Foreign Policy Handbook Issue 5

Redefining the National Interest

YOUNG AMERICANS for LIBERTY

ForeignPolicyHandbook.com

Issue V | August 2010

Leaving the Graveyard

p. 20

War Shifts: Pakistan

Pakistan Leaked!

p. 12

General Difficulties

p. 5

The Young Americans for Liberty’s

Foreign Policy

Handbook

August 2010

Young Americans for Liberty | http://www.yaliberty.org | June 2010

Contents

YAL MISSION STATEMENT

The mission of Young Americans for Liberty (YAL) is to train, educate, and mobilize youth activists committed to "winning on principle." Our goal is to cast the leaders of tomorrow and reclaim the policies, candidates, and direction of our government.

YAL STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES

We are the Young Americans for Liberty (YAL). As Americans we recognize the God-given natural rights of life, liberty, and property set forth by our Founding Fathers. Our country was created to protect the freedoms of the individual and directed by we the people.

We recognize that freedom deserves responsibility and therefore we hold ourselves to a high moral character and con-duct. Integrity emphasizes our stance towards action. Principle defines our outlook towards government. Peace and prosperity drives our ambitions towards our countrymen.

We inherit a corrupt, coercive world that has lost respect for voluntary action. Our government has failed and dragged our country into moral decay. The political class dominates the agenda with a violent, callous, controlling grip. And, for this we do not stand.

Editor in Chief

Roy Antoun

Contributors

Gabriel Aquino

Ryan Bell

Brian Beyer

Marissa Yturralde-Giannotta

Jeremy Davis

Brendon DeMeo

Jihan Huq

Elliot Engstrom

Daniel Suraci

Undeniably Hypocritical

By Gabriel Aquino

“General Difficulties”

By Ryan Bell

Afghanistan: Forever a Pawn

By Brian Beyer

Pakistan Leaked

By Marissa Yturralde-Giannotta

Chalmers Johnson’s Nemesis

By Jeremy Davis

Foreign Aid Horror Files By Brendon DeMeo

Terrorists or Insurgents?

By Jihan Huq


By Elliot Engstrom

Uganda Bombings

By Daniel Suraci

3

5

9

12

14

17

18

20

22

[email protected] | P.O. Box 2751 Arlington, VA 22202 1

Letter From the Editor Dear Reader,

As neoconservatives continue their world-

dominating agenda, taxpayers in the United States

are paying for undeclared, expensive wars.

In the past decade, the U.S. has engaged in two

undeclared wars and now the battle spreads into

Pakistan. American military funding has doubled

since 2000 and, today, the country is happily running

a deficit.

Governments will always find excuses for war

because war is the health of the state. Wars generate

revenue for the government through taxation and the

money is spent frivolously on government programs,

waste, and the military-industrial-complex.

While many conservatives and neoconservatives preach small govern-

ment, they never hesitate to say that they are willing to give up a portion of

their income in order for government to keep them safe. But has government

been keeping them safe? Why are we so willing to give government power

over our own lives if it can hardly control its own spending habits?

Now that American soldiers are engaging “terrorists” in Pakistan, it’s hard

to say that perpetual war is keeping us safe if the world is left in constant tur-

moil. With Europe finding homegrown terrorists in its backyard and the U.S.

relying on citizens (not Homeland Security) to find threats like the Christmas

bomber and the Times Square bomber, I have to ponder: Ifthese wars abroad

were stopping the terrorists, why do they keep popping up?

Roy M. Antoun New York State Chairman, Young Americans for Liberty

Want to write for the Foreign Policy Handbook?

Contact [email protected]

Find us on the web:

http://yaliberty.org

Find us on Facebook

http://facebook.com/yaliberty

Follow us on Twitter

http://twitter.com/yaliberty

“Of the Youth, by the Youth, for the Youth”

The objective of the Foreign Policy Handbook is to rationally discuss the faults in American

foreign policy and offer practical, liberty-minded solutions. Over the past century, our elected

leaders have collectively corrupted U.S. foreign relations into a hotbed of backfiring interven-

tionism. It is the job of the youth to mobilize and inform, because it is we who will be paying

the price in blood and gold.

While views expressed in the articles do not represent all the members of YAL, they do express

the views of the respective authors. Young Americans for Liberty does not support or oppose

any candidate for office.

http://www.foreignpolicyhandbook.com

Young Americans for Liberty | http://www.yaliberty.org | Aug 2010 [email protected] | P.O. Box 2751 Arlington, VA 22202 2

Commentary | Young Americans for Liberty | The Foreign Policy Handbook | Issue V | August 2010

One of the longest and most expensive terrorist investiga-

tions in British history came to an end in July, when three

men: Ibrahim Savant, Arafat Waheed Khan, and Waheed

Zaman were found guilty of a 2006 plot to attack seven trans-

Atlantic airliners bound for the United States and Canada with

liquid explosives. This trial follows up the convictions of

three other men in a similar trial last year, bringing to at-

tention an urgency of action, by British authorities. Their

conviction has sparked some international outrage re-

garding the clarity of evidence, testimony, and ver-

dict.

Scotland Yard divulged specifics regarding the

investigation, noting that it was their most elabo-

rate effort ever mounted, costing nearly $40 mil-

lion. During the time period when the investigation

took place, over 29 surveillance teams were de-

ployed to observe the plotters.

Furthermore, the report of this plot has

greatly impacted the international commu-

nity's stance on airline security. Since then,

airline authorities have laced tight restrictions

upon the size and type of liquids and creams

that passengers can take onto flights. Meas-

ures like these were introduced after the Sept. 11 attacks in the

United States, and were replicated worldwide.

Considering that the die has been cast, let's observe this as

an informative experiment in the hamster cage that is interna-

tional relations, shall we?

Western imperialist rhetoric supposes that, in order to

deter Islamic "terrorists" from continuing to attack within

western nations, military forces must be deployed to Arab

nations (conquest of Persia, coming soon!), but not nec-

essarily the nations of origin for the aforementioned

terrorists. The occupying force will give the terrorists

something to chew on within their home country as they

defend their homes, their families, and their way of

life... wait, no... The occupying force will fight indefi-

nitely against the nativist scourge insurgency...The

occupying Western force will defend their country,

from another country, protecting the freedoms that

have been left alone by the increasingly large police

state in their country will fight to prevent the incep-

tion of "terrorist" cells who are active on the other

side of the world. Makes perfect sense, right?

What good would it do to keep the military at

home, to defend security? Why not just beef up

local police forces?

What better way to protect civil liberties that

the "terrorists" hate than to keep them under lock

Ph

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f US

New

s.com

Gabriel Aquino


Undeniably Hypocritical


and key with new security measures?

The "terrorists" won't relent, so let's

continue to send young men and women into harm’s way to

deter their presence at home…

...but the "terrorists" are still plotting attacks in the west?

How can that be? Western military forces are killing "hostiles"

daily.

Why is it still happening? Aren't there plenty of targets

to shoot at in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan?

Western occupation has existed in the Middle East since the

1800s, starting with the British Empire. Since then, anti-

Western sentiments, tied to fringe elements of Islam, began

and have grown. So where is the validity of progress, causa-

tion, or even correlation, in the interventionist argument?

Occupying Middle Eastern nations for decades has only led

to escalated action on both sides. Is there any incentive for

these "terrorists" to quit? Surely not, for psychologically, the

Middle Eastern constituencies ripest for terrorist action are

have had a first-hand account of Western imperialism. Very

rarely is fundamentalism the sole factor. In this case however,

many of the "terrorists" found in Europe are "home-grown". It

seems to be that the "home-grown" cells have felt the plight of

their brothers and sisters a world away, or are rejecting the

fusion of tightening security and heightened suspicion of the

Islamic community in European countries.

One cannot reject the obvious, these cells that have been

convicted of plots in European nations did not meet with

European military forces on the battlefield. In fact, they en-

tirely bypassed the "preemptive war" meant for them, along

with a load of empty interventionist rhetoric.

If only stubborn overlords and appointed bureaucrats

elected officials would make some sense of it all, and heed

common sense, along with the outcry of the citizenry. The so-

lution is simply this: There are people thousands of miles

away, infuriated with Western Imperialism. Give them nothing

to be upset about, and in the period of time that the Western

nations should consider a period of humble diplomacy, the

military would not be deployed abroad, but at home for secu-

rity. Deal?


Riot police in England: the most apparent danger to liberty is state control. When wars overseas give bloated governments excuses to control society, the police state becomes your backyard. Photo source: www.digitaljournal.com

Welcome to the Police State

Aquino, continued



In an article written by freelance

journalist Michael Hastings, "The Run-

away General", appearing in issue no.

1108/1109 of Rolling Stone magazine

(July 8–22 2010), McChrystal and his staff

mocked civilian government officials, in-

cluding Joe Biden, National Security Advi-

sor James L. Jones, US Ambassador to Af-

ghanistan Karl W. Eikenberry, and Special

Representative for Afghanistan and Paki-

stan Richard Holbrooke. McChrystal was

not quoted as being directly criti-

cal of the president or the

president's policies, but

several comments from his

aides in the article re-

flected their perception of

McChrystal's disappoint-

ment with Obama on the

first two occasions of their meeting. McChrystal's staff was

contacted prior to release of the article and did not deny the

validity of the article, though senior members of his staff

dispute this, and have accused Hastings of exaggerating the

seniority of aides quoted and breaking the "off the record"

trust of private conversations.

The statements attributed to McChrystal and members

of his staff drew the attention of the White House when

McChrystal called Biden to apologize. McChrystal issued a

written statement, saying:

―I extend my sincerest apology for this profile. It was a mistake reflecting poor judgment and should never have happened. Throughout my career, I have lived by the prin-ciples of personal honor and professional integrity. What is reflected in this article falls far short of that standard. I have enormous respect and admiration for President Obama and his national security team, and for the civilian leaders and troops fighting this war and I remain commit-ted to ensuring its successful outcome.”

Biden's call to tell him of the apology prompted

Obama to request a copy of the profile and then to summon

McChrystal to attend in person the president's monthly se-

curity team meeting at the White House in lieu of attending

via secure video teleconference. During a brief meeting

with Obama on June 23, two days before the article

was released to newsstands, McChrystal tendered

his resignation, which the president accepted.

Shortly thereafter, Obama nominated Gen-

eral David Petraeus to replace McChrystal in his

role as top commander in Afghanistan. Obama's

statement on the topic began as follows:

"Today I accepted Gen. Stanley McChrystal's resigna-

tion as commander of the International Security Assis-

tance Force in Afghanistan. I did so with consider-

able regret, but also with certainty that it is the

right thing for our mission in Afghani-

stan, for our military and for our

country."

Later that day

McChrystal released the

following statement:

―This morning the presi-

dent accepted my resignation as Commander of U.S. and

NATO Coalition Forces in Afghanistan. I strongly support

the president's strategy in Afghanistan and am deeply

committed to our coalition forces, our partner nations,

and the Afghan people. It was out of respect for this com-

mitment—and a desire to see the mission succeed—that I

tendered my resignation. It has been my privilege and

honor to lead our nation's finest.”

Shortly after his removal from command in Af-

ghanistan, McChrystal announced that he would retire from

the Army. The day after the announcement, the White

House announced that he would retain his four-star

rank in retirement, although law generally requires a gen-

eral officer to hold their rank for three years in order to re-

tain it in retirement. His retirement ceremony was held on

July 23, 2010 at Fort McNair in Washington D.C. During

this ceremony, McChrystal was awarded the Distin-

guished by Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Casey and

the Defense Distinguished Service Medal by Gates.

“General Difficulties” Ryan Bell

General Stanley A. McChrystal received heavy flak from Washington after being inter-viewed for a controversial article published by Rolling Stone Magazine.

You can find the original Rolling Stone article here: http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/17390/119236

http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/17390/119236


Stanley McChrystal, Obama's top commander in Af-ghanistan, has seized control of the war by never taking his eye off the real enemy: The wimps in the White House. By all means, question McChrystal’s judgment in making derisive comments about his boss, the Com-mander in Chief. In fact, McChrystal was right to chal-lenge the president. General McChrystal’s main mistake was to apologize for the remarks he made in Rolling Stone. As you will observe, this isn’t the first occasion that General McChrystal has used interview commentary or the press, in one fashion or another, to force the hand of a Commander-In-Chief to do what is best for the troops that serve under him. Every time General McChrystal has taken such an action, he has done so knowing that both his command and his career were at risk. Yet, like a true leader; General McChrystal took that risk after thoughtful in-trospection on what course was most proper for the good of the nations and his troops. So, al-though I wish he’d stand firm and not waiver in the slightest on his commentary, I forgive him for a minor tremble during such a major event in his life. Some commenta-

tors have suggested that this was a near treasonous (and equally unprofessional) act committed by this four-star general and that

such discontent would have been better relayed in private to the President and those in other relevant positions.

We must not forget however that this is some-thing that would be deemed un-necessary, and can be seen, a choice with potential for

the tarnishing of his reputa-

tion and that of the war itself

when publicized in this fashion. We must ask if General McChrystal

would have ever considered such an option as valid unless his views were not being ignored or otherwise completely disre-

garding in those very same private sessions. Just as the famed MacArthur ultimately lost his battle with President Truman and his war policy of appeasement; which averted a confrontation with China, but also set the stage for the prolonged carnage of Vietnam, General McChrystal will lose his battle with President Obama. The recalling of General McChrystal was not just for a fireside chat with President Obama; nor is it for a typical chewing session by the Commander-in-Chief. General


Washington vs. McChrystal Bell, continued

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Richard Holbrooke, special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, was highly dis-liked by Gen. McChrystal.


McChrystal was recalled to be fired from his position. General McChrystal has taken from the President the political voice in the execution of warfare and dared, whether it was intentional or not, for the President to confront him in de-bate by expressing his opinion in this pub-licized manner. This was not something Obama, or any President, could simply ignore. Unfortunately and unsurprisingly, but also understandably, the President will not give him that debate; nor should he out of respect for the long standing prin-ciple of civilian rule over the mili-tary. Albeit I believe that, given some nec-essary prerequisites, we should let the military do its job to the best of its ability with as little political and bureaucratic red-tape as possible. What this really comes down to is that it would not be appropriate for the Presi-dent to redress these criticisms on the American stage in some off-color grand-stand which would eventually do nothing but add more media headlines and likely create further consequences for our troops abroad in the form of mishandled policy in an effort to suppress suspicions

among the populace. After

all, the wars in the Middle East create

enough derogatory headlines all on their own.

This is not the key issue, yet it further illustrates the reality

that we should not engage in wars we are not will-

ing to fight to the end, with the fullest

extent of resources our nation has to offer, to

limit the number of Ameri-can deaths as much as is

plausible, and to do what must be done to accomplish our

mission as quickly and as effectively as

possible...and then leave.

Unfortu-nately these

wars have been a mire of deception, na-tion building, resource ex-ploitation, con-

troversial weap-ons and drug

deals, unconstitutional provisions, politi-cal scapegoats and a particu-larly grandiose highlight of the wide-spread problems within our civilian gov-ernment, our intelligence agencies, and particularly within our own military es-tablishment. One can hardly blame the Democrat-controlled Whitehouse for taking a hard-ened stance against this outburst, espe-cially when its voters, as well as our own President have run the field unabashed with laying all of the ills of these wars at the feet of our previous administration. They have been hard pressed to accept the responsibility for our current failures on the front as being derivative of the current administrative troupe. General McChrystal knows all of this. He is acutely aware of Generals such as George C. Patton and Douglas MacAr-thur. As American warriors of distinction he holds a deep admiration and respect for their standards of excellence and for their accomplishments in battles fought all over the world. He understands how these two men in particular were re-spected, loved and at all times in full

command of their troops, who often went far above any expectations in perform-ance of their duties. General McChrystal, like Patton and MacArthur, is a warrior and a visionary leader who wants to win; not capitulated, and certainly does not wish to leave the job unfinished.

Until now, he has been relatively unknown. However, we will hear and learn more about him as time

passes. In my view, General McChrystal has not only taken on the President and the wimps in Washington such as Senator John Kerry; but he’s also sent a message to his fellow generals that a war strategy of shedding American blood and treasure with the goal of hand-tied warfare and appeasement can no longer be tolerated. We have reached a point in history where if we are to engage in warfare it must be of necessity to win. Our new ene-mies are of the ideological nature of the Japanese in World War 2. If we wish to wage war against them we must be able to outlast them, being firm in our belief that we hold moral superiority in our ef-forts or we will have sealed our own fate. As in Korea and Vietnam where guerilla fighters often disguised them-selves to fit in among the locals to both kill and gain sympathy from a gullible press and shake weak, panicked politi-


“We have reached a point in

history where if we are to

engage in warfare it must be

of necessity to win.”

www.Interest Of The State.com

Redefining the National Interest

Gen. McChrystal was a big advocate for nation-building. He wanted his troops to assimilate with the population by living with the population. Photo: John Moore / AP


cians and Presidents, we need to show greater strength, determination and courage to face down those who would end democracy and our way of life and punish them with impunity no matter how the rest of the world views us (this does not mean killing hundreds of civilians with CIA-pi lo ted mi l i tary predator drones) . But isn’t it past time to question the propriety of an Afghan strategy that both parties endorse? As was the case in Korea, the United States military did most of the fighting and took most of the losses as our allies wrung their hands on the sidelines. If we are to bear the bulk and the bur-den of fighting just wars alone or with minimal support from our allies or the United Nations, then our opinion is the only one that matters. When they are willing to put action to their rheto-ric then and only then, would I suggest they’ve earned the right to speak and give advice. Until then, we either need to fight to win or not fight at all and protect the valuable lives and health of our young sons and daughters.

General McChrystal may have lost the faith of the President and other politicians in Washington that he can perform his duties well, but I guaran-tee you that the most important group of people looking to General McChrystal for direction and strength have not. That group is the junior offi-cers and enlisted members of United States com-bat forces. They may not admit it, but I suspect the vast majority are ecstatic to see a senior officer finally speak out for Washington to do the right thing and either fight or leave. I simply hope that Gen-eral McChrystal’s personal and professional sacri-fice does not fall on deaf ears throughout the up-per ranks of the United States military and that the Chairman and other members of the Joint Chiefs heed the warning as a rancher would heed the sound of coiled snakes’ rattle.


Predator Drones Creating new terrorists everyday.

Brian Beyer



July 2011 marks the beginning of the with-

drawal of American troops from Afghanistan. How-

ever, as President Obama has said, ―We didn't say

we'd be switching off the lights and closing the door

behind us." As the war in Afghanistan will undoubt-

edly rage on through the remainder of Obama’s

term, the American public will grow increasingly

skeptical of, if not downright against, the operation.

War weariness in Europe has caused governments

to collapse (the Netherlands) and prompted NATO

to declare an end date (albeit nonbinding) of 2014.

Eventually, just as Europe is planning to do, Amer-

ica will have to cease major combat operations.

This leaves Afghanistan in an interesting situa-

tion that the country has not known for years: it will

have to govern and police itself with minimal, if no,

international assistance. Pakistan, a regional power-

house, has high hopes of forging an unbreakable al-

liance with Afghanistan. However, India could

prove to be a remarkably difficult hurdle to clear.

Sadly, Afghanistan is a pawn in the

great Paki-

stan-India

rivalry.

India

wishes to secure a presence in Afghanistan in order

to encircle Pakistan in an attempt to exert regional

dominance. Pakistan, on the other hand, desires to

play a pivotal role in Afghanistan in order to prevent

Indian encirclement.

This same kind of game was played before from

the late 1990’s to as recent as 2002. India provided

funding and arms to the Northern Alliance, a

―military-political umbrella organization‖ opposed

to Taliban rule. Pakistan’s powerful intelligence

agency, the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence), gave

the Taliban money, arms, and training so as to pre-

vent the Indian backed Northern Alliance from

gaining a foothold. The Taliban were promptly

ousted by US and other foreign forces during the

initial invasion of Afghanistan. India was victori-

ous and Pakistan was secretly

bitter with defeat.

Afghanistan: Forever a Pawn


Today, Pakistan generally

continues to rely on hard power,

although covertly, while India is

winning over the Afghan people

through foreign aid and economic

development. As a result, Pakistan

is now, more than ever, desperate

for a say in Afghan politics.

Despite official denial, it is well

known that the ISI retains close

links with Taliban linked groups.

This bond is very strategic and

clever nonetheless. The ISI’s

thought process is this: Pakistan

must continue to provide aid of all

sorts to these groups in order to pre-

vent the US, Afghanistan, and its

allies from defeating them. Once it

is recognized that they are a force

that cannot be defeated, Pakistan

can broker power deals between

them and the Afghan government.

This gives Pakistan an incredible say

in Afghan policy, and would make

Indian encirclement impossible.

It appears that Pakistan is be-

coming somewhat frantic in trying

to find the right group to mediate

with. Recently, Pakistan has made it

well known that they would be in-

terested in facilitating talks between

the Haqqani network and the Af-

ghan government.

The Haqqani network was

started during the Soviet

Occu-

pation of

Af-

ghanistan during

the 1980’s by the

infamous muja-

hedeen Maulavi

Jalaluddin

Haqqani. During

the bloody occu-

pation, which is

presciently par-

allel to the cur-

rent war in Af-

ghanistan,

Haqqani re-

ceived financial

and material as-

sistance from

Pakistan’s ISI

and America’s

CIA in order to

prevent Soviet

incursion into

South Asia.

Haqqani and his

fighters were

often considered some of the most

ruthless and effective ―destroyers of

the occupiers.‖ However, whom

Charlie Wilson once considered

―goodness personified,‖ Jalaluddin

Haqqani, his son Sirajuddin, and

their group of

loyal fighters

are


Afghanistan’s new police force, funded by your tax dollars.


now considered one of the gravest

threats to American and NATO

forces in Afghanistan. The

Haqqani network has claimed re-

sponsibility for a slew of attacks in

Afghanistan, most notably an as-

sassination attempt on President

Hamid Karzai in 2008.

Why would an insurgent group

that is so hostile to both the United

States and the Afghan government,

and is based in Pakistan be able to

have a say in the future of Afghani-

stan? The reason is becoming quite

clear: both Afghanistan and the US

realize that the Haqqani network

cannot be defeated, and the only

other option is a political solution.

This is due largely to the fact that

they’re headquartered in the law-

less North Waziristan region of

Pakistan. Due to their strategic lo-

cation, they are immune from an

attack by American ground forces

out of respect for Pakistani sover-

eignty. Also, since the network is

deemed an ―asset‖ by Pakistani in-

telligence, there has been little in-

tention to tackle this radical

Islamist group by the Pakistani

army.

Luckily for Pakistan, it appears

that the plan is slowly working, al-

though with some bumps on the

way. Sirajuddin Haqqani, son of

Julaladdin, reportedly met with

President Karzai to discuss recon-

ciliation efforts. However, Karzai

vehemently denied the allegations,

which shows that he is not quite

ready to go public with the policy

shift. It is also widely believed that

Karzai forced Amrullah Saleh, di-

rector of Afghan intelligence, and

Hanif Atmar, interior minister, to

resign over their opposition to

talks with people like the

Haqqanis. Such actions by Karzai

demonstrate that reconciliation is

possible but distant.

Opposition to reconciliation

efforts can be heard loud and clear

in the United States. Senator Carl

Levin, chairman of the Senate

Armed Services committee de-

manded that the Haqqani network

be put on them terrorist blacklist.

CIA director Leon Panetta said

that, ―I think

It’s very difficult to proceed

with a reconciliation [between Af-

ghanistan and the Haqqani net-

work] that’s going to be meaning-

ful.‖ Despite American criticism, it

appears that as Pakistani influence

on Afghan politics is waxing, and

American influence is waning.


International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) soldier. Many ISAF troops (NATO’s security force) are stationed in Afghanistan in a prolonged, no-win war.

Marissa Yturralde-Giannotta


Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton recently told the Pakistan govern-ment that the United States would send an ad-ditional $500 million in aid to the country. The aid includes American tax-payer money on initiatives to help improve public health, water distribution, and agriculture. Among these initiatives are projects including building a 60-bed hospital in Ka-rachi and helping farmers export mangos.

In an attempt by Mrs. Clinton to bridge the tension gap between the two countries, Pakistan has now been able to secure $500 million additional ex-tra cash to its economy, at the same time progressing its national inter-ests.

What is even more alarming is the recent news about Pakistan’s aid to the Taliban. The classified military documents re-leased by WikiLeaks de-tails that the country’s In-ter-Service Intelligence (ISI) has been securing the Taliban along the Afghan-Pakistan border. Senior Taliban officials told Newsweek that, ―they [Pakistan] feed us with one hand and arrest and kill us with another.‖

United States and Pakistan relations have not been the best in re-cent years, which was

the point of Mrs. Clin-tons return to the coun-try. However, Pakistan has continued to resist in helping the United States strike Taliban sanctuaries.

It seems for the Pakistani government their

goal is an increased and pro-longed war in Afghanistan for

several reasons. For one, Pakistan wants to

establish itself as a regional key player and to do so they need to have

some sort of influence with the Tali-ban, a legitimate and recognizable

force in the same region. To gain this position it needs a group like

the Taliban to extend its power. Not only do they need the Tali-

ban but they also need the United States hand in its

economic interests. The Pakistani gov-ernment knows that if it continues to show a ―strong face‖ towards terrorism it can continue

to funnel tons of Ameri-can aid into their country

while at the same time aiding the Taliban. So what side is Pakistan ultimately on? Well that’s easy: Pakistan is on Pakistan’s side just


Pakistan Leaked


as America is on America’s side. Pakistan’s battle against ter-

rorism has been lackluster. Sui-cide bombers have killed many innocent civilians in the coun-try and public sentiment is turning against the American war to the North. Many Paki-stani’s now blame the United States for its own terrorism in-side its borders. Thus, the Paki-stani government now faces a direct challenge from its citi-zenry to not align itself to closely with the United States for fear of intensified terrorism. Pakistan has also planned to buy nuclear reactors from China, a move that has alarmed the United States. The deal goes beyond in-ternational norms of the non-

proliferation regime. Mrs. Clin-ton did not seem to raise the is-sue during her meeting with the Pakistani government.

But, not only does this raise questions in our role in Opera-tion Enduring Freedom and the legitimacy of aid to Pakistan, but it also raises economic questions. Our country is still facing an alarming unemploy-ment rate with a recession still continuing. For Mrs. Clinton, $500 million does not seem like a large sum; however this is still money that could’ve been used by the American taxpayer for saving and investment that ultimately turns into produc-tion (a real stimulus).

The United States needs to reevaluate its position not only in Afghanistan and Pakistan but also in its position in hand-ing out economic aid. In most situations, US aid only helps in


propping up regimes and continuing their power for our own in-terests. Instead of di-rectly affecting the peo-ple of that country, aid flows through corrupt governments and indi-viduals who use that aid in their benefit.

In this case, Paki-stan is taking some of that aid in aiding the enemy for their own interests.

Pakistan is doubling timing our country. They, like the United States, have their own reasons for their well-being. Prolonging the war, aligning with other regional powers (the Taliban) and increasing their own influence are their goals just as any

other nation. The United States should recognize this and stop giving Pakistan among with other nations tax-payer money.

Julian Assange at a news conference. A former hacker, Julian runs the WikiLeaks website, which hosts leaked gov-ernment documents which were otherwise hidden from the public. He has received heavy flak from Washington. Source: urbanchristiannews.com

Jeremy Davis


The humble and respectable republic that was

once America is long gone. In its place is an empire bent on forging the world into its military playground.

In his book Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic, Chalmers Johnson spells out the chilling reali-ties of the what’s become America’s empire.

―The United States today is like a cruise ship on the Niagara River upstream of the most spectacular water

falls in North America. A few people on board have begun to pick up a slight hiss in the background, to observe a faint haze of mist in the air or on their glasses, to note that the river current seems to be running slightly faster. But no one yet seems to have realized that it is

almost too late to head for shore.‖ Johnson’s somber warning is perhaps one of the most damag-ing critiques of a misguided foreign policy ever put to print. The neo-conservatives who gleefully steer America’s interventionist for-eign policy are directing a once sturdy republic turned authoritarian empire to the edge of col-lapse. Since the conclusion of World War II and the rise of America as sole ―super power‖, the for-eign policy of the United States has been fueled by a culture of persistent militarism. This has in turn corrupted our constitutional system of gov-


Chalmers Johnson’s Nemesis

American militarism has reached the shores of virtually every continent on earth. All at taxpayer expense.

An Estonian soldier in Baghdad. Ameri-can foreign policy often drags other countries into unnecessary wars.


ernment, the American republic, and democracy in general. This has also brought us numerous scandals of torture, illegal spying on U.S. citi-zens, fudging facts in order to justify needless undeclared wars, and an acceptance of America as the world’s policeman.

In terms as to who reigns su-preme in government war making, one of Uncle Sam’s favorite pas-times; Congress has been consistent in abdicating its constitutional au-thority to declare war. It has instead chosen to empower an increasingly unitary president with the ability to initiate war via his own determina-tion. Congress’ lack of willingness to provide the necessary check on the executive has enabled the president to initiate countless invasions such as the ones in Iraq and Af-ghanistan. This ―breakdown of con-stitutional govern-ment‖ as Johnson frames it has re-sulted in an inter-national U.S. he-gemony that spans to the corners of the entire earth.

The extent to which America’s global network of military bases

spans is quite startling. Ac-cording to the Department of De-fense’s Base Structural Report as cited by Johnson, the United States currently operates and maintains approximately 737 military bases in over 130 countries. He also reveals that the Pentagon estimates that all overseas U.S. military structures collectively hold the worth of nearly $127 billion. Aside from the massive economic distortion they prop up domestically, a perhaps equally negative impact fer-mented by these bases is re-flected in the resentment they create in their host na-tions.

The hatred and opposi-tion generated by the pres-ence of U.S. forces in these countries and the local cor-

ruption that tends to accompany them get nourished because many large segments of the citizen population typically view American troops as an unjustified occupational force standing in their back-

yard. The picture painted by these bases of America

around the world actually serve us greater harm and have a hand in creating the very thing they claim to be protecting us from.

Johnson notes that America does not need colonies in the tradi-tional and historical sense to be un-derstood as an empire. ―Once upon a time, you could trace the spread of imperialism by counting up colo-nies. America’s version of the colony is the military base; and by follow-ing the changing politics of global basing, one can learn much about our ever more all-encompassing im-perial ―footprint‖ and the militarism that grows with it.‖

An entire chapter is also devoted in comparing the American empire to those of Britain and Rome and presents a choice in determining which path the United States will follow. Johnson puts it this way: America can either go the way of the British empire and essentially aban-don its imperial aspirations in search of a more democratic system of government (although Johnson himself admits this transition wasn’t carried out in the most effective manner) or the way of Rome and lose all attachments to a republic in favor of an authoritarian dictator-ship.

In his final chapter titled The




Crisis of the American Republic, Johnson outlines America’s devotion to Keynesian-ism and its destruction economically as well as the governments’ ever present quest for secrecy and less accountability to the American public. This chapter also brings Johnson’s final warning.

―In Nemesis, I have tried to present historical, political, economic, and phi-losophical evidence of where our current behavior is likely to lead. Specifically, I believe that to maintain our empire abroad requires resources and commit-ments that will inevitably undercut our domestic democracy and in the end pro-duce a military dictatorship or its civilian equivalent.‖

He also warns of the damage done to the founders’ vision of America. ―The founders of our nation understood this well and tried to create a form of government – a republic – that would prevent this from occurring. But the combi-nation of huge standing armies, almost continual wars, military Keynesianism, and ruinous military expenses have destroyed our republican structure in favor of an im-perial presidency.‖

From cover to cover, never once does Chalmers John-son let up in his assault on exposing the faults of rampant militarism, the regime toppling CIA as the president’s pri-vate army, the military industrial complex, or erosion of constitutional government.

How long has it been in Afghanistan?


Subject: China Style of Government: Good ol’ fashioned, soul-rending Communism President: A brutal, godless dictator named Hu Jin-tao

According to the Foreign Policy magazine web-

site, China has received nearly $1 billion dollars in

grants from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, as of

July of this year. This is a fund that China has do-

nated $16 million to over the past eight years. It is a

fund that the American taxpayer has donated $5.5

billion to over the past eight years. China has re-

ceived 60 times what they have donated to the fund.

Yes, this is the same China that owns hundreds of

billions of U.S. debt. It is the same China that has a

massive army and seems to make almost everything

you own. Yet, the American government pours $5.5

billion of your money into a fund that China can

draw about a billion from. I am sure that the money

helps some people in China, but is it right to force,

say, a struggling American single mother to pay for

the AIDS medication of some disease-ridden Chinese

hookers? Isn’t the ―utopia‖ that is communist China

supposed to take care of its people with the money

they have exacted from their own citizens?

But that is only the beginning. According to an

Associated Press article published on the CNBC web-

site, entitled ―Foreign Nations Offer Gulf Spill Aid to

US - for a Price,‖ The U.S. spends roughly $30 mil-

lion per year altogether on foreign aid to China.

Think of that next time you drive on a shoddily paved

road, or consider the state of some inner city schools,

or consider the astronomically high U.S. debt. Con-

sider that the next time you read a story of some

family being brutally murdered by Chinese govern-

ment officials for practicing their religion, or think of

all the babies forcibly aborted due to the Chinese

government’s rather barbaric ―breeding policies.‖


Subject: Pakistan Style of Government: A ―federal republic,‖ but in the eyes of the scrutinizing observer, it is some kind of mafia made up of Islamists and dictators President: Asif Ali Zadari - They also have a prime minister named Yousaf Raza Gillani

The nation of Pakistan is ravaged by war in the mountains on its shared border with Pakistan, and the people of Pakistan continue to suffer under draconian laws which lead to such things as the stoning of rape victims. Pakistan is perpetually hostile towards its neighbor, and our ally, India, and it’s con-tinuing to make deals with China which scare the wits out of every Sean Hannity-worshipping neocon. Yet, President Obama signed a bill in October of last year which will send a whopping $7.5 billion to Pakistan over the next 5 years, ac-cording to an article on the Newsweek website entitled ―A Timeline of U.S. Aid to Pakistan.‖ Since 9/11, the U.S. govern-ment has given even more than that. In August of 2009 the Foreign Policy magazine website pointed out that the bulk of U.S. aid sent to Pakistan ends up going to the corruption-ravaged Pakistani army and intelli-gence services. In an article penned by Azeem Ibrahim, titled ―How America is Funding Corruption in Pakistan,‖ Ibrahim goes on to mention that both the army and intelligence ser-vices are scarcely controlled by the civilian government, and that the money often winds up in the hands of individuals. If you thought the idea of being forced to pay for the medical care of Chinese citizens was bad enough, the idea of sending your money to kleptocrats in Pakistan, a nation still plagued by the idea of ―honor killings,‖ must be even more troubling. We have enough parasites masquerading as useful workers employed by our own government to pay for. Now, you may be burdened for AIDS victims no matter where they are. So helping people in China with AIDS is not a bad idea at all to you. Or, you may like the idea of funding the needy in Pakistan. Don’t misunderstand me, I too wish to alle-viate the suffering, and I strongly believe in voluntarily help-ing the poor and needy. But, the key operative in all of this is the word ―force.‖ You are forced against your will to pay for AIDS victims in China. You are forced against your will to fund a corrupt group of military leaders who are hardly ac-countable to the people they supposedly serve. You have no choice in the matter. You may find spending your money on such causes ludicrous or immoral, yet you cannot ―opt out‖ if you pay taxes to the federal government.

This is the first entry in what I would like to call the “foreign aid horror files.” Each issue I will pick two or three countries which receive aid from the U.S. government, aka: the American taxpayer, and detail some of the fiascos involved. We will hear grim tales of theft, extortion, shocking immorality, murder, corruption, greed and much more, all fueled by the hard-earned cash of the American worker.

Foreign Aid Horror Files Brendon DeMeo



On many occasions, we have heard of what the Taliban is. Since the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, the American media has constantly shown it's audience of who and what the Taliban are. Often many times, there are misconceptions and misinformation. In the begin-ning of the invasion, many called the Taliban terrorists who protected their sacred leader Osama bin Laden. However, are the Taliban terrorists or insurgents? Who are they really? What funds them? Are they striving for a global jihad? What is a terrorist? First off, in order to fully understand and consider a group [or an individual] a terrorist is to decipher the definition of a terrorist. According to dictionary.com, a terrorist is someone [or a group] who advocates the use of terrorism. The definition of a terrorism is the use of violence and threats to intimidate for political purposes. Also, the Taliban are not Al Qaeda [ a terrorist group]. So in essence, by deciphering the definition of terrorist and terrorism, we immediately can cross it out when it comes to the Taliban. The Taliban are not a global terror-ist institution. Rather, they existed in Afghanistan pre 9/11 and for several years as well. They not only existed, but governed Afghanistan. Terrorists are usually rogue groups or individuals, each having a local problem to deal with. Terrorists also do not have armies and often do not have a flag to represent [especially in case of Mus-lim terrorists]. A couple examples are Somalia's Al Sha-bab and the most obvious of all, Al Qaeda. What is an insurgent? The definition of insurgent is different, however. Accord-ing to dictionary.com, an insurgent is ―a person who rises in forcible opposition to lawful authority, esp. a per-son who engages in armed resistance to a government or to the execution of its laws; rebel.‖ In today's case, the Taliban can qualify as a rebel/insurgent group, especially after the fact that they are no longer officially in power. The Taliban's political and military fight against the Af-ghan Karzai government is also what qualifies them as an insurgent group. The Taliban also carry some ele-ments of nationalism, just as they have during the earlier

Soviet and British invasions. Insurgents don't have re-quire uniforms and have guerrilla tactics.

Who are the Taliban? Although there are many misconceptions about the Tali-ban, it is believed that they originated after the Soviet withdrew troops from Afghanistan in 1989. The literal meaning of taliban is ―students‖, or ―religious students‖. Many of the Taliban were former Afghan fighters of the Mujahadeen during the 1980s. A majority of the Taliban members are Pashtun [which a large, significant popula-tion of Afghans are]. It is widely believed that the foun-der of the Taliban is Mullah Mohammed Hasan Reh-mani, a peg legged former fighter against the Soviets during the early days of Russia's occupation of Afghani-stan. The current leader is Mullah Mohammed Omar. According to Taliban and militant Central Asian Islamic groups expert Ahmed Rashid, the Taliban did provide some sort of stability after a devastating 20 years of war in Afghanistan. Before the Taliban were an official group, the country was in devastating condition. It was mostly divided by many local warlords. The whole country was basically disintegrated. For example, the country's capi-tal Kabul was controlled mostly by the Tajik government of Burhanuddin Rabbani before 1994 [the emergence of the Taliban]. Before 1994,the country was in such a terrible shape that even international aide workers feared working in Af-ghanistan, especially rough regions like Kandahar. Cor-ruption also prevailed among local warlords. Many of them sold everything to Pakistani traders, including items of local civilians. Most of those items were also sto-len. At often times, the local warlords would seize peo-ples homes and give them off to their political support-ers. Sometimes, they would also kidnap children and use them for their sick pleasures. A number of these activi-ties were committed by the once glorified Mujahadeen. This was the prevalent situation in Afghanistan, before the 1994 emergence of the Taliban. According to the Taliban, since they vehemently opposed these local atrocities, they set an agenda of their own—restoring peace, disarming the population and restore the Islamic integrity in Afghanistan.

Terrorists or Insurgents? Jihan Huq


Thus, since the Taliban were in political power, they pro-vided some sort of stability for the country.

Global Jihad? What Strives Them to do What they do? Historically speaking, the Taliban have only engaged in conflicts in Afghanistan and in the border region of Paki-stan [although the Pakistani Taliban are different from Afghan Taliban in certain ways]. Taliban resistance began after the U.S invasion of Af-ghanistan and practically dismantling the Taliban gov-ernment. Here is where the problem lies. Ever since the fall of Kabul, the Taliban have been a massive resistance force against the pro Western govern-ment [or Karzai to be exact]. This is what they are using to gain more popular ground. During 2003-2004, more Taliban resistance increased. Funny thing, because a lot of neocon ―experts‖ previously claimed that the fall of Kabul would cease all insurgent activity [Max Boot, for one]. What drove the very same people against Communism and the Soviets is what is driving the same issues right now—imperialism/nation building. Back when the Soviets were their enemies, the Afghan Mujahadeen despised them not merely for nationalism, but rather for their hatred of Communism and godlessness. This is why the Taliban is our Mujahadeen fighters. They see the American troops as occupiers. The Af-ghans [including Taliban] believe that the Americans are there for oil and to forcibly ―democratize‖ or liberalize them. The

Taliban and the Mujahadeen have a strong history of re-jecting secularism. Their faith in God is also another con-tributing factor to resisting the occupying forces. Tribal-ism and maybe xenaphbia can play that as well. Since many Afghans are located with a certain tribe, tribalism is very crucial to afghan life. Fear or distrust of anyone who isn't Afghan can be a psychological thing, since the British, the Soviets and Americans are all the non Af-ghan/Muslim occupiers. Conclusion While reading this article, one may conclude that this is pro Taliban regime, which is not. The Taliban are local resistance forces dedicated to defeat the Americans and Westerners due to their rejection of imperialism, occupa-tion and secularism. If we are to win in Afghanistan, we must decipher who we are fighting. Initially, it was Al Qaeda. However, now it is the Taliban. It is my opinion that we should not fight the local resistance [since they represent a significant amount of the Afghan popula-tion]. Since Al Qaeda is no longer in Afghanistan, we should use our intelligence to dismantle them and with-draw troops from Afghanistan. It is nonsensical to pick a new battle [the Taliban], when we came in for another [al Qaeda]. Though they are the largest resistance force, there are still minor ones [Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin and Haqqani Network]. The Taliban are obviously the best funded and influential. History has revealed that Afghanistan is the graveyard of empires. Whether it be the Mujahadeen or the Taliban, Afghanistan is no place to nation build, or pick the wrong fight with. We should always take heed of what the Foun-ders have said about nation building and imperialism. Too bad Washington is reluctant to listen.


Taliban Funds Most experts agree that a majority of Taliban contri-butions come from the selling of opium. In fact, a large portion of Afghanistan's economy is also based on opium/heroin goods. Often times, they will sell opium to purchase weapons and sometimes even buy it's support [a very tactical move, might I add]. Historically speaking, the Taliban have a good record of pro opium policy. Previously, they have provided Muslim farmers to grow opium for their personal economy. However, after they first captured Kanda-har, they decided to legalize all drugs for economic gain. They even began to collect the Zakat [charity] on the dealers of opium to give to the poor. Many locals were actually grateful because the Taliban allowed them to grow their own opium in peace. Of course, the policy was done for mostly economic and political rea-sons.


Now that coalition forces have just recently suffered their deadliest month yet in the conflict in Afghani-stan, it now it has become more cru-cial than ever to rethink the strategy of the United States and its allies in the region. Currently, the cornerstone of this strategy rests upon two key fac-tors – winning over the local peoples of the region, and training local forces to carry the burden when, and if, coa-lition forces leave the region.

At least on the exterior, these goals in Afghanistan do make some sense. The only possible way to succeed via a continued military occupation of Af-ghanistan is to attain and bank on the support of the local peoples. Also, if western powers are ever to withdraw from the region, local forces will have

to be able to maintain whatever struc-ture these forces leave in their wake.

However, while this strategy is not completely outlandish and does show some merit on the part of military strategists in that they are leaning more towards localized models that entail comprehension of diverse local factors, the question still must be asked – is this strategy actually possi-ble to carry out and have the sought after effects in the region? Can the United States and its allies actually win over the peoples of Afghanistan and western Pakistan, and can these same powers possibly train forces that will remain peacekeepers in the years to come? Despite the fact that I ad-mire the intentions of the military’s current strategy in this region, I do not think that their plan is in fact possible. It seems to me that rather we are fighting an unwinnable war to win over a people that we do not and can-


Elliot Engstrom



not understand, and that by funding the Afghani security forces of today, we are inevitably funding our enemy of tomorrow, just as our nation has mistakenly done so many times in the past in this very region.

I cannot foretell the future. Nor can anyone else. However, I can comment on what is likely to occur. And, in constructing such a model, two of the most important subjects to understand are history and praxeology, or human behavior.

An attempt by the United States to make Afghanistan a stable, west-ern-friendly state is by no means a new happening. The date of the be-ginnings of our intervention in the region could be debated, but a de-cent starting point is the late 1970’s when President Carter put forth the Carter Doctrine, which stated that the United States would defend its interests in the Middle East.

This doctrine just barely pre-ceded the Soviet invasion of Af-ghanistan, and it was this invasion that saw the beginnings of American forces, at this point being mostly

CIA and other such agencies, which were attempting to hamper the So-viet forces by funding the Afghani resistance.

Now, there is no room here for a history of American involvement in Afghanistan. However, what must be noted is that during the 1980’s and 1990’s, a pattern developed in the Middle East – the United States would fund a group in the hope of combating some common enemy, and then in later years the group funded with American taxpayer money would inevitably end up

turning against the United States. A few prominent examples of this are Al Qaeda, who received $6 billion from the United States from 1989 to 1992, the Afghani Taliban, who was receiving US foreign aid up to the very minute American forces en-tered their country (and continues to receive US foreign aid through Pakistani backchannels) and Sad-dam Hussein, who received chemi-cal weapons from the US during the Iraq-Iran War of the 1980’s, weap-ons he later used to kill American soldiers.


This, though briefly put, is the history, or the ―what.‖ So now must come an examination of the ―why,‖ or the element of praxeology. For obviously, our attempts to forge friendships in the region in the past have failed. Our friends have be-come our enemies, in fact our worst enemies.

There are several possible expla-nations for why this occurs. How-ever, mine is quite simple – we do not understand these people, we do not understand this region, we do not understand Islamic culture, and, to be quite blunt, we never will. It is not a wrongdoing by the West to look at the Middle East through Western eyes. Rather, it is the only

way that a westerner possibly can look at the Middle East. On top of this extremely problem-atic misunderstanding of the Middle East by Western peoples then comes another layer of problems, these be-ing the base problems of interven-tion in any context, amplified by the extreme foreignness and instability of the Middle East as a whole. The consequences of intervention in any scenario are so unpredictable, so many, and so far-reaching that no one can possibly intervene and suc-cessfully fulfill their objectives with-out in the process creating a dozen new problems. This is seen with the federal government intervening in states in their own country – how

much greater then are the problems when intervening in a region like the Middle East?

All this now brings us back to the point on considering the future. As I mentioned previously, I cannot say what the future holds. However, I can make an educated guess. And, based on analyses of both history and human behavior, it is safe to say that by both indirectly and directly funding the training of a new mili-tary force in Afghanistan, we very likely are creating our enemy of to-morrow. For when these people that we are now training realize that the United States is not leaving, that they are not in fact a free state, that they have become a part of the

Soviet troops roaming around Afghanistan

during the height of the Cold War. The Sovi-

ets were forced to withdraw after fighting

heavy resistance from the Mujahedeen.

Daniel Suraci


American empire, and that if they want to live culturally independent of western influence they will have to forci-bly remove Western elements within their borders, it seems extremely probable that they will do exactly that. To say that we are creating a force that will do what we expect it to do in the future is a wish at best. The reality is that we do not and cannot understand what is truly a foreign mindset, and our best course of action would be to distance ourselves from what is and will be for many years of region of perpetual conflict.


On July 11, 2010, twin bombings occurred in Kampala, Uganda, killing 76 people. The bombers are believed to be linked to al Qaeda, through a So-malian group Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab is a 'militant group' which controls most of southern and central Somalia. Somalia itself is split into multiple fac-tions, despite the typical Western view that there is in fact a solidified government in Somalia that has a president, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed.

In response to the attacks, the African Union has taken action and compiled a response team to at-tack the threat, under the orders of one Somali fac-tion under Sharif Ahmed. This should come as no surprise after a cursory review of Somalian history, which shows that the country has been a plaything of Western forces for the past century.

Should America be supporting the African Un-ion's initiative to combat al-Shabaab? The answer is a resounding no. Somalia has been in a state of nearly perpetual war and puppet governments since 1920, beginning with invasions from the British, control by the Italians as a protectorate, World War II, and British and Italian control until 1960. By 1969, a successful coup overthrew the President, leading to a dictatorship in 1976, and the Ogaden war between Somalia and Ethiopia.

Somalia was, of course, was part of the Cold war. Originally an ally of the Soviet Union, the Soviets betrayed them during the Ogaden war, and so So-malia allied with the United States. Holding a key geographical position, Somalia was flooded with US dollars, but when the Cold War came to an end, the country's political factions became divided. Con-stant militant uprisings throughout the 1980s even-tually turned to civil war.

The Somali Civil War was influenced by a failed 'peacekeeping' mission by the United Nations, lead-ing to a United States intervention. Clinton's failure to achieve 'peace' through war in Somalia lead to a second United Nations peacekeeping mission, lead-ing to the creation of a ―Transitional Federal Gov-ernment‖ (TFG), which Sheikh Sharif Ahmed now runs, known as the single most corrupt government in the world.

This mess was compounded on by both the Bush

Uganda Bombings


administration. Al-Shabaab had very little support until Bush back violent warlords against the group. As a direct result, al-Shabaab gained favor in the eyes of Somalians. So the Bush reac-tion? Fund the Ethiopians, the Somalians' most hated enemy, to kill them. The result? More sup-port for al-Shabaab by the Soma-lians. When this invasion failed, al-Shabaab was in a position of such strong popularity as to be a threat to the transitional govern-ment, which were now being given funding and massive amounts of weapons by the Bush administration. Al-Shabaab's popularity relies entirely on their appearance of fending off foreign

invaders. Again, even with it happening before their eyes, American leaders failed to see blowback occur.

This cursory review of history shows the question is not whether or the not the United States should interfere in Soma-lia now after the Uganda bomb-ings, but whether America should continue its support of a regime put into place by interna-tional interests. At least, unlike Yemen, the United States is not bringing its own troops into So-malia.

The country of Somalia has been facing unrest due in large part to the interests of foreign governments, and secondly to

domestic religious and clan con-flicts. The only question worth asking is what will the ramifica-tions be for further United States involvement?

First, the United States can-not 'promote the democratic practice' as is its so-called mis-sioned in nation building by in-stalling a government through funding. It sends the message of ―Democracy is fine, as long as you democratically vote to agree with us.‖ The Somalian people are obviously sick of foreign in-vaders telling them how to live, so much so that a very tradition-ally moderate Muslim population gave way to al-Shabaab. When an international force tells people


how to live, their natural reaction is to reject the for-eign invaders. This has been the case throughout al-most all of history, and will remain so.

The second issue is if this greater international government does in fact represent even the desires of the Somali people or is capable of fulfilling their mis-sion. Since the bombings, the African Union has in-creased its troop force in Somalia to 8,000, funded thus far with over $176 million United States taxpayer dollars. A reoccurring problem throughout the occu-pation (which it is) of AU troops in Somalia is that the Somalian people and troops do not trust them. The Washington Times reports that Somali troops and AU troops do not trust each other and have been unable to coordinate or accomplish much.

Last, it should be obvious that further involvement in Somalia accomplishes nothing but further helping al Qaeda and al-Shabaab remain entrenched, and in fact strengthen their stature in the area. That leaves Amer-ica with two alternatives: kill them all or leave. The first strategy has been shown to be impossible, from Vietnam to Afghanistan to Iraq. Even where it has been tried, more militant groups fending off the for-eign invader have popped up. War crimes have been committed. Massive amounts of dollars have been hemorrhaged. And defeat still seems inevitable to eve-ryone but pundits. The second strategy remains un-tried in modern times. Perhaps, it is finally the time for America to simply try leaving.



“Anyone who has ever looked into

the glazed eyes of a soldier dying

on the battlefield will think hard

before starting a war.”

- Otto von Bismarck

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