Frederick H. Konteh Team Leader - World...

CMDA/GRS Governance and Corruption Study

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Acknowledgements This study was made possible through the generous financial support of the Department for International Development (DFID) as part of its continued assistance to the Government and people of Sierra Leone in the fight against corruption and the overall governance restructuring and reform programme. The study team is also immensely grateful to the overall technical assistance provided by the World Bank through the expertise of Francesca Frecanatini and her assistant; their special input into the Executive Summary is particularly acknowledged. We would like to express our profound gratitude to members of the Steering Committee for the Governance and Corruption Survey for their encouragement, support and patience without which this project could not have seen a successful conclusion. In particular, the chairman of the Committee and the Co-ordinator of Governance Reform Programme, Mr. Emmanuel Osho Coker’s tremendous show of understanding and co-operation always saw the team through several hitches and constraints especially in times when it was difficult to meet set deadlines for specific tasks. We also owe special thanks and gratitude to Prof. Bob Kandeh, director of Statistics Sierra Leone (SSL), also member of the Steering Committee for providing us with the SSL’s sampling frame from which we derived our EAs for the survey. The active facilitating role played by Mr Haakawa Moseray as Project Officer was also quite helpful. Mr Emmanuel A. R. Gaima, initially part of the study team, did not only contribute to its design but also continued to provide technical advice especially on issues pertaining to governance. Special thanks also go to Mr Taziff Koroma who helped to proof-read the draft of this report. Several other people also made invaluable contribution to the successful conduct of the survey for which the study team remains quite grateful. The names of these various individuals, especially those who served as enumerators and supervisors cannot be mentioned. However, our colleagues who served as regional co-ordinators deserve a special mention – Mr Samuel J Braima, Mr Dante Bendu and Mrs Elizabeth Sam - as well as Mr F.A.S. Walker who was always available as technical back stopper and Mr Patrick Gbondo the Administrative Assistant. Frederick H. Konteh Team Leader CMDA Study Team

1. Frederick H. Konteh 2. Abdulai Jalloh 3. Andrew Allieu


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Table of Contents Page Executive Summary 1 Chapter One: General Introduction 28 1.1. Background……………………………………………………………….…. 28 1.2. Justification……………………………………………………………….…. 29 1.3. Objectives…………………………………………………………………… 31 1.4. Sampling…………………………………………………………………….. 32 1.6. Scope and Structure of Report ……………………………………………… 32 Chapter Two: Governance Analysis……………………………………………. 33 2.1. Key Findings on Governance and Public Sector Performance…………….. 33 2.2. Major Factors Influencing Personnel Recruitment, Management and Reward System…………………………………………………………. 36 2.3. Analysis of Public Sector Management System and Employees’ Understanding of Institutional Objectives, Roles and Responsibilities …….. 43 2.4. Budget and Procurement……………………………………………………. 48 2.5. Public Officials’ Assessment of the Quality of Service Delivery Determinants of Enhanced Service Delivery and Reform Measures……….. 53 2.6. Service User Experiences and Views on Service Delivery…………………. 57 Chapter Three: Corruption and State Capture 69 3.1. Key Findings on Corruption…………………………….…………………… 69 3.2. Detailed Analysis of Bribery and Unofficial Payment ……………………… 73 3.3. Detailed Analysis of Government and Institutional Efforts at Combating Corruption…………………………………………………………………….. 86 3.4. Detailed Analysis of the Process and System of Reporting on Corruption…………………………………………………………………….. 88 Chapter Four: Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 90 4.1. Conclusions ………………………………………………………………….. 90 4.2. General Policy Recommendations…………………………………………….. 92 Appendixes: Volume Two


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0 10 20 30 40 50

Control ofCorruption

GovernmentEffectiveness

Political Stability

Regulatory Quality

Rule of Law

Voice andAccountability

percentage of countries that rank worse

1996 1998 2000 2002

The above chart depicts the percentile rank of Sierra Leone on each governance indicator. Percentile rank indicates the percentage of countries worldwide that rate below Sierra Leone (subject to margin of error). For instance, the “Voice and Accountability” bar in 2002 has length 28.8%. The interpretation is the following: an estimated 28.8% of the countries rate worse and an estimated 71.2% of the countries rate better than Sierra Leone in this indicator. The governance indicators presented here reflect the statistical compilation of responses on the quality of governance given by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries, as reported by a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations. Higher values imply better governance ratings. Countries' relative positions on these indicators are subject to margins of error. Consequently, precise country rankings should not be inferred from this data.

Source: Governance Research Indicators, based on data in D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, 'Governance Matters III: Updated Indicators for 1996-2002

Executive Summary

Corruption and poor governance are by no means novel issues in Sierra Leone. Over the past decade researchers and practitioners have documented the deterioration of state institutions and the rise of corruption. A DFID report, conducted in 2000 using focus groups and perception-based household interviews, highlighted the widespread and long-standing prevalence of corruption at all levels of society in Sierra Leone1. Furthermore, a more recent World Bank study on public sector reform2 suggested, “the public sector is characterized by a centralized organization, improper internal incentives, limited human and institutional capacity, and a failure to reach the poorest citizens”.

Figure A3 provides a summary of the trend of six governance dimensions between 1996 and 2002. While in some governance dimensions the country has improved greatly since 1996, such as for example, Voice and Accountability and Control of Corruption, on others - Rule of Law and Government Effectiveness, the deterioration is extremely significant.

This endemic and prolonged diffusion of mis-governance has been linked to the persistent economic downturn and political instability of Sierra Leone. Despite its abundant natural resources and highly educated human resources within the public sector, Sierra Leone has received the lowest value of the United Nations Human

1 Two are the key findings worth mentioning from this comprehensive report: corruption is widespread (94% of households report corruption is rampant) but the government is doing very little about it (almost 60% of households report that the government’s efforts at fighting corruption are very limited) 2 Garnett and Lopez, 2002. 3 Governance Research Indicators, based on data in Kaufmann, D. , Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M. “Governance Matters III” Updated indicators for 1996 – 2002.

Figure A: Governance Indicators (Sierra Leone)


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Development Index. The decade-long civil war, during which the public sector suffered incalculable losses both in terms of human skills and infrastructure, clearly played a role in this declining trend. However, as Sierra Leone emerges from years of civil war and conflict, there is the possibility to reform government institutions and improve governance in the country. The purpose of this report is to provide the Government of Sierra Leone with updated information on the status of governance and corruption in Sierra Leone. This effort is fully supported by the international donor community and builds on past government efforts.

The authorities have attempted since 1999 to re-build its public sector and address the issue of poor governance. Among the key reforms immediately implemented in the aftermath of the civil war, Parliament enacted the Anti-Corruption Act (ACA) in February 2000. The Act established the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), with the mandate “to investigate instances of alleged or suspected corruption referred to it by any person or authority or which has come to its attention, whether by complaint or otherwise and to take such steps as may be necessary for the eradication or suppression of corrupt practices4”, which includes the submission of cases for prosecution to the Attorney General’s Office. The activities of the ACC are often reported in the local newspapers and have helped increase awareness on corruption issues and citizens’ rights.

Following the ACC’s formation, the Department for International Development (DFID) commissioned the aforementioned study on corruption. The study, completed in 2000, suggested the following set of preliminary policy recommendations:

1. Implementing a nation-wide awareness campaign to inform and educate people on their rights and duties about corruption and on the existing mechanisms to protect themselves from corrupt practices.

2. Strengthening the ACC and the Judiciary, in terms of staffing and resources to

improve their ability to handle and prosecute corruption cases. 3. Reinforcing meritocracy in public administration.

4. Promoting the decentralization of the ACC outside the capital and the main

cities.

5. Continue to regularly monitor the quality of Governance.

The limited accomplishments achieved and many, still unresolved problems, however, have created a growing skepticism in the public opinion about the true commitment and capacity of the country’s leaders to fight corruption and improve governance. Thus, the ACC was created as an essential component of the Governance Reform Programme. To guarantee the necessary organizational capacity for the programme, the Government established the Governance Reform Secretariat (GRS). 4 Anti-Corruption Act, 2000, Part III, Section 5 (I).


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The GRS has been established with DFID funding as the focal point for the public sector reform, local government reform and decentralization, and its steering committee and sub-committees provide the machinery that can initiate, define and manage reform programmes over a broad area and with a wide range of donor support. It was within this arrangement that a sub-committee was set up to oversee an in-depth diagnostic analysis of governance and corruption in the country. The Steering Committee comprises representatives from the Government, the ACC, Civil Society, the Central Statistics Office (now Statistics Sierra Leone), the media and the international community. This institutional arrangement aims to promote a sustainable collaboration among local stakeholders and to build local capacity. The Steering Committee, chaired by Mr Emmanuel Osho Coker, has the responsibility to draft the Strategy based on the results of this in-depth analysis of Governance and Corruption in the country.

This report constitutes the main findings of the in-depth analysis and is based on detailed, experiential information from three separate surveys of public officials, households, and enterprises5. In particular, it summarizes the experiences of 1800 households, 600 managers and 590 public officials as users and providers of public services, and offers useful insights on:

1. The magnitude and the costs of poor governance and corruption, especially for the least protected segments of the population;

2. The institutional strengths and weaknesses in the country;

3. The institutional dimensions that should be reformed to improve governance.

The recent experiences of other countries in their fight against corruption support and justify this approach6. Such comprehensive and in-depth diagnostic analysis has often provided the much-needed input for policy makers and civil society for related program formulation and implementation. Moreover, by focusing on institutions and their performance, it promotes open and constructive dialogue among key stakeholders (both Government and the civil society). Finally, the rich data collected can be used to establish quantitative benchmarks for monitoring the success of institutional reforms already underway and, if necessary, to redirect them to concentrate efforts on priority areas. The report attempts to build upon the 2000 DFID study. Its overall scope is however broader since it aims at providing objective and experiential information to the Government for the design of a holistic and integrated reform policy meant to improve governance, accountability and transparency and to reduce corruption. In particular, the report tries to:

5 The user survey targets households in their role as users of public services, subject to regulations and laws, and as clients for licenses and permits. The enterprises survey is directed toward firms in their dual role as service users as well as providers who are subject to laws, regulations, licenses and permits. The public official survey focuses on their roles as policy sources and provides for a detailed picture of institutional strengths and weaknesses of governance in Sierra Leone. 6 For a few illustrations on similar programs currently in progress in other countries, please visit: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/capacitybuild/index.html


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• Ascertain the performance of key public institutions and their effectiveness in service delivery from the perspective of households and business enterprises;

• Determine the degree of interaction/inter-relationship between the public and

service providers;

• Determine the impact of corruption on the process and outcome of this interaction;

• Investigate the dynamics of administrative procedures and decision making in the public sector;

• Determine the implication for (or effect on) good governance/public sector

performance of such procedures and other factors (including corrupt practices).

Figure B: Key Problems in Sierra Leone, 2002 (as reported by households managers and public officials)

The main message of this work is

that corruption is a pervasive and institutional problem, which hampers the potential for the growth and development of Sierra Leone. In particular, the report offers a few lessons that should be taken into account in the development of the Governance Reform Strategy Ø Sierra Leone faces many problems in

the aftermath of the civil war, from unemployment, to high cost of living and poor infrastructure. Corruption however is considered as one of the most serious challenges faced by the country by all respondents (Figure B)

Ø Corruption is widespread and has a significant cost for the country: As

Figure D illustrates, corruption manifests itself in many forms in Sierra Leone, from bribes to obtain basic public services to misappropriation of funds. Moreover, bribery appears to have a regressive impact, with the lowest income citizens paying the largest share of their income on bribes (Figure G). The cost of corruption also emerges clearly from the willingness of managers to pay a reasonable proportion of their revenues in order to eliminate corruption (11.2% of firm’s monthly revenues; Figure A.6).

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Safety concerns /delinquency

Infrastructure /Quality of roads

Corruption

High cost of living

% respondents considering that these are very serious problems

household business public official


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Ø The public management of resources is poor and too centralized

1. Human resources and personnel: The use of bribes to obtain a job within the public sector is very common, with more than one third of public officials reporting such practice. Promotion appears to be based on seniority and made transparently in at least 60% of cases (Figure 5). At the same time, public officials report that political pressures in 26% of the cases influence hiring/promotion decisions. In terms of job and salary satisfaction, the majority of respondents feel that their jobs are secure, but are not satisfied with their salary levels.

2. Financial resources: Transparency in budget administration is an

issue for more than one third of public officials interviewed, and especially for the Sierra Leone Police and the Ministries of Health and Information (Table 30 in the Appendix). Decisions about the budget are seriously influenced by political pressures and external influences (Figure 7) and a significant amount of budget resources are lost due to “irregularities”.

3. Information: Public officials report that information about some key

functions, such as, management of funds and personnel, is highly centralized and is not shared with subordinates. There is also a strong, widespread feeling among public officials of exclusion from the policy making process (Tables 18 and 19 in the Appendix). Managers feel likewise about the lack of information and transparency of government’s requirements and decisions. Only about one third of managers acknowledge clarity of information about the requirements to establish a business.

Ø Corruption and poor management of public resources translates into poor

quality of public service and citizens’ exclusion. As users report, the overall quality of the public services is poor, with agencies like the Sierra Leone Housing Corporation (SALHOC) the Income Tax Department (now part of the National Revenue Authority (NRA)), the Department of Surveys and Lands and Immigration ranking at the bottom of the list. The Northern and Eastern parts of the country face the greatest challenge for health and income tax services (Table 49 in the Appendix). Poor quality of services is not however the only by-product of mis-governance. Because of the unofficial costs often necessary to obtain a public service, a significant proportion of citizens decide not to seek the service needed. This is especially true when dealing with the agencies that provide the poorest quality of services - SALHOC, the Sierra Leone Transport Authority (SLRTA), the Income Tax Department, and the Department of


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Surveys and Lands. In addition, in the case of the SALHOC and SLRTA, low income users are least likely to seek the service needed than wealthier citizens (22% and 25% of the cases, respectively; see Additional Figures)

In sum, this is the time for change. As public officials reported, there is a strong support for reforms in the public sector, especially for reforms that promote meritocracy, accountability and transparent management of public resources. (Figure L). Moreover, the recent efforts promoted by the Government in building operational and institutional capacity for policy changes in the area of governance have helped change the citizens’ perceptions on the government’s effectiveness to fight corruption. (Figure C) Thus, there is a window of opportunity for Government and for the country to implement sustainable policy changes to improve governance.

Figure C: Effectiveness of Government in fighting corruption

Households perception, 2000 & 2002

1. An overview of the main findings • Diffusion of corruption: Corrupt practices in Sierra Leone are widespread and appear in various forms. Figure D summarizes the most common practices of corruption reported in Sierra Leone. Service delivery by the public sector in Sierra Leone was generally marked by irregularities and bribery. Indeed, 67% of users and 20% of managers report that they were asked to pay a bribe to obtain public services. In addition, bribery affects other aspects of the relationship between the private sector and the public sector: 23% of public officials report that bribes were necessary to obtain public contracts. Perhaps a most glaring indication of the widespread nature of

Figure D: Corruption in Sierra Leone - A summary (as reported by households, managers and public officials)

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not effective atall

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2000 Report 2002 SL Survey

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purchasing of positions (% of public officials reporting it is a very frequent

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percentage of cases in which bribes were necessary to obtain public

contracts (as reported by public officials)

percentage of users that were asked to pay a bribe while trying to obtain

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percentage of managers that were asked to pay a bribe while trying to

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corruption is the fact that a significant proportion of public officials (42%) owned up to irregularities in the management of their institution’s budget, including misappropriation; the same proportion reveal that purchasing positions is very frequent in their institutions.

• Bribes are not exclusive for national enterprises, but are also reported to be quite widespread among foreign investors. As shown in Figure E, business respondents state that 20% of domestic and 18% of foreign firms frequently pay bribes for licenses and permits. For public service procedures, 17% of foreign firms are said to pay bribes frequently compared to 16% of domestic firms. Around 9%-13% of firms report that they frequently pay bribes to pursue legal proceedings in the judicial branch, to obtain contracts with state institutions or to update on fiscal situation. The administration of justice is particularly afflicted by mis-governance. The Court System is not utilized by many firms and households (at least one third decided not to use a court despite the need) (see Additional Figures A.1). At least three quarters of households

agreed that the most important obstacles to accessing the courts were influence of corruption, high legal fees, long court process and high gratification. The use of bribes to advance legal proceedings or to alter legal decisions is also quite common (see Additional Figures A.2)

Integrity and honesty of key institutions. The citizens of Sierra Leone question the honesty of key Government agencies. Figure F reports the top 5 and the bottom 5

agencies in terms of honesty. Among the agencies rated as most dishonest we find Customs, the Traffic Police, Surveys and Lands, the Income Tax Department and Law Officers. From a positive perspective, public officials give a very high honesty/integrity rating to Parliament, followed by Births and Deaths, NPA, SIERRATEL and the ACC. Households give the most positive assessment to the Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service, followed by the Bank of Sierra Leone and the Sierra Leone Water Company; and business enterprises regard the commercial banks as the least dishonest (or most honest) followed by Bank of Sierra Leone and the Sierra Leone Water Company.

Figure E: Bribes for type of activity: Comparing domestic and foreign enterprises

0% 5% 10% 15% 20%

Update on fiscal situation

Obtain contracts with state institutions

Pursue legal proceedings in the judicialbranch

Public service procedures

Request for licenses and permits

% of firm s reporting tha t bribe s a re very frequent

foreign domestic


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2. A Closer Look

• Corruption imposes barriers to households to access basic social services. Households are often discouraged to use Public Services. Up to 20% of households report that the reason for not using the Public Services is that they couldn’t pay the unofficial costs, thus, hurting heavily the poorest people. (see Additional Figures A.3) In addition, households pay higher bribes to obtain access to some basic public services, such as water, telecommunications, postal services, electricity and traffic police. (see Additional Figure A.4)

Figure F: Perceived level of honesty in public institutions

(as reported by managers, public officials, and households)

• Corruption increases inequality. Bribery is a significant and regressive ‘tax’ on public service users. Users report major bribe expenditures extorted from institutions in charge of Income Tax Department, Surveys and Lands, Public education, Public health services, Judges/Courts officials and Municipal/District Councils. Furthermore, the poorer groups are disproportionately affected by corruption, with lower income users

0% 10% 20% 30% 40%

Bank of Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service (SLBS)

Sierra Leone Water Company (SALWACO)

University of Sierra Leone

Ministry of Gender Social Welfare & Children’sAffairs

Law Officers Department

Income Tax Department

Surveys and Lands Department

Traffic police

Customs Department

% of respondents reporting the institution to be honest

households public officials business


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spending on average in bribe payments a percentage of their income at least twice as high as wealthier households. (Figure G)

Figure G: Percentage of household income spent on bribes for obtaining

services, by income status (as reported by households)

• Corruption has a negative impact on business environment: 40-46% of managers

report that bribes to different public institutions have a negative impact on the country’s business environment. (Additional Figures A.5) Furthermore, corruption costs firms greatly, especially when dealing with bureaucracy. 36% of firms spend 1 to 5 hours per week and 15% more than 5 hours dealing with bureaucracy. Businesses, however, are not without guilt and try to influence political decisions. 30% of managers report that Parliament is where their staff spent the most time in dealing with bureaucracy. (see Figure H).

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Public healthservices

Public educationservices

Income TaxDepartment

Judges/Courtsofficials

Municipal/Dist.Councils

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percentage of household income spent on bribes

The thin lines represent margins of errors (or 95% confidence intervals) for each value

low income middle income high income


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• Shared responsibility at the roots of such poor governance system. Many firms

share mis-governance responsibility with public sector institutions as illustrated in Figure H and A.5. Public procurement is also another channel through which firms promote poor governance (Figure E). At least 10% of managers report always paying a bribe to win public contracts. In addition, the reported percentage bribe ‘fee’ expected to secure such contracts is rather large. In the north, east and south around 50% of firms report that they invest more than 10% of the value of the procurement contract in gratification when doing business with government. In the Western Area only 18% of firms report that this is so.

• Estimating the total cost of corruption on businesses. Managers report that they are

willing to offer on average 11 % of their firm’s monthly income to eradicate corruption. Small firms appear to be the most willing to pay (11.4% versus 9% of large firms). This large potential tax contribution is not only an indicator of how costly corruption is financially for many competitive businesses, but also of the potential fiscal losses to the Treasury if a more transparent system were to exist. (see Additional Figures A.6)

• Bribery payments do not translate in higher quality of public services for the

users and firms. There exists a negative relationship between the quality of the service and the amount paid in bribes to the institution providing it. (Figure I)

• Quality of service delivery: The study has revealed widespread dissatisfaction with the quality of service delivery, especially with key institutions such as Customs, Income Tax, Surveys and Lands, SALHOC and SLRTA. The Judiciary and Law

Figure H: Institution where firms spent more time dealing with bureaucracy

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parliament law officers customs income tax

% firms reporting that the greatest amount of time was spent in this institution

Figure I: Bribes and quality of public services (as reported by managers)

corr = -0.6239

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Officers were also considered very inefficient. Institutions that received an overall positive assessment from users include the water supply services, the Administrator and Registrar General’s Office, the Armed Forces and the Police. Interestingly, however, public officials generally thought that the public’s perception on the quality of services rendered by their individual organizations was high and that their performance was satisfactory to the public. • Geographical heterogeneity and the quality of service delivery. The quality of public services appears on average to be lower in the Northern and Eastern provinces than in the rest of the country. However, the assessment of quality of public services by households and business could be analyzed by province and for each service. In the Eastern Province, Income tax, customs and public health stand out for their underperformance. In the Western Area, the worst ratings are for police and traffic police. In the North, vehicle license obtains very bad assessment compared to other regions. A high percentage of respondents consider water services to be of poor quality in all provinces except in western area. In the South the law courts, education, health, and income tax obtain a better assessment compared to other regions. It appears that the quality of public services in the different regions is different for those services provided locally (water, health and education), while it is more uniform for services provided nationally (like vehicle license and immigration. (Figure J)

Figure J: Quality of public services (as reported by households and managers)

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Eastern Province

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% of respondents reporting very poor quality

households business


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3. Management of Human Resources and Personnel • Recruitment and personnel decisions: The survey reveals that recruitments and top level management decisions are still influenced by external factors such as illegal payment, political connections and family ties. Standard administrative procedures are followed with regard to recruitment and personnel management decisions in many agencies, as indicated by the majority of respondents (55 to 65 percent). • Remuneration, manpower development/training and job security/satisfaction: The salary level of public officials is far from encouraging. Hence, over two thirds of public officials reported a high level of dissatisfaction. Surprisingly, however, the majority of respondents stated that their current working environment, as compared to a couple of years ago, was better. Finally, just over half of respondents received any from of training on the job during the last two years. 4. Management of Public Contracts, Funds, Budgetary Process • Observance of procedures in budget management: Public officials reported that the correct procedures in the management of budget and procurement were followed in their agency. These include documentation, clarity and transparency, and formalization of procurement guidelines. According to the survey results, budget planning and monitoring is not widely practiced by government agencies. Moreover, external influences significantly affect budget planning and monitoring. Finally, public officials recorded frequent budget losses arising from irregularities such as fraud (Figure D). • Fulfillment of needs from budgetary allocations: It is interesting that despite the evidence of irregularities and external influences on budget management, most public officials agreed that their needs were met from budgetary allocations. 5. Management of Information • Observance of administrative procedures: Very few respondents indicated that managerial decisions taken were being recorded. More worryingly, a significant proportion of the respondents (20%) indicated that auditing mechanisms do not exist in their agencies. Thus, a good number of public institutions do not have built-in checks, creating room for inefficiency and corruption. • Participation in the decision-making process: Participation in the decision-making process on the part of public officials is important, since it can guarantee institutional efficiency and enhance service delivery. Public officials in Sierra Leone, however, did not feel part of the decision making process (44 percent reported that senior managers never made provision for inputs from their subordinates in arriving at major decisions). Furthermore, more than half of public officials stated that too many levels existed within their institution, and that the decision-making process was centralized.


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6. Reporting Mechanisms • Users do not know how to report a corrupt act: When asked if they knew what process to follow in reporting a corrupt act by a public official, two-thirds of households reported they did not know. More than three quarters acknowledged having observed an incident of corruption, but the majority of households decided not to report it, mostly because of lack of knowledge on where to report. • Geographical heterogeneity in the knowledge of the process to report a corrupt act: Regional analysis shows Eastern Province as the most knowledgeable (43%), followed by Southern Province (37%), and Western Area (30.5%) with the Northern Province recording the lowest (23%). 7. Key Public Sectors - Education, Health, Judiciary

• Education services: With the exception of the Southern Province (16%), more than one third of households reported that the quality of education is poor. In addition, households reported that the number of hours spent in school by their children is much lower than the hours spent by teachers. (see Additional Figures A.7) Inadequate infrastructure and facilities, cost of education and low professional capacity of teachers were considered by households as important causes of poor education. • Health services: A significant proportion of respondents from both households and business enterprises (48.4% and 40.2% respectively) considered services provided by the health sector to be poor. Households also often needed to pay a bribe to obtain medical assistance (26% of cases) • The Judiciary: Households and managers overwhelmingly reported that the judicial system did not function effectively and fairly because of the high costs, the lack of credibility and professionalism of judges, and the overly complicated legal procedures. For all these reasons, 67% of households and 52% of managers preferred to use alternative mechanisms for conflict resolution. Households also reported that the Judiciary is often manipulated by economic interests (about 70% of respondents) and is dependent on the Government (about 57% of respondents) (Figure K)

Figure K: Undue influence on the Judiciary (Households)

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% of respondents reporting that the Judiciary is...


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8. Indicators of Public Sector Performance

The data from the public officials survey in Sierra Leone allows us to explore the link between institutional dimensions of the public administration and levels of corruption as reported by public officials. Since many institutional features are centrally determined, one might expect little variation across public sector bodies and regions. As shown subsequently, this is not the case, and the quality of governance and corruption vary greatly across regions and government agencies in Sierra Leone.7 Table A provides a summary of the definitions of the indicators constructed for this analysis.

In particular, we focused first on the variance of governance and corruption across the four geographical regions, motivated by the heterogeneity of behaviour found in previous analysis. We then focus on the variance across government agencies to identify potential institutional weaknesses. Finally, we explored the correlation between corruption and each of the governance indicators to highlight the institutional limitations that may foster corruption.

7 The analysis reported here is based on the governance and corruption indicators, constructed using the public official data. To construct these indicators, we aggregate the relevant survey questions using a factor analysis technique and obtain one single indicator for each governance dimension. For additional details about the methodology used, please see Main Report, Volume II.


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Table A - Definition of indices Governance variable Definition

ACCESS TO THE POOR

Index of accessibility to poor citizens of the public service provided by the institution. High numbers imply high levels of access

AUDIT MECHANISIMS Percent of cases where the decisions on personnel and budget management are subject to external and/or internal audits.

ENFORCEMENT OF RULES

Percent of cases wherein rules/guidelines/regulations in the personnel and budget management are well supervised and strictly applied.

MERITOCRACY Percent of cases wherein the decisions on personnel management are based on professional experience/merit/performance or education levels.

POLITICIZATION Percent of cases wherein the decisions on personnel and budget management are subject to political ties, party affiliations, political pressure.

POLITICIZATION IN PERSONNEL

Percent of cases wherein the decisions on personnel management are subject to political ties, party affiliations, political pressure.

QUALITY OF RULES Percent of cases where rules/guidelines/regulations in the personnel and budget management are formally written, simple, clear, not requiring and excessive number of administrative steps.

RESOURCES Percent of cases where physical, financial and human capital resources of the agency are adequate.

TRANSPARENCY Percent of cases where the decisions on personnel and budget management are done transparently.

CITIZEN VOICE An index representing the existence of consumer feedback and complaint mechanisms.

WAGE SATISFACTION Percent of employees very satisfied or somewhat satisfied with their wages. Corruption index Definition

OVERALL CORRUPTION INDEX

Corruption index representing widespread of bribery over regulatory/legal decisions, bribery over public contracts, corruption in personnel management and corruption in budget management.

CORRUPTION IN PERSONNEL (1)

Corruption index representing the percentage of cases where decisions on personnel management are based on unofficial payments (job purchase).

CORRUPTION IN PERSONNEL (2) Same as (1) using an alternative set of questions to proxy job purchase.

CORRUPTION IN BUDGET

Corruption index representing the frequency within the institution of irregularities/diversion of funds or any other type of budget abuse.

CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC CONTRACTS Corruption index representing widespread of bribery in the contracting process


10

Regional analysis of governance and corruption

• The geographical heterogeneity of corruption. Corruption is not equally widespread across Sierra Leone, and different types of corruption affect different parts of the country, as shown in Table 2. Corruption in personnel and budget affect the Eastern Province, while corruption in public contracts is a problem especially in the Northern Province. The Southern Province stands out as the least corrupt province in all four indicators of corruption. Table B: Governance and corruption indicators by province

Southern Province

Northern Province

Eastern Province

Western Area

WHOLE COUNTRY

Corruption in budget 35 43 48 39 40 Overall corruption 22 32 35 33 32 Corruption in public contracts 18 35 29 33 30 Corruption in personnel (2) 39 44 55 53 49 Accessibility for poor 85 74 87 74 78 Audit Mechanisms 55 59 66 58 58 Enforcement of rules 70 67 80 73 71 Politicization 21 34 22 34 32 Quality of rules 62 62 70 61 63 Resources 54 51 47 55 52 Transparency 51 55 53 51 55 Citizen voice 70 59 65 66 66 Meritocracy 66 65 70 69 68 The indicators above take value between 1 and 100. To interpret them, please keep in mind that:

- The higher the value of the corruption index, the more severe the problem - The higher the value of the governance indicator, the better the quality of that dimension • The geographical heterogeneity of governance. Governance dimensions, such as

meritocracy and auditing mechanisms also display a variance across regions. Consider for example, access to public service by poor citizens. The national average is 78. The variance across the four regions is however between 74 (Western Area and Northern Province) and 87 (Eastern Province). Similarly, the indicator of enforcement of public sector rules displays a significant variability across the four regions. This suggests the need for targeted policies in each region aimed to strengthening specific governance dimensions. Analysis of 31 Government Institutions of Sierra Leone

• Exploiting Institutional heterogeneity. The data from the public official allows us to explore the heterogeneity across government institutions in terms of corruption and governance performance. The evidence indicates that governance performance varies greatly across government agencies in Sierra Leone. Despite this variance, there is a consistency in the scores institutions receive across the different indicators. Institutions that score high in some indicators tend to score also high in others, and vice versa (Table 3).


11

Consider, for example, the Judiciary and the Supreme Courts and the Independent institutions (Bank of SL and National Electoral Commission). These institutions display high levels of governance performance. On the other side of the spectrum, the Ministry of Works and Public Maintenance presents the greatest challenge. Finally, a few institutions score low in some governance dimensions, while high in others, as in the case of the House of Parliament, which has the lowest values on all indicators but transparency. Table C. Governance and corruption indicators by institution

Audit Enforcement

of rules Resources Transparency Citizen voice

Wage satisfaction

Presidential Affairs 52 74 51 55 59 17

Ministry of Finance 57 68 52 54 60 25

Quasi-independent institutions 69 85 41 63 78 32

Ministry of Trade and Industry 64 84 60 59 63 19

Ministry of Internal Affairs 60 76 57 61 76 0

Ministry of Energy and Power and NPA 72 92 62 61 69 25

Ministry of Foreign Affairs & International Cooperation 50 74 54 50 30

Ministry of Development & Economic Planning 54 72 69 57 58 25

Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender & Children's Affairs 59 71 53 56 58 13

Ministry of Health & Sanitation 54 71 53 55 65 21

Ministry of Information and Broadcasting 55 68 51 51 60 18

Ministry of Education, Science and Technology 54 69 51 55 67 26

Ministry of Youth and Sports 56 76 50 52 72 25

Ministry of Labor and Industrial Relations 61 71 48 56 64 25

Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security 60 69 46 58 66 16

Ministry of Local Government & Municipal and district councils 58 72 54 57 63 15

Ministry of Transport & Communications 64 77 46 57 66 31

Ministry of Works and Public Maintenance 53 67 52 53 68 5

Ministry of Lands, Housing & Country Planning 54 57 56 13

Ministry of Mineral Resources 60 67 68 55 55 21

House of Parliament 54 53 41 59 50 13

Office of the Attorney General, Minister of Justice and Director of Public Prosecutions

60 75 49 55 67 25

Traffic Police and Sierra Leone Road Transport Authority 41 74 64 54 63 34

Supreme Courts 64 78 55 56 72 43

Local Courts 61 68 41 53 77 36

SALWACO/GVWC and SIERRATEL 56 73 53 57 58 35

SALPOST 61 66 46 54 60 28

Sierra Leone Ports Authority 53 66 56 54 59 42

SL National Tourist Board and SL Standards Bureau 44 47 49 51 63

Police and Prisons 59 68 57 53 66 25

Post-conflict institutions 60 71 47 54 64 44

WHOLE COUNTRY 58 71 52 55 66 25

Please note that we introduce a color-coding of the different agencies simply to facilitate the reading of the results. % Institutions highlighted in red are the ones with relatively low scores for each indicator % Institutions highlighted in green are the ones with high scores for each indicator


12

Exploring possible links between corruption and governance

As we have seen in Table 3 above, there is great disparity in the governance indicators among institutions thus it is misleading to generalize for all institutions on performance, governance and corruption. This subsection will emphasize the most significant correlations between the corruption index and the different governance variables.

• The quality of the rules of internal organization are good predictors of the level of corruption in any organization. Agencies in which internal rules and procedures are simple, clear, well monitored and not excessively bureaucratic are significantly correlated to lower levels of corruption, as is shown in Figure 1.

• Effective complaint mechanisms translate to lower corruption. Complaint mechanisms channel the concerns of users about the quality of the public services that they receive and provide a means to hold accountable those in charge of delivering public services. As shown in Figure 2, the institutions more responsive to complaints are also those with lower corruption. This finding suggests that making complaint mechanisms more transparent, accessible, and responsive can help reduce corruption in public services.

• Corruption in personnel is a very serious challenge for government agencies in Sierra Leone (see Table 1 in the Appendix). A simple correlation analysis shows that high degree of politicisation in personnel management, that is, whether decisions are based on political ties, party affiliations and political pressure, instead of being based on professional experience, level of education, merit or performance, is significantly associated with the practice of “job purchase” (correlation coefficient between politicisation and corruption in personnel is 0.71).

Figure L: Quality of the rules and corruption (based on responses of 31 government agencies)

r = - 0.57

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

40 50 60 70 80Quality of rules

Ove

rall

corr

up

tio

n

Figure M: Citizen voice and Corruption in budget (based on responses of public officials of 31 government

agencies)

r = - 0.42

0

20

40

60

80

100

40 50 60 70 80

Citizen voice

Co

rru

pti

on

in b

ud

get


13

• Corruption in the budget is highly associated with lack of access to public services by the poor. Thus, more accountable decision-making in the budget management could significantly improve the situation of the poor. (correlation coefficient between accessibility and corruption in budget is -0.47). 9. Elements For Change Public Officials’ Assessment of Government and their Institution’s Sincerity in Fighting Corruption: The majority of respondents, about 79 percent, expressed the belief that the Government is willing, genuine and sincere to fight corruption, while a lower but significant 66 percent made a similar complimentary assessment about its organization’s concern and willingness to fight corruption. Households assessment of Government’s sincerity and effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies: About half of the respondents stated that the Government is sincere in fighting corruption. On the other hand, a mere 30 percent of considered Government’s anti-corruption strategies as effective. Overall these results represent a much less positive assessment of the government commitment than that of the public officials.

Public Officials support to various

0% 25% 50% 75% 100%

Strengthen the operational management

Simplifying administrative procedures

A public servant statute regulating the application ofpenalties and rew ards according to job completion

A law that ensures that economic resources used bypolitical parties w ill have their origin and f inal useclearly identif ied

Establishing objectives and norms for fulf ilment ofservices

Regular declaration of assets of public officials

Establish effective mechanisms for allow ing citizensfree access to all information held by the state

Decrease in the number of public off icials if salary andbenefits are increased

Greater control given to the public and civil societyover public sector activities

Privatisation of public sector services

Decentralization of state administration

Establish a public service career structure based ondefined job performance criteria


14

Comparison of households perception in the effectiveness of Government in fighting corruption (2000 versus 2002): Between 2000 and 2002 the public perceptions of the effectiveness of the government efforts in fighting corruption has changed. There has been a shift in the proportion of respondents at both extremes: a decrease in the number of people that considered the Government as not effective at all and an increase in the number of people saying that it is effective. (Figure C) Public Officials support for public service reform measures: The majority of respondents registered support for public sector reforms that could enhance performance and service delivery. These include strengthening operational management, establishment of objectives and norms for fulfillment of objectives, overall implementation of public sector reforms, mechanisms for free access of citizens to state information, down-sizing personnel to increase salaries, privatization. (Figure L) Conclusions and Policy Recommendations The findings discussed in the previous pages underscore one of the essential features for successful governance-improving reforms: the set of public sector reforms should be comprehensive and coordinated across sectors. This multi-pronged approach, described in Box 1, has been used in a set of reformist countries and has the benefit of tackling the different forms of corruption, promoting institutional accountability and transparency, strengthening enforcement mechanisms, improving public sector management, and supporting civil society participation.

Box A: A multi-pronged strategy for improving governance and reducing corruption

Anticorruption

Institutional Restraints:• Independent and effective judiciary• Legislative oversight• Independent prosecution, enforcement

Civil Society Participation:

• Freedom of information• Public hearings of draft laws• Role for media/NGOs

Political Accountability:• Political competition, credible political parties• Transparency in party financing• Disclosure of parliamentary votes• Asset declaration, conflict of interest rules

Competitive Private Sector:

• Economic policy reform• Competitive restructuring of monopolies• Regulatory simplification for entry• Transparency in corporate governance• Collective business associations

Public Sector Management:

• Meritocratic civil service with monetized, adequate pay• Budget management (coverage, treasury, procurement, audit)• Tax and customsadministration• Sectoral service delivery (health, education, energy)• Decentralization with accountability

Source: World Bank, 2000, Anti-corruption in Transition—A Contribution to the Policy Debate.


15

A holistic, cross-sector reform package, however, is not sufficient for the successful and sustainable implementation of governance-improving reforms. This type of reforms aims to change the established interests of a small group of citizens and, therefore, may encounter strong resistance. To address this challenge it is necessary for a joint partnership effort of Government and the society. The government should commit to the reform process for the medium-long term and should build local capacity to ensure the sustainability of the reforms. The citizens should, on the other hand, participate actively in the monitoring of the reform implementation. While the comprehensive approach described in Box A is generally applicable, the details of the reform package should vary significantly from country to country. An in-depth diagnostic assessment of the institutional strengths and weaknesses, as the one carried out in 2000 and described in this report, would allow the country to identify the priority areas for reform. Building upon the findings of the 2000 diagnostic study, five broad areas were identified for action. These areas are discussed in detail in Chapter 4 of the Report. 1. Public resource management. The public officials survey shows clearly the link between a strong open system of public administration and low levels of corruption. In order to improve the management of human resources it is crucial to enhance and make more transparent the recruitment process for all categories of public jobs, ensure the insulation of the civil service from political and external influences and introduce clear guidelines for personnel performance and evaluation.

To reduce, corruption in public expenditure management, on the other hand, the Government should review the existing statutory and regulatory framework for public financial management and design a revised framework, which promotes transparency, clarifies responsibilities among actors, and provides checks and balances in the system. Within this set of proposed reforms, it is important to include the decentralization and disclosure of the budget preparation process. In addition, the Government should reform the public procurement process, making it more transparent, since in its current status it greatly penalizes firms trying to do business with the government. 8 2. Transparency and accountability. Key elements for reducing corruption and improving governance are greater transparency and accountability and an effective monitoring system. Better monitoring and accountability can be achieved by promoting open access to information. In this context, a key reform measure could be the introduction of downward accountability of local government by its population. This could be achieved through extensive education and sensitization so that people understand the roles and responsibilities of local councilors, chiefdom councils, public servants, and communities; and through specific initiatives aimed to improve the transparency of local government activities and functions. In addition, existing accountability “watchdogs”, such as the Auditor General’s Office, should be empowered with logistical and technical support. 8 Between 18% to 50% of managers (Western and Eastern Provinces, respectively) report that they need to pay more than 10% of the value of the contract to ensure business with the government


16

Since every bureaucratic and regulatory intervention creates an opportunity for corruption, reducing the regulatory burden on firms should be viewed as a key element of an anticorruption strategy. Indeed, firms whose managers spend more time dealing with government bureaucracy are much more likely to pay bribes. While reducing the number of regulations and inspections and building transparency into their implementation are key components of regulatory reform, the process of developing and implementing new regulations should also be addressed. 3. Civil Society participation and access to information. As emphasized above, successful governance and anti-corruption strategies are the product of society-wide and integrated efforts, which comprise all the branches of the government, the private sector and the civil society. The established partnership between the government, civil society and donors in the Anti-Corruption Steering Committee is the first step to ensure civil society participation. The promotion of local accountability mechanisms would be the subsequent, and necessary, step. Participation cannot be achieved, however, without access to information. The report highlights the limited and often contradictory information available to citizens and managers about services available and functions. There were also complaints about the lack of responsiveness of current procedures to the challenges facing public sector management. For this purpose, it would be useful to strengthen the information systems of public agencies – both in terms of state of the art equipment and personnel training - to move away from manual to electronic filing and data-based system. 4. Capacity building: to sustain the reforms and policy changes discussed above, it is critical to strengthen the capacity of public officials. There is an urgent need to restructure and increase support to the training of personnel within the public sector. In particular, concerted effort should be made to build up the capacity of the new councils to manage local affairs. Intensive training for councillors and their staff will need to be designed and implemented over the coming years. Given the magnitude of capacity building needs at the central and local government levels, it may be useful to invest in strengthening key local training institutions, such as the Institute of Public Administration and Management (IPAM) and the Civil Service Training College (CSTC).

In addition, training should also be provided to community groups and NGOs on skills to monitor Government performance and advocating for Government accountability and transparency. Finally, because of the reported lack of knowledge on how to report a corrupt act, the Anti-Corruption Commission may need to concentrate on an education and awareness campaign to motivate citizens to be actively involved in the fight against corruption. 5. Specific Anti-corruption measures. In addition to broader governance reforms, a combination of holistic, but interconnected measures should be considered in the fight against corruption aimed at strengthening the Judiciary and the Anti Corruption Commission (ACC). The Judiciary was rated by respondents as performing the least in the fight against corruption. To make the Judiciary more effective, this branch of the Government should be made increasingly independent of the executive and be allowed to process cases quickly. The ACC should receive support for the decentralization of its operations in the regions. This will improve the currently poor quality of the existing corruption reporting mechanism.


17

In sum, broad-based support and articulation of a governance and anticorruption strategy (that includes prevention, education, and enforcement) are important first steps. The implementation of the strategy may however prove to be the most formidable challenge. Requiring detailed action plans for reducing corruption and improving quality from across the state sector, and monitoring their implementation, helps ensure that progress is achieved. When progress isn’t made, external monitoring brings accountability—but only if the action plans are formal and public. Structure of the report The report is structured as follows. Chapter One provides a general introduction and background information. Chapter Two represents the core of the report, as it provides a detailed discussion and analysis of the governance and public sector management issues from the perspectives of both providers (public officials) and users (households and managers). Chapter Three builds on the findings presented in Chapter Two and focuses on corruption and mis-governance, using the experiences of service providers and service users. Chapter Four summarizes the main lessons and presents a few recommendations for possible policy action geared toward the improvement of the governance system in Sierra Leone.


18

Additional Figures

A.1. Utilization of Court System (as reported by households and managers)

26%

28%

30%

32%

34%

36%

Households Business

% of households / firms that felt the need to use the court system but decided not to

A.2. Bribes o pursue legal proceedings (as reported by public officials managers and households)

0% 5% 10% 15% 20%

households

business

public officials

% of respondents reporting that most times/always bribes are paid to pursue legal proceedings


19

0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000

RegistrarGeneral’s

Department


District &MunicipalCouncils

Surveys &Lands

leones

small scale medium scale large scale

A.3

A4.1 Amount spent on bribes for obtaining services by size of firm

(as reported by managers)

A.4.2 Amount spent on bribes for obtaining services by household income

(as reported by households)

0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000

RegistrarGeneral’s

Department


District &MunicipalCouncils

Surveys &Lands

leones

low income middle income high income


20

A.5 Impact of corruption on business environment

(as reported by managers)

A.6 Willingness to pay to eliminate corruption Percentage of business’ monthly income that firms are

willing to pay to completely eliminate ...

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

first obstacle thataffect the

operational growthof business

all corruption inSierra Leone’spublic sector

all corruption inpublic sector, by

size of firm

largemediumsmall

36%

37%

38%

39%

40%

41%

42%

43%

44%

45%

46%

47%

% of managers reporting that there is a significant negative effect of these forms of corruption on the

country’s business environment

Bribes to Parliament

Bribes to executive officials

Bribes to local authorities

Bribes to Judiciary

Bribes to Central Bank

Bribes to regulatory officials


21

A.7 The quality of education services (households)

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Teacher

Eldest child going to school

Teacher


Teacher


Teacher


Wes

tern

Are

aE

aste

rnP

rovi

nce

Nor

ther

nP

rovi

nce

Sou

ther

nP

rovi

nce

% of respondents reporting hours spent in school by..

1 or 2 3 to 5 more than 5


22

Chapter 1: General Introduction

1.1 Background

1.1.1. Corruption and bad governance are widely considered among the most important

factors responsible for the state of socio-economic decline in post-independence Sierra Leone. Corruption, particularly among politicians, state functionaries and public officials - in its diverse forms including bribery, misappropriation, embezzlement, ‘voucher-gate’, 'contract-gate', nepotism, under-invoicing, tax evasion etc. - has become so rampant over the past three decades that the resources of the state (state revenues) virtually disappeared into private pockets and bank accounts both at home and abroad. Mis-governance and an inept/inefficient and unproductive Civil Service have not helped the situation. In effect there was total neglect or failure on the part of past governments to tackle corruption or address the needs of the mass of the population in terms of the provision of basic social services/facilities - health, education, water and sanitation, electricity infrastructure (good road and communication network), support to private sector development, employment creation.

1.1.2. As a consequence, the country has witnessed widespread and increased poverty so that

the gap between the haves and the have nots has continued to widen. Most Sierra Leoneans became so disgruntled that many (especially the unemployed youth) provided ready instruments for the civil strife that engulfed the country in the past decade. The same social ills and injustice brought about by widespread corruption and bad governance were advanced as reasons by the leadership of the rebellion. Genuine or not, these reasons were so compelling that the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) quickly extended its influence over most of the country by the mid to late 1990s in its campaign to remove successive governments from power.

1.1.3. Apparently, it was in appreciation of the factors discussed above that the Government,

(with support from the Department for International Development (DFID)) decided to set up the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) in 2000 to curb corruption. It was for these same reasons that the Government initiated programmes for the reform and restructuring of the governance system and has been putting in place measures geared toward making the civil service more professional, efficient, productive and dignified.

1.1.4. In the same vein, the Government of Sierra Leone approached DFID in late 1999 to

provide financial support for an Anti-Corruption Survey. This support was provided and DFID commissioned a study entitled "National Perception and Attitudes Towards Corruption in Sierra Leone" The study, which was carried out between March and June 2000, provided baseline data on the perceptions, opinions and attitudes of Sierra Leoneans toward corruption as well as gauged their level of awareness of the Anti-


23

Corruption Act (ACA) and their level of confidence in the Commissioners who were yet to assume office.

1.1.5 The findings of the said study have apparently been useful to the effort of Government

in general and the ACC in particular in instituting measures and strategies, particularly preventive, to curb corruption and focus attention on institutions where corrupt practices were considered to be quite serious.

1.1.6 It was but essential that a follow-up study be conducted in order to ascertain how Sierra

Leoneans now view corruption and Government's efforts at curbing the menace two years after the ACC has been established and functioning. The follow-up study would also go a step further to looking into institutional, bureaucratic and administrative issues of governance and service delivery that have implications for performance and/or corruption. This is particularly in terms of the interaction between the public sector and the business/private sector.

1.2. Justification

1.2.1. Given the severe effects of widespread corruption on society and the widely

acknowledged view that it is a principal factor for the state of socio-economic decay, poverty and instability in Sierra Leone, as in many other developing countries, one cannot overemphasise the benefits of a corrupt free system or one in which this social menace is kept at its lowest. In the absence of such a system it was difficult if not impossible to realise good governance, equitable distribution of state resources/improved standard of living for the majority of Sierra Leoneans, stability, economic development and growth.

1.2.2. The ACA was passed into law in February 2000 and ACC established in 2000, about

two years ago. A baseline study undertaken prior to the members of the Commission taking office had as its overall objective "to investigate into and analyse the people's knowledge and thoughts on what constitutes corruption, corrupt practices, responses to Government's attempt at curbing corruption, level of appreciation and confidence in the Anti-Corruption's mandate, operations and its key staff”. Among other things, the study revealed: over 90 percent of respondents considered corruption to be rampant and a similar proportion stated it was rampant in "most government departments"; bribery was regarded as the most common corrupt practice; the highest rate of corruption was said to exist in the Ministry of Youth, Education and Sport, followed by the Judiciary and the Ministry of Marine Resources; 57 percent of respondents were aware of the ACC/ ACA compared to 43 percent that were not. It is but essential that a follow-up study be done to determine how much impact the ACC has created on Sierra Leoneans over the period and to what extent these perceptions and views might have changed.

1.2.3. Given the critical linkage between governance and in particular the public sector and

corruption, this follow-up study would also bring into focus factors and determinants of


24

service delivery and performance of the public sector, issues pertaining to recruitment, capacity building, upward mobility and the reward system, all of which have implications for low productivity and the tendency to indulge in corrupt practices.

1.2.4. In a similar vein the ways in which the citizenry and the private sector interact with the

public sector in accessing and using public services and utilities are critical to good governance and overall national development. It is essential to investigate the relationships (positive or negative) between institutional arrangements, the behaviour of public officials, the attitude of civil society and governance. The implications of such interactions for corrupt practices are worthy of investigation.

1.2.5. Clearly, the results of the study would provide the basis for the ACC and public

institutions, departments and parastatals to evaluate their activities over the period and make possible the design and implementation of strategies for bridging gaps and overcoming impediments to success. The study report would be useful in refining the operations of state institutions and/or officials as well as adopting practical steps to improve on the capacity of state enterprises and to a certain extent private ventures to provide quality and more efficient services for the Sierra Leonean public. The results would thus help the design of a national policy/strategy geared toward curbing corruption and enhancing service delivery, performance and productivity in the public sector and reducing the losses to the national economy due to bad governance, institutional inadequacies and corruption.

1.2.6. The results of this study, if widely disseminated, would help promote the culture of

popular participation in critical decision making processes and transparency and would engender the feeling in Sierra Leoneans that their views on such matters are regarded highly, thus enhancing their cooperation with the ACC.

1.2.7. In order to ensure a successful implementation of the Governance and Corruption study,

and promote a sustainable collaboration among local stakeholders, the Governance Reform Secretariat (GRS) took leading role in this effort. Under the auspices of the GRS a Steering Committee was set up, which comprises representatives from the Government, the ACC, the civil society, the Central Statistics Office, the media and the international community. The Steering Committee, chaired by Mr Emmanuel Osho Coker, has had to draft the action plan, formulate the terms of reference and oversee the diagnostic study. The diagnostic study comprises three separate surveys of public officials, households, and enterprises with about 3000 interviews. It builds upon the 2000 DFID study. It is however broader in scope since it aims at assessing the overall quality of governance on the basis of respondents’ actual experiences.

1.2.8. The user survey targets households in their role as users of public services, subject to

regulations and laws, and as clients for licenses and permits. The enterprises survey is directed toward firms in their dual role as service users as well as providers who are subject to laws, regulations, licenses and permits. The public official survey focuses on


25

their roles as policy makers and providers of public services. The ‘triangulation’ of the data from these three sources provides for a detailed picture of institutional strengths and weaknesses of governance in Sierra Leone.

1.3 Objectives

1.3.1. The overall objective of the study is to generate objective in-depth information essential

for the design and development of a public sector reform package. The report emanating from the diagnostic study is intended to provide the basis and framework for policy measure meant to improve governance, capacity building, public- sector performance and service delivery and to tackle corruption.

1.3.2. The specific objectives include:

1. To ascertain the performance of key public institutions and their effectiveness in service delivery from the perspective of households and business enterprises;

2. To determine the degree of interaction/inter-relationship between the public and

service providers;

3. Determine the impact of corruption on the process and outcome of this interaction;

4. Investigate the dynamics of administrative procedures and decision making in the public sector;

5. Determine the implication for (or effect on) good governance/public sector

performance of such procedures and other factors (including corrupt practices).


26

1.4. Sampling9

1.4.1. A sample size of 1,800 households, 600 public officials and 600 business enterprises were targeted for interview. Household heads were randomly selected in all the four regions of the country on the basis of a quota system to ensure that each one accounted for a fraction of the sample that is fairly proportional to its size. Business enterprises were classified into large scale (50 respondents), medium scale (150 respondents) and small scale (400 representatives). List of the first two categories were compiled from which respondents were systematically sampled. For the petty traders, the sample was distributed among the various district headquarters from the same selected EAs as for the household survey and using the same quota system. (See appendix for a detailed account of sampling and data collection procedures).

1.5. Scope and Structure of Report

1.5.1. The Public Officials Survey targeted respondents from various Government and Quasi-

government institutions, including the Executive, Parliament, the Judiciary, the Civil Service, Parastatals and Regional and District Development Committees.

1.5.2. The Enterprise Survey focused on members of business and commercial firms and

institutions as well as of business community/Petty Traders Association. 1.5.3. The Household/User Survey covered heads of households who are Sierra Leoneans that

are beneficiaries of public services and clients for licenses and permits. 1.5.4. The report has been structured as follows:

v Chapter One provides general introduction and has included background to the study, justification and objectives.

v Chapter Two represents the core of the report, as it provides synthetic

discussion and analysis of governance and public sector management issues from the perspectives of the service providers (public officials) and the service users (households and business enterprises).

v Chapter Three follows on from Chapter Two in discussing and analysing

corruption, which is considered to be critical to service delivery and the performance of public institutions. Here again the experiences and judgements of service providers and service users are analysed and balanced against each other.

v Chapter Four presents general analytical conclusions that could be drawn from

the survey results on the basis of which recommendations are outlined for 9 For details on study design and methodology, see Appendix 1.


27

possible policy action geared toward the restructuring of the governance system in Sierra Leone.


28

Chapter Two: Governance Analysis

2.1. Key Findings on Governance and Public Sector Performance

2.1.1. Public sector management and administrative procedures: Results from the public officials survey indicate deficiency in the entire system pointing to poor and inefficient budget and procurement processes, a non-participatory decision-making process, political interference in recruitment and promotion matters, and inadequate opportunities for training and manpower development. On the positive note, however, the public officials’ results reveal the observance of certain basic administrative principles and procedures including announcement of vacancies and written communications both within and between departments/organisations. Perhaps, most important is the overwhelming support recorded by respondents for public sector reform measures.

2.1.2. Public sector performance and service delivery: The study results have revealed widespread dissatisfaction with public sector performance and service delivery on the part of households and business enterprises, especially with key institutions including Customs and Income Tax, Surveys and Lands, the Judiciary and Ministry of Works. Interestingly, however, public officials generally thought that the public’s perception on the quality of services rendered by their individual organisations was high and that their performance was satisfactory to the public. This particular result must be treated with caution given the fact that the individual’s self-evaluation of himself (or the institution he belongs to) could hardly be devoid of bias and is likely to be influenced by the urge to present a positive picture. In this regard the results from households and business respondents on the assessment of public sector performance and service delivery should be given greater consideration than those of the public officials.


29

2.1.3. Service users’ evaluation of key services: Only the household and business enterprises surveys made provision for evaluation of basic social service reflecting on the performance of the respective public institutions. Results on a few major services that seem to influence the well being of the public most, as shown in Figure1, are summarised below; see also Tables3 and 4 in Appendix. Detailed analysis (including regional analysis for households) on the experiences of service users in their dealings with the public sector as well as their evaluation of the services is done in 2.6.

Figure1: Households' and Business Enterprises' Assessment of some major public services

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

Education

Health

Income Tax

Law courts/NA court

Surveys & Lands

Percentage that rate services as poor

Households Business Enterprises


30

• Health services: A significant proportion of respondents from both households and business enterprises (48.4 and 40.2 respectively) considered services provided by the health sector to be poor.

• Education services: Education was one of the institutions on which the total number of valid responses was significantly high - 1,650 for households and 552 for business enterprises - the majority of which (about 66% and 76% respectively) recorded a positive assessment. The relatively low proportion of respondents, about one third for households and one fourth for business enterprises, who gave a negative assessment of this sector, indicates that on the basis of the survey results the majority of service users were satisfied with the services provided by the public education sector.

• Income Tax: It is interesting to note that more or less the same proportion of

respondents (about half) from both the household and business enterprises surveys assessed the services of the Income Tax department as poor.

• Surveys and Lands: Even though the number of valid responses was relatively low, both households and business enterprises’ respondents gave the most uncomplimentary assessment to the Surveys and Lands department (77% and 74% poor respectively).

• The Judiciary: More than half of all household respondents, as compared to less than half of business enterprises regarded the services provided by the law courts as poor. It is interesting to note – even though only about 70 percent of business respondents gave an opinion – that the quality of services of the law courts received a more positive assessment from this component of the study; 64.7 percent as compared with 47 percent of household heads. Could this mean that the bulk of the business people often managed to have justice prevail in their favour?

• Household heads assessed the rest of the social services positively. These include water supply services (54%), the Administrator and Registrar-General’s Office (60%) traffic police/police in general (64%). The corresponding assessment by business enterprises was positive as well, represented by a higher proportion of respondents, albeit with the same pattern of fewer definitive responses on the issues.


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2.2. Major Factors Influencing Personnel Recruitment, Management and Reward System

2.2.1 The quality of personnel, especially from the middle to the senior level, within the public sector - in terms of calibre/qualification, motivation and dedication to duty - is a critical determinant of productivity and performance in the public sector. These attributes are in turn determined by key administrative decision making and operational procedures relating to recruitment, manpower development, the reward system and mechanisms for regulating professional conduct. This section analyses the factors (both internal and extraneous) that tend to affect personnel administration and management from the perspective of public officials themselves. As the subsequent analysis and discussion will reveal there are some positive findings about public sector personnel that are to do mainly with procedural and operational practices, where as in areas of conditions of service and the level of satisfaction of public officials, there remains a great deal to be desired.

2.2.2 Salary delays: As indicated in Figure2, 64 percent of respondents reported experiencing

salary delays in their institutions; the survey data further reveal that according to 62 percent of the said respondents salaries were delayed for more than one week! These results are far from encouraging as salary delays have a tendency to aggravate the problem of low salaries and help to de-motivate public officials even further. Table 5 (in Appendix) gives a breakdown of experiences of salary delay by institution/organization of public officials, showing that the various sectors of the Public Service suffer salary delays at differing degrees. However, according to the data, the problem was greatest in the Ministry of Education (81%), followed by Local Government (79%) and Social Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs (75%). Delays were reported to be least among the National commissions, followed by the Ministry of Development and the Parastatals.


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Figure2: Public Officials' Evaluation of Some Governance Issues

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

Do Public Officials influencehiring decisions?

Are there sanctions for poorperformance?

Are there sanctions forunprofessional conduct?

Have you participated intraining activities

Was salary ever paid lateduring 2001-2002

Percentage reporting Yes

2.2.3. Sanctions for unprofessional conduct: In an attempt to determine the extent to which

employees’ behaviour is regulated by professional standards, respondents were asked whether in the year prior to the study, anyone in their organization was sanctioned or punished for any action proved to be a breach of professional conduct. As shown in Figure2.1, close to 50 percent of the responses showed that sanctions were imposed for unprofessional conduct and an even lower proportion said the same for poor performance. As one would expect, Table 6 in Appendix shows that the imposition of sanctions for unprofessional conduct was reported most among the Sierra Leone Police (75%); this was followed by the Parastatals (67%) and then the Ministry of Defence (56%). The Ministry of Social Welfare Gender and Children’s Affairs accounted for the least reported cases of sanctions (18%), followed by the Ministry of Development (25%) and the Ministry of Local Government (34%).

2.2.4. Training of personnel on the job: The data indicates that some form of training was

provided in the past two years prior to the conduct of the survey in which 57 percent of the respondents participated. This shows that a lower yet significant 43 percent of respondents did not have access to any form of training within this same period,


33

suggesting serious shortcomings in the upgrading of existing staff through the application of new skills and the induction of new staff. While the result points to a reasonable effort at personnel training, the proportion never been trained is significant enough to influence motivation, performance and productivity. Table7 in Appendix presents results on respondents’ training experience within the two years prior to the survey for the various public organizations. The Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs recorded the highest proportion of respondents who had access to training (75%), followed by the Ministry of Justice (64%) and the Sierra Leone Police (62.5%). The Ministry of Development accounted for the lowest proportion of respondents who participated in some training (40%) followed by the Ministry of Local Government (47.8%).

2.2.5. Recruitment and Promotions: A lower, yet significant, proportion of respondents

(26%) stated that the influence of political party officials on recruitment/promotions was an issue in their institution. This does not augur well for national development. Apart from the fact that persons more qualified may have been left out unjustly, the effect is that invaluable service may be missed and there is the tendency also for certain individuals counting on their connection in high places to take things for granted in terms of productivity and their level of efforts to enhance output/performance. Table 8 (see Appendix) reveals that Local Government recorded the greatest level of influence (36%), while the Executive/Legislative recorded the least (0%).

2.2.6 Announcement of vacancies: On announcement of vacancies, a standard institutional

procedure for recruitment, a significant 66 percent of respondents indicated that this was a practice within their organisation (either always, mostly or frequently); see Table9 in Appendix. Ideally, in a system that firmly adheres to transparency and meritocracy, one would expect this practice – for which budgetary allocations are normally made - to be the norm in most if not all instances. The results show that the announcement of vacancies was observed most by the National Commissions (96.5%), followed by the Ministry of Defence (89%) and then the Sierra Leone Police (77.5%). Ironically the Ministry of Information accounted for the highest proportion of respondents who stated that vacancies were not announced (72.5%); this was followed by the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs (50%) and the Ministry of Agriculture (48%).

While the general picture with regard to announcement of vacancies by Government institutions is positive, we can argue that tapping the requisite capacities to ensure efficiency and productivity would be contingent not only upon a transparent advertisement but more so, on ensuring that all the procedures that follow – short-listing, interviews and selection – are transparent and based purely on merit. Such specifics could however not be ascertained by the survey.

2.2.7 Proportion of staff members qualified for their rank/position: An impressive 89

percent of the respondents indicated that (many/most or all) personnel in their organisation were qualified for their positions and ranks, as compared to an insignificant 11 percent who said that this was not the case in their organization; see


34

Table10 in Appendix. In the ministries of Defence, Justice and Development a reasonable proportion of respondents stated that ‘very few’ of the personnel in their specific offices were qualified – 30 percent, 29 percent and 20 percent respectively.

2.2.8 Remuneration and incentive: With over 60 percent of respondents earning below

Le200, 000 ($100) and only 13 percent earning Le400,000 ($200) or more (Table11 in Appendix), it is not surprising that 72 percent of respondents stated that their salary level was either unsatisfactory or completely unsatisfactory as shown in Figure3.

Although the high level of dissatisfaction is apparently influenced by their poor remuneration in absolute terms, it is probable that public servants also view their situation in relative terms, that is, with reference to what their compatriots with identical qualifications and experience working in private and non-governmental institutions earn. Clearly, such a paltry salary situation and a very high level of dissatisfaction of public officials was bound to have significant implications for their level of commitment; indeed many have argued that the low salaries create the temptation or incentive for corruption. While there is no moral basis for such an argument, it is but necessary that some drastic measures be taken to raise the reward package for public officials, as this would invariably increase their job satisfaction. Furthermore, while it would not entirely eliminate room for corruption, it would at least strengthen the hand of Government and the relevant institutions in dealing with cases of corruption in the public sector.

As a measure to encourage the maintenance and upkeep of excellent and professional standards certain institutions have in place a special reward (incentive) scheme. A lower proportion (30%) of respondents stated that such a scheme for the reward of excellent professional achievements existed in their organisation, as against a similar proportion (39%) that stated otherwise. As Table12 in Appendix reveals the Ministry of Defence stands out among the various Government institutions in the offer of reward for excellent professional standards (67%). Though much lower, the Sierra Leone Police recorded the second most significant statistic in this regard (46%), followed by the Educational sector (40%).


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2.2.9 Job satisfaction and security: In the light of the results discussed above, it is interesting that when asked to assess the public sector now as compared to a couple of years ago in terms of overall working environment, the majority, 63 percent, of respondents, as shown in Figure 4 said it was better, now than before. However, a significant degree of disillusionment could be seen in the contrary view expressed by the rest of the respondents that may have adverse implication for productivity and performance. This suggests that there is still a lot of room for improvement.

Figure3: Public Officials's level of satisfaction with salary

Unsatisfactory72%

Fairly Satisfactory23%

Satisfactory5%

Figure4: Working in the public sector is generraly the same/better/worse than before - Public Officials' views

Worse28%

The Same9%

Better63%


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With regard to job security a highly significant 83 percent of respondents said that their job was secure (including those who said ‘fairly secure’ ‘secure’ and ‘quite secure’); see Table13 in Appendix. Thus job security – a fundamental factor that many people consider in seeking employment – can be seen as at least one positive feature of public sector employment, which apparently makes it more attractive than certain other (often better paid) jobs.

2.2.9 Factors influencing key personnel management decisions: Figure 5 gives a picture of the survey findings on the effect of certain factors on personnel management decisions. From the positive perspective, at least 60 percent of respondents (in each case, except for one) stated that personnel management decisions were:

• based on professional experience/merit (79%);

• based on level of education (78%); • were either seldom or never influenced by illegal payment (72%);

• vacancies were announced appropriately (69%);

• made in a transparent manner (66.5%);

• subject to regular audits (66.5%);

• useful for the institution’s improvement (63%);

• subject to formal procedure of appeal (62%);

• based on seniority or age (50%).

However, the proportion of respondents who stated that these procedures were either never or were seldom the case in their institution, although smaller, is significant enough to be an issue of concern. This is especially so with regard to transparency and regular auditing, leaving sufficient room for corrupt practices and inefficiency. The survey results suggest (see Table14 in Appendix) that the Ministry of Defence is the most transparent in personnel related decision making process (100%), followed by the Ministry of Information (87.5%) and the Parastatals (79%), while the Ministry of Agriculture is the least transparent (43%), followed by Social Welfare Gender and Children’s Affairs (46%) and Development (50%).


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Figure 5: Factors influencing personnel management decisions

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

Based on family ties/friendship

Influence by illegal payments

Based on political ties/pressure

Based on influential connections

Based on seniority

Subject to formal procedure of appeal

Useful for the improvement of institution

subjected to regular audits

Made in a transparent manner

Vacancies announced appropraitely

Based on level of education

Based on professional experience

% stating that factor has an influence

From the negative perspective, it is important to note that over 50 percent of respondents reported that personnel management decisions were:

• based on influential connections; • based on political ties or pressure and

• based on family ties or friendship (25 percent in this case)

Table15 in Appendix presents results on the influence of political pressure and influential connections on personnel management decisions for various public institutions. The two sets of results reflect a similar pattern. For the influence of both factors the Ministry of Defence tops the list (accounting for 57% in either case). The Ministry of Agriculture ranks second for the influence of political pressure (50%) and third for influential connections (51.8%), while the Ministry of Local Government ranks third for Political pressure, the Ministry of Health ranks second for influential connections.


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2.2.11 Observance of written procedures and enforcement of decisions relating to personnel

management: The results indicate that within the public service the general practice is for personnel management decisions to be formally written and strictly applied, with about 84 percent and 80 percent of all respondents, respectively, stating that such was the case (either always, mostly or frequently); see Table16 in Appendix. An almost equal proportion (78%) referred to ‘excessive number of administrative steps’. This borders on ‘redtapism’ (or excessive recourse to bureaucracies), which could be a major impediment to service delivery or productivity.

We can note, on the basis of the survey data, that in a significant number of public institutions, top-level administrative decisions pertaining to personnel management are largely influenced by laid down rules and standards/guidelines, including formal appeal, auditing and transparency and that such decisions are not influenced by illegal payments. Moreover such decisions are not only formally documented, but are as well strictly applied. These positive determinants are important and could promote efficiency and productivity. Their effect, would however be undermined by the negative extraneous non-regulatory factors of influential connections, political and family ties that are experienced in half the number of all situations, as these tend to border on the individual/personal interest of the decision makers or down right acts of corruption. Such a situation was bound to adversely affect staff morale, dedication and even retention with adverse consequence on performance and service delivery. We could infer that in such circumstances even the best laid down rules, standards and procedures that determine operations become ineffectual in performing their regulatory roles.

2.3. Analysis of Public Sector Management System and Employees’ Understanding of

Institutional Objectives, Roles and Responsibilities 2.3.1 The procedures and methods by which the public sector is administered and governed

are fundamental to its performance and service delivery. If the system follows acceptable procedures, norms and practices, then, all other things remaining constant, the public sector would be efficient and productive. This section presents results on analysis of the experiences of public officials on the ways in which their institutions are managed as well as their performance.

2.3.2 Inter-departmental and inter-organisational communication: A regular horizontal

flow of information between departments in the same institution or organisation and across line organisations is germane to overall service delivery in the public sector. To this end, nearly all respondents (97%) stated that there is often if not always communications within their departments. Similarly the overwhelming majority (93%) stated that there was a certain amount of inter-departmental communications going on; see Table17 in Appendix.


39

2.3.3 Participatory nature of decision-making: The degree of participation in the decision-making process on the part of all key members of a work force is as important as (if not more than) making sure that decisions are communicated to all and sundry. This ensures more than anything else that decisions are easily implemented and adhered to. Decisions emanating from such participatory process could easily guarantee institutional efficiency and productivity and enhance service delivery, thus increasing the citizens’ confidence in the public sector. It is interesting to note that a significant 44 percent of the respondents acknowledged that senior managers never made provision for inputs from their subordinates in arriving at major decisions, while a similar proportion said that key decisions were participatory enough in their institutions, with the rest of the respondents not taking any definite position; (Table18 in Appendix). This result diminishes the positive effect of communicating decisions or making them transparent, which was generally reported to be the case. For, personnel may tend to have very little motivation in implementing decisions that were merely handed down to them, which they ought to have contributed to in the first place. In the few instances where decision-making was said to be all-inclusive, a significant 39 percent of respondents stated that senior managers never considered the opinions of sub-ordinates. These results are further reinforced by the response from 54 percent of all respondents that several levels existed within their institution for decision- making, and that of a similar proportion (52%) that the decision-making process was centralised. This meant that in about half of the institutions decisions are taken at the top and passed down through various levels. Clearly such a top-laden (or top-bottom) approach in decision-making does not augur well for efficiency and productivity. There could be resentment arising from lack of ownership of internal policies often considered as an imposition.

Table19 in Appendix and Figure6 below present a picture of the centralisation of decision-making process across various Government institutions/organisations with the Ministry of Agriculture representing the worst case scenario, followed by Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Defence, while the Parastatals represent the institutions where decision-making was least centralised (or most participatory) followed by Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs and Ministry of Local Government.


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Figure 6: Public Officials' Views on Centralization of Decision Making in the Public Service

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

Min. of Agriculture

Min. of Justice

Min. of Defence

Min. of Development

S.L Police

Min. of Education

Min. of Finance

Min. of Health

Min. of Information

Nat. Commissions

Min. of Local Govt.

Others

Min. of Social Welfare

Para-statals

% that rate as centralised

2.3.4 Recording of managerial decisions: It is interesting to note that only half of all

respondents indicated that there was a system for recording managerial decisions taken within their institutions; see Table18 in Appendix. For the several institutions where such a practice is not followed this could undermine accountability and follow-up actions, which are essential ingredients of an efficient system.

2.3.5 Performance Evaluation: Every organisation needs a mechanism for feed back to

determine the degree of compliance of employees’ efforts with the overall strategic objective of the organisation as well as the degree to which individual employees are performing in relation to their official job descriptions and level of posts. This exercise often needs to be done on a periodic basis, as it ought to be ongoing for as long as employees remain on the job and the organisation continues to be in existence. Of the five hundred and ninety respondents targeted nation-wide, 43 percent indicated that they are evaluated once every year, while 15 percent stated that they are evaluated more than


41

once in a year and 5 percent said every two years; 30 percent said that they had never been evaluated; see Table20 in Appendix. To facilitate the evaluation of performance there should be written standards of performance. Consistent with the above statistics, 70 percent said that such formal written performance standards existed in their organisation, which suggests that in a significant number of cases performance evaluation is carried out and is supported by written standards; see Table20 in Appendix. Assuming that respondents were sincere on this issue, then there is the observance of a very important instrument for enhancing performance within the system.

2.3.6 Provision of job descriptions: The survey also sought to determine whether upon being

appointed the respondent was provided with the usually expected job descriptions. More than three-quarters (80%) of respondents answered ‘Yes’. As Table21 in Appendix shows, while each Public institution recorded above 60 percent of respondents who acknowledged the provision of job descriptions, the Parastatals and National Commissions accounted for the highest (94% each), followed by the Ministry of Justice (92%). It is commendable to note that the bulk of respondents could recall being provided with a written job description although the contents and its suitability in terms of its functional relevance and appropriateness could not be determined. Assuming, however that job descriptions should reflect employees’ understanding of institutional roles, the result on this issue above might suggest that for a significant proportion of respondents the job description would hardly be of any purpose.

2.3.7 Consistency in institutional policies: Policy consistency within an organisation is very

important especially in ensuring continuity and sustainability of the organisation’s goals. On this issue 71.5 percent of respondents agreed that there was policy consistency in their organisation (with differing levels of conviction); see Table22 in Appendix. Table21 presents detailed results on the various Government institutions, with the Ministry of Development recording the most impressive statistic (100%), followed by the Ministry of Information (80%) and the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs (78.5%). The level of inconsistency in policies of certain public sector institutions, as indicated by over a quarter of all respondents, in institutions such as the National Commissions (35.5%), the Ministry of Education (30%) and the Ministries of Justice and defence (28%) is significant. This could bring into question these institutions’ ability to meet the objectives or obligations for which they were established.

2.3.8 Existence of formal written Mission Statement: As Table22 in Appendix reveals, the

majority of respondents, 69.8 percent stated that their organisation had a formal written statement as against 30.2 percent who said this was not the case. The latter statistic is significant and is consistent with the significant number of respondents who expressed lack of understanding about their institutional roles/responsibilities.

2.3.9 Contribution of office space and equipment to performance: On the issue of office

space, a higher proportion (58.5%) of respondents expressed that this contributed positively to meeting their needs; see Table24 in Appendix. A slightly more significant


42

proportion (62%) of respondents acknowledged the contribution of office equipment, such as computers, to their performance; see table23. With regard to office space, the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs recorded the most positive result (79%), followed by the Ministry of Development (70%) and then the Ministry of Education (66%) while the Ministry of Defence accounted for the lowest percentage (33%), followed by the National Commissions (34%) and then the Ministry of Finance (36%). For office equipment, on the other hand, the Ministry of Finance accounted for the highest statistic (82%), followed by the Ministry of Development (80%) and the Parastatals (70%), while the Sierra Leone Police recorded the lowest (37%), followed by the National Commissions (50%) and then the Ministry of Health (55%). The results show that in the area of providing the requisite equipment and facilities required for optimum output from personnel, for a good number of departments the public sector is doing well. The indication also is that the majority of respondents were using such facilities to the desired effect.

2.3.10 Employees’ understanding of institutional roles and responsibilities: As Table26 in

Appendix reveals, a significant 45.9 percent of respondents agreed that they did understand their various institutional roles and responsibilities, with a similar proportion (47.8%) giving the forthright response that they did not understand the roles/responsibilities that their institution demanded of them, while 6.3 percent were indifferent. As Table20 in Appendix indicates the Ministry of Justice recorded the lowest proportion of understanding of institutional roles (28.5%), followed by the Ministry of Defence (30%) and then the Ministry of Finance (39%). On the other hand, the Ministry of Information recorded the highest rate of understanding, followed by Development (60%) and then Social Welfare Gender and Children’s Affairs (57%). This is a critical issue to be addressed by any policy reform measures, as it is unlikely that officials would measure up to the expectations of their institutions in terms of service delivery and performance if they did not clearly understand their roles and responsibilities.

2.3.11 Employees’ understanding of institution’s objectives and strategies: Consistent with

the results on institutional roles and responsibilities, only 45.6 of public officials interviewed agreed that all levels of public officials had a clear understanding of their institution’s objectives and strategies; see Table27 in Appendix. The Ministry of Defence recorded the lowest level of understanding (22%), followed by the Ministry of Finance (33%) and Ministry of Health (44%), while the Ministry of development recorded the highest proportion (60%), followed by the Sierra Leone Police (59%) and the Ministries of Information and Social Welfare Gender and Children’s Affairs (50%).

2.3.12 Identifying with Organisation’s objectives/strategies by various levels within

institution: 51.7 percent of the respondents agreed that various levels of personnel in their institution identified themselves with its objectives/strategies, as against an almost equal percentage that stated otherwise. As Table28 reveals the Ministry of Defence, the National Commissions and the Ministry of Justice include institutions wherein a significant proportion of respondents did not agree that all levels of staff in their


43

organisation did identify themselves with its objectives and strategies – 60 percent, 48 percent and 43 percent respectively.

2.4. Budget and Procurement 2.4.1 Budgetary issues are critical to the administration and operational activities of all

government institutions and organisations. Budgets are public funds broken down into units and shared among various public offices, departments and institutions and the efficiency and productivity of every institution depends to a very large extent on the ways in which its budget, whether adequate or not, is managed and administered. In public institutions, procurement is a key aspect of budgetary management and rumours, scandals, suspicions or cases of corruption often tend to revolve around procurement. This section discusses and analyses responses from the public officials interviewed on these key issues. It should, however, be observed that valid responses are generally below 100 percent and the number of responses stating ‘Don’t know/not sure’ is higher here than for any other modules within the survey instrument; this is not surprising as only very senior members of the public service would be in a position to provide answers to such questions. This could be partly explained as arising from the fact that most middle and junior cadre personnel do not have schedules relating to such issues.

2.4.2 Documentation, clarity and transparency of budget administration: On the question whether budget administration/procedures were formally documented, 80 percent of the respondents who gave a definitive response (representing about half of all respondents) said they were. Exactly the same kind of results was recorded on simplicity and clarity of budget administration. On the other hand, 59 percent of respondents out of a similar number of definite responses stated that the budget process was transparent; see Table29 in Appendix. The response for documentation and clarity/simplicity of budget procedures is so overwhelming while the proportion that recorded transparency in budget administration is significant enough to easily provide for accountability on the part of several institutions in the public sector. However, whether or not institutions generally accounted for public funds that were put at their disposal is a different matter and this could only be ensured if proper follow-up and auditing mechanisms were in place and enforced. On the other hand, if transparency of budget administrative decisions should be considered as a proxy measure for accountability, then it is obvious that accountability would be a problem for a significant 40 percent of the institutions for which valid responses were obtained. Table30 gives detailed results of transparency of budget administration by organization. The number of valid responses for each institution/ministry is significantly low, which suggests that a significant number of the respondents were either not informed about financial matters in their organization or merely chose not to volunteer a response to such a critical issue. The few valid responses however show that the Ministry of Development recorded the highest percentage for transparency (100%), followed by Ministry of Agriculture (75%) and Ministry of Justice (70%). For ‘not transparent’ responses, the Sierra Leone Police topped the list (58.3%), followed by the Parastatals (53%) and then the Ministries of Health and Information (50%).


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2.4.3 Bureaucracy in budget administration: The majority of respondents, 69 percent out of the total (about half of all public officials), who gave a definite response based on their knowledge on (or willingness to respond to) this issue, acknowledged excessive administrative steps in the process of budget management/decisions, (Table31, in Appendix). Based on these results, the Ministry of Information would represent the most bureaucratic institution in budget management decisions (100%), followed by the Ministry of Justice (80%), and then the Ministry of Local Government (79%). The least bureaucratic is the Ministry of Development (33%), followed by the Ministry of Defence (40%) and the Sierra Leone Police (47%). Given the general tendency for too much bureaucracy to derail operational procedures and processes, we may infer that in this kind of situation, decisions and actions relating to dispensation of institutional funds would be arduous and slow; this could be inimical to productivity and performance especially in cases that demand urgent budgetary decision.

2.4.4 Budgetary supervision: As Table32 in Appendix shows, 55 percent of the total number of respondents gave a definite response and most of these (85.4%) stated that budgetary supervision, which should involve managers ensuring that rules are followed, was in practice in their institution.

2.4.5 Strictness in the application of budget administration: Nearly half (49%) of all respondents stated that all related budgetary decisions were strictly applied, while a significant 35 percent indicated a non-enforcement of budget administrative decisions, with 16% stating that they did not know (or were not sure) whether or not this was the case; see Table32 in Appendix.

2.4.6 Extraneous influences on budget management: A host of factors were used to assess and determine whether external forces do have an influence on the budget management process, see Figure7, see also Table33.

• Budget process and political pressure: 39 percent endorsed the existence of a practice of political influence, 71 percent denied the involvement of politics on the management process of the budget.

• The budget process and regional ties: 32 percent accepted a certain degree of regional influence on the process, whilst 68 percent declared no regional influence or lack of awareness of it.

• Influential connection and budget process: 33 percent accepted that

influential connections were playing a part in the process; 68 percent said that this was not the case.

• Influence of illegal payment on the budgetary management: 30 percent

accepted that illegal payments influenced budgetary decision while 70 percent said such influence did not exist.


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Figure 7: Influence of external factors on budget aministration - as reported by public officials

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45

Illegal payments

Influenced by regional ties

Based on influentialconnections

Political pressure

Percentage reporting that the factors do influence

Clearly, the above results show that in a good number of institutions budget management was affected by one external influence or another, this ranged from regional affiliations, political connections to illegal payment. Here again, there is evidence of sufficient grounds for impropriety with regard to budget management in various public institutions.

2.4.7 Budget planning and monitoring: Budgets are normally instruments for planning and

could be used to achieve institutional objectives. An attempt was made in the study to determine whether budget planning had any relation with institutional fulfilment. The respondents had some idea about this relationship with 63 percent stating that within their institution this was the case (either always, mostly or frequently) as against 37 percent who said it was either seldom or never the case; see Table34 in Appendix. On the issue of budget expenditure monitoring a significant 88 percent said this was a


46

practice in their institution, while 80 percent stated that budget expenditure monitoring was fairly effective, effective or very effective; see Table34.

2.4.8 Budget loss arising from irregularities: Indeed respondents accepted the occurrence of

irregularities in budget expenditure. On the issue of loss arising out of fraud, 51 percent admitted it did happen - to a moderate, reasonable and great extent – while 49 percent expressed that it did not happen at all or it happened to a negligible extent; see Table35 in Appendix.

2.4.9 Relationship between staff incompetence and loss: 72 percent of respondents accepted

that there was some form of linkage between staff incompetence and budget loss; see Table35 in Appendix (ranging from moderate to great extent in terms of magnitude), while the rest indicated that this was not the case.

2.4.10 Formalisation of procurement guidelines: This is cardinal to efficient financial

management practices. Hence the survey attempted to determine whether guidelines, policies or regulations are formalised. The responses were as follows: 70 percent indicated that between one quarter to three quarters of any given time guidelines are formalised in writing, 26 percent stated that formalization is conducted in writing all of the time, with 4 percent stating that it is never done in their institutions; see Table36 in Appendix.

2.4.11 Institutional procurement decision making process: As Figure8 illustrates about 60

percent of respondents stated that decision making pertaining to procurement in their institutions was characterised by too many levels, while about 50 percent said that the process was either well centralised or too centralised.


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Figure 8: Public Officials' responses on some institutional procurement decision making processes

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Few levels in thedecision making process

Decision makingprocess too centralised

Decision makingprocess well centralised

Too many levels indecision making

% that agree

Series1

2.4.12 Procurement contracts involving gratification: For procurement contracts involving gratification, the overwhelming majority (91%) of respondents indicated lack of knowledge of whether it existed within their organisation, while a mere 9 percent acknowledged that procurement involved gratification in varied degrees. It is not clear whether all of these respondents were genuinely ignorant about this issue. Given its sensitive nature, however, we can surmise that most people would prefer not to take a position on gratification with respect to procurement. A possible reason could be the link between gratification and bribe, which is classified as a corrupt act with its attendant implications (charge and prosecution).


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2.5. Public Officials’ Assessment of the Quality of Service Delivery, Determinants of Enhanced Service Delivery and Reform Measures.

2.5.1 This section discusses and analyses responses from service providers on the quality of their service from their experiences/perspective (or as they thought was perceived by their clients), assessment of the performance of key public institutions, major determinants of high performance and their level of support for possible measures that could enhance performance.

2.5.2 Interaction with the public and the latter’s perception on quality of service: Nearly all the respondents, 98 percent, stated that their organisation had direct dealing with the public; see Table37 in Appendix.

2.5.3 Nature and quality of services delivered to the public: When the respondents’ were asked to what extent public perception of the quality of their services was high, most respondents (93%) said it was high (including those who said always, most times and frequently). Similarly 94 percent of them indicated that (in various degrees) the services that their organisation provided were satisfactory to their clients; see table38 in Appendix.

It is worth noting that employees notion on the way in which their organisation’s work/performance and its dealings with the public are viewed by the public may not coincide with the actual perception of the latter. However such a positive notion on the part of public officers as suggested by their responses generally could influence their attitude to work and productivity in a positive way. In the light of the above result, it is interesting that, according to a significant 59 percent of respondents, (Table39 in Appendix) services delivered by their organisation to the public did not usually comply with formal (written) rules. Yet, in most institutions, (as recorded by 85.7% of respondents) there were mechanisms to respond to the needs of clients. Assuming that both sets of responses represented a genuine picture of what obtains, then the implication is that the mechanisms only exist in principle, but generally not in practice.

With regard to whether members of the public knew well about (policy) decisions generated in their organisation, a significant proportion (61%) stated that this was totally or partially the case, as against 26 percent who either partially or totally disagreed, with the rest indifferent to this situation; see Table40.

With respect to mechanisms to channel user complaints and preferences, most respondents, 87 percent, also indicated that within their organisation such channels were in place; see Table41. However, unless such channels are being utilised by the public then they are not serving their purpose. In fact, results from the household survey will reveal (shortly) that such channels are utilised on a minimum scale. It could also be inferred that such channels may not have been sufficiently publicised for members of


49

the public to know about and possibly make reasonable use of for the intended purposes.

With regard to the cost of services, the majority of respondents, 85 percent, stated that, to a certain extent, services were being offered in their organisation at low cost. A similar proportion (88%) stated that access to institutional services by the poor was unproblematic; see Table41.

2.5.4 Determinants of enhanced service delivery: As Figure9 shows (see also Table42 in Appendix), at least 68 percent - and in most cases between 85 and 90 percent – of respondents endorsed the notion that the following are essential factors for a productive management and operation of their organisation:

• better communication;

• better equipment;

• increased number of staff;

• improved legal system;

• reduced operational mandate;

• higher salary structure for employees;

• higher managerial autonomy;

• better trained/competent staff;

• reward to be performance-based;

• immunity from political influence;

• improved capacity to deal with institutional corruption;

• budgetary resources to institutions;


50

Figure 9: Public officials' opinion: In your institution how important are the following for productive mangement/operation?

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

More budgetary resources

Better capacity to detectand punish corruption

Immunity from politicalinfluence

Reward to be performance-based

Better trained competentstaff

Greater managerialautonomy

Higher salary

Reduced operationalmandate

Better legal framework

More staff

More/better equipment

Better communication (info.flow)

Percentage reporting the factors are important

2.5.5 Support for public service performance measures: Degrees of support registered by respondents for various measures that could improve public sector performance and service delivery, as shown in Figure10 and Table43 in Appendix are summarised below:

• Attracting between 47 and 57 percent of respondents’ support were the establishment of Public Service Career Structure based on defined job criteria; decentralisation of state administration and privatisation of public sector services.

• Over two thirds of the respondents (67 to 75 %) were in support of greater public and civil society control over public sector activities; down-sizing of staff size in


51

order to increase salary and other benefits; and effective mechanisms for citizens to have increased access to state held information.

• Between 77 percent and 88 percent of respondents registered support for greater regular declaration of assets of public officials; establishment of objectives and norms for fulfilment of services; legislation on penalties and rewards for public servants, as well as for simplifying administrative procedures; and strengthening operational management of public service institutions.

Figure10: Public officials' support for major public service performance measures

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

Establishment of publicservice career structure

Decentralisation of stateadministration

Privatization of public sectorservices

Greater public/civil societycontrol over public sector

activities

Decrease in staff sizefollowed by increased salary

and benefits

Effective mechanisms forincreased citizens' accessto state-held information

Percentage in favour of measures

The above results are quite remarkable in that they suggest that save for a few, such as a career structure based on defined criteria and privatisation, key reform policy measures would receive maximum cooperation from public officers. It may therefore be relatively easy to implement such measures, whereas for some, efforts may need to be made for public officials to understand and see the rationale for them.


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2.5.6 Perceived level of public support for Government in the implementation public sector reforms: The bulk of the public officials interviewed 85.6 percent expressed the belief that members of the public would support public sector reform.

2.6. Service User Experiences and Views on Service Delivery

2.6.1 Heads of households targeted in this study represent the general public, the citizenry of Sierra Leone, who are the users or the clientele of public services. More importantly, they are the people who elected the government, on whose behalf state resources are managed, to whom the government is responsible and whom all public officials ought to be serving. The business community, on the other hand, interacts with certain government departments and offices in a service provider-client relationship. It serves as an important source of government revenues (in the form of taxation), a major engine of economic growth and development. Therefore, the experiences and views of selected household heads and businessmen (including entrepreneurs, and medium and small scale businessmen) are of fundamental importance to the general discussion and analysis of governance issues.

2.6.2 Seriousness/ranking of key national problems: Some of the problems faced by Sierra

Leoneans in the aftermath of a decade old debilitating war include high cost of living, poor health care delivery facilities and services, low quality educational services, poor sanitation and water supply services. Results on how serious they thought each of these problems were in Sierra Leone, presented in Table44 in Appendix and Figure11 are summarised below.

• Between 90 and 96 percent of household respondents considered unemployment, cost of living/inflation, poor road networks, corruption in the public and private sectors, cost of health care and housing shortage to be serious national problems in Sierra Leone. Following these, by degree of seriousness, were low quality of healthcare, education, problem of access to clean water, social injustice and insecurity.

• On ranking the most serious national problem, the highest proportion, 40 percent, of respondents rated cost of living/inflation as the number one, this was followed by rising unemployment (recorded by a significant 20% as the most serious).


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Figure 11: Households' opinions about various social problems

0 20 40 60 80 100 120

Political instability

Bad leadership

Safety concerns

Food availability

Social injustice

Access to clean water

Drug abuse

Poor sanitation

Quality of education

Quality of health care

Cost of education

Cost of health care

Housing shortage

Poor roads

Corruption - private sector

Corruption - public sector

Unemployment

Cost of living

Percentage that rate problems as serious


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2.6.3 Current standard of living as compared to three years ago: When household respondents were asked about the present standard of living of their household compared to three years ago, about 69 percent claimed they were better off now. This is probably a reflection of the relative peace/stability and hence signs of prosperity that the country is enjoying now. As Table45 in Appendix shows the Eastern Province accounted for the highest proportion of respondents who stated that their standard of living was better now (86%), followed by the Southern Province (76%), as compared to the Western Area and the Northern Province, which recorded 60 percent and 67 percent respectively.

2.6.4 Interaction with/use of major public services: Only three out of the major public

services listed in Table46 in the Appendix and Figure12 below, did over 40 percent of households use or interact with during the twelve months lading to the survey; these include the public health services, the public education services and the national registration system. On the other hand over 50 percent of business enterprises’ respondents stated that they made use of public health services, income tax and the police excluding traffic police; see Table47 in the Appendix. These results might suggest that there is no relationship (or a correlation) between respondents’ use of social services and their assessment of the quality of services provided by public institutions (discussed in 2.1.3). To this end households’ interaction with the Department of Surveys and Lands is very low and yet their assessment of its services is most negative; their use of health and education services is high and yet, an uncomplimentary assessment was recorded for health services whereas respondents were relatively positive about services provided by the public education sector.


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Figure 12: Households and Business Enterprises, usage of public services

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

Courts

Municipal/ District Councils

Central Tender Board

Surveys & Lands

Registrar General's

Income Tax

Police excl. Traffic

Traffic Police

Water Company

Telecommunications

Public Electricity

Immigration

Postal Services

Customs

Public Health

Percentage that use services

Households Business Enterprises


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2.6.5 Detailed analysis of service user results on evaluation of basic services

Surveys and Lands: It is worth noting, as Table48 in Appendix indicates, that valid responses on certain institutions such as Surveys and Lands were dismally low (representing below half the total number of all respondents). Furthermore, as the statistics reveal, the pattern of responses across the provinces in this particular case is much the same, with no particular Province showing any deviation (or differential) from the aggregated/national pattern.

Income Tax Department: As Table 49 in the Appendix reveals, not up to half the number of all household respondents gave an assessment of the quality of service of the income tax department. The breakdown of responses across the various Provinces, however, reveals that the most negative assessment came from the Eastern Province, followed by the Western Area with 79 percent and 55 percent stating either “very poor” or “poor”, respectively. On the other hand, the Southern Province gave the most positive assessment to the income tax department, with over 50 percent of valid responses recording “fairly good”.

Health services: The overall assessment of the quality of health services was also not very positive as just over 50 percent of respondents on the whole gave a positive assessment, the majority of whom said “fairly good”; see Table50 in the Appendix.

The household data shows that Eastern Province recorded the highest proportion of negative assessment (78%) followed by Western Area (53%) and then Northern Province (39%) with Southern Province recording the lowest (29%).

Education services: As Table51 in the Appendix shows, although the pattern of greater proportion for ‘favourable’ than ‘unfavourable’ assessment was the same across the various provinces; the proportion of positive responses was highest for the Southern Province followed by the Eastern Province and then the North, with the Western Area recording the least.

Water supply services: Results on households’ evaluation of water supply services are shown in Table52 in the Appendix and Figure 12 below. It can be seen that for the entire survey population (valid responses) about 46 percent described the quality of their water supply situation as poor. The corresponding figures for the provinces show Western Area as distinctly favourable (23%), as compared to the other provinces – Eastern Province (61%), Southern Province (79%) and Northern Province (84%).


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Figure 12: Households' evaluation of water services by region

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Western Area Eastern Region Southern Region Northern Region All regions

% of households rating water services as "poor"

Obstacles to using the court system: Household heads and business respondents were asked to indicate how important each potential obstacle was to them in accessing the court system; see Table52 in the Appendix and Figure13. For households, accounting for between 85 and 93 percent of respondents, the following factors were considered important - high lawyers’ fees, influence of corruption, long court process, high gratification and high court fees. On the other hand, only 50 percent of respondents considered incompetent judges as an important obstacle. Although the corresponding figures for business enterprises are lower, the pattern of responses was quite similar with each of these factors, except ‘incompetent judges’ considered as an important obstacle to using the courts in Sierra Leone by a substantial proportion of respondents.


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Figure 13: Obstacles to using courts - Households' and Businesses' views

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Incompetence of judges

Process too complex

Court fees too high

High gratification

Process too long

Court decisions influencedby corruption

Lawyer fees too high

Percentage that rate as important

Households Business enterprises

The results on importance of gratification as an obstacle to accessing the courts presented for the various regions in Table53 in the Appendix suggests that the pattern of responses (as for all the other variables in this module) was quite similar for the regions. While at the extreme end of ‘not important’, the proportion is negligible, there is a progressive increase of responses from ‘not important at all’ to ‘important’ after, which, with the exception of the Eastern Province the proportion that stated ‘extremely important’ declines again.

Household views on obstacles to good education: As shown in Figure14 below and

Tables55 through 58 in the Appendix, 70 to 75 percent of respondents considered infrastructure and facilities, cost of education and professional capacity of teachers and ‘the system not updated’ as important causes of poor education. It can be observed that for cost of education, the Eastern Province recorded the highest percentage, while the


59

Southern Province recorded the lowest; for the educational system not being updated, the provincial regions accounted for about the same proportion of respondents (much higher than the Western Area) which considered this variable as an important obstacle to good education; with regard to teachers’ professional capacity and inadequate infrastructure there is hardly any differential in the results recorded for all the four regions.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

% t

hat

rat

e as

imp

ort

ant

ob

stac

le

Cost involved Educational systemnot updated

Teachers'professional

capacity

Inadequateinfrastrusture and

equipment

Figure 14: Households' opinion: obstacles to good education

Western Area Eastern Region Northern Region Southern Region


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2.6.7 Business Transactions and Experiences

Length of period of registration of business: Respondents were asked about the length of time it took them to register their business. The total number of valid responses was quite low (about 50%) suggesting that half the number of respondents probably did not register their business, which should be expected particularly of petty traders who constituted a significant proportion of business respondents. Out of the total valid responses about 29 percent indicated that it took less than a week whilst 24 percent stated that it took up to two weeks, with a similar proportion stating that it took up to a month and the rest two months ad above; see Table59 in the Appendix. For the rest of the respondents (about 50%) this question was not applicable, as they had not gone through the process of registration. The table shows that there is a relationship between the size (or category) of business and the length of period involved in registration, suggesting that while there seems to be practical difficulties about the process for the entire business sector, the low scale businesses tend to spend longer time than their large-scale counterparts.

Length of period involved in clearance of goods from Customs: A significant proportion (66.0%) of the few respondents (97) involved in importation stated that it would take them more than a month to claim their goods from the time they arrived at the port of entry; 13.4 percent stated one month, whilst the rest said seven days to two weeks; see Table60 in the Appendix. It could be deduced that there is a significant delay in importation of goods especially with regard to the process of clearing them from Customs. This also partly explains the reason why very few firms do import or the fact that majority rely entirely on commodities being imported by other firms or deal in locally produced commodities. Shipment duration, on the other hand, ranges from more than a month, for 68 percent, to one month for 7.2 percent, and between four days to two weeks for the rest of business respondents who do import goods.

Proportion of cost as official duty fees: As would be expected clearing goods at the port of entry tended to add up to importation cost. As Table61 reveals about 71 percent stated that less than a quarter of the imported cost was official fees from duties, whilst 26 percent stated that a quarter to half of total cost of import was official fees from duties and 3 percent stated half to three quarters of import cost was incurred from duties.

Proportion of goods lost in shipment: Respondents importing goods were asked to state the percentage of goods or items lost in shipping due to breakage, theft or other; see Table62 in Appendix. 94 percent stated loss of less than a quarter due to breakage while 6 percent stated a quarter to half loss due to breakage. Theft was, strangely enough, not mentioned as a factor for causing loss of goods. Possible reason for this could be the low number of persons within the business community that import goods as indicated earlier.

Meeting the requirements of licences and taxes: Respondents were asked to indicate

which of these two government requirements was the most difficult to meet. About 47 percent considered license/fees to be the most difficult compared to 15 percent who said


61

taxes were the most important; see Table63. An additional 39 percent and 34 percent referred to licences/fees and taxes, respectively as the second most difficult requirement to meet. From the above result, it could be inferred that for the majority of respondents, license/fees and taxes were perhaps too high/exorbitant and therefore were an impediment to business.

Proportion of income spent on security: When respondents were asked to indicate the percentage of total income spent on security, the vast majority (58%) indicated that they did not spend anything on security and a negligible 5 percent stated that they spent a certain amount of income on security; see Table64 in the Appendix. This clearly shows that since the majority of the businesses are small scale/petty, the potential or actual security risks are not high and therefore expenditure on this that could increase operational cost significantly is not necessary.

Obstacles to the business environment: Business respondents were asked to state among a range of factors which ones they considered as a serious obstacle to the business environment in Sierra Leone; see Table65 in the Appendix and Figure15 below. The data reveals that financing ranks highest (87%) followed by public sector corruption (86.5%), private sector corruption (83.2%), infrastructure (83%) and inflation (77%). The least important factors include labour, security and the judiciary.


62

Figure 15: Enterprises: Obstacles to the business environment

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Availability and price of skilled workers

Cost of labour

Security

Judiciary

Insufficient demand

Political instability

Taxes and regulations

Availability and price of inputs

Exchange rates

Crime

Inflation

Infrastructure



Financing

% reporting as a very serious problem

The major obstacles have been analysed by category of business; see Figure16. The results show that for each of the factors, large scale enterprises recorded the highest proportion of respondents that considered it to be a serious problem, whereas there’s no distinct difference between the medium scale and small scale and the latter record slightly higher figures.


63

Figure 16: Major obstacles by category of business

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Taxes and regulation

Infrastructure



Financing

% reporting as a "serious problem"

Large scale Medium scale Small scale


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Chapter Three: Corruption and State Capture

3.1. Key Findings on corruption

3.1.1 Issues investigated: In an attempt to improve upon the DFID-sponsored 2000 Anti-corruption survey and provide better insight into the prevalence of corruption and its effect on the state machinery, this study has gone beyond gauging the perceptions and opinions of respondents. It has elicited information from respondents representing all the stakeholders, the service providers as well as the clients, on their views pertaining to the integrity and honesty of key public institutions and their experiences with regard to bribery and unofficial payment in their mutual interactions, as well as (on the part of households) knowledge of reporting and actual reporting. The key messages from these responses are presented in this section while detailed analysis of the data on all the issues from each set of the three survey components follow in subsequent sections.

3.1.2 Seriousness of corruption and evaluation of efforts to tackle the problem: It is worth noting that corruption is still regarded as a serious social problem in Sierra Leone affecting the nation’s development. This is evidenced by the ranking of corruption by about 90 percent of households as a serious national problem (the third most serious after cost of living and unemployment; see Figure11) and - as revealed by results of all three studies - the irregularities in public sector management procedures, especially in the management of funds, the ways in which bribery and unofficial payment affect (or impair) public service delivery and the issue of contracts and the generally low esteem in which key public agencies are held by respondents in terms of honesty and integrity. Perhaps a most glaring indication is the significant proportion of public officials who owned up to irregularities in the management of their institution’s budget, including misappropriation.

Both the public official and household surveys elicited information on respondents’ thoughts on the genuineness and sincerity of efforts on the part of Government to tackle corruption. The results are markedly contrasting with the majority of public officials indicating that there were sincere and genuine efforts to fight corruption as against less than half of household respondents who took a similar position and who regarded Government’s anti-corruption strategies as ineffective. It is ironical also that a lot more of the public officials interviewed were positive about the Government’s efforts to fight corruption than about the sincerity of their individual organisations to help curb the menace.


65

3.1.3 Integrity and honesty of key institutions: Public officials’ judgement on the integrity and honesty of public institutions must be treated very seriously as it may be derived from a very informed perspective. On the other hand, the assessment of households and business enterprises (the governed) is quite critical in that it signifies the level of trust/confidence that service users have in these institutions. Tables 66, 67 and 68 present detailed results for all three components of the study, whilst Figure17 below gives a summary picture of those rated as most dishonest and least dishonest. It is important to note that among the agencies rated as most dishonest by the respondents of all three sets of surveys were Customs, Surveys and Lands, and the Income Tax Department, Law Officers, the Traffic Police and Immigration. From a positive perspective, public officials gave a very high honesty/integrity rating to Parliament, followed by Births and Deaths, NPA, SIERRATEL and the ACC; households gave the most positive assessment to the Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service, followed by the Bank of Sierra Leone and the Sierra Leone Water Company; and business enterprises regarded the commercial banks as the least dishonest (or most honest) followed by Bank of Sierra Leone and the Sierra Leone Water Company.

Figure 17: Household, Public Officials and Enterprises' perceived level of dishonesty of various agencies/insitutions

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40%

Bank of Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service (SLBS)

Sierra Leone Water Company (SALWACO)

University of Sierra Leone

Ministry of Gender Social Welfare & Children’s Affairs

Law Officers Department

Income Tax Department

Surveys and Lands Department

Traffic police

Customs Department

% of respondents reporting the institution to be honest

households public officials business

3.1.4 Influence of bribery and unofficial payment on public service delivery: The results from the three sets of surveys reveal that service delivery by the public sector in Sierra Leone was generally marred by irregularities and influenced by bribery/unofficial


66

payment. A significant proportion of the public officials interviewed (over one third) acknowledged the prevalence of bribery in each case:

• as a precondition for service delivery in their organisation/institution; as influencing the issue of contracts;

• as influencing the alteration of legal decisions; • as influencing elected officials to promote the personal interests of

certain public officials; • in the pursuit of jobs (practice of purchasing jobs).

An even much higher proportion (nearly two thirds), acknowledged the alteration of legal decisions within their institution due to bribery. From the perspective of the service users/clients, the bulk of the household heads interviewed (over two thirds) owned up to the payment of bribes for basic public services as a common phenomenon, as compared to below half of the business respondents who gave a similar response. On the other hand a much higher proportion of business enterprises targeted (similar to that of households) acknowledged the payment of bribes for licences and permits. A point worth noting also is the evidence from the survey data that the burden of bribery is heavier on smaller enterprises than bigger enterprises, as a greater proportion of the former than the latter reported paying bribes to obtain public services especially licenses and permits. On the other hand, analysis of the payment of bribes by the income status of households shows a direct relationship between economic status and the proportion of household income spent as bribes.

3.1.5 Knowledge of reporting procedures and actual reporting: Given the fact that the citizenry tend to stand at the receiving end of bribery and corruption affecting public sector administration and service delivery while public servants are the main actors (or perpetrators), principal support is generally expected to come from the populace in the fight against corruption. It is for this reason that household heads were exclusively asked about their knowledge of corruption reporting procedures, whether or not they do report observed cases as well as factors that impede their quest to report. A very significant proportion of households (about two thirds) said that they did not know the process to follow in reporting cases of corruption. Whereas over three quarters acknowledged having observed an incident of corruption the bulk of them stated that they had not bothered to report, with over half of them pointing to lack of knowledge on where to report as reason for not reporting. Detailed/regional analysis will follow. On the basis of the study results it is obvious that the Anti-Corruption Commission may need to do a lot more in terms of sensitising, educating and motivating the masses to be actively involved in the fight against corruption.

3.2. Detailed Analysis of Bribery and Unofficial Payment


67

3.2.1 Public Officials assessment: On bribery as a precondition to accessing public service, the greater proportion, (57.0%) of respondents indicated that bribery was either non- existent or negligible within their institution as a means to accessing the services by the public; see Table69 in the Appendix. A significant proportion (43.0%) however, admitted that in their institutions members of the public had to bribe in a number of instances before service was delivered to them. This is a serious indictment of public institutions from public officials themselves that suggests blatant act of corruption associated with the rendering of public service in several situations. It undermines efficiency and performance and erodes public confidence in the public sector. There is a great deal of variation in the results among the various Government institutions: The Ministry of Defence takes the lead in the proportion of respondents who said that bribery is widespread as a pre-condition to service delivery (80%), followed by Ministry of Agriculture (77%) and Ministry of Local Government (70%). The Ministry of Justice accounted for the lowest proportion (22%), followed by education (28%) and Development (33%).

Table70 in the Appendix and Figure18 below present results on the purchase of jobs among respondent’s colleagues - implying an act that the respondent himself might be guilty of. In complete contrast with the response on the effect of bribery on the issue of contract, 63 percent of respondents acknowledged that the purchase of jobs was a common practice in their institution. Here again the results are varied with the Ministry of Defence topping the list (89%) followed by the Ministry of Justice (87.5%) and the Ministry of Agriculture/Education (72%). At the opposite end is the Ministry of Social Welfare Gender and Children’s Affairs (36%), followed by the Ministry of Local Government (48%) and the Ministry of Development (50%).


68

Figure 18: Public Officials' veiws on prevalence of purchasing jobs among their colleagues

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

M in. of Defence

M in. of Just ice

M in. of Agriculture

M in. of Finance

M in. of Education

Others

M in. of Information

Nat. Commissions

Para-statals

M in. of Health

S.L Police

M in. of Development

M in. of Local Govt.

% t hat agreed i t is commo n.

Undoubtedly, job purchasing has a serious implication for, if not a severe negative effect on, public sector performance. Apart from making the system and procedure of recruitment – advertisements and the conduct of interviews etc.- appear as a sham (or a mere formality), it negates the whole idea of meritocracy and undermines efficiency and productivity, given the fact that those who tend to get the job are persons most able/willing to pay and not necessarily those most deserving.

On the influence of bribery on the alteration of legal decisions, the majority of respondents (63%) did not agree that this practice was widespread in their institution. Table71 in the Appendix gives detailed results for the various institutions. The data however reveals a great deal of variation with the Ministry of Development recording the highest proportion of respondents (67%) of those who acknowledged widespread bribery as influencing legal decisions, followed by Ministry of Agriculture (58%) and the Parastatals (51%), while the Ministry of Defence recorded the lowest (12.5%), followed by Ministry of Information (20%) and the Ministry of Justice (21.4%).

A significant 60.7 percent of respondents acknowledged the influence of bribery of central bank officials in order to ensure that the personal interest of staff of their organisation was favoured by bank decisions; see Table72 in the Appendix. In terms of the proportion of respondents who gave this response for the individual organisations, the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs recorded the highest (75%), followed by the Parastatals (74.6%) and the Ministry of Information (70%); the


69

Ministry of Finance recorded the lowest (36.9%), followed by the Ministry of Defence (37.5%) and Ministry of Justice (49.9%). While the survey did not go further to investigate the kind of decisions for which bribery is offered, it is implied that such decisions would have to do with the processing of cheques for the withdrawal of salaries and other funds assigned to the organisation. Apparently also, the monies paid as bribes are taken from the very budget of the organisation and this was bound to introduce irregularity in the management of the funds.

With regard to irregularities such as misappropriation in the use of organisation’s funds the majority of respondents, 63 percent, admitted that it took place in their organisation within the last two years leading to the survey. This represents a serious self-indictment on the part of the public sector. Assuming that the respondents were forthright in their response to this particular question then we can argue that service delivery and productivity in the public sector is principally affected by the mismanagement of funds allocated to the various Government agencies for specific purposes. Table73 in the Appendix and Figure19 present a picture of the acknowledgement of irregularities by respondents of the various public institutions, with the Ministry of Information accounting for the highest proportion, followed by Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs and Ministry of Agriculture. This also calls into question whatever follow-up and auditing mechanisms have been in place to ensure transparency and the judicious use of public funds.


70

Figure 19: Public officials' assessment of bribes for contract, and irregularities/misappropriation

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

Min. of Development

Min. of Health

Min. of Finance

Para-statals

S.L Police

Others

Nat. Commissions

Min. of Education

Min. of Local Govt.

Min. of Defence

Min. of Justice

Min. of Agriculture

Min. of Social Welfare

Min. of Information

% that said irregularities(Misappropraitions) are "frequent"

% that said bribes for contracts are "widespread"

On bribery as a determinant for the issue of contracts, the majority of public officials interviewed (62%) stated that the practice was not widespread in their organisation as against a lower yet significant 38 percent who stated otherwise; see Table74 in the Appendix and Figure19 above. Results from the various Government institutions reveal a great deal of variation with the Ministry of Information recording the highest proportion of respondents for this corrupt practice (70%) followed by the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs (66%) and then Ministry of Agriculture (47%). Recording the lowest proportion (albeit represented by merely 3 respondents) was the Ministry of Development (0%), followed by the Ministry of Health and Sanitation (16%) and the Ministry of Finance (32%).


71

On bribery went on as a means of influencing elected representatives to ensure that particular laws favour the personal interests of certain public officials most respondents (79%) agreed that bribery did influence elected representatives to promote, through specific laws, the interests of certain public officials within their organisation. On this issue, as shown by Table75, (apart from the fact that no valid responses were obtained from the Ministries of Agriculture and Defence) there is not much variation in the results for individual organisations – all the other institutions except the Ministry of Finance recorded above 60 percent, with the Ministry of Development (100%) topping the list, followed by the Parastatals (88.6%) and the Ministry of Local Government, Gender and Children’s Affairs (86%). The results indicate that it is a general practice in the public sector for elected officials to be bribed in order to influence the normal course of events, which is obviously inimical to productivity and efficiency.

On the influence of various factors on corruption, (Table76 in the Appendix and Figure20) the majority of respondents considered the following factors as significantly promoting corruption:

• Lack of a transparent political system (91%)

• Poor economic policies like privatisation (90.7%)

• Low salary of public officials (87%)

• Lack of independent and effective judiciary (83.5%)

• Lack of special incentive to public officials (81%);

• Lack of independent and effective media (80.5%)

• Lack of effective reporting system (70.3%)

• Cultural factors (64.8%)


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Figure 20: Public officials' views on the probable causes of corruption

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Cultural factor

lack o f efficient corruption reporting system

Lack of independent & effective media

Lack of incentive mechanism fo r public officials

Lack of indepandent & effective judiciary

Salary of public officials

Poor economic policies such as privatisation

Lack of transparent & accountable po litical process

P e rcentage saying the facto rs are "impo rtant"

3.2.2. Households Assessment: With regard to unofficial payments for basic public services a very significant proportion of households (about 82%) – much greater than the corresponding figure for public officials - declared that they were making these payments either always, most times or frequently; see Table77 in the Appendix and Figure21 below. An even higher proportion (88%) of respondents stated that they had to make unofficial payments for licenses or permits. A lesser but significant two thirds of respondents indicated that they always had to make unofficial payments in order to influence the advancement of legal proceedings.


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Figure 21: Households' experience: frequency of payment of bribes for public services

76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92

For update on f iscalsituation

For basic public services

For basic licences andpermits

To advance legalproceedings

% of household paying bribes

Figure22 below presents a picture of how the various regions compare in the payment of bribes for basic public services as well as for licenses/permits and legal proceedings; see also Tables78, 79 and 80 in the Appendix. The results show no marked differential between the regions. For basic services Southern Province records the highest percentage (87%), followed by Eastern Province (85%); the corresponding figures for Eastern Province and Western Area are more or less the same (79.5 and 79.6, respectively).


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Figure 22: Households' experiences with unofficial payments.

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

Basic services Licences & permits Legal proceedings

% t

hat

mad

e u

no

ffic

ial p

aym

ents

Western Area Eastern Region Nothern Region Southern Region All regions

As the above figure shows, when asked whether public officials did ask (or hint) for gratification in situations where households had to pay for service, the majority of respondents said, “Yes”. A similar proportion (60%) stated that the payoff was made spontaneously, with this same proportion recording that they did not know in advance how much to pay. About half of the household respondents indicated it was certain, upon offering gratification that the service would be rendered.

The household assessment is summed up in a position taken by most (97%) of the respondents that corruption is a very serious problem in Sierra Leone and about one third of them that it is either much worse or worse as compared to ten years

Figure 23: Do Public Officials ask for payoffs ? - Households' Response

Yes64%

No36%


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ago; see Table81 in the Appendix. It may seem a little encouraging that nearly half of the households thought that the problem of corruption was better than was the case ten years ago. But the results on the whole, especially on the seriousness of corruption, resonate with and reinforce earlier results on the ranking of corruption as one of the three most important national problems by most households. The results generally seriously call the ongoing efforts of Government to stem corruption to question. One gets the impression that as far as the people are concerned, these efforts have so far not yielded the desired result of minimising corrupt practices. On the other hand, it may well indicate that if any meaningful effort is being made (or any gains are being realised), the people are not sensitised adequately enough to appreciate it.

Attempt has been made to relate the payment of bribes to households’ income status; see Figure24 below and Table82 in the Appendix. The results indicate that generally irrespective of income status the bulk of households tend to spend not more than 10 percent of their income on bribes. With regard to the differential cost/burden of bribery on household income, for below 1 percent and 10 percent of the household income being spent on corruption there is a direct relationship between economic status and the payment of bribes. Conversely, whereas not up to 5 percent of households on the average spend above 25 percent of their income on bribes in Sierra Leone, it can be observed that medium income households account for the highest proportion of those that fall in this category, followed by low income, with higher income households accounting for the least.


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Figure 24: Percentage of household income spent on bribes by income status

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

No payment Less than 1 - 10% 11 - 25% Above 25%

Percentage of income on bribes

Per

cen

tag

e o

f h

ou

seh

old

s

Low Medium Higher

3.2.3. Business Enterprises Assessment: In responding to the question, how common was it to pay some gratification for public service procedures, (quite unlike the public officials and the households results) a significant proportion (75.4%) of business respondents stated that they were not paying (or they seldom paid) any gratification as compared to 37.9 percent who said that they were paying either ‘frequently’ ‘most times’ or ‘always’; see Table83 and Figure25.


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Figure 25: Business enterprises' experience: payment of gratification for public service procedures

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

Large scale Meduim scale Small

% reporting payment is "common"

The Figure above indicates that the proportion of respondents owning up to the payment of gratification to public officials for basic services was highest for small-scale enterprises, lower for medium scale and lowest for large-scale enterprises. Rather curiously these results tend to imply an inverse relationship between payment of gratification and size of business. We observe that unlike for households, the burden of bribery is greater on smaller enterprises than bigger ones implying that bribery may be serving as a serious impediment to growth of business for smaller businesses in particular. Table84 and Figure26 present summary results on the payment of gratification for other kinds of services; see also Figure26 below. The results show that for only licences and permits did over one third of business respondents acknowledge the payment of bribes; for the rest, including updates on fiscal situation, state contracts and the advancement of legal proceedings, the corresponding proportion is below one quarter.


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Figure 26: Business enterprises' perceptions on payment of bribes for specific public services

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

Bribes for public service procedures

Bribes for request for Licenses and Permits

Bribes for updates on f iscal situation

Bribes to obtain contracts from Gov't Insts.

Bribes for pursuance of legal proceedings

Percentage stating that bribe was paid

Detailed results on payment of gratification for various forms of public services by category of business are presented in Tables85 through 89. For all the services except for updates on fiscal situation, the proportion of high scale managers that said “bribery is common” is distinctly lower than the corresponding figures for medium scale and small scale enterprises, whereas there is very little differential between these two. With regard to whether the payment of bribes to bank officials to influence favourable treatment was significant, 41.2 percent of all business enterprises targeted stated that it was significant; see Table90 in the Appendix. The results for the three categories of enterprises show very little variation, 44.4 percent, 41.5 percent and 40.8 percent for large-scale, medium scale and small-scale business enterprises respectively.

In terms of contact with certain public services, as Table91 indicates, only a handful of institutions did more than half of business respondents interact with during the year preceding the survey. These include public health services (67%), income tax department (64%) and police (excluding traffic police) (53%). Asked whether the public institution they interacted with did demand the payment of bribes, the police recorded the highest proportion of the relevant respondents who said ‘yes’ (59%), followed by Customs (55%) and Income Tax (40.5%); see Figure27 below.


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Figure 27: Business enterprises: percentage asked to bribe out of those making contact with institutions

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

The commercial banks

Law courts

Public health services

Treasury department

Immgration

Registrar general's office

Income tax department

Survey and lands

Traffic police

Customs department

Police ecluding traffic police

Percentage asked for bribes


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3.3. Detailed Analysis of Government and Institutional Efforts at Combating Corruption

3.3.1 Having established that corruption was still a serious national problem in Sierra Leone and having looked at the various ways in which corruption, especially the payment of bribes or gratification, took place, it was important to determine the thoughts of respondents about ongoing effort on the part of Government and relevant institutions to fighting corruption, and the contribution of various other organisations/agencies to this venture. In this particular case, assessment was only elicited from the public officials and the households.

3.3.1 Public Officials and Households’ Opinion About Institutions Helping to Fight Corruption: Table92 in the Appendix and Figure28, below presents results on the opinion of public officials and household heads interviewed about whether various institutions were helping to combat corruption in Sierra Leone.

Figure 28: Public officials' and households': opinion about institutions helping to combat corruption

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

Courts

Director of Public Prosecutions

Professional association

Police

Armed Forces/Military

Parliament

Auditor General

NGOs

Anti-Corruption Commission

NCDHR

Academics & Teachers

Civil society movement

Churches/religious bodies

Media (Press &TV)

% reporting that institutions "helped"

Households Public officials


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The results reveal that in general terms households were more critical than public officials about the efforts of various institutions in helping to curb corruption. For both survey components the highest proportion of respondents referred to the media as helping to combat corruption – public officials 81.2 percent and households, 68.8 percent. For public officials Civil Society ranks second (79.7%), followed by Churches/Religious bodies (76.3%); whereas for households, Churches/Religious bodies recorded the second highest percentage (58%) followed by Civil Society (57%). The proportion of public officials who considered the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights (NCDHR) and the Anti-Corruption Commission to have helped in fighting corruption was significant, 69 and 59 respectively. Households on the other hand were not so impressed with the efforts of these institutions – 42 percent and 41 percent respectively.

3.1.2. Public Officials’ Assessment of Government and their Institution’s Sincerity in Fighting Corruption: The majority of respondents, about 79 percent, expressed the belief that the Government was willing, genuine and sincere to fight corruption, while a lower but significant 66 percent made a similar complimentary assessment about its organisation’s concern and willingness to fight corruption; see Table93 in the Appendix. The Ministry of Information recorded the highest proportion of respondents (87.5%) who acknowledged the genuineness of their organisation to fight corruption, followed by the National Commissions (79.3%) and the Parastatals (77%). It is ironical to note that, from the public officials’ perspective, while both central Government (executive) and other Government institutions were generally considered to have a remarkable drive to fighting corruption, the acknowledged commitment of Government – referring to the executive and perhaps legislative arms - is much higher than that of government organisations, ministries and departments. It is obvious that unless executive’s determination is marked by an equal determination of all government institutions, it would be difficult to curb corruption.

3.3.3 Households Assessment of Government’s Sincerity and Effectiveness of Anti-corruption Strategies: On how sincere the government of Sierra Leone was in combating corruption, about half (52%) of the respondents stated that Government was sincere as against a significant 48 percent who thought otherwise. On the other hand, a mere 30 percent of respondents considered Government’s anti-corruption strategies to be effective as against a very significant 70 percent who said otherwise. The statistics here (combined) are consistent with those (discussed earlier) representing the notion of very little improvement in the situation with regard to corruption. Overall these results represent a much less complimentary assessment than that of the public officials. For both sets of responses regional level analysis shows Western Area as providing the most complimentary statistic, followed by Eastern Province.


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3.4. Detailed Analysis of the Process and System of Reporting on Corruption

3.4.1. It is households that are normally caught in the middle of incidents of corruption and they bear the greatest responsibility to report acts of corruption and thus provide much needed support to established institutions that work to stem the menace. For this reason only the household survey attempted to elicit information on the knowledge and experiences of Sierra Leoneans with regard to the process of reporting corruption, and analysis in this section is therefore limited to households.

3.4.2 Knowledge of reporting process: When asked if they knew what process to follow in reporting a corrupt act by a public official, two-thirds (about 68%) of all respondents reported they did not know. This result is quite significant and might partly provide the reason why (if at all) the Anti-corruption Commission may not be getting as much co-operation from the public as they would expect in terms of reporting incidents of corruption. Regional analysis shows Eastern Province as the most knowledgeable (43%), followed by Southern Province (37%), and Western Area (30.5%) with the Northern Province recording the lowest (23%).

3.4.3 Observation/reporting of an act of corruption: Respondents were asked whether during the past 12 months they had observed a corrupt act to which the vast majority (about 89%) responded in the affirmative. Again, one can imagine how much effect this would have had in terms of enhancing the ACC’s work if most (if not all) of such cases were reported. The result that follows indicates that this was far from the case. As a follow-up, respondents were asked whether they had or anyone in their household at any time during the past 12 months reported a corrupt act. About two-thirds (66%) stated they had not done so. Once again the question of not being aware of the process, coupled, perhaps, with the lack of motivation (or incentive) are the obvious explanation.

3.4.4 Ease/difficulty and effectiveness of reporting process: On the process of reporting a corrupt act the proportion of valid responses (11%) was too insignificant to allow any meaningful analysis; see Table96 in the Appendix. Nevertheless out of these few responses 68 percent that the process was difficult. Valid responses for effectiveness of the reporting process were even much smaller; yet over half of them considered the process to be effective.

3.4.5 Protection for reporter: When asked how they thought the present system protected a potential reporter of a corrupt act from harassment, about 59 percent of the very few respondents who gave a valid response stated that they were unprotected; see Table98 in the Appendix.

3.4.6 Reasons for not reporting: On the most important reason for not reporting corrupt acts, about 56 percent of respondents stated they didn’t know where to report corruption. This result is consistent with the one discussed earlier on knowledge of reporting


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process. The second most important reason for not reporting was considered by 14 percent of respondents as the fact that the case could not be proved.


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Chapter Four: Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

4.1. Conclusions 4.1.0. This report on Governance and Corruption in Sierra Leone, based on data derived from

three sets of surveys – public officials, households and business enterprises - has provided interesting revelations on the dynamics of public sector management and administration (including systems, procedures, and determinants), the quality and efficiency of service delivery and the overriding impact of corruption on the entire system. Results from public officials have shown that apart from the observance of a few basic principles and procedures regarding personnel management, public sector management and administration are marred by institutional inadequacies, poor personnel morale and high dissatisfaction and extraneous factors (political and influential connections and illegal payment). Results from the service users (households and business enterprises) have generally represented a negative assessment of the quality and efficiency of key public institutions and service delivery. The three sets of surveys have also been largely in agreement about the prevalence and seriousness of corruption in the public sector and its impact on performance and service delivery.

4.1.1 On the issue of observance of established administrative procedures of governance,

whereas the overwhelming evidence is positive, it is important that evidence also points to a non-participatory process and a top-laden system. Such a system has apparently left room for manipulation, de-motivation and disillusionment of personnel and decline in public service delivery and performance.

4.1.2 On budget, procurement and contract arrangements/administration, evidence from the

public officials survey indicates the non-observance of rules, principles, procedures and regulatory measures that should ideally ensure propriety and accountability. Essentially, irregularities and impropriety in the administration of institutional budget, procurement and contract, as suggested by the public officials survey represent the nucleus of problems that have always plagued the public sector, bordering on malpractices, misappropriation and corruption. These are the most critical issues that seemingly underline the poor performance and poor service delivery of most public sector institutions as well as explain the poor image that tends to characterize the public sector generally.

4.1.3 Lack of performance evaluation, auditing mechanisms, poor documentation, record and

information storage are other common critical features of a good number of public institutions as revealed by the survey results. They are very much related to the above issues and serve to compound the problem of productivity. Such a scenario promotes lack of accountability, corruption, manipulation and impunity.


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4.1.4 On the issue of recruitment, remuneration and manpower development, the only positive revelation is that vacancies are generally advertised and the fact that public officials generally ascribe job security to the public sector. On the negative side, the influence of factors such as political connections points to an irregular system of recruitment into the public service. In addition there is a high level of dissatisfaction with the low salary conditions/poor incentives and limited opportunities for on the job training – a factor that many consider to provide a basis, if not motivation, for corruption. As a consequence, the public sector has apparently suffered the loss (or flight) of competent personnel and low motivation among those that cannot transfer their services elsewhere. Here again, we find an important contributory factor to the low productivity or poor service delivery of the public sector.

4.1.5 On the assessment of key public institutions and public sector performance, it is

interesting that most public officials speak positively of their own institution in terms of the considered impact of service delivery on the clients. Ironically, however, the majority is critical about certain key institutions, including the judiciary, Income Tax Department and Customs. Perhaps in this particular situation, the position of the clients – households and business enterprises – should count most and this generally constitutes ‘a vote of non-confidence’ as it were, in many public institutions including those mentioned above (in agreement with the public officials) as well as the Ministry of Lands and Housing, the Departments of Surveys and Lands and the Judiciary and the Courts. The key issue is that the clients’ general negative assessment of public institutions, reflect the problems relating to administration and management already depicted by the public officials survey.

4.1.6 With regard to efforts to fight corruption, again the results would suggest that a lot more

would have to be done – starting with the central Government and down to individual institutions as well as those primarily given the mandate to spearhead the campaign - to make the required impact on the entire system and convince Sierra Leoneans that the society is being cured of this all important menace.

4.1.7 Measures pertaining to public sector reforms are perhaps one area on which the study

results have been most encouraging, with evidence underlining huge support on the part of public officials for possible reform structures and measures, suggesting that Government could count on their cooperation, which is vital in the implementation of any changes.


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4.2: General Policy Recommendations

4.2.1 On the basis of the study results and key findings/conclusions we propose a number of

policy recommendations that should first respond to problems of weaknesses and inadequacies and then focus upon and build on the identified strengths and aspects of restructuring/reforming the system.

4.2.2 Standard procedures and practices must be encouraged for recruitment to all categories

of jobs within the public sector. Towards this end, there is need for a diagnostic review of the present/existing recruitment procedures for streamlining and standardization across all national institutions.

4.2.3 The link between remuneration and motivation and enhanced and improved

performance need not be overemphasized. A comprehensive national public sector remuneration assessment/review could be a proactive national priority programme. Review must focus on grades, volumes of responsibility, strategic nature of tasks performed and the level of risk and vulnerability of exposure to corruption especially within the revenue collection, budgeting and procurement sub-sectors of the country.

4.2.4 Training: There is an urgent need to restructure and increase support to the training of

personnel within the public sector. In the face of meagre resources local/national institutions could be supported to take up the task. The Civil Service Training School/College should be resuscitated, IPAM could provide technical backstopping in the short to medium term while a comprehensive capacity building programme is designed that could be based on both the felt and emerging needs of the country (Sierra Leone).

4.2.5 Administrative procedures: Knowledge of existing procedures to most of the

respondents was quite scanty. In most cases, there were complaints about the lack of responsiveness of current procedures to the challenge facing public sector management. We therefore recommend that review of the current administrative and financial manuals be done to incorporate changes that could foster improved performance.

v Public officials should be periodically provided refresher orientation(s) on procedures, codes and ethics, and also updated copies of administrative and financial procedures for reference purposes.

v There is need for the production and circulation of standard professional guidelines on the maintenance of professional ethics and standards. Such standards will also require a mechanism to regulate and monitor them.

4.2.6 Budget administration and management: The budget preparation process should be

shared with all senior and middle level personnel. It is recommended quite strongly that the process be decentralized so that public sector workers could be afforded opportunity


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to participate. One strategy is for Ministries and all related public sector institutions to undertake in-house budget preparation, administration and management sessions for all relevant staff prior to compilations and submission of national estimates to the Ministry of Finance.

A manual with simple instructions and guidelines for budget administration could prove invaluable given the difficulties respondents expressed on clarity and simplicity its preparation is being strongly recommended.

4.2.7 Procurement and contracts: The activity schedule showed evidences of being

problematic for Government and the state. As a matter of priority, it is proposed that the entire scheme on Procurement and Contracts be reformed with emphasis on strict guidelines, monitoring and adoption of best practices. We further recommend that the reform be phased and concurrently local capacity built to manage the process. This recommendation could assist in curtailing wastage through illegal transactions, reduce grand corruption and improve the local resource base of the country thereby harnessing all the attendant benefits and advantages.

4.2.9 Social service provision: The provision and management of public service institutions

is weak and unreliable. It is recommended that the Government commission a national user survey to gauge national perceptions. The outcome of the survey could prove invaluable to the activities and mandates of the National Privatisation Commission. Strong policy guidelines are recommended for executive board members of institutions providing services to reduce politics/undue influences and adherence to strict corporate practices and adoption of strategies to improve viability.

4.2.10 Combating corruption: A combination of holistic, but interconnected measures should

be considered in the fight against corruption.

v The Judiciary should be made increasingly independent and to make provision of speedy processing of cases forwarded to it. One strategy is to de-link the Attorney General’s office from Justice Ministry to reduce current level of executive interference with the judicial process. (The Judiciary was rated as performing the least in the fight against corruption).

v The Anti Corruption Commission must be immediately provided

support to decentralize its operation to the regions. This will improve upon the corruption reporting mechanism/strategy, which was indicated to be weak.

v The ACC must strengthen and consolidate its partnership with civil and

professional groups in raising awareness and educating the nation on the vices of corruption. The Commission it is being recommended must be funded to have a Civil Groups Support Unit (CGSU) for stronger alliance and coordination.

v Parliament must be encouraged to take a proactive posture towards the

campaign and fight against corruption. It is being recommended that action be


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taken to have a select Parliamentary Committee on corruption. This Committee must provide support for the Commission, follow-up on constraints and recommendations emanating from the Anti-corruption Commission annual reports. It must pressurize the executive (Attorney General & Justice Minister’s office) into action on “Stalled cases” often lodged with the Judiciary. This committee could be empowered to summon and demand explanations from individuals, groups and institutions on allegation of corruption.

v With the creation of the National Revenue Authority and the

anticipated increase in the volume of locally generated revenue, accountability watchdogs especially the Auditor General’s Office should be empowered with logistical support; recruitment of highly trained and competent accountants and auditors; provided with motivating terms and Conditions of Service, annual auditors reports to be given increased and wider publicity, with conducted discussions hosted for civil and professional groups.

v As the data strongly suggest that public officers are the bedrock of

corruption, in order to start a process of redressing this malaise, it is strongly recommended that on assumption of office, all public officers should undertake statutory declaration of assets and the process repeated annually for as long as the individuals holds the appointment. The proposed (CGSU) for the ACC could work with Civil Society to ascertain, verify and track declaration of all assets nationwide.

4.2.11 Legislations & business: The legislations relating to business enterprises featured prominently among the obstacles to the growth of business in Sierra Leone. It is recommended that laws relating to business be reviewed, updated and consolidated with a view to being business friendly and enhancing promotion and growth.

4.2.12 Personnel performance evaluation and procedures of appeal: It is recommended that a

system of supervisor-supervisee joint evaluation be introduced. There is need to respect the basic public administration principle of regulating the number of supervisors for a supervisee for improved coordination, proper understanding of roles and enhancement of smooth organisational operations. Moreover, for fairness and appeal purposes, we recommend that a Career Review Group be set up, with representation from senior, middle and junior management and responsible for reviewing petitions from evaluations and other administrative actions recommended or taken against officers.

4.2.13 Information storage and retrieval: This is one of the weakest areas within the public

sector. It is recommended that Ministries, Departments and Commissions be empowered – both in terms of state of the art equipment and personnel training - to move away from manual to electronic filing and data-based system. The provision of data entry clerks and computers could be a modest start to a gradual process. This will not only increase efficiency in filing and retrieval, but could also mitigate against


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frequent loss of vital information through pilfering, but more importantly remarkably enhance confidentiality.

4.2.14 Follow-up action: The study has produced valuable data with baseline information to

monitor and track governance and corruption in Sierra Leone. It is proposed that follow-up studies such as sectoral reviews, user surveys, and client service analysis be funded and conducted at reasonable intervals.

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