Francisco vs Hr1

7/31/2019 Francisco vs Hr1

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NGMGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITSOFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THEPHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DEVENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BYSENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON,REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR.AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.FUENTEBELLA, respondents.

JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

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G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003

SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA,JR. AND HENEDINA RAZON-ABAD, petitioners,ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETEQUIRINO QUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention,WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THEPHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,vs.

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGHTHE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER ORPRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DEVENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIXWILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THEPHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT,SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.DRILON, respondents,

JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

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G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M.CAGAMPANG, petitioners,WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THEPHILIPPINES, INC., petitioners-in-intervention,vs.FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY ASSENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G. DE VENECIA,

JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THEHOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,

JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,

SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

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G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THEPHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,vs.

JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY ASSPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY ASPRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLICOF THE PHILIPPINES, GILBERT TEODORO, JR.,FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMAIV, HENRY LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN,MARCELINO LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWINGATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSASOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE,ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO

MARAON, JR., CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS,AGAPITO AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR.,GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOSLACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN,SORAYA JAAFAR, WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO,CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDACRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINODY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINOBIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON,

JACINTO PARAS, JOSE SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO,HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIOMACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR., FRANCISNEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIASBULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLOBONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO

YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO,JESLI LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDIAGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO, RENEVELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES,DIDAGEN DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA,

JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA, JVBAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERTREMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUANMIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON, JR.,

JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO, MAURICIODOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELOMONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA, JESNARFALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO,

JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIASLOPEZ, respondents,

JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-

intervention.

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G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003

HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZBUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA PAPA, NAPOLEON C.REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C.LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S.


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MALLARI, petitioners,WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THEPHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,vs.HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. ANDROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY ASSECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

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G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003

SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKERRAUL M. GONZALES, petitioners,WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THEPHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,

vs.

THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGHTHE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER ORPRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DEVENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIXWILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THEPHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT,SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.DRILON, respondents,

JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

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G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003

LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ,SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN MATIBAG, RAMONMIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDOMALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDONAOE, LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH,EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA,GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA,WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATEANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICOPABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO,MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDYEMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG, DR.BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE,WILLIE RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO

BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILYSENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA, SALVACIONLOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPHLEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMONSIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON,VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL ISORENA, MAURESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, ANDEDILBERTO GALLOR, petitioners,WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THEPHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE C. DEVENECIA, JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BYHON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON,HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET AL., respondents.

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G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003

PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T.REYES, petitioners,vs.HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALLMEMBERS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON.SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, ANDALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINESENATE, respondents.

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G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003

ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITYAS A MEMBER OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THEPHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMON. MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYERAND MEMBER OF THE ENGINEERINGPROFESSION, petitioners,vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVESREPRESENTED BY THE 83 HONORABLEMEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON.REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAMFUENTEBELLA, respondents.

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G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003

INTEGRATED BAR OF THEPHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGHTHE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER ORPRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DEVENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIXWILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THEPHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATEPRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents.

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G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003

CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner,vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGHTHE SPEAKER, AND THE SENATE OF THEPHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATEPRESIDENT, respondents.

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G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003

U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC.,GOERING G.C. PADERANGA, DANILO V. ORTIZ,GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO,LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON,ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSAR. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-PADERANGA,FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF OTHERCITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES, petitioners,vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER

JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE OF THEPHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLINDRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES FELIXFUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTO TEODORO, BYTHEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OFTHE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80 HOUSEREPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED AND FILEDTHE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINSTSUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G.DAVIDE, JR. respondents.

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G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003

FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE,THE HONORABLE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES, respondents.

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G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003

NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,vs.HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA ANDGILBERT TEODORO, IN REPRESENTATION OFTHE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OFIMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIOG. DAVIDE, JR. AND THE HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THEPHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER,HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, respondents.

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G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003

VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L.HOFILEA, petitioners,vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGHSPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AND THESENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGHSENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLINDRILON, respondents.

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G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003

IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENTCOMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G.DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS,

JR., petitioner.

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G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner,vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGHTHE SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, HON.

JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVEGILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVEFELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OFTHE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATEPRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLINDRILON, respondents.

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G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003

DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP,CEBU CITY CHAPTER, MANUEL M. MONZON,PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A.MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBER,ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE COLLEG EOFLAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERSASSOCAITION OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC],REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI,CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORSOF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC],REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUELAWYERS ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW],REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ,FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS[FIDA], REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN,CARLOS G. CO, PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBEROF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADYLAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.],MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND BERNARDITOFLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OFCOMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THEPHILIPPINES, CEBU CHAPTER, petitioners,vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES,REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ASHOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE,REPRESENTED BY SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON,AS SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.

CARPIO MORALES,J.:

There can be no constitutional crisis arising from aconflict, no matter how passionate and seeminglyirreconcilable it may appear to be, over thedetermination by the independent branches ofgovernment of the nature, scope and extent of theirrespective constitutional powers where theConstitution itself provides for the means and basesfor its resolution.


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Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrationsof the often frictional, at times turbulent, dynamics ofthe relationship among these co-equal branches. ThisCourt is confronted with one such today involving thelegislature and the judiciary which has drawn legalluminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a fewof our countrymen to vent cacophonous sentimentsthereon.

There may indeed be some legitimacy to thecharacterization that the present controversy subjectof the instant petitions whether the filing of thesecond impeachment complaint against Chief JusticeHilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House ofRepresentatives falls within the one year barprovided in the Constitution, and whether theresolution thereof is a political question hasresulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more truthto the view that it was brought upon by a politicalcrisis of conscience.

In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that ourConstitution is sufficient to address all the issueswhich this controversy spawns that this Courtunequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, thatthe feared resort to extra-constitutional methods ofresolving it is neither necessary nor legallypermissible. Both its resolution and protection of thepublic interest lie in adherence to, not departurefrom, the Constitution.

In passing over the complex issues arising from thecontroversy, this Court is ever mindful of theessential truth that the inviolate doctrine ofseparation of powers among the legislative,executive or judicial branches of government by nomeans prescribes for absolute autonomy in thedischarge by each of that part of the governmentalpower assigned to it by the sovereign people.

At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checksand balances which has been carefully calibrated bythe Constitution to temper the official acts of each ofthese three branches must be given effect withoutdestroying their indispensable co-equality.

Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines ofrepublican government, intended as they are toinsure that governmental power is wielded only forthe good of the people, mandate a relationship ofinterdependence and coordination among thesebranches where the delicate functions of enacting,interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized toachieve a unity of governance, guided only by whatis in the greater interest and well-being of the

people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.

Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:

ARTICLE XI

Accountability of Public Officers

SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Publicofficers and employees must at all times be

accountable to the people, serve them with utmostresponsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, actwith patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.


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SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, theMembers of the Supreme Court, the Members of theConstitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsmanmay be removed from office, on impeachment for,and conviction of, culpable violation ofthe Constitution, treason, bribery, graftand corruption, other high crimes, orbetrayal of public trust. All other public

officers and employees may be removedfrom office as provided by law, but notby impeachment.

SECTION 3. (1) The House ofRepresentatives shall havethe exclusive power to initiate allcases of impeachment.

(2) A verified complaint forimpeachment may be filed by anyMember of the House of Representativesor by any citizen upon a resolution ofendorsement by any Member thereof,which shall be included in the Order ofBusiness within ten session days, andreferred to the proper Committee withinthree session days thereafter. TheCommittee, after hearing, and by amajority vote of all its Members, shallsubmit its report to the House withinsixty session days from such referral,together with the correspondingresolution. The resolution shall becalendared for consideration by theHouse within ten session days fromreceipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all theMembers of the House shall benecessary either to affirm a favorableresolution with the Articles ofImpeachment of the Committee, oroverride its contrary resolution. The voteof each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint orresolution of impeachment is filed by atleast one-third of all the Members of theHouse, the same shall constitute theArticles of Impeachment, and trial by theSenate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachmentproceedings shall be initiated againstthe same official more than once withina period of one year.

(6) The Senate shall havethe sole power to try and decide all cases ofimpeachment. When sitting for that purpose, theSenators shall be on oath or affirmation. When thePresident of the Philippines is on trial, the ChiefJustice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shallnot vote. No person shall be convicted without theconcurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of theSenate.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall notextend further than removal from office anddisqualification to hold any office under the Republicof the Philippines, but the party convicted shall

nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution,trial, and punishment according to law.

(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules onimpeachment to effectively carry out thepurpose of this section. (Emphasis andunderscoring supplied)

11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW RULE

RULE II

INITIATING IMPEACHMENT

Section 2. Mode of InitiatingImpeachment. Impeachment shall beinitiated only by a verified complaint forimpeachment filed by any Member of theHouse of Representatives or by anycitizen upon a resolution of endorsementby any Member thereof or by a verifiedcomplaint or resolution of impeachmentfiled by at least one-third (1/3) of all theMembers of the House.

RULE V

BAR AGAINST INITIATION OIMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGAGAINST THE SAME OFFICIA

Section 16. ImpeachmentProceedings Deemed Initiated.cases where a Member of the Housfiles a verified complaint ofimpeachment or a citizen files a vecomplaint that is endorsed by a Meof the House through a resolution oendorsement against an impeachaofficer, impeachment proceedingsagainst such official are deemed

initiated on the day the CommitteeJustice finds that the verified compand/or resolution against such officas the case may be, is sufficient insubstance, or on the date the Housvotes to overturn or affirm the findthe said Committee that the verifiecomplaint and/or resolution, as themay be, is not sufficient in substan

In cases where a verified complaintresolution of impeachment is filed endorsed, as the case may be, by aleast one-third (1/3) of the Memberthe House, impeachmentproceedings are deemed initiat

at the time of the filing of suchverified complaint or resolutionimpeachment with the SecretaGeneral.

RULE V

BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT

Section 14. Scope of Bar. Noimpeachment proceedings shall beinitiated against the same official morethan once within the period of one (1)year.

Section 17. Bar Against InitiatioOf Impeachment Proceedings. Within a period of one (1) year fromdate impeachment proceedings aredeemed initiated as provided in Se16 hereof, no impeachmentproceedings, as such, can be initiatagainst the same official. (Italics inoriginal; emphasis and underscorinsupplied)


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Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI ofthe Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House ofRepresentatives adopted and approved the Rules ofProcedure in Impeachment Proceedings (HouseImpeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001,superseding the previous House ImpeachmentRules1 approved by the 11th Congress.The relevant distinctions between these two

Congresses' House Impeachment Rules are shown inthe following tabulation:

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representativesadopted a Resolution,2 sponsored by RepresentativeFelix William D. Fuentebella, which directed theCommittee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, inaid of legislation, on the manner of disbursementsand expenditures by the Chief Justice of the SupremeCourt of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."3

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estradafiled an impeachment complaint4 (first impeachmentcomplaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr.and seven Associate Justices5 of this Court for"culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of thepublic trust and other high crimes."6 The complaintwas endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico,Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen PiangDilangalen,7 and was referred to the HouseCommittee on Justice on August 5, 20038 inaccordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of theConstitution which reads:

Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachmentmay be filed by any Member of the House ofRepresentatives or by any citizen upon a resolutionof endorsement by any Member thereof, which shallbe included in the Order of Business within tensession days, and referred to the proper Committeewithin three session days thereafter. The Committee,after hearing, and by a majority vote of all itsMembers, shall submit its report to the House withinsixty session days from such referral, together withthe corresponding resolution. The resolution shall becalendared for consideration by the House within tensession days from receipt thereof.

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was"sufficient in form,"9 but voted to dismiss the sameon October 22, 2003 for being insufficient insubstance.10 To date, the Committee Report to thiseffect has not yet been sent to the House in plenaryin accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XIof the Constitution.

Four months and three weeks since the filing on June2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003,a day after the House Committee on Justice voted todismiss it, the second impeachment complaint11 wasfiled with the Secretary General of the House12 byRepresentatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District,Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (ThirdDistrict, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice HilarioG. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of thelegislative inquiry initiated by above-mentionedHouse Resolution. This second impeachmentcomplaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of

Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House ofRepresentatives. 13

Thus arose the instant petitions against the House ofRepresentatives, et. al., most of which petitionscontend that the filing of the second impeachmentcomplaint is unconstitutional as it violates theprovision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitutionthat "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall beinitiated against the same official more than oncewithin a period of one year."

In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B.Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a duty as amember of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines touse all available legal remedies to stop anunconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raisedin his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition andMandamus are of transcendental importance, andthat he "himself was a victim of the capricious andarbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure inImpeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12thCongress,"14 posits that his right to bring animpeachment complaint against then OmbudsmanAniano Desierto had been violated due to thecapricious and arbitrary changes in the HouseImpeachment Rules adopted and approved onNovember 28, 2001 by the House of Representativesand prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 andRule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declaredunconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ ofmandamus directing respondents House ofRepresentatives et. al. to comply with Article IX,Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution, toreturn the second impeachment complaint and/orstrike it off the records of the House ofRepresentatives, and to promulgate rules which areconsistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Courtpermanently enjoin respondent House of

Representatives from proceeding with the secondimpeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M.Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, allegingthat the issues of the case are of transcendentalimportance, pray, in their petition forCertiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ"perpetually" prohibiting respondent House ofRepresentatives from filing any Articles ofImpeachment against the Chief Justice with theSenate; and for the issuance of a writ "perpetually"prohibiting respondents Senate and Senate PresidentFranklin Drilon from accepting any Articles ofImpeachment against the Chief Justice or, in theevent that the Senate has accepted the same, from

proceeding with the impeachment trial.

In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castroand Soledad Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers,lawyers and members of the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines, alleging that their petition for Prohibitioninvolves public interest as it involves the use ofpublic funds necessary to conduct the impeachmenttrial on the second impeachment complaint, pray forthe issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining


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Congress from conducting further proceedings onsaid second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez,alleging that this Court has recognized that hehas locus standi to bring petitions of this nature inthe cases ofChavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-

Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation,16 praysin his petition for Injunction that the secondimpeachment complaint be declaredunconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L.Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and members of thelegal profession, pray in their petition for Prohibitionfor an order prohibiting respondent House ofRepresentatives from drafting, adopting, approvingand transmitting to the Senate the secondimpeachment complaint, and respondents DeVenecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articlesof Impeachment to the Senate.

In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives

Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul M.Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the House ofRepresentatives, they have a legal interest inensuring that only constitutional impeachmentproceedings are initiated, pray in their petition forCertiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachmentcomplaint and any act proceeding therefrom bedeclared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R.Alfonso et al., claiming that they have a right to beprotected against all forms of senseless spending oftaxpayers' money and that they have an obligationto protect the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, andthe integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their petitionfor Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as "a

class suit" and pray that (1) the House Resolutionendorsing the second impeachment complaint aswell as all issuances emanating therefrom bedeclared null and void; and (2) this Court enjoin theSenate and the Senate President from takingcognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding thesecond impeachment complaint, and issue a writ ofprohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutorsand agents to desist from conducting anyproceedings or to act on the impeachmentcomplaint.

In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public InterestCenter, Inc., whose members are citizens andtaxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, acitizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar,

both allege in their petition, which does not statewhat its nature is, that the filing of the secondimpeachment complaint involves paramount publicinterest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of theHouse Impeachment Rules and the secondimpeachment complaint/Articles of Impeachment bedeclared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R.Perito, as a citizen and a member of the PhilippineBar Association and of the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez,Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their petition for theissuance of a Temporary Restraining Order andPermanent Injunction to enjoin the House ofRepresentatives from proceeding with the secondimpeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of thePhilippines, alleging that it is mandated by the Codeof Professional Responsibility to uphold theConstitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari andProhibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V andSections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the HouseImpeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional andthat the House of Representatives be permanentlyenjoined from proceeding with the secondimpeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. ClaroFlores prays in his petition for Certiorari andProhibition that the House Impeachment Rules bedeclared unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law AlumniCebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in their petition forProhibition and Injunction which they claim is a classsuit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v.Factoran17 which was filed in behalf of succeedinggenerations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of awrit prohibiting respondents House ofRepresentatives and the Senate from conductingfurther proceedings on the second impeachmentcomplaint and that this Court declare asunconstitutional the second impeachment complaintand the acts of respondent House of Representativesin interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.

In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer FatherRanhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging that the issues in

his petition for Prohibition are of national andtranscendental significance and that as an official ofthe Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a direct andsubstantial interest in the unhampered operation ofthe Supreme Court and its officials in dischargingtheir duties in accordance with the Constitution,prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the Houseof Representatives from transmitting the Articles ofImpeachment to the Senate and the Senate fromreceiving the same or giving the impeachmentcomplaint due course.

In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon,as a taxpayer, alleges in his petition for Prohibitionthat respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at thetime they filed the second impeachment complaint,

were "absolutely without any legal power to do so, asthey acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articlesof Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powersof the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF)."

In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S.Flores and Hector L. Hofilea, alleging that asprofessors of law they have an abiding interest in thesubject matter of their petition for Certiorari andProhibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue"which they are trying to inculcate in the minds of


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their students," pray that the House ofRepresentatives be enjoined from endorsing and theSenate from trying the Articles of Impeachment andthat the second impeachment complaint be declarednull and void.

In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. DioscoroVallejos, Jr., without alleging his locus standi, butalleging that the second impeachment complaint isfounded on the issue of whether or not the JudicialDevelopment Fund (JDF) was spent in accordancewith law and that the House of Representatives doesnot have exclusive jurisdiction in the examinationand audit thereof, prays in his petition "To DeclareComplaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Actionand Jurisdiction" that the second impeachmentcomplaint be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine BarAssociation, alleging that the issues raised in thefiling of the second impeachment complaint involvematters of transcendental importance, prays in itspetition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the secondimpeachment complaint and all proceedings arisingtherefrom be declared null and void; (2) respondentHouse of Representatives be prohibited fromtransmitting the Articles of Impeachment to theSenate; and (3) respondent Senate be prohibitedfrom accepting the Articles of Impeachment and fromconducting any proceedings thereon.

In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C.Barcenas et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, pray intheir petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) thesecond impeachment complaint as well as theresolution of endorsement and impeachment by therespondent House of Representatives be declarednull and void and (2) respondents Senate and SenatePresident Franklin Drilon be prohibited fromaccepting any Articles of Impeachment against theChief Justice or, in the event that they have acceptedthe same, that they be prohibited from proceedingwith the impeachment trial.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261,160262 and 160263, the first three of the eighteenwhich were filed before this Court,18 prayed for theissuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/orpreliminary injunction to prevent the House ofRepresentatives from transmitting the Articles ofImpeachment arising from the second impeachmentcomplaint to the Senate. Petition bearing docketnumber G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for thedeclaration of the November 28, 2001 HouseImpeachment Rules as null and void for being

unconstitutional.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277,160292 and 160295, which were filed on October 28,2003, sought similar relief. In addition, petitionbearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged thatHouse Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislativeinquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice ofthe JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine ofseparation of powers and is a direct violation of theconstitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of thejudiciary.

On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session ofthe House of Representatives, a motion was put forththat the second impeachment complaint be formallytransmitted to the Senate, but it was not carriedbecause the House of Representatives adjourned forlack of quorum,19 and as reflected above, to date, theArticles of Impeachment have yet to be forwarded tothe Senate.

Before acting on the petitions with prayers fortemporary restraining order and/or writ ofpreliminary injunction which were filed on or beforeOctober 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered torecuse themselves, but the Court rejected their offer.Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Courtdirected him to participate.

Without necessarily giving the petitions due course,this Court in its Resolution of October 28, 2003,resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions; (b) requirerespondent House of Representatives and theSenate, as well as the Solicitor General, to commenton the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of November3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments onNovember 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointeddistinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 Inaddition, this Court called on petitioners andrespondents to maintain the status quo, enjoining allthe parties and others acting for and in their behalfto refrain from committing acts that would render thepetitions moot.

Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House ofRepresentatives through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia,Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by way of specialappearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting thatthis Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much lessprohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives,which is an independent and co-equal branch ofgovernment under the Constitution, from theperformance of its constitutionally mandated duty toinitiate impeachment cases. On even date, SenatorAquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed aMotion to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 andComment, praying that "the consolidated petitionsbe dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court overthe issues affecting the impeachment proceedingsand that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction ofthe Senate as the impeachment court to try anddecide impeachment cases, including the one wherethe Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognizedand upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI ofthe Constitution."22

Acting on the other petitions which were

subsequently filed, this Court resolved to (a)consolidate them with the earlier consolidatedpetitions; (b) require respondents to file theircomment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3,2003; and (c) include them for oral arguments onNovember 5, 2003.

On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines,through Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, filed aManifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned,the petitions are plainly premature and have no basisin law or in fact, adding that as of the time of the


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filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue waspresented before it since (1) its constitutional duty toconstitute itself as an impeachment courtcommences only upon its receipt of the Articles ofImpeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principalissues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively tothe proceedings in the House of Representatives.

On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a"Petition for Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261,160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295,questioning the status quo Resolution issued by thisCourt on October 28, 2003 on the ground that itwould unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a"constitutional deadlock" and praying for thedismissal of all the petitions as the matter inquestion is not yet ripe for judicial determination.

On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B.Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. No.160262 a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene andto Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition inIntervention."

On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mgaManananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino,Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No.160261. On November 5, 2003, World War IIVeterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. alsofiled a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave toIntervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263,160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.

The motions for intervention were granted and bothSenator Pimentel's Comment and AttorneysMacalintal and Quadra's Petition in Intervention wereadmitted.

On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the viewsof the amici curiae and the arguments of petitioners,intervenors Senator Pimentel and AttorneyMakalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo onthe principal issues outlined in an Advisory issued bythis Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:

Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the SupremeCourt may be invoked; who can invoke it; on whatissues and at what time; and whether it should beexercised by this Court at this time.

In discussing these issues, the following may betaken up:

a) locus standi of petitioners;

b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);

c) political question/justiciability;

d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases ofimpeachment;

e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all casesof impeachment;

f) constitutionality of the House Rules onImpeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of Article XI ofthe Constitution; and

g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)

In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary andsubstantive issues arising from the instant petitionsas well as the myriad arguments and opinionspresented for and against the grant of the reliefsprayed for, this Court has sifted and determinedthem to be as follows: (1) the threshold and novelissue of whether or not the power of judicial reviewextends to those arising from impeachmentproceedings; (2) whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicialreview have been fulfilled; and (3) the substantiveissues yet remaining. These matters shall now bediscussed in seriatim.

Judicial Review

As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court toexercise the power of judicial review to determinethe validity of the second impeachment complaint.

This Court's power of judicial review is conferred onthe judicial branch of the government in Section 1,Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in oneSupreme Court and in such lower courts as may beestablished by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts ofjustice to settle actual controversies involving rightswhich are legally demandable and enforceable,and to determine whether or not there hasbeen a grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of anybranch or instrumentality of the government.(Emphasis supplied)

Such power of judicial review was early onexhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose P.Laurel in the definitive 1936 case ofAngara v.Electoral Commission23 after the effectivity of the1935 Constitution whose provisions, unlike thepresent Constitution, did not contain the presentprovision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what

judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laureldiscoursed:

x x x In times of social disquietude or politicalexcitement, the great landmarks of the Constitutionare apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirelyobliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicialdepartment is the only constitutional organwhich can be called upon to determine theproper allocation of powers between the


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several departments and among the integral orconstituent units thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is ofcourse lacking perfection and perfectibility, but asmuch as it was within the power of our people, actingthrough their delegates to so provide, thatinstrument which is the expression of theirsovereignty however limited, has established arepublican government intended to operate andfunction as a harmonious whole, under a system ofchecks and balances, and subject to specificlimitations and restrictions provided in the saidinstrument. The Constitution sets forth in nouncertain language the restrictions andlimitations upon governmental powers andagencies. If these restrictions and limitationsare transcended it would be inconceivable ifthe Constitution had not provided for amechanism by which to direct the course ofgovernment along constitutional channels, forthen the distribution of powers would be mereverbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions ofsentiment, and the principles of good government

mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitationsand restrictions embodied in our Constitution are realas they should be in any living constitution. In theUnited States where no express constitutional grantis found in their constitution, the possession ofthis moderating power of the courts, not tospeak of its historical origin and development there,has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for aperiod of more than one and a half centuries. In ourcase, this moderating power is granted, if notexpressly, by clear implication from section 2of article VIII of our Constitution.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers ofgovernment. Who is to determine the nature,scope and extent of such powers? The

Constitution itself has provided for theinstrumentality of the judiciary as the rationalway. And when the judiciary mediates toallocate constitutional boundaries, it does notassert any superiority over the other departments; itdoes not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of thelegislature, but only asserts the solemn andsacred obligation assigned to it by theConstitution to determine conflicting claims ofauthority under the Constitution and toestablish for the parties in an actualcontroversy the rights which that instrumentsecures and guarantees to them. This is intruth all that is involved in what is termed"judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of

judicial review under the Constitution. Even

then, this power of judicial review is limited to actualcases and controversies to be exercised after fullopportunity of argument by the parties, and limitedfurther to the constitutional question raised or thevery lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstractioncould only lead to dialectics and barren legalquestions and to sterile conclusions unrelated toactualities. Narrowed as its function is in thismanner, the judiciary does not pass upon questionsof wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. Morethan that, courts accord the presumption ofconstitutionality to legislative enactments, not only

because the legislature is presumed to abide by theConstitution but also because the judiciary in thedetermination of actual cases and controversiesmust reflect the wisdom and justice of the people asexpressed through their representatives in theexecutive and legislative departments of thegovernment.24 (Italics in the original; emphasis andunderscoring supplied)

As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderatingpower" to "determine the proper allocation ofpowers" of the different branches of government and"to direct the course of government alongconstitutional channels" is inherent in all courts25 as anecessary consequence of the judicial power itself,which is "the power of the court to settle actualcontroversies involving rights which are legallydemandable and enforceable."26

Thus, even in the United States where the power ofjudicial review is not explicitly conferred upon thecourts by its Constitution, such power has "been setat rest by popular acquiescence for a period of morethan one and a half centuries." To be sure, it was inthe 1803 leading case ofMarbury v. Madison27 thatthe power of judicial review was first articulated byChief Justice Marshall, to wit:

It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that indeclaring what shall be the supreme law of the land,the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not thelaws of the United States generally, but those onlywhich shall be made in pursuance of the constitution,have that rank.

Thus, the particular phraseology of theconstitution of the United States confirms andstrengthens the principle, supposed to beessential to all written constitutions, that a law

repugnant to the constitution is void; andthat courts, as well as other departments, arebound by that instrument.28 (Italics in the original;emphasis supplied)

In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decadesbefore its express grant in the 1935 Constitution, thepower of judicial review was exercised by our courtsto invalidate constitutionally infirm acts.29 And aspointed out by noted political law professor andformer Supreme Court Justice Vicente V.Mendoza,30 the executive and legislative branches ofour government in fact effectively acknowledged thispower of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil Code,to wit:

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequentones, and their violation or non-observance shall notbe excused by disuse, or custom or practice to thecontrary.

When the courts declare a law to beinconsistent with the Constitution, the formershall be void and the latter shall govern.


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Administrative or executive acts, orders andregulations shall be valid only when they arenot contrary to the laws or theConstitution. (Emphasis supplied)

As indicated inAngara v. ElectoralCommission,31 judicial review is indeed an integralcomponent of the delicate system of checks andbalances which, together with the corollary principleof separation of powers, forms the bedrock of ourrepublican form of government and insures that itsvast powers are utilized only for the benefit of thepeople for which it serves.

The separation of powers is a fundamentalprinciple in our system of government. It obtainsnot through express provision but by actual divisionin our Constitution. Each department of thegovernment has exclusive cognizance of matterswithin its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its ownsphere. But it does not follow from the fact that thethree powers are to be kept separate and distinctthat the Constitution intended them to be absolutelyunrestrained and independent of each other. TheConstitution has provided for an elaboratesystem of checks and balances to securecoordination in the workings of the variousdepartments of the government. x x x And the

judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court asthe final arbiter, effectively checks the otherdepartments in the exercise of its power todetermine the law, and hence to declareexecutive and legislative acts void if violativeof the Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoringsupplied)

In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme CourtJustice Florentino Feliciano, "x x x judicial review isessential for the maintenance and enforcement ofthe separation of powers and the balancing ofpowers among the three great departments ofgovernment through the definition and maintenanceof the boundaries of authority and control betweenthem."33 To him, "[j]udicial review is the chief, indeedthe only, medium of participation or instrument ofintervention of the judiciary in that balancingoperation."34

To ensure the potency of the power of judicial reviewto curb grave abuse of discretion by "any branch orinstrumentalities of government," the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitutionengraves, for the first time into its history, into blockletter law the so-called"expanded certiorarijurisdiction" of this Court, the

nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in thefollowing excerpt from the sponsorship speech of itsproponent, former Chief Justice ConstitutionalCommissioner Roberto Concepcion:

x x x

The first section starts with a sentence copied fromformer Constitutions. It says:

The judicial power shall be vested in one SupremeCourt and in such lower courts as may be establishedby law.

I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I

will read it first and explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice tosettle actual controversies involving rights which arelegally demandable and enforceable and todetermine whether or not there has been a graveabuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess ofjurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of thegovernment.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actuallya product of our experience during martial law.As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in thepast, but the role of the judiciary during thedeposed regime was marred considerably bythe circumstance that in a number of casesagainst the government, which then had nolegal defense at all, the solicitor general set upthe defense of political questions and got awaywith it. As a consequence, certain principlesconcerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus,that is, the authority of courts to order the release ofpolitical detainees, and other matters related to theoperation and effect of martial law failed because thegovernment set up the defense of political question.And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it ispolitical, we have no authority to pass upon it." TheCommittee on the Judiciary feels that this wasnot a proper solution of the questionsinvolved. It did not merely request anencroachment upon the rights of the people,but it, in effect, encouraged further violations

thereof during the martial law regime. x x x

x x x

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine thelimits of power of the agencies and offices ofthe government as well as those of its officers.In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiteron the question whether or not a branch ofgovernment or any of its officials has actedwithout jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction,or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse ofdiscretion amounting to excess of jurisdictionor lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicialpower but a duty to pass judgment on matters

of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1,which means that the courts cannot hereafterevade the duty to settle matters of this nature,by claiming that such matters constitute apolitical question.35 (Italics in the original;emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To determine the merits of the issues raised in theinstant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to


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the Constitution itself which employs the well-settledprinciples of constitutional construction.

First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, thewords used in the Constitution must be giventheir ordinary meaning except where technical termsare employed. Thus, inJ.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v.Land Tenure Administration,36 this Court, speakingthrough Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:

We look to the language of the document itselfin our search for its meaning. We do not ofcourse stop there, but that is where webegin. It is to be assumed that the words inwhich constitutional provisions are couchedexpress the objective sought to be attained.They are to be given their ordinarymeaning except where technical terms areemployed in which case the significance thusattached to them prevails. As the Constitutionis not primarily a lawyer's document, it beingessential for the rule of law to obtain that it shouldever be present in the people's consciousness, itslanguage as much as possible should be understoodin the sense they have in common use. What itsays according to the text of the provision tobe construed compels acceptance and negatesthe power of the courts to alter it, based on thepostulate that the framers and the people meanwhat they say. Thus these are the cases where theneed for construction is reduced to aminimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis estanima. The words of the Constitution should beinterpreted in accordance with the intent of itsframers. And so did this Court apply this principlein Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary38 in thiswise:

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction isthe intention underlying the provision underconsideration. Thus, it has been held that the Courtin construing a Constitution should bear in mind theobject sought to be accomplished by its adoption,and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented orremedied. A doubtful provision will be examined inthe light of the history of the times, and the conditionand circumstances under which the Constitution wasframed. The object is to ascertain the reasonwhich induced the framers of the Constitutionto enact the particular provision and thepurpose sought to be accomplished thereby, inorder to construe the whole as to make thewords consonant to that reason and calculated

to effect that purpose.

39

(Emphasis andunderscoring supplied)

As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on InternalRevenue40 where, speaking through Madame JusticeAmuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:

x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but inkeeping with the fundamental principle ofconstitutional construction that the intent ofthe framers of the organic law and of the

people adopting it should be given effect. Theprimary task in constitutional construction is toascertain and thereafter assure the realization of thepurpose of the framers and of the people in theadoption of the Constitution. It may also be safelyassumed that the people in ratifying theConstitution were guided mainly by theexplanation offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis

and underscoring supplied)

Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. TheConstitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus,in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court, through ChiefJustice Manuel Moran declared:

x x x [T]he members of the ConstitutionalConvention could not have dedicated aprovision of our Constitution merely for thebenefit of one person without considering thatit could also affect others. When they adoptedsubsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, thatsaid provision should function to the full extentof its substance and its terms, not by itselfalone, but in conjunction with all otherprovisions of that great document.43 (Emphasisand underscoring supplied)

Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. ExecutiveSecretary,44 this Court affirmed that:

It is a well-established rule in constitutionalconstruction that no one provision of theConstitution is to be separated from all theothers, to be considered alone, but that all theprovisions bearing upon a particular subjectare to be brought into view and to be sointerpreted as to effectuate the great purposesof the instrument. Sections bearing on aparticular subject should be considered and

interpreted together as to effectuate the wholepurpose of the Constitution and one section isnot to be allowed to defeat another, if by anyreasonable construction, the two can be madeto stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, ifpracticable, and must lean in favor of a constructionwhich will render every word operative, rather thanone which may make the words idle andnugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)

If, however, the plain meaning of the word is notfound to be clear, resort to other aids is available. Instill the same case ofCivil Liberties Union v.

Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consultthe debates and proceedings of the constitutionalconvention in order to arrive at the reason andpurpose of the resulting Constitution, resortthereto may be had only when other guides failas said proceedings are powerless to vary theterms of the Constitution when the meaning isclear. Debates in the constitutional convention "areof value as showing the views of the individualmembers, and as indicating the reasons for their


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The cases ofRomulo v. Yniguez58 andAlejandrino v.Quezon,59 cited by respondents in support of theargument that the impeachment power is beyond thescope of judicial review, are not in point. These casesconcern the denial of petitions for writs of mandamusto compel the legislature to perform non-ministerialacts, and do not concern the exercise of the power ofjudicial review.

There is indeed a plethora of cases in which thisCourt exercised the power of judicial review overcongressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona,

Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well within the powerand jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether theSenate or its officials committed a violation of theConstitution or grave abuse of discretion in theexercise of their functions and prerogatives.In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act ofthe Philippine Senate on the ground that itcontravened the Constitution, it held that the petitionraises a justiciable controversy and that when anaction of the legislative branch is seriously alleged tohave infringed the Constitution, it becomes not onlythe right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle

the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62

this Courtdeclared null and void a resolution of the House ofRepresentatives withdrawing the nomination, andrescinding the election, of a congressman as amember of the House Electoral Tribunal for beingviolative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution.In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held that the resolution ofwhether the House representation in the Commissionon Appointments was based on proportionalrepresentation of the political parties as provided inSection 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject tojudicial review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that theact of the House of Representatives in removing thepetitioner from the Commission on Appointments issubject to judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 itheld that although under the Constitution, thelegislative power is vested exclusively in Congress,this does not detract from the power of the courts topass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress.InAngara v. Electoral Commission,66 it ruled thatconfirmation by the National Assembly of theelection of any member, irrespective of whether hiselection is contested, is not essential before suchmember-elect may discharge the duties and enjoythe privileges of a member of the National Assembly.

Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for thecontention that the exercise of judicial review overimpeachment proceedings would upset the system ofchecks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to beinterpreted as a whole and "one section is not to beallowed to defeat another."67 Both are integral

components of the calibrated system ofindependence and interdependence that insures thatno branch of government act beyond the powersassigned to it by the Constitution.

Essential Requisites for Judicial Review

As clearly stated inAngara v. Electoral Commission,the courts' power of judicial review, like almost allpowers conferred by the Constitution, is subject toseveral limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or

controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;(2) the person challenging the act must have"standing" to challenge; he must have a personaland substantial interest in the case such that he hassustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result ofits enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionalitymust be raised at the earliest possible opportunity;and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the

very lis mota of the case.

x x x Even then, this power of judicial review islimited to actual cases and controversies to beexercised after full opportunity of argument by theparties, and limited further to the constitutionalquestion raised or the very lis mota presented. Anyattempt at abstraction could only lead to dialecticsand barren legal questions and to sterile conclusionsunrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is inthis manner, the judiciary does not pass uponquestions of wisdom, justice or expediency oflegislation. More than that, courts accord thepresumption of constitutionality to legislativeenactments, not only because the legislature ispresumed to abide by the Constitution but also

because the judiciary in the determination of actualcases and controversies must reflect the wisdom andjustice of the people as expressed through theirrepresentatives in the executive and legislativedepartments of the government.68 (Italics in theoriginal)

Standing

Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined asa personal and substantial interest in the case suchthat the party has sustained or will sustain directinjury as a result of the governmental act that isbeing challenged. The gist of the question ofstanding is whether a party alleges such personalstake in the outcome of the controversy as to assurethat concrete adverseness which sharpens thepresentation of issues upon which the court dependsfor illumination of difficult constitutional questions.69

IntervenorSoriano, in praying for the dismissal of thepetitions, contends that petitioners do not havestanding since only the Chief Justice has sustainedand will sustain direct personal injury.Amicuscuriae former Justice Minister and Solicitor GeneralEstelito Mendoza similarly contends.

Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General assertsthat petitioners have standing since this Court had,in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers, voters,concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving

paramount public interest70 and transcendentalimportance,71 and that procedural matters aresubordinate to the need to determine whether or notthe other branches of the government have keptthemselves within the limits of the Constitution andthe laws and that they have not abused thediscretion given to them.72Amicus curiae Dean RaulPangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of thesame opinion, citing transcendental importance andthe well-entrenched rule exception that, when thereal party in interest is unable to vindicate his rightsby seeking the same remedies, as in the case of the


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Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot himselfinvoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts willgrant petitioners standing.

There is, however, a difference between the rule onreal-party-in-interest and the rule on standing, forthe former is a concept of civil procedure73 while thelatter has constitutional underpinnings.74 In view ofthe arguments set forth regarding standing, itbehooves the Court to reiterate the rulingin Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify what ismeant by locus standi and to distinguish it from realparty-in-interest.

The difference between the rule on standing and realparty in interest has been noted by authorities thus:"It is important to note . . . that standing because ofits constitutional and public policy underpinnings, isvery different from questions relating to whether aparticular plaintiff is the real party in interest or hascapacity to sue. Although all three requirements aredirected towards ensuring that only certain partiescan maintain an action, standing restrictions requirea partial consideration of the merits, as well asbroader policy concerns relating to the proper role ofthe judiciary in certain areas.

Standing is a special concern in constitutional lawbecause in some cases suits are brought not byparties who have been personally injured by theoperation of a law or by official action taken, but byconcerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actuallysue in the public interest. Hence the question instanding is whether such parties have "alleged sucha personal stake in the outcome of the controversyas to assure that concrete adverseness whichsharpens the presentation of issues upon which thecourt so largely depends for illumination of difficultconstitutional questions."

x x x

On the other hand, the question as to "real party ininterest" is whether he is "the party who would bebenefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'partyentitled to the avails of the suit.'"76 (Citationsomitted)

While rights personal to the Chief Justice may havebeen injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts ofthe House of Representatives, none of the petitionersbefore us asserts a violation of the personal rights ofthe Chief Justice. On the contrary, they invariablyinvoke the vindication of their own rights as

taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens,individually or in a class suit; and members of the barand of the legal profession which were supposedlyviolated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of theHouse of Representatives.

In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens,taxpayers and legislators when specific requirementshave been met have been given standing by thisCourt.

When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitionerassailing the constitutionality of a statute must bedirect and personal. He must be able to show, notonly that the law or any government act is invalid,but also that he sustained or is in imminent dangerof sustaining some direct injury as a result of itsenforcement, and not merely that he suffers therebyin some indefinite way. It must appear that the

person complaining has been or is about to bedenied some right or privilege to which he is lawfullyentitled or that he is about to be subjected to someburdens or penalties by reason of the statute or actcomplained of.77 In fine, when the proceedinginvolves the assertion of a public right,78 the merefact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement ofpersonal interest.

In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue wherethere is a claim that public funds are illegallydisbursed, or that public money is being deflected toany improper purpose, or that there is a wastage ofpublic funds through the enforcement of an invalid orunconstitutional law.79 Before he can invoke thepower of judicial review, however, he must

specifically prove that he has sufficient interest inpreventing the illegal expenditure of money raisedby taxation and that he would sustain a direct injuryas a result of the enforcement of the questionedstatute or contract. It is not sufficient that he hasmerely a general interest common to all members ofthe public.80

At all events, courts are vested with discretion as towhether or not a taxpayer's suit should beentertained.81 This Court opts to grant standing tomost of the petitioners, given their allegation thatany impending transmittal to the Senate of theArticles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of theChief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditureof public funds.

As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to questionthe validity of any official action which he claimsinfringes his prerogatives as a legislator.82 Indeed, amember of the House of Representatives hasstanding to maintain inviolate the prerogatives,powers and privileges vested by the Constitution inhis office.83

While an association has legal personality torepresent its members,84 especially when it iscomposed of substantial taxpayers and the outcomewill affect their vital interests,85 the mere invocationby the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or anymember of the legal profession of the duty to

preserve the rule of law and nothing more, althoughundoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it withstanding. Its interest is too general. It is shared byother groups and the whole citizenry. However, areading of the petitions shows that it has advancedconstitutional issues which deserve the attention ofthis Court in view of their seriousness, novelty andweight as precedents.86It, therefore, behooves thisCourt to relax the rules on standing and to resolvethe issues presented by it.


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In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filedin behalf of all citizens, persons intervening must besufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests ofall concerned87 to enable the court to deal properlywith all interests involved in the suit,88 for a judgmentin a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable tothe class, is, under theres judicata principle, bindingon all members of the class whether or not they were

before the court.89

Where it clearly appears that notall interests can be sufficiently represented as shownby the divergent issues raised in the numerouspetitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as aclass suit ought to fail. Sincepetitioners additionallyallege standing as citizens andtaxpayers, however, their petition will stand.

The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403,invokes the sole ground of transcendentalimportance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R.No. 160397, is mum on his standing.

There being no doctrinal definition of transcendentalimportance, the following instructive determinantsformulated by former Supreme Court JusticeFlorentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) thecharacter of the funds or other assets involved in thecase; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard ofa constitutional or statutory prohibition by the publicrespondent agency or instrumentality of thegovernment; and (3) the lack of any other party witha more direct and specific interest in raising thequestions being raised.90 Applying thesedeterminants, this Court is satisfied that the issuesraised herein are indeed of transcendentalimportance.

In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted aliberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitionerwhere the petitioner is able to craft an issue oftranscendental significance to the people, as whenthe issues raised are of paramount importance to thepublic.91 Such liberality does not, however, mean thatthe requirement that a party should have an interestin the matter is totally eliminated. A party must, atthe very least, still plead the existence of suchinterest, it not being one of which courts can takejudicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failedto allege any interest in the case. He does not thushave standing.

With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19,Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an intervenorto possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation,or in the success of either of the parties, or aninterest against both, or is so situated as to be

adversely affected by a distribution or otherdisposition of property in the custody of the court orof an officer thereof. While intervention is not amatter of right, it may be permitted by the courtswhen the applicant shows facts which satisfy therequirements of the law authorizing intervention.92

In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and PeteQuirino Quadra's case, they seek to join petitionersCandelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save forone additional issue, they raise the same issues andthe same standing, and no objection on the part of

petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed,this Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion forLeave of Court to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention.

Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mgaManggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to joinpetitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invokingtheir right as citizens to intervene, alleging that "theywill suffer if this insidious scheme of the minoritymembers of the House of Representatives issuccessful," this Court found the requisites forintervention had been complied with.

Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R.Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292,160295, and 160310 were of transcendentalimportance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires ofthe Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-Interventionwith Leave to Intervene" to raise the additional issueof whether or not the second impeachmentcomplaint against the Chief Justice is valid and basedon any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution.

Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggolng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. andWorld War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines,Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter in litigationthe respective motions to intervene were herebygranted.

Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, soughtto intervene for the limited purpose of making ofrecord and arguing a point of view that differs withSenate President Drilon's. He alleges that submittingto this Court's jurisdiction as the Senate Presidentdoes will undermine the independence of the Senatewhich will sit as an impeachment court once theArticles of Impeachment are transmitted to it from

the House of Representatives. Clearly, SenatorPimentel possesses a legal interest in the matter inlitigation, he being a member of Congress againstwhich the herein petitions are directed. For thisreason, and to fully ventilate all substantial issuesrelating to the matter at hand, his Motion toIntervene was granted and he was, as earlier stated,allowed to argue.

Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene,the same must be denied for, while he asserts aninterest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standingrequirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forthin Dumlao v. Comelec,93 to wit:

x x x While, concededly, the elections to be heldinvolve the expenditure of public moneys, nowherein their Petition do said petitioners allege that theirtax money is "being extracted and spent in violationof specific constitutional protection against abuses oflegislative power," or that there is a misapplication ofsuch funds by respondent COMELEC, or that publicmoney is being deflected to any improper purpose.Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondentfrom wasting public funds through the enforcementof an invalid or unconstitutional law.94 (Citationsomitted)


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In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Sorianofailed even to allege that the act of petitioners willresult in illegal disbursement of public funds or inpublic money being deflected to any improperpurpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a memberof the Bar does not suffice to clothe him withstanding.

Ripeness and Prematurity

In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through ChiefJustice Fernando, held that for a case to beconsidered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisitethat something had by then been accomplished orperformed by either branch before a court may comeinto the picture."96 Only then may the courts pass onthe validity of what was done, if and when the latteris challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.

The instant petitions raise in the main the issue ofthe validity of the filing of the second impeachmentcomplaint against the Chief Justice in accordancewith the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the

12th Congress, the constitutionality of which isquestioned. The questioned acts having been carriedout, i.e., the second impeachment complaint hadbeen filed with the House of Representatives and the2001 Rules have already been already promulgatedand enforced, the prerequisite that the allegedunconstitutional act should be accomplished andperformed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds,has been complied with.

Related to the issue of ripeness is the question ofwhether the instant petitions are premature.Amicuscuriaeformer Senate President Jovito R. Salongaopines that there may be no urgent need for thisCourt to render a decision at this time, it being thefinal arbiter on questions of constitutionality anyway.

He thus recommends that all remedies in the Houseand Senate should first be exhausted.

Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan ofthe U.P. College of Law who suggests to this Court totake judicial notice of on-going attempts toencourage signatories to the second impeachmentcomplaint to withdraw their signatures and opinesthat the House Impeachment Rules provide for anopportunity for members to raise constitutionalquestions themselves when the Articles ofImpeachment are presented on a motion to transmitto the same to the Senate. The dean maintains thateven assuming that the Articles are transmitted tothe Senate, the Chief Justice can raise the issue oftheir constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to

dismiss.

The dean's position does not persuade. First, thewithdrawal by the Representatives of their signatureswould not, by itself, cure the House ImpeachmentRules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither wouldsuch a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate thequestioned second impeachment complaint since itwould only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2)and (3) of Article XI of the Constitution97 and,

therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer theirinjuries.

Second and most importantly, the futility of seekingremedies from either or both Houses of Congressbefore coming to this Court is shown by the fact that,as previously discussed, neither the House ofRepresentatives nor the Senate is clothed with thepower to rule with definitiveness on the issue ofconstitutionality, whether concerning impeachmentproceedings or otherwise, as said power isexclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlierquoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution.Remedy cannot be sought from a body which isbereft of power to grant it.

Justiciability

In the leading case ofTanada v. Cuenco,98 ChiefJustice Roberto Concepcion defined the term"political question," viz:

[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legalparlance, what it means in ordinary parlance,namely, a question of policy. In other words, in thelanguage of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to"those questions which, under the Constitution, areto be decided by the people in their sovereigncapacity, or in regard to which full discretionaryauthorityhas been delegated to the Legislature orexecutive branch of the Government." It is concernedwith issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality,of a particular measure.99 (Italics in the original)

Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistencyand seemingly without any rhyme or reason, thisCourt vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance ofcases which involved political questions. In somecases, this Court hid behind the cover of the politicalquestion doctrine and refused to exercise its powerof judicial review.100 In other cases, however, despitethe seeming political nature of the therein issuesinvolved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever itfound constitutionally imposed limits on powers orfunctions conferred upon political bodies.101 Even inthe landmark 1988 case ofJavellana v. ExecutiveSecretary102 which raised the issue of whether the1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, thisCourt shunted the political question doctrine andtook cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people ofa Constitution is a political question, it being aquestion decided by the people in their sovereigncapacity.

The frequency with which this Court invoked thepolitical question doctrine to refuse to takejurisdiction over certain cases during the Marcosregime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when hebecame a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify thisCourt's power of judicial review and its application onissues involving political questions, viz:

MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.


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I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybodyhas made, I suppose, the usual comment that thejudiciary is the weakest among the three majorbranches of the service. Since the legislature holdsthe purse and the executive the sword, the judiciaryhas nothing with which to enforce its decisions orcommands except the power of reason and appeal toconscience which, after all, reflects the will of God,

and is the most powerful of all other powers withoutexception. x x x And so, with the body's indulgence, Iwill proceed to read the provisions drafted by theCommittee on the Judiciary.

The first section starts with a sentence copied fromformer Constitutions. It says:

The judicial power shall be vested in one SupremeCourt and in such lower courts as may be establishedby law.

I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. Iwill read it first and explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice tosettle actual controversies involving rights which arelegally demandable and enforceable and todetermine whether or not there has been a graveabuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess ofjurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of thegovernment.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually aproduct of our experience during martial law. As amatter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past,but the role of the judiciary during the deposedregime was marred considerably by the

circumstance that in a number of cases againstthe government, which then had no legaldefense at all, the solicitor general set up thedefense of political questions and got awaywith it. As a consequence, certain principlesconcerning particularly the writ ofhabeascorpus, that is, the authority of courts to orderthe release of political detainees, and othermatters related to the operation and effect ofmartial law failed because the government setup the defense of political question. And theSupreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, wehave no authority to pass upon it." The Committeeon the Judiciary feels that this was not aproper solution of the questions involved. Itdid not merely request an encroachment upon

the rights of the people, but it, in effect,encouraged further violations thereof duringthe martial law regime. I am sure the members ofthe Bar are familiar with this situation. But for thebenefit of the Members of the Commission who arenot lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start with adecision of the Supreme Court in 1973 on the caseofJavellana vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am notmistaken. Martial law was announced on September22, although the proclamation was dated September21. The obvious reason for the delay in its publicationwas that the administration had apprehended and

detained prominent newsmen on September 21. Sothat when martial law was announced on September22, the media hardly published anything about it. Infact, the media could not publish any story not onlybecause our main writers were already incarcerated,but also because those who succeeded them in theirjobs were under mortal threat of being the object ofwrath of the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional

Convention had begun on June 1, 1971 and bySeptember 21 or 22 had not finished theConstitution; it had barely agreed in thefundamentals of the Constitution. I forgot to say thatupon the proclamation of martial law, somedelegates to that 1971 Constitutional Convention,dozens of them, were picked up. One of them wasour very own colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So,the unfinished draft of the Constitution was takenover by representatives of Malacaang. In 17 days,they finished what the delegates to the 1971Constitutional Convention had been unable toaccomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the1973 Constitution was presented to the Presidentaround December 1, 1972, whereupon the Presidentissued a decree calling a plebiscite which suspendedthe operation of some provisions in the martial lawdecree which prohibited discussions, much lesspublic discussions of certain matters of publicconcern. The purpose was presumably to allow a freediscussion on the draft of the Constitution on which aplebiscite was to be held sometime in January 1973.If I may use a word famous by our colleague,Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum,however, the draft of the Constitution was analyzedand criticized with such a telling effect thatMalacaang felt the danger of its approval. So, thePresident suspended indefinitely the holding of theplebiscite and announced that he would consult thepeople in a referendum to be held from January 10 toJanuary 15. But the questions to be submitted in thereferendum were not announced until the eve of itsscheduled beginning, under the supposed

supervision not of the Commission on Elections, butof what was then designated as "citizens assembliesor barangays." Thus the barangays came intoexistence. The questions to be propounded werereleased with proposed answers thereto, suggestingthat it was unnecessary to hold a plebiscite becausethe answers given in the referendum should beregarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite.Thereupon, a motion was filed with the SupremeCourt praying that the holding of the referendum besuspended. When the motion was being heard beforethe Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice deliveredto the Court a proclamation of the Presidentdeclaring that the new Constitution was already inforce because the overwhelming majority of thevotes cast in the referendum favored the

Constitution. Immediately after the departure of theMinister of Justice, I proceeded to the session roomwhere the case was being heard. I then informed theCourt and the parties the presidential proclamationdeclaring that the 1973 Constitution had beenratified by the people and is now in force.

A number of other cases were filed to declare thepresidential proclamation null and void. The maindefense put up by the government was that the issuewas a political question and that the court had nojurisdiction to entertain the case.


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x x x

The government said that in a referendum held fromJanuary 10 to January 15, the vast majority ratifiedthe draft of the Constitution. Note that all membersof the Supreme Court were residents of Manila, butnone of them had been notified of any referendum intheir respective places of residence, much less didthey participate in the alleged referendum. None ofthem saw any referendum proceeding.

In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wildfire. So, a majority of the members of the Court feltthat there had been no referendum.

Second, a referendum cannot substitute for aplebiscite. There is a big difference between areferendum and a plebiscite. But anothergroup of justices upheld the defense that theissue was a political question. Whereupon,they dismissed the case. This is not the onlymajor case in which the plea of "politicalquestion" was set up. There have been a

number of other cases in the past.

x x x The defense of the political question wasrejected because the issue was clearly

justiciable.

x x x

x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began toperform its functions, it faced the followin

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