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Fraser Report, Congressional Investigation into Unification Church -- 1978

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474
95th Congress 1 2d Session j COlOfflTTEE PRINT INVESTI KOREAN-AMERI REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OCTOBER 31, 1978 Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
Transcript
elements in
evolution of
years. The
of
contribute
Korea.
Donald
11
Introduction
13
17
Written KCIA plans 102
KCIA
124
The Justice Department's bribery
Korean-American trade
210
Others
agencies,
and
officials
. 351
use
and
board
361
KCFF
ties
tions
400
400
the Conduct
of the
Investigation 405
n. The Japanese
rV. House
Wan
421
Tongsun
Park
421
Kim
Korean-American Relations
investi-
of the
nancial
Transactions;
and
policies,
from this
subcommittee hearings
romanized
given names
of
well-
were trans-
Gragert
execu-
tive
The
of
the
exten-
small-scale
study by the
the report.
International
Relations,
94th
operations
were
to
insure
congressional
impor-
tant
objective
—to
convince
House,
At
at
to be
placed under
Sang
Ho,
also
known
as
Yang
Kang
because of
Blue
Howev-
er,
Director Lee Hu
separate
lobbying
Kjru
ceived
from
Park
activities;
(e)
Prevention
and
countering
of
65
persons
in
the
defection
against questionable
the FBI
violat-
questioning
Hi,
Organization. In
Park
in
order
as a
dollars in commissions he
ture's
the
and Attorney
and the
de-
velop
and
Department of Justice
economy
is
one
Korean
Korean
Government's
desire
to
*
the
1971
the
official of
pers and
ing
advertising
boycotts
Korean
Affairs
pro-Korean
and
other
agencies
that
grants
be
made,
universities
purposes
[pp.
263-284].
(5)
The
ities
zation,
designated
by
the
subcommittee
as
nization and
ished. Among
Korean
component
of
the
Moon
Organization
which
manufactures
parts
for
the
M-16
and
that
 to own the bank eventually. The subcommittee
found no
tion
in
modernization
all
other
hand,
the
U.S.
Government
did
compensate
U.S.
Government,
actual
intimidation
continued.
States
has
relations with other
countries generally regarded
to have
subcommittee did
The openness of the American
system
unacceptable.
by
South
receptive
to
democracies.
unified
people
with
a
is
political
In
that
year,
interests in
States recognized Japa-
nese interests in
late
1930's
through
1945,
a
futile
provide
the
Japanese
capitalize
on
August
15,
1945,
with
the
Japanese
surrender
Pentagon
and
proposed
to
in the
Japan
and
dismembered
by
Liberation had resulted in an influx
of millions
and
The economic
necessities. Further, because
settle
arrived in the
provide stability to
particu-
larly
to
be
U.S.
military
govern-
ment,
this
could
of
a
viable
non-Communist
resolution
(Garden City, N.J.
DPRK in
following coup
June of
were
with-
been Mao
Some
historiams
Security
U.S.
The Korean
U.S.-ROK
mutual
defense
treaty,
a
visit
by
the
U.S.
somewhat
had no ties to any particular region of the country.
Educated
in
aided
serious disadvangage,
frequently abandoned
status
quo
on
with
three
manipulate
the
The
climax
of
the
student
revolution
came
200
students
United
States
the
military
government
after
1961.
in
takeover was
Chang
festering dissatisfaction
Although
the
Pil,
the
chief
includ-
ing
Park
Aside
from
strong
in the military
UNC to
that
he
did
caught both
command
to
Armed
Forces
will
armed
forces.'
U.S.
support
of
the
that Park
had flirted
in
the
mid-1940's
before
ROK
Gov-
ernment
More
democratic
later,
Henderson
sug-
gested
that,
ment.^® These American
anxious
effect
of
did not
fully
backed
allega-
tions,
tee
interviewed
U.S.
initial
hostility
to the coup.
rest of the
19,
1961,
than
2,000
summer it had
to Secretary
than 50 percent
budget.**
A
new
U.S.
in early
that they
constitutional
*'
ment
to
Washington

ational
fiscal
and
economic
to
indi-
fiscal
ects and
would
provide
resources
At
the
on
June
16,
meeting
record
of
the
NSC's
action
and in im-
would be
returned to
against members of
the Chang Myon
longer
had
Park
in
ic development plan.
aid
Republic of Korea, in order to further such long range
economic
develop-
ment.
From
the
beginning,
Chang Myon, pre-
development.
The
services
were
(New
Haven:
Korea
close
ties
to
the
U.S.
CIA.
Washington, D.C., from
that the real
close to
the coopera-
CIA. The subcommittee
A former
aide to Kim Jong Pil said that the U.S. CIA had provided
advice
matters, but indicated that
not combine domestic security
The
party
chairman,
Kim
the
Korean
stock
market.^®
at
United
States—
one
Park
law
was
lifted
voters
they
retired
ended
restoration of civilian rule.
rule, the
the nation
as a
econom-
»»
and former
six candidates
per district.
This fact,
commitment
shift in the
whose involvemciiL
in Vietnam
on poli-
cies toward
Korea. Perhaps
1967
that
Korea
had
close
reopen talks
normalization
of
would
a
for
were
intensified
on
June
22,
1965,
when
In
a
DRP
had waited for an opportune time to push ratification through
the
totaling about
a
of
the
funds
were
also
used
for
DRP
and
scribed
as
follows:
the
amount)
in
The
system,
of
as
well.
solidarity of the free world in Asia.
To Korea,
Relations,
p.
289.
38
p.
168.
through
character-
istic
of
a
The success
cent.
growth of the
consid-
was Korean
made
by
the
Gov-
ernment
the
chairmanship
of
Kim
(S.
reported.
met
by
riot
police.
nage ring operating
European countries. Former KCIA
in charge
of the
were
be
on espionage
possi-
remind them of
p.
38.
States
Moon Organization, as
funds in the United States for a ROK-controlled
operation run
had
years
were
United States.
eties
commensurate with
manipulating
and
coordinate
influence
activities
tive
of
assassinating
vulnerability.
Two
The
most
sig-
1968,
and
what
the world.
Janu-
ary
30,
1968,
the
That Communist military
the
South Korean
leaders doubted
domestic
States to
behalf
of
his
made
to
in Korea
States
to
retali-
ate
made
resist
armed
States
pp.
54-56.
THIRD-TERM
AMENDMENT
Contemporaneous
insecur-
constitution to run
Park in power
nationwide
sent to
had been obtained
amendment
was
not
favorable.
strong
an
the
amendment
the
Blue
KCIA.^o
On September
a
the
concentration
of
U.S.
involvement
been  solved
by repainting
borrowing,
were
crucial
for
the
U.S.
assistance.
These
accomplishments
were
a
mounting
institutions. This wais in part the result of the change
in
U.S.
foreign
to ROK Government officials.
goods in the
rights.
Al-
had been
was
mercial
finan-
cial
United
under the Public
rice
production
and
Park desig-
kickbacks
were
reportedly
missions
the latter
factor in
in
Nixon's
decision
in
1970
REDUCTION OF
withdrawals
that
10,000
U.S.
troops
diplomatic
channels
the
modernization
program
and
early
as
the
Govern-
the
U.S.
Administration
and
Congress.
of them
ing in
called
and
Korean
ities
coordinated
was
decided
instead
to
President signed
surrounding
us are ever increasing their hostilities to our own free Korea. Pak
Bo Hi of the
and traveled to
bers of
Congress listed
by
Tongsun
Park
and
as
attempt
to
alter
Voice
October
1970,
entitled
'Tlan
for
States, was found
Asia, some
and the Blue
House expressed pleasure
and Cultural Activities,
that an
direct connection between
In the summer of
the
The
information
recalled seeing more than
a
ued, however,
opposition
and
promote
In the
months before
in-
creased
the
econo-
finances
a
cam-
April
9,
a
North
a
April
24,
be
by a
45 percent,
according to
were calls
priving
President
leaders of
and
the
the campuses,
primarily over
training
for
students.
In
October,
troops
faction-
al strife culminated on October 2 when Kim's opponents joined the
opposition party in a vote
of
no-confidence
for
seats
and
to
of
1971.
President
ance of
1971, the
pp.
191-196.
regula-
tions,
and a secret trip to Seoul
by
the
Vice
Premier of the DPRK. The two sides agreed that unification should
be achieved
by peaceful means
to defame each other or to
undertake armed provocation; to
kinds, and
direct telephone line between Seoul and Pyon-
gyang and to establish
development, having
his
be
consolidated
so
tion of
bade political activity,
democratic in-
on Asian and
was made.
political,
and
ments,  we will
an
expression
people against
the North-South
voting
procedures.®^
In
the
those eligible
cast
by
the
special
electoral
the
Yushin
Constitution
at
the
Conference for
March
12,
and
on
the
all power in
bers
of
the
constitutional
committee
that
reporting on the movement to restore democracy, lost all advertis-
ing
the newspaper was sustained
the public through an increase in circulation and many small
anonymous
ment
As of
the
restora-
tion
of
democracy.
Korean
residents
in
for
Park government.
Ambassador
the new
that
President
he
died,
overthrown
Govern-
ment
1972
and
instructed
to
take
measures
Gov-
ernment,
the
Policy, hearings
before the
Relations,
U.S.
22,
June
station
chief,
American
and
Japanese
swept
Yang
Doo
Won,
he
was
best
In
1971
and
1972,
there
were
on the
1973,
the
United
Nations
once
again
a
focus
of
debate
Korea.
On
June
23,
President
prior
to
entry.
The
the United
States seemed to
eventual reunification
ed President Park's
it would
in
solicit
support
from
the
Korean-American
community
by
dis-
seminating
embargo
they
would
be
penalized
the
influence in the
President
Park.
During
his
restrict
phen
tions
began
to
arise
amount could be
raised to $165
a
certification.
The
reduc-
violations
of
represented to
lobbying
became
more
Policy,
of
the Washington
to
have
a
serious
pressure
Korea, and
In early
more
information
it had
 *
a
was dismissed
Times reported that KCIA officer Kim Sang Keun was being
re-
called
low profile
campaign
for
committee to
treated
separately:
 International
Agreements
nant aspect
However,
its
in
tain the animosity
the cold
the United
United
States
and
compete
with
the
how
the
Sino-Soviet
rivalry
would
of Korea. That
U.S.
politics.
has
by
North
the
world.
Added
'
close of
World War
military balance on the
modern-
indus-
tries.
This
process
was
given
only
needed to demonstrate
interested
enough
in
Korea favored participation in the Vietnam war for several
rea-
rience with North
strength;
Korean
Cultural
and
Department
time
told
the
subcommittee
that
the
Korean
undetected.
prisoner
but
quickly
as
a
great
shock
the
Korean
Government
and
the North
forces
that
a
part
House
enemy pressure in South Vietnam.
South Korean leaders
States was
more concerned
response
Eun
States showed little
over
the
States stood with
between
the
two
nations.
(3)
To
(4)
To
bilateral
Pueblo.^^
Vance agreed on avoiding
Vance
^^
Vice President Humphrey
be
undertak-
en
2*
to discuss
President
Johnson's
call
to
halt
meeting in
mention
mors
troops.^^
Nevertheless,
incidents
against
the
backdrop
to
respond
more
forcefully
to
Communist
the
opening
a
be
action
[The President]
unless
the
a
ered
to
be
Nixon's
views.
will
be
cautious
about
prepared
vol.
46,
No.
1,
p.
113,
see
appendix
C-9.
reduction
in
the
would be receiving
on
the
withdrawal
of
U.S.
forces
Nevertheless,
as
early
as
1963,
discussions
I
he
proposed
a
troop
reduction.
from
1966
to
1968,
recalled
was needed
the
previous
administration
and
complete
Defense
Agency. With

out
consist-
ent
with
1970,
listed
two
reasons
spending
world-
wide.^^
Secretary
of
Defense
^
in mind,
was communi-
begin
f
I
President
Park.
Porter
testified
a
we would not
a
1
1
if
Shortly
afterward,
 i
En
from
the
by
doubt whether Con-
effective
as
two.
the
DMZ
and
the
 meager
5-year
program.
Porter
United
States
press
to the United States, Kim
Dong
Jo:
I
that
Vietnam war
being fought he did not think U.S. had seriously thought of
reducing forces
in Korea.®
by U.S.
if
settled at conference but
responsive
to
its
security
needs.
gress to
understand
repeatedly said *'tell
effects:
(1)
Washington
At
a
press
2d
forces,
disclosure of
to
a
peak.
were
reason-
ably
intelligence.
modernization and a U.S.
Laird said
were
also
might be
part of
Congressman.
In
connec-
the reduction of U.S.
sess.,
Apr.
psychologically,
this,
the
period.'^ Congress,
as
a
5-year
package.
As
a
number
priate the
cuts for Korea.
gress changed
to
Military
Credit
Sales
(FMS)
modernization
was
being
asked
to
shoulder
a
1972,
Park
had
instituted
the
Yushin
constitution
which
virtually
guaranteed
him
in
South
Affairs.
hearings could
be seen
is
shown
June
second set
of figures
levels
(something
the
administration
had
opposed).
Neither
administration
nor
what
it
saw
as
contemplaud
a
second
until Jimmy Carter's
withdrawal
he
put
repugnant to our people
combat brigades
administration's
intent
on
March
9,
and
former
Ambassador
objections
consider
the
administration's
rationale
1970's because
of the
1978.
communist superpow-
ers after
value
of
encourage
or
underwrite
on
U.S.
involvement
in
a
Korean
Assistant Secretary
of Defense,
Korea
to
improve
its
defense
production
of
North.
While
that
concern
no
longer
exists,
''catchup
ball
exports of
related to
in
1960's
were
dominated
by
the
the
principal
concern
economic and
adverse consequences
to
thoritarian.
He
encouragement
of
ROK
gation. The focus was principally on U.S. policy toward Korean
self-sufficiency and Korean efforts
become an arms exporter.
a
full
dently
of
the
United
States.
Korean
Government
would
purchase
a
certain
ny's
ment was demanding.
would have
to
Japanese
and
other
Department
officials
in
1968
revealed
an arms
industry in
economical-
ly,
the
United
States
1968;
when negotiating for
plant. »2
November
April
Industries'
it
was
policy
had
been
the
subcom-
policy
was
South
Korea's
ultimate
to 1978,
Korean
defense
production.
For
example,
defense
industries,
were
among
the
participants.
Little
of the WEC. Allegedly,
cuss weapons
said to
of
1972,
to
begin
a
second-rate
the
WEC.
He
told
the
subcommittee
repro-
cessing
facility
from
the
Canadians
withdrew
offers
1975,
any
ROK
negotiations for purchase
in an area of strong
concern
to
interests of the
States
with
other
Government was
of
assist-
ance
for
expanding
its
procurement
and
addition to
singled
to negoti-
Korean defense contractor owned
a
coordination,
we will notify you about 'who and when' of our side
to
discuss
with
you.
Another
Tong
December 1977.
visit
apparent
under-
standing
of
the
foreign
at
the
M-16
contract
to
both
and
had
been
actively
pursuing
Relations,
joint
committee
print,
 Legislation
on
Foreign
Relations
Through
1977,
Feb.,
1978,
pp.
273-300.
muni-
Proposed
Korean
officials
export
to
countries
of
Southeast
Asia
of
approval prior to getting the
approval of the Korean Government,
though
be released
lel
come.
Korean
did
not
attempt
to
any
other
request by
courtesy
ex-
tended
weapon.
Equally
of
concern
Letter
from
Assistant Secretary Douglas J. Bennet, Jr., to Congressman Donald M. Fraser,
Sept.
14,
1978.
1
other
evidence
suggested
that
Government
documents
stemmed
from
direct
President of the Libyan Arab Republic. It
should
be
exports.
A
third
case
related
launchers.
*=^2
 ^^^
by
15.
Further,
the
letter
Government
so
desired.
The
letter
Journal,
Jan.
countries
agents to handle exports of
Korean
 surplus
as
well.
matter
ties.
Viewed
suggested that
defense material
to Cummings that his
Government could not consider
disposing
of
its
surplus until it had met the needs of its modernization program.
However, rather than mailing its reply directly to
Cummings, the
*
28,
the
following
might want
[Cummings] to
Korea.
the
the defense industry
ating
venture
included
both
time
the
Government
industry.
The
 °
the State
request, this
Conclusions and
issue,
private,
covert
for U.S.
course,
a
to
the
legitimacy
sovereign
of dollars
long run, these
its own
open
to
And, as
Korean
attitudes
The
of the
(2)
That
in the area of arms exports, there appeared to be a
contradiction
difficulties
with
third-
country
 
Export
as
**The KCIA
is involved
1960's as
a
intelli-
gence.
initiate
plans
involvement in
staff
I
that
they
had
strongly
KCIA as an
always
been
one
directors have
The Korean
Legal Center,
United States, hearings before
Mar.
17
part
1,
June
22,
1977
United
States,
22, Sept.
with
the
diplomatic
rank
of
minister.
administra-
tion;
KCIA
procurement;
and
monitor
and
evaluate
to
in-
favoring
he was to
portion of
procure-
ment;
KCIA
headquarters
sent
pur-
chase
and
detected
the officer
assigned to
the North
York told
;
 pro-North
partly
Koreans
in
;^
none of the
said that
p.
10.
the decrease
having
been
contacted
the
activities
States
that KCIA intimidation
belief was frequently
of
Korean
true whether
opposed
s'and
intimidation,
were often ambiguous;
night. The
United
States.
i|
Kim
Woon
territory of
Tom
United
U.S.
Los
Angeles-based
journalists
and
sometimes
physical
threats
were
Korean
Consul
General,
Park
Young,
tried
to
that
a U.S.
citizen and
to have
anti-Govern-
ment
circles,
by
the
countries:
Korea,
by
some
activi-
ties.
A
work in
agent, according
ate
On another
occasion two
phone
who lives
in Seoul
to be KCIA operatives that if he did not stop
his anti-Government
activities his
family in
Cho's
The
subcommittee
received
numerous
other
allegations
of
KCIA
harassment
from
told by
 
in
some
cases
vying
with,
the fact that the KCIA often
car-
ried
or,
at
least,
to
Korean
communities.
directly
to
the activities of Hancho Kirr
an
he had
o
create public
money
was
5
$400,000
which
Yang
had
Yang had
National
f
public-
Choi
t
a
Dr.
C.
C.
Choi
(a
by Hahn Kwang
'
the loyalty of former
subordinates for years after
and
to
in Washington
and Kim
loyal ties
consid-
Y. Lee,
while Park
Gov-
at ROK
Government anti-
and
Cultural
Activities,
p.
383.
1975 that
Won to
through the diplomatic pouch. Chung asked Choi to accept the
package
Embassy. Several months later,
few
hours
never
discussed
the
media section of the
Sang
Keun.
ther
contact
with
him
until
he
delivered
Pak Bo Hi, during
vealed
that
dential Protective
a
Yong
and
Park
that
Kyu
and
is the
outlined
by
Lee
Jai
KCIA
auxiliaries.
Americans.
Contact,
therefore,
had
Park Thomson, employed in the office of House Speaker Carl
Albert;
employees.
had to share
further
limited
by
hampered
from
Seoul.
help
the
Bo Hi and
telling the
project
its
sup-
port.*^
commissions
following
negotiations
with
Kim
The KCIA's
issuance of
passports for
gence
and
Tongsun
Park
the
KCIA.'^®
The
document
entitled
could
been
^'almost
help
Korea.
The
the
academia,
have invested
in Korea
already (Gulf,
to
encouraging
The commissions derived
tions
can
be
used
to
fund
was able to  have the cake and eat it too.
Programs
and
activities
**•
ry):
$100,000-$130,000.
(2)
Farming
equipment
imports
viding accurate
achieve
specific
(a)
In
to
utilize
(b) By providing
the United States
formulated.
feasibility
of the
The suggestion was
to
obtain
classified
information
on
diplomatic
influence
plans
de-
in Park's
home with
another KCIA
by
the
KCIA
Annual
KCIA
plans
The
plans
for
operations
in
Since
Kim's
official
assignment
docu-
ments
found
in
Tongsun
Park's
home,
particularly
the
''Plans
for
Korea's
Foreign
Policy
Toward
The
1976
basis
of cooperation with the policy research committee of the Republi-
can Party.
cles,
that
so
far
as
he
knew,
KCIA
any sinister plot to get unpublished
information from
I
The
''manipulate,
for example,
will ;
 
approach
to
Korean
residents
aca-
''^
the Korean Peninsula
of
these
plans.
if he had
or not
as to impress
organizations
we were
under informal
plan
may
tells me
that this
he
interpreted
as
objective
stated
in
was deemed
significant por-
repetition
of
themes
and
even
specific
details,
together
China.
the following
in
aggressive
residents,
Korea
was
within the United
ly using
section of
Questionable
Korean
Activities,
the
Kore-
ans
the
instructed to confine
with
U.S.
considered
coercion,
manipulation,
keep
a
and that he did
residents throughout the
the
as
the
number
the U.S.
missions
that
delete
a
to
registration
requirements
the national defense, the inter-
nal
of the
by Foreign
Relations Committee,
are intelligence
their
(NSA), which
is responsible
intelligence
its mission
NSA does not
President, the
National Security
Council, and
activi-
ties
came
The dissemination in
former
at
I
knew
then
that
the National Security Council,
officials. Some of the
Apr.
of
them
regarded
such
ac-
tivities
as
whereby
certain
types
of
information
were
disseminated
for
anti-Communist
activities.
ington
to
arrange
a
fundraising
by a
arrival,
Yang
You
Chan,
a
former
ROK
Washington,
D.C.
good
got
retired
prominent Americans
Kore£in administration;
of
Chung.
and
Cultural
Activities,
pp.
323-325;
355-366.
Washington
was
were
violating
the
FARA.
State
the case.
U.S.
Government
in
it to broadcast anti-Communist
7th Bureau was
Service
that
Kim
Kyong
Eup
was
a
KCIA
a clandestine
Mays told Berger that after he met with Sun Myung
Moon
in the
United States
cal objectives
of the
year
concerns,
Burke
called
repeated the story. Mays
up, but
to
Government
facilities.
Further,
taint
those
prominent
Ameri-
cans
were
following
the
of
and the
disseminated
it
within
Kim
Hyung
the
were
enunciated
by
Nixon
in
shortly
made
by
Congressmen
»»
a senior
anguish in
that
votes
the
funds,
and
high-level Blue
U.S.
decisionmaking
as a
Wook, both of whom had supported many of his activities.
Park
••
House.
He
replied,
 I
stopped
before
and
I'm
ruling
Democratic
Republican
Party.
Apparently
Kim Kwang,
 foreign
trol
tions
would
be
lobbying
itself
would
fulfill
activities.
ued
their
already
incorporation
was
revoked
due
sies
appropriate
bearing
60,000
letters
which
as 1967
The reason
which solicited funds
States. Fulbright
described the
consistent
with
50
million
am
following
my
president's
instructions
as
a
government
in
a
political
environment.
I
do
not
want
a
text
which
would
continue
monitoring
the
situation
Prime
activities to
sun Park and others
he
influence
congres-
sional
deliberations
their govern-
the
first
indication
the
subcommittee
Congressmen
tell
me
when
they
of 1970
lobbying
activities
could
have
taken
Park
Chung
Hee
might
have
who
possible
whether
of
Tong-
prominent-
Justice
regarding
activities had
been discussed.
*«The publicity
suspicious
Kwon; according
the
State
re-
plied
that
it
wanted
a
The
main
thrust
Act.
an
afterthought
the FBI the
some
to
for
the
information
of
other
agencies.
As
a
E)epartment.
agency.
In
the go-ahead
to send
it to
both Kissin-
which accompanied the communica-
from
by
Director
which the two congres-
as
being
under
that
stated:
about
Party might
subcommit-
aware
contributed
ROK
Government
evidence
available
Committee
on
International
Relations,
(June
8,
1971)
had asked
Flanz and
classi-
fied
information
from
Gallagher's
subcommittee
to
Representatives
and
government before
Security
Adviser
carries
a
caveat
made. The
reference to
The seriousness with which the FBI regarded this information is
reflected
July
14,
1971,
with
an
addendum
ell
as
to
the
it only
Government, and any
por-
tion
of
the
Fulbright's
admonition
 
the
C. Hise,
Korea was not
'
3
Pak and
assertion
that
Yang
conduct
any
indepth
audit
of
KCFF
had
recently
be-
The
sub-
find-
ings
to
of the
influenced
Far East. His purpose
it clear
with him
ROFA
and
the
Korean
given
free
use
ney
General
and
the
National
Security
Adviser.
On
called
the
first
memorandum,
dated
September
30,
1971,
which
stated
that
two
congressional
aides
name
The
Criminal
Division
of
and
recommended
was
true
have them
investigated by
and Mitchell.
and
Mitchell testified that
national
campaign.
Mitch-
ell
the
informa-
tion
sensitive infor-
with information on
other international events
others in
his office,
might
have
received
each
document
indicat-
ed
and
reviewed
by
policy
people
and
returned
indicted,
I
assume
that
the
Justice
Department
Gov-
ernment
representatives
contacted
Some Con-
which
caused
them
to
this
As
recollection of
Crovernment officials
no
further
action
in
the
instant
matter.
Should
information
subsequently
come
has
once
again,
as
in
the
cooperation,
and
we
look
forward
which
to act as sales
be
under P.L.
a
be
required
for
all
of
to
the
Korean
Government.
the
Republican
president
of
Dai
activities,
instructed
Yushin
program,
as
well
as
to
obtain
cally
addressed
to
the
attention
of
until
the
rake-off
sent
a
1971
on
the
same
was here that
and
in
session
with
480 rice
D.C., indicate that
Kim
as a lobby-
his George
Town Club
KCIA
Washington
station
sent
to
Washington
thoughts
for
action
directed
against
him,
motivated
by
hadjrei
only
recently
wide
press
prominence.]
ins
United States
Rak
was
removed
as
KCIA
director,
Soo,
had
shelved
all
meetings held
1973, it was
Wash-
that
he
Government.
and
Choi.
In
all
cases
the
funds
came
from
that the
Nidecker
testified
family,
his
personal
His
activities,
because
they
were
effectiveness.
he
the Korean
Government claimed
Korea.
The
directives to its
Francisco,
nese Prime
Minister Kakuei
interest
was being
attempt by
the Blue
which
the attempts
groups
President
—the
KCIA,
of tangled motives
delivered
the
information
to
in
mid-November.
At
indicted on
recommended
that
Tongsun
Park
not
only
be
lobbying
and
influence
efforts
in
be
named
With respect
of
indicating
criminal
activity
to
Attorney
to dismiss
to
Ranard's
office.
the
U.S.
Government
concerns
of
their
for
an
advantage
of
the
information.
Embas-
sy
personnel
have
nothing
to
do
with
Secre-
the first
intelligence he
received intelligence
a
foreign
principal.
by foreign
The
of
Investiga-
tion
should
be
treated
as
one
the
cost
of
its
self-sufficiency.
Korea.
AID
also
pursued
a
subsidiary
the
assistance programs.
U.S. mili-
the
1960's,
these
programs
Japanese rule.
latent and
away from
in
January
1962;
inflation
which
resulted
from
retained
the
funds and
Korean
economic
independence
in
the
long
term.
of
12. 1961; see appendix
serve
interest to the
75
186
Technical
180 220
Sources:  AID
Program Memorandum
ROK
does not
supported by several
power
and
transportation
as-
sistance,
economic
planning
organization
of
the
Korean
Government.
export
development.
encouraged a
spirit of
through the
elimination of
quantitative import
controls and
cially
by
tightening
interests
there
—strategic
and
economic—
went
over
all
investments
and
loans,
tern
by
item.
In
addition,
AID
and
EPB
officials
met
formally
on
a
/eekly
to reform
Stabilization
was
to
be
accompa-
components of
those policies.
firm control
by
conomic leadership
enabled the
tion
unitary
xchange
both
its
major
desire
economic
ing
steadily
from
grant
to
loan
assist-
mce
loans. Therefore,
June
1965
to
Sep-
ember
related.^°
  he
Second
section,
pp.
174-177.
reforms it
called for
1968,
concern.
30 percent in 1965
m
1960's,
and
li
few
years
after
the
Japanese
agreement,
the
Korean
Government
discouraged
Japanese
direct
investment.
modern
technology
and
marketing
and
management
techniques
into
Korea.*®
1960's
cannot
be
of
U.S.
military
assistance.
on a
belief that
a stable,
field submission,
$200 million
per year
totaled
about
$200
lillion
from
1946
to
1971.
program,
the
MAP
c
liars
The
million cut
U.S.
modernization
plan
(see
below)
in
and
equip
for compensation
in six
was
not
jeopardized.
memorandum
Transportation Service, Washington, D.C.
economy.
1970 program
principal
cause
of
this
phenomenon
has
been
the
Korean
receipts
Im
Vietnam.
graiijfsi
assistance
to
loans
and
then
even
to
reduce
b
impossible,
the
argument
ij
economic
this area.®*
The United
States frequently
to
in^
loc
currency,
and
li
efter
The United
suppa
decides that such
have been forcefully controlled,
rategy
next
aid
-^sources
to
help
This particularly
'
than
unions
are
largely
government
controlled
its
staff,
while
the
AID
brought
lie in
in-country
training
of
tions and labor
so
the
other.
We
the latter
needs.
The
economy
was
leavily
time
of
extraordinary
upheaval
suspended full
)il,
dramatically
It
was
Korea's
influenced
Korea
social
years
1972-76,
to
to be
reflecting
approprite.®^
will
compensate
U.S.
lenders
have been
sending low-key
reaching the state
and
minimal to nonexistent.
demands
of
workers,
the
jgime
resorted
to
intimidation
and
were met with
le agricultural
to re-
growth
in
Korea's
domestic
savings
]
,
did
the trade
(
request
a
since the
tion
and
*'
Public
Law
4i
and/or
new
development
loans;
Government's
ef-
orts. '
I
After
the States provide
Park
issued
a
presidential
decree
on
August
3,
1972,
spending,
and
increased
the
U.S.
role
in
the
policies,
in
this
instance
1
import
synthetic
>reign exchange
political
sue.
recommend
14,
10
percent,
the
oreans
were
unprepared
to
that
the
United
By
this
5-year
with the
(3)
the
United
States.
any
agreement,
Korea
could
reduce
its
osses
by
upgrading
United
States
was
using
he
textile
negotiations
as
an
not
1973
outlook
for
a
sustained
countries most severely
situation
pay-
nents
gap
as
irresponsible
temptation to
be
more
perni-
cious.
It
wrong kind
of policy
IMF just at the point when it is in a
position to
The
IMF's
consideration
$2.2
be about
from
its
to Ex-Im loans.
of
overall
imports
1970
U.S.
By
the
1970's,
however,
uport
States,
and
1976 Korea 1
fromf
Taiwan
mar-l
kets.
initial
recommendation]
that
tariff
quotas
overseas
trade
restrictions,
with
losses
-om
U.S.
restrictions
estimated
to
to rescind
Korea's Deputy Prime Minister,
politics
Korea's economic
countries.
well
attention
to
countries
with
an
annual
per
capita
GNP
of
$300
or
Is.
The
1975
we
increased
because of facto
5 80
Law
prerogatives
of
Park met with Prime
Office
 «See
p.
191-196
of
complain
about
we
ar
assisting
your
country,
you
are
in
turn
assisting
our
country
a
very
largl
deficit.
He
was
equa
to Korea.
the
word
to
the
appropriate
people
to
proceed
or
the
200,00(
tons
worked
out
an
agreement
with
I needed
then was
might
add
South and California,
the
alloca
to. The
Government wanted
hole
it
seniority
in
tht
development
loan,
and
as
much
rice
AID.
KCIA
Law 480 program
Law
480
assistance
of
TongsunJ
and
early
ined in
advance who
not only
undertaken
services.***
A
ard
contracts.
estimator or engineer for designsj
drawings, and an
for the
'••
KPA,
inasmuch
as
Law 979
with
contractor
Industry
in
relation
to
fostering
who
are
received the
require*]
t«i
ual
contract the KMCA. On of that, the winning bidder ha(^
to
pay
supporting organizations
1975 tha
for procuremen
trouble
with
the
Kong
Che
oe.
Army
CID
to
him
by
the
' D,
^orea
withdraw
by
the
Government
of
Korea
itself
to
neutralize
this
law
Korea would not only deprive us
of
thl
repre-
sentative
of
be
improvident
Korean
and
Americans.
One
further
result
of
the
changes
the
KMCA
KMCI
intercessions
actuall;;
serve
a
useful
function
an-
]>unced
that
mone;i
available
suitable
to
Koreail
to staff members,
added
that
U.SI'
accepted
impact
both
the
U.S.
subject
to include
t^en a
addressed
t
i
the
desirable
woui
be
the
placing
at
scope of applicatio:
in
as
104
was apparently enacted to impede Korean nationals from collaborating in pre
reports exploiting scandalous matter.
Constitutional safeguards aimed at
th
Emergency
Christif
Conference
in
September,
KCIA
the Government;
program
bribes.
on
wide-scale
irregu-
larities
by
the
greater
factionalism,
which
apparently
October
supporters
of
faction,
Pil)
as
Eisenberg has long
was
an
article
by
Fred
Barbash,
There is
^im Hyung
Wook and
that
he
had
sided
with
the
DRP
Korean
political
parties
parties
is
i
as
subcommittee,
Concern-'
ing
vary
greatly.
1977.
From
October
1964
to
subcommittee
as
quick-
Wook and
S. K.
wasi
as
follows.
If
factions,
with
the
The
strongly
of
loans
decreased,
pre-
:ipitating
a
part of
he
:ept
$750,000
anc
by
a
close
confidant
political
asked
to
contribute
$10
million
^^o
in
the
agent's
name
S. K.
of
extortionate
demands
as to
illing to do that.
the
Japanese
other
iree
trading
each by the
Korean Exchange Bank
[anhattan
Bank's
any
business
organization
such
unwritten
law.
American
companies,
I
am
we give
of
such
firms
are
actively help
eat
it
2
Op
at
Rak
Park Chung
in
tb
Korean
Also see
the
end,
1
payments
regime,
with th'
to ii'
to
or
i
off
cials,
payment,
request
Tl
Dng Pil.
The subcommittee
but
had once again
funds'
However,
Caltex's
Korean
Grou]^
which
was
considering
problems.^^
Foremost
's
decision
C
F.
Loveland,
Dec.
1,
1972;
see
appendix
C-95;
memorandum
1
Nov. 15,
wa}
Choi
could
expect
commissions
from
both
Apex
partly shared
any
stage
Charli
may
not
b
able
your portion
amounts
of
cash.
At
evideno
which
suggested
Koreai
distributor
of
a
Sperry
Rand
spending
by
ccon
by
Hohenberg
Brothers
Co.
International,
a
well ha^
assumed the
arrangement to
director
$1
million
ranking
officials
of
le
Korean
(ils.
soon became
Government. In
Park Chung Hee
 solicitation
and
the
manner
election.
Goodman
stated
business was
Oil created
the
sale
goods
and
services
is
governed
by
price
compete. Tl
that
froi
internal
auditors;
these
Korea
for
political
activi-
ymd
with
infoi
mation
concerning
their
problems
the commercial
in shaping
plex
its
tant
function
Korea
Infor-
film-lending and
library facilities
open to
the public.
and the
Korean resi-
of scholars
of [ROK]
*
Korean
academic
offers of financial assistance
scholars, the
use.
Grants
made
a
university
of
of
funds
Uni-
In
said
that
Professor
Nahm
vas
himself
thinking
of
writing
letter,
had allocated
Studies.
The
center
received
partial
Yong Shik,
fearing adverse
publicity in the United States over the grants, held one up that
had
orean
Government.
Harvard
the^
are
quite
sensitive
about
some
the
a gc
explicitly negative on two occasions in]
private
talks,
and
the
enthusiasm even
seems
tcj
want
is any independent, informed scholar on Korean politics and law at Harvard
This attitude
business community as
Korean donors but
exchange
matters.
the grant.
his business
9,
1974.**
that
r
broader
field
pose
about
basis of
be«|
used
to
finance
instruction
in
Korean
anthropology,
student
felloe
ships,
and
a
lecture
response
Min
Kwan
Shik,
i
ition,
to
discuss
Columbia's
fundraising
ete responses. He
some
with Korean Traders
the
non-governmental
foundations
presently
providing
fman-
al
was
to
apply
through
P.
J.
Koh,
16
clear
that
the
KTSF
been
make the
a
private
foundation
was
the controversy which might
a
money for its own
adequate
for
the
development
of
Korean
studies
and
urged
that
there
j
i,
the
ii
beemij
ing
for
an
annual
report
by
Columbia's
chief
academic
valid
He
argued,
 'Exchange'
is
is,
as
we
a
component
upcoming
confeii
o]
nor the KTA
symposium informed the
understanding that topics involvin
university system
sources, relying
instead on
tl^
Federal
Government
under
that asking
for Korean
University of Washington
Koh,
misunderstanding,
felt
gradual
studies
source
Ray
co:
to
the
state
language
program
for
them.
This
pposal
was
studies
program.
During
Ir
18,
did
rt
focus
Hu bard. These
because they
were undertaki
APPROACHES TO U.S.
Standards
Official
Conduct,
to
attempt
to
look
for
all
cases.
|al of
flattered
by
t]
degree,
Admiral
LaRocque
said
because Colonel
some
controversy
of
the
trip
was
never
rais«
again.
selected
the
United
met Professor Lee
Prof. Robert
^alapino of
3n other
University
of
Korea
that
time.
However,
Dr.
a
Young,
chief
of
tl
policies
of
received several hundred dollars
bank account.
these
SDcommittee
that
the
institute
ington-based
lyon
testified
been elected the
of
$88,000.
Education
KCIA station chief.
1970's, held in 1973
Major
Powers,
;
Park
Chong
Korean
States.
to
implement
this
minds
of
intimida-
tion
of
Korean
students
had
the
influence
of
ed
ties of the
dertaken
by
American academic
time, the
in the

Association.
the
Korean
Govern-
ment.
The
Korean
Blue
the,
university
violation of
university policy.
toi
to President Park,
of
the
form
a
laundering
operation
The ROK
Government also
two other occasions.
Asia,
the
Korean
|
>
4
months
by
increasing
its
circula-
:ion
substantially
and,
more
importantly,
by
placing
advertise-
|n
1972,
the
Government
attempted
I
Chu]
that
the
the
sponsors
of
thti
-^i
left the conferenal
leftwing.i^<>
This
Min
Shin
of 1973
the attention of
of the plan
also called for
cor
tained
10
minutes
of
news.
For
a
of
reasons—
havl
promised
The
ROK
noney to a
idviser.
'/oice
of
America
direction
or VOA
for USIA to
USIA]
investigation,
Government
 cover,
no
full
investigation
was
ever
undertaken,
nor
was
Korean elections.
all
private
radio
imprisonment for a
position
ofl
w
the
U.S.
newspaper,
U.S. media
U.S.
mili-
be
course of
thejji
ir^
were to
the
visa
of
one
U.S.
corre-
spondent,
Elizabeth
Japanese
media
over
the
list
in
the
fall
of
1974,
for the
Korean
proups
of countries to
be
unusual for immigration
visa lookout
a
crime
however,
thai
acceptance
of
between
1970
Eas'j
Pak
Bo
Hi,
Moon's
aide
and
translator
and
president
of
ambitions and activities. He said
that
in America to be able to  dictate policy on major
issues, tc
UC and
^^^
his
plans
to
cause,
as
well
FLF
It
soon
became
apparent
lat
he
busi-
encompasses
5 well.
isembles
a
grea
reverence
and
he
into one
around
th<
''^
espousal of
 American-styl
Russia
Sun
Soviet
Union
in
policies.
In a January 1973 speech. Moon spoke of the necessity of
establish-
ing
universities
in
=^**
will
be
able
and Freedom
Foundation; and
founded
movement.
In
September
1961,
Kim
Young
Oon
and
several
other
Moon
living
Association
for
the
Unifi-
trustees along
known
as
the
owner
association
de-
lared
substantial
the publication
Virginia
organizations
er,
Church:
In
effe'^t
and stability.**'
The growth
had been slow in
States in December
1971 to tat
himself
organization
nd
organization. *®^
was originally called
New York
City Tax
The purists in th
that the
Church in
expressed
desire
to
begin
political
work
to
God.'**
According
to
Wood,
 
reported
that
the
1977
confer-
ice
cost
which are directed
ARP), and
relating
of
(Collegiate
Association
battlefield,
and
if
them
win
th«
people
our churches
the time,
—the corpa
had
Spirit Association
giving
an
sums
tht
national
UC
in
501(cX3)
of
the
Internal
Revenue
Code
of
1954;
(2)
Sun Myung
The
Korean
March
1964
those
preservation
and
perpetuation
of
Korean
democracy
of
understanding,
shape its policies
be to gain
with wealthy
make
KCFF
serve
Moon's
Moon
Organiza-
in
1963
in
a Korean dsmcing group
thus
UC,
took
the purpose of
Moon and the
to the subcom-
things together,
is
my
business
enterprises
structure
are used interchangeably
(machinery), the
rifles,
lathes,
grenade
launcher
stockholders were:
36
1978)
4
Boek
sales were
This
increase
j
was
consistent
with
noted
that
tita-
nium
another
UC
publication,
a large
comer on
a
acquired
in
i
tax avoidance
by donating
money to
does not
permit trans-
fer of
—in this
foundation.
Pharmaceutical, is also chairman
the Unification
Moon
follow-
25
percent
Ars.
and
market-
enterprises.
On
International
Exchange
a
maintenance
company
and
iwned
a
in 1974 he
the
Uniteci
States
IRS agents auditing thf|
News World and its counterpart in Japan were not the
onl>l
In July
a movie
company is
bein|S
Onei
Way
Productions,
with
offices
various stock
of cash
rhe
called the
interchange-
UC leaders
In
April
1963,
for
affiliated
and
on
the
organizational tie with any
bases
of
this
responsibility
for
his
organization's
fiscal,
prophet of the
worldwide
organi-
zation.
by the organizaJ
degrees
All members
of the UC are used interchangeably in any of the 60
front organiza-('|
tions, as
stated that
[UC]
would
be
the|
arm ol
Unified
Family and pass out literature for it, and then turn around at
a
moment's
notice
and
disseminate
political
of Rev. Moon that the Church would become
oni
*
as reporters for
him
to
bring
fundraising
teams
of cash
were frequent-
IC
members
must win
before
any
cumbersome'
yl
INS
of
the
UC,
Takeru
Ka'
a
financial
sleight-ofi
^f
hand, was able to have his visa status changed to one
which
would
When
he
beinf'
UC
members^
th^t
by
was awarded
s
trad
er's
of having
Organization of free
and
back
anc
4b
re<
kb
hii
Stlj
$5,000.=*^®
Little Angels
letter,
Pak
Bo
noted that the UCI
of
KCFF
funds
mt
God's
chosen
they
proceedings was
 
* * *
God
difficult for us to advance full-stream [sic] is that we
ainot
the
narrower
defini-
tion
of
'political
Wood
said
Moon's
the way
a model
political
until he
trusts you
absolutely,i|{pill
policy. If
death,
into the
serve*
^j
you
approach
enhaned
P
Moon's
political
President
»l
oi%ei
the
San
Francisco
Chronicle
bold headline
National
Prayer
and
Fast
and Italy
as well.
Bruce
Herschen-
ways
the
eyes
of
Presideni
to
the
rallies
i
the
impact
they
his
arrival
L
UC
becam
members.
(9
a
former
(Master
Speaks,
Dec
which
the
PR
team
succeed-
Korea
to
deteriorate
Over
a
period
of
several
weeks,
anti-Japanese
demonstrations
Government
a
a memb©
Circle
ant
afterward
told
egging
make
a
in Korea until September 21. Thus Elkins
( J
the
Salonen
explaine
that:
of
some
then
the
quality
of
o
Republic of
 Americj
Committee
Wives
and denied
any political
Moon, having known
indebted
to
the
Unification
Church.
DC
UN was
secret.
We
wrote
They
Unification
became
controversia
in
the
favorable
imagi
respectability.
Moon
mad
witness described
how in
Eisenhower
had
followers
solicite
political
anj
J
i
the
Day
of
Hope
tour.
As
ycfti
jy
have
1,
they
they
When you
foundation
to
pled with his ability to turn out hundreds of disciplined
followejj
io
for
enabling
with the Government.
funds for
securing
a
$10,000
Lee
passed
be
considered
for
thi
U.N.
Noting
thjj
in
choosiii
that
KAP
and repeating many
to
tl
to
1'
had been inspired to organize KAPA in 1969 when, after meetii
with
tl'
port for £in anti-Communist
Ki
KAPA
m
to
be
explained
to
U
members.
in
terms
of
servici
to
Korea:
I
will
suffer
a
sc
back.
Organization
establishtj
an
anti-Communist
ence
of
other
by the Korejj
b
he
earj
er, it was reported that the KCIA station chief in Washington hr
opposed
Moon's
alii
Defense
had,
by
1976,
helped
ma,
a
charging
Hwa
officers
documents.
reported
the
charge
as
ien held against her
compelled
to
adopt
a
new
'ligion).'*^'*
All
sources
agreed
a
follower
of
Moon's
sino
the
May
1961,
joined
thi
KCIA
a close friend
Han
Sang
Ki
In
Jong Pil
political
tool.
or
and
was
a
great
deal
c
independent
later ii
'
<
As just
^
jo
proselytizers
for
the
UC
even
two army
as
translate
the
government,
the
Ministry
of
Education
Government.
From
the
early
1960's
through
1978,
KCFF
served
as
an
after
resigning
from
Bo
Hi
and
the
KCFF
as
shown
by
letter
recount-
ed
a
briefing
Angels
was
the
a line against further commu-
nist aggression in Asia and have dedicated American
lives and treasure
vided
$796,231
one of its
it
serve
s)
projects,
sponsorship of the Little
be removed
as a
 the
financial
Spirit
Association
and
its
leader,
Roland
enclosed
the
UC
and
had
understood
KCIA
under
Kim
Jong
Pil.**«
Executive
branch
agencies
of the ROK Govern-
ment
also corroborated
Op-
to have said that
was
under
pp.
626-627,
634-635.
KCFF
was
funded
years
any
movement
Unification Church
with the
Unification Church
Moon
had
ambitious
the Little
minute
talk
at
the
beginning
as
an
instrument
by
Angels
con-
certs
often
provided
the
top
followers
to
mingle
to
it.
However,
some
possible link
the
UC.
Angels would
Newsletter for October
Re:
best
not
Angels
simply
say
founding
just been
UC.***
split within
1976.
It
within
arm's
length
of
discharged
within
a
have
worked
for
GOOD
A
be
a
very
fine
Board
Member,
or,
a
1976.
1978
to
administer
the
KCFF
and
later
became
on
a discharge
from the
and the
for
free
use
of
Korean
made
On special
j
instructions from the KCIA director, the issuance of passports for I
the
|
at
a
j
those efforts,
Freedom Foundation, appendix
for
preparation
of
a
another
his
Government.
''aware of
the work
Jong Pil
defense
industry
The
must
be
not have prospered
assistance from
several reasons.
1977,
when
the
Korean
Government
'
assets
and
I
use
.
Tong
for the
information
heavy
weaponry.
Interviews
of
Pusan
and
was
shown
ROK
Government,
was
subcontractors.
With
Organization wanted to admit
information
j
had been exported or
the
strange
completed
Kim
a
con-
cessional
place in late
both
through
the
diplo-
and
he
did
not
read
the
letter. ^
time,
accord-
pick up the money.
had
she was
husband
payment
to
Ikeda
March
to
when
or
not
know
admission that KCIA money
the
i
the
Moon
noticed
:he unpublished article. The two Koreans took a copy of
the
article
Arhen
it appeared in News
example,
wheD:
a
wide-ranging,
inexpensive^^
marketing
network.
The
tc^
American
products
,
it,
from
th<
I
iijli
is a small
made
ex
refer
j
orders
raise approximately
Moon
Organization.
As
loans were for
W
ratify an
out no further
a
refused, and Bank of America
collected Moon's collateral.
the
uncertain
In
connection
j
resolutions
j
appendixes
C-257,
C-261,'
i,
and
C-263.
film company with
prior
to
establishment
of
UCI,
it
j
in
New
York.
object of their
spoke
of
a
Ii
id
was
a
factor
the
assets
lisi
ies
funds
i
collaboration
between
the cash
to purchase
$738,000
in
This money was
stock purchases
both
a
frequent
need
for
our trade
bank,
so
that
the
at
Chase
Manhatttan
Bank
which
had
been
set
his
ac-
7
days
($75,000)
for
his
stock
purchase
came
mostly
from
a
loan
to
his
in various ways
Salonen
gave him
nearly
but
(Ishii's
assistant)
hac
any
control
^i
Pak
1975,
whether
Mr. Fraser. What is the
name of
Pension Fund International.
get attached to it?
or^Jel
the fund.
gave the
Moor
H
^
that the
or
more
than
ten
years,
that
will
be
UC
members
with funds
be
located,
while
others
aimed
their
'hose
who
did
respond
did
the
ubcommittee.*^*
period  not clearly
to
bankn^l
be wired to
rules. Then,
on December
a
Pak
andc
jsj
names)
and
because
the
bank
experienced
ifficulty
j't
from
Yang
Doo
Won,
a
buying the stock; Kim
KCIA money.
However, Kim
1976,
staff
stock
percent,
or
$100,000.
Park,
using
nees so as
to avoid the limitation. He said,  I was going to maneu
ver
later
and
acquire
Diplomat National
Bank and
was
 highly
conceiv^
the
Government
well, undoubti
of
imunity.
Pak
as
an
dividual
of
the
Korean
Government
helped
finance
be noted
Charles Kim
by
Tongsun
Park
came
from
noteworthy
by
the cash
its
in-
was
and
would
By early
Organization
Moon Organization
United
States
Some
by disguising
the
names
of
UC
members.
(12)
and
other
tax-
exempt
the
investigation
the
UC
until
the
early
saw them
Government, including
in
the
1976-78
period
ap-
peared to have had an effect on the degree of influence Moon's
supporters had with the Korean Government, there were continu-
ing
support.
cans, Koreans, and others who identified themselves
with
Moon
Organization-sponsored
activities
such
as
nism and South Korean
motives behind
positive contribu-
tions. For
associated with
and
other
executive
branch
agencies
currently
investigating
allegations
relat-
ing
to
Sun
Myung
UC,
issues:
(a)
connection
with
purposes of fundraising, political
systematic
and
with
financial
assets
into
and
out
of
the
large
governments
for
use
in
appropriate
proceed-
ings
involving
nents derive tax advantages
organizations
are
used
Moon
Organi-
zation
has
self-proclaimed
of
the
United
States
to
know
what
involvement in
rifles and
other weapons
to produce
to equip
of
going
established
to
im-
plement
its
text
to
Treaty
Affairs
at
State.
Eight
of
the
might wish to
examine under the
international
agreements
to
the
quiring
approval
by
the
Secretary
of
final
authority
in
determining
what
pertinent
provisions
of
resident
their
requests
and
submitted
below.
Case
to
go
nent
recent
history
of
individuals
from
a
for perma-
that
admissible
and
national
welfare,
safety,
or
security.
and
staff of the
further efforts
lacks
any
The
date
neither
the
Judiciary
Subcommittee
ly not
ing the
 compelling reasons
INS
had
failed
proceeding
would obtain
permanent resident
the United
fundraising
and
other
work
obtain
resident
status
for
inten-
DOS
participated
in
demonstra-
tions
against
brother was arrest-
tor-
tured.
Department
of
to depart
not
oversight
com-
mittee.
Congress in passing
to de-
the
friendly
relations
between
the people
of South
cooperation to the
other Korean
money
the
Government,
citing
considerations
citizens. This
taking the position
that the agreement under which the visas had been issued limited
interviews to
United States seeking
of their
Korea.
prompted
by
information
indi-
Tongsun
Park
and
Sun
M)aing
Moon
together
in
denouncing
those purchases.
As
a
a subpena
He
was
given
until
May
13,
public
announcements
so
by
likely
in House rules
and per
Rule
XI2(h)(l)
provides
that
of its Members
receiving
evidence
which
shall
not
be
XI2(k)(5)
testimony at an investigative
 
value
there were no
Federal
rules.
source
proceeds
from
foreign
exchange
transactions
must
Exchange
Bank
equivalent
sentatives
of
Persons
the stock
to
loans, he
as
 President,
Unification
Church
Pension
Fund
International.
All
of
to
gain
access
and
even
that
questioning
activities
in
the
United
States.
Park's
relations
all topics
of interest
to
reach of
Department.
event he
and
a
member
of
the
Korean
National
on June
knowledge
of
Institute on
of
July
11,
be
checked,
proved
to
be
accurate
as
far
as
controversy
provide
information
to
the
revealed
Wook and
the ROK
Sohn
expressed
words:
was telling the
the
KCIA
the United
candor in his
dealings with the
knowledge
KCIA
station
chief
in
Tokyo.
of the KCIA's
Kim
while his
accordance with
or
agents
con-
formed
to
U.S.
laws.
The
accounts and
public discussion
of the
foreign
principal
before
any
agents of foreign governments, while others are
subject to
are
punishable
under
various
to
to any
situation in
which an
to
exist.
CONCLUSIONS
by
individual Americans who are
and
$100
in
questions
prepare
distinc-
tions
illegal.
a document
preparing guidelines
the Korean
16,
consideration
specifically
imposes
a
duty
on
all
persons
with
persons
on
the
domestic
way.
the circumstances
the Legal
was our
perspective
to
the
investigation
We believe
insights
into
questions
often
thereby
contributes
to
been absent or simply
too much. Thus,
Qualified
country
by The
insurance
on
Capitol
Hill.
They
could
more-or-less neutrals
tempts to better
headlines.
however,
to
determine
nitions
in that light.
materialize
in
the
precise
form
to
shows,
the
Moon
operation
is
is
cast system in
ernment, established in
Bo
the
ROK
Government
to
promote
political
objectives.
of young
both
ROK
Grovemment.
Moon
Organization—
work
of
economic,
ject
to
the
control
and
and
provided
free
of
charge
by
the
Korean
Government.
Research
Institute
on
Korean
Affairs
the
KCIA
established
exchange
rate:
1964
to
December
1965,
255
appear in their
with the family
e.g.,
Tongsun
Economic
Affairs,
U.S.
Embassy,
Seoul,
1971-75;
Economic Planning
U.S.
Korean
Korean
Cultural
and
Freedom
Foundation,
1966.
June
1977
and
in
July
state of the
coup;
founder
and
Democratic
Republic
and
Choung Kyu;
J
—Aide
gation by
the House
Conduct.
tor of
Radio of
Free Asia
November 1976;
 
Nam Duck
Pak Bo Hi—
ROK
Embassy,
1961-64;
testified before
former
nation
in
1974;
and
November
1977.
Suzi
Park
Thomson—
of the House
ing
Govern-
ment;
early

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