Free Trade of Pharmaceutical Products: The Limits of Intellectual Property Enforcement at the Border

By Xavier Seuba Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona

Issue Paper No. 27

ICTSD Programme on IPRs and Sustainable DevelopmentMarch 2010

Free Trade of Pharmaceutical ProductsThe Limits of Intellectual Property Enforcement at the Border

Intellectual Property and Sustainable Development Series

l ICTSD Programme on IPRs and Sustainable Development

By Xavier Seuba Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona

Free Trade of Pharmaceutical ProductsThe Limits of Intellectual Property Enforcement at the Border

Issue Paper No. 27

March 2010

ii Seuba — Free Trade of Pharmaceutical Products: The Limits of Intellectual Property Enforcement at the Border

Published by

International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD)International Environment House 27 Chemin de Balexert, 1219 Geneva, SwitzerlandTel: +41 22 917 8492 Fax: +41 22 917 8093E-mail: [email protected] Internet: www.ictsd.org

Executive Director: Ricardo Meléndez-OrtizProgrammes Director: Christophe BellmannDeputy Programmes Director: David Vivas-EuguiSenior Fellow: Pedro RoffeProgramme Manager: Ahmed Abdel Latif

Acknowledgments

This paper was commissioned under the ICTSD Programme on Intellectual Property Rights and Sustainable Development. ICTSD is grateful for the support of the UK Department for International Development (DFID).

The author has greatly benefited from the comments made to earlier drafts by Frederick M. Abbott, Ahmed Abdel Latif, Tenu Avafia, Sophie Bloemen, Carlos Correa, Miguel Ángel Elizalde, Carlos Espósito, Javier Fernández Pons, Alexandra Heumber, Thomas Henninger, José Massaguer, Kevin Outterson, Pedro Roffe, Ana Paula Soares, Diane Stephenson, Karin Timmermans, Germán Velásquez and David Vivas-Eugui.

This paper was presented in a workshop held at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in October 2009, and benefited from the views of Marta Abegón, Oriol Casanovas, Manuel Cienfuegos, Caterina García, Josep Ibáñez, Sílvia Morgades, Ángel Rodrigo, Constanza Sánchez and Lídia Tur. In October 2009, the paper was also discussed at an informal meeting held in Geneva with trade diplomats representing several developing countries at the WTO and at a technical seminar held in Prangins, Switzerland.

For more information about ICTSD’s Programme on IPRs and Sustainable Development, visit our website at http://ictsd.net/programmes/ip/

ICTSD welcomes feedback and comments on this document. These can be sent to Ahmed Abdel Latif at [email protected]

Citation: Seuba, Xavier (2010). Free Trade of Pharmaceutical Products: The Limits of Intellectual Property Enforcement at the Border. ICTSD Programme on IPRs and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper No. 27, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva, Switzerland.

Copyright © ICTSD, 2010. Readers are encouraged to quote this material for educational and non-profit purposes, provided the source is acknowledged.

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non-commercial-No-Derivative Works 3.0 License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ or send a letter to Creative Commons, 171 Second Street, Suite 300, San Francisco, California, 94105, USA.

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of ICTSD or the funding institutions.

ISSN 1684-9825

iiiICTSD Programme on IPRs and Sustainable Development

CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ivFOREWORD vEXECUTIVE SUMMARY viii1. ThE ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ThE

DETENTION OF IN-TRANSIT GENERIC DRUGS 12. PATENTED PRODUCTS IN TRANSIT CONTROL UNDER COUNCIL

REGULATION (EC) 1383/2003 43. ThE CUMULATIVE NATURE OF WTO OBLIGATIONS 74. ThE RELATIONShIP BETWEEN ThE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND FREE

TRADE 95. TRIPS ARTICLES 51 AND 52 116. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGhTS BASICS: INDEPENDENCE,

TERRITORIALITY AND RIGhTS CONFERRED BY A PATENT 167. ThE SPECIAL STATUS CONFERRED TO PhARMACEUTICAL

PRODUCTS IN ThE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM AND ThE RELEVANCE OF OThER PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS 22

8. FREEDOM OF TRANSIT OF PATENTED AND GENERIC PRODUCTS PURSUANT TO GATT ARTICLES V AND XX (D) 24

9. ThE BLURRING LINES BETWEEN SUBSTANDARD AND “COUNTERFEIT” MEDICINES 30

10. CONCLUSION 32ENDNOTES 35REFERENCES 43

iv Seuba — Free Trade of Pharmaceutical Products: The Limits of Intellectual Property Enforcement at the Border

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACTA Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement

AIPPI International Association for the Protection of Intellectual Property

DSU WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding

DSB WTO Dispute Settlement Body

DSS WTO Dispute Settlement System

EC European Community

ECJ European Court of Justice

EFPIA European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations

EU European Union

FTAs Free Trade Agreements

GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

ICH International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use

PhRMA Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America

TAXUD EC Commission’s Taxation and Customs Union Directorate-General

TBT Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade

TRIPS Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights

WHO World Health Organization

WTO World Trade Organization

vICTSD Programme on IPRs and Sustainable Development

Recent cases of detentions of generic medicines in-transit have attracted wide international attention in view of their implications for efforts to promote greater access to medicines, particularly in developing countries. They often result from the application, by certain countries, of border measures that go beyond the minimum standards set by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and that are often considered, by the same countries, as instrumental in impeding the trade of “counterfeit” medicines. Clearly, the border measures in question, their interpretation and implementation, raise complex legal and technical issues under the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

In order to facilitate dialogue and achieve a better understanding of the issues at stake, ICTSD released, in June 2009, a working paper entitled Border Measures Concerning Goods Allegedly Infringing Intellectual Property Rights: the Seizures of Generic Medicines in Transit. The author, Xavier Seuba, is Senior Lecturer in Public International Law at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona.

In the months that followed its release, the working paper received numerous comments and was presented at two seminars (Barcelona and Prangins) and at one informal meeting with WTO trade diplomats (Geneva). Exchanges about the paper, further readings and reflections enriched the analysis of a complex topic with important economic, social and legal repercussions.

From a legal perspective, the controversy created by these detention cases revolves around two main interrelated topics: first, the adoption of new intellectual property IP enforcement rules affecting third countries’ markets; second, the enforcement of intellectual property rights at the border in a manner that tends to strengthen the position of intellectual property rights holders.

In both cases, the controversy in the area of intellectual property poses significant challenges to free trade. The consolidation of this conclusion, which was mentioned in the working paper, did not occupy the centre stage. Yet, it is the most important reflection resulting from the months of dialogue that took place between issuing the working paper and the present publication. It is also the reason why the author has changed the title to a more appropriate one that fully reflects this new emphasis: Free Trade of Pharmaceutical Product: The Limits of Intellectual Property Enforcement at the Border.

As the author correctly points out, tensions between the principles of free trade and intellectual property protection are not new. In fact, to a certain extent, the TRIPS Agreement acknowledges these tensions. It was adopted to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights. However, its Preamble also emphasizes the need “to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade”. In this case, the trade in generic pharmaceuticals is both legitimate and permitted under WTO agreements and jurisprudence.

Against this background, the paper examines the nature and scope of existing EC custom border regulations – Council Regulation (EC) 1383/2003 - in light of WTO law, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the TRIPS Agreement and other WTO Members instruments, particularly the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health (2001) and the General Council decision of 30 August 2003.

The paper reminds us that, although TRIPS Article 1 allows WTO Members to “implement in their law more extensive protection”, this faculty is made conditional on not contravening other TRIPS provisions. In this respect, the author argues that Regulation 1383/2003 grants to patentees rights not contemplated in TRIPS Article 28. In particular, the right granted to seize goods in

FOREWORD

vi Seuba — Free Trade of Pharmaceutical Products: The Limits of Intellectual Property Enforcement at the Border

transit is difficult to reconcile with the territorial nature of intellectual property rights, because in seizing a specific product not intended for the European Union (EU) market, it mandates taking as reference the patent status in the European Member State in which application for customs action is made. Furthermore, the TRIPS Agreement does not include the control of goods in transit, or this potential control is not clearly considered: transit has nothing to do with the release of goods by custom authorities foreseen in TRIPS Article 51.

The author further argues that Regulation 1383/2003 might impose unnecessary restrictions and delays that impede the freedom of transit enshrined in GATT Article V, which permits the control of in-transit goods under the condition that they are not made subject to “unnecessary delays and restrictions”. It also does not fulfil the reasonability test set forth in GATT Article V:4, which establishes that regulations imposed on traffic in transit shall be “reasonable”. While both customs and patents regulations are recognized in Article GATT XX(d) as grounds that permit measures derogating from GATT obligations, if those regulations were inconsistent with TRIPS, they could not be defended through the exception set forth in this article .

The author emphasizes that the Doha Declaration, and its command to interpret the TRIPS Agreements in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect public health, could be decisive in a WTO panel’s ruling on the TRIPS compliance of Regulation 1383/2003 and its implementing measures.

Often border measures taken in relation to in-transit medicines arise in the context of efforts aimed at combating “counterfeit” drugs, which is a laudable objective. However, there has been a generalized use of “counterfeit” drugs to designate all types of intellectual property rights infringements and simultaneously indicate products’ lack of quality. This sends a confusing message to border authorities, countries and international organizations. This matter deserves to be thoroughly clarified in order to avoid mixing public health considerations with other unrelated issues pertaining to intellectual property rights (IPRs) enforcement.

Finally, the paper underlines that attention should be paid to the transposition of the EU border measures scheme in developing countries through the free trade agreements that the EU concludes with these countries. If that were the case, similar detentions could occur in developing countries in the future.

The paper addresses some of the most salient legal questions raised by the recent cases of detentions of generic medicines in transit. We also hope that it could contribute to fostering a constructive dialogue that would clarify the main provisions in the EC border regulation that lend themselves to abuse by right holders, with potential disruptive consequences on the legitimate trade of generic medicines. Beyond the EC regulation, a number of recent laws adopted in developing countries include provisions on border measures that raise similar concerns.

Beyond the legal analysis, the paper seeks to contribute to the wider global debate on the strengthening of IPRs enforcement measures and its repercussions. Indeed, such strengthened enforcement of IPRs has gained prominence in recent years on the global trade and intellectual property agenda. A number of initiatives and developments in this area at the global, regional and bilateral level carry wide-ranging implications for the regulation of the knowledge economy. Strengthened border measures that result in detentions of goods in transit are part of this overall picture. They crystallise the already conflicting relationships between public health and intellectual property on one hand, and free trade and intellectual property on the other.

This paper was commissioned under the ICTSD Programme on IPRs and Sustainable Development. The Programme has sought to achieve a better understanding of IP in the context of sustainable development with a view to ensuring proper balance between the different interests at stake

viiICTSD Programme on IPRs and Sustainable Development

Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz Chief Executive, ICTSD

in designing appropriate IP regimes supportive of development objectives and compliant with international commitments. Another central objective has been to facilitate the emergence of a critical mass of well-informed stakeholders in developing countries – including decision-makers and negotiators, but also actors in the private sector and civil society – able to define their own sustainable human development objectives in the field of IP and effectively advance them at the national and international levels.

The premise of ICTSD’s work is based on the understanding that IPRs have never been more economically and politically important – or controversial – than they are today. Patents, copyrights, trademarks and geographical indications are frequently mentioned in discussions on such diverse topics as public health, climate change, food security, education, trade, industrial policy, traditional knowledge, biodiversity, biotechnology, the Internet and creative industries. In a knowledge-based economy, a better understanding of IP is indispensable to informed policy-making in all areas of development.

In this context, we trust that you will find this issue paper a useful contribution to the global debate on the enforcement of intellectual property rights and its repercussions on public policy objectives.

viii Seuba — Free Trade of Pharmaceutical Products: The Limits of Intellectual Property Enforcement at the Border

Detentions of generic medicines in transit, as a result of the implementation of border measures in some countries, have created controversy in view of their important implications for the free trade of pharmaceutical products and access to medicines. However, they also raise deeper and more systemic questions that affect many different economic areas. For example, what are the limits of intellectual property enforcement at the borders in light of the principles governing international trade? What is the adequate balance between intellectual property enforcement and free trade when transit is involved? While these issues are not new, the proposed standards of intellectual property enforcement, and the means followed to enshrine and implement them, certainly represent new developments that require careful examination. These standards are so demanding that their compatibility with basic free trade and intellectual property principles is dubious. Paradoxically, and leaving aside opaque initiatives such as the ACTA, the new standards are promoted either through free trade and association agreements or through internal customs regulations with effects in third countries.

The standards in question are part of a wider trend toward the strengthening of intellectual property rights (IPRs). Since the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) was adopted, its main promoters have strived to raise the standards set forth therein and to strengthen the enforcement of TRIPS provisions. Due to difficulties in increasing TRIPS standards through the adoption of new WTO obligations, the United States of America and the EU have followed several paths to enshrine new and higher intellectual property regulations. One of these paths has been the promotion of new bilateral, regional, and multilateral agreements. Indeed, this initiative has been so successful that the normative landscape for the international protection of intellectual property rights is totally different and much stricter now than it was in 1995, when TRIPS entered into force. The non-discrimination principle -as enshrined in the TRIPS Agreement- has played a decisive role in extending the stringent standards set forth in said agreements. Moreover, these new covenants have been instrumental in securing intellectual property rights enforcement, an objective also pursued through additional means. Up until this time, lists of allegedly infringing countries, retaliatory measures resulting from those lists, diplomatic and economic pressures, and national and international litigation have been the main tools used by the United States and the EU to ensure intellectual property rights enforcement.

Although intellectual property policies and free trade agreements promoted by the United States have been those receiving most of the attention, in the last five years, the EU has emerged as a similarly active actor as far as intellectual property maximalist standards are concerned. In addition to new substantive matters, such as data protection through temporal exclusivity and patent extensions in the free trade agreements, the EU is particularly perseverant on intellectual property rights enforcement. But, EU action on enforcement is not limited to the negotiation of free trade agreements. In fact, according to the EU, it is essential to focus on a vigorous implementation of the enforcement legislation, a goal to be attained both through internal and international actions. In 2004, the EU Directorate-General (DG) for Trade adopted the Strategy for the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in Third Countries, which mapped EU future actions in this field. The Strategy identifies numerous activities to guarantee the enforcement of intellectual property rights in third countries, such as identifying priority countries, measures to be taken in the context of bilateral and multilateral agreements, political dialogue, technical cooperation, retaliatory measures, dispute settlement and the creation of public-private partnerships aimed at the enforcement of intellectual property rights.

Together with these enforcement-related initiatives, one of the main tools devised within the EU is its customs regulation. Although envisaged to have effects within European borders, the European

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ixICTSD Programme on IPRs and Sustainable Development

legal system on customs, and more important, its use and specific interpretation, have noteworthy effects on both third countries and international trade.

Although its ultimate goal is the protection of intellectual property rights granted in EU Member States, the Council Regulation (EC) 1383/2003 and the Community Customs Code have proven instrumental for the extraterritorial enforcement of intellectual property rights. Presently, the EU controls all goods protected by almost any intellectual property right as long as these goods pass through EU territory. This implies that both goods that have been cleared by customs (imported, exported and re-exported goods) and goods that have not been cleared by customs (for instance, goods under suspensive procedure or goods that merely transit the EU customs territory) are subject to control. This regime is in fact the outcome of the rapid evolution of EU law on the matter, which has resulted in a scheme of uncertain compatibility with WTO law, and also with fundamental intellectual property law principles and norms: the principle of freedom of transit, the territorial nature of intellectual property rights and the rights conferred to intellectual property rights holders.

In 2008, the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) 1383/2003 resulted in several detentions of in-transit medicines that were otherwise legal in their exporting and importing countries. These detentions continued in 2009. While some hold that detentions have been minimal and the result of the MEDI-FAKE initiative -which targeted customs control on illegal medicines entering the EU- others who oppose suggest that the detentions have been neither incidental nor accidental, something which would indicate that a policy backing them may exist. Whatever the case, the detention of medicines in transit has aroused substantial attention and concern, because it forces the assessment of EU Regulation 1383/2003 and its consistency with WTO law. It also brings into question the feasibility of international generics trade. More important, if norms that back the detentions were to become the general legal framework, the systemic effects on public health could not be more worrying. In fact, Regulation 1383/2003 implementation against in-transit generic medicines has heightened debates regarding the already conflicting relationships between, on the one hand, public health and intellectual property, and on the other hand free trade and intellectual property. As mentioned earlier, the impediments to international trade resulting from certain levels of intellectual property enforcement make necessary a comprehensive appraisal of the ongoing initiatives regarding intellectual property enforcement.

In most of the cases, WTO Agreements are cumulative, which obliges consideration of all norms potentially involved in a controversy. That is to say, if two or more WTO agreements become of relevance, all of them will be taken into account. When assessing EU Regulation and border measures compatibility with WTO law, attention must be paid to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the TRIPS Agreement and subsequent WTO Members instruments, particularly the Doha Declaration and the General Council Decision of 30 August 2003. WTO adjudicative organs have established that, when both the GATT and the TRIPS Agrrements are involved in a dispute, a logical approach is to begin with TRIPS.

All intellectual property international treaties and national intellectual property laws enshrine or implicitly recognize two fundamental and interlinked principles of intellectual property law, namely the territoriality and independence principles. According to these principles, intellectual property rights are territorial and protection depends on each country’s national legislation. Council Regulation (EC) Regulation 1383/2003 hardly reconciles with these principles because in seizing a specific product not intended for the EU market it mandates taking as reference the patent status in the European Member State in which application for customs action is made. Moreover, European Court of Justice (ECJ) jurisprudence on trademarks has traditionally linked right-holders’ entitlements, in relation to goods in transit, to those products with potential diversion into the EU internal market. Thus, the subject-matter of a specific intellectual property right and the rights of the title holder would

x Seuba — Free Trade of Pharmaceutical Products: The Limits of Intellectual Property Enforcement at the Border

be affected only if IP infringing goods were placed on the internal market. By contrast, against the territoriality principle and against ECJ jurisprudence linking customs actions to the affectation of conferred title holder rights, the mere transit of goods presently permits the title holder to exercise all of his exclusive rights.

TRIPS mentions the need to avoid intellectual property protection becoming an unnecessary barrier to trade. References to this are found in the Preamble and in several articles. TRIPS Article 41, which guides the implementation and interpretation of all TRIPS references to intellectual property enforcement, forbids enforcement measures becoming barriers to legitimate trade. Trade in generic pharmaceuticals is permitted in terms of WTO Agreements and jurisprudence. The fact that legitimate trade of generic products has been disrupted confirms that there is not only a potential for Regulation 1383/2003 to be trade restrictive and easily abused, but that this is also occurring in practice.

TRIPS Article 51 lays down the obligation to control the importation of goods protected by trademarks and copyrights. Adopting Regulation 1383/2003, the EU has made use of the power granted by TRIPS Article 1 to “implement in their law more extensive protection” bearing in mind that TRIPS places minimum standards on Member States. This power, however, is made conditional upon not contravening other TRIPS provisions. Some Regulation 1383/2003 provisions are in contradiction to the territoriality principle and broaden the rights conferred to intellectual property rights holders. The Regulation’s effects on legitimate trade make a discussion on the matter between the EU and other WTO Members worthwhile. Such a dialogue should help the EU clarify its provisions so that, at least, the reference to the intellectual property law of the transit country when controlling in-transit goods and the power granted to holders to control goods not affecting their competitive position in the market where their rights are granted are amended.

In accordance with the Doha Declaration, a pro-public health interpretation of obligations and rights arising from TRIPS would presently guide any patented medicines case at the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). In accordance with Article 31.3.a of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, when interpreting a treaty, any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions shall be taken into account. The Doha Declaration has, at least, this status and its command to interpret TRIPS in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect public health could be decisive in the panel’s ruling on the TRIPS compliance of Regulation 1383/2003 and its implementing measures. Another WTO subsequent instrument, General Council Decision of 30 August 2003 on compulsory cross-licensing, which presently works as a waiver and will probably amend TRIPS Article 31, could also be jeopardized by Regulation 1383/2003. If this were the case, the EU would probably need to amend Regulation 1383/2003. Moreover, the EU should clarify Regulation (EC) 816/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council on compulsory licensing of patents relating to the manufacture of pharmaceutical products for export to countries with public health problems, as this may also be instrumental in blocking the transport of medicines not produced in the EU and addressed to countries without manufacturing capacity. Furthermore, pursuant to the link established through DSU Article 3.2 between WTO law and the rest of public international law, it is possible to resort to other international obligations in search of clarification of WTO norms.

Particular attention should be paid to the exportation to developing countries of Regulation 1383/2003. Through the transposition of the EU border measures scheme to the free trade agreements it concludes, the way is paved to similar detentions occurring in developing countries in the future. If that were the case, most of the generics trade would not be possible, something that also puts into question said free trade agreements provisions on border measures compatibility with TRIPS. In this sense, it is argued that some of the TRIPS provisions on enforcement can be deemed not to be the floor as it was generally understood, but rather a ceiling that cannot be exceeded.

xiICTSD Programme on IPRs and Sustainable Development

Pharmaceutical products are covered by the liberty of transit mandated in GATT Article V. However, this article permits the control of in-transit goods under the condition to not subject them to “unnecessary delays and restrictions”. Moreover, GATT Article V:4 establishes that regulations imposed on traffic in transit shall be “reasonable”, a prescription that makes it necessary to address several questions. First and foremost, there is the question regarding the meaning of reasonable, or, more specifically, what it implies for a regulation to be reasonable. GATT Article V:4 enshrines an open standard (reasonableness) against which specific regulations shall be assessed. WTO adjudicative organs have showed their preference for the literal interpretation, which implies relying on the ordinary meaning of the words. “Reasonable” means “as much as is appropriate or fair; moderate” and implies a degree of flexibility that involves consideration of all of the circumstances of a particular case. This requirement is reinforced by the Article V:4 reference to “the conditions of the traffic”, which refers to the characteristics of the merchandise. Therefore, Article V:4 necessitates consideration of whether it is reasonable to control goods that are in transit and could be patented in the country of transit. The independence principle, the territorial nature of patents and the numerus clausus nature of the list of powers granted by a patent indicate the lack of reasonability of such a control. The reasonability standard of GATT V:4 is contained in a section of an article that establishes the freedom of transit as a general rule, and within a legal regime devoted to the promotion of free trade, location which mandates taking a restrictive stance against regulations and actions hampering free trade.

When assessed against this legal framework, European regulation on border measures raises doubts due to the unnecessary delays and restrictions it may cause, and also regarding its reasonableness. In any case, even if an infringement of Article V was found, GATT Article XX (d) permits the adoption or enforcement of measures necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations not inconsistent with the GATT. Both customs and patents regulations are recognized in Article XX (d) as grounds that permit measures derogating from GATT obligations. National rules that are necessary for the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement would be regarded as laws or regulations that are not inconsistent with GATT within the meaning of Article XX (d). On the contrary, if those rules were inconsistent with TRIPS they could not be defended through the exception set forth in GATT Article XX (d). Furthermore, both GATT Article XX (d) reference to measures’ necessity and GATT chapeau must also be taken into account when assessing its potential invocation.

Using “counterfeit” as a generic term to designate all intellectual property rights infringements and simultaneously indicate products’ lack of quality has become common practice among some international organizations, developed countries and R&D based companies. Nevertheless, this term sends a confusing message to border authorities, countries and international organisations, and it is at the background of the discussion on the measures to be taken in relation to in-transit medicines. The defining criterion to identify a counterfeit product is its deliberate mislabelling with respect to identity or source. If such mislabelling does not occur, there is no counterfeit. Counterfeit medicines are certainly related with trademark law, but have a very marginal relationship with patent law. Although it is an unfortunate term due to the confusion it creates, “counterfeit” medicines may represent a public health problem if they are also substandard medicines, that is, medicines that do not conform to the pharmaceutical standards set for them. In terms of public health, this last phenomenon is a much more worrisome problem. Rather than concentrating on intellectual property law, to guarantee the quality of medicines it would be more useful to strengthen national drug regulatory authorities and reinforce World Health Organization (WHO) activities on medicines standardization and guarantees. This, however, opens new questions related to WHO technical standards precedence and the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).

1 Seuba — Free Trade of Pharmaceutical Products: The Limits of Intellectual Property Enforcement at the Border

In 2008 and 2009, several cases of generic medicines detentions while in transit in the EU were reported. The following were at least the detained medicines and active ingredients: artovastatine, sildenafil, losartan, clopidogrel, valsartan, zidovudine, rivagstimine, olanzapine and abacavir. Seized quantities were relevant, in certain cases exceeding 500 kilos of a particular active ingredient (losartan) and in other cases more than 500,000 tablets of a specific product (olanzapine). In October 2009, 1,740,000 tablets of clopidrogrel were detained in Paris. Some of the involved right-holders companies sent letters to ge-neric manufacturers informing them that their in-transit goods infringed patents and supplementary protection certificates granted in EU Member states.1 Accordingly, generic manufacturers were threatened with the destruction of goods, a threat that had, in some cases, allegedly been executed. Except for a single product, the detained shipments source was India, and final destinations were several developing countries, such as Mexico, Brazil, Nigeria, Peru, Colombia and Ecuador. Most of the detentions took place in the Netherlands, but detentions were also reported in France, Spain, the United Kingdom and Germany.

There are several reasons for particular concern regarding generics detentions at European borders. Both the European geographic posi-tion and transportation strength explain its role as a transit hub for an important percentage of international medicines trade, and even South-South trade. In addition, many health-related non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have their headquarters in Europe, and the products they send to the field go through European customs territory. If pharmaceutical products are going to be regularly intercepted in transit countries on alleged patent infringement grounds, international generics trade can be seriously hampered. Moreover, the basis that supports the EU law legality of said detentions, Council Regulation (EC) 1383/2003, is being exported to developing

countries’ legislation through the conclusion of free trade agreements,2 paving the way for similar detentions occurring in developing countries once the implementation of provi-sions contained in free trade agreements commences. The deterring effect on generics trade, and the importance attached to generics in controlling medicine prices and therefore facilitating access to medicines, explains the concern surrounding the European actions and also the importance of the legal arguments in this matter.

The timing and number of detentions give cause for the assessment of the legality of Regulation 1383/2003 in relation to WTO law. WTO Member States adopted TRIPS desiring “to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade”.3 However, the TRIPS Agreement was also adopted “taking into account the need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights”,4 and it is a treaty of minimums that allows Member States to adopt higher intellectual property protection standards. In this sense, albeit not expressly recognized in TRIPS, the power of Member States to control intellectual property rights of protected products in transit could be a justifiable measure if it did not contravene WTO or other public international law obligations.

On 3 March 2009, in a session of the WTO TRIPS Council, Brazil pointed out several arguments according to which European detentions would infringe the TRIPS Agreement.5 The first of those arguments stated that “seizure of goods in transit –any good: be it medicine or not - on grounds that they may be violating intellectual property rights registered in the country of transit is, in itself, a violation of GATT Article V”. However, this argument was not developed further, and Brazil emphasized a rather different argument: as the medicines in question do not enjoy patent protection

1. ThE ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIghTS AND ThE DETENTION OF IN-TRANSIT gENERIC DRUgS

2ICTSD Programme on IPRs and Sustainable Development

either in the country of exportation, or in the country of importation, whether or not the medicines are patent protected in the country of transit is irrelevant and cannot justify their detention. To sustain this argument, Brazil quoted TRIPS Article 28 (rights conferred) and recalled the territoriality principle, a keystone rule of intellectual property rights law.

India, in its submission to the Council for TRIPS - at the above-mentioned session of the Council - focused its arguments on the legiti-macy of the generics trade.6 In this regard, India argued that TRIPS Article 41.1 provides that enforcement procedures “shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse”. The legitimacy of generics, “particularly when there is no risk of diversion to the internal market”, would accordingly dismiss European arguments and forbid detentions. India also alluded to problems over access to medicines that validating European detentions would have, particularly to those patented products that could be compulsorily cross-licensed in export and import countries under the “paragraph 6 system”. As regards the latter, the possibility that right-holders could try to block compulsory licensed products while in transit in Europe should be assessed against Article 13 of Regulation (EC) 816/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council, on compulsory licensing of patents relating to the manufacture of pharmaceutical products for export to countries with public health problems.7

On the other side of the debate, EU Commission representative at the Council for TRIPS affirmed that detentions and Council Regulation 1383/2003 of 22 July 2003 are fully TRIPS compliant. He claimed that Regulation 1383/2003 merely develops and implements a power that can be inferred from TRIPS Article 51, namely, the power to control patent-protected goods even if they are in transit. Moreover, the EU representative maintained that detentions and not seizures had taken place. In their arguments, the EU established

a link between intellectual property rights violations and public health protection. As a justification of this link - a rather common place in EU intellectual property enforcement policy in recent years8 - the EU stated that border measures in Europe help to save lives in third countries because they are instrumental in impeding the trade of “counterfeit” medi-cines.9 This is an interesting argument, beca-use it helps the EU to construct a position that mixes public health and intellectual property protection arguments in a way that is just the opposite of what has been common over the last decade. Thus, according to the EU, intellectual property rights would not impede health protection due to its effects on medicines prices and access: by contrast, intellectual property protection would save lives because of its alleged relationship with medicines quality. The EU also affirmed that detentions had been incidental and by no means systematic, and it gave assurances that destruction of goods had neither been executed nor ordered. Finally, it has also been argued that detentions could have been the undesired outcome of the successful MEDI-FAKE initiative, which over a two-month period commanded European Member States border authorities to focus their attention on the prevention of illegal medicines from entering the EU.

In the Dutch Parliament, debate took place on these issues. In response to questions raised from MPs Ewout Irrgang and Farshad Bashir to the Minister for Foreign Trade, the State Secretary for Finance and the Minister for Development Cooperation, the Dutch government affirmed that “Dutch customs took the action it did on the basis of the applicable EU Legislation”.10 However, Dutch authorities indirectly recognized that they had been surprised by the effects of Regulation 1383/2003 when they affirmed, “The position of the Netherlands is that in such situations, developing countries’ interest in access to medicine should be better protected than it currently is. As the enforcement of intellectual property law by customs is based on European legislation, the Netherlands has asked the


European Commission to study this matter further. We have urged the Commission, if the current legislation poses impediments to access to medicine, to propose a solution that would facilitate access by developing countries”.11 The Dutch government emphasised that “more clarity is needed about the scope of European legislation and the latitude that national governments have. As soon as this clarity has been achieved, the framework agreement will, if necessary, be modified”.12

As far as international organizations are con-cerned, both the WTO and the WHO issued statements in reference to the detentions. WTO Director General Pascal Lamy, in response to a letter drafted by several NGOs,13 said, “The issue at stake is very important and sensitive”. However, he pointed out that “the matter is also being further explored at the bilateral level between the Members concerned. This is why I sense that at this stage Article 5 of the DSU concerning disputes is not of relevance in this case”.14 A stronger statement was made by the WHO, which issued a press release on its Website stating that “recent events related to the handling of medicines in transit and the potential consequences for the supply of medicines in developing countries are of major concern to the organisation” and asserted that

“[e]nsuring that the interests of trade and health are appropriately managed, also means that the flow of legitimate medicines, including generic medicines, is not impeded”.15

The European Generic Medicines Association, in reaction to the detentions, affirmed that “the EC is entitled under TRIPS to detain products under alleged patent infringement”, but it urged “for caution in this area to avoid detention that has no fundaments and indeed presents no public health risk”.16 The European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) stated, “It is neither the policy nor practice of our members to encourage Member States to use the powers of detention available to them to prevent the flow of legitimate generic products from manufacturer to customer”.17 Finally, several health-related NGOs deemed “seizures” unac- ceptable. According to these NGOs, the combi-nation of GATT Article V and TRIPS Articles 41 and 51 would render detentions of patented goods in transit against WTO regulations.18 Médecins Sans Frontières, pointed out the confusion that the European position made between counterfeit drugs and quality generic drugs, something that was leading “to a dangerous situation where legitimate trade in generic drugs is blocked”.19


Generic medicines in transit have been detained invoking Council Regulation (EC) 1383/2003 on customs action against goods suspected of infringing certain intellectual property rights and the measures to be taken against goods found to have infringed such rights.20 This regulation permits customs authorities to either suspend the release or detain suspected goods, depending on whether or not the goods must be cleared by customs. Both measures are aimed at enabling border authorities to destroy the goods or, alternatively, to permit the right-holder to initiate the proceedings that should establish whether its rights have been infringed.

Referring to European actions as “seizures” has been deemed inappropriate by the EU, which claims that “temporal detentions” took place. In fact, Regulation 1383/2003 does not use at any moment the term “seizure”, but, instead refers to “suspension of release” and “detention”, which are the envisaged actions by customs authorities against goods suspected of infringing certain intellectual property rights.21 Although this paper follows the EU terminology, it is important to note that the different meanings of “to seize” coincide with European actions: “to hold of suddenly and forcibly; take forcible possession of; take possession by warrant or legal right”.22

Regulation 1382/2003 is the last step of a relatively fast process by which EU law has expanded border measures to be taken in relation to goods allegedly infringing intellectual property rights. Said expansion has both affected the intellectual property rights categories covered and the situations enabling border authorities to take action, resulting in a very sophisticated legal framework aimed at curbing intellectual property rights infringements occurring in third countries. The first step in this process was carried out in 1986, when an EU regulation was enacted ordering border measures to be taken with respect to the importation of trademark

infringing products, i.e. counterfeited goods. Eight years later, a new regulation was enacted mandating the detention of not only counterfeited, but also pirated merchandise. This control was to be used in cases of importation, exportation, re-exportation and entry for a suspensive procedure.24 Notably, and despite corporate demands, patent infringements were not yet covered. It was in 1999 when, through an amendment of this regulation and after the Commission so recommended it,25 patent and supplementary protection certificates infringements were introduced.26 By that time, only the control of plant variety rights, geographical indications and designations of origin remained out of the regulation’s scope. The gap was remedied by Regulation 1383/2003, mandating the control of goods protected by said rights. Following Commission proposals, Regulation 1383/2003 strengthened the position of right-holders in several respects: it broadened the intellectual property rights categories covered, provided right-holders with cost-free access to the system, facilitated the destruction of allegedly infringing goods and, among other measures, extended the scope for ex officio action by customs authorities.

Recent European detentions of pharmaceutical products have been executed invoking patent rights and supplementary protection certificates, which are intellectual property rights categories foreseen in Regulation 1383/2003 Article 2.1.c) (i) and (ii), respectively. Actions undertaken in relation to those products should fall into one of the circumstances addressed by Regulation 1383/2003 Article 1.1, which constantly refers to the European Customs Code and distinguishes two sets of situations. On the one hand, subsection a) allows customs authorities taking action against goods suspected of infringing intellectual property rights and entered for release for free circulation, export or re-export. On the other hand, subsection b) covers the cases of goods also suspected

2. PATENTED PRODUCTS IN TRANSIT CONTROL UNDER COUNCIL REgULATION (EC) 1383/2003


of infringing intellectual property rights and found during checks when entering or leaving the customs territory, placed under a suspensive procedure, in the process of being re-exported subject to notification or, finally, placed in a free zone or warehouse. In fact and despite the fact that each one of those situations has its peculiarities, Regulation 1383 allows taking of action in all kinds of customs situations regarding goods not subject to intra-community trade. Notably, as the third recital of the Regulation establishes, the transhipment of goods is included among the covered situations.

The scope of EU regulation could hardly be broader. It covers goods placed in all kinds of customs procedures (1.1.a) and also goods not subject to any custom procedure (1.1.b). Customs clearance is not, therefore, a requirement to control goods suspected of infringing intellectual property rights. This is particularly important when assessing the effects on international trade that border measures have. As the aforesaid facts regarding the detention of medicines illustrate, the EU is detaining goods that have not been cleared by customs. The explanation is that, presently, in the EU, the mere transhipment of goods allows border authorities to take action. Next, and before introducing the control of goods merely passing through the EU or being transhipped, a brief outline of the potential situations is offered.

Four situations under which border authorities may take action can be distinguished. First, actions can concern merchandise entering into the EU to circulate without restrictions. Second, they can be taken for goods entering for export, re-export and for goods found during checks on goods in the process of being re-exported subject to notification. Exportation consists of sending European goods outside the European customs area, a process which is contrary to release for free circulation. Re-exportation refers to the departure from the EU of non-Community goods introduced into the European territory without having been released for free circulation at any time.

This process usually requires notification to the customs authorities, which explains the reference to “goods in the process of being re-exported subject to notification”. The third situation is the one concerning goods found during checks on products entering or leaving the EU. As Article 91 of the European Custom Code establishes, “goods brought into the customs territory of the Community shall, from the time of their entry, be subject to customs supervision”. Until a customs-approved treatment or use is assigned to goods, they remain under customs supervision and held in temporary storage. Fourth, the last situation covers goods found during checks on merchandise placed under a suspensive procedure. Goods placed under one of the situations covered by the suspensive status (which the amended European Customs Code presently names “special procedures”) are not intended for the EU, and their relation with the EU is limited to transiting the European territory. Suspensive or special procedures include several possibilities: transit (external and internal); storage (temporary storage, customs warehousing and free zones); specific use (temporary admission and end-use) and processing (inward and outward processing).27

Detained in-transit pharmaceutical products either were under “external transit” special procedure or they merely were to be transhipped. The external transit regime allows non-Community goods to move from one point to another within the EU customs area, without such goods being subject to import duties or other charges.28 This status is particularly indicated for products arriving and leaving from different States integrating the EU customs area due to better transport connections or costs. For instance, under the external transit status detained medicines in Schiphol airport the final destinations of which were Ecuador, Mexico, Peru or Colombia could have potentially been transported to Madrid-Barajas airport, which is an important hub of EU-Latin America flights. The other potential - and much more likely - situation in which detained medicines were found was mere transhipment. In accordance with


the available information, the goods arrived in the EU with the sole purpose of changing the means of transport and abandoning the EU customs area. According to Schneider and Vrins, transhipped goods would be included in the scope of Article 1.1.b) of Council Regulation (EC) 1383/20003,29 which permits customs authorities to take action when goods are found during checks on products entering or leaving the EU in accordance with Articles 37 and 183 of the former EC Customs Code, presently Articles 91 and 177 of the Modernised Customs Code. This is also the understanding in relevant countries of transit. As the Dutch Group of the AIPPI has recently stated:

“Article 16 of the APR (EC Regulation 1383/2003) stipulates what is to be done with goods that are found to infringe an IP right. This provision basically prohibits any further trade in these goods. This includes entry of the goods in the Community customs territory, release for free circu-lation, (re-)exportation, placement under a suspensive procedure or in a free zone or free warehouse, and removal of the goods from the Community customs territory. Article 16 also applies to goods in transit that have been found to infringe an IP right as meant in the APR”.30

According to Regulation 1383/2003, and regarding patent infringing products or pro-cesses, actions to be taken in accordance with said regulation must target goods which, in the Member State in which the application for customs action is made, infringe a patent under that Member State’s law. This is a sound provision if products are intended to be introduced in that Member State or in EU internal markets. However, this stipulation, when applied to goods in transit, is at odds with a traditional principle of intellectual

property law - the territoriality principle - with one of the goals that the WTO aims to achieve - free trade - and with the rights conferred to patent owners - prohibiting the fabrication, use, offer for sale, sale or importation of the patented product. Therefore, Regulation 1383/2003 entails a constant balancing act as regards the presumption against extra-territoriality of intellectual property law, the TRIPS Agreement and other WTO provisions that compel Members not to impede legitimate trade. Therefore, it is worthwhile to regularly check whether the “compromise between the imperatives of international trade, free movement of goods, and protection against intellectual property rights infringements” is indeed respected under Regulation 1383/2003, as some authors and scholars maintain.31

It is important to note that, like the TRIPS Agreement, Council Regulation (EC) 1383 Article 3.1 excludes parallel imported goods. As Regulation 1383/2003 deals with actions to be taken at EU external borders, it is assumed pursuant to Article 3.1 that inter-nationally parallel imported goods are out of the Regulation’s reach. ECJ jurisprudence is helpful on this point. In Class International BV v Unilever NV and others, the ECJ determined that external transit of parallel imported products did not breach right-holder trademark rights. This being the case - as contrario sensu demonstrate pledges to extend the Regulation to allow the detention of parallel imported products from outside the Community32 - it is not easy to justify why parallel imported products (by definition, patent protected in importing and exporting countries) in transit in the EU customs escape the Regulation’s scope while products that are not patented in either the exporting or importing countries, but are effectively patented in the EU can be detained while in transit in Europe.


Several TRIPS and GATT provisions are of relevance in the dispute arising from European detentions of in-transit patented products. So, for the assessment of the legality of the same facts, different WTO agreements become relevant. On the one hand, TRIPS specifically regulates patent-protected products and addresses the suspension of release of goods allegedly infringing intellectual property rights. On the other hand, GATT Article V establishes the principle of freedom of transit, and Article XX lays down several general exceptions to the GATT provisions. Among the exceptions, subsection (d) of Article XX may be of relevance in the construction of the EU legal position.

It is possible that each of the parties involved in a WTO controversy finds its interests better reflected in one specific WTO agreement relevant to the case. This diversity may result in the invoking of different norms pertaining to different agreements depending on the interest of the parties. Nevertheless, WTO panels and the Appellate Body itself have stated on numerous occasions that from the fact that the WTO Agreement is a ‘single undertaking’ it follows that “WTO obligations are cumulative and Members must comply with all of them at all times”.33 The application of this principle to the specific domain of dispute settlement implies that both the GATT and the TRIPS Agreement must be taken into account when analyzing European detentions. This, however, does not clarify the exact path to follow when a specific controversy involves norms found in different WTO agreements.

The specific interaction between TRIPS and other WTO agreements has already been addressed by WTO adjudicative organs. In European Communities – Protection of trademarks and geographical indications for agricultural products and foodstuffs, the panel pointed out, “Certain claims under TRIPS Agreement and GATT 1994 relate to the same aspects of the measure at issue. There is no hierarchy between these two agreements,

which appear in separate annexes to the WTO agreement. One logical approach would be to begin in each instance with the TRIPS Agreement”.34 Despite intuitively sharing the panel’s views, one may still wonder about the basis for the “logical approach” to which the panel refers.

A possible explanation may be found in the lex specialis principle, which establishes that if a matter is being regulated by a general norm as well as a more specific rule, the latter should take precedence over the former. Lex specialis does not only apply in the case of conflict of treaties, but also as a general rule of interpretation. In the case of the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the GATT, TRIPS, as a more specific set of rules to apply to goods protected by intellectual property rights could, on the one hand, be read against the background of the general standards set forth in the GATT; on the other hand, it could be understood as a specification of the GATT principles. Nevertheless, this plausible explanation could also be formulated the other way around. Given the fact that the case regarding the detention of generic products in transit has to do with free trade and the regime of products in transit as well as the fact that the GATT devotes much more attention to the transit regime than TRIPS (an entire article in the GATT versus a brief mention in a TRIPS footnote), the GATT and not TRIPS could be considered the lex specialis.

Between the GATT and the TRIPS Agreements there are interactions that have to be taken into account, in particular the shared goal of avoiding the use of intellectual property rights to create barriers to legitimate trade. This interaction may help in attributing sense to general GATT principles not yet implemented in relation to TRIPS. For instance, and of special importance given the matter under discussion, it may be worth analyzing the meaning given in the GATT to the notion of “disguised restriction to international trade”, and apply such meaning to restrictions that find their origin in certain

3. ThE CUMULATIVE NATURE OF WTO OBLIgATIONS


levels of intellectual property enforcement. But the interaction can also work the other way around, which permits looking at the TRIPS Agreement as one containing “new rules and disciplines concerning the applicability of the basic principles of GATT 1994” as the TRIPS Preamble affirms. In this last regard, TRIPS

provisions on border measures and in-transit goods could be considered as specifying the GATT provisions on the same subject, something which does not impede reading them in light of the GATT principles on the same subject and assessing the same facts against the GATT norms once analysis of TRIPS is concluded.


Although the TRIPS Agreement affirms that one of its objectives is to reduce distortions and impediments to international trade, intellectual property rights are by their very nature trade restrictive. In fact, the incorporation of intellectual property into the multilateral trade system during the Uruguay Round has livened up an old debate concerning the relationship between free trade and intellectual property. Numerous scholars have highlighted the existing contradiction between WTO trade liberalization objectives and the protectionism introduced by TRIPS into the intensive technological products market.35 Certainly, a positive link between free trade and intellectual protection would have surprised free trade promoters of the nineteenth century. The then heated debate between intellectual property defenders and opponents had, as major players on the one hand, protectionism promoters aligned with intellectual property rights defenders, and, on the other hand, patent system opponents that simultaneously were free trade promoters.36

Circumstances have changed and a more encompassing argument has been made, and that is that free trade is not only a matter of increasing trade, but also trade in legitimate products. It is in this context, that it has been acknowledged that fostering competition im-plies guaranteeing protection against rivals that take unmerited advantage of innovators’ efforts. This is why specific levels of protection of intellectual property have been agreed. This is also why it is understood that these levels of protection are related with the preservation of competition conditions, not being possible to equate them with trade restrictions. But this understanding cannot be disassociated from two matters of fact, at least in the field of patents. On the one hand, it is not advisable to establish a single global level of intellectual property protection. The reason is to be found in the understanding that the appropriate level of protection may change from country to country due to numerous economic, social

and cultural reasons. On the other hand, it is widely recognized that patents, due to the prerogatives the law grants to the title holders and given its strictly national nature, may imply, as a result of the exercise of the ius prohibiendi they confer, an impediment to the international trade of certain products.37

Both the diversity of national standards regarding intellectual property and the nature of certain intellectual property categories - particularly patents - raise again the difficult relationship between trade promotion and intellectual property regulation. Therefore, it is clear that the nineteenth century tension between free trade and intellectual property protection persists. In fact, to a certain extent, the TRIPS Agreement acknowledges such tension and tries to mitigate conflicting outcomes by framing specific articles within broad free-trade promoting principles. This is why TRIPS mentions the need to avoid intellectual property protection becoming an unnecessary barrier to trade in the Preamble and several articles. These references can be classified into two groups, depending on their influence over the whole agreement or their rather limited influence on a single topic or part of the Agreement.

The main general references to avoid intellectual property becoming a trade barrier are found in the Preamble and in Article 8. The TRIPS Preamble starts by declaring the WTO Members’ desire “to reduce distortions and impediments to international trade” and continues, pointing out the need “to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade”. In addition, TRIPS Article 8, containing the principles to apply to the whole treaty’s implementation, also recognizes the need to avoid both intellectual property rights abuses and practices that imply trade restrictions. More precisely, Article 8.2 affirms that appropriate measures “may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual

4. ThE RELATIONShIP BETWEEN ThE TRIPS AgREEMENT AND FREE TRADE


property rights by right-holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology”. Article 40 further specifies this power and states that “some licensing practices or conditions pertaining to intellectual property rights which restrain competition may have adverse effects on trade” and recalls the power granted to states “to prevent or control such practices”.

As regards enforcement measures, TRIPS Part III Section 1 contains a single article that encapsulates several general obligations re-garding enforcement. Given its location and comprehensive nature, Article 41 guides the implementation and interpretation of the rest of the enforcement part and sections, including Section 4, on border measures. This is important, because the second sentence of Article 41 “takes account of the public interest in the availability of IPR-protected products”38 when affirming that enforcement procedures “shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse”. It recognizes, therefore, the protection against abuses by right-holders and the protection of legitimate trade as standards to be applied to the entire Part III and, consequently, on border measures legislation and implementation. It is argued that the mandatory language of TRIPS Article 41, added to TRIPS Article 1.1 condition imposed upon new standards to “not contravene the provisions of this Agreement”, impose a ceiling on both implementation of TRIPS Part III and new standards related to enforcement.39

The Article 41 reference to “legitimate trade” may well oblige one to think about the legi-timacy of generic medicines in international trade. If no disagreement existed on said trade legality, Brazilian Ambassador Roberto Azevedo would probably have been right when he claimed at the Council for TRIPS that detentions responded to an “excessive and inappropriate interpretation of intellectual property law”.40 The WTO panel report in Canada-Pharmaceutical Products gave a defi-

nition of ‘legitimate’ in a matter also related to medicines and intellectual property rights. According to the panel, ‘legitimate’ “must be defined in the way that it is often used in legal discourse – as a normative claim calling for protection of interests that are ‘justifiable’ in the sense that they are supported by relevant public policies or other social norms.”41 In this regard, and in addition to the fact that seized medicines were legitimate in exporting and importing countries, the validity of generics international trade is not contested at all. What is more, numerous international organizations and WTO Members have individually, collec-tively, internally and internationally recog-nized the need to promote such trade in order to guarantee access to medicines. This public policy goal, together with the human right status granted to access to medicines,42 should end any debate regarding the “legitimacy” of generics trade.

On the basis of all the aforementioned, it is certainly possible for a WTO DSB panel to be asked whether Council Regulation (EC) 1383/2003 restricts legitimate trade and, thus, the TRIPS Preamble and Articles 1.1, 8, 41, 51 and 52 become relevant. The fact that the trade of legitimate generic products has been disrupted proves not only that Regulation 1383/2003 is potentially trade restrictive and can be abused, but also that this is the case in practice. Moreover, pharmaceutical companies’ allegations when challenging transit goods expose further problems related to their understanding of rights granted by their patents. Although EFPIA official statements would indicate the opposite,43 the facts and above right-holders’ letters show that R&D based companies understand that national patent rights permit disrupting international trade despite challenged goods not having effects in their jurisdictions and being legal in foreign jurisdictions. The EU regulation is instrumental in fostering that view, which makes it necessary for the EU to clarify whether it also shares that understanding and what measures could be adopted to avoid the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) 1383/2003 becoming a barrier to legitimate trade.


TRIPS Articles 51 and 52, devoted to the suspension of release by customs authorities and its application, are located in Part III of TRIPS, which sets forth general principles and detailed mechanisms for the enforcement of intellectual property rights. Part III includes civil measures and criminal and administrative procedures, and Section 4 of that Part (which includes Articles 51 and 52) deals with border measures. With respect to actions to be controlled, TRIPS Article 51 establishes the obligation to allow an application to be lodged for the suspension of the release into free circulation of imported infringing products. The imposition of border controls on importation operates as a “safety net in the event that enforcement at the source has not taken place”.44 Certainly, Members may also provide for corresponding procedures concerning the suspension of the release of infringing goods destined for exportation, but this clearly remains a power of the contracting parties. Moreover, a footnote attached to Article 51 confirms that there shall be no obligation to apply such procedures to in-transit goods.

Not all enforcement measures contained in Part III refer to all intellectual property rights categories. Article 51, for instance, only establishes the obligation to deploy certain border measures with regard to specific intellectual property rights, namely trademarks and copyrights. In contrast, border measures are optional when applied to other intellectual property rights, such as patents. It is not by coincidence that customs have traditionally controlled only counterfeit and pirated goods,45 that is to say, visibly infringing goods. Even today, other intellectual property rights border enforcement measures are rare. There are several explanations for this. Regarding patents, the most relevant argument relates to the difficulty in assessing patent infringements at first sight. This difficulty arises from the complexity of

patents, as well as the technical complexity of products to which patents are attached. This appraisal requires an assessment of the scope of claims, a much more problematic activity than the usual visual inspection performed by customs authorities on products allegedly infringing trademarks and copyrights.46 More-over, determining patent violations in medi-cines requires examinations that involve labo- ratory tests and other relatively complex pro-cedures that in the majority of cases cannot be performed by customs authorities.47

Council Regulation (EC) 1383/2003 surpasses TRIPS standards regarding scope, entitled applicants, actions, sanctions and procedures. That is to say, EU regulation expands the TRIPS regime in almost every respect. Nevertheless, due to the minimum nature of the standards provided therein, this does not necessarily imply a violation of the TRIPS Agreement. In fact, by adopting Regulation 1383/2003, the EU has made use of the power granted by TRIPS Article 1 to “implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement”. But, it has to be duly taken into consideration that this is not an absolute freedom, because TRIPS Article 1 made that power conditional upon “such protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement”. In this context, there is a need to recall the condition alluded to above to not unreasonably restrict legitimate trade imposed on measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights, and assess that requisite against the consequences of the EU TRIPS plus legislation on border measures.

A definition that based legitimacy on “public policies or other social norms” was offered above. According to said definition, generics trade is legitimate and, as such, it falls within the trade promotion objectives of the WTO. In fact, WTO free trade aspirations render the fostering of trade in legitimate products - both patented and generic - a logical outcome. This is why there is a need to assess whether trade restrictions of generic medicines are

5.1 Infringement under the Laws of the Country of Importation

5. TRIPS ARTICLES 51 AND 52


backed by sound legal arguments. Companies compelling the EU to detain generic medicines in transit understand that they can claim the rights conferred by TRIPS Article 28 even though there is no possibility of those products entering European markets and, consequently, the subject matter of their rights not being affected at all.48

An argument against European detentions and Regulation 1383 related articles can be found in TRIPS Article 52, which states that right-holders must provide evidence “to satisfy the competent authorities that, under the laws of the country of importation, there is prima facie an infringement. In addition, TRIPS footnote 14 refers to the law of the country of importation to verify the existence of an infringement of a trademark or copyright, which are, as noted earlier, the only intellectual property categories that WTO Members must control. Therefore, both from the general proposition of TRIPS Article 52 and from the reference to the law of the country of importation contained in TRIPS footnote 14, it can be inferred that patent-infringing goods will be considered those that infringe the rights of the holder under the law of the country of importation.

A potentially controversial concept is the one of “importation”. The GATT does not include a definition of importation, and in the case of products in transit some discrepancies may exist regarding whether or not an importation has taken place. To “import” means “to bring (goods or services) into a country from abroad”;49 therefore, in principle crossing the border would be enough to consider that an importation has occurred. If this affirmation was correct, each transit operation would imply an act of importation and could hence be impeded by right holders located in the country of transit. Nevertheless, this argument must be disregarded in attention to the territoriality principle, the lack of exploitation of the patent in the national territory and the non violation of any of the rights granted by a patent.

The nature of the operations of transit and importation differ. GATT Article V:1 distinguishes transit from importation, and several TRIPS articles allude to transit and importation separately. As European detentions have been carried out invoking the law of the country of transit, which is what Council Regulation (EC) 1383/2003 permits when it mandates measures to be taken if goods “in the Member State in which application for customs action is made, infringe: (i) a patent under that Member State’s law”,50 it can be sustained that both the regulation and the detentions are against TRIPS Article 52. Consequently, national regulations and practice that follow Regulation 1383/2003 would also be against TRIPS Article 52.

Patent holders invoking the law of the transit country to assess the status of the goods could try arguing that the Article 52 reference to take into account the law of the importing country, when assessing the infringement, might be related to the main situation addressed in Article 51 - and the only one for which Article 51 is mandatory, that is to say, the suspension of release of imported counterfeited or pirated goods. Other situations, such as the exportation or transit, would not be the ones addressed in Article 52 and could therefore be judged pursuant to the laws of the countries of exportation and transit. This last thesis is, nevertheless, far from clear, for both legal and factual reasons. From the legal point of view, the territorial principle and the rights conferred by an intellectual property right would render the opposite conclusion.51 And, from a factual point of view, the letters sent by rights-holders to generic companies in the context of the detentions cases demonstrate that their actions assume that importation into the EU had taken place. In one letter, for instance, the patent holder affirms that “by importing clopidogrel, you are infringing the aforementioned intellectual property rights of Sanofi-Aventis”.52 In that case, no importation into the EU ever took place, but only transit through the EU customs territory: the consignment was originated in India and was in transit in the Schiphol airport on its way


to Colombia. In order to adjust the facts and argumentation to the second interpretation offered of TRIPS Article 52 above, Sanofi-Aventis would have better alleged something along the lines of “by transiting clopidrogrel through European customs zones, you are infringing…” Although said argumentation would have surprised those familiar with fundamental intellectual property rights principles, not to say free trade promoters, it is in fact the one consistent with the second interpretation offered of TRIPS Article 52. In any case, and regarding the proper meaning of TRIPS Article 52, it can be sustained either that only the law of the final destination State is the relevant one, or that the TRIPS Agreement is unclear on this matter, a vagueness that makes it worth seeking clarification through the WTO Dispute Settlement Understan- ding (DSU).

Another important point to make is that, pursuant to TRIPS, Member states are free when deciding on the specific application of border measures to goods in transit. As TRIPS footnote No. 13 states, “there shall be no obligation to apply such procedures to imports of goods put on the market in another country by or with the consent of the right-holder, or to goods in transit”. The reference to the application of such procedures and not to the legal incorporation of the same makes it clear that, even if enshrined in their legislation, Members are always free to disregard their application. That is to say, even if the title holder lodged an application for the detention or suspension of release into free circulation of such products in conformity with its internal law, a WTO Member would be free to disregard such an application in conformity with WTO law.

TRIPS Article 51 and footnote 13 have never been interpreted by any WTO adjudicative organ, and their application and meaning

remain unexplored. This is the reason why it might seem controversial an interpretation that, nevertheless, both from the text and from a technical point of view, appears to be the most plausible one: TRIPS only enables border measures taking place regarding goods that are imported, exported and re-exported, but not border measures against goods that do not need their release by customs authorities. The latter include, among others, goods in transit protected by all types of intellectual property rights. In accordance with this view, the control of goods in transit is contemplated by several international treaties dealing with specific intellectual property rights categories (for instance, Article 9.4 of the Paris Convention, regarding trademarks, and Article 16.1 of the Berne Convention, regar-ding copyrights). However, patents are not included among these categories. Thus, there is no international treaty laying down the control of patented goods in transit.

The explanation to the above proposition is straightforward. The title of TRIPS Article 51 is “Suspension of Release by Customs Authorities”. It regulates, therefore, poten-tial border measures to be taken against goods that need to be released by customs authorities. However, in the daily reality of the customs activity, border authorities suspend the release of goods that enter or exit the national jurisdiction. That is, the suspension of release concerns goods that come from or enter into the internal market, i.e. imported, exported and re-exported goods. Accordingly, Article 51 identifies two potential situations: the one concerning goods that are released for “free circulation” (importation), and the one regarding “suspension by the customs authorities of the release of infringing goods destined for exportation from their territories”. The combination of both situations permits the re-exportation.

In contrast, goods in transit are never released for free circulation or released for exportation, because they are only meant to transit the country. Although goods in transit might be transhipped in appropriate custom houses or facilities and might be subjected to

5.2 The Suspension of Release Does Not Include Detention: Consequences in Light of the Territoriality Principle and the Rights Conferred by a Patent


special transit procedures - such as external transit - this has nothing to do with any sort of “release by custom authorities”. In fact, what characterizes goods in transit is that they were never meant (and they will never need) to be released by customs authorities in the transited country. This is, in fact, a defining criterion to identify a good in transit. In view of all that, TRIPS Article 51, entitled “Suspension of Release by Customs Authorities” either was not drafted correctly or it cannot apply to goods in transit.

Council Regulation (EC) 1383 confirms this interpretation. As mentioned previously, pur-suant to Regulation 1383 customs authorities may either suspend the release of the goods or detain them. These are distinct operations to be applied to goods placed under different procedures. Accordingly, Regulation 1383 recital nº 5 states that suspension of release applies to importation (“release for free circulation”), exportation and re-exportation, while detention is the appropriated action for goods placed under a suspensive procedure, placed in a free zone or a free warehouse, in the process of being re-exported with notification, introduced into the customs territory or leaving that territory. Thus, in the EU law, two figures (suspension of release and detention) apply to different customs operations depending on whether or not these operations imply goods legally entering into the national market. By contrast, TRIPS foresees explicitly only the suspension of release.

Obviously, this being the case, the question is why TRIPS footnote 13 alludes to transit. There are at least three potential explanations. The first consists in affirming that footnote 13 (“there shall be no obligation to apply such procedures (…) to goods in transit”) confirms that procedures envisaged in Article 51 are not the ones to apply to goods in transit. Thus, footnote 13 would be the corroboration of what can be deduced from the plain meaning of the words. A second conceivable explanation to the statement in footnote 13 that “there shall be no obligation to apply such procedures (…) to goods in transit” is

that this is a reference is another example (of the generalizations – in occasions giving place to ambiguities - contained in TRIPS. It is generally accepted that the TRIPS Agreement was a compromise among very different views concerning the appropriate regulation for intellectual property. In this sense, the need to find a halfway between conflicting interests explains the ambiguity in numerous provisions. More specifically, with respect to Article 51 and footnote 13, the abridgment into a single article of different procedures that usually were applied to different intellectual property rights categories could be the explanation of the alleged inaccuracy of footnote 13. Whatever the explanation, the control of transit is not included in TRIPS, while, on the other hand, the control of patented goods in transit is not foreseen by any existing IP international treaty. A third explanation is that, even though TRIPS does not use the technically correct wording, Article 51 applies to goods that do not need to be released by customs, that is, goods in transit. Nevertheless, as Professor Abbott has affirmed, it does not apply to patents: “At the time TRIPS was negotiated, the practice of seizing goods in transit based on allegations of patent infringement was unknown, so member would not have contemplated such practice as an option when drafting the relevant provision”.53

Finally, it remains to be seen what would be the practical outcome of this thesis. A possible point of departure is stating that any national or regional measure that affects international trade of patented products cannot infringe international treaties dealing with inter-national trade or intellectual property. There is no international treaty laying down the control of patented goods in transit, not even implicitly, but there are international treaties establishing the basic foundations of the intellectual property system. Among those basic institutions there are the territoriality principle and the patent as a basic legal figure that confers a set of negative rights. These negative - and exhaustive - rights do not include controlling goods not intended


for the market where the rights apply. At the same time, TRIPS Article 1 establishes that all standards that increase the agreed levels of protection cannot contradict the Agreement. In addition, it has to be recalled that the latter expressly obliges that application of enforcement procedures in a manner that

does not create barriers to legitimate trade. In view of all that, and recalling that the TRIPS Agreement contains no provision justifying the adoption of measures against products in transit allegedly infringing patent rights, a strict stance should be adopted against the control of such products in transit.


6. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIghTS BASICS: INDEPENDENCE, TERRITORIALITY AND RIghTS CONFERRED BY A PATENT

A patent confers the rights exhaustively enumerated in the corresponding regulation, for a limited duration of time, and within a specific territory. When considering the spatial scope of a patent, it is usual to refer to the so-called principle of territoriality. This principle implies that the protection conferred by a patent only covers the sovereign territory of the granting state. That is, the spatial efficacy of the laws governing an intellectual property right is delimited by the territoriality principle: the national territory. The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States is clear: “patents are considered territorial, having legal effect only in the territory of the issuing state”.54 Therefore, patent validity and applicability is only to be judged according to the lex loci.

Both national intellectual property legislations and public international law recognize the territoriality principle. The United States Patent Act, for instance, states that a person may be liable for patent infringement if he/she “makes, uses, offers to sell or sells any patented invention, within the United States”.55 The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property Article 4bis.1 enshrines a related principle to that of territoriality: the principle of independence. According to this principle “patents applied for in the various countries (…) shall be independent of patents obtained for the same invention in other countries”. The principle of independence recognizes that an invention may be protected differently in each national legal system, and that the protection granted by each national legal system to that invention does not affect the corresponding protection offered by the other legal systems.56 This can be observed, for instance, regarding the patentability criteria: States maintain different approaches regarding the meaning of inventive step, industrial application and novelty, diffe-rences that the independence principle render

unchallengeable not only as enshrined in the corresponding legislations, but also in their precise application. The same applies regarding a patent’s scope, efficacy and duration. The non-application of the independence principle would not only contradict the fundamentals of the intellectual property system, but also would create problems of impossible resolution. In this context, it is worth recalling that in 1972 a US District Court noted that “Courts in the foreign territories whose patents are involved here… (might) disagree with this court’s determinations on the validity of the patents. Those Courts would at any rate be faced with the hard choice of accepting the inexpert determination of a foreign court or creating an unseemly conflict with the judgment of the court of another country”.57

The TRIPS Agreement, acknowledging the existing independence, sets minimum standards and allows WTO Members to adopt higher levels of protection, something which, in fact, implies that intellectual property law should not have extra-territorial effects, and that each State is responsible for the level of protection it grants. WTO Member States agreed in 2003 to a text that explicitly recognizes the “territorial nature of patent rights”. The WTO General Council Decision of 30 August 2003 establishes in paragraph 6(i) the conditions governing the waiver that allows exporting the cross-licensed product to least developing countries pertaining to an area of regional integration. After having set those conditions, paragraph 6(i) establishes that “it is understood that this will not prejudice the territorial nature of the patent rights in question”.58

The territoriality and independence principles do not exclude interactions between protected goods and activities occurring abroad. That is to say, legislators have recognized that patents may relate with extra-territorial activities that impact on the national jurisdiction. This recognition is found, for instance, in Paris

6.1 The Territorial Nature and Inde-pendence of Patents


Convention Article 5 and TRIPS Article 28.1.b, which establish that a patented processes permits impeding the importation of products made by that protected process. Another example is the prohibition of exportation of components of patented products so as to induce the combination of such components abroad in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the importing State.59 In the same vein, the United States has also forbidden the exportation of components that are meant for use only in a patented device.60 These title holder’s powers should be viewed not as an exception to the territoriality principle, but as recognition of the interrelation between patents and activities occurring abroad, and also part of the minimum rights granted by a patent.

It could be argued that, despite not entering into the European market, medicines were certainly in European territory, albeit in the customs zone. Together with the legal arguments derived from the national scope of patent rights and the consequent independence of title holder’s exclusive rights,61 and in addition to the particularities of the transit regime,62 it is doubtful that an economic entitlement as a patent without economic effects in a specific jurisdiction can nevertheless be challenged in said jurisdiction. Although bizarre, this proposal is not unrelated to other cases. Professor Chisum recalls a seminal case that may be worth taking into account in this context. In Brown v. Duchesne, the US Supreme Court constricted the literal territorial scope of a US patent. A French vessel in US territory used a gaff on board covered by a patent, an unauthorized use in the US territory, which the Supreme Court did not, however, consider an infringement.63 This case, which was preceded by a similar case that resulted in an amendment to the English patent law,64 gave place in 1925 to the present Article 5 of the Paris Convention dealing with patented devices forming part of vessels, aircrafts or land vehicles.

Letters sent by European patent holders to generic companies affirm that in-transit goods infringe patents granted in EU Member States.

These allegations don’t only go against the territoriality principle and basic assumptions regarding the rights a patent confers, but also are difficult to reconcile with EFPIA statements. According to EFPIA, “Where the product is not counterfeit and it is ascertained that no intellectual property rights apply at either country of origin or destination, the customs authorities should allow the product to be released, irrespective of the intellectual property status of the product in the EU”.65 An inherent contradiction exists between the territoriality principle and Regulation 1383/2003. Only this contradiction explains positions that claim that if products are not “counterfeit” according to the EU law and are not patent infringing in source and destination countries, they will be released for free circulation. Thus, from that standpoint, on the one hand EU Law becomes relevant to assessing the “counterfeit” nature of goods, and on the other the patent status in third countries also becomes relevant. In any case, all that has been achieved is the disruption of generics trade invoking European patent rights of goods not intended for the EU market. Something that Regulation 1383/2003 allows due to its understanding that the law of the transit country is the relevant one when assessing the legality of in-transit goods.

To state that conferred rights are enforceable only in the issuing State, that is to say, invoking the territoriality principle, is helpful at explaining why States other than the one granting an intellectual property right cannot decide on the validity or enforcement of said right in the granting State or third States. From the point of view of intellectual property rights owners, the territoriality principle implies that the title holder will be able to claim his rights if the jurisdiction where the right is protected and the place of infringement coincide.66 However, only by analyzing the rights conferred by each of the intellectual property rights categories will it be possible to determine where the title-holder rights end. Otherwise, there is

6.2 Rights Conferred by a Patent


nothing impeding the title holder located in the transit country to claim his rights regarding goods in transit also invoking, precisely, the territoriality principle.

As far as patents are concerned, TRIPS Article 28 states that, where the subject matter of a patent is a product, the owner has the right to prevent third parties from the acts of making, using, offering for sale, selling or importing said product. On the other hand, where the subject matter is a process, the owner can prevent third parties from the act of using the process and from the acts of using, offering for sale, selling or importing for these purposes at least the product obtained directly by that process. Therefore, patents’ main characteristic is granting a negative right, an ius prohibendi regarding certain acts performed in the granting state and enshrined in a numerus clausus list.

Although transit cannot be impeded, because it involves an activity not included in the list of acts that the title holder can prohibit, this might be an incomplete and too formalistic explanation as it relates to the exclusion of the control of transit among the holders’ rights. In fact, the relevant explanation may be found in the underlying reasons that render it not acceptable to impede the transit. And these underlying reasons have to do with the territorial nature of intellectual property rights and the independence of patents. As noted above, an intellectual property right confers a national entitlement, a power over protected products in the domestic market. This is why activities that bear no relationship with the domestic market, such as the transit, simply cannot be included in the numerus clausus list of rights granted by an intellectual property right.

Title holders’ dissatisfaction with this state of things has led to resort to fictions in some jurisdictions. For instance, in reference to cases such as Sosecal v. Sisvel,67 the Dutch Group of the AIPPI has pointed out that in order to establish whether or not goods in transit infringe an intellectual property right

“Dutch courts apply a so-called legal fiction. In order to establish infringement, goods in transit should be regarded by way of fiction as goods which have been produced in the Netherlands. (…) The use of the legal fiction in the Netherlands has been cause of much debate among scholars and legal professionals. Goods which in their country of origin and destination do not infringe IP rights can still be detained by customs and found to infringe an IP right in the Netherlands as meant in the APR (EC Regulation 1383/2003) based on this fiction.”68

As it will be seen, this fiction contravenes ECJ jurisprudence regarding the rights conferred by intellectual property rights and the control of in-transit goods.69 In this regard, in order to control goods in transit that do not affect Dutch title holders’ competitive position in the Dutch or EU markets, Dutch courts fictitiously assume that goods have been produced in the Netherlands. Although Abbott accurately states that “it is hard to imagine a greater departure from the principle of independence of patents than the ‘manufacture fiction,’”70 this legal construction may have several explanations. Among these explanations, there are some more justifiable legally speaking than others. A well-orientated but not convincing justification could be that, given the fact that transit is not among the activities considered acts of exploitation of a patent, Dutch courts have tried to link - or even assimilate - the transit to one of the actions expressly foreseen as forbidden utilization of the invention: making the protected product. A first answer to this proposal is that, in case any assimilation could be accepted at all, the most suitable forbidden acts to link with the transit would be the sale and the importation, but not the manufacture. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish transit from importation and sale.

The sale implies the wish to change the power of disposition over the goods, something that in principle does not occur in the transit. This is why it can be affirmed that leaving the goods in the hands of the carrier does not imply granting him the power of disposition over the goods.


That is to say, in the operation of transit the carrier merely puts in contact the sender with the addressee, but he is not entitled to put the products into the market of the transited country.71 It is also necessary to differentiate transit from importation. Although it is clear that the transit implies entering the product into the national territory, it is also clear that this is not its ultimate goal. That is to say, in the importation, the goods are introduced in the national territory in order to exploit them there. In contrast to importation, in the operation of transit the introduction into the national territory of the transit country is just a circumstantial event: the circulation in transit is merely instrumental to reach the final destination, this last being found in another country where the product will be exploited.72

This general approach cannot omit the exis-tence of other potential situations. Indeed, the transit frequently implies changing the carrier or the means of transport in the transited country. This is the case, for instance, of the transhipment, included in the Regulation 1383/2003 scope. In cases that imply a change of the power of disposition over the goods, the right holder could try to assimilate the transit to the operations of sale or importation, assimilation that could allow the title holder to impede the transit. Nevertheless, since the beginning of the twentieth century numerous national courts have addressed these types of allegations and have, continually, stated that transhipment - and like operations - do not imply the introduction of the protected goods into the national market.73 In such cases, the contact with the national market is merely circumstantial, while changing the power of disposition does not imply a change of the final destination of the goods. In fact, as Massaguer has recalled, conferring a power to title holders to prohibit the transit alleging changes regarding the power of disposition over the goods would be based on purely formal arguments and would be of little help to the freedom of trade.74

On various occasions, the ECJ has dealt with the interaction between the territoriality

principle, the rights conferred by different intellectual property rights categories and the push for enforcing local intellectual property standards which may have extra-territorial effects. Albeit in most of the cases the ECJ has dealt with controversies arising from trademarks litigation, the fundamentals of its jurisprudence are transferable to other intellectual property rights categories.

In 2000, when judging a well-known case, The Polo/Lauren Company LP v. Pt Dwidua Langgeng Pratam, the ECJ linked the validity of Regulation 3295/94 - which preceded the present Regulation 1383/2003 - to one of the pillars of the EU, the then Article 113, on common commercial policy. The Court affirmed that provisions on intellectual property affecting cross-border trade constitute an essential element in international trade legislation, and that the external transit of non-Community goods is not devoid of effect on the internal market. Alleging the possible diversion of those goods onto the European market, the Court upheld the legality of the Regulation.75 In relation to that case, General Advocate Jacobs said that “the risk that counterfeit goods in external transit may be fraudulently brought on to the Community market is a relevant consideration in examining the validity of a regulation that seeks to empower customs authorities to take action when such goods are found during the course of checks on goods in external transit”.76 The fact that TRIPS may open the door to similar measures being taken in relation to patented products in transit is a sound basis for the EU to defend WTO conformity of Regulation 1383/2003. This conclusion, however, invites us to distinguish between the validity of a certain regulation as far as European and WTO law is concerned and the admissibility of certain right-holders requests and implementing measures. It also must be remembered that the ECJ made the control of in-transit goods conditional on their potential diversion onto the EU market. While there is the possibility of deviating goods to the EU internal market under the external transit special procedure, this event is much more unlikely in the case of mere transhipment.


In Montex Holdings Ltd. V. Diesel SpA, the ECJ was assured that both intellectual property protected goods in the case were legal and that they would not be diverted onto the EU market. In that case, a cargo from a non-EU country was in transit through Germany, with Ireland as its final destination, a country where the goods were not trademark protected. In response to several preliminary questions, the Court affirmed that “external transit does not constitute use of the mark liable to infringe the right of the mark’s proprietor to control the putting of the goods in question on the Community market, because it does not imply any marketing of those goods”. This led the Court to conclude that the proprietor of a trademark can prohibit the transit through a Member State - in which that mark is protected - of goods bearing the trademark and placed under the external transit procedure “only if those goods are subject to the act of a third party while they are placed under the external transit procedure which necessarily entails their being put on the market in that Member State of transit”.77 The ECJ also made it clear that the risk of diversion could not be merely a theoretical one. By contrast, the right-holder must demonstrate either “the existence of a release for free circulation” or “another act necessarily entailing their being put on the market” in the transit State.78 In this regard, the Court made it clear that “placing non-Community products under a suspensive customs procedure does not make it possible for them to be put on the market in the Community in the absence of release for free circulation”.79

Advocate General Jacobs was even clearer in Unilever NV and Others. This case concerned genuine trademarked goods that the applicant was trying to introduce in the European Economic Area. The defendants blocked the products at the Dutch border alleging legislation prohibiting the entry of counterfeit products, something that soon became clear was not the case. Among the questions the Advocate General answered was whether a trademark proprietor may oppose the entry of legally trademarked

goods from third countries into the territory of a Member state. Jacobs responded to the question by recalling that trademark owner exclusive rights are granted in order to enable the proprietor to protect his specific interests as proprietor. In this context, Jacobs affirmed that he could “not see how the essential function of a trademark can be compromised solely by the fact that goods genuinely bearing that mark are subject to the external transit procedure and hence by definition are not in free circulation within the Community”.80 And even more important for the detentions case, Jacobs recalled the Rioglass case,81 where the ECJ affirmed that the mere passing in transit did not involve any marketing of the goods and therefore could not infringe any rights, and stated that “if the Court took that view with regard to goods in free circulation in the Community it would apply a fortiori to non-Community goods in respect of which import formalities have not been completed”.82

ECJ jurisprudence on EC Treaty Article 30 may also be helpful at laying down the limits of enforcement of measures adopted to secure compliance with regulations for intellectual property protection. EC Treaty Article 30 authorizes prohibiting or restricting importation, exportation and transit of goods invoking the protection of industrial and commercial property. Intellectual property rights enforcement would be therefore a legitimate basis to move away from free trade principles. Even so, the ECJ made it clear that these actions can be aimed only “to protect the specific subject-matter of the right of industrial and commercial property”.83 In the area of pharmaceutical products, and in the context of the jurisprudence related to the exhaustion of rights doctrine, the ECJ has stated that the specific subject matter of a patent is to use an invention for placing the goods resulting from said invention onto the market for the first time.84 It is difficult to find out how the mere transit of a product could affect this specific subject matter, since neither the invention would be used nor the product placed onto the market.


So, under a very similar legal regime to the present one, the ECJ and its Advocate General have linked the detention and the suspension of release of protected goods in transit to the very fact that those goods could be diverted on to the transited market. In itself, the transit of goods through a country where they are protected does not imply any infringement. The background argument is that only by placing the goods onto the internal market can the subject-matter of a specific intellectual property right, and the rights of the title holder, be infringed. Consequently, the detention of in-transit goods would be warranted only if those goods threatened right-holders’ competitive positions in the transit country. By contrast, in the detention cases under consideration no one questions that generics were not intended to enter in the European internal market. The introduction of the product, therefore, would be the only trigger that would allow the EU to initiate actions against products in transit that respect intellectual property laws of exporting and importing countries.

In this context, it might be necessary to point out other legislative constructions that better reflect the needed correlation between the territorial nature of intellectual property rights and the rights conferred to the rights holder. A first option is the freedom of transit of goods when no affectation of the competitive position of the title holder in the transited market exists. This option matches TRIPS provisions requirements on border measures, and it is certainly fully respectful

of both the territorial nature of intellectual property rights and the rights conferred to the title holder.

A second option, based on fiction, consists of anticipating the moment and location of the protection of an intellectual property right. This is the case of Switzerland, where the Article 8.3 of the Patents Act establishes that “The transit of patent-infringing goods can only be prohibited when the patent owner can also prohibit the import into the country of destination”.85 Although there is no affectation of the specific-subject matter of a patent in the country of transit, the Swiss law permits anticipating the moment of the protection that the same title holder could demand in the destination country. Swiss authorities justify anticipation “in view of the increasing international dimension of counterfeiting and piracy”.86 Nevertheless, this option is far from unproblematic when assessed against both the prohibition of extraterritoriality of intellectual property rights and the rights conferred to the rights holder. This is the case for two reasons: first, the Swiss authorities might be found in the situation of examining the validity of the patent in the importation country and second, the rights holder may prevent the transit without its rights in the transit country having been affected at all. It may be argued, however, that this is a more plausible formulation than the much broader European one, because at least it takes into account the status of the good in the relevant country, which is the destination formulation.


7. ThE SPECIAL STATUS CONFERRED TO PhARMACEUTICAL PRO-DUCTS IN ThE WTO LEgAL SYSTEM AND ThE RELEVANCE OF OThER PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS

Over the last fourteen years, the impediments that the TRIPS Agreement may pose to the access to medicines have provoked a response both legal and political in favour of interpreting the TRIPS Agreement in a manner supportive of public health. So-called TRIPS flexibilities have been emphasized and, in a legally binding way, all WTO Members gave an undertaking that TRIPS “can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all”.87

Numerous authors have explored the TRIPS margin of discretion and have offered interpre-tations that would reduce the impact of TRIPS on medicines prices and access. To that scholar and civil society effort, developing countries added their strength at the WTO to obtain a compromise that ended doubts and favoured a pro-public health interpretation of TRIPS. This is something that was achieved with the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. Despite the fact that a parallel movement to ratcheting up TRIPS standards mainly through free trade agreements has co-existed with said pro-public health legal interpretations and reforms, it may be well ascertained that a pro-public health inter-pretation would presently guide any case at the DSU that has to do with pharmaceutical products. Nevertheless, it has been stated that “the confiscation (EU detention of losartan) is contrary to the letter and spirit of the Doha Declaration”.88

In a hypothetical detentions case at the WTO DSB, the panel probably would be confronted with the task of interpreting TRIPS Articles 41, 51 and 52 together with GATT Article V and XX (d). States confronting European detentions and regulations would almost certainly raise the public health problems caused by said actions and regulations. In accordance with

DSU Article 3.2, the panel would clarify TRIPS provisions “in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law”. Pursuant to the general rule of interpretation of international treaties contained in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and more specifically in accordance with Article 31.3.a), when interpreting a treaty, any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions shall be taken into account. The Doha Declaration has this status, at least, and its command to interpret TRIPS in a manner supportive of WTO members’ right to protect public health could be decisive in the panel’s ruling on the hypothetical detentions case.

Moreover, European regulation and detentions not only jeopardize the pro-public health interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement, but also the WTO General Council Decision of 30 August 2003 and the proposed amendment to TRIPS Article 31.89 Under a certainly controversial system, both texts aim to overcome the problem that countries lacking manufacturing capacity face in making use of the TRIPS provision on compulsory licenses. The system depends on cross-licensing patented products both in exporting and importing countries. The fact that nothing is said regarding transit countries could - in principle and under the EU law - allow title holders to block compulsory licensed goods in such transit countries. Again, if an EU clarification is not offered, the systemic effects of Regulation 1383/2003 could make recurring to the WTO dispute settlement system necessary.

The above clarification should cover not only the interaction between WTO and EU law, but also the relationship between certain pieces of EU legislation, such as EU Regulations 1383/2003 and 816/2006 on compulsory licensing of patents relating to the manufacture of pharmaceutical products for export to countries with public


health problems. In principle, taking into account the goals and spirit of Regulation 816/2006, one would expect that it impedes European patentees from disrupting the transit of compulsory licensed medicines in third countries under the decision of the General Council of 30 August 2003. However, when analyzed in greater detail, the conclusions might be just the opposite. Article 13.1 of Regulation 816/2006 bans the import of products manufactured under a compulsory licence into the community, granted pursuant to the WTO General Council Decision of 30 August 2003 and/or Regulation 816/2006 for the purposes of release for free circulation, re-export, placing under suspensive procedures or placing in a free zone or free warehouse. Nevertheless, this prohibition is waived pursuant to Article 13.2 in the case of re-export to the importing country cited in the application, or placing under a transit or customs warehouse procedure or in a free zone or free warehouse for the purpose of re-export to that importing country.90 This constricts the exception provided in Article 13.2, which would cover only products licensed in the EU, but not, for instance, those licensed in India and addressed to countries without manufacturing capacity. The reason is to be found in the term application and its referral to products licensed solely in the EU. In fact “application” is the term used in Regulation 816/2003, and it is absent in the wording of the General Council Decision of 30 August 2003. Therefore, according to this view, under the system established in the General Council Decision of 30 August 2003, products licensed in States other than those of the EU would not benefit from the exception contained in Article 13.2 and could be, consequently, detained in the EU while in-transit. This outcome might not have been that expected when EU regulation was drafted, but presently patentees may understand that they have the power to disrupt the transit of compulsory licensed medicines in non-EU States.

But more than Vienna Convention Article 31.3.a) could be relevant. Among the Vienna Convention rules to which DSU makes reference there is also Article 31.3.c), which lays down that when

interpreting a treaty, and together with the context, any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relationships between the parties shall be taken into account. Article 31.3.c) comes into play whenever a certain norm is ambiguous, when a term has a specific meaning in customary international law or when terms are open and need further references to other public international law norms to specify their meanings. In this regard, a WTO panel affirmed that when the application of Article 31 gives several possible interpretations as a result, the interpreter will be obliged to choose that which better matches other applicable norms of public international law.92 Given the nature of seized goods and their relevance to the protection of health, European actions may result in a shortage of medicines in developing countries, something which would have an impact on the right to health of the patients of said countries. This right, as enshrined in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, obliges States not only to adopt internal measures, but also to “provide international assistance and cooperation”. Due to their restricting effects on access to medicines, EU border measures mandating the detention of legitimate in-transit generic medicines would counter said ICESCR obligation, something that could, therefore, be taken into account by WTO adjudicative bodies when interpreting the GATT and TRIPS provisions involved in the case.

Finally, commitments undertaken by EU Member States in the WHO should be taken into account when analyzing European border measures and their impact on public health. The World Health Assembly Resolution 61.21, which laid down the Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual property, committed all WHO Member States to “take into account, where appropriate, the im-pact on public health when considering adop-ting or implementing more extensive intel-lectual property protection than is required by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights”.93 Undoubtedly, Council Regulation (EC) 1383/2003 and resulting actions fall into said commitment.


8. FREEDOM OF TRANSIT OF PATENTED AND gENERIC PRODUCTS PURSUANT TO gATT ATRICLES V AND XX (D)

8.1 The Freedom of Transit Principle

Already quoted is the WTO Communities - Trademarks and geographical indications panel report affirming that absent any hierarchy between TRIPS and GATT, “One logical approach would be to begin in each instance with the TRIPS Agreement”. Consequently, after having dealt with the TRIPS Agreement, now follows the analysis of the European regulations and detentions under the GATT provisions.

Several GATT Articles are potentially relevant to the case. These include various Article V subsections and Article XX (d). In fact, some of the legal arguments raised regarding the WTO legality of European detentions have focused their attention on GATT Article V, which sets the legal framework for the freedom of transit principle. Article V:1 states that goods and means of transport shall be deemed to be in transit when the passage across the territory of a contracting party “with or without trans-shipment, warehousing, breaking bulk, or change in the mode of transport, is only a portion of a complete journey beginning and terminating beyond the frontier of the contracting party”. Having established the definition of in-transit goods, Article V:2 lays down the fundamental principle of freedom of transit. Despite its transcendence, this principle was only interpreted for the first time by a WTO panel in April 2009 in the Colombia – Indicative prices and restrictions of ports of entry dispute.94

The panel established for this dispute specifically dealt with Article V subsections 1, 2 and 6. Regarding subsection 2, the panel agreed with the parties that subsection 1 - that is, the above-mentioned definition of transit - informed the scope of obligations under V:2. According to the panel, “When applied to Article V:2, ‘freedom of transit’ must thus be extended to all traffic in transit when the goods’ passage across the territory of a Member is only a portion of a complete journey beginning and terminating beyond the frontier of the Member across whose

territory the traffic passes. Freedom of transit must additionally be guaranteed with or without trans-shipment, warehousing, breaking bulk, or change in the mode of transport”.95

In its report, the panel specified the meaning of the first and second sentences of Article V:2.96 According to the panel, the provision of freedom of transit pursuant to the first sentence of Article V:2 “requires extending unrestricted access via the most convenient routes for the passage of goods in international transit whether or not the goods have been trans-shipped, warehoused, break-bulked, or have changed modes of transport. Accordingly, goods in international transit from any Member must be allowed entry whenever destined for the territory of a third country. Reasonably, in the Panel’s view, a Member is not required to guarantee transport on necessarily any or all routes in its territory, but only on the ones “most convenient” for transport through its territory”. As far as the second sentence of Article V:2 is concerned, the panel considered that “the obligation in Article V:2, second sentence is clear on its face: Members shall not make distinctions between goods which are ‘traffic in transit’ based on the flag of vessels; the place of origin, departure, entry, exit or destination of the vessel; or on any circumstances relating to the ownership of goods, of vessels or of other means of transport”.98

At first sight, the liberty of transit mandated by Article V:2 would clearly prohibit detentions of generic drugs in transit. However, GATT Article V contains other subsections and must be contextualized in a broader framework and in relation to other GATT provisions. In this regard, GATT Articles V:3, V:4 and XX (d) become fundamental. To begin with, GATT Article V:3 modulates said freedom of transit when stating that “Any contracting party

8.2 Are the Delays and Restrictions Necessary?


may require that traffic in transit through its territory be entered at the proper custom house, but, except in cases of failure to comply with applicable customs laws and regulations, such traffic coming from or going to the territory of other contracting parties shall not be subject to any unnecessary delays or restrictions and shall be exempt from customs duties and from all transit duties”. Two points may be raised with respect to subsection V:3.

First, EU authorities could state that by detaining and analyzing medicines’ patent status they are merely implementing the power granted in V:3 to apply “custom laws and regulations”. This argument assumes that Regulation 1383/2003 is part of EU customs law and not EU intellectual property law, and it is thus included under the scope of GATT Article V:3. Several arguments support this thesis. Council Regulation (EC) 1383/2003 refers to the EC Customs Code to determine customs situations covered, so the EU can defend that intellectual property control of goods exported, imported, re-exported or in transit is part of its customs law and enforcement system. Certainly, a major goal of European Customs authorities is to fight against intellectual property infringing goods crossing European borders, which explains why, within the Commission, surveillance of Regulation 1383/2003 is under the mandate of the Customs Policy Division of the DG for Taxation and the Customs Union (TAXUD). In a similar sense, Regulation Article 21 grants advisory role in relation to the regulation implementation to the Customs Code Committee established by Article 247 of the Customs Code.

GATT V:3 also forbids unnecessary delays or restrictions. This, despite being rather ambiguous terminology, it is no stranger to WTO DSB jurisprudence, where the so-called “necessity test” is well-known. According to this test, if the party had other less trade-restrictive and equally effective alternatives to achieve a certain public policy goal, it should have chosen those alternative measures. If it is accepted that goods might be temporally detained in order to determine whether they infringe a particular intellectual property right, attention must

focus on measures that integrate the inspection regime. In this particular case, and in line with TRIPS Article 55, EU Regulation prescribes a relatively short period for the right holder to inspect the product and decide what to do (10 days)99 which, in principle, makes it difficult to challenge the Regulation as such for resulting in “unnecessary delays”. This, however, does not preclude a different conclusion regarding specific cases where timeframes have been outstandingly longer, exceeding even 80 working days,100 as the Dutch authorities themselves have recognized.101 That is to say, it would be possible to raise an issue at the DSB regarding EU Regulation as applied.

Together with the potential infringement of GATT V:3 caused by Regulation 1383/2003 as applied (i. e. the temporal dimension that would refer to the prohibition of unnecessary delays established by V:3), it is also necessary to evaluate the existence of unnecessary restrictions. It has already been said that the parallelism between the temporal frameworks set forth in TRIPS and in the EU Regulation regarding the actions of border authorities could justify the compatibility of EU Regulation with Article V:3. Another parallelism could deliver the opposite conclusion as far as the existence of an infringement of the condition set forth in Article V:3 to not cause “unnecessary restrictions”. If it is established that the provisions governing European border authorities actions concerning goods in-transit infringe the TRIPS Agreement, as was affirmed above, then it can also be sustained that European interruption of the flow of generic drugs in transit implies unnecessary restrictions.

GATT Article V:4 lays down a fundamental rule regarding the principle of freedom of transit. It establishes that “all charges and regulations imposed by contracting parties on traffic in transit to or from the territories of other contracting parties shall be reasonable, having regard to the conditions of the traffic”. Hence, Article V:4 imposes an open standard (reasonableness)

8.3 The Reasonableness of the EU Regulation


against which specific regulations shall be assessed. In this context, if an infringement of GATT Article V:4 resulting from Regulation 1383/2003 was found, it would be necessary to amend the corresponding provisions of the Regulation 1383/2003.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 31.1 lays down the general rule of interpretation that “a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose”. It includes, therefore, the grammatical, contextual and teleological versions of the hermeneutic operation. Although not rejecting any of them, WTO adjudicative organs have always showed their preference for the literal interpretation, which implies relying on the ordinary meaning of the words. In this regard, the Appellate Body - quoting Sir Ian Sinclair - has manifested that only “where the meaning imparted by the text itself is equivocal or inconclusive, or where confirmation of the correctness of the reading of the text itself is desired, light from the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole may usefully be sought”.102 The stance of the Appellate Body helps to explain why - unlike other international dispute settlement mechanisms - recourse to the dictionary has become routine among members of the WTO adjudicative organs.

“Reasonable” means “as much as is appropriate or fair; moderate”.103 In a similar vein, it can also mean “not extreme or excessive”.104 It is clear, therefore, that deciding whether something is reasonable or not requires an evaluation of all the relevant circumstances, process that requires a case-by-case analysis. This case-oriented analysis has been, in fact, the one performed by WTO adjudicative organs when the term reasonable has appeared in disputes. For instance, in 2004, in the case Mexico - Measures affecting telecommunications servi-ces (Mexico - telecommunications), the United States challenged Mexico’s compliance with the GATS and the specific undertakings of Mexico in relation to the GATS.105 Among the main issues the panel had to deal with was the meaning of reasonable terms, conditions and rates. The

panel stated that “reasonable can be defined as something ‘of such an amount, size, number, etc., as is judged to be appropriate or suitable to the circumstances or purpose”.106 From that sense of reasonable the panel inferred that, regarding rates, reasonable meant that they must “represent the costs incurred in providing the service”.107

Mexico - Telecommunications was not the first case where a WTO adjudicative organ dealt with the meaning of reasonable. In US – Hot-Rolled Steel, the Appellate Body insisted on the need to adopt a case-by-case approach when deciding on the meaning of reasonable. The Appellate Body stated that “the word ‘reasonable’ implies a degree of flexibility that involves consideration of all of the circumstances of a particular case. What is ‘reasonable’ in one set of circumstances may prove to be less than ‘reasonable’ in different circumstances. This suggests that what constitutes a reasonable period or a reasonable time, under Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, should be defined on a case-by-case basis, in the light of the specific circumstances of each investigation. In sum, a ‘reasonable period’ must be interpreted consistently with the notions of flexibility and balance that are inherent in the concept of “reasonableness”, and in a manner that allows for account to be taken of the particular circumstances of each case”.108

From the Mexico - Telecommunications and US – Hot-Rolled Steel rulings, it can be inferred that the meaning of reasonable is fundamentally contextual. This is a finding that GATT Article V:4 reinforces when, after having stated that regulations must be reasonable, it adds “having regard to the conditions of the traffic”. This implies that the reasonability will be assessed in a different manner depending on what are the “conditions of the traffic.” Again, it is necessary to establish the meaning of “conditions of the traffic”.

On the one hand, “conditions” refer to “the state of something or someone, with regard to appearance, fitness, or working order”.109 On the other hand, in accordance to GATT Article V:1


“traffic” is the term used to refer to those goods and merchandise that are in transit. Thus, the “conditions of the traffic” are the characteristics of the merchandise. Accordingly, regulations regarding transit must be reasonable, having regard to the characteristics of the goods. In the specific case of the potential impact of Regulation 1383/2003 over the free trade of patented goods, the panel should take into account as - a characteristic of the goods - the fact that they could be patented in the country of transit. And the question, therefore is, “Is it reasonable controlling goods that are in transit and could be patented in the country of transit?” An answer to this question may be found in the analysis of Regulation 1383 presented in the previous sections of this paper. Another potential answer could be inferred from the trade-restrictive effects this practice would have.

Interestingly enough, the literal interpretation of the term “reasonable” in Article V:4 obliges taking into account the context in which the term is applied. But Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention commands something different when it mandates taking into account the context. Vienna Convention Article 31.1 makes necessary the assessment of the location of the interpreted provision in a specific treaty, and also the relevance of that treaty in a specific legal regime. Therefore, to know the meaning of the reasonability that GATT V:4 prescribes to regulations, it is of relevance to consider the fact that this prescription is contained in a section of an article that establishes the freedom of transit as a general rule.110 It is also interesting to note that said treaty is part of a complex system of treaties and institutions that have the promotion of free trade as its rationale.

The consideration of the object and purpose of the treaty is the last element contained in the rule that enshrines Vienna Convention Article 31.1. Article V:4 is part of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947, which was adopted with the view of reducing tariffs and other barriers to trade and eliminating discriminatory treatment in international commerce. Trade liberalization aimed at the improvement of human well-being

was, therefore, the underlying goal of the GATT in 1947. Moreover, when States decided to create the WTO and signed the Marrakech Agreement, they laid down the institutional machinery necessary to promote free trade. The promotion of free trade is, in fact, the cross-cutting goal of all WTO agreements. For instance, as already discussed, TRIPS establishes that intellectual property must not become a barrier to legitimate trade. Having in mind the trade-liberalization objectives of the GATT, the WTO Agreement and the WTO itself, it can be affirmed that regulations regarding traffic in transit are not reasonable if they restrict the trade of legitimate products.

As part of the context to consider when adopting a view on the reasonability of the Regulation 1383/2003, it should be recalled that: i) In the implementation of the Regulation, the EU has detained goods that contact the European territory. Once goods have been detained, the EU regulation confers title holders a right not contemplated among patent holders rights enshrined in TRIPS Article 28: the right to exclude the entrance in a third market (the destination market) of products not originating nor intended to enter into the patent’s territorial scope; ii) In addition to expand title holders rights, this power also implies leaving aside foundational principles of the intellectual property system: the territoriality and independence principles; iii) In granting this new right, EU Regulation interferes with the TRIPS Agreement Article 41, which prescribes that enforcement procedures shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade; and iv) EU Regulation results both in unnecessary delays and in unnecessary restrictions to inter-national trade.

Should the existence of GATT inconsistencies be proven, the EU could still find its regulation and measures justified pursuant to GATT Article XX, and more precisely, XX (d). The chapeau of Article XX and the text of Article XX (d) provide that, “Subject to the requirement that

8.4 The Potential Invocation of gATT Article XX (d)


such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: (d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to customs enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of Article II and Article XVII, the protection of patents, trademarks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices”. Both customs enforcement and the protection of patents are thus recognized in Article XX (d) as grounds that permit measures derogating from GATT obligations.

As the Appellate Body has affirmed, in order that the justifying protection of Article XX may be extended to it, the measure at issue must not only come under one or another of the particular exceptions listed under Article XX; but also satisfy the requirements imposed by the opening clauses of Article XX.111 The first condition, in any case, is to identify a provisional justification under exception (d), which requires demonstrating two elements. “First, the measure must be one designed to ‘secure compliance’ with laws or regulations that are not themselves inconsistent with some provision of the GATT 1994. Second, the measure must be ‘necessary’ to secure such compliance. A Member who invokes Article XX (d) as a justification has the burden of demonstrating that these two requirements are met”.112

In determining whether a measure is designed to secure compliance with laws and regulations as provided in Article XX, a WTO Member raising a defense should identify the laws or regulations for which it seeks to secure compliance, establish that those laws or regulations are not themselves WTO-inconsistent and demonstrate that the particular measure at issue is itself designed to secure compliance with the relevant laws or regulations.113 Any national

rules that are necessary for the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement would be regarded as laws or regulations that are not inconsistent with GATT within the meaning of Article XX (d).114 Nevertheless, if it is established that EU Regulation and measures are inconsistent with TRIPS, the justification under Article XX (d) would be hardly sustained. In any case, before the panel, the EU would maintain not only the consistency, but also its necessity of its measures. In this second regard, the increasing importance attached to the fight against counterfeiting, piracy and other intellectual property rights infringements could be a sound basis to sustain the necessity of certain border measures. Nevertheless, the so-called ‘necessity test’ is a demanding one.

Regarding the ‘necessity test’ and the evaluation of EU Regulation and measures according to the same, the Appellate Body in Korea – Various Measures on Beef clarified the term “necessary” when affirming that a “‘necessary’ measure is, in this continuum, located significantly closer to the pole of ‘indispensable’ than to the opposite pole of simply ‘making a contribution to.’”115 Nevertheless, the Appellate Body accepted that a measure that is not absolutely indispensable may be deemed necessary if it overcomes a weighing and balancing process. More recently, in the Brazil-Tyres case, the Appellate Body placed greater emphasis in this weighing and balancing process. Although the Appellate Body recognized that “to be characterized as necessary, a measure does not have to be indispensable,” it also emphasized that the contri-bution of that measure to the fulfillment of the objective “must be material, not merely marginal”. Importantly, that contribution must be weighed against its trade restrictiveness,116 a test that the EU may find difficult to overcome.

According to the Appellate Body, the weighing and balancing process “is comprehended in the determination of whether a WTO-consistent alternative measure that the Member concerned could ‘reasonably be expected to employ’ is available, or whether a less WTO-inconsistent measure is ‘reasonably available.’”117 The fact that among WTO Members very different legal


frameworks exist to address the same problems that Council Regulation (EC) 1383/2003 aims to tackle, would be an important factor when assessing either the availability of WTO-consistent alternative measures or the availability of less WTO-inconsistent measures.

In the WTO DSB, “the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. If that party adduces evidence sufficient to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the burden then shifts to the other party, who will fail unless it adduces sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption”.118

However, even if the EU could demonstrate that EU Regulation and measures overcame said highly demanding test, measures and Regulation would still be assessed against the requirements set forth in Article XX chapeau, namely, they could not be applied in a manner that would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restricti-on on international trade. As mentioned above, restrictions that find their origin either in highly-demanding levels of intellectual property enforcement or in levels that are against basic intellectual property principles may be seen as disguised restrictions to international trade.


9. ThE BLURRINg LINES BETWEEN SUBSTANDARD AND “COUNTERFEIT” MEDICINES

In recent years, it has been argued that in order to protect public health, enhanced action must be taken in the intellectual property field, an argument that has been deployed, for instance, at the Council for TRIPS119 and enshrined in the Regulation 1383/2003 preamble. In parallel, and although terminology is of the utmost importance in this field, it is possible to observe great confusion with potentially im-portant consequences. Some companies often refer to generic medicines of guaranteed qua-lity as pirated, counterfeited, substandard or spurious.120 Legally and technically speaking, the first two terms refer to copyright and trademark law infringements,121 while the third and fourth are traditional in the pharmaceutical terminology. As it has been stated, “patent, trademark and drug safety issues are unneces-sarily conflated”.122 Using “counterfeit” as a ge-neric term to designate all intellectual property rights infringements and, at the same time, to indicate the lack of quality of certain products, is certainly problematic. This misuse may confuse border authorities, developed and developing countries and even international organizations, and it is at the basis of the discussion of the measures that should be taken in relation to medicines in transit.

Exemplifying the consequences of said confu-sion, several of the letters sent by right-holders’ companies to importers of Indian generic medicines interchangeably referred to seized medicines as counterfeit and patent infringing. Moreover, they also made reference to public health concerns. For instance, in a letter sent by one of the originator firms to a Colombian distributor of active ingredients in relation to a clopidogrel in-transit shipment seized at the Dutch border, the firm, as a patent holder, threatened to destroy the goods after affirming that “Dutch customs suspected that these products might be counterfeit and suspended their release”. In fact, the firm was invoking its patent rights.123 In another case, a letter sent to the Indian generic manufacturer regarding the

detention of 500,010 olanzapine tablets at the Dutch border stated that the claimant was the owner of a European patent with validity in the Netherlands, that the firm had determined that the tablets were patent-infringing products that had not been produced by the originator or any of its licensees, and finally and as a consequence, that the tablets could be unsafe.124

The present situation and its relationship with the very viability of generic medicines free trade calls for a brief clarification of terms. For the WHO, the defining criterion to identify a counterfeit product is its deliberate mislabelling with respect to identity or source. That is, falsified medicines. If such mislabelling does not occur, there is no counterfeit. The WHO states that “counterfeiting can apply to both branded and generic products and counterfeit products may include products with the correct ingredients or with the wrong ingredients, without active ingredients, with insufficient active ingredients or with fake packaging”.125 Those counterfeits that do not include the correct ingredients are part of the broader phenomenon of substandard pharmaceuticals. That is to say, products whose composition and ingredients do not meet the correct scientific specifications and that may be either ineffective or dangerous to the patient.126 That is, “medicines that do not conform to the pharmaceutical standards set for them”.127 Sub-standard medicines represent, therefore, the real public health problem, which, nevertheless, has a limited relationship with trademark law and a marginal relationship with patent law.

There is an important ongoing international debate on how to tackle the problems derived from the lack of quality of certain pharma-ceutical products. In fact, some of the problems associated with substandard medicines are related to trademark law. In this sense, it is clear that one of the mechanisms to commercialize substandard products is through deception about the identity of the product’s source. However, no convincing arguments linking


patent infringements and product quality have been developed. It is stated that “Substandard medicines represent a far larger risk to public health than counterfeit medicines”.128 Nevertheless, the fact that there is little com-mercial incentive to invest in the fight against the proliferation of substandard medicines, would explain why most of the attention is concentrated in the counterfeit phenomenon.129 Probably, to guarantee the quality of medicines, it would be more useful to strengthen national drug regulatory authorities and reinforce WHO activities on medicines standardization and guarantee, activities that are being replaced by the ones of the International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH).130

The EU alleges that its intellectual property rights border measures pursue public health objectives, namely, the protection of public health in third countries. “Especially in the case of counterfeit medicines, which is a problem that mainly concerns developing countries, the EU considers it a duty to also prevent – to the extent possible - any adverse effects

trade in such products could have in vulnerable populations in their countries”.131 If that were the case, the focus would be better placed not on the TRIPS Agreement and Regulation 1383/2003 but in the WTO Agreement on technical barriers to trade (TBT). If the EU wanted to protect third countries’ public health, it should enact European regulations that matched international standards “of reference” on pharmaceuticals quality and that were specifically devoted to products in transit. Setting aside the fact that the TBT agreement does not foresee the application of technical regulations to goods in transit, the adoption of such a regime would open several new and interesting debates. These would include, among other things, deciding whether the international standards of reference are the ones adopted by the WHO or the ones promoted by the ICH.132 However, any prospect of seeing the European Medicines Agency acting as an international agency for control over the quality, safety and efficacy of pharmaceutical products in transit in European ports and airports is highly dubious. So the question, therefore, is why TAXUD and national customs authorities should develop such activity.


10. CONCLUSION

Developed countries’ efforts to strengthen intellectual property enforcement can, in some cases, contradict the principles underpinning the WTO legal regime. In fact, when analyzing the detention of goods in transit allegedly for the protection of patents, it becomes clear that the most prominent systemic matter raised concerns about the challenges to international trade implied by certain levels of intellectual property protection. It is, therefore, necessary to ask whether Council Regulation (EC) 1383/2003 contradicts several of the agreements included under the WTO Agreement umbrella, particularly due to the potentially trade restricting effects of EU Regulation and the difficultly involved in reconciling its coexistence with basic intel-lectual property law principles. Considering the systemic consequences of the EU Regulation and given that it affects both third countries’ markets and the integrated global market, it would be worth asking a DSB panel to examine the EU Regulation’s compatibility with WTO law. When assessing such compatibility, both the GATT and the TRIPS Agreement must be taken into account. This cumulative reading has been mandated by WTO DSB organs, which have also affirmed that one logical approach is to begin the analysis with the TRIPS Agreement.

It is necessary to distinguish between the WTO compliance of Regulation 1383/2003 and the WTO compatibility of the Regulation’s implementing measures. As far as the former is concerned, particularly problematic are its trade restrictive provisions, the rights it grants to patentees and the reference to the transit law to assess the legality of products not intended for the European market. According to ECJ jurisprudence, the Regulation would be justified only as a means to avoid introducing goods infringing intellectual property rights in the European market, but not to control the protection of intellectual property rights in third countries. If a DSB panel assessed the necessity of such a legal scheme, as well as its relationship with other WTO obligations and its practical consequences, it would probably take into account the apparent contradiction

between the ECJ restrained jurisprudence and the almost unrestrained stance of Regulation 1383/2003.

The TRIPS Agreement only mandates controlling the importation of potentially counterfeit and pirated goods. However, it permits the adoption of a more extensive protection under the condition that said protection does not contravene TRIPS itself. The practical consequences of the EU Regulation when mandating the implementation of all kinds of border measures in relation to goods protected by almost all types of intellectual property categories are problematic and may be TRIPS infringing. At least, directly affected are i) the foundational principles of independence; ii) TRIPS Article 28 regime on the rights conferred to patentees; iii) TRIPS references to avoid intellectual property becoming a barrier to legitimate trade; iv) the pro-public health interpretation mandated by the Doha Declaration; and, v) the feasibility of the scheme created by the WTO General Council Decision of 30 August 2003 and the decision to permanently amend Article 31 of TRIPS.

With respect to the practical consequences that would be presented to a WTO panel, the EU is detaining products that are not intended for the European market and for which no peril of diversion exists. Moreover, those products are legal in exporting and importing countries. In practical terms, under the current EU legal framework even if a product is not patent-protected in its destination, patent holders are able to block it at the hubs where it neces-sarily transits, which implies disrupting generic medicines distribution and access. Hence, if detentions continue, the goals pursued by the Doha Declaration and the mechanism operationalized in the Decision of 30 August 2003 may be in jeopardy.

In contradiction with the obligation enshrined in EU Regulation to follow the law of the State in which the application is made when controlling in-transit products, and also contradicting letters addressed to generic manufacturers and


importers, the EU and the EFPIA affirmed that if products are not patent-protected in exporting or importing countries, no action will be taken against them. In fact, it seems as if the EU had been surprised either by the real power Regulation 1383/2003 grants to European right-holders or by the public outcry that its border measures on life-saving drugs have provoked. In any case, to sustain the affirmation that the EU Regulation does not impede legitimate drugs transit through European customs, it would be necessary to amend - or at minimum clarify - Regulation 1383/2003 Article 2.1.c) (i) and (ii), and Article 10, which make the detention of a specific good dependant on the status of patents and supplementary protection certificates in the transit country. The ongoing process to amend Regulation 1383/2003 is a good opportunity to introduce said changes.

If the controversy finally finds its way through the WTO DSS, a WTO Panel could establish that

• Council Regulation (EC) 1383/2003 impedes the respect of the free transit principles laid down in the GATT and in TRIPS.

• Regulation 1383/2003 grants to patentees rights not contemplated in TRIPS Article 28.

• The right granted to seize goods in transit badly reconciles with the territorial nature and independence of intellectual property rights.

• The TRIPS Agreement does not include the control of goods in transit or this potential control is not clearly drafted; transit has nothing to do with the release of goods by custom authorities foreseen in Article 51.

• Regulation 1383/2003 imposes unnecessary restrictions and provokes unnecessary delays that impede the freedom of transit enshrined in GATT Article V.

• Regulation 1383/2003 does not fulfil the reasonability standard set forth in GATT Article V:4.

• GATT Article XX (d) is of no application to the case.

In this context, it is worth recalling that Article XXVI.4 of the Agreement Establishing the WTO lays down that “Each Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements”.

Two additional issues must be considered when assessing recent detentions. On the one hand, the European push for the introduction of legislation that emulates that of the EC in developing countries and on the other hand, the problematic misuse of “counterfeit” terminology when assessing patent infringements and public health problems.

Through the conclusion of association agre-ements, economic partnership agreements, partnership and cooperation agreements and free trade agreements, the EU is trying to fully or partially export Regulation 1383/2003 to developing countries. This was a goal clearly stated in the EU Strategy for the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in Third Countries, in which the Commission DG Trade undertook to “revisit the approach to the IPRs chapter of bilateral agreements, including the clarification and strengthening of the enforcement clauses” taking Regulation 1383/2003 as a “source of inspiration and a useful benchmark”. The EU has already managed to introduce a twin regime for the detention of protected products while in transit in the EC-CARIFORUM Agreement and has proposed a stricter regime to Andean and ASEAN countries, this last one covering all intellectual property categories. If the power granted to right holders to detain in-transit goods on alleged patent infringements is extended, generics trade will be at risk of being seriously hampered. Moreover, inducing developing countries to concentrate their resources on highly sophisticated intellectual property rights en-forcement regulations is of dubious compa-tibility with European undertakings in the health and intellectual property field.

A worrying and not entirely accidental confusion regarding the “counterfeit” term has been created. The use of “counterfeit” as a generic word that refers to a mix of public health


concerns, trademark violations and unrelated patent conflicts has been instrumental in giving extra legitimacy to patentees’ claims. This explains why in the controversy that has arisen from European detentions of safe and legitimate products, the EU and the European rights-holders invoke public health worries to justify their

actions. It is necessary to address the misuse of the counterfeit terminology not only to avoid the reoccurrence of arguments deployed to detain medicines allegedly infringing intellectual property rights, but also to not create confusion among consumers, who until now have relied on generic drugs as a safe and effective tool.


ENDNOTES1 Letters on file with the author.

2 See. X. Seuba, Health Protection in the European and Andean Association Agreement, Amsterdam: HAI, 2009, pp. 50-53, http://www.haiweb.org/23032009/18%20Mar%202009%20Policy%20Paper% 20EU-CAN% 20Association% 20Agreement%20FINAL.pdf.

3 TRIPS Agreement Preamble.

4 Ibid.

5 See, for all, Statement by Brazil, TRIPS Council, 3 February 2009. Agenda item “M” -OTHER BUSINESS- Public Health Dimension of the TRIPS Agreement. www.ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/intervention-by-brazil.pdf (Consulted March 2009).

6 Statement by India, TRIPS Council, 3 March 2009. Agenda item “M” -OTHER BUSINESS- Public Health Dimension of the TRIPS Agreement www.ip-watch.org/files/India%20Statement%20to% 20General% 20Council%20Jan2009.doc (Consulted March 2009).

7 See Section 7 below.

8 See this paper’s last point for further details regarding the link between intellectual property rights enforcement and public health protection.

9 Cfr. “It is important to allow the customs authorities to control goods in transit suspected to infringe IP rights so that they can stop the traffic of potentially dangerous products, such as fake medicines”; “a significant and worrying level of trade in illegal medicines indicating a potentially serious public health and safety issue, which fully justify the control of medicines in transit suspected to infringe IP rights”. (Ip-health) Intervention by European Communities at the TRIPS Council (Dutch Seizures), http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2009/March/013528.html (Consulted March 2009).

10 “Formal response of the Dutch government on seizures and border measures in FTAs (to parliamentary questions)”, http://lists.essential.org/pipemail/ip-health/2009/April/013674.hml (consulted on April 2009).

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/seizures/WTO_seizures_18feb.pdf (consulted February 2009).

14 www.keionline.org/misc-docs/seizures/dglamyresponse.pdf (consulted April 2009).

15 http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2009/access-medicines-20090313/en/index.html (consulted March 2009).

16 EGA, Letter addressed to Mr. Lászlo Kovács, 20 February 2009 (on file with the author).

17 EFPIA, EFPIA Statement. Customs seizures of in-transit medicines, 13 March 2009, dhttp://www.efpia.eu/content/default.asp?PageID=559&DocID=6574 (consulted March 2009).

18 KEI, IQsensato, BUKO-Pharma, HAI, Essential Action, Consumers Action, Health GAP, Medico International, Oxfam International, Third World Network, U.S.PIRG, “Seizures of Medicines as goods in transit to developing countries”, letter sent to Pascal Lamy, WTO Director General, See. www.keinonline.org/misc/docs/seizures/WTO_seizures_18feb.pdf (consulted February 2009). Some of these NGOs, three weeks later, issued a joint press release focused on public health grounds. Joint press release from Knowledge Ecology


International, Health Action International and Oxfam. Call on the EU to allow life-saving generic medicines to reach world’s poorest, 6 March 2009.

19 Cfr. Alexandra Heumber, IP policy adviser for MSF, in W. New, “Alarm escalates over delayed generic drug shipment as action sought”, Intellectual Property Watch, 6 March 2009.

20 Council Regulation (EC) No 1383/2003, of 22 July 2003, concerning customs action against goods suspected of infringing certain intellectual property rights and the measures to be taken against goods found to have infringed such rights, OJ (2003) No L 196/7.

21 See EC Regulation 1383/2003 third Recital and articles 4, 9.1 and 11.

22 Concise Oxford Dictionary, tenth edition, revised, 2001. Another term, used by the Dutch authorities themselves, is “confiscation” See question No. 2 of the “Formal response of the Dutch government on seizures and border measures in FTAs (to parliamentary questions)”, http://lists.essential.org/pipemail/ip-health/2009/April/013674.hml (consulted on April 2009).

23 Council Regulation (EEC) No 3842/86 of 1 December 1986 laying down measures to prohibit the release for free circulation of counterfeit goods. OJ (1986) No L 357/1.

24 Council Regulation (EC) No 3295/94 of 22 December 1994 laying down measures to prohibit the release for free circulation, export, re-export or entry for a suspensive procedure of counterfeit and pirated goods, OJL (1994) No 341/18.

25 Report from the Commission on the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 3295/94 of 22nd December 1994 as regards border controls on trade in goods which may be counterfeit or pirated, and Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) amending Regulation (EC) No 3295/94 laying down measures to prohibit the release for free circulation, export, re-export or entry for a suspensive procedure of counterfeit and pirated goods, COM(1998) 25 final, OJ [1998] C108/63.

26 Council Regulation (EC) No 241/1999 amending Regulation (EC) No 3295/94 laying down measures to prohibit the release for free circulation, export, re-export or entry for a suspensive procedure of counterfeit and pirated goods, OJL (1999) L 27.

27 See article 135 of Regulation (EC) No 450/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 23 April 2008, laying down the Community Customs Code (Modernised Customs Code).

28 ECJ, The Polo/Lauren Company LP v. Pt Dwidua Langgeng Pratam, C-383/2000, (ECR I-2519), par. 26.

29 M. Schneider, O. Vrins, “Regulation (EC) 1383/2003”, M. Schneider, O. Vrins, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights Through Border Measures, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 95, 3.116.

30 Netherlands, Report Q208, Border Measures and other means of custom Intervention against Infringers, In the name of the Dutch Group of the AIPPI by Gertjan Kuipers (Chariman), Manon Rieger-Jansen, Bas Pinckaers, Fisal Van Vesel, Jef Vandeckerckhove, 2009, www.aippi.nl/uploads///Q208%20NL%201.PDF (consulted April 2009).

31 M. Schneider, O. Vrins, op. cit., p. 66.

32 A. Clark, “Parallel imports: a new job for customs?”, European Intellectual Property Review, vol. 21, nº 1, 1999, pp. 1-7; M. Schneider, O. Vrins, op. cit., p. 110.


33 Turkey- Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, Report of the Panel, 31 May 1999, WT/DS34/R, par. 9.92.

34 European Communities – Protection of trademarks and geographical indications for agricultural products and foodstuffs, Report of the Panel, WT/DS290/R, 15 March 2005, par. 7.87.

35 R. C. Dreyfuss, A. F. Lowenfeld, “Two Achievements of the Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together”, Virginia Journal of International Law, vol. 37, 1997, p. 280. It has been affirmed that TRIPS is an anomaly in the WTO regime. In this sense, see R. Weissman, “A Long Strange TRIPS: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives Available to Third World Countries”, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, nº 17, 1996, p. 1069.

36 Vid. F. Machlup, E. T. Penrose “The patent controversy in the nineteenth century”, The Journal of Economic History, vol. X, nº 1, 1950, pp. 4-6, 9; See also P. Roffe, G. Vea, “The WIPO Development Agenda in a Historical and Political Context”, N. Netanel (Ed.), The development agenda: global intellectual property and developing countries, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 82-83.

37 J. Massaguer, Los efectos de la patente en el comercio internacional, Barcelona: Librería Bosch, 1989, p. 32.

38 UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource book on TRIPS and Development, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 581.

39 See for an in-depth analysis of the TRIPS enforcement provisions as a ceiling, H. Große Ruse - Khan, T. Jaeger, “Policing patents worldwide? EC Border Measures against Transiting Generic Drugs under the EC - and WTO Intellectual Property Regimes”, International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 2009, vol. 40, nº 5.

40 Op. cit.

41 Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents, Report of the Panel, WT/DS/114/R, 17 March 2000, par. 7.69.

42 See section 7 below.

43 EFPIA, EFPIA Statement. Customs seizures of in-transit medicines, 13 March 2009, dhttp://www.efpia.eu/content/default.asp?PageID=559&DocID=6574 (consulted March 2009).

44 A. Otten, H. Wager, “Compliance with TRIPS: The Emerging World View”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 391, 1996, p. 405.

45 The first ones to be controlled were counterfeit goods. Only at a later stage –and on some occasions very recently- were pirated goods also subjected to control.

46 C. Correa, “The Push for Stronger Enforcement Rules: Implications for Developing Countries’’, The Global Debate on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights and Developing Countries, Geneva: ICTSD, 2009, p. 49; D. Gervais, “The International Legal Framework of Border Measures in the Fight Against Counterfeiting and Piracy”, M. Schneider, O. Vrins, Enforcement…, op. cit., p. 49.

47 A recent report of the Dutch group of the AIPPI states that only in the Netherlands are customs authorities offices equipped with laboratories, See Netherlands, Report Q208, op. cit., p. 8.


48 See section 6.2 below.

49 Compact Oxford English Dictionary, www.askoxford.com/concise_oed/import?view=uk (consulted in November 2009).

50 Regulation 1383/2003 article 2.1(c)(i). In the same vein, article 10 states that “The law in force in the Member State within the territory of which the goods are placed in one of the situations referred to in Article 1(1) shall apply when deciding whether an intellectual property right has been infringed under national law”.

51 See below Section 6.

52 Letter sent 28 October 2008 by the patent owner to the Colombian importer regarding “Clopidogrel - Suspension of the release of goods by the Dutch customs (container nr. 074-6946 9582)” (on file with the author).

53 F. M. Abbott, “Seizure of generic pharmaceuticals in transit based on allegations of patent infringement: a threat to international trade, development and public welfare”, WIPO Journal, nº 1, 2009, p. 47.

54 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 415 cmt. i. Regarding Europe, see article 22.4 of EC Council Regulation 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters, (2001) OJ L 12, p.1, which establishes that “The following courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of domicile: 4. in proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of patents (…) the courts of the member state in which the deposit or registration has been applied for, has taken place …)”. Article 10.4 of the Spanish Civil Code establishes that “intellectual property and industrial property rights will be protected within the Spanish territory in accordance with the Spanish law”.

55 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).

56 J. Massaguer, op. cit., p. 71. Professor Massaguer recalls an exception to this principle: article 43 of the Amity Covenant between San Marino an Italy of 1939 compromised both States to impede in its territory violations of an intellectual property right that has been granted in the other State.

57 Packard Instrument Co. v. Beckman Instruments Inc., 346 F. Supp. 408, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 282 (N.D.Ill. 1972), Quoted from D. S. Chisum, D. S. Chisum, “Normative and Empirical Territoriality in Intellectual Property: Lessons from Patent Law”, Virginia Journal of International Law, vol. 32, 1996-1997, p. 611.

58 WTO General Council, Implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Decision 30 August 2003, WT/L/540, 2 September 2003.

59 The US introduced this provision in response to a case where separated components of a patented invention were exported and later on assembled and sold abroad (Deepsouth Packing Co. V. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972).

60 See for both prohibitions 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), sections 1 and 2 respectively.

61 See A. von Mühlendahl, D. Stauder, “Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in a Global Economy – Transit and other Free Zones”, W. Prinz zu Waldek und Pyrmont, R. Brauneis, M. J. Adelman, D. J. Drexl (Eds.), Patents and Technological Progress in a Globalized World. Liber Amicorum Joseph Strauss, Berlin: Springer, 2009, p. 660.


62 See infra.

63 D. S. Chisum, “Normative and Empirical Territoriality in Intellectual Property: Lessons from Patent Law”, Virginia Journal of International Law, vol. 32, 1996-1997, p. 605.

64 In 1852, and in response to the ruling Caldwell v. Vanvlissengen, the English Parliament amended the patent law to exclude from liability ships coming from third countries and which, either in English waters or ports, could be regarded as infringing patent rights.

65 EFPIA, EFPIA Statement. Customs seizures of in-transit medicines, op. cit.

66 See A. von Mühlendahl, D. Stauder, op. cit. p. 654.

67 J. van den Brink, “Comeback for the legal fiction of the Anti Piracy Regulation?”, Kennedy van der Laan Newsletter, August 2008, www.kvdl.nl/KVdL/en-GB/_main/News/Newsletter/Newsletter+August+2008/Anti+Piracy+Regulation_IP/default.htm (consulted in October 2009).

68 Netherlands, Report Q208, op. cit., p. 12.

69 In particular, as the AIPPI affirms, Montex v. Diesel.

70 F. M. Abbott, “Seizure of generic pharmaceuticals in transit…”, op. cit., p. 49.

71 J. Massaguer, op. cit., p. 134.

72 Ibid., pp. 142-144.

73 In 1915, for instance, in the Taeschner-Pertussin case, the Bundesgerichtshof stated that the transferral of the power of disposition over the goods to the carrier did not imply the introduction of the products into the national market in a way that could be considered as infringing the national patent. See this case and related ones in J. Massaguer, op. cit., pp. 144-145.

74 Ibid., p. 145.

75 “There is a risk that counterfeit goods placed under the external transit procedure may be fraudulently brought on to the Community market”, ECJ, The Polo/Lauren Company LP v. Pt Dwidua Langgeng Pratam, C-383/2000, (ECR I-2519), pars. 33 and 34.

76 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, 26 May 2005, par. 34.

77 Montex Holdings Ltd. V. Diesel SpA, C281/05, pars. 25 and 27. The ECJ had sustained very similar arguments one year before in Case C-405/03, Class International BV v. Colgate-Palmolive et al., 2005, ECR-I-8735.

78 Ibid. par. 25.

79 Class International BV v. Colgate-Palmolive et al., 2005, ECR-I-8735, par. 47.


81 In Rioglass the Court affirmed that “Article 28 EU is to be interpreted as precluding the implementation pursuant to a legislative measure of a Member State concerning intellectual property, of procedures for detention by the customs authorities of goods lawfully manufactured in another Member State and intended, following their transit through the territory of the first Member State, to be placed in the market in a non-member country”. Case C-115/02, Administration des douanes v. Rioglass S.A., (2003), ECR I-12705, par. 30.



83 Case C-23/99, Commission / France, [2000] ECR I-7653, par. 38.

84 See, for instance, Case 15/74, Centrafarm / Sterling Drug, [1974] ECR 1147, par. 9.

85 For more details regarding the Swiss formulation, see Swiss Federal Institute of Intellectual Property, Interpretation of the Patents Act, www.ige.ch/e//jurinfo/documents/j10030e.pdf (Consulted May 2009).

86 Ibid.

87 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 20 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, par. 4.

88 F. M. Abbott, “Worst Fears Realised: The Dutch Confiscation of Medicines Bound from India to Brazil”, Bridges Monthly, February-March 2009, p. 13.

89 Decision of the General Council of 30 August 2003, “Implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and public health”, IP/C/W/405.

90 All emphasis added.

91 D. French, “Treaty Interpretation and the Incorporation of Extraneous Legal Rules”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 55, April 2006, pp. 303-304; C. McLachlan, “The principle of systemic integration and article 31(3) (c) of the Vienna Convention”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 54, April 2005, p. 312.

92 European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products (EC-Biotech), Report of the Panel, 21 November 2006, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R, par. 7.69.

93 WHA, Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property, WHA61.21, 2008, Annex par.36, point 5.2 (b).

94 The Panel set up to issue the report recognized that the task was “arduous since it will be necessary to interpret article V of the GATT without any meaningful guidance”. Colombia – Indicative prices and restrictions on ports of entry, Report of the Panel, 27 April 2009, WT/DS366/R, par. 7.388.

95 Ibid., par. 7.396.

96 In its first sentence, article V:2 prescribes that “There shall be freedom of transit through the territory of each contracting party, via the routes most convenient for international transit, for traffic in transit to or from the territory of other contracting parties”. In its second sentence, article V:2 establishes that “No distinction shall be made which is based on the flag of vessels, the place of origin, departure, entry, exit or destination, or on any circumstances relating to the ownership of goods, of vessels or of other means of transport.”

97 Colombia – Indicative prices and restrictions on ports of entry, op. cit., par. 7.401.

98 Ibid., par. 4.402.

99 Council Regulation (EC) 1383/2003 article 13.

100 In the Losartan case, for instance, the shipment was detained on 4 December 2008 and was released on 8 January 2009. This period of time included 23 working days. In the Abacavir case, the shipment was seized on 12 November 2008 and released on 12 March 2009, a period which exceeds 80 working days.


101 Cfr. “The customs authorities did not respect the time limits for detention and disposal of this case”. See “Formal response Dutch government on seizures and border measures in FTAs (to parliamentary questions)”, op. cit.

102 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, 8 October 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R, par. 114.

103 The Concise Oxford Dictionary, Tenth Edition, revised, 2001, p. 1193.

104 Merriam Webster Online Dictionary, www.webster.com/cgi-bin/dictionary.

105 The Reference Paper contained in the Mexico’s GATS Schedule of Specific Commitments establishes in its article 2.2(b) that interconnection provided by a major supplier must be ensured on terms, conditions and rates that are reasonable. On the other hand, GATS Annex on telecommunications 5(a) establishes that “Each Member shall ensure that any service supplier of any other Member is accorded access to and use of public telecommunications transport networks and services on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions, for the supply of a service included in its Schedule”.

106 Mexico – Measures affecting telecommunications services, Report of the Panel, WT/DS204/R, 2 April, 2004, par. 7.182.

107 Ibid.

108 Appellate Body, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, pars. 84-85.

109 The Concise Oxford Dictionary, Tenth Edition, revised, 2001, p. 279.

110 Subsection 4 of article V recognizes an exception to that general rule, in the sense that Members may adopt regulations and impose charges to the traffic. Nevertheless, those charges and regulations shall be reasonable. As the freedom of transit is the general rule and limitations are exceptions to that general rule, these exceptions must be interpreted narrowly. This is why the “reasonableness” criteria must be defined in the context of what the article prescribes, which is freedom of transit.

111 United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, 20 May 1996, WT/DS2/AB/R, p. 22.

112 Korea – Various Measures on Beef, Appellate Body Report, 10 January 2001, DS161/AB/R, par. 157.

113 US – Shrimp (Thailand), Report of the Panel, 15 May, 1998, WT/DS58/R, par. 7.174. See also Panel Report, US – Customs Bond Directive, par. 7.295.

114 E. McGovern, International Trade Regulation, Exeter: Globefield Press, Third edition, 1995, p. 21.12-1.

115 Korea – Various Measures on Beef, Appellate Body Report, op. cit., par. 161.

116 Brazil – Measures Affecting the Import of retreaded Tyres. Appellate Body Report, WT/DS332/AB/R, 3 December 2007, par. 210.

117 Korea – Various Measures on Beef, Appellate Body Report, op. cit., par. 166. The Appellate Body also followed this approach to the word ‘necessary’ as used in paragraph (b) of Article XX in EC – Asbestos, 5 April 2001, WT/DS135/AB/R, par. 172.

118 United States—Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Shirts and Blouses, Appellate Body Report, 23 March 1997, WT/DS33/AB/R, p. 14.


119 In a joint communication referring to counterfeiting and drafted in general terms, and not only related to public health, the EU, Japan, Switzerland and the US affirmed that “This activity (counterfeiting) has harmful effects on society as a whole: it puts public health and safety at risk, threatens legitimate commerce, and entails loss of jobs and government tax revenues. This activity is also often linked to organized crime and other types of crimes”. Joint Communication from the European Communities, Japan, Switzerland and the United States at the Council for TRIPS, Enforcement of intellectual property rights, IP/C/W/485, 2 November 2006, par. 2.

120 On this confusion, see, K. Outterson, “Counterfeit drugs: the good, the bad and the ugly”, Albany Law Journal of Science & Technology, vol. 16, 2006, pp. 526-542.

121 The TRIPS Agreement introduced the “counterfeit and pirated” terminology, but only in reference to trade mark and copyright infringements. TRIPS footnote 14(a) alludes to “counterfeit trademark goods” as “any goods, including packaging, bearing without authorization a trademark which is identical to the trademark validly registered in respect of such goods, or which cannot be distinguished in its essential aspects from such a trademark, and which thereby infringes the rights of the owner of the trademark in question under the law of the country of importation”.

122 K. Outterson, “Import Safety Rules Should Not Hinder Legitimate Generic Drug Markets”, Boston University School of Law Working Paper, nº 09-25, May 19, 2009.

123 Op. cit.

124 Letter sent on 9 December 2008, on file with the author.

125 www.who.int/impact (consulted March 2009).

126 “Combating counterfeit medicines”, WHO Drug Information, vol. 18, nº 2, 2004, p. 133.

127 R. H. Behrens, A. I. Awad, R. B. Taylor, “Substandard and counterfeit drugs in developing countries”, Tropical Doctor, vol. 32, nº 1, 2002, pp. 1-2.

128 J-M. Caudron et al., “Substandard medicines in resource-poor settings: a problem that can no longer be ignored”, Tropical Medicine and International Health, vol. 13, nº 8, 2008, p. 1068.

129 Ibid.

130 X. Seuba Hernández, “Autoridad privada y bienes públicos en la regulación farmacéutica. El caso de la Conferencia Internacional sobre la Armonización de los Requisitos para el Registro de Fármacos para Uso Humano”, X. Seuba (Coord), Salud Pública y Patentes Farmacéuticas, Barcelona: Librería Bosch, 2008, pp. 243-270.

131 Letter addressed by Catherine Ashton -European Commissioner for Trade- and László Kovács -Commissioner for Taxation and Customs Union-, to Médecins Sans Frontières, on 25 March 2009, CAB24/CA/PH/caD(09)256A(09)324 (on file with the author).

132 Ibid.


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World Trade Organization. United States – Customs bond directive for merchandise subject to Anti-Dumping/Countervailing Duties [US – Customs Bond Directive], Report of the Panel, 29 February 2008, WT /DS345/R.

World Trade Organization. United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, 8 October 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R.


World Trade Organization. United States – Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Shirts and Blouses, Appellate Body Report, 23 March 1997, WT/DS33/AB/R.

World Trade Organization. United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, 20 May 1996, WT/DS2/AB/R.

World Trade Organization. United States – Measures Relating to Shrimp from Thailand [US – Shrimp (Thailand)], Report of the Panel, 15 May 1998, WT/DS58/R.

SELECTED ICTSD ISSUE PAPERS Agriculture Trade and Sustainable Development

Constructing a Composite Index of Market Acess. By Tim Josling. Issue Paper No.23, 2009.

Comparing safeguard measures in regional and bilateral agreements. By Paul Kruger, Willemien Denner and JB Cronje, Issue Paper No.22, 2009.

How would a WTO agreement on bananas affect exporting and importing countries? By Giovanni Anania, Issue Paper No.21, 2009.

Biofuels Subsidies and the Law of the World Trade Organisation. By Toni Harmer, Issue Paper No.20, 2009.

Biofuels Certification and the Law of the World Trade Organisation. By Marsha A. Echols, Issue Paper No.19, 2009.

Competitiveness and Sustainable Development

The Potential Role of Non Traditional Donors ‘Aid in Africa. Issue Paper No.11 by Peter Kragelund, 2010.

Resilience Amidst Rising Tides: An Issue Paper on Trade, Climate Change and Competitiveness in the Tourism Sector in the Caribbean. Issue Paper No.9 by Keron Niles, 2010.

Aid for Trade and Climate Change Financing Mechanisms: Best Practices and Lessons Learned for LDCs and SVEs in Africa. Issue Paper No. 8 by Vinaye Dey Ancharaz, 2010.

Hoja de ruta para el sector textil y confección y desarrollo sostenible en Nicaragua. Documento de Trabajo No.2 por Ana Victoria Portocarrero Lacayo, 2010.

Hoja de ruta para el sector textil y confección y desarrollo sostenible en Guatemala. Documento de Trabajo No.1 por Pedro Prado et al, 2010.

El sector textil y confección y el desarrollo sostenible en Nicaragua. Documento de Fondo No.7 por Ana Victoria Portocarrero Lacayo, 2010.

El sector textil y confección y el desarrollo sostenible en Guatemala. Documento de Fondo No.6 por Pedro prado et al, 2010.

Dispute Settlement and Legal Aspects of International Trade

Trading Profiles and Developing Country Participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement System. By Joseph Francois and Henrik Horn. Issue Paper No. 6, 2008.

Developing Countries, Countermeasures and WTO Law: Reinterpreting the DSU against the Background of International Law. By Andrea Bianchi and Lorenzo Gradoni. Issue Paper No. 5, 2008.

Does Legal Capacity Matter? Explaining Dispute Initiation and Antidumping actions in the WTO. By Marc L. Busch, Eric Reinhardt and Gregory Shaffer. Issue Paper No. 4, 2008.

Fisheries, International Trade and Sustainable Development

The Importance of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures to Fisheries Negotiations in Economic Partnership Agreements. By Martin Doherty. Issue Paper No. 6, 2008.

Fisheries, Aspects of ACP-EU Interim Economic Partnership Agreements: Trade and Sustainable Development Implications. By Liam Campling. Issue Paper No. 6, 2008.

Fisheries, International Trade and Sustainable Development. Policy Discussion Paper, By ICTSD, 2006.

Intellectual Property Rights and Sustainable Development

Evaluación del impacto de las disposiciones de ADPIC + en el mercado institucional de medicamentos de Costa Rica. Por Grevin Hernandez’Gonzalez y Max Valverde, Documento de Fondo No. 26, 2009.

Access to Climate Change Technologyby Developing Countries: A Practical Strategy. By Cynthia Cannady, Issue Paper No. 25, 2009.

Innovation and Technology Transfer to Address Climate Change: Lessons from the Global Debate on Intellectual Property and Public Health. By Frederick M. Abbott, Issue Paper No. 24, 2009.

Technology Transfer in the TRIPS Age: The Need for New Types of Partnerships between the Least Developed and Most Advanced Economies. By Dominique Foray, Issue Paper No. 23, 2009.

Trade in Services and Sustainable Development

Facilitating Temporary Labour Mobility in African Least-Developed Countries: Addressing Mode 4 Supply-Side Constraints. By Sabrina Varma, Issue Paper No.10, 2009.

Advancing Services Export Interests of Least-Developed Countries: Towards GATS Commitments on the Temporary Movement of natural Persons for the Supply of Low-Skilled and Semi-Skilled Services. By Daniel Crosby, Issue Paper No. 9, 2009.

Maritime Transport and Related Logistics Services in Egypt. By Ahmed F. Ghoneim, and Omneia A. Helmy, Issue Paper No. 8, 2007.

Environmental Goods and Services Programme

Market Drivers in Renewable Energy Supply Goods: The Need to Level the Playing Field. By Veena Jha, Issue Paper No.10, 2009.

Environmental Priorities and Trade policy for Environmental Goods: A Reality Check., By Veena Jha, Issue Paper No.7, 2008.

Trade and Sustainable Energy

Climate Change and Trade on the Road to Copenhagen. Policy Discussion Paper, 2009.

Trade, Climate Change and Global Competitiveness: Opportunities and Challenge for Sustainable Development in China and Beyond. By ICTSD. Selected Issue Briefs No.3, 2008.

Intellectual Property and Access to Clean Energy Technologies in Developing Countries: An Analysis of Solar Photovoltaic, Biofuel and Wind Technologies. By John H. Barton, Issue Paper No. 2, 2007.

Regionalism and EPAs

Revisiting Regional Trade Agreements and their Impact on Services and Trade, by Mario Marconini, Issue Paper No.4, 2009.

Trade Agreements and their Relation to Labour Standards: The Current Situation by Pablo Lazo Grandi, Issue Paper No.3, 2009.

Legal and Systematic Issues in the Interim Economic Partnership Agreements: Which Way Now? by Cosmas Milton Obote Ochieng, Issue Paper No.2, 2009.

Environmental Issues in Economic Partnership Agreements: Implications for Developing Countries, by Beatrice Chaytor, Issue Paper No.1, 2009.

Global Economic Policy and Institutions

The Microcosm of Climate Change Negotiations: What Can the World Learn from the European Union? By Håkan Nordström, Issue Paper No.1.

These and other ICTSD resources are available at http://www.ictsd.org

The International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) has been active in the field of intellectual property since 1997, amongst others, through its Programme on Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and Sustainable Development. One central objective of the Programme has been to facilitate the emergence of a critical mass of well informed stakeholders in developing countries including decision makers, negotiators as also the private sector and civil society who will be able to define their own sustainable human development objectives in the field of IPRs and effectively advance them at the national and international levels.

The Programme has generated an Issue Paper Series on Intellectual Property Rights and Sustainable Development with the intention of offering a clear, jargon-free synthesis of the main issues to help policy makers, stakeholders and the public in developing and developed countries to understand the varying perspectives surrounding different IPRs, their known or possible impact on sustainable livelihoods and development, and different policy positions over the TRIPS Agreement and other relevant international intellectual property arrangements.

This Issue Paper Series is the consequence of a participatory process involving trade negotiators, national policy makers, as well as eminent experts in the field, the media, NGOs, international organizations, and institutions in the North and the South dealing with IPRs and development. Previous publications under this Series include:

• Evaluación del impacto de las disposiciones de ADPIC + en el mercado institucionalde medicamentos de Costa Rica. Documento de Fondo No. 26 por Grevin Hernandez Gonzalez y Max Valverde, 2009.

• AccesstoClimateChangeandTechnologybyDevelopingCountries:APracticalStrategyIssue Paper No. 25 by Cynthia Cannady, 2009.

• InnovationandTechnologyTransfertoAddressClimateChange:LessonsfromtheGlobalDebate on Intellectual Property and public Health. Issue Paper No. 24 by Frederick M. Abbott, 2009.

• TechnologiesTransferintheTRIPSAge:TheNeedforNewTypesofPartnershipsbetweenthe Least Developed and Most Advanced Economies. Issue Paper No. 23 by Dominique Foray, 2009.

• TheGlobalDebate on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights andDevelopingCountries. Issue Paper No. 22, 2009.

• IntellectualPropertyandCompetitionLaw.IssuePaperNo.21byCarlosM.Correa,2007.

• Intellectual Property Provisions in European Union Trade Agreements: Implications forDeveloping Countries. Issue Paper No. 20 by Maximiliano Santa Cruz S., 2007.

• Maintaining Policy Space for Development: A Case Study on IP Technical Assistance inFTAs. Issue Paper No. 19 by Pedro Roffe and David Vivas with Gina Vea, 2007.

ABOUT ICTSD

Founded in 1996, the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) is an independent non-profit and non-governmental organisation based in Geneva. By empowering stakeholders in trade policy through information, networking, dialogue, well targeted research and capacity building, the Centre aims to influence the international trade system such that it advances the goal of sustainable development.

www.ictsd.org

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Free Trade of Pharmaceutical Products: The Limits of Intellectual Property Enforcement at the Border

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