CURRENT STATE OF THE MARINE CORPS HISTORY DIVISION...THE VIETNAMESE MARINE CORPS-VNMC THE FIRST AND LONGEST POWS OF WWII...OLD FRIENDS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA...MARINES IN SOUTH AFRICA U.S. M14 S ERVICE R IFLE ...OPERATION “E ND OF R AINBOW”...B EHIND THE V IETNAM S TORY BULLETIN OF THE MARINE CORPS HISTORICAL PROGRAM HISTORICAL BULLETIN VOLUME 33, NUMBER 1 2008 P ASS THIS ISSUE ON TO ANOTHER MARINE DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. PCN 10401220100
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CURRENT STATE OF THE MARINE CORPS HISTORY DIVISION...THE VIETNAMESE MARINE CORPS-VNMCTHE FIRST AND LONGEST POWS OFWWII...OLD FRIENDS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA...MARINES IN SOUTHAFRICAU.S. M14 SERVICE RIFLE...OPERATION “END OF RAINBOW”...BEHIND THE VIETNAM STORY
BULLETIN OF THE MARINE CORPS HISTORICAL PROGRAMHISTORICAL BULLETIN VOLUME 33, NUMBER 1 2008
PASSTHISISSUEON
TOANOTHERMARINE
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution isunlimited.
PCN 10401220100
HISTORYDIVISION
PRESIDENTMARINE CORPS UNIVERSITY
MajGen Donald R. Gardner, USMC (Ret)
DIRECTORDr. Charles P. Neimeyer
Secretary to the DirectorMrs. Jeanne Riffe
CHIEF HISTORIANMr. Charles D. Melson
HISTORIES BRANCHMr. Charles R. Smith (Branch Head);Dr. Nathan S. Lowrey; Mr. PaulWestermeyer; Mrs. Wanda F. Renfrow
HISTORICAL REFERENCE BRANCHMr. Danny J. Crawford (Branch Head);Mr. Robert V. Aquilina; Ms. Lena M.Kaljot; Ms. Kara R. Newcomer; Ms.Annette D. Amerman; Mrs. SheliaBoyd
ORAL HISTORY BRANCHDr. Fred H. Allison (Branch Head); Mr.Rob Taglianetti
FIELD HISTORY BRANCHCol Michael D. Visconage; ColStephen Evans; Col Patricia Saint;LtCol David Benhoff; LtCol KurtWheeler; LtCol Craig Covert; LtColJeffrey Riley; Maj Daniel Sparks; MajValerie Jackson; Maj Joseph Winslow;Capt Cameron Wilson; CWO-4Michael Sears; CWO-3 WilliamHutson; MGySgt Robert Yarnall; GySgtMichael Coachman; LCpl MichaelSatkovich
FORTITUDINE STAFFMaj Valerie JacksonMr. William S. Hill
Mrs. Peggy F. FriersonMr. Greg A. Macheak
Marine Corps History Division3079 Moreell Avenue
Quantico, Virginia 22134Telephone (703) 432-4877http://[email protected]
Motto of the United States Marine Corps in the 1812 era
Historical Bulletin Vol. 33, No. 1 2008
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABOUTTHE COVER
Cover Illustration: Sgt Richard L. Yaco,USMC’s 28” x 38” acrylic paintingshows moonlit Marines on ghostlypatrol passing a dragon sculpture atthe beginning of the 1968 TetOffensive in I Corps by Communistforces.
CURRENT STATE OF THE MARINE CORPS HISTORY DIVISION...THE VIETNAMESE MARINE CORPS-VNMCTHE FIRST AND LONGEST POWS OFWWII...OLD FRIENDS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA...MARINES IN SOUTHAFRICAU.S. M14 SERVICE RIFLE...OPERATION “END OF RAINBOW”...BEHIND THE VIETNAM STORY
BULLETIN OF THE MARINE CORPS HISTORICAL PROGRAMHISTORICAL BULLETIN VOLUME 33, NUMBER 1 2008
PASS
THISISSUEON
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Memorandum from the Director: The Current State of the Marine CorpsHistory DivisionDr. Charles P. Neimeyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
This bulletin of the Marine Corps historical program is published for Marines, at the rate of onecopy for every nine on active duty, to provide education and training in the uses of military andMarine Corps history. Other interested readers may purchase single copies or four-issue sub-scriptions from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office. The appro-priate order form appears in this issue.
“We can only know who we are by being certain ofwho we have been.” Gen Leonard F. Chapman, Jr.
24th Commandant of the Marine Corps
2 Fortitudine,Vol.33,No.1,2008
Fortitudine, Vol. 33, No.1, 2008 3
Memorandum from the Director
Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer
The Current State of the MarineCorps History Division
As a still relatively “new” directorwith just over a year of service in
my current position, it seems the timefor me to give our readers a “state ofHD” update. And in fact, much changeand considerable production hasoccurred within the division in the past12 months that may interest our out-side audiences.First and foremost, after a hiatus of
over two years, we were able to resur-rect our popular historical news bul-letin, Fortitudine. We do not want thislapse of coverage to happen again andhave taken steps to ensure that a newedition is produced each and everyquarter. Moreover, the new Fortitudineis intended to be more “history-cen-tric.” What I mean by this is that fromnow on we will place more emphasisupon Marine Corps heritage and histo-ry stories than ever before. This meansmore vignettes about the past signifi-cant accomplishments of Marines in“every clime and place” and less infor-mation on the mundane details of divi-sion operations. It also means that wenot only include information on thedistant past, but also not forget tocover the activities of today’s Marineswho, as we all know, are making his-tory every day. I also would like totake this opportunity to invite anyoneout there who would like to contributeto this body of work to submit theirwriting to our editor for possible inclu-sion in a future edition of Fortitudine.We hope that over time we will createa diverse body of historical vignettesfor our reading audience to enjoy. Forexample, our past three editions haveincluded stories on the grand openingof the new National Museum of theMarine Corps, profiles of Marine Medalof Honor recipients, the USS ArizonaMarine detachment at Pearl Harbor,and even a short story on the genesisof the term Fortitudine. So as you cantell, we intend to cover a very broad
range of historically relevant topics.Another major milestone was
accomplished when the HistoryDivision completed a near total revi-sion of the Marine Corps Order (MCOP5750.1G dated 1992) on the MarineCorps Historical Program. The revisedorder was long overdue and necessaryso that our current program moreaccurately reflects the new arrange-ment of the History Division and par-ticularly the new National Museum ofthe Marine Corps. Included in theorder is important reference informa-tion for field commands on subjectssuch as the Marine Corps commemo-rative naming program, the frequencyand disposition of command chronolo-gies, personal papers, artifacts, combatart, and general operating instructionsfor the History Division, the NationalMuseum of the Marine Corps, and theLibrary of the Marine Corps.During the past year, the History
Division has greatly increased its pub-lication schedule. The following publi-cations were disseminated in 2007:The U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2003 (anthol-ogy); Small Unit Actions (battle study);and With the First Marine Division: NoGreater Friend, No Worse Enemy(occasional paper). The Field HistoryBranch historians returned from Iraqwith a significant amount of historical-ly relevant material and produced atleast five articles for Leatherneck mag-azine and the Marine Corps Gazette. Apathbreaking article, “Good Newsfrom Al Anbar,” published in theFebruaryMarine Corps Gazette by fieldhistorian, Lieutenant Colonel KurtWheeler, documented the turn aroundin this particularly insurgent-proneprovince long before the story reachedthe mainstream media in the UnitedStates. One of our writers edited amore traditional history of the U.S.Marines in the Korean War,1950–1953 while another produced a
“best of” anthology on IrregularWarfare (from the PhilippineInsurrection to the present day). Otherdivision historians continued to fleshout our Global War on Terrorism serieswith Baghdad, Basrah, and Beyond(monograph) and battle studies onNajaf and Task Force Tarawa. We alsoanticipate the publication of anotherbattle study titled, U.S. Marines inBattle: Khafji. This study will form partof an all encompassing history of theMarine Corps in Operations DesertShield and Desert Storm.
Renowned historian and retiredMarine lieutenant colonel, Dr. Ken
Estes will soon be completing a two-year effort to document Marine activityin Operation Iraqi Freedom II and theHistory Division hopes to publish hiswork by the fall of 2008. I have alsodirected that we begin work on adevelopmental history of the MarineCorps from 1972 to include all thetechnological and doctrinal changesthat have taken place within the Corpssince that time up to the present day.We also began planning for the 100thanniversary of Marine aviation and willpublish what we hope will be thedefinitive history on this subject in2012.This particular issue of Fortitudine
is dedicated to the 40th anniversary ofthe height of Marine Corps involve-ment in Vietnam (1968). And believe itor not, we are beginning to makeplans to produce a 50th anniversarycommemorative series on the Vietnamconflict in just a few years. This hasbeen quite a busy year and we will bejust as active in 2008 and beyond.Historical production and our workproduct are definitely up, and we willlikely hire a few more civilian histori-ans to assist us in this effort in thecoming years. It is a good time to be inHistory Division. �1775�
4 Fortitudine,Vol.33,No.1,2008
As noted by the late BrigadierGeneral Edwin H. Simmons in his
foreword to Dr. Jack Shulimson’s U.S.Marines In Vietnam: The DefiningYear, 1968, the title of this impres-sive—and massive—history accuratelyreflects the defining year of theVietnam War. This was the year of theTet Offensive, Khe Sanh and HueCity—names which became all toofamiliar to Americans in daily home-town newspapers and televisionbroadcasts. Ironically, although by theend of the year, enemy initiatedattacks had fallen to their lowest levelsin two years, the war without an endcontinued. In commemoration of the40th anniversary of these momentousevents, Fortitudine has reprinted the“Chronology of Significant Events,January–December 1968,” whichappears as Appendix B of Dr.Shulimson’s history of Marine Corpsoperations in Vietnam during that“defining” year of 1968. The pho-tographs which accompany thechronological entries were themselvesselected from among the many hun-dreds of prints appearing in Dr.Shulimson’s book.
1 January - Allied and communistforces in Vietnam begin the new yearwith a ceasefire. The allies report 63violations of the truce.
1 January - The Marine Corps trooplevel in Vietnam reaches 81,249. TheIII Marine Amphibious Force, which isresponsible for I CTZ, begins the yearwith a total strength of 114,158 troops,composed of 76,616 Marines dividedamong the 1st Marine Division, the 3dMarine Division, the 1st MarineAircraft Wing, and Force LogisticCommand; 3,538 Navy personnel; and36,816 Army personnel, including theAmerical Division and one brigade ofthe 1st Air Cavalry Division, and 88 AirForce personnel.
3 January - The 5th Marines concludesOperation Auburn south of Da Nang(28 Dec 67–3 Jan 68). The operation
results in 37 reported enemy casualtieswith 24 Marines killed and 62 wound-ed.
11 January - As part of OperationCheckers, in an effort to rotate units ofthe 1st Marine Division north torelieve the 3d Marine Division, TaskForce X-Ray headquarters is activatedat Phu Bai. Task Force X-Ray subse-quently relieved the 3d MarineDivision headquarters at Phu Bai,which moved to Dong Ha in QuangTri Province.
16 January - The 2d Battalion, 26thMarines reinforces the Marine base atKhe Sanh.
16 January - A North Vietnamese rep-resentative states that North Vietnamwill not begin peace talks until theUnited States halts bombing of theNorth.
20 January - Operation Lancaster I (1Nov 67– 20 Jan 68), a 3d Marinesoperation to safeguard Route 9between Cam Lo and Ca Lu, ends witha reported 46 enemy casualties and 27Marines killed and 141 wounded.
20 January - The 1st Marines con-cludes Operation Osceola I (20 Oct67–20 Jan 68) in the Quang Tri Cityregion. The operation resulted in a
reported 76 enemy casualties with 17Marines killed and 199 wounded.
20 January - The 4th Marines con-cludes Operation Neosho I (1 Nov67–20 Jan 68) north west of Hue. Theoperation resulted in 77 reportedenemy casualties with 12 Marineskilled and 100 wounded.
20 January - A Marine patrol partici-pating in Operation Scotland makescontact with a heavy concentration ofNorth Vietnamese troops around Hill881 South near Khe Sanh. The ensuingbattle signaled the beginning of thesiege of Khe Sanh.
21 January - The 1st Air CavalryDivision is placed under the opera-tional control of III MAF commander,Marine Lieutenant General Robert E.Cushman, Jr.
21 January - The 4th Marines beginOperation Lancaster II in the samearea as Operation Lancaster I.
21 January - The 3d Marines beginOperation Osceola II in the same areaas Osceola I.
21 January - General Westmoreland,Commander USMACV, orders a tempo-rary halt to work on the “McNamaraLine,” the barrier and antiinfiltrationsystem south of the Demilitarized Zone.
Marine Corps Chronology
Marines in Vietnam, 1968by Robert V. Aquilina
Assistant Head, Reference Branch
Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A190802
Marines are seen stacking empty 105mm casings at Khe Sanh, indicative of theartillery support provided for the base. In the background, partially obscured byclouds, is Hill 950.
Fortitudine, Vol. 33, No.1, 2008 5
21 January - The NVA begins the bom-bardment of the base at Khe Sanh andthe Marine outposts in the surroundinghills. This rocket, mortar, and artillerybarrage will continue for the next 77days.
22 January - The 1st Battalion, 9thMarines, reinforces the garrison at KheSanh.
22 January - The 1st Air CavalryDivision begins Operation Jeb Stuartin the northern part of I CTZ.
23 January - The USS Pueblo (AGER 2),an American intelligence ship, isseized off the coast of Korea by theNorth Koreans.
23 January - Special Landing ForceBravo consisting of BLT 3/1 andHMM–165 begins Operation BadgerCatch near the Cua Viet River.
26 January - Operation Badger Catch isrenamed Operation Saline. TheMarines in Badger Catch continue towork in conjunction with OperationNapoleon, a similar effort by the 1stAmphibian Tractor Battalion to keepthe Cua Viet River supply line open.
27 January - The seven-day communistceasefire for the Tet holiday begins.
29 January - The allied ceasefire forthe Tet holiday begins in all of SouthVietnam except I CTZ.
30 January - Enemy troops launch thebeginning of their Tet offensive in ICorps, attacking Da Nang and severalcities south of the base.
31 January - The NVA opens its Tetoffensive throughout South Vietnamwith attacks against 39 provincial cap-itals and major cities including Saigonand Hue.
31 January - VC troops fail in anattempt to seize the U.S. Embassy inSaigon after breaching the compound.
31 January - General Leonard F.Chapman becomes the 24thCommandant of the Marine Corps,upon the retirement of the formerCommandant, General Wallace M.Greene, Jr.
31 January - 1st Brigade, 1st AirCavalry Division launches a counter-offensive air assault into the city ofQuang Tri.
31 January - Operation Kentucky in“Leatherneck Square,” south of theDMZ, resulted in 353 reported enemycasualties.
31 January - The Americal Divisioncontinues Operation Wheeler/Wallowa south of Da Nang.
1 February - The 1st Brigade, 1st AirCavalry Division, together with ARVNforces, successfully defend the city ofQuang Tri. The enemy sustained 900reported casualties and 100 captured.
1 February - Richard M. Nixonannounces his candidacy for presi-dent.
1 February - Units of the 1st and 5thMarines begin Operation Hue City todrive the NVA out of the city.
5 February - Marines from the 26thMarines at Khe Sanh repel a battalion-sized attack killing a reported 109 NVAsoldiers with 7 Marines killed and 15wounded.
7 February - NVA units overrun theSpecial Forces base at Lang Vei, westof Khe Sanh.
7 February - Elements of the 3dMarines, 5th Marines, and theAmerical Division engage the 2d NVADivision in fighting around Da Nang.
9 February - III MAF units succeed inthrowing back the 2d NVA Divisionoffensive at Da Nang.
9 February - MACV Forward, underGeneral Creighton B. Abrams, DeputyCommander USMACV, is establishedin I CTZ at Phu Bai.
13 February - The headquarters andcombat elements of the 101st AirborneDivision arrive in I CTZ.
16 February - Operation Osceola IIends. This operation resulted in 21reported enemy casualties with 2Marines killed and 74 wounded.
23 February - NVA troops fire morethan 1,300 shells into the Marine garri-son at Khe Sanh. This barrage marksthe heaviest shelling of the entiresiege.
24 February - American and SouthVietnamese troops capture the Citadelin Hue.
25 February - American forces declarethe city of Hue secure.
29 February - Operation Saline is com-bined with Operation Napoleon.
29 February - The 27th Marines arrivesin Da Nang from the U.S. as part ofthe reinforcements approved byPresident Lyndon B. Johnson. ThePresident made extensive reductionsto original recommendations of MACVand the JCS.
29 February - Operation Kentuckyresults in 398 reported enemy casual-ties with 90 Marines killed and 277wounded.
1 March - Clark Clifford replacesRobert S. McNamara as Secretary ofDefense.
2 March - Operation Hue City endssuccessfully as the 1st and 5th Marinesdefeat the NVA assault in Hue. Theoperation resulted in 1,943 enemycasualties with 142 Marines killed and1,005 wounded.
10 March - MACV Forward is deacti-vated.
10 March - Provisional Corps Vietnamis created. This command, led byLieutenant General William B. Rosson,USA, controls the 3d Marine Division,the 1st Air Cavalry Division, and the101st Airborne Division and is subor-dinate to Lieutenant GeneralCushman, commander of III MAF.
12 March - Senator Eugene McCarthymakes a substantial showing in theNew Hampshire primary, winning 40percent of the vote, with PresidentJohnson winning 49 percent.
16 March - Troops from the AmericalDivision massacre more than 100 civil-ians, mostly women and children, inthe village of My Lai.
21 March - As part of the SingleManagement System, the Seventh AirForce assumes responsibility for coor-dinating and controlling all fixed-wingaircraft missions, including those ofthe 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.
31 March - Operation Scotland (1 Nov67–31 Mar 68) near Khe Sanh ends.The operation, which included thedefense of the besieged garrison ofKhe Sanh, resulted in a reported 1,631enemy casualties with 204 Marineskilled and 1,622 wounded in action.
31 March - The 1st Cavalry Division
6 Fortitudine,Vol.33,No.1,2008
concludes Operation Jeb Stuart. Thisoperation resulted in a reported 3,268enemy casualties with 284 Army per-sonnel killed and 1,717 wounded.
31 March - President Johnsonannounces a partial halt in the bomb-ing of North Vietnam and that he willsend an additional 13,500 troops toSouth Vietnam. In a surprise move,the President declares that he will notrun for re-election due to the war inVietnam and public unrest at home.
31 March - Operation Kentucky resultsin a reported 413 enemy casualtieswith 38 Marines killed and 217wounded.
1 April - The 1st Air Cavalry Divisiontogether with units from the 1stMarines and the ARVN, beginsOperation Pegasus from the Marinebase of Ca Lu to relieve the Marinegarrison at Khe Sanh.
9April - U. S. troops retake the SpecialForces Camp at Lang Vei, southwest ofKhe Sanh.
15 April - Operation Pegasus endswith the relief and resupply of KheSanh. The operation resulted in 1,044reported enemy casualties, with 51Marines killed and 459 wounded. The
1st Air Cavalry Division suffered 41personnel killed and 208 wounded.
15 April - With the relief of Khe Sanhand the end of Operation Pegasus,Operation Scotland II, a continuationof Marine Corps action around thebase at Khe Sanh begins.
19 April - Elements of the 1st AirCavalry Division, the 101st AirborneDivision, and several ARVN unitsbegin Operation Delaware/Lam Son216. This operation takes place in theA Shau Valley and is designed as aspoiling assault to disrupt enemypreparations for another attack onHue.
30 April - NVA units are engaged inthe village of Dai Do by BLT 2/4.Heavy fighting in this area continuesuntil 3 May.
30 April-17 May - Marine, Army, andARVN units succeed in thwarting apossible enemy assault on Dong Ha.The NVA suffered a reported 1,547casualties while the allies sustainedcasualties of nearly 300 dead and1,000 wounded.
4 May - The 7th Marines beginOperation Allen Brook, an operationdesigned to disrupt the growing
enemy presence south of Da Nang.
5 May - Signalling the second majoroffensive of the year, enemy troopslaunch 119 rocket and mortar attackson towns and cities throughout SouthVietnam.
13 May - Peace talks among NorthVietnam, South Vietnam, and theUnited States begin in Paris.
17 May - Operation Delaware/LamSon 216 ends with a reported 735enemy casualties with 142 Army per-sonnel killed and 731 wounded.
17 May - 1st Air Cavalry Divisionbegins Operation Jeb Stuart III alongthe border of Quang Tri and ThuaThien Provinces.
18 May - Battalions from the 1stMarine Division begin OperationMameluke Thrust in the centralregions of Quang Nam Province.
20 May - Major General Raymond G.Davis replaces Major General RathvonMcC. Tompkins as CommandingGeneral, 3d Marine Division.
22 May - The Marine Corps makes itsfirst use of the North AmericanOV–10A Bronco as an observationand counterinsurgency aircraft.
26 May - Major General Rathvon McC.Tompkins becomes deputy comman-der of III MAF, replacing MajorGeneral William J. Van Ryzin.
27 May - Peace talks between theUnited States and North Vietnambreak down in Paris.
27 May - Operation Kentucky resultsin a reported 817 enemy casualtieswith 134 Marines killed and 611wounded.
27 May - Marine Corps force levels inVietnam reach 89,000.
1 June - Lieutenant General Henry W.Buse, Jr., replaces Lieutenant GeneralVictor H. Krulak as the CommandingGeneral, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.
5 June - Robert F. Kennedy is assassi-nated.
26 June - Major General Carl A.Youngdale relieves Major GeneralDonn J. Robertson as commander ofthe 1st Marine Division.
27 June - Marine troops begin to dis-mantle and withdraw from their static
Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A371377
In heavy house-to-house fighting in the Citadel, a Company C, 1st Battalion, 5thMarines machine gunner, with his assistant close by, fires his M60 machine gunon its tripod at an enemy position. Both Marines are laden with bandoliers ofammunition for their weapon.
Fortitudine, Vol. 33, No.1, 2008 7
defense base at Khe Sanh.
1 July - General Creighton Abramsrelieves General William Westmore-land as Commander USMACV.
1 July - Operation Thor begins in theeastern part of the DMZ. Planes fromthe Air Force, the Navy, and theMarine Corps, as well as artillery fromArmy and Marine artillery batteries inthe DMZ sector and naval gunfirefrom cruisers and destroyers off thecoast pound enemy artillery installa-tions in the DMZ.
7 July - Operation Thor ends.
25 July - The 1st Brigade, 5th InfantryDivision (Mechanized), USA, arrives inI CTZ and is placed under the opera-tional control of III MAF.
15 August - Provisional Corps Vietnamis deactivated and replaced by XXIVCorps.
23 August - Operation Allen Brookends. This operation resulted in 1,017reported enemy casualties with 172Marines killed and 1,124 wounded.
23 August - Enemy troops mount theirthird major offensive by firing on 27
different allied installations and citiesincluding Hue, Da Nang Air Base, andQuang Tri City. The major thrust ofthis effort is the city of Da Nang. Thecommunists fall far short of theirobjective due to resistance of U.S.Army, Marine Corps, and SouthVietnamese troops.
24 August - The Democratic PartyConvention begins in Chicago.Vietnam War protesters clash violentlywith police for the next four days.
29 September - The USS New Jersey(BB 62) arrives off the coast of theDMZ. The arrival of this battleshipgreatly increases the Navy’s firepowerand power projection in the easternDMZ.
29 September - Engagements fromOperation Kentucky result in 305reported enemy casualties with 1Marine killed and 8 wounded.
6 October - 7th Marines beginOperation Maui Peak, an effort torelieve the Special Forces base atThuong Duc in Quang Nam Province.
19 October - Operation Maui Peakends, resulting in 202 reported enemy
casualties with 28 Marines killed and143 wounded.
23 October - Operation MamelukeThrust ends, resulting in 2,728 report-ed enemy casualties with 269 Marineskilled and 1,730 wounded.
23 October - The 5th Marines beginsOperation Henderson Hill in QuangNam Province as a continuation ofOperation Mameluke Thrust.
28 October - The 1st Air CavalryDivision begins to move from I CTZ toIII CTZ.
31 October - President Johnsonannounces a complete halt in thebombing and naval bombardment ofNorth Vietnam.
1 November - North Vietnamese offi-cials announce that they will meet inParis with representatives from theUnited States, South Vietnam, and theNational Liberation Front to beginpeace talks.
1 November - South Vietnamese units,aided by squads and platoons ofAmerican troops, begin theAccelerated Pacification (Le Loi)Campaign in order to regain the trustand control of South Vietnamese vil-lages lost due to the major enemyoffensives of the year.
2 November - South VietnamesePresident Nguyen Van Thieu statesthat his nation will not negotiate inParis if the communist NationalLiberation Front is given equal statuswith the other participants.
3 November - Operation Jeb Stuart IIIends. This operation resulted in 2,016reported enemy casualties with 212Army personnel killed and 1,512wounded.
5 November - Richard Nixon wins thepresidential election by narrowlydefeating Hubert Humphrey.
11 November - The Americal Divisionends Operation Wheeler/Wallowaafter 14 months in the Nui Loc SonValley. This operation resulted in areported 10,020 enemy casualties with683 Army personnel killed and 3,597wounded.
20 November - The 1st Marines beginOperation Meade River, nine milessouth of Da Nang, in support of the
Navy doctors and corpsmen from Company C (“Charlie Med”), 3d MedicalBattalion, wearing helmets and flak jackets, conduct an emergency operation ona wounded helicopter pilot at the Khe Sanh dispensary. Most wounded were evac-uated out of Khe Sanh as soon as possible.
Photo from the David Douglas Duncan Collection
8 Fortitudine,Vol.33,No.1,2008
South Vietnamese AcceleratedPacification Campaign.
23 November - Operation Lancaster IIends. This operation resulted in areported 1,800 enemy casualties with359 Marines killed and 2,101 wound-ed.
26 November - President Johnsonstates that the peace talks will includethe United States, South Vietnam, anda communist delegation which consistsof representatives from North Vietnamand the National Liberation Front.
6 December - Operation HendersonHill ends. This action resulted in areported 700 enemy casualties and 35Marines killed and 273 wounded.
9 December - Operation Napoleon/
Saline ends, resulting in a reported3,495 enemy casualties with 353Marines killed and 1,959 wounded.
9 December - Operation Meade Riverends with 841 reported enemy casual-ties with 107 Marines killed and 522wounded.
21 December - Major General Carl A.Youngdale relieves Major GeneralRathvon McC. Tompkins as DeputyCommanding General, III MAF. MajorGeneral Ormond R. Simpson relievesMajor General Youngdale asCommanding General, 1st MarineDivision.
29 December - Camp Carroll, theartillery base that supported the garri-son at Khe Sanh, is deactivated.
29 December - Allied troops inVietnam announce that they will nothonor any holiday truces.
29 December - III MAF ends the yearwith operational control of the 1stMarine Division, the 3d MarineDivision, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing,the Marine Force Logistic Command,the 101st Airborne Division, theAmerical Division, and the 1st Brigade,5th Infantry Division (Mechanized),USA.
29 December - The year closes with31,691 reported enemy casualties atthe hands of Marine units in III MAF.The cost of the year’s fighting to theMarine Corps was 4,618 Marines killedand 29,320 wounded. �1775�
LtCol Ernest C. Cheatham, in forefront of the picture, directsa target for a Marine Ontos equipped with six 106mmrecoilless rifles, along Le Loi Street. The Perfume River can
be seen in the background as well as the Citadel across theriver.
Courtesy of LtCol Ralph J. Salvati, USMC (Ret).
Fortitudine, Vol. 33, No.1, 2008 9
The period following World War IIsaw a number of associated
Marine Corps founded in the Republicof China, the Republic of Korea, theRepublic of Vietnam, the Philippines,Indonesia, and Thailand. They hadbeen formed, with the help of foreignmilitary aid, to fight the various con-flicts to contain communist expansionin the region. Also present at varioustimes were other Marines from theNetherlands, France, and GreatBritain. The beginnings of the ColdWar witnessed this proliferation ofamphibious forces in Asia, in partbecause of the reputation the U.S.Marines had earned in the crossPacific drive against Japan and inother post-war confrontations.Three Corps fought together in
Vietnam from 1965 through 1973.Each of these Corps were similar for-mations, but with its own history andtraditions: the United States Marines,the Vietnamese Marines, and theKorean Marines. Common to each wasa reputation for toughness on them-selves and any enemy; strong unitpride and loyalty; and a privilegedplace within the defense structure oftheir respective countries. This is thestory of one of them.When the French departed
Indochina in 1954, they left behindthe fledgling armed forces of theVietnamese Republic. Included werethe riverine forces of the navy and anassortment of army commandos thathad provided the troops for them.These had formed the river assaultdivisions (Dinassauts) that Dr. BernardB. Fall observed as “one of a fewworthwhile contributions” to militarytactics of The First Indochina War(1945–1954). The commandos wereformed into two battalions andgrouped at Nha Trang when the sepa-ration of Vietnam into north and southwas completed. After the GenevaAgreement that arranged the with-
drawal of France from Indochina andthe partition of Vietnam into northand south pending elections, theAmericans moved to help the govern-ment of South Vietnam against thecommunist bloc-supported People’sRepublic of Vietnam.On 1 October 1954, the mixed
commando units were designated asthe Marine Infantry of the VietnameseNavy. In April 1956, it became knownas the Vietnamese Marine Corps of theNavy consisting of a Marine Group oftwo landing battalions. In 1961, theVietnamese Marines became part ofthe South Vietnamese armed forcesgeneral reserve. Expansion resultedfrom successful employment againstdissidents and bandits, which led tothe formation of a 5,000-man Marine
brigade in 1962. Vietnamese MarineCorps influence increased in part withthe role it played in complex nationalpolitics that saw Marines involved incoups in 1960, 1963, and 1964. Thiscontinual balancing of power wasreflected in assignment of forces, com-manders, and the direction of the war.
The formation of its own trainingand replacement centers allowed
the Marines to keep up to strengthwithout relying on the army for man-power. Both officers and men attend-ed schools in the United States atQuantico, Virginia, where a genera-tion of Vietnamese and Americans metand served together. One Marine com-mandant, General Le Nguyen Khang,observed that his men were proud “to
Feature
The Vietnamese Marine Corps-VNMC(THUY QUAN LUC CHIEN-TQLC)
by Charles D. MelsonChief Historian
A U.S. Navy diesel submarine is used for amphibious training of VietnameseMarines in the early 1960s. Here a boat team climbs from the deck to a waitinginflatable small boat while the American crewman pass down the paddles. Thesmall arms and equipment were the same as those used by U.S. Marines at thetime.
Department of Defense (USMC) photo A410919
10 Fortitudine,Vol.33,No.1,2008
be associated in spirit and deed withthe select group of professional mili-tary men of many nations who callthemselves Marines.”Of the total of 565,350 South
Vietnamese in the armed forces in1965, more than 6,500 were Marines.This figure expanded to more than15,000 men in 1973. Total casualty fig-ures are not available, but in theheavy 1972 fighting, some 2,455Marines were killed in action andanother 7,840 men were woundedduring the same period. In 1965, theVietnamese Marine Brigade was orga-nized into a Corps headquarters, twotask force headquarters (“A” and “B”),five infantry battalions, an artillery bat-talion, and supporting units of engi-neers, motor transport, military police,medical, and reconnaissance.Headquarters were located in Saigonwith outlying facilities at Song Than,Thu Duc, and Vung Tau. A colonel,who was dual-hatted as a service andthe brigade commander, commandedit. By this time, Vietnamese Marineswere separated from the VietnameseNavy and answerable to the high com-mand of the Republic of VietnamArmed Forces. Present was a 28-manadvisory unit from the U.S. MarineCorps. American field advisors weredown to the battalion level.
By 1966, the Marines formed anoth-er battalion and realigned sup-
porting units to become a more bal-anced combined arms force. It wasstill lacking in armor, aircraft, andlogistic support. In 1968, a Marinedivision was formed of two brigades.In 1970, there were three brigades,nine infantry battalions, and threeartillery battalions. Supporting unitscontinued to be formed through thefollowing year, reaching a peak of 939officers and 14,290 men at the timethe Americans withdrew. To face themilitary crisis in 1975, three additionalbattalions and a fourth brigade wereformed in time for the SouthVietnamese defeat.An examination of some of the cor-
poreal aspects of the VietnameseMarines is useful before consideringtheir performance. This is the “sol-dier’s load” in more than just materialbecause it reflects the corporate tradi-
tion or myth. Specific designationsand numbers, used to identify clothingand equipment, were complicated bydifferent languages, although in mostcases, names were just the translationof the equivalent terms for, at firstFrench, and then American items.There were also different designationsfor the same item: a generic term usedby the Marines, the supply term usedto catalog the item, and the manufac-turer’s jargon. Generic nomenclatureis used with the vernacular terms usedby Marines to find a balance betweenregulation and reality for the decadecovered.The Vietnamese Marines used naval
rank insignia with army rank titles.Eight enlisted grades existed andseven officer grades were usedthrough brigadier general. The rankstructure reflected French influence,beginning with private, private firstclass, corporal, chief-corporal,sergeant, chief sergeant, adjutant, andchief-adjutant. Officers were the moreconventional candidate through sec-ond lieutenant, first lieutenant, cap-tain, major, lieutenant colonel, and
colonel. Silver braid on black wasworn instead of the naval gold.Officers and enlisted men both woretheir rank on shoulder boards. In thefield, this was simplified to wearing asingle shoulder board on the front ofthe shirt. This resulted in a miniatureversion that could be fastened on ashirt or pocket button. By the end ofthe period, miniature rank insigniaembroidered in black on green clothwas worn on the collar or headgear inthe fashion of the Americans. All threetypes of rank badge were in usethroughout the war. On occasion,Vietnamese army pin-on rank wasworn during joint operations.
Distinctive organizational emblemsevolved with the service over
time and defy documentation. Theearliest emblems included Vietnamesenavy badges worn on caps and berets.These were in metal and embroideredforms. The emblems were gold forofficers and silver for enlisted men.The distinct Marine Infantry badgehad a much longer service life. It dis-played crossed anchors surrounded bya plain circle. It was in both metal andembroidered variations. The embroi-dered beret badge used dark blue andthen green backing. The officers’embroidered version had a wreath ofrice stalks around crossed anchorscentral design; the enlisted versionhad only the crossed anchors.In 1959, a new service device was
adapted with an eagle, globe, andanchor motif. It closely followed theAmerican Marine emblem, butevolved to incorporate traditionalVietnamese features. According to anofficial document, these included ananchor through a globe for theMarines’ naval character, a five point-ed red star with Vietnam in the centerindicating combat spirit and the fiveparts of the world, and an eaglespreading its wings representedunyielding martial spirit. A black back-ground stood for bravery in difficultsituations—the color of a “death vol-unteer.” This design eventually formedthe basis for cap, beret, unit, and ser-vice insignia. Again, there were bothofficer and enlisted versions. Themetal cap and beret badges were goldand silver for officers and brass for
Insignia courtesy of the author.
Vietnamese Marine Corps brigadeinsignia worn on the shoulder of the“tiger stripe” utility uniform. While theeagle, globe, and anchor are similar tothe U.S. Marine emblem, the scarletand gold star and silhouette showedboth North and South Vietnam. Theshield was in black, the color of a“death volunteer.”
Fortitudine,Vol. 33, No. 1, 2008 11
were worn on the upper right sleeve.The infantry battalions had a series ofnicknames and slogans that werereflected on their battalion insignia:1st Battalion’s “Wild Bird,” 2dBattalion’s “Crazy Buffalo,” 3dBattalion’s “Sea Wolf,” 4th Battalion’s“Killer Shark,” 5th Battalion’s “BlackDragon,” 6th Battalion’s “Sacred Bird,”7th Battalion’s “Black Tiger,” 8thBattalion’s “Sea Eagle.” and 9thBattalion’s “Mighty Tiger.” For theartillery units, this was the 1stBattalion’s “Lightning Fire,” 2dBattalion’s “Sacred Arrow,” and 3dBattalion’s “Sacred Bow.” Support andservice battalions followed this exam-ple as well.Uniforms were used on ceremonial
occasion with the addition of whitegloves, white duty belts, colored neckscarves, white parade shoulder cords,medals, ribbons, fourrageres, andwhite bootlaces. Four classes of unitawards existed and were indicated by
fourrageres worn on the left shoulderin red (gallantry), green (merit), yel-low (national), and combination of allthree colors for nine previous cita-tions. The Marine band had its owndistinct variation on this theme thatincluded a tailored uniform worn out-side the trousers.
Like the other Marines, theVietnamese had a series of uni-
forms that reflected climate and occa-sion: service dress with coat and tie,khaki dress, and combat dress thatbecame its characteristic uniform asthe war went on. A black navy beretand badge of the Marine Infantry wereworn at first, but by 1965, standardheadgear was a green beret withMarine Infantry badge. Also wornwas a utility cover or rain hat in sea-wave camouflage pattern. The M1 hel-met was used with either a net orAmerican pattern cloth camouflagecover. The first combat uniform worn
enlisted. The embroidered beretbadge was backed in green and thenlater in red.While initial field uniforms were
unmarked similar to the AmericanMarines, major variations of serviceand unit insignia developed. OneMarine advisor recalled that in 1967 hewore the brigade shoulder patch, aservice emblem on his pocket, and thecolored battalion nametape. First usedwas a full color service emblem on ablack shield worn on the upper leftsleeve indicating the Marine group orbrigade. Later a full color serviceemblem on a green circle was wornon the right breast pocket as a corpsinsignia at about the time additionalbrigades were formed. Finally, a fullcolor emblem on a green shield wasworn on the upper left sleeve to indi-cate the Marine division, replacing theprevious brigade emblem. Theemblem on the left sleeve was in linewith the Army of the Republic ofVietnam practice. Cloth emblemsworn on the combat uniform weregenerally of a high quality woven(Bevo) manufacture. Printed variationswere for general service issue.
Battalion insignia developed at thesame time from colored name tags
worn over the right breast pocket thatwere based on colors used to assem-ble units after amphibious or riverinelandings. Noted in use were the fol-lowing colors: division or brigadeheadquarters units were green withwhite letters, (the 1st Battalion in bluewith white letters, 2d Battalion in pur-ple with black letters, 3d Battalion inolive with while letters, 4th Battalionin red with black letters, 5th Battalionin maroon [black?] with gold letters,6th Battalion in green with black let-ters, 7th Battalion in orange, 8thBattalion in blue with red letters, and9th Battalion in brown with green let-ters). The artillery battalions usedwhite and red combinations while theamphibious support battalion usedgreen with gold or red letters.American advisors added a tape overthe left breast pocket that had “U.S.Marines” in black on green, whiletheir name tapes on the right were inwhite on green.Eventually distinct battalion patches
A Vietnamese Marine Corps honor guard presents arms to visiting Marine CorpsCommandant Leonard F. Chapman in 1968. The green beret, insignia, and unitawards were worn on special occasion. The influence of the French colonialperiod is apparent.
Department of Defense photo
12 Fortitudine, Vol. 33, No.1, 2008
was the olive green shirt and trousersused by the army. This remained inuse as basic training and fatigue cloth-ing well after the adoption of the cam-ouflage uniform, more from economythan sentiment. The “sea-wave” pat-tern uniform, or “tiger stripes,” wasadopted in 1956 as a distinctive com-bat uniform. The four-color cloth wasimported and manufactured into uni-forms in South Vietnam. There werealso examples of the army camouflageleaf pattern being used. This allowedfor considerable variations in style andquality. In general, it consisted of ashirt with two covered chest pockets,trousers with two thigh and two seatpockets. Pen and cigarette pocketswere popular modifications on theshirt sleeves and trouser legs. A blackweb belt with solid face brass bucklewas issued. The American Marineopen face buckle was popular as well.Footwear ranged from local Bata can-vas jungle boots, to full leather boots,to the American tropical combat boot.
The Marines that went to war in1965 should have reflected knowl-
edge of the “soldiers load,” a subjectthat was examined critically by S.L.A.Marshall and the U.S. Marine CorpsSchools early in the 1950s. In practice,considerations of culture, supply, andcircumstance were shown to havebeen just as important factors in deter-mining what was carried into battle.Individual combat equipment variedgreatly over the period, from a mix-ture of French and American surplusto the standardized issue of M56 loadcarrying equipment from the U.S.Military Advisory Command Vietnam(MACV) beginning in 1965. Thisincluded the replacement of M44 andM45 combat and cargo packs with thetheater designed semi-rigid indige-nous rucksack, the “ARVN pack.” Adistinctive Vietnamese field item wasthe individual hammock made fromparachute nylon and suspension lines.In 1965, the Vietnamese were armedwith American .30-caliber small armsthat had been in existence since WorldWar II: M1 rifles, M1 carbines, M1911pistols, M1A1 submachine guns, andM1918 Browning automatic rifles. Thisrequired the use of webbing andaccessories to carry the ammunition
and magazines for these weapons.This was followed by outfitting withM16s and newer small arms by MACVat the same time as the other SouthVietnamese forces. The Marines werea priority for this outfitting along withthe airborne units of the nationalreserve.Another characteristic Vietnamese
field item was the ever-present alu-minum squad cooking pot. The cook-ing pot was an essential item in theway the Vietnamese fed in the field.The Marines carried five days ofrations of rice, dried salted fish, andcanned sardines. What was not issuedhad to be acquired locally. A typicalmeal consisted of five types of food:one salted, one fried or roasted, veg-etable soup, green vegetables, andrice. A fermented sauce, nuoc-mam,was served as a spice and source ofprotein. Problems also resulted if thetactical situation prevented meals frombeing obtained and prepared. If cir-cumstances did not allow resupply orpreparation, then the Marines wouldgo hungry. This included any Ameri-can advisors that were present, mostof whom lost weight with the Vietna-mese in the field.By 1960, the date on Vietnam’s
Campaign Medal, a state of armedconflict existed between the twoVietnams and their allies in the SecondIndochina War (1960–1975). This wasa civil war that had international con-notations between several world pow-ers and their clients. It was a con-frontation that displayed a full spec-trum of violence, from individual ter-rorist acts and guerrilla fighting to con-ventional land combat, with extensivesea and air components. Enemy forcesranged from National Liberation Frontguerrillas in South Vietnam of varyingquality and quantity, to the regulars ofthe People’s Army of Vietnam, whowere infiltrated into South Vietnamalong the Ho Chi Minh Trail. They alsodefended North Vietnam with forcesthat were more conventional.The Southeast Asia Theater of
Operations was divided into NorthVietnam, South Vietnam, the TonkinGulf littoral, and the inland frontiers ofLaos and Cambodia. The country ofSouth Vietnam consisted of politicalprovinces grouped together into mili-
tary regions or tactical zones num-bered from I through IV, from north tothe south. The country was dividedgeographically from east to west intoa coastal plain, a piedmont region,and the central highlands.As part of the national reserve, the
Vietnamese Marines found themselvesfrom the 17th Parallel in the north tothe islands of the extreme south.When assigned to a specific corpsarea, the Marines would serve underArmy of the Republic of Vietnam(ARVN) general officers, and the corpscommanders. Prior to 1965, mostoperations were by single battalions inIII and IV corps. A variety of coun-terinsurgency operations wereengaged in, to include search anddestroy, search and clear, helicopterand riverine assault, and securitytasks. Characteristic employment wasin response to critical situationsrequiring rapid movement with shortnoticeAfter 1965, the Marines deployed
more to the II and I Corps areas as thewar progressed away from the Deltaand capital regions. Multiple battalionoperations became the norm throughthe use of task force headquarters.Two battalions under Task Force “A”concluded a series of operations overa four-month period that resulted in444 communists killed and another150 taken prisoner. This included anotable engagement in April 1965near An Thai, Binh Dinh Province,which resulted in the 2d InfantryBattalion earning a U.S. PresidentialUnit Citation for a successful defenseagainst a superior communist force.
From 1966 through 1967, theMarines spent more time in I Corps
and conducted operations in conjunc-tion with the Americans in this criticallocale. It was observed that Marineswere in the field 75 percent of thetime, then the highest figure obtainedby South Vietnamese forces. Duringthe 1968 Tet Offensive, the Marinesfought in both Saigon and Hue todefeat the communist attempt at ageneral uprising. During this year, theVietnamese Marines maintained acasualty to kill ratio of one to seven.In March 1969, the 5th Infantry
Battalion earned a U.S. Naval Unit
Fortitudine,Vol. 33, No. 1, 2008 13
Citation for action in III Corps, nearBien Hoa. This resulted in 73 commu-nists killed, 20 taken prisoner, andcaptured weapons. The Marines tookpart in the aggressive SouthVietnamese external operations thatcoincided with the American depar-ture: Cambodia in 1970 and Laos in1971. The Laotian incursion was thefirst time a division command posttook the field to control maneuverbrigades.By 1971, at least two Marine
brigades remained in I Corps facingthe demilitarized zone and the NorthVietnamese, filling the vacuum leftwhen the Americans moved from thisregion. During the Spring Offensive in1972, the Vietnamese Marines were
fully employed for the defense of thenorth and at first were used piecemealunder control of the 3d ARVNDivision. The Marine Division estab-lished itself as a major fighting forcein the month-long battle to recaptureQuang Tri City; in the process, theykilled an estimated 17,819 NorthVietnamese soldiers, took 156 prison-ers, and captured more than 5,000weapons and vehicles. At the begin-ning of 1973, the Marine Division wasregarded by the South Vietnamese asan “outstanding unit” of the Republicof Vietnam Armed Forces.The Vietnamese Marines remained
committed to the defense of thedemilitarized zone through 1974. Firstordered to protect Hue and Da Nang
from the communist attack in spring1975, the Marines were hastily with-drawn with the collapse of the SouthVietnamese in the northern provinces.Five battalion commanders and some40 company commanders were killedduring the fighting. The division reor-ganized and deployed its remainingforces at Long Binh for the final battlefor Saigon. There it stayed throughthe subsequent fighting at the end ofApril 1975. At that point, theVietnamese Marine Corps ceased toexist except in memory and history.For the Vietnamese, the conflict wasthe end of a 30-year civil war inwhich the Vietnamese Marine Corpsplayed a part until the bitter end.
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that no matter what job is assigned,every Marine is a rifleman. Despitethese great contributions to our under-standing of the war, the branch is stillactively seeking to add to its holdings,and encourages all Marine veteransholding materials documenting theirexperiences in Vietnam to contact thebranch so that these materials can bepreserved for future generations ofwarfighters.
The branch is also doing its part tomake more readily available the
Corps’ official records of the conflict.Recently, the branch transferred nearly
1,000 boxes of command chronologiesand related records to the ModernMilitary Records Branch of theNational Archives and RecordsAdministration, College Park,Maryland.This included the transfer of elec-
tronic copies of all these records,which the branch is working withNARA to make available as soon aspossible. The project has opened anunprecedented level of cooperationbetween the facilities which we hopewill continue to serve the Corps, veter-ans, and researchers into the future.
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Perhaps no past conflict in whichthe Marine Corps has engaged has
more pertinent lessons for the currentwarfighters in today’s conflicts in Iraqand Afghanistan than the Vietnam War.And yet it remains one of the least-well documented. While making everyeffort to acquire documentation on theMarine Corps experience in Vietnam,there is still much to be done.In the past few years, the Archives
and Special Collections branch of theLibrary of the Marine Corps has addedcollections of personal papers to itsholdings which contribute greatly toour understanding of the Marine Corpsrole in this conflict. The wartime lettersof General John Chaisson, who servedat the Military Advisory CommandVietnam during the conflict, provide aunique insider’s perspective on theworkings of that organization. Thepapers of Brigadier General RichardCarey provide much needed insightinto the Marines’ role in OperationFrequent Wind, the evacuation ofSaigon. Finally, the collected papers ofmany members of the 1st AmphibiousTractor Battalion tell one of the MarineCorps’ finest stories of the time-hon-ored tradition of overcoming all hard-ship to complete the mission, reinforc-ing that fundamental understanding
Library of the Marine Corps
Lessons for Today’sWarfightersby Dr. Jim Ginther
Archival Team Leader
Members of Company G, 2d Battalion, 4th Marines return from Saigon to USSVancouver on 30 April. They had reinforced security at the Embassy duringOperation Frequent Wind.
14 Fortitudine, Vol. 33, No.1, 2008
The barracks was surrendered andthe colors were hauled down for
the last time. It was without doubt oneof the saddest moments in the historyof the Corps—a Marine detachmentsurrendering to the enemy without afight. Even the Japanese wereastounded, but there was nothing elsefor the commanding officer to do—allthe arms and ammunition werealready at the docks at Chinwangtao.The North China Marine EmbassyGuards at Peiping (Peking) andTientsin had shipped their suppliesout only two days prior in anticipationof leaving China on 10 December1941. While Pearl Harbor was beingattacked, across the International DateLine and throughout that dark andsnowy night, these Marine EmbassyGuards were quietly being surroundedby a force they would not be able torepel their way through the morningof 8 December 1941. On that day, 189Marines and 14 sailors became the firstUnited States military prisoners ofWorld War II. Those who survived andhad not escaped, were held longerthan any other in the war—almostfour years.Although war with Japan loomed
on the horizon in 1941, prospects fora peaceful solution were not given up.As the political talks, negotiations, andpressure was applied, Japanese occu-pying troops and Marines EmbassyGuards were not getting along. Asthings became increasingly worse, theMarines curtailed their travel, theirtour of duty was eventually cut from30 to 24 months, and the embassyguard force was reduced by half. InOctober of 1941, Peiping MarineEmbassy Guard Private First ClassDouglas A. Bunn was shot in the legwhile on post by an unknownassailant. To most Marines, though, lifewent on as usual and any major eventswere separated by enough time toconceal the obviousness of it all in
Rebellion in Peiping (Peking). FirstLieutenant Smedley D. Butler hadbeen decorated as well for his part inthat conflict near Tientsin. These leg-ends and their fellow Marines hadbeen victorious despite being repeat-edly surrounded by a vastly largerenemy. The Japanese knew theywould be up against a group of hero-ic men who would fight to the deathagainst all odds. They had to carefullyplan this capture and timing would becritical. They had to catch the Marinesoffguard.
Whether or not Japan’s timing oftheir attack on the United States
had anything to do with timing theircapture of 200 Marines in China, thelocal Japanese authorities knew thatboth Tientsin and Peiping had justshipped out their entire supply ofammunition and machine guns, andthe Japanese timing could not havebeen better. On 8 December, 7December in the United States,Marines at all three locations were sur-rounded and taken prisoner. ThePeiping Marines on guard that morn-ing were ordered not to resist as wordspread that the Japanese, throughoutthe night, had somehow managed toget mortars and machine guns placedup on the two-story high Tartar Wall,which surrounded the compound, andon the 10-story Chien-Men Tower.Private First Class Chester M. Biggslater wrote that Japanese troops sur-rounded the Peking Embassy as far asthe eye could see. It says a lot aboutthe Marines that the Japanese waiteduntil the Marines had shipped out allof their armament and then felt theyneeded so many troops to convincethe Marines not to resist. That morningnews came in, by radio, that theJapanese had attacked Pearl Harbor.The Japanese authorities demanded
to speak with the commanding officerto discuss the immediate surrender of
Oral History
The First and Longest POWs ofWWII:North China Marine Embassy Guards - Part I
by Rob TaglianettiOral Historian
today’s hindsight. Meanwhile, UnitedStates and Japanese negotiations werefailing and the decision was finallymade to withdraw all Marines andUnited States personnel from China.In November of 1941, one year
after all government dependants wereordered out, the 4th Marine Regimentwas ordered out of China. All MarineEmbassy Guards kept their posts,however, until they and the Embassystaff could close down operations,including packing, shipping, anddestroying any items that could not betaken. While the Marines ensured thesafety of the remaining diplomats,their own departure preparationsremained. The soonest they would beready to board ship was 10 December.It could be coincidence that theJapanese launched their attack on theUnited States just two days before theMarines were scheduled to leave, butall this Embassy activity was undoubt-edly observed by the Japanese author-ities. The Japanese had watched the4th Marine Regiment safely leaveChina and redeploy to the Philippines.They could foresee and probablychaffed at the thought that theseMarines would cost many Japanesecasualties in defending those islandswhen the Japanese would soonlaunch an attack there. A group of twohundred Marines would make a fineshow of force, they may have thought.They could parade them aroundNorthern China to convince theChinese to give up resistance. Theycould study these men and learn theirmannerisms, capabilities, use them inlabor camps, and perhaps trade themfor Japanese prisoners one day.The Japanese knew about the hero-
ic nature of Marines in defendingthemselves. In fact, they had examplesat these very same locations in Chinajust 41 years prior. Private Daniel(Dan) J. Daly was awarded the Medalof Honor fighting in the Boxer
Fortitudine,Vol. 33, No. 1, 2008 15
the compound. Colonel William W.Ashurst, the Peking detachment com-manding officer, went over to theJapanese Embassy that morning andlearned that the discussion would notbe about the terms the surrenderwould be under, for that had beendetermined to be unconditional, buton how and at what time it wouldtake place. Both Colonel Ashurst andMajor Luther A. Brown, commandingofficer of the Tientsin detachment,received assurances from the Japaneseauthorities that if they surrenderedand did not attempt any escape, theyand their Marines would be repatriat-ed, under the Boxer Protocol, alongwith all the others in the diplomaticcommunity.The time for a formal surrender of
the Peiping compound was set for1300 that day. As the flag was low-ered, the bugler sounded out his lastnotes and then broke the bugle overhis knee and threw the pieces downto the ground. The arms were stacked,eyes welled up, hearts sank for themoment, but the Marines kept theirchin up and returned to their barrackswhere they were confined until fur-ther notice. There is and was no causefor shame. Marines are trained torespect authority and follow orders.They were not only ordered but oblig-ed to remain, until all preparations fordeparture were made, and the lastcivilian left the Embassy and was safeon board ship. They obeyed no mat-ter what the cost, and they sacrificedtheir freedom for the next four yearsto see that those diplomats were safe-guarded until the last moment.The story of these Marines for the
first month of captivity took placeamong two groups in two locations,including 140 men held at the Peipingcompound and 63 in Tientsin thatincluded the Chinwangtao detach-ment. On 10 December, after theJapanese had seized all arms, militarygear, radio equipment, and any itemswhich could be used as weapons,Private First Class Matthew H.Stohlman recorded in his journal whatmost affected him just two days aftertheir capture. “Our greatest loss todaywas that of three radios. One fromour barracks, one from the officer’squarters, and one from the hospital
corpsmen’s quarters. Now we arecompletely cut off from the outsideworld.” Surprisingly, most Marineswere simply enjoying the diversionand attention they were getting andwere taking this short war with a play-ful and jolly mood. A wedding washeld in Tientsin between SergeantAlan A. Sydow and his British girl-friend (visiting hours were Wednesdayand Saturday from 1400 to 1600).Some thought it was going to be ashort adventure that they could chuck-le about some day.
On the first Christmas of their cap-tivity both detachments were still
held at their respective compounds.Spirits were still high because mostmen held out hope for repatriation,and the security was still relativelyrelaxed. Care packages were allowedin, and both detachments saved uprations to put on a good spread. On23 December in Peiping, the menwere allowed, under guard, to attendmidnight Mass at the Chapel of theHospice de Saint Michael, across fromthe compound. Protestant serviceswere held in the mess hall. TheirJapanese captors donated a Christmastree, and on Christmas Eve they sangcarols. After Christmas dinner, most ofthe men were sick from gorging. InTientsin, where it seemed that theJapanese authorities were a bit more
relaxed, the men held some of thewildest parties many of them had everattended. At their Christmas dinner,the Japanese authorities gave eachman one bottle of beer, which theyused while proposing a satirical toastto the victory of the United States.Private First Class Stohlman recordedthe irony in his journal. “The fact thatwe were drinking a toast withJapanese beer in a Japanese concen-tration [camp] to the victory of theUnited States gave quite a bit of sig-nificance to the dinner”.On 10 January 1942, all Peiping
Marines were moved down to Tientsinwhere all of them remained until theywere transferred to their first prisonerof war camp on 1 February 1942.While in this holding pattern at theTientsin compound, food and spacequickly became scarce, and someMarines began to see what might beahead. While optimism prevailed, theolder Marines took note of theJapanese capture of Wake and Guamand saw what it would really take tofree them. They started setting realisticliberation dates—like 1945. �1775�
TO BE CONTINUED
Note: Rob Taglianetti is an oral historianat the Marine Corps History Division whorecently conducted video oral historieswith six of the last seventeen survivingNorth China Marine POWs.
Marine Corps Photo Collection
Col William W. Ashurst and Cpl Arthur C. Davision (carrying white flag) arriveat the Japanese Legation in Peiping, China to discuss the Marines’ surrender.
16 Fortitudine,Vol.33,No.1,2008
It started in 1821 when the firstAmerican ship steamed into
Bangkok harbor. Unlike many of itsAsian neighbors, Thailand—or Siam asit was known then—welcomed for-eign visitors to its shores. Missionariesand traders maintained a regular pres-ence in the kingdom, culminating withU.S. diplomat Edmund Roberts negoti-ating the 1833 Treaty of Amity andCommerce in Bangkok. The cordialrelationship between the two coun-tries continued to exist and flourishthroughout the 19th century. So muchso that King Mongkut, made famousby Hollywood’s The King and I,offered President Abraham Lincolnwar elephants to aid the Union in itsfight against the Confederacy. ThePresident politely declined, saying thatthe American climate would be tooharsh for the very useful and intimi-dating pachyderms. As typical of hisleadership, President Lincoln, consid-ering the long-term effects on theentire nation, made a wise choice.The next century proved to be
more defining for the two nations mil-itarily. In the two world wars,Thailand participated on a minor scalein the first, while in the second main-tained even relations with the UnitedStates, despite it’s occupation byJapanese troops. In 1950, the Thaissigned the Thai-U.S. MilitaryAssistance Agreement, opening thedoor for a potential presence of U.S.troops in the kingdom. For the MarineCorps, the first large scale involvementwith the Thai military came in Octoberof 1956 when Marines of the 9thMarine Regiment, along with RoyalThai Marines, stormed ashore on thebeach of Had Chao Samran in front of25,000 spectators as part of OperationTeam-Work. Then on the eve of theVietnam War in 1961, President JohnF. Kennedy ordered 5,000 Marines tothe northern Thai region of Udorn tocounter communist expansion in
neighboring Laos. More than a decadelater in 1972, Task Force Delta, con-sisting of McDonnell Douglas F4Phantom squadrons of Marine FighterAttack Squadrons 232, 115, and 212,operated out of the Royal Thai AirForce Base in Nam Phong. Due tomounting pressure from her neigh-bors, however, the kingdom askedthat all U.S. forces be withdrawn assoon as possible. By 1976, U.S. troopswere gone.
After the tumult in Asia in the1970s, the United States and
Thailand once again resumed regularmilitary cooperation exercises with thefirst running in 1982 of the now three-decade-old exercise, Cobra Gold. Withforces from the III MarineExpeditionary Force and the Navy’sSeventh Fleet as the main players, the
exercise sought to create a commonunderstanding and interoperabilitybetween the two countries’ militariesto be able to respond to future con-tingencies in the area. By 1983, how-ever, Thailand’s neighbor Vietnamlabeled the exercise a “serious act ofprovocation” against the communistnations on the borders, namelyVietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Hanoiwent so far as to accuse the UnitedStates of attempting to reintroduce atroop presence in Southeast Asia.Cobra Gold ‘84 drew the attention ofthe Soviets, as U.S. Navy personnelreported Russian ships offshore moni-toring the activities. By 1985, the exer-cise had expanded to include all ser-vices of both countries. Commandingofficer of the Royal Thai Marine Corps’1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment,Commander Terdsak Promsiri, noted
Field History
Old Friends in Southeast Asia:U.S.Marines in Thailand
by Maj Valerie JacksonEditor and Field Historian
Department of Defense Photo (Marine Corps) A422894
In a photo by SSgt Dub Allen, an F-4J of VMFA-232 readies for a combat missionat Nam Phong airbase in Thailand on 12 October 1972.
Fortitudine, Vol. 33, No.1, 2008 17
after training with Marine Reservistsfrom 3d Air Naval Gunfire LiaisonCompany that “they’re presence herehas been valuable to us,” and “we’velearned a lot from them and we workvery well together.”
By the 1990s, Cobra Gold contin-ued to be the mainstay of joint
U.S.-Thai military cooperation. Areduced military budget in Americastressed the importance of relying onsister services within the U.S. armedforces and also U.S. allies. In Thailand,expansion to humanitarian assistanceprojects, such as medical and dentalsupport and construction of schoolsand orphanages for local Thais helpedto foster a spirit of appreciation forU.S. involvement in the area. Thelargest to date Cobra Gold in 1994drew praise from the CommandingGeneral, III Marine ExpeditionaryForce, Major General Donald R.Gardner. “We’ve. . .achieved our goalof deploying to Thailand, conductinga huge exercise and enhancing ourfriendships with the Thais at the sametime,” he noted. Events in Somalia
scaled back the amphibious demon-stration that year, with the withdrawalof the USS Pelelieu and her amphibi-ous ready group. In 1995, OperationCARAT (Cooperation Afloat Readinessand Training) began as an annualseries of bilateral maritime and avia-tion exercises between the UnitedStates and six Southeast Asia nations.Today, U.S. Marines continue to par-ticipate in this very fruitful exercise.With the turn of the century, events
in both Thailand and the United Statesstressed the individual nations in dif-ferent ways. While the U.S. armedforces began wide scale militaryinvolvement in Afghanistan and Iraqafter the attacks of 11 September 2001,responsibilities in Southeast Asia werenot abandoned. Exercises in Thailandcontinued, although sometimes scaledback in size due to operational com-mitments. The December 2004 tsuna-mi relief, orchestrated by Marines outof Uttapao Naval Base, “saved thou-sands of lives,” according to DeputyChief of Mission at the U.S. Embassyin Bangkok, Mr. Alexander A. Arvizu.After proving the merits of decades
of interoperability exercises in thecountry, the 37th running of CobraGold in 2007 focused on peace oper-ations. Again, Mr. Arvizu remarkedthat the exercise now has a true mul-tilateral nature that enhances the U.S.’sability to respond to peace enforce-ment and peacekeeping missions inthe area with the help of severalnations. Lieutenant General John F.Goodman, Commanding General,Marine Forces Pacific, noted that theUnited States must maintain “freedomof action” in Southeast Asia, and thecontinuation of these exercises plays alarge role in accomplishing that goal.
With America’s mission inSouthwest Asia turned to fight-
ing a counterinsurgency, the Thai mil-itary is taking valuable lessons fromexercises with the U.S. Marines anddirectly implementing them in theirstruggle with insurgents in the southof their country. In the Pattani regionbordering Malaysia, separatist groups,labeled by the Thais as possible for-mer communists, Muslim jihadists, andbandits, have claimed the lives ofmore than 2,300 people since 2004.The Thai armed forces use the U.S.Marines’ lessons learned from combat-ing similar groups in Iraq andAfghanistan by forcefully applyingthem to the region of their countrythat is vital to peace in Southeast Asia.Since that first ship sailed into
Bangkok harbor more than 180 yearsago, the United States and Thailandhave maintained a friendly and uniquerelationship. The Thai people, knownfor their flexibility and affability, haveembraced the American military.Through the direct support and friend-ship of the United States MarineCorps, Thailand has grown into asolid, life-long partner for the U.S. inAsia. �1775�
LtCdr Pilan Amsanang, Royal Thai Marine Corps, was the field exercise opera-tions officer for Cobra Gold 2007. A graduate of U.S. Marine Corps ExpeditionaryWarfare School, he has done 10 previous Cobra Golds and serves as an exampleof how the exercise has evolved into a truly integrated training opportunity forthe American and Thai armed forces.
Photo by Maj Valerie A. Jackson
The author conducted historicalcoverage of Cobra Gold 2007 forthe History Division and isindebted to Maj Stephen C.“Beavis” Cohn and Col James E.Reilly for their assistance ingaining access to U.S. Marinesand regional partners through-out the exercise.
18 Fortitudine,Vol.33,No.1,2008
In August 2007, the 33d Congress ofthe International Commission ofMilitary History was held in CapeTown, South Africa—a first for thecountry and sub-continent. Congressmembers highlighted the continuedinterest in an area of persistent impor-tance in the post-Cold War era.President George W. Bush reinforcedthis importance by announcing thisyear the formation of a U.S. AfricaCommand by 2008.As Chief Historian, I had the oppor-
tunity to attend the Congress alongwith several other academic and ser-vice military historians. Whileimpressed with the quality of the pre-sentations and of the historic sites andbattlefields visited, I wonderedwhether or not there had ever been aMarine presence in southern Africa.When I returned to the States, I didsome digging.United States Marines have been in
South Africa as part of the AmericanEmbassy staff, with various deploy-ments of the U.S. Navy, and as partic-ipants in diplomatic and contingencyefforts, reflecting the strategic locationof the Cape of Good Hope. A lesserknown connection with South Africawas General Thomas Holcomb,Commandant of the Marine Corps,who served as U.S. MinisterPlenipotentiary and EnvoyExtraordinary to the Republic of SouthAfrica.When Ambassador Holcomb
arrived in Pretoria in 1944, in themidst of World War II, his concernswere global as well as regional. As amilitary man and Service chief, heviewed his diplomatic mission inbroad terms. His goals were to estab-lish friendly relations, to advise ondevelopments that would affect theUnited States, to protect and promoteAmerican business, and to provide theU.S. Government’s views. Recognizingthe size of the region, he used aDouglas DC3, flown and maintainedby a U.S. Marine detachment, to fly
throughout South Africa, the neigh-boring mandate of South West Africa,Portuguese Angola and Mozambique,British Nyasaland, and SouthernRhodesia. His time in South Africa wit-nessed the finish of World War II, thestirrings of the Cold War, and the endof colonial rule in Africa. As Holcombreturned to the United States in 1948,the victory of the National Party andits policies of separation by race fore-told the suspension of U.S. Navy portvisits from 1967 until after the 1994transition to full democracy.The South African Defense Force
included Marines for a time—in facttwo separate organizations. Between1951 and 1955, from the example ofthe Royal Marines, a South AfricanCorps of Marines was responsible forcoast defense, including the majorports of Walvis Bay, Cape Town, andDurban. Eight Marine regiments,including a support unit under theNaval and Marine Chief of Staff,manned coastal guns, antiaircraftartillery, and radar. Eventually Marineswere deployed on ships and became
From the Chief Historian
Marines in South Africaby Charles D. MelsonChief Historian
Courtesy of Brig D.F.S. Fourie
South African Corps of Marines capbadge included Protea flower with anaval anchor and flaming artilleryshell. These symbolized the coastartillery and anti-aircraft defense mis-sion of the Corps.
Members of the South African Navy’s Marine Brigade dig in for a base defenseexercise.
Courtesy of the South African National Museum of Military History
Fortitudine, Vol. 33, No.1, 2008 19
known for their band and “dressblues.” The goal of the service chiefwas to train the Marines “to the samestandards as those of the RoyalMarines and the United States MarineCorps.” The development and deploy-ment of ship mounted surface-to-sur-face missiles during the Cold War,however, made the South AfricanMarines outdated and an “unwarrant-ed expense.” As a result, existing per-sonnel were transferred to the armyand navy.Like all good ideas, the concept of
Marines was revisited during the peri-od of South Africa’s Border War from1966 to 1989. During the conflict, theSouth African Army and Air Forcetook pride of place and budget. Anylanding operations were conducted bythe Army and Special Forces as theNavy only had submarines,minesweepers, patrol gunboats,frigates, and support ships. As theconflict expanded down the west andeast coasts, the nationalist and com-munist threats offered exposed flanks.When the need for increased navalparticipation was recognized, it wasfelt that an amphibious force could beused for both base security andamphibious operations. In 1979, theSouth African Navy decided to estab-lish a Marine Brigade. With some-where near 1,000 men, it was morelike a reinforced battalion landingteam. Augmentation from the SouthAfrican Army was planned to bringthe brigade to full strength. At thetime, the South African Navy had thir-
ty ships, manned by some 4,500 offi-cers and men (including about 1,500national servicemen) and another10,000 reservists. While predominantlywhite, roughly 20 percent of the navywas black or Asian. Of the MarineBrigade, the majority were regular ornational servicemen, with 15 to 30percent being reservists.According to the South African
Defense Force, “the duties of themarines are an amalgam of sailors andsoldiers, they are trained as both, andconsequently their training is toughand comprehensive.” Basic navaltraining was at Saldanah Naval Base,followed by a light infantry course atEikesboshock. The South African Navy
Marine Brigade had little time for gar-rison and ceremonial duties. From1981, companies were rotated throughthe operational area in South WestAfrica where the Marines were usedprimarily in riverine or mounted coun-terinsurgency efforts, based at first atOshakati, then Wenela Base, Caprivi.Marines also manned the harbor pro-tection units and were coxswains forlanding craft. Marines were also basedat Richard’s Bay, Durban, EastLondon, Port Elizabeth, Simons Town,Table Bay, Saldanah Bay, and WalvisBay. In 1989, the Navy conducted anamphibious demonstration at WalvisBay with South African Marines andparatroopers. That action demonstrat-ed the ability of the South Africans toblock Soviet or Cuban support torebel groups from the sea.Despite these contributions, the
Marines were again eliminated in a1990 cost-cutting effort. As recently as2005, the question of the need forMarines was revisited as part of a “cri-sis response capability” for SouthAfrica and its expanded navy. Maybethe past will be prologue again, andthe usefulness of a dedicated amphibi-ous force will be recognized. With theSouth African Navy being recognizedas the principle source of peacekeep-ing and humanitarian deployments,the logic for its own land force is obvi-ous. �1775�
Department of Defense Photo
Gen Thomas Holcomb, Commandantof the Marine Corps and Ambassadorto the Republic of South Africa.
Delta Class landing boats are used to bring South African Marines ashore dur-ing a landing exercise.
Courtesy of the South African National Museum of Military History
Contact Information
The International Commissionof Military History (ICMH)
consists of 44 national commis-sions. The U.S. Commission ofMilitary History (USCMH) sendsdelegates to the annual meet-ings. American historians alsotake part in the organization’sleadership council, militaryarchives and bibliography com-mittees, and in the scientific pro-gram. The 2008 Congress will beheld in Trieste, Italy. For mem-bership information, dues, andannouncements, visit the U.S.Commission’s website athttp://uscmh.acdis.uius.edu orcontact the USCMH Secretary-General at P.O. Box 523431,Springfield, Virginia 22152.
20 Fortitudine,Vol.33,No.1,2008
The battle-proven success of the M1Garand rifle during World War II
assured that its successor would be of asimilar design. As early as 1944, workbegan to improve the much-loved rifle.Desired changes to the M1 includedlighter weight, a full-automatic capabil-ity, and a detachable large-capacitymagazine. After many trials and experi-mental models, the U.S. Governmentaccepted the M14 Rifle into service inMay 1957.The M14 replaced four different
weapons: the M1 Garand, the M1/M2carbine, the Browning Automatic Rifleand the M3A1 .45-caliber sub-machinegun. Additionally, the rifle was cham-bered for a new cartridge identified as7.62 mm NATO. The M14, along withthe M60 machine gun, would fulfill allof the infantry’s small arms require-ments with the same caliber ammuni-tion. This new cartridge was .5 inchshorter in overall length than the .30-06or M2 .30-caliber cartridge used in theM1 Garand. Ballistically it measures upalmost identically.The M14 sported all of the desired
changes and modifications. It wasslightly lighter in weight. It was capableof selective-fire; that is it could be firedin either a semi-automatic or fully auto-matic mode. And it utilized a detach-able box-type magazine, which held 20rounds of ammunition. This was a greatimprovement in fire power over theeight-round clip utilized in the M1Garand. Four companies manufacturedthe new service rifle: SpringfieldArmory in Massachusetts; Harringtonand Richardson Arms Company ofWorcester, Massachusetts; Olin-Mathieson Chemical Corporation(Winchester) of New Haven,Connecticut; and Thompson-Ramo-Wooldridge, Incorporated, Cleveland,Ohio.Vietnam was the true test of combat
worthiness for this new rifle. The firstMarine Corps units to land in Vietnamin March 1965 carried M14s. Like itspredecessor, the M1 Garand, the M14
proved reliable and hard-hitting underthe worst of jungle and mountain con-ditions. Although the M14 was popularwith Marines, the 5.56 mm M16A1eventually replaced it as the standardcombat rifle of the U.S. military.Studies revealed that a scaled-downlighter rifle capable of full automaticfire would be more portable duringmodern close combat operations.Also, a lighter caliber round meant thatmore ammunition could be carried bythe individual combatant. Many M14rifles were destroyed or transferred tofriendly nations, but a number of themremained in service with the U.S.Armed Forces, most notably on com-petitive Marine Corps rifle teams and inthe fleet with the U.S. Navy. The authorremembers the M14 being in ships andNaval Station armories through 1998.During the 1990s, the Marine Corps
reinstated a concept effectively used inboth World War II and Korea. In theearlier wars, a Marine squad’s table oforganization and equipment included asniper rifle and a “designated marks-man.” The designated marksman was aMarine who possessed exceptionalshooting skills and engaged and
destroyed enemy targets outside theranges normally used by an infantry-man. His special training, although notas intense as sniper school, focusedmore on developing and enhancinglong-range shooting skills.These specially designated Marines
used the M14 for this role, and theweapon has performed well as theDesignated Marksman Rifle. Built byskilled Marine Corps armorers at thePrecision Weapons Shop at Quantico,Virginia, these weapons are assembledfrom a specially tuned match rifle.Armorers fit them with a Harris bipod,competition fiberglass stock, and aUnertl or Leupold 10 power opticalsight. Additional accessories mayinclude firearms suppressors and nightvision optical sights for special opera-tions.The M14’s attraction was not restrict-
ed to military use as evidenced by acommercially produced semi-automaticonly version of the rifle, which gainedpopularity with many target shootersand sportsmen, who quickly recog-nized its strength, accuracy, anddependability. However, the U.S. M14was designed first and foremost as acombat service rifle. Its fame and repu-tation earned first on the battlefields ofVietnam, continues now during theGlobal War on Terrorism.In honor of this popular rifle, the
National Museum of the Marine Corpsexhibits two different M14 rifles in theVietnam War gallery. The first is in the“Weapons of War” case, and the secondrifle is slung across the shoulder of theMarine dog handler cast figure in theQuang Nam village scene, as seen inthe photograph.Retired—then resurrected—the M14
continues to serve our fighting men andwomen. Although features, configura-tion, and materials of construction havechanged somewhat since its initialintroduction, this weapon of iron andwood, with a lineage to the great armsdesigner John Garand and the M1, isstill shooting and serving. �1775�
National Museum of the Marine Corps
Iron andWood:The U.S.M14 Service Rifleby Alfred V. Houde, Jr.Curator of Ordnance
Cast figure of a Marine dog handlerarmed with an M14 and his dog, work-ing near a hut as part of the “In the Air,on Land and Sea: The War in Vietnam,”exhibits, National Museum of theMarine Corps.
Photograph by Robert Sullivan.
Fortitudine, Vol. 33, No.1, 2008 21
database Proquest, found under the cate-gory “Military & Security.” Under anadvanced search, using the keywordsDewey Canyon, Marine, and Davis, westrike gold finding the following articles:“Operation Dewey Canyon,” by MajorGenenal Robert H. Barrow, MarineCorps Gazette (Nov 1981), “DeweyCanyon: All Weather Classic,” by FirstLieutenant Gordon M. Davis, USMC,Marine Corps Gazette (Jul 1969), and“Operation Dewey Canyon,” by MarcBernstein, Vietnam (Aug 2007).The Operation Closes:Evaluation ofOperation End of the Rainbow
In the first part of Phase III, we gar-nered several good print and microformsources that help explain some of thePhase I questions. Not familiar withOperation Dewey Canyon? An excellentplace to begin would be The VietnamBattle Chronology by David Burns Siglerfound in the catalog search. Consultingthe index for Dewey Canyon, we founda listing on page 87 that has the officialchronology for Operation DeweyCanyon beginning on the date 22January through 19March 1969. Theentry includes a listing of Fire SupportBases (FSB), the purpose of DeweyCanyon, the division commander, MajorGeneral Raymond Davis, Marine Corpsunits involved, and a day by day listingof engagements within the operation.In U.S. Marines in Vietnam series, we
found a thorough description ofCombined Action Program. The bookdescribes a CAP as a, “15-man rifle squadwith squad leader, M79 grenadier, NavyCorpsman, and three rifle teams of fourmen each, working with a PopularForces 35-man platoon to defend a vil-lage or a group of hamlets.” Why is thisso significant? Given the role of militaryadvisors within the current conflicts inIraq and Afghanistan, CAP provides ahistorical example of this role, its sixbasic missions, and how effective it mayor may not have been.
In the records of the U.S. MarineCorps in the Vietnam War, we discov-ered the hidden gems CommandHistories/Chronologies of Fleet MarineForce, Pacific Command (FMFPAC)1964–1973, III Marine Amphibious ForceCommand (III MAF) 1964–1971, and theDivision Command Histories/Chronol-ogies, 1965–1971, which include refer-ences to Operation Dewey Canyon.These highly important sources detailthe actions by Marines often writtenvery close to the events themselves.In the second part of Phase III, our
Proust database search, we struck paydirt with three excellent articles detailingwho General Ray Davis was, what madeOperation Dewey Canyon significant, therole of FSBs within the operation, thecontention surrounding this mission as aforay into Laos, and what made this soimportant to the Marine Corps. As anadded bonus, these articles can beemailed directly to the searcher.
Lessons LearnedThe Breckinridge Branch of Library of
the Marine Corps provides a collectionof resources on Vietnam, includingresearch assistance by the reference staffif you are struggling to find informationon your topic. “Operation End of theRainbow” proved successful in usingtwo prime weapons in the library’s arse-nal: the online library catalog and theonline library databases. In both search-es we were able to obtain a selection ofspecific information on OperationDewey Canyon. Within the books andmicrofilm we located, we found detailedreports of events as they occurred,explanations of acronyms, supportingdocuments, narratives by Marinesinvolved in specific combat missions,detailed timelines of events, and organi-zational data often listing persons ofinterest. The main lesson learned? Oneshould never underestimate the level ofsources provided by The Library of theMarine Corps. �1775�
Phase I: Establish the BreckinridgeAcademic Library, one of the branch-
es of The Library of the Marine Corps, asa collection of Vietnam resources tomeet multiple study needs.As a researcher, student, Marine, or
history buff, you may need to find infor-mation on any number of topics con-cerning Vietnam. Perhaps you have beentasked to find information on any of thefollowing: What was Operation DeweyCanyon? Why was it significant? What areFSBs? Who was General Ray Davis? Arethere division command chronologiesfor Operation Dewey Canyon? What wasthe Combined Action Program?Zone of Action:The library collection,
both online and in print, including micro-form, bound periodicals, and official his-tories.Conditions: Prime. The library pro-
vides multiple study alcoves, more than50 internet terminals, WiFi, and referenceassistance on location, by phone (703)784-4411, or email: <[email protected]>Phase II:Ascertain the nature of the col-lection through a search using primeweapons issued: the online library cata-log and the online databases. Codename:Operation End of the Rainbow.Phase III Part 1: Searching. The first
search focuses on library materials in thelibrary catalog using general keywordterms including: Vietnam, Marine,chronology, microform, Dewey, Davis,and Combined Action Program. Resultsinclude: Records of the U.S. Marine Corpsin the Vietnam War, Confidential U.S.State Department Files on Vietnam, TheVietnam Battle Chronology by DavidBurns Sigler and U.S. Marines inVietnam series by the Marine CorpsHistory and Museums Division.Phase III Part 2: Searching. The second
search focuses on resources found in thelibrary databases accessed from thelibrary homepage, www.mcu.usmc.mil/MCRCweb/library.htm. We chose the
Library of the Marine Corps
Codename:“Operation End of the Rainbow”A Multi-Resources Battle Study Exercise
by Rachel S. Kingcade and Patricia LaneBreckinridge Library
22 Fortitudine, Vol. 33, No.1, 2008
Lieutenant General Duane A. Wills,a highly decorated combat veteranfrom the Vietnam War, died 21 May2007 in Tucson, Arizona, at the ageof 68. The Independence, Missouri,native was commissioned a secondlieutenant in the Marine Corps fol-lowing his 1961 graduation from theUniversity of California at LosAngeles. He then completed TheBasic School, Quantico, Virginia, andwas ordered to flight training atPensacola, Florida, in January, 1962.He was designated a Naval Aviator inJuly 1963.Upon graduation from flight
school, he was assigned to MarineFighter Squadron 212, at MarineCorps Air Station, Kaneohe Bay,Hawaii, and served with thesquadron until August 1966. FromMay to December 1965, he served onboard the USS Oriskany off the coastof Vietnam, when his squadronserved as part of the carrier’s airwing. He was promoted to captain inNovember 1965. In August 1966, hewas assigned to Naval Air StationKingsville, Texas, where he served asa flight instructor from September1966 to July 1968. After conversiontraining to the F-4, he was promotedto major and ordered to Vietnam inNovember 1968, where he servedwith Marine Fighter Attack Squadron542 and Marine Aircraft Group 11. Heflew 600 combat missions and morethan 7,000 mishap-free flight hours inboth fixed-and rotary-wing aircraft.During this period, he earned theDistinguished Flying Cross with goldstar; the Bronze Star Medal withCombat “V”; 45 Air Medals; and theNavy Commendation Medal withCombat “V.”General Wills held a variety of
assignments following his graduationin June 1973 from the Marine CorpsCommand and Staff College, whichincluded tours of duty as the person-nel officer of 2d Marine AircraftWing, Marine Corps Air Station,
Cherry Point; operations officer,Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 115;logistics officer of Marine AircraftGroup 15; and executive officer ofMarine Fighter Attack Squadron 314.He later served as CommandingOfficer, Marine Fighter AttackSquadron 235 and CommandingOfficer, Marine Aircraft Group 24.In July 1984, he assumed com-
mand of the 31st Marine AmphibiousUnit in the Western Pacific, and com-manded that unit until its colors wereretired in April 1985. He later wasassigned duty as the Chief of Staff,Fleet Marine Force Pacific. He waspromoted to brigadier general in1987, and later commanded the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing and served asDeputy Commander, III MarineExpeditionary Force on Okinawa,Japan. General Wills’ last assignmentwas Deputy Chief of Aviation, Head-quarters, Marine Corps.
The Marine Corps History Divisionwas deeply saddened to hear of
the passing of a member of itsextended family with the 2 August2007 death of Major Christopher M.
Kennedy. A 1994 graduate of theNaval Academy, he accepted a com-mission as a second lieutenant in theMarine Corps. Upon completion ofThe Basic School, he continued hismilitary education at flight school,earning his “Wings of Gold,” and apost as Navigator and ElectronicCounter-Measures Officer for EA-6BProwlers. He later returned to hisbeloved Naval Academy, where heserved as a professor of history andAcademy drill team commander. Helater was mobilized and deployedduring 2003 to Iraq as a field histori-an, documenting Marine Corps activ-ities and operations. While in thatcapacity, he also served as the princi-pal author of the History Division’sU.S. Marines In Iraq, 2003: Anthologyand Annotated Bibliography. His tourin Iraq was followed by a deploy-ment to Haiti, and from August2005–December 2006, he served withMarine Forces Europe in Stuttgart,Germany, as a logistics operationofficer, where he led efforts for thecross-national military training exer-cise African Lion, and was honoredby the Moroccan government for hisefforts. �1775�
In Memoriam
Passing of Noted Marine Aviatorby Robert V. Aquilina
Assistant Head, Reference Branch
Department of Defense Photo
LtGen Duane A. Wills
Then Capt Christopher M. Kennedy
Fortitudine, Vol. 33, No.1, 2008 23
tion for not standing against the com-munists more strongly and swiftly.Related to this was the possible inva-sion of communist North Vietnam,based upon Moyar’s belief that thedomino theory was legitimate.Inaccurate press coverage undercut
the Diem regime and preventedexpanded American support thatmight have worked short of large-scale troop deployments. While notdirectly related to the current conflictin Iraq, there are important similari-ties as well as differences in the twoconflicts.Central to this account is the coup
and assassination of SouthVietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diemin 1963. This event was precededand followed by a running debate on
how best to maintain Vietnameseindependence in a civil war as anAmerican ally in the struggle againstcommunism in Southeast Asia. Therewere several aggressive strategicoptions available that would haveenabled South Vietnam to resist
aggression from North Vietnamwithout large-scale Americanmilitary involvement. WithPresident John F. Kennedy’sdeath, President Johnson chosenot to act on these options dueto what the author found wasinadequate intelligence andfalse assumptions about thenature of the Vietnameseregime and Cold War context.Along with these pivotalevents, others were reconsid-ered: the 1960–1961 NationalLiberation Front (Viet Cong)insurgency, the 1963 Buddhistprotest movement, the 1964battle of Ap Bac and the role ofAmerican military advisors.
Dr. Mark Moyar was educat-ed at Harvard and
Cambridge Universities andtaught at Cambridge, OhioState, and Texas A&M. At pre-sent, he is a professor at theMarine Corps University atQuantico, Virginia. His story isa complex and well-writtenaccount that sets the bar highfor scholarship. It is essential
reading for anyone wanting a freshunderstanding of one of America’slongest and misunderstood conflicts.The juncture between policy intentand reality is well illustrated and ofusefulness in light of present foreignaffairs. Hopefully, a future volumewill cover the decade of Americandirect involvement and fightingbetween 1965 and 1975.Mr. Melson is the author of U.S.
Marines in Vietnam: The War thatWould Not End. �1775�
Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War,1954-1965. By Mark Moyar.Cambridge University Press, NewYork, NY, 2006, ISBN-13; 978-0-521-86911-9, 512 pp., $32.00.
When the Marine Corps began toexamine its role in the
Vietnam War, it started with avolume covering the periodfrom 1954 until 1964, the so-called “advisory and combatassistance” era. Published in1977, it would have benefitedfrom the background providedby this definitive examinationof how the United Statesbegan its involvement in oneof the major conflicts of theCold War. Since then, thestory of Vietnam has beendominated by journalistsdespite the efforts of moreserious researchers. MarkMoyar is one of the latter, whoproclaims he is a revisionist inthe effort to document the rea-sons the conflict was enteredand justified (the author self-defines his position in reactionto an orthodox school thatwas critical of Americanefforts). His case is made byextensive research and accessto previously unavailable orunder utilized sources. This isreflected in some 83 pages ofnotes.Moyar argues that much of what is
orthodox about the history of theVietnam War was not true. In this hehas provided a detailed assessment ofDiem and his regime. He claims boththe Kennedy and JohnsonAdministrations failed to recognizethe significance of North Vietnamesesupply lines through Laos andCambodia and the need to disrupt theHo Chi Minh Trail. Moyar comesdown harshly on President LyndonBaines Johnson and his administra-
Books in Review
Behind the Vietnam Storyby Charles D. MelsonChief Historian
24 Fortitudine, Vol. 33, No.1, 2008
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