Forensic engineering: a reappraisal ofthe Tay Bridge
disasterPETER R. LEWIS and KEN
REYNOLDSAddressTheTayBridgedisasterof1879shockedtheworldandledtoimportantchangesinbridgedesign,construction,and
inspection. The Court of Inquiry produced its nal report in six
months, and condemned the structure for itsdesign and materials
defects. However, the court did not specify exactly how the nal
collapse of the high
girderssectionoccurredonthenightoftheaccident.Byreexaminingthewealthofevidencesurvivingfromthetime,inparticular
the photographic archive and the court proceedings, we have looked
again at the causes of the disaster.Our reappraisal conrms the
conclusions of the original inquiry, but it also extends them by
suggesting that
lateraloscillationswereinducedinthehighgirderssectionofthebridgebytrainspassingoveraslightmisalignmentinthetrack.
Theamplitudeof theseoscillations grewwithtime,
becausejointsholdingthebridgetogether
weredefective,andthisinturnresultedinfatiguecracksbeinginducedinthecastironlugs,whichreachedcriticalityonthenightofthedisaster.
Numerouseastwestlugsfracturedwhenalocal
trainpassedoverthebridgeinawesterlygaleontheeveningof28December1879.Theexpresstrainwhichfollowedwasmuchheavier,andthetowers
in the high girders collapsed progressively as the train was part
way over the section. Although wind loadscontributedtothe disaster,
the bridge was alreadyseverelydefective owingtofailure of its most
importantstabilising elements.From the early days of the Open
University we have is vital to most product failures, and all
assumptionsmade must be explicitly stated and justied. This last
usedcase studiesofdisasters (suchas theMarkhamCollieryincident of
1973, inwhicheighteenminers is not a luxury item, but a necessary
precondition inexpert evidence used, for example, in the UK courts.
diedwhenabrakerodfailed, causingapitcagetofall tothe bottomof
ashaft) todemonstrate the Failurewill always occur at theweakest
part of astructure, andcanresult inachainreactionif not importance
of fatigue.1 In our new course on
forensicengineering,2theblockoncatastrophicfailuresfol- checked
(the collapse of theWorld Trade Centre on11September 2001is
agoodexample). Computer lows earlier blocks which present case
studies of morerecentproductfailuresonamuchsmallerscale.We analysis
can thus seriously overestimate the ultimatestrength of a
structure, and must surely be used with use our own published
papers as the basis for studentanalysis, and expand the text where
necessary to caution. Bias will be familiar to all forensic
engineerswho have entered litigation. Sometimes it is produced
explain the underlying principles.3The forensic tools usedtoanalyse
disasters are by preferential inspection of evidence not yet
availableto the other side. When this happens, however, most
identical tothose usedfor troubleshootingroutineproduction or
failure problems, photographic evi- cases arequicklysettledas
thewholepicturesoonemerges. In other cases there is an inbuilt bias
to the dencebeingacoretool. Simplemechanical analysisusing
reasonable estimates of key variables allows client who is paying
the fee. Interpretation of the evi-dence is thentwistedor ignored,
ultimatelyat the hypotheses to be tested against the witness
evidence.Elementarychemistrymayalsoentertheanalysisin expense of
the client, should the facts be against them.IntheTayBridgedisaster
of 1879, thefocus of considering stress corrosion cracking
problems.Whateversurvivesisthemostlikelyscenariowhich this paper,
the bridge designer Sir Thomas Bouchquicklyraisedthe defence that
the windblewthe causedtheaccident. Determiningtheprecisecauseor
causes of aproduct failure is vital for making trainfromthe
trackintothe bridge, andthat theshock caused the lugs on the
nearest tower to break, better products, andif thecauseis
misinterpreted,further failures may be expected.
socausingthecollapse. Histheoryreceivessupportfrom some local
Dundee people,4 however it fails to The skills neededtosolve
problems inforensicengineeringarenot easilydeveloped, becausethere
explain why all twelve towers collapsed and not
justtheonenearestthepointonthehighgirderswhich are somany factors
tobe overcome. Bias for oragainst a particular theory can be a
formidable the train allegedly hit. In fact, there is little
realevidenceinsupportofthistheory.Onlytheguards obstacle in
approaching the truth, often encouragingselectionof the facts
tobolster aparticular view- van and one passenger carriage showed
anything liketheserious damagethat wouldbeexpectedif they point
without the wider picture being examined.Appreciation of the
approach of dierent disciplines hadcomeothetrack. Tracesof
glancingdamageINTERDISCIPLINARY SCIENCE REVIEWS, 2002, VOL. 27, NO.
4 1 2002 IoM Communications Ltd DOI
10.1179/030801802225005725Published by Maney for the Institute of
Materials, Minerals and Miningisr000170708-10-02 17:27:28Rev
14.05The Charlesworth Group, Huddersfield 01484 517077above the
trackdiscussedat the inquirywere too describingit as badlydesigned,
badlyconstructed,and badly maintained. Whatever conclusions we
hightohavebeencausedbythetraintopplingoverin the wind. Even if it
had occurred, why did all the
cometoinourreanalysisarethereforeboundtobecontroversial, anda
stimulant toexponents of all high girders collapse so
catastrophically? The answermustbethattheywereeitherall
intrinsicallyweak, theories to justify their arguments. For our
students,thishelpsthemappreciatehowevidenceissiftedby or had been
seriously weakened by 28 December1879 by extensive generic aws. The
1880 inquiry forensic engineers in arriving at reasonably
coherentconclusions. came tothe conclusionthat thebridges
downfallwas duetoinherent defects whichmust sooner orlater have
brought it down.5 SteadydeteriorationContemporary
evidenceoccurredbyslackeningof joints andfatigue crackpropagation
caused by trains passing over the struc- Where tostart research? It
seemedtous that thebestdenovostartingpointswerethe1880reportof
ture.Inouranalysisofthephotographstakenafterthedisaster, someof
whicharepublishedherefor the inquiry, and the photographic
collection inDundee. Theywerebothprimaryevidence, andso the rst
time, we show just what the aws were thatcaused the collapse of the
high girders, and how they of greater signicance thanall the
secondary andtertiary information. The report was photocopied
weakenedthestructure. Ourreappraisal of theevi-dence still
available conrms and extends the ndings from the microche, and the
photographs scanned toproduce high resolution ti les. Both were
signicant of the original Court of Inquiry.exercises: the report
runs to over seven hundredpages, and the archive stands at over fty
images. InThe Tay Bridge disastertheformoftiles,
thepicturescouldbeenlargedup to about ten times to examine the
points of detail The collapse of the Tay Bridge on 28 December
1879wastheworststructural failuretohaveoccurredin
whichthecourtdiscussedatsomelength. Theysaya picture is worth a
thousand words, and the dictum Britainat thetime, andintermsof
bothliveslostand the size of the failed structure it still retains
this proved very apt in this case. The photographic archiveproved
invaluable because the pictures had been dubiousdistinction.
Unlikemanyotherdisasters, ithas retained its hold on the public
imagination, recordedwithaplatecameraof lowaperture, andusing a ne
emulsionat long exposures insunny perhaps because it
involvedbotharailwayandabridge failure, perhaps because of the
scale of the weather, judging by the resolution we obtained fromthe
enlargements. Indeed by their clarity and crispness accident in
terms of lives lost and the extent ofdevastation. theygaveareal
immediacytoourresearch. Intheabsence of key material remains
(particularly the cast Several popular books
havebeenwrittenonthedisaster, includingJohnPrebblesThehighgirders
ironcolumnswhichsupportedthebridgebutseeNote13),
theywerethemostimportantelementin from 1955 (the oldest),6 a book
from the early 1970sby JohnThomas,7 andthe most recent by David the
reinvestigation. Although parts of the high girdersare preserved in
the Royal Scottish Museumin Swinfen.8 A recent engineering analysis
has also beencarried out by D. R. H. Jones of Cambridge Edinburgh,
numerous cast iron exhibits fromtheinquiry were lost in the London
Blitz of 1940. University.9 The report of theCourt of
Inquiryisavailable in the parliamentary archives, together with The
best approach then was to read the report, forthe witness evidence
it contained, in conjunction with several keyexpert reports,
numerous linediagramsdescribingtheremainsofthecollapse, andthetwo
the pictures in eect working as the court
worked,sincethepictureswereuseddirectlyinevidenceto nal reports.10
Most interesting of all, the scene
wasphotographedaboutaweekafterthecollapsebya the court. Owing tothe
scale of the disaster, thestarting point would be the shots taken
froma local rm, Valentines of Dundee; themainarchivelies in Dundee
City Library, and other photo- distance: Fig.
1showsthenewbridgeasseenfromDundee, anda closeupof thehigh girders
sectionis graphs are kept at the University of St Andrews.
Thewitness statements are preserved in the Scottish showninFig. 2.
The secondset of pictures showsthe bridge after the accident, seen
from the south side National ArchiveinEdinburgh,
andthelibraryoftheInstitutionof Civil Engineers inLondonholds of
the estuary: here Fig. 3 demonstrates the extent ofthe devastation,
withtenpiers swept totally clear detailed plans of the structure.It
isclearfrommodernaccountsthat thecauses of the towers which once
stood upon them (Fig. 4).The Tay Bridge was atthe time the longest
in the ofthedisasterarestill controversial. Theviewthatwind loading
alone toppled the bridge is still held by world, spanning about two
miles across the Tayestuary. It was thecentral part,
thesocalledhigh some, andis arguedmost
stronglybyMartinandMacleod,11 whilst others argue that the train
derailed girders, whichcollapsedcompletelyonthenightof28 December
1879, leaving a gap of well over half a andhit thebridge, thus
bringingit down.12 Theseviews reect some of the contemporary
opinions mile(almostexactlyakilometre).Thecollapsetookwith it the
express train from Edinburgh and a total consideredby the original
inquiry. However, thePresidentoftheCourt, HenryRothery, condemned
of seventy-ve victims, twenty-nine of whomwerenever found. When
boats approached at rst light next the construction of the bridge
in no uncertain terms,2 INTERDISCIPLINARY SCIENCE REVIEWS, 2002,
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TheTayBridgejustaftercompletion,showingthecentreorhighgirders
sectionneededtoallowpassage of high masted sailing
shipsupstreamalongthe river toPerth(clearance4
Closeupofthejoinbetweenthelowandhighwasabouttwenty-sevenmetresathightide).sections
of the bridge showingpartly intactSome finishing work was still
being performedtiersontwopiers.Theboatintheforegroundon the bridge,
judging by the staging
andissearchingforsurvivorsinthegirders,whichladders seen at various
pointsarejustvisibleinfrontofthethirdfallenpier,pokingabovethewaterline.
Numeroustiebarbreaks canbeseeninthecentreof thelaststanding
towerexcept for theguards vanandthenal passengercarriage (Fig. 6).
The locomotive (a new 440engine) had only supercial damage, and
would laterbe restored to a long working life.The events of the
night of 28December 1879So what happened that night?
Fromeyewitness2 Closeupof
thejoinbetweenthehighgirdersevidencetothecourt, arather
confusedpictureof at left and the lowgirders at right on
theDundeesideofthebridge.
Thecentreofeacheventsemerged.Astronggalewasblowing,theskyhightower
shows thediagonal tie bars andpartly cloudy, partly lit by a full
moon. A local trainhorizontal struts which united the two sub-had
been seen crossing at a quarter past six, althoughtowers. Unlike
the low tower at extreme right,the journey across had been dicult,
and sparks ewthetopsofthehightowersarenotreinforcedfromthewheelsof
thecarriagesasthewindtilted by complete girdersthe carriages
against the guard rail. Bridges wereroutinely tted with such rails
to prevent toppling inday, theyfoundnosurvivors or bodies. The
highjust such circumstances. The worried passengers andgirders were
resting on the estuary bed, in a
remark-guardslaterdescribedtheshakingof thecarriages,ably intact
state and partly exposed at lowtide(Fig. 5). Divers later found the
train resting betweenthefourthandfthpiers, relativelylittledamaged5
Sideofthehighgirdersseenatlowtide.The3 Long shot of the collapsed
high girders section girders were found almost intact close to the
pierbases, andlaidout inawaveformalongside of the bridge, with
twelve pier platforms almostcompletely swept off their high towers
the high section of the bridgeINTERDISCIPLINARY SCIENCE REVIEWS,
2002, VOL. 27, NO. 4 3isr000170708-10-02 17:27:28Rev 14.05The
Charlesworth Group, Huddersfield 01484 5170776 Plan of the section
of the high girders between the fourth (no. 32) and fifth (no. 33)
piers, showing thenearly intact train with the 440 locomotive at
the frontalthough the driver and stoker were entirely unaware
outside edges of the lugs holdingbracingbars foreachcolumn(Fig. 9).
Thereareninesuchlugends
oftheproblembecauseofthegreaterweightofthelocomotive. showninFig.
8, andwhile some may have comefrom adjacent broken tie bars (Fig.
10), the rest must At about 7.13 pm, anexpress
traindrawnbyamuchlarger andheavier locomotive left the south
havecomefromthemissinghighertiers.Moreover,the two partly standing
piers showed that the centre end of the bridge and was seen by
witnesses inDundeepassingoverthesouthernpart, againwith bracing
bars facing east were most likely broken(Fig. 7).
Asimilarpatternappearsonthetwofully some diculty and with sparks
ying from the wheels.One witness thought he saw the lights on the
bridgeshakeat about thistime. Anespeciallyseveregustwas felt on
land just as the train was passing throughthe high girders at about
7.20 pm, and severalobserverssawwhat appearedtobeashes of
lightcoming fromthe metalwork of the bridge.
Someclaimedtohaveseenthegirdersfall, startingatthesouth end, but
others thought the collapse had
startedfromthenorth.Thenearestobserverswereaboutamile fromthe
trainwhenit fell (Fig. 1shows theview of some of them) and were
scattered at variousquite dierent locations, so it is not dicult
toappreciate why accounts of the disaster varied.The Court of
InquiryActingrapidly,thecourtassembledwithinvedaysat Dundee to take
direct witness evidence. The
threejudgesalsocommissionedthephotographicsurvey,and themselves
visited the site of the fall by boat andinspectednumerous
wreckedpiers. Just twoof thetwelve towers survived with intact
tiers, the rst nextto the standing pier of the low section shown in
Fig. 7.Whatwefoundmostrevealingwasthenatureofthe debris on these
two partly standing piers. Because7
Twopartlyintacttiersonthefirstpier,photo-most of the superstructure
had been swept away, thegraphed fromthe south looking north.
Eaststone platforms were relatively clear of debris,
apartfacingtiebarshaveall brokenonthecentrefrom fractured wrought
iron bolts and broken
piecescells,whilethewestfacingtiebarsareintact.of cast ironof
almost identical shape (Fig. 8). ItBreakage has occurred
consistently at thelower lugs turnedout that these lumps of cast
ironwere the4 INTERDISCIPLINARY SCIENCE REVIEWS, 2002, VOL. 27, NO.
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Huddersfield 01484 5170778
Debrisfieldwithninelugendsplusnutsandboltsontheplatformofthethirdpier(lookingeast).
Base of fifteen inch column at left showingstructure of cottered
joint10 Broken lower lug on third pier (looking
west),standingtowersofthelowsections, althoughsomeshowingconical
taperonbearingsurfaceforof thewest facingbarswerealsofracturedat
theironeandaneighthinchbolt(lefthandarrow).lug attachments (Fig.
4).The narrowest part of the hole is an inchThe discovery of the
lug ends in abundance on pierand a quarter in diameter, so
producing aplatforms suggested that the collapse occurred by loss
large stress concentration at the contact
zone.Jointatrightshowsgapbetweencotterandslot,allowinglooseningwithtime(righthandarrow)of
the vital eastwest tie bars which braced thecolumns together and
were held by the lugs. It clearlydemanded cross-examination of
foundrymen still resi-dentintheareaatthetimeoftheoriginal
inquiry.All the cast iron was made at the local Wormitfoundry, but
their evidence proved contradictory.Thesuggestionthat
therewerecoldshut lines onthe lugs, for example, is not borne out
by our directinspectionofenlargementsofthelugs(suchasthatshown in
Fig. 10). These defects occur where themetal parts at ahole
andthenrecombines at theother side. If the metal is too cool, a
shut line formsandisaclearweaknessinthelug. Moreover,
closeinspection of the fractures showed that the bolt holeswere not
drilled out to give a parallel bearing surfacefor the bolts. On the
contrary, the holes were cast asone with the lug and column, and
given a taper. Thiswas aserious designdefect because it
producedasevere stress concentration, over and above thatcaused by
the hole, when the bolt was stressed duringstrainingof
thebracingbars. Theeect must havebeen to raise the stress at the
outer edge of the holebywell overthreetimesthenominal
appliedstress.Inaddition, it wasobservedbyHenryLaw,
expertadvisertotheinquiryteam, that thebolt diameterwas
oneandaneighthinches tot thenarrowestpart of thetaperedholeof
aninchandaquarter.The bolts were thus a very loose t, inducing
anotherstress raising factor into the equation. Our inspectionof
the photographs revealed that all connection
holesinthestructureweretapered, apartfromtheangeholes inthecast
ironcolumns, whichweredrilled.Figure 11 shows the bolt holes on an
upper lug,whilst Fig. 12 shows anexample ona strut joint.9
Linedrawingof variousjointsonfifteeninchCross-examinationof
thefoundrymenshowedthatdiameter column, includingupper
andlowerthelugswereaproblemfromthestart,
withmanylugs,strut,andflange,allcastasonewiththecolumn (Institution
of Civil Engineers) breaking in the yard from impacts. Attempts had
beenINTERDISCIPLINARY SCIENCE REVIEWS, 2002, VOL. 27, NO. 4
5isr000170708-10-02 17:27:28Rev 14.05The Charlesworth Group,
Huddersfield 01484 517077thetapersectionlugs, ill ttingbolts(Fig.
10), andthelackofacontinuousconnectionattheheadofthe column where
the high girder was supportedbythepier. Ineect, eachtower
consistedof
twoseparatesubtowersconnectedsolelybythebracingbarsandstrutslyingonaneastwest
axis(Fig. 2).Thateachsubtowerfellseparately
wassuggestedbytheremains at thefthpier, wheretheeast
towerlayunderthehighgirderandthewestontop.Thisobservation was made
by John Cochrane, an engineercalled by Sir Thomas Bouch.Materials
testingThe suspicions about the design of the lugs, especially 11
Conical taper on broken upper lug. The columnshows part of a
lifting wing used during raisingthelower lugs oneachcolumn,
ledtheinquirytoof the girderscommissionextensivematerials tests
onintact sur-vivingcolumnsandtheirbracingbars, whichmusthave been
taken from the intact parts available fromthe rst and third piers
(Fig. 7). They turned toDavidKirkaldy, awell
knownengineerandownerofone oftherst
commerciallaboratoriesequippedwithathreehundredtoncapacityhydraulictenso-meter
for mechanical testing purposes. He tested thecomplete bracing bar
structure to destruction,althoughat averyslowrate of test,
aninevitableresult of thewaystrainwas recordedat numerousdatum
points during the test.14Kirkaldysresultswerenotavailabletill
nearthe12 Conical taperonbrokenstrutlugwithintactend of the inquiry
(which by then had been transferredupper lug joint in foregroundto
Westminster, where the expert evidence was heard).His data conrmed
early suspicions about the bracingmade to burn them back on, with
mixed success. Ifsystemforthecastirontowers. Thelugholesweresuch
repaired lugs had been used in the bridge, furtherthe weakest link
in the chain, breaking from the edgesweakness would have been
introduced.injustthesamewayasfoundonthepiers,andtheAlthough only a
very small proportion of the towerlower lugs were weakest of all,
possessing a strengthparts layonthepier platforms, attentionwas
alsoonly about a thirdthat of solidcast iron(testeddrawn to tment
defects exposed in the broken parts.separately from samples
machined from the columns)!However, such defects were rather
intermittentHowever, even these results were probably
optimisticaccording to testimony, a feature we have conrmedbecause
they did not allow for fast loading conditions,by inspection of the
photographs. What were faras occurred on the night of the disaster.
Thosemore serious were the many design defects present inconditions
wouldhave producedthe muchhigherthehighgirders section(seetable).
Theseincludedstress concentration expected of a loose tapered
bolthole, and thus a much reduced strength. Under slowTable
Designdefects foundinthehighgirderstestingwhat happenedwasthat
thetoughwroughtsection of the old Tay
Bridgeironboltsbentintothetaper,
andsoincreasedthestrengthbyspreadingtheload.15Indeed,
suchboltDefect
PrevalencebendingprobablyoccurredextensivelythroughtheLugs of low
strength Allstructure during initial tting of the tie bars,
judgingBolt holes with conical sections, so bolts Allby the number
of bent bolts seen in the pictures. Thisacting only against short
length of holewould also explain why the joints worked
loose1=inchboltsfortiebarsfittedto1Ainch Allbolt holes in lugs and
flanges withtime. Thewrought irontiebarsprovedtobeStrut not
abutting column wall Allvery tough, none of the bracing bars or the
struts inStrut bolts difficult to tighten
Allthephotographsbeingbroken. Most werehoweverNo spigots on column
ends, allowing lateral Somegrossly deformed by the collapse of the
towers.movement of columnsL girders not continuous across pier head
AllPier base too small AllTheoretical analysisBatter on eighteen
inch columns too low AllGirders resting freely on piers MostBoththe
experts employedbythe inquiryandSirGirder not centred on pier;
deviation at joint OneThomas Bouch produced very similar analyses
of thebetween high and low girdersstabilityof the structure
whenloadedbyalateral6 INTERDISCIPLINARY SCIENCE REVIEWS, 2002, VOL.
27, NO. 4isr000170708-10-02 17:27:28Rev 14.05The Charlesworth
Group, Huddersfield 01484 517077wind. They applied a quasi static
analysis to determine tower. Further support for dangerous
vibrations fromwhat wind magnitude would topple an individual
passing trains was provided by many passengers,towerintotheestuary,
assumingthat eachbracing especially those travelling from south to
north. Theseelement was loadeduniformly. Theyestimatedthe included
the Provost of Dundee, who had
complainedareaexposedtothewindbythestructureandthen to the local
stationmaster of the alarming vibrationsadded the eect of the solid
train when on the tower. heandothers hadfelt.
NothingwasdonetoallayThe open lattice of the tower actually has a
relatively their fears.smallexposedarea,andthetrainwasthusasigni-
But movement of a dierent kind had beencant contributor to the
turning moment. The experts observed much earlier. After completion
of the bridgecalculatedthat awindpressureof about thirty-ve in the
spring of 1878, an inspector was appointed
topoundspersquarefoot(psf )wouldtoppleatower maintain the
structure, a Mr Noble. In fact he spentin the high girders section
of the bridge. There being most of his time worrying about the
problem of scournoanemometers ingeneral use, evidence of wind
around the bases of the masonry piers, dumping largeforce to
produce such a pressure came from observers
amountsofrocktoinhibittheproblem.WhilenearestimatesusingtheBeaufortscale.Thegeneralcon-oneofthepierplatformsinOctober1878,heheardsensuswasawindforceoftenoreleven(stormtoa
rattling noise when a train passed overhead. In
hisviolentstorm),whichonthescaleisequivalenttoaown words to the
court:wind speed of fty-nine to sixty-eight miles per hour, 11404.
Leaving the foundations, let us go up a little bit.Didyoudiscover
whether anyof theironworkof the producingapressureof tenandahalf
tofourteenbridgewasgettingunstableorloose?Intakingthosepsf.
Benjamin Baker (appearing as an expert witnesssoundingsthat
Ihavespokenof,
InoticedorheardaforBouch)madeameticuloussurveyofdamagetochattering
of the bars.wallsandbuildingssuchassignal boxes, andeven11405. You
heard them moving or shaking?
Yes.examinedtheconditionoftheballastonthetrack.[]He concludedthat
pressures were nogreater than11409.
Didyouexaminethebarsinordertoseewhatfteen psf on the night of the
disaster. Such a gurewasthematterwiththem, orwhethertheyneededanyis
far below the predicted toppling pressure, so whatrepairs?
Yes.explanation could there be for the collapse?11410. Tell me what
it was you found to be wrong withthe bars on your examination of
them? I do not knowwhether I can explain it to you. I found that
the cottersin coming together had got a little loose there was
notMovement of the bridge piersa sucient width to get a good grip,
and they had got aCritical evidence of the state of the bridge a
fewlittle loose.months before the accident came from the crew
working []on repainting the bridge. They had experienced severe
11416.Howloosewerethey?Hadtheybeenlooseofcourse they would have
been found at sight. We had to vibrations on the piers when a train
passed overgo and nd out where this chattering motion took
place,(without anywindblowing). Hereisthetestimonyandthenthroughthe
cotters tosee whichwas loose,of one of the
painters:whichshowedmethattheymusthavebeenjustabout4916.
Didthepassingof thetrainshaveanyeect onas tight as this.
Insoundingthemwithahammer wethe bridge? Very much.foundthat
theywere not tightenedupsuciently. In4917. What was its eect?
Oscillation, I would term itdriving themhome we foundthat they were
scarcelyrst, side to side movement.wide enough to get a tight
grip.4918. Was there any other movement? Yes.[]4919. What? Vertical
movement.11425. Did you report what you had found to anybody?4920.
With regard to the oscillation or lateral movement, No.was that
severe? Yes, it was very severe.11426. Why? Because I thought I
could remedy it.[]Suchwasthedramatictestimonyofdefectivejoints
4940. What eect did you see the motion thus producedhave on
anything that was placed on the bridge? I have in the towers in the
high girders section of the bridge.seenthespillingofapail
ofwateralongwhilebeforeUnfortunately, MrNobledidnotpassthenewsonthe
train approached. You could feel the oscillation halfto Bouch, but
decided to x the problem himself. Hea mile
o.purchasedlengthsofwroughtironbar(ahalfbya4941. But you have seen
a pail of water upset? No, notquarter of an inch in section), and
cut them to makeupset, only the water oscillating and spilling over
the side.shims.16 He hammered them into loose joints to
stop4942.Haditanyeectonthepaint-pots?Wealwaysthe chattering, but by
so doing he jammed the jointssecured them with every passing
train.into a xed state bearing little or no strain from
the[]tiebars. Eachtiebarwasmeant tobestrainedon4953. Were both
those movements greatest inside ortment by knocking the cotters
together, the tie bars outside of the high girders? Inside, about
the centre.thenactingtostabilisethetowers. Itwasreckoned This
evidence was corroborated by eight otherafterwards that he might
have treated some hundred workmen who had been on the piers during
theand fty joints in this way. summer of 1879. The extent of
lateral movementTakentogether, theevidenceof thepaintersand of the
bridge appears fromtheir evidence
tohavebeenbetweentwoandthreeinchesat thetopof a
MrNoblepointedtowardsseriousdeteriorationofINTERDISCIPLINARY
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17:27:28Rev 14.05The Charlesworth Group, Huddersfield 01484
51707713 Closeup of three broken lugs from twelfth pier.The centre
sample shows numerous crack arrestlineswithasmall
blowholeonthelefthandwing of the lug, probably indicating
intermittentcrack growth (fatigue)the towers of the high girders
section after the bridge14 Closeup of fractured lug on third pier
(lookinghadbeentestedbytheBoardofTradeinFebruarywest).
Onlyonewingofthelefthandlughas1878. The tests involved running six
heavy loco-broken, suggestingcyclic loadingduringormotives (total
weight of well over four hundred tons)before the accident and
collapse of the tower.Therearenowashersonthestrutbolts, and
athighspeed(fortymilesperhour)overthebridgethese appear to be
tightened by differentand observing the eect on the pier towers.
Theamounts(judgingbydifferingthreadheightsBoard of Trade inspector,
Major-General Hutchinson,above the nuts)measuredlittle eect onthe
structure.17 However,byOctober of that year joints
werecomingloose,probably as a result of high frequency vibrations
representing intermittent growth. There is supportingevidencefor
afatiguemechanismfromtheseveral from passing trains. Hammering
shims into the gapsmay have stopped the joints rattling, but it
also meant partly crackedlugs seeninthe photographs. Oneexample
fromabout sixfoundsofar is shownin that they were no longer
eective. That steady cumula-tivelooseningof thestructureonall of
thetowers Fig. 14: one wingof the lugis broken, whilst theother is
intact, suggesting at least one cycle of tensile allowedthelateral
movement felt bytheworkmenon the bridge in 1879. load. Even today,
hairline fatigue cracks in ake (orgrey) cast iron products are very
dicult to spot, and
Theimplicationsofthemovementsofthebridgewerefullyappreciatedbythecourt,whoreferredto
it ishardlysurprisingthat neitherthepaintersnorMr Noble detected
them. theracking of theeastwest bracesof thetowers.However, the
court failedtotake the further step
Brokentiebarlugsonthetwofullyerecttowersand the two partly standing
piers support the of pointing out the problem to which movement
coulgive rise. Fatigue was known at the time (cyclic testimony of
the workmen. Both east and westfacingbars arebroken, conrmingthat
thetowers testing of rail axles having been pioneered by
WohlerinGermany), but testing hadbeenconductedfor
musthavebeenoscillatinglaterallyduringthenalcollapse. The pattern
of failure preserved in the four hundredsof thousandsormillionsof
cycles, ratherthanthemuchsmallernumbertowhichthebridge towers is
more complex than indicated by simpleeastwest oscillation however.
Lugs in the outer sets was exposed by passing trains. (Britain was
torediscover the problem of low cycle fatigue cracking of bracing
bars are also broken, despite being angledat forty-ve degrees to
the eastwest axis. This seems during the investigation into the
Comet airlinerfailuresintheearly1950s.) Thejointsmost at risk to
showthat the vibrations in the nal collapseprobably had a more
complex form, again conrming would be those which were still
tensioned, essentiallybecause the imposed loads from passing trains
would
thetestimonyoftheworkerswhentheystatedthatthetowersmovedbackandforthalongtheaxisof
be transferred fromthe loose to the tight
joints.Fatiguecracksthusprobablygrewinaproportion the bridge as
well as laterally and vertically. Furthersupport for this
hypothesis is provided by the fact that of the joints, relieving
the loads but allowing greatermovement. although a majority of
columns fell to the east, somecolumns on some piers actually fell
to the west. Anestimateofthefreelateral movementcreatedbythe poor
tolerances of the joints inthe
towersalonegivesaswayatthetopofaboutfourinches,Reconstruction of
eventsnot dissimilar to that felt by the painters in thesummer of
1879. There is evidence for fatigue crack- So where does this new
analysis of the collapse takeus? The evidence for steady
deterioration of the pier ingfromsomeof thefracturesurfaces
seeninthepictures. TheexampleinFig. 13showscrackarrest structure is
convincing. It was produced by two mainmechanisms,
poorlydesignedjoints inthe bracing lines over part of the broken
surface, each arrest line8 INTERDISCIPLINARY SCIENCE REVIEWS, 2002,
VOL. 27, NO. 4isr000170708-10-02 17:27:28Rev 14.05The Charlesworth
Group, Huddersfield 01484 517077bars which allowed play to develop
(chattering joints),andlargestressconcentrationsat thebolt
holesofthelugswhichallowedfatiguecrackstogrow. Thehistoryof
thebridgefromits openingtothenalcollapse is thus important
toanunderstandingofwhyit collapsedsodramaticallyinthe gale of
28December 1879. In fact the bridge had been open totrac well
before its ocial opening in the spring of1878, since September
1877tobe precise. It tookgoods trac, trains carryingstone
andballast forcompletion of works in Dundee, and a growing tracin
coal from the Fife coalelds to feed the jute
millsofDundee.18Itwasheavilyloadedfromtheoutset,andtracgrewas
passenger trains wereaddedtothe timetable. Such conditions led, as
alreadydescribed, tothelooseningof joints rst
heardbyMrNobleinOctober1878, andtheswayingofthetowersfelt
bythepaintersinthesummer of 1879.On the day of the disaster, extra
loads were added tothe high girders structure by the westerly
gale,especially during the passage of the six oclock localtrain.
The rear carriages were swaying severelyenough to cause sheets of
sparks from the wheels astheymettheguardrail.Buthowmuchoftheswaywas
caused by wind acting against the carriage
sides,andhowmuchbythebridge itself swayingonitsjoints? If joint
looseness andfatigue crackinghadprogressed so far, then sway of the
bridge itself musthave beenconsiderable. Manymore tie bars must15
Thetowersinthehighgirderssectionofthehavebrokenandswungfreeduringthepassageofbridgeweretopheavy,
thecentreof gravitythelocal train,
leavingthebridgeinaparlousstatelying near the the level of the
track whenthe express train from Edinburgh crossed on the
forthefollowing expresstrain.Noneof thedamagenight of 28 December
1879wouldhavebeenseenfromthelandbecausenighthad already fallen.When
the express entered the high girders, the
towerofjustoverahundredtons.Thetowerswereevenlighterintheoriginal
design, beingcompletely greater weight of the train (well over a
hundredtons) would have produced critical movement to aid hollow,
howeversomeonedecidedtoll themwithPortland cement, increasing the
total mass. The topplingofthetowersoverwhichthetrainpassed.Each
tower behaved as though composed of two weight of the high girders
was also increased when itwas decided to cover the wooden trackway
with separatetowerslinkedbystrutsandtiebarsalone.The train nearly
reached the fth tower before ballast. The rise in centre of gravity
is shown inFig. 15. Thuseachtowerinthehighgirderssection collapse
overtook it, probably starting at the southernend and working
progressively forwards until the was very top heavy, much more so
than those in thelowsectionowingtothe greater distance between
entire high girders section had been swept away. Thatall the towers
in the section had deteriorated is piers and the heavier girders
neededto spanthisgreater distance (Fig. 16). amply demonstrated by
their state after the accident(Figs. 3 and 4).
Acluetothelateralvibrationinducedbypassingtrains comes fromevidence
not presented to theoriginal inquiry, but rst revealed by John
Thomas.19Unanswered questionsTrain drivers reported a distinct
sideways lurch whenenteringthehighgirderssection,possiblycausedby
This picture of tower collapse leaves anumber
ofundeterminedissues.Whatcausedlateralmovement
aslightmisalignmentofthetrack.
Thiscouldhavebeenenoughtocreatealowfrequencylateral wave to develop
in the rst place, for example? It isinteresting toobserve that the
designof the high along the entire section, a wave which grew in
ampli-tude with time owing to progressive loosening of the girders
sectionproducedverylarge deadloads oneachtower. Usinggures
estimatedbytheinquiry joints combinedwithfatiguecrackgrowth.
Studiesin the 1930s by Inglis showed how such waves could experts
in 1880, we have calculated that the centre
ofgravityofthetowersrosetojustbelowtherailline develop in long
bridges from wheel hammer, althoughhe only considered vertical
vibratory waves.20 Vertical when the train weight of well over a
hundred tons isaddedtotheweight of girder(gettingonforthree
movements of several inches couldbe inducedbytrains, the exact
movement depending on train weight hundred tons), compared with the
weight of a singleINTERDISCIPLINARY SCIENCE REVIEWS, 2002, VOL. 27,
NO. 4 9isr000170708-10-02 17:27:28Rev 14.05The Charlesworth Group,
Huddersfield 01484 51707716
Thecentresofgravityofthetowersinthelowerpartofthebridgeweremuchlowerbecausethepiers
were closer together and supported smaller girders of lower weight,
which helps to explain whythey survived the collapseand speed,
length of girder, and so on. The position used on the old Tay
Bridge, but why the design wasdegradedmaynever beknown.23 Perhaps
it was a
ofthegirderintheestuaryoorissuggestive,sinceitadoptedawavelikeform.
Therecentunpredicted cost cuttingmeasure the Tayproject was
underseverecost constraintsthroughout theconstruction sideways
oscillation of the MillenniumBridge inLondon is a reminder of this
problem. phase.GustaveEiel hadbuilt
manytubularbridgesintheearly1870s intheMassif Central, suchas
theConsequencesBoubleviaduct.24Thejointswerequitedierent indesign,
the tie bars being joined to gusset plates below Thenal report of
theinquiryteamwas deliveredby 30June 1880, a remarkablyshort
turnaround, (ratherthanat)thecylinderjoints,
andusingrivetsinsteadof bolts. All corners were givenverylarge
especially compared with present practice. Bouchhimself was held
personally responsible, and he died radii of curvature, minimising
stress concentration atthe joint. The towers were given curved
buttresses at
afewmonthslater.21Thebridgewasrebuiltwithadoubletrack,
usingsurvivinggirders fromthelow the base to resist side loading,
reminiscent of EielslaterandmorefamoustowerinParis. Eachof the
sectionoftheoldbridge,andparalleltothelineoftheoriginal structure.
Thesupportpiersweremuch Bouble towers was tted with an internal
spiralstaircasefor easeof inspection, unliketheoldTay
wider,sogivingamuchhighersafetyfactoragainsttoppling,andupstreamoftheoldpiers,whichthen
Bridge, where inspection involved climbing downfromthe track using
the struts and tie bars a actedas breakwaters. Theoldpiers
remaintothisdayasahauntingreminderofthetragedyin1879. hazardous
procedure at best.Bouchhadtenderedfor acrossingof theForth Steel
replacedcast ironinthe newbridge,
havingbeenrapidlyapprovedbytheBoardofTradeafter estuary,
whichlapsedaftertheTayBridgeinquiry.BenjaminBaker, JohnFowler,
andWilliamArrol thedisaster. BothBessemer andSiemens steel hadbeen
availablefor sometime, butcould not beused producedthe successful
bid, eventually building amassive steel cantilever bridge with high
resistance to owingtoaBoardof Tradeembargo. IntheUSA,steel
hadbeeninuse for some years, andwas a wind loading. All joints were
riveted using innovativemethods developed by Arrol, and the bridge
was principal material for the Brooklyn suspension bridge,opened in
the early 1880s.22 subjected to a quite unprecedented level of
inspectionbytheBoardof Tradeduringconstruction. Owing Tubular
bridges using cast iron columns had beenbuiltelsewhere,
Bouchhimselfhavingbuiltamuch touncertaintyovertheeect of
highwindsontallstructures, a Royal Commission was set up to examine
shorter but higher tubular bridge at BelahinthePennines. It
surviveduntil demolitioninthe1960s, thesubject,
withSirGeorgeStokesakeymember.25Thecommissionrecommendeddesignguidelineson
but trac was always low, and the dead load on
thetowersmuchreducedowingtotheirmorefrequent windloadings for civil
engineers, suchas allowingfor a maximum pressure of fty-six psf
during design spacing along the track. They were also given a
muchgreater camber to resist lateral loading. Strangely of
structures. Like many other distinguished scientistsof the day,
Stokes hadgivenevidence tothe Tay enough, the joint design was
quite dierent from that10 INTERDISCIPLINARY SCIENCE REVIEWS, 2002,
VOL. 27, NO. 4isr000170708-10-02 17:27:28Rev 14.05The Charlesworth
Group, Huddersfield 01484 517077Bridgeinquiry,
evidencewhichservedtounderline Dr Mike Fitzpatrick, Dr Sarah
Hainsworth andProfessor Andrew Strang (both of Leicester
University), the problems of accurate measurement of wind speedand
pressure. One of his anemometer designs is to be and John Rapley
for stimulating discussions andoriginal insights. Dundee City
Library provided scans seen in the Science Museum today.of
thephotographstakenforthe1880inquiry, theUniversityof St Andrews
scans of relatedpicturesVictorian and modern
disastersfromtheValentinecollection,andtheInstitutionofCivil
Engineers copies of the original drawings of the The Tay Bridge
disaster inquiry pioneered systematicinvestigation and recording of
the evidence visible at bridge. One of the authors (PRL) would also
like tothank the Royal Academy of Engineering for support
anaccident site. It was probably the rst time asystematic
photographic survey was made for an for travel to ANTEC Dallas and
other conferences.accident investigation, aninvaluable archive
whichhas enabledus toreexamine the disaster withtheNotes and
literature citedbenet of modern knowledge of likely failure
modes.Otheraccidentsoftherailwayageweresystematic-1. The example
comes from Open University course T351,ally investigated before
this date, for example the Dee Failure of stressed materials, rst
presented in 1976.2. OpenUniversitycourseT839, Forensicengineering,
Bridge disaster of 24 May 1847 and the
Oxfordrstpresentedin2000,ispartofanMScprogramme disaster of
Christmas Eve, 1874. However, photo-in manufacturing. It currently
attracts about a hundredgraphy was not available in 1846, and not
used (as farmature students per year intwopresentations.
Theasisknown)
torecordtheOxford(orShipton-on-coursecompriseswrittentextandvideoprogrammes,Cherwell
) disaster. Ontheother hand, thereportsone of which was recorded in
2001 and deals with thedo provide copious numbers of detailed line
diagramsTay Bridge disaster. It is very similar to a publicly
broad-fromwhich much information can be distilled.26cast
TVprogrammeassociatedwithanundergraduateTherearestrongindicationsthatthebrittlefractureengineering
course ( T173, Engineering the future).of one of the giant cast
iron girders in the Dee BridgeThere is an related website on the
Tay Bridge disasterwascreatedbyfatigueinthelowertensilesidenearat
www.open2.net/forensic_engineering. The only otherthe centre of the
bridge. The design of the bridge was postgraduate course in the UK
with a forensic engineer-ing component is Craneld Universitys MSc
in condemned by both the ocial report and the inquest,Forensic
Engineering and Science, which attracts about and Robert Stephenson
came close to being accusedtwenty students a year.of manslaughter.
He abandoned this way of building3. Suchpapers include i. . irvis
and c. vrinx:NN:bridges forever.27 The later Oxford crash was
causedFailureofapolypropylenetank, EngineeringFailurebyabrokenwheel
onanoldcarriage, whichsub-Analysis, 1999, 6, 197232; i. . irvis:
Degradationsequently derailed and created a pileup when theof an
acetal plumbing tting by chlorine, Proc.brakeswereapplied.
BrittlecracksfromrivetholesANTEC, Orlando, FL, USA, 2000; andc. .
c:cc:in the wrought iron tread caused the failure, probablyFailure
of stainless steel water pump couplings,indicating fatigue over a
long period of time.Engineering Failure Analysis, 2001, 8,
189199.Catastrophicrailwayaccidents areof coursenot4. v.
nov:TheriddleoftheTayBridgedisaster,BBCyet a thing of the past. In
the UK, a train was TV programme for Open University course
T173,Engineering the future (2001). derailedat HateldinOctober
2000as aresult of5. Report of the Court of Inquiry, andreport of Mr
fatigue of the steel track, which led to
disintegrationRothery,uponthecircumstancesattendingthefallofof the
track into over three hundred pieces, probablyaportionof
theTayBridgeonthe28thDecember,causedbyrollingcontactloadsfrompassingtrains.1879,
Parliamentary Papers, 1880, LIX.The reasons underlying the failure
are still being6. onN irnnir: The high girders; 1955,
Harmondsworth,investigated.28 Intheevenmorerecent
PottersBarPenguin.accident (10May2002), bolts onpoints near the7.
onN1nox:s: TheTayBridgedisaster: newlightonstationwereleftloose,
theslacksocreatedcausingthe 1879 tragedy; 1972, Newton Abbot, David
&derailment of the last coachof a passing
train.29Charles.Poorly assembled or maintained joints as well as8.
n:vin sviNrrN: The fall of the Tay Bridge; 1994,fatigue are thus
still serious problems facing rail Edinburgh, Mercat Press.9.
n..n.oNrs: Engineering materials 3: materials failure
engineers.analysis, chaps. 27, 28; 1993, Oxford, Pergamon.10.
Report of the Court of Inquiry, andreport of
MrAcknowledgementsRothery (see Note 5).11. 1. x:1iNandi. x:ciron:
TheTayBridgedisaster:The authors would like to thank the Open
Universitya reappraisal based on modern analysis methods,for
permissiontopublishvarious gures anddia-Proceedingsof
theInstitutionof Civil Engineers, CivilgramsfromT839,
Forensicengineering, adistanceEngineering, 1995, 108, 7783; more
details of theirlearning course from the postgraduate
manufacturingmethod of analysis are given in Developments
inprogramme. The course was funded by EPSRC understructural
engineering: Forth Rail Bridge centenarytheir IGDSscheme andis
acollaborative ventureconference; 1990, London,
Spon.withtheUniversityofNorthLondon. Theauthors 12. v. nov:
Theriddleof theTayBridgedisaster (seeNote 4). are grateful to Dr D.
R. H. Jones, Colin Gagg,INTERDISCIPLINARY SCIENCE REVIEWS, 2002,
VOL. 27, NO. 4 11isr000170708-10-02 17:27:28Rev 14.05The
Charlesworth Group, Huddersfield 01484 51707713. Following local
publicity about our work, we received 27.
ThestoryistoldinL.T.C.RoltsclassicbookRedinformation that a cast
iron column from the old Tay for danger (1955, London, John
Lane/Bodley Head),Bridgesurvivedinabackgardennearthesiteofthe
withsomemoredetailsinthesameauthorsGeorgebridge in Fife. We and
coworkers at Leicester university and Robert Stephenson; 1960,
London, Longman.have examined a sample from this column, which
shows 27. Interimrecommendationshavebeenpublishedbythea graphitic
structure withfewgas voids withinthe
UKHealthandSafetyExecutiveatwww.hse.gov.uk/wall. The inner surface
appears to showtraces of railway/hateld/investigationb1.pdf.
FourpeoplediedPortlandcement, whilst the outer has beenpainted and
seventy were injured in the derailment.withredlead. JohnThomas
states inhis book(see 28. Information about the crash is at
www.hse.gov.uk/Note 7) that red lead rather than whitewash was
chosen railway/pottersbar/index.htm. Onthis occasionsevenfor the
painting in the summer of 1879. Pending direct people died and
seventy-six were injured, manyinspection, the column therefore
appears to be genuine. seriously.14.
KirkaldysLondonworkshopat99SouthwarkStreetis now run as a museum
(the Kirkaldy Testing Museum,openbyappointment). Operationof the
tensometerwasdemonstratedontheBBCTVprogrammeLocalHeroes
(16May2000): the presenter, AdamHart-Davis, includedasupercial
explanationof the Tay Dr Peter R. LewisDepartment of Materials
Bridge disaster using a hair dryer and a bridge
ofEngineeringbuilding blocks.Faculty of Technology15. The
suggestion was made during the inquiry fromThe Open
Universityobservation of many bent bolts on the pier
platforms,Walton Halland was repeated in v. c. xix:inx:
IllustrationsMilton Keynes MK7 6AAof David Kirkaldys systemof
mechanical testing,UK283296; 1891, London, Sampson
[email protected]. Ashimisathinstripof material
usedinstructures,Peter Lewis is senior lecturer in materials
engineering at themachinery, etc. tomakeloosepartst; acotterisaOpen
University, having previously lectured at Manchestertapered wedge
designed to secure part of a
structure.University(wherehepublishedseveralarticlesonRoman17.
North British Railway, Tay Bridge: a report bygold mining). He
chairs two postgraduate courses, ForensicMaj-Gen Hutchinson, March
5th, 1878, Parliamentaryengineering ( T839) and Design and
manufacture withPapers, 1878, LIX.polymers ( T838), and is external
examiner to the Craneld18. n:vin sviNrrN: The fall of the Tay
Bridge (see Note 8).UniversityMScinForensicEngineeringandScience.
He19. onN1nox:s: The Tay Bridge disaster (see Note 7). has
appearedinnumerous trials inthehighandcountycourts,
andpreparedaboutthreehundredexpertreports. 20. c. r.
iNciis:AmathematicaltreatiseonvibrationsinHehasalsocoauthoredtwobooksandpublishedseveralrailway
bridges; 1934, Cambridge, Cambridge Universityreviews and numerous
papers in journalssuch asRAPRAPress.Review Reports and Engineering
Failure Analysis.21. Adirectconnectionwasmadebythepublic,
perhapsbecausehewasblamedsopersonallybytheinquiry.Whilst the link
cannot be proved, particularly as Bouchhad suered various bouts of
illness through the latterpartofhislife,
itcannothavebeenpleasanttohavebeen so publicly rebuked by the
inquiry and Parliament,and to suer the indignity of seeing all his
other bridgesinspected for defects (some were reinforced,
somedemolished altogether), as well as losing the ForthKen
ReynoldsBridge contract.The Old Dairy22. x.
xcciiioicn:Thegreatbridge;1982,NewYork, Russwell LaneNY, Simon
& Schuster. Little BrickhillMilton Keynes MK17 9NN 23.
Theplansof theBelahbridgearekept inthePublicken.reynolds@Record Oce
at Kew.btopenworld.co.uk24. n.nrcxr11: Bridges; 1969, London,
Hamlyn.25. Report of theCommitteeappointedtoconsider the
KenReynoldsisthesonofavillageblacksmithandhashad a lifelong
fascination with the working and heat question of wind pressure on
railway structures; 1881,treatment of metals. He worked initially
inthe quality London, HMSO. Apart from his work on wind,
Stokescontrol labs of a foundry, and later in the research
divisionwill alsobe rememberedfor his famous lawontheon
titaniumaerospace alloys. He thenjoined Birminghammovement of
spheres through viscous
uids.CollegeofAdvancedTechnology(nowAstonUniversity)26. Report of
the Court of Inquiry into the
circumstancesandpioneeredthinfouryearsandwichdegreesinvolvingattendingtheaccidentontheGreatWesternRailwayindustrial
training, andthroughUNESCOhealsohelpedatShipton-on-Cherwell
onthe24thDecember,
1874;establishpostgraduatecoursesinIndiabeforejoiningthe1875,
London, HMSO (also published in ParliamentaryOpenUniversityin1971.
SincehisretirementasaseniorPapers, 1875, LXVII, 297) and Report to
thelecturer he has practised as an independent forensic
metal-Commissioners for Railways by Mr Walker andlurgist, withwell
overathousandexpertreportstodate.CaptainSimmons RNonthe fatal
accident onthe He has appeared in numerous court cases involving
tracaccidents, personal injury, and product liability. He became
24thdayof May1847, bythe fallingof the
bridgeinvolvedintheTayBridgecasestudybyexaminingand over the River
Dee, on the Chester and Holyheadcommenting upon the original
photographs from 1880.Railway, June 1847 (also in Parliamentary
Papers,1847, LXIII, 186).12 INTERDISCIPLINARY SCIENCE REVIEWS,
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