes. This objective wasappropriate at the time of project formulation and remains valid today.
7.12 In converting the previously existing extension service from acampaign approach to a T & V system the air, was to improve the coverage andeffectiveness of the service and the accountability of its staff. Thisimprovement has occurred much more slowly than was originally anticipatedmainly due tn the late start of the project. However, now the new extensionservice anticipated at appraisal is largely both in place and functioning,its success will depend entirely on the quality of messages for farmers.Whereas previously the FA and other agricultural staff had several items tooffer the farmer - advice, subsidised seeds and crop chemicals, assistancein operations such as spraying, now, under the T & V system there is onlythe message as the inputs are now distributed through the private sector. Itis therefore vitally important if the project is to achieve its finalobjectives that appropriate messages be given to the field staff. Moreoverit is crucial that these messages should be based on an analysis, not 'mlyof their.impact on production, but also of their worth to the farmer interms of income and return per farm family or hired labour.
7.13 Improvement in extension messages now needs to be given highestpriority. 6.less this can be achieved there will be little merit inconversion from the campaign to the T & V extension system. The programme ofadaptive research, now still in its inttial stages, therefore requires keyattention.
7.14 At present, the role of the field staff could be, with advantage,slightly more flexibly interpreted to include more involvement inavailability of inputs, credit and irrigation water for the small farmer.Assistance could be provided in coordinating likely requirements andavailability of inputs, assisting small farmers in obtaining credit andresolving problems of irrigation water availability. This assistance wouldnot need to detract to a significant extent from the T & V system ofoperation. Much of any additional responsibility would devolve on the AD,who at the present time appears to be less than fully extended in his roleof supervising and supporting the FA.
7.15 The extension system should also be linked more closely to thelandlord and tenant/sharecropper situation in Sind. This has already beenrecognised by DAE and arrangements made for "progressive farmers"; whichgenerally means resident landlords to be regularly contacted by the ADA orAO. Also the introduction of the Impact Production Blocks has apparently
- 99 -
been able to. attract landlord support. These modifications to the basic Tand V system adapting the system to local conditions are likely to increasethe benefits obtained from the investments already made in strengthen)ng the.extension services of Sind province.
Table i- 100 -
!tÅl. at1 ullp eita i Ififfim am ~0t11 0' 14C 'Wltw*1.
I. 8.,ha sh h åej t mas .n sea eeetlr teeei
1." 't %,t~ m
te øøø g91 4 % 111t111 lwl,64 its.. .............. .......... ... .. .. e at t s
8 oth physical contilngncis ad provisjon for priC* 4scalation included in the cost estIaates made atappruisa have bumn reallocated to each coaonent on a oro ata basis.1 July to 30 June.
3 Total Includes Rs 2.2 N expenditure Incurred In 1986 of which Rs 0.7 H bas yøt to bS disbursed, Actualsare calendar years correSponding to endinq split year.
Ild Wm ld t d§I -b Eim l hmMl
* ttus..er.
......................................................................... a . .........................................................................
feulsumat. teII'. Iabrators 5ee etad Iratolftoma btewml. Mlf tuakval l
M5 kr tale, 1. fetit e.
*1
Table 7
PAKISTAN
SINO AGRICULTURAL AND ADAPTIVE RESEARCH PROJECT
(Credit 922-PAK)
Allocation of Credit Disbursements
Credit disbursements were proposed as follows 1/:
(a) 95% of expenditures for the construction of housing,training and research facilities; and
(b) 100% of foreign expenditures for directly importedvehicles and equipment, or 100% of local expenditures(ex-factory) for vehicles and equipment manufacturedlocally, or 90% of expenditures for other vehiclesand equipment provided locally.
Proposed and external credit disbursements are as follows:
Appraisal Report ActualProposals 2
(US million) ......
Civil works 7.50 4.87Equipment and transport 1.00 0.96
Sub-total 8.50 5.83
Unallocated i-
Total 9.00 5.83
Amount cancelled, effective 23 January 1986, is US$3.17 million.
/ The accounts were kept open to accommodate final reimbursementapplications. Effective 23 January 1986, the amount of the Creditremaining (USS3.17 million) was cancelled.
1 ， 겯
ㅣ
Ilu
Table 10Page I
PAKIMAN
SIND AWtICULTWM aTENSION AM ADAPTIVE RESEARM MJECT
(9201t M-pox
Details m Trainim Proymn
Comrs"
Basic Sarm,
Cates - 1964 Duration TYpQ of Work1hoo Participants No(Weeks
28 Jamary - 9 February 2 SNS SNS zz
12 - 24 Febr"417 2 Extension Organisation ADA 20
3 - 25 Plarch 2 Extension AD 23
Is - 28 Narch 2 Ext ice AD 29
2. Advanced Cou!3es
13 - 25 October 2 Trainer SIG, Trainers isATI instructorsTraining Unit OfficersAID
7 October - 8 November 2 Advanced Extension ADM 28ATT instructorsSIG
11 - is maymber I Farm Nonagament F&m Superintendent 27Fwm NaoagersAD
24 Novembe - 6 Dec~ 2 Nedia Training unit officers 21ATI instructorsAID
8 - 13 December I Senior " ement CA, Project 0". 1
WA, SSW. ADA, SMSDauty Directors. Agriculture
* - 111 -
Table 10Page 2
Dates - 1984 Duration Type of Workshop Part4cipants 1a
(Qe"ss
3. Other Courses
3 - 14 Nch , 15 2 Adaptive Researct SSMS. ADA, SKS, AD 2.Research Off icrChmistStatistician
L 'AND ADAPTIVE RESEARCH PROJECTlNDIA (Cedit 92- PA
Arii
.. JACOBABAD \
PROJECT DISTRICTS
H PU umwmty
he~Rm* Slhfi\ Pms Oc iuw,es:
•• Dimict Bon r
- - - lftetAer8Ina Bounderies
CM K -/ \ esasse & * pquuCetmKARACHI uCpmå Cm
ARP AR J
0 50 100 Ktm
Attacitmn 1- 121 - Pa 1
Extracts from the SociaL Peiew of the ApricuLturaL Extewin ad atiw Reserch P a CT adin the P"jb ad Sratirme of PakistM, PLaring a DeaeLmt Divisic, IsUaabad, Mrch 198
fts follarg strct fm p 13 of the rwism tm's .art refer to the PaJprojet, bt the tm stte tit ty wemaLid als for the Sird prject.
F. POINTS FOR CONSIDERATIONIRECOMMENDATIONS
44. Following points are worth considerationlrecommendation:
(i) Field Assistant is the focal point of the whole pro-gramme. He is a front line worket. In order to moti-vate him, it is essential that he may be granted higherpay scale commensurate with his qualifications and ex-perience. The team recommends BPS-8 which has alsobeen recommended by the various committees in thepast. Alternatively, the ratio of grant of BPS-9 to one-third of the sanctioned strength of Field Assistants maybe enhanced to 50 per cent of the posts to provide betterservice prospects to them.
(ii) Suitable extension in the existing accommodation ofField AssistantlAgricultural Officer may be made sothat they are in a position to accommodate their familiescomfortably. In the meantime, standard rent based onthe accommodation under actual occupation of theField Assistant may be determined and realised fromhim every month so that in lieu thereof he gets his fullhouse rent allowance.
(iii) In order to make the Field Assistant eflicient and dedi-cated to his job, the team recommends creation of an-other cadre between Field Assistant and AgriculturalOfficer. This proposal will improve their career pros-pects and consequently their effciency.
uv) Presently. transport is provided.to the extension staff onhire purchase basis which, as stated earlier,* does not
- 122 - Attadwet 1Pap 2
involve any element of compulsion. The team recom-mends that motor cycleb,cycles may be provided to ax-tension stuff by the Government.
(v) Genuine T.A. may be paid to. extensloi stafT for toursundertaken by them and for this purpose, adequatefunds may be provided.
(vi) Inputs for demonstration plots may be provided to ex-tension staff by the Government.
(vii) Suitable awards may be paid to elficient extension staff
(viii) Frequent transfers ol extension stalT may be w. oided
specially of FA:AO in the interest of efficiency.
(ix) Certain quantity of seed of newly evolved varieties maybe distributed to the farmers through -FA:AO alongwithpackage of technology.
(x) A suitable revolving fund may be placed at the disposalof responsible officers or Agriculture Department foradvancing credits in kind to the farmers in times ofemergency to be realised from them after crop harvcst.
(xi) The :ssential inputs lke sec. r:rtilizer. pesticides maybe made available at suitable sale points like LnionCouncil level and AOiFA should be given authorityto ensure their quality. quantity and prices. Similarly,sprayers and other agricultural equipments may bemade available at such points.
(xii) Multi-dimensional approach for teaching the*farmers isrequired. Farming community has different levels ofeducation, mostly farmers are illiterate, some are semi.literate and others are 'highly literati. The teachingshould cater to the requirements of all categories offarmers. The teachings should. therefore, include widcranging method, stich at oral. visual and mobile exhi-bitions or agriculturail products. The possibility of re-vivine cinema %ian% or this purpose may also he %:on-sidered.
Attatwet 1-123- Pag 3
1. Further specific observations for the Sind Project are set out onpage 20. para. 68 of the review report as follows:-
if Maintenance of adaptive research farms is unsatisfactory and trialsconducted are also not up to the mark.
ii) The link between adaptive research, extension staff and the farmer.is weak.
iii) Technical staff. i.e. SMS/SSMS need in-service training torefurbish their outmoded knowledge.
iv) Number of demonstration plots is limited and these are beingmaintained in a haphazard manner.
v) Research extension staff are appointed to higher posts on theiriersonal pay and grade without being given the pay of the higherpost. Consequently, they take no interest in their jobs.
vi) The work of Field Assistant is not being effectively supervised.
vii) The messages transmitted by the extesion staff to the contactfarmers are not further disseminated to the farming community atlarge with the result that there is no diffusion of knowledgebeyond a few selected farmers.
viii) Ad hoe selection of contact farmers is being made an; criteria forthis purpose has been laid down.
ix) The rate of occupancy of Field Assistant houses is low.
PAKISTAN*,s~eao< nw oas *,foo
SIND AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION AND ADAPTIVE RESEARCH PROJECT ZNOZ
.JACOBABAD \ \
4SNKARPUR
SUKKURL A R K A N ký
PROJECT DISTRICTS AGRO-CLIMATIC ZONES OF THE SINDK H R P R M Agricultural Trair.rg Institute
AAAR PUR gneltral urit Northern Rice Zone
\A BSHAH aiRarNorthern Cotton -Wheat Zone
Main Research Stations -nemdct
ZonProject Districts:
rs Fall Investenent Dst,cins Southern Cotton - Wheat Zone
Lower Investment Dstr.cis Southern Rice - Sugarcane Zone
--- D,sticr Bondaies L - -- - District BoundariesDA D U -J-- Provncial Boundarnes 7 - - - Provinc,al Boundaries
International Boundares t- - Inrernational Boundcries~DERes
ur/ { AR~ves
RiersConals
CanisKARACHI Provincial Copitl
THARPARKARìB A DIý
T HAT TA-- JJ
KIL. 0
R
2IOEE5 5 50 75 100
IBRD 12916R1
Tiabl.D. Approx-mate
PAKISTAN ns ALne of Control
PUNJAB EXTENSION AND t IXRAWALPINDI(
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTLocation Map of Project Districts ° Jhelv '° -Dar
'. ~Jhelum -
A WM HE UM* Agn-.,lb.ral tyonn
Main Research Statons anwa Goag Ag,e,cvival Tra.n.ng Insmutits • 0Prolect D,strcts j Sial ko.
O National Capail P: S I -.- O TRo af rince
GuZr a I ALK OT* opt~ofPrvmc.Q Sørgodho*
S D.stirct Headquarters g3- Provnce Boundaries GUJRANWALA 3
------ D.stnct BoundariesInternational Boundanes Shekhu r
