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Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

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Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002
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Page 1: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System

Joshua Young

CS585F – Fall 2002

Page 2: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

Scenario

• Computer is still in its original environment

• Computer is on

• Computer appears connected to the internet.

• Computer and room have not yet been touched

• Evidence handling procedures are already in place

Page 3: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

Take Pictures…(Video if possible)

Page 4: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

Lots and Lots of Pictures…

Page 5: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

Intro to WinHex

• Hex Editor Plus• Many Forensic Uses, especially for the novice

– Disk Cloning, Ram Capture, Hex Searches, Spanned Files

• Small (can fit on a floppy)• Inexpensive

– Free limited trial Version– $100 for full version (with variations in between)

• http://www.winhex.com

Page 6: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

Ram Capture Before Unplugging

Page 7: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

RAM Export

Page 8: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

Get Password Hashes

• Use PWDUMP from floppy to floppy

• While this causes a small change to the disk, the hashes are not easily recovered once the machine is off– Win 2000 encrypts the hashes. Even if you

use a boot disk to access the NTFS partition and recover the SAM file, password crackers will not be able to break it.

Page 9: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

LophtCrack 4 Foiled

Page 10: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

PWDump2

• Any changes to the Hard Disk would be minor.

• Source Code is available, so the impact could be independently verified

• Only works if the person logged on has administrative rights

Page 11: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

PWDump2 to the rescue

Page 12: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

Freeze the System

• Once we have the RAM….

• And the Password Hashes…..

• Pull the plug

Page 13: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

Don’t Forget Other Media

• Collect all other media for analysis (similar analysis to Hard Disk)– Floppies– CDRoms– Zip Disks– Smart Cards / Memory Sticks

• If media has software on it, record name, serial number, and whether it was original media or not.

• If possible, check serial numbers with vendors to see if any of it violates copyright law.

Page 14: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

Computer

• Used Linux Bootable Toolbox 2.0– Genuine Intel Pentium II– Speed: 348.49 Mhz– Cache: 512Kb– Flags: fpu vme de pse tsc msr …etc

• Memory– Main 129,835,008

• FdiskDevice Boot Start End Blocks ID System

/dev/hda1 * 1 832 6289888+ 7 HPFS/NTFS

Page 15: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

Prep Destination disk(s)

• To be on the safe side, before cloning the hard disk, it is a good idea to wipe the drive that will house the clone. This helps eliminate any question that data found on the disk could have originated on your system.

• I used QuickWiper as an example

Page 16: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

QuickWiper

Page 17: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.
Page 18: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

Clone the Hard Disk(bit for bit copy)

Page 19: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

Create Hash of Disk (2 or more different types if possible)

Page 20: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

Time Stamp the Evidence

• Using a service such as digistamp, it is a good idea to timestamp the evidence to help prove that you made no additional changes to the media.

Page 21: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

Begin the Analysis

• Never work on the original media. Always use the copy.

• I conducted my analysis within windows itself.

• First I cracked the passwords so I could log in.

Page 22: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

LophtCrack 2.5

Page 23: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

Map Files

• Use known good version of cmd.exe file• Pipe lists to text files• Get several files

– By date (creation, last access, last write, etc.)– By extension (pics, docs, zips, etc. )– By type (hidden, system, read-only, etc.)

• Import into excel or database for analysis• Notepad is not adequate for large text

files. I used TextPad to view, search, etc.

Page 24: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.
Page 25: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

Dir Command

• Dir c: /Q /S /TA >d:FileList1.txt

• Q displays owner

• S causes recursive list

• TA displays last access time

• Took about 5 minutes to run

• Produced a 4.5 Meg File

Page 26: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.
Page 27: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

Objective

• Focus on typical use of the computer• Focus on possible illegal activities

– Illegal Material (Piracy and/or outlawed content)– Hacking– Unauthorized Data

• Focus on Information Collection– Contacts– Account Numbers– Passwords

Page 28: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

I searched for 4 types of data• Configuration

– System Information– Networking Parameters– Installed Programs

• Regular– documents, email, keyword, zipped, etc.

• Deleted– Recycle Bin– Marked for deletion but still recoverable– Left Over Registry Entries

• Hidden– Slack/Free Space– Steganalysis– Encrypted– Altered File Types– Streams

Page 29: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

System Info

• On top of data obtained by the Linux Bootable Toolkit (shown before), the information contained under the start menu/settings/control panel details the system– All Administrative tools are there– Date/Time, System, Hardware Settings– Disk Tools– Computer Management Application

Page 30: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.
Page 31: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

Specific things to look for in configuration

• Web Site(s)

• FTP Site(s)

• Terminal Services

• DNS or Mail Services Running

• Log Files– EventViewer– C:\WINNT\system32\LogFiles\

Page 32: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.
Page 33: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.
Page 34: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

Network Parameters

• Simple IPConfig command

• Windows Network Dialog– Start Menu/Settings/Network and Dialup

Connections

Page 35: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

IPConfig

Page 36: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.
Page 37: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

Specific things to look for in network settings

• Dial-Up Accounts (to contact for logs)

• VPN’s set up

• Whether it’s got multiple IP’s

• Protocols Installed

• Sharing Configuration

Page 38: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

Installed Programs

• Add/Remove Programs• Hard Disk

– List files by .exe, .com, .bat, .zip, .msi

• Services• Registry

– Regedit– Deleted Apps may leave key values or

Components installed

• Programs that run at start up

Page 39: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.
Page 40: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

Dir *.msi /s(Microsoft Installer Files)

Page 41: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.
Page 42: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

Regedit Search for ‘Transcender’

Page 43: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

Start Up Programs

• Start Menu For each user

• Regkey:– HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE– HKEY_CURRENT_USER

• Software/microsoft/windows/currentversion– Run– Runonce– Runonceex

Page 44: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

Specific things to look for in Installed Programs

• Hacking/Cracking Tools– Encryption– Data Hiding– Sniffers– Password Crackers

• Illegal Software– Bootleg Software

• Registered Software• Development Tools• Financial Software

Page 45: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

Regular Data

• Pictures• Office Docs (Word, Wordperfect, Excel, etc.)• Emails• Wav Files• Movie Files• PDF Files• Search for ‘Common File Types’ on

www.google.com returns many sites that list common extensions and their viewers.

Page 46: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

Finding and Viewing Data

• Dir or Windows Search• Some Apps contain recent file lists• Regedit search• Some must be viewed individually, but some can

be viewed all at once– Example, lview pro for images

• Be sure to include hidden files– Search parameter – Attrib command

• Be sure to check attachments folder for email

Page 47: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.
Page 48: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.
Page 49: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

Advantages to Lview

• Opens all common image files• Presents in many formats (slideshow,

contact sheet, etc.)• Preview pane• Can pass a file list from command line

(obtained by something like the Dir command)

• Does not rely on extension– Will open .jpg file even if extension is wrong

Page 50: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

If Docs are encrypted…

• Several Inexpensive utilities can break passwords on many common files.– AccessData– Cain

• Keys may be found written down or stored electronically in plaintext (via textfiles)

Page 51: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

Deleted Data

• Recycle Bin• Marked For Delete but recoverable

– Trial Version of Norton doesn’t work on NT– WinHex will list deleted files, but has limited

recovery capability (fragmentation hinders it).

• Registry Search– Keys are often left over

• Important to do on an unaltered copy of the drive

Page 52: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.
Page 53: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.
Page 54: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

Web Info

• History

• Cache

• Cookies

• Tools I tried didn’t work

Page 55: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

Hidden Data

• Important to do these tests on an unaltered copy of the drive

• Free/Slack/Swap Space

• Staganalysis

• Encryption

• Altered File Types

• Streams

Page 56: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

Free/Slack/Swap Space

• Swap Space is a file on Windows

• Free Space is space marked available to write to in Windows

• Slack Space is unused space at the end of a file

• Used WinHex

Page 57: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

Free Space

Page 58: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

Altered File Types

• Software can detect files via their headers

• Most apps will open their own files correctly if pointed to them directly

• Some applications serve as multipurpose. For example, word opens most document types. LViewPro opens most image types.

Page 59: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.
Page 60: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

Alternate Data Streams

• Originated to provide compatibility with Macintosh Hierarchical File System (HFS)

• Invisible using standard windows browsing utilities.

• Free program Lads will display all streams

Page 61: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.
Page 62: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

Steganalysis and Encryption

• Both very effective at hiding data, especially when used together.

• Detection is difficult, but actually recovering the data can be unfeasible for most analysts.

• Most common means of detection is the presence of software utilities used for Steganography or Encryption

• Most common means of recovery is poor password security. Either passwords are found via other applications or written down.

Page 63: Forensic Analysis of a Windows 2000 Server Operating System Joshua Young CS585F – Fall 2002.

Conclusion

• Was able to accumulate a considerable amount of information from a default Windows 2000 Server machine

• Several tools and techniques didn’t work as described in research. Windows is getting better.

• If secured correctly, I don’t know that I would have been able to recover much information at all.


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